Online Appendix

Evolutionary leadership theory and economic voting: Warmth and competence impressions mediate the effect of economic perceptions on vote

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Appendix A – Indicators of institutional and economic country differences

Table A1. Indicators of institutional and economic difference between countries

	USA	Australia	Denmark	Source
Trade as % of GDP	28%	41%	100%	World Bank (2007)
GDP (billion $)	14478	854	319	World Bank (2007)
General government final consumption expenditure (% of GDP)	15%	17%	24%	World Bank (2007)
Trade union density	12%	19%	68%	OECD (2007)
Effective number of parties	2.1	3.03	5.41	QoG OECD dataset (2007)
Government Fractionalization Index	0%	0%	62%	QoG OECD dataset (2007)

Definitions:

- **Trade** is the sum of exports and imports of goods and services measured as a share of gross domestic product.
- **GDP** at purchaser's prices is the sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of the products.
- **General government final consumption expenditure** (formerly general government consumption) includes all government current expenditures for purchases of goods and services (including compensation of employees).
- **Union density** is defined as the ratio of union members divided by the total number of employees
- **Effective number of parties** measures how many parties, weighted according to size, are in a party system in a given election
- **Government fractionalization index**: The probability that two deputies picked at random from among the government parties will be of different parties.

Appendix B – Overview of candidates and trait measures in each election

Table B1. Incumbent political leaders in our analysis

Country	Year	Incumbent name	Incumbent party	Note
Australia	1993	Paul Keating	Labour	-
	1996	Paul Keating	Labour	-
	1998	John Howard	Liberal	-
	2001	John Howard	Liberal	-
	2004	John Howard	Liberal	-
	2007	John Howard	Liberal	-
	2010	Julia Gillard	Labour	She was de facto PM for 2 months before the election & served as deputy PM for Rudd
	2013	Kevin Rudd	Labour	Came back as PM for 2 months before election. He was minister of foreign affairs in Gillard government till '12 and competed with her for party leadership
Denmark	2005	Anders Fogh Rasmussen	Venstre	-
	2007	Anders Fogh Rasmussen	Venstre	-
USA	1984	Ronald Reagan	Republican	-
	1988	George H.W.Bush	Republican	H.W.Bush was the vice president so it seems quite reasonable to include him as an incumbent
	1992	George H.W.Bush	Republican	-
	1996	Bill Clinton	Democratic	-
	2000	Al Gore	Democratic	Gore was the vice president so it seems quite reasonable to include him as an incumbent
	2004	George W. Bush	Republican	-
	2008	John McCain	Republican	McCain was a very prominent Republican leader, but one that had difficult relationship with Bush admin.

Table B2. Items measuring trait impressions in each election data

Country	Year	Warmth variable(s)	Competence variable(s)
Australia	1993	Reliable	Intelligent & Knowledgeable
	1996	Reliable	Intelligent & Knowledgeable
	1998	Reliable	Intelligent & Knowledgeable
	2001	Trustworthy	Intelligent & Knowledgeable
	2004	Trustworthy	Intelligent & Knowledgeable
	2007	Trustworthy	Intelligent & Knowledgeable
	2010	Trustworthy	Intelligent & Knowledgeable
	2013	Trustworthy	Intelligent & Knowledgeable
Denmark	2005	Reliable	Knowledgeable
	2007	Reliable	Knowledgeable
USA	1984	Compassionate & Caring for people	Intelligent & Knowledgeable
	1988	Compassionate & Caring for people	Intelligent & Knowledgeable
	1992	Compassionate & Caring for people	Intelligent & Knowledgeable
	1996	Compassionate & Caring for people	Intelligent & Knowledgeable
	2000	Caring for people	Intelligent & Knowledgeable
	2004	Caring for people	Intelligent & Knowledgeable
	2008	Caring for people	Intelligent & Knowledgeable

Appendix D – Model 1: main models (sociotropic evaluations)

Table D1. Results from the main models from each country in Study 1.

	USA				Australia				Denmark			
	estimates	z	95% CI		estimates	z	95% CI		estimates	z	95% CI	
Competence <– Economy	0.15	11.98	0.12	0.17	0.17	20.82	0.15	0.19	0.19	11.78	0.16	0.22
Warmth <– Economy	0.23	18.79	0.21	0.26	0.25	26.76	0.23	0.27	0.35	18.04	0.31	0.39
Vote <– Competence	1.01	10.39	0.83	1.21	0.56	7.91	0.42	0.71	0.93	6.87	0.67	1.21
Vote <– Warmth	1.76	20.86	1.61	1.94	1.00	20.21	0.91	1.10	1.59	19.82	1.43	1.75
Direct effect	0.65	7.20	0.48	0.82	0.67	10.85	0.55	0.81	0.55	3.90	0.29	0.84
Indirect effect: Competence	0.15	7.75	0.11	0.19	0.10	7.40	0.07	0.12	0.18	5.75	0.12	0.24
Indirect effect: Warmth	0.41	14.10	0.36	0.48	0.25	15.79	0.22	0.28	0.55	13.35	0.48	0.64
Total effect	1.21	12.90	1.03	1.39	1.02	16.68	0.90	1.15	1.28	8.95	1.01	1.58
Prop. Mediated: Competence	12%	6.93	9%	16%	9%	6.91	7%	12%	14%	5.01	9%	20%
Prop. Mediated: Warmth	34%	11.13	29%	41%	24%	11.73	21%	29%	43%	7.95	34%	55%
Contrast	0.27	7.58	0.20	0.34	0.15	6.94	0.11	0.20	0.38	6.99	0.28	0.49

