

## Assignment 5

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$$1) \begin{array}{ccc} x_1 & x_2 & -1 \\ \end{array}$$

$$\begin{array}{|c|c|c|c|} \hline & a & -a & b \\ \hline x_1 & a & -a & b \\ \hline \end{array} = -6,$$

$$\begin{array}{|c|c|c|c|} \hline & -a & a & b \\ \hline x_2 & -a & a & b \\ \hline \end{array} = -c_2$$

$$\begin{array}{|c|c|c|c|} \hline & c & c & 0 \\ \hline -1 & c & c & 0 \\ \hline \end{array} = f$$

$$s_1, s_2 = g$$

a)  $b > 0 \& c > 0$ . Since  $b > 0$  we have MBFT

$c > 0 \Rightarrow$  we can pivot on either  $c$

Look at  $a x_1 - a x_2 - b = -\epsilon_1$ ,

$$a(x_1 - x_2) - b = -\epsilon_1, \epsilon_1 \geq 0$$

$$a(x_1 - x_2) - b \geq 0 \Rightarrow a(x_1 - x_2) \geq b$$

$$a(x_1 - x_2) \geq b > 0$$

$$a(x_1 - x_2) > 0 \rightarrow x_1, x_2 \geq 0$$

either  $x_2 > x_1 \rightarrow a < 0 \Rightarrow$  this case is impossible as  $a(x_1 - x_2) \geq 0$   
 or  $x_1 > x_2 \rightarrow a > 0$

$a > 0 \Rightarrow a_{ij}, a_{2j} \leq 0 \Rightarrow$  Primal unbounded

Primal unbounded  $\Rightarrow$  dual infeasible

b)  $b > 0 \Rightarrow$  MBF1

$c < 0 \Rightarrow$  STOP, current solution is optimal

Primal optimal  $\Rightarrow$  dual optimal solution possible

c)  $b \leq 0 \Rightarrow$  MT

$c > 0 \Rightarrow$  look at  $\alpha y_1 - \alpha y_2 - c = s_1$ ,

$$\alpha(y_1 - y_2) = s_1 + c, \quad s_1 + c > 0$$

$$\alpha(y_1 - y_2) > 0$$

either  $y_1 > y_2 \Rightarrow \alpha > 0$

or  $y_2 > y_1 \Rightarrow \alpha < 0$

1) production cost =  $a \cdot \text{production} + b$

Minimize maximum error ( $\text{abs}$ ) incurred in estimating daily production costs

if  $a=2, b=-1000 \rightarrow pc = 2p - 1000$

$$pc + 1000 = 2p$$

3) let  $A \in \mathbb{R}^{2 \times 2}$  be a game matrix

$A$  has a saddle point  $\Rightarrow A$  row minimum & column maximum

$$\begin{pmatrix} a_{11} & a_{12} \\ a_{21} & a_{22} \end{pmatrix}$$

$a_{ij}$  is saddle  $\Rightarrow a_{ij}$  is smaller than its row neighbor  
 $a_{ij}$  is larger than its column neighbor

Assume WLOG  $a_{11}$  is saddle  $\Rightarrow a_{11} < a_{12}, a_{11} > a_{21}$

$a_{11} > a_{22}$  also as if  $a_{11} < a_{22}$  then  $a_{12} \leq a_{22}, a_{11} \geq a_{21}$  and then  
 $\rightarrow a_{ij}$  wouldn't be a saddle  $\Rightarrow \text{F}$

$$\Rightarrow a_{11} > a_{21} \& a_{11} > a_{22}$$

$$a_{12} > a_{11} > a_{21} \& a_{12} > a_{11} > a_{21} \rightarrow a_{12} > a_{22}$$

$\Rightarrow a_{11} > a_{21} \& a_{12} > a_{22} \rightarrow$  row 2 is dominated by row 1

Now we have  $(a_{11}, a_{12})$ ,  $a_{11} < a_{12} \rightarrow$  column 2 is dominated by column 1

