

Alexander Clyde

Department of Economics, UCL
Drayton House, 30 Gordon Street
London, UK, WC1H 0AX

Email: alexander.clyde.econ@gmail.com
Website: alexanderclyde.com
Citizenship: British

- Education:** PhD Economics
University College London (UCL), Expected Completion: 2025
- MRes Economics (Distinction)
University College London (UCL), 2018
- MSc Economics (Distinction)
University College London (UCL), 2016
- BSc Economics (First Class Honours)
University of Warwick, 2015
- Research Fields:** Primary field: Microeconomic Theory
Secondary fields: Bounded Rationality, Behavioural Economics
- References:** Ran Spiegler
University College London and Tel Aviv University
r.spiegler@ucl.ac.uk
- Philippe Jehiel
University College London and Paris School of Economics
jehiel@enpc.fr
- Mark Armstrong
University College London
mark-armstrong@ucl.ac.uk
- Job Market Paper:** **Narrow Inference and Incentive Design**
- There is evidence that people struggle to do causal inference in complex multidimensional environments. This paper explores the consequences of this in a principal-agent setting. A principal chooses a mechanism to screen an agent. The agent makes choices on multiple dimensions, and infers the effect of each action separately without properly controlling for the other actions. I characterize the principal's optimal mechanism when facing an agent who does such 'narrow' inference, and contrast it with their optimal mechanism when the agent is fully rational. I identify cases showing when the principal benefits from narrow inference and when they do not.

Working Papers:	<p>Proxy variables and Feedback Effects in Decision Making <i>(Revise and Resubmit at Games and Economic Behavior)</i></p> <p>When using data, often an analyst only has access to proxies or measurements of the true variables of interest. I propose a framework that models economic decision makers as 'flawed statisticians' who assume potentially noisy proxies are perfect measurements. The decision maker understands the causal relationship between the true variables and fits the true causal relationship to the measured variables. As there is feedback from the decision maker's choices to the distribution over variables, a notion of equilibrium is required to close the model. I illustrate the concept with applications to policing/crime and market entry.</p>
Teaching Experience:	<p>MSc Microeconomics, UCL Teaching Assistant (2018 - 2023)</p> <p>MSc Behavioural Economics, UCL Teaching Assistant (2019 - 2023)</p>
Research Experience:	<p>Research Assistant to Ran Spiegler (2023-Present)</p>
Awards and Scholarships:	<p>Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) Studentship, 1+3 Prize for Best Dissertation (MSc Economics)</p>
Seminar and Conference Presentations:	<p>UCL PhD Seminar: November 2021, March 2023, June 2024 UCL Theory Brown Bag: November 2021, June 2022, May 2024 Royal Economic Society Conference (Glasgow): April 2023 Enter Seminar, Tilburg University: April 2023 PhD Economics Workshop, Queen Mary University: May 2023 Royal Economic Society PhD Conference (Glasgow): June 2023 Econometric Society Summer Meeting (Barcelona): August 2023 Econometric Society Winter Meeting (Palma): December 2024 (Upcoming)</p>
Other Professional Experience:	<p>Assistant Economist (Civil Service Fast Stream) HMRC (UK Tax Authority) Worked on VAT and Insurance Premium Tax policy analysis for two fiscal events</p>
Programming Experience:	<p>Matlab, R, Stata, SAS</p>