

Aleksandr (Sasha) Levkun

CONTACT INFORMATION

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EDUCATION

Ph.D. in Economics 2022
University of California, San Diego La Jolla, CA

B.Sc. in Economics (summa cum laude) 2016
National Research University – Higher School of Economics Moscow, Russia

REFERENCES

Simone Galperti	UC San Diego	sgalperti@ucsd.edu
Joel Sobel	UC San Diego	jsobel@ucsd.edu
Renee Bowen	UC San Diego	r0bowen@ucsd.edu

FIELDS OF INTEREST

Microeconomic Theory, Information Economics, Political Economy

JOB MARKET PAPER

“Communication with Strategic Fact-checking”

We examine communication between an informed sender and an uninformed receiver with a presence of a strategic fact-checker. The sender makes a claim about an issue to persuade the receiver to approve the sender’s proposal. The fact-checker has its own goal and chooses a stochastic fact-checking policy that checks sender’s claims. Checking a claim is costly and, with some probability, can fail to verify whether the claim is true or false. Full fact-checking is optimal when the cost is below a threshold. Otherwise, no fact-checking is optimal. We characterize the cost threshold as a function of fact-checker’s preferences. The receiver need not prefer a fact-checker with preferences aligned with the receiver to one with opposed preferences. Adding multiple fact-checkers does not necessarily improve communication even when all fact-checkers are willing to fully check by themselves. For intermediate cost of checking, having multiple fact-checkers can lead to underprovision of fact-checking due to free riding.

FORTHCOMING PAPERS

“The Value of Data Records” with Simone Galperti and Jacopo Perego,
Forthcoming at **The Review of Economic Studies** October 2022

Many e-commerce platforms use buyers’ personal data to intermediate their transactions with sellers. How much value do such intermediaries derive from the data record of each single individual? We characterize this value and find that one of its key components is a novel externality between records, which arises when the intermediary pools some records to withhold the information they contain. Ignoring this can significantly bias the evaluations of data records. Our analysis has several implications about compensating individuals for the use of their data, guiding companies’ investments in data acquisition, and more broadly studying the demand side of data markets. Our method combines modern information design with classic duality theory and applies to a large class of principal-agent problems.

WORKING PAPERS

“Strategic Mediation of Information in Autocracies”

May 2020

This paper presents the optimal editorial policy for state-owned media manipulating information flow from a strategic informed elite to an uninformed receiver. The receiver attempts to match the state of the ruler’s competence with a binary action. If the elite’s and audience’s preferences are too distant from each other, then the editorial policy is uninformative. Otherwise, the media signal whether the state is higher or lower than a threshold which depends on the elite’s preferences. The media benefit from a more lenient elite, as long as the elite is not too lenient. The media are worse off when the receiver is more critical of the ruler, whereas the elite generally is better off when the receiver is more critical. When the receiver has private information about how critical he is, I characterize the lower bound on the media’s payoff obtained within the class of restricted editorial policies. I identify a sufficient condition that implies the bound is achieved.

WORK IN PROGRESS

“Dynamics of Risky Agreements” with Renee Bowen and Malte Lammert

2022

We study the formation, dissolution and duration of risky agreements. Two agents decide whether to participate in an agreement at each instant over an infinite horizon. The agreement may favor one agent, but which agent might be favored is, ex-ante, unknown to both agents. A favorable agreement is beneficial compared to no agreement, but an unfavorable agreement is costly. Either agent can kill the agreement at any time. Each agent chooses to participate in the agreement if they are sufficiently optimistic that it is favorable to them. In equilibrium agents behave as if myopic, and agreement duration is generically inefficient.

RELEVANT POSITIONS HELD

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, SAN DIEGO
Research Assistant for Simone Galperti
Research Assistant for Joel Sobel

La Jolla, CA
2019 – 2020
2020

TEACHING EXPERIENCE

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, SAN DIEGO
Teaching Assistant

La Jolla, CA
2017 – 2022

- ECON 1 (Principles of Microeconomics), ECON 3 (Principle of Macroeconomics), ECON 100ABC (Microeconomics), ECON 109 (Game Theory), ECON 142 (Behavioral Economics), ECON 171 (Decisions Under Uncertainty), ECON 210B (Macroeconomics B, Ph.D. level)

NATIONAL RESEARCH UNIVERSITY – HIGHER SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS
Teaching Assistant

Moscow, Russia
2015 – 2016

- Probability and Statistics, Econometrics, Behavioral Economics

SERVICE

REFeree

- 2022 *American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Journal of Political Science, Games and Economic Behavior*
- 2021 *Games and Economic Behavior*

FELLOWSHIPS AND AWARDS

UC San Diego Cindy Vojtech Summer Research Fellowship	2021
UC San Diego Graduate Summer Research Fellowship	2017 – 2019
UC San Diego TA Excellence Award	2018, 2021
UC San Diego Regents Fellowship	2016 – 2017

OTHER INFORMATION

Languages: English (fluent), Russian (native)
Programming: proficient in Python, MATLAB, R