$(a_{11}) \Rightarrow 1 \times 1$  matrix

WLOG  $(a_{ij})$  is a saddle point that can be reduced to a  $1 \times 1$  matrix  
by dominance

$$4) \quad A = \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 0 & -1 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 \\ -1 & 0 & 1 \end{pmatrix}$$

a) Column domination:  $\nexists$  a pair of columns  $k, l$  for  $1 \leq i \leq m$  s.t.  $a_{ik} \geq a_{il}$   
as we have alternating values for each comparison

Row domination:  $\nexists$  a pair of rows  $k, l$  for  $1 \leq i \leq m$  s.t.  $a_{ik} \geq a_{il}$   
as we have alternating values for each comparison

b)

$$\textcircled{1} \quad q_1 \quad q_2 \quad q_3 \quad -1$$

$$P_1 \quad \boxed{0 \quad -1 \quad 1 \quad -1 \quad -1} = 0$$

$$P_1 \quad \boxed{-1 \quad 1 \quad 0 \quad -1 \quad 0} = \epsilon_1$$

$$P_2 \quad \boxed{-1 \quad 0 \quad 0 \quad 0 \quad 0} = \epsilon_2$$

$$P_3 \quad \boxed{1 \quad 1 \quad 0 \quad 1 \quad 0} = \epsilon_3$$

$$-1 \quad \boxed{-1 \quad 0 \quad 0 \quad 0 \quad 0} = 5$$

$$= 0 = s_1 = s_2 = s_3 = g$$

In matrix game  $A$ :  
max of columns:  $\textcircled{1} \quad 0 \quad -1$

$$0 \quad 0 \quad 0$$

$$-1 \quad 0 \quad \textcircled{1}$$

(Choose top left)  
 $\Rightarrow$  pivot on  $(2, 1) = -1$  &  $(1, 2) = -1$

$$\textcircled{1} \quad q_1 \quad q_2 \quad q_3 \quad -1$$

$$P_1 \quad \boxed{0 \quad -1 \quad -1 \quad -1 \quad -1} = 0$$

$$P_1 \quad \boxed{-1 \quad 1 \quad 0 \quad 1 \quad 0} = \epsilon_1$$

$$P_2 \quad \boxed{-1 \quad -1 \quad 0 \quad 1 \quad 0} = -\epsilon_2$$

$$P_3 \quad \boxed{-1 \quad 0 \quad 0 \quad 2 \quad 0} = -\epsilon_3$$

$$-1 \quad \boxed{-1 \quad -1 \quad 0 \quad 1 \quad 0} = 5$$

$$= 0 = s_1 = s_2 = s_3 = g$$

pivot on  $(1, 2) = -1$

$$b) \quad \begin{array}{cccc|c} & q_1 & q_2 & q_3 & -1 \\ \textcircled{1} & 0 & -1 & 1 & 1 & 0 \\ P_1 & 1 & -1 & 1 & 2 & 1 = t_1 \\ P_2 & -1 & -1 & 1 & 2 & 1 = -t_2 \\ P_3 & -1 & 0 & 0 & 2 & 0 = -t_3 \\ -1 & -1 & -1 & 1 & 2 & 1 = f \\ \hline 0 & = s_1 & = s_2 & = s_3 & = g \end{array}$$

Delete 0-col row  
Now we have MBFJ

$$\begin{array}{cccc|c} & q_1 & q_2 & q_3 & -1 \\ P_1 & -1 & 1 & 2 & 1 & -t_1 \\ P_2 & -1 & 1 & 2 & 1 & -t_2 \\ P_3 & 0 & 0 & 2 & 0 & -t_3 \\ -1 & -1 & 1 & 2 & 1 & f \\ \hline 0 & = s_1 & = s_2 & = s_3 & = g \end{array}$$

