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**Q1** Let  $P$  be an EC point. What is the minimum number of EC sums/doubles necessary to compute  $[259]P$ ?

- ☐ a) 8
- ☒ b) 10
- ☐ c) 11
- ☐ d) 12
- ☐ e) 258
- ☐ f) 259

**Q2** What is the main limitation of a trivial secret sharing scheme?

- ☐ a) Unlike the Shamir scheme, it is not ideal
- ☐ b) Unlike the Shamir scheme, it is not unconditionally secure but only computationally secure
- ☐ c) It permits only to implement  $(t,n)$  schemes with  $t$  strictly lower than  $n$
- ☒ d) It permits only to implement  $(n,n)$  schemes and not  $(t,n)$  schemes with  $t < n$

**Q3** In the Boneh-Franklin's Identity Based Encryption scheme, what happens if an attacker compromises the PKG?

- ☐ a) Nothing, as there is no PKG in such scheme
- ☐ b) It becomes impossible to decrypt a previously encrypted data
- ☒ c) the attacker may find all private keys for all users
- ☐ d) the attacker may revoke all users' public keys

**Q4** Three parties A, B, C setup a group  $(3,3)$  RSA signature, i.e. a message is correctly signed if all three parties contribute to the signature with their shares of the private key  $d$ . Being  $x$  and  $y$  random values (in the appropriate range), shares are:

Share\_A =  $d-x-y$

Share\_B =  $x$

Share\_C =  $y$

Assuming that a message  $M$  needs to be signed, schematically describe the specific modular operations and exchange of messages that such a  $(3,3)$  RSA signature requires.

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**Q5** What may happen if Alice digitally signs two different messages M1 and M2, with ECDSA using the same nonce  $r$  ( $r = x\text{-coordinate}(kP) \bmod n$ )?

- ☒ **a) The attacker can compute Alice's Private key**
- ☐ **b) The attacker can forge a signature for any linear combination of M1 and M2**
- ☐ **c) The attacker can decrypt both M1 and M2**
- ☐ **d) The attacker can perform an expansion attack on one of the two messages**

**Q6 Assume arithmetic modulus 100.** A Linear secret sharing scheme involving 4 parties is described by the following access control matrix:

A:	1	1	1
B:	0	1	0
C:	0	0	1
D:	0	0	-1

Assume that the following shares are revealed:

A  $\rightarrow$  36  
B  $\rightarrow$  51  
D  $\rightarrow$  18

What is the secret?

- a) 3**    **b) 5**    **c) 31**    **d) 33**    **e) 67**    **f) 69**    **g) 95**    **h) 97**    **i) another result = \_\_\_\_\_**

**Q7** Describe the threshold El Gamal decryption, and specifically explain why the private key is never revealed in the reconstruction.

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**Q8** A same message  $M$  is RSA-encrypted using two different public keys  $e_1 = 11$  and  $e_2 = 17$ , but same RSA modulus  $n=35$ . The two resulting ciphertexts are:  $c_1=3$  and  $c_2=17$ . Decrypt the message applying the Common Modulus Attack (show the detailed computations required).

*[Just in case you might need to rapidly compute inverses mod 35, see table associated to exercise Q10]*

Answer: by the extended GCD(17,11)  $\rightarrow \{r,s\}=\{2,-3\}$

Hence

$$M = 3^{-3} \times 17^2 \bmod 35 = 12^3 \times 17^2 \bmod 35 = 12$$

**Q9** Consider the Elliptic curve  $y^2 = x^3 + 2x - 1$  defined over the modular integer field  $Z_5$ . A) find all the points  $EC(Z_5)$  and B) specify what is the order of the corresponding group

O, {0,2}, {0,3}, {2,1},{2,4},{4,1},{4,4}

Order 7

**Network Security – prof. Giuseppe Bianchi – 3rd term exam, 14 February 2020**

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**Q10** A Shamir Secret Sharing scheme uses a non-prime modulus  $p=35$  (if you need modular inverses see table on the right). Of the 5 participating parties  $P_1, \dots, P_5$ , with respective  $x$  coordinates  $x_i = \{1, 2, 3, 4, 5\}$ , parties  $P_1$ ,  $P_2$  and  $P_5$  aim at reconstructing the secret.

a) compute the Lagrange Interpolation coefficients for parties 1, 2, 5;

b) Reconstruct the secret, assuming that the shares are:

$P_1 \rightarrow 18$

$P_2 \rightarrow 24$

$P_5 \rightarrow 19$

c) Prove that the system is NOT unconditionally secure, by showing that the knowledge of the two shares  $P_1$  and  $P_5$  leak information about the secret – specifically, after knowing shares  $P_1$  and  $P_5$  which would be the only possible remaining secret values?

x	1/x mod 35
1	1
2	18
3	12
4	9
6	6
8	22
9	4
11	16
12	3
13	27
16	11
17	33
18	2
19	24
22	8
23	32
24	19
26	31
27	13
29	29
31	26
32	23
33	17
34	34

[Answer: Secret = 14;

set of possible secrets: the 7 possible values which satisfy  $19+10x \text{ mod } 35 \rightarrow$

$\rightarrow \{4, 9, 14, 19, 24, 29, 34\}$