

# Aleksandr (Sasha) Levkun

ECONOMICS DEPARTMENT  
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, SAN DIEGO

## CONTACT INFORMATION

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## EDUCATION

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Ph.D. in Economics 2022  
*University of California, San Diego* La Jolla, CA  
• Advisors: Simone Galperti, Joel Sobel, Renee Bowen  
B.Sc. in Economics (summa cum laude) 2016  
*National Research University – Higher School of Economics* Moscow, Russia

## REFERENCES

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Simone Galperti	UC San Diego	<a href="mailto:sgalperti@ucsd.edu">sgalperti@ucsd.edu</a>
Joel Sobel	UC San Diego	<a href="mailto:jsobel@ucsd.edu">jsobel@ucsd.edu</a>
Renee Bowen	UC San Diego	<a href="mailto:r0bowen@ucsd.edu">r0bowen@ucsd.edu</a>

## FIELDS OF INTEREST

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Microeconomic Theory, Information Economics, Political Economy

## RELEVANT POSITIONS HELD

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UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, SAN DIEGO	La Jolla, CA
<i>Research Assistant</i> for Simone Galperti	2019 – 2020
<i>Research Assistant</i> for Joel Sobel	2020

## WORKING PAPERS

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“**The Value of Data Records**” with Simone Galperti and Jacopo Perego,  
Conditionally Accepted at **The Review of Economic Studies** July 2022

Many e-commerce platforms use buyers’ personal data to intermediate their transactions with sellers. How much value do such intermediaries derive from the data record of each single individual? We characterize this value and find that one of its key components is a novel externality between records, which arises when the intermediary pools some records to withhold the information they contain. Ignoring this can significantly bias the evaluations of data records. Our analysis has several implications about compensating individuals for the use of their data, guiding companies’ investments in data acquisition, and more broadly studying the demand side of data markets. Our method combines modern information design with classic duality theory and applies to a large class of principal-agent problems.

**“Communication with Strategic Fact-checking”**

December 2021

We examine communication between an informed sender and an uninformed receiver with a presence of a strategic fact-checker. The sender makes a claim about an issue to persuade the receiver to approve the sender’s proposal. The fact-checker has its own goal and chooses a stochastic fact-checking policy that checks sender’s claims. Checking a claim is costly and, with some probability, can fail to verify whether the claim is true or false. Full fact-checking is optimal when the cost is below a threshold. Otherwise, no fact-checking is optimal. We characterize the cost threshold as a function of fact-checker’s preferences. The receiver need not prefer a fact-checker with preferences aligned with the receiver to one with opposed preferences. Adding multiple fact-checkers does not necessarily improve communication even when all fact-checkers are willing to fully check by themselves. For intermediate cost of checking, having multiple fact-checkers can lead to underprovision of fact-checking due to free riding.

**“Strategic Mediation of Information in Autocracies”**

May 2020

This paper presents the optimal editorial policy for state-owned media manipulating information flow from a strategic informed elite to an uninformed receiver. The receiver attempts to match the state of the ruler’s competence with a binary action. If the elite’s and audience’s preferences are too distant from each other, then the editorial policy is uninformative. Otherwise, the media signal whether the state is higher or lower than a threshold which depends on the elite’s preferences. The media benefit from a more lenient elite, as long as the elite is not too lenient. The media are worse off when the receiver is more critical of the ruler, whereas the elite generally is better off when the receiver is more critical. When the receiver has private information about how critical he is, I characterize the lower bound on the media’s payoff obtained within the class of restricted editorial policies. I identify a sufficient condition that implies the bound is achieved.

**WORK IN PROGRESS**

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**“Dynamics of Risky Agreements”**

with Renee Bowen and Malte Lammert

2022

**TEACHING EXPERIENCE**

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UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, SAN DIEGO

*Teaching Assistant*

La Jolla, CA

2017 – present

- Econ 1 (Principles of Microeconomics), ECON 3 (Principle of Macroeconomics), Econ 100ABC (Microeconomics), ECON 109 (Game Theory), Econ 142 (Behavioral Economics), Econ 171 (Decisions Under Uncertainty), ECON 210B (Macroeconomics B, graduate)

NATIONAL RESEARCH UNIVERSITY – HIGHER SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS

*Teaching Assistant*

Moscow, Russia

2015 – 2016

- Probability and Statistics, Econometrics

**SERVICE**

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REFEREE

- 2022 *American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Journal of Political Science, Games and Economic Behavior*
- 2021 *Games and Economic Behavior*

## FELLOWSHIPS AND AWARDS

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UC San Diego Cindy Vojtech Summer Research Fellowship	2021
UC San Diego Graduate Summer Research Fellowship	2017 – 2019
UC San Diego TA Excellence Award	2018, 2021
UC San Diego Regents Fellowship	2016 – 2017

## OTHER INFORMATION

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Languages: English (fluent), Russian (native)  
Programming: proficient in Python, MATLAB, R