Pivot on  $|1, 2| = 1$

$$\begin{array}{cccc|c} & q_1 & t_1 & q_3 & -1 \\ S_1 & 1 & & & & \\ S_2 & -1 & 1 & 2 & 1 & -q_2 \\ P_2 & 0 & -1 & 0 & 0 & -t_2 \\ P_3 & 0 & 0 & 2 & 0 & -t_3 \\ 1 & 0 & -1 & 0 & 0 & -s \\ \hline 0 & = s_1 & = p_1 & = s_3 & = g \end{array}$$

$c_1, \dots, c_n \leq 0 \Rightarrow \text{Optimal}$

$$E_1(p) = p_1 a_{11} + p_2 a_{21} + p_3 a_{31} = -p_1. \min E_1(p) = -l, (1, 0, 0)$$

$$E_2(p) = p_1 a_{12} + p_2 a_{22} + p_3 a_{32} = p_1 - p_2. \min E_2(p) = -l, (0, 1, 0)$$

$$E_3(p) = 2p_1 + 2p_3, \min E_3(p) = 0, (0, 1, 0)$$

$$EV \max_{1 \leq j \leq n} \min E_j(p) = 0$$

$$b) f_1(q) = q_1 a_{11} + q_2 a_{12} + q_3 a_{13} = -q_1 + q_2 + 2q_3 \max f_1(q) = 2, 1, 0, 0, 1$$

$$f_2(q) = -q_2 \quad \max f_2(q) = 0, 1, \frac{1}{2}, 0, \frac{1}{2}$$

$$f_3(q) = 2q_3 \quad \max f_3(q) = 2, 1, 0, 0, 1$$

$$EV \min \max f_i(q) = 0: \\ 1 \leq i \leq n$$

Both are 0  $\rightarrow$  fair game

$$(1) \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 0 & -1 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 \\ -1 & 0 & 1 \end{pmatrix} \quad \begin{array}{l} \text{row 0} \\ \text{column } \square \\ \text{row min} \\ \text{col max} \end{array}$$

Saddle point is middle  $0, (2, 2) = 0$

Yes the reduced tableau has  $g=f=0$  as von Neumann

$$\text{and opt. strats: } \vec{p} = \begin{pmatrix} 0 \\ 1 \\ 0 \end{pmatrix} \text{ for row } \vec{q} = \begin{pmatrix} 1 \\ \frac{1}{2} \\ \frac{1}{2} \end{pmatrix} \text{ for col}$$

as we can overlook the matrix multiplication & see which one maximizes/minimizes payoff

5) Player 1 write int: 1..15

Player 1 tells player 2 an integer

Player 2 guesses if player 1 was telling the truth:

If 1 gets caught lying: 10\$ to 2

If falsely accused lying: 5\$ to 1

If 1 truth 82 accused truth: 1\$ to 2

If 1 lie 82 accused truth: 5\$ to 1

		T	L
		T	(-1)   5
1	L	5   (-10)	

No domination rules

row 0

column □

⇒  $\exists$  a saddle point

$$E_1(p) = p_1 a_{11} + p_2 a_{21} = -p_1 + 5p_2 \quad \min E_1(p) = -1, (1, 0)$$

$$E_2(p) = p_1 a_{12} + p_2 a_{22} = 5p_1 - 10p_2 \quad \min E_2(p) = -10, (0, 1)$$

row:  $\max_{j=1,2} \min E_j(p) = -1$  EV

$$F_1(p) = q_1 a_{11} + q_2 a_{12} = -q_1 + 5q_2 \quad \max F_1(q) = 5, (0, 1)$$

$$F_2(p) = q_1 a_{21} + q_2 a_{22} = 5q_1 - 10q_2 \quad \max F_2(q) = 5, (1, 0)$$

column:  $\min_{j=1,2} \max F_j(q) = 5$  EV

6)  $x, y, z \in R$

x	x
y	z

if  $(x \leq y \leq z)$  then  $\begin{cases} x \\ y \\ z \end{cases}$  q.t. so  $= y$ , von Neumann;  $y$

for  $x \square y, y \square z, z \square x$   
there are  $3 \cdot 3 \cdot 3 = 27$  combinations of