TableD2 - Full main SEM model in USA (N = 6889)

LHS	RHS	Estimate	z.score	p.value	CI.lower	CI.higher
vote	competence	1.008	10.388	< .001	.829	1.215
	warmth	1.763	20.855	< .001	1.606	1.945
	economy	.648	7.205	< .001	.482	.823
	pid_incumb	2.513	32.733	< .001	2.369	2.670
	age	-.001	-.842	.400	-.004	.002
	income	.038	2.325	.020	.006	.071
	white	.154	2.994	.003	.059	.262
	interest	-.131	-2.173	.030	-.252	-.015
	year1988	-.249	-3.596	< .001	-.379	-.108
	year1992	-.389	-5.624	< .001	-.522	-.257
	year1996	-.393	-5.551	< .001	-.527	-.257
	year2000	-.531	-7.539	< .001	-.675	-.405
	year2004	-.070	-.878	.380	-.228	.093
	year2008	-.196	-1.797	.072	-.412	.023
	female	-.016	-.380	.704	-.098	.066
	educationprimary	-.054	-.429	.668	-.314	.179
	educationsecondary	.048	.958	.338	-.055	.143
	educationsomehigher	.087	1.699	.089	-.010	.191
competence	economy	.146	11.980	< .001	.122	.169
	pid_incumb	.237	31.100	< .001	.223	.252
	age	.0003	1.666	.096	-.0001	.001
	income	.001	.634	.526	-.003	.006
	white	.005	.790	.429	-.008	.019
	interest	.031	3.874	< .001	.014	.046
	year1988	.002	.248	.804	-.016	.019
	year1992	.057	5.742	< .001	.037	.076
	year1996	.054	5.937	< .001	.037	.073
	year2000	.016	1.624	.104	-.003	.035
	year2004	-.124	-10.609	< .001	-.146	-.100
	year2008	.056	3.501	< .001	.024	.086
	female	.016	3.139	.002	.006	.027
	educationprimary	.045	3.106	.002	.018	.074
	educationsecondary	.052	7.825	< .001	.039	.066
	educationsomehigher	.034	5.302	< .001	.022	.048
warmth	economy	.234	18.788	< .001	.208	.259
	pid_incumb	.418	51.824	< .001	.402	.434
	age	.001	5.006	< .001	.001	.001
	income	.004	1.717	.086	-.0004	.008
	white	.026	3.660	< .001	.012	.040
	interest	.013	1.479	.139	-.005	.029

	year1988	.024	2.814	.005	.007	.042
	year1992	.045	4.830	< .001	.027	.064
	year1996	.023	2.588	.010	.007	.042
	year2000	.0004	.040	.968	-.019	.022
	year2004	-.032	-2.839	.005	-.055	-.010
	year2008	.047	2.897	.004	.015	.078
	female	.042	7.808	< .001	.031	.052
	educationprimary	.068	4.623	< .001	.038	.098
	educationsecondary	.040	5.543	< .001	.026	.055
	educationsomehigher	.019	2.607	.009	.006	.033

TableD3 - Full main SEM model in AUS (N = 14140)

LHS	RHS	Estimate	z.score	p.value	CI.lower	CI.higher
cand_vote	competence	.564	7.908	< .001	.423	.706
	warmth	1.004	20.213	< .001	.911	1.104
	econ_socio	.675	10.851	< .001	.551	.806
	ownpartyin	1.433	42.367	< .001	1.374	1.508
	ownpartyout	-.838	-20.479	< .001	-.919	-.753
	educationprimary	.068	1.789	.074	-.006	.144
	educationsecondary	.087	2.326	.020	.013	.164
	urbansmalltown	.044	.681	.496	-.085	.167
	urbanmidtown	.053	.851	.395	-.072	.177
	urbanlargetown	.132	2.364	.018	.013	.239
	urbancity	.205	4.603	< .001	.116	.290
	year1996	-.535	-8.795	< .001	-.661	-.420
	year1998	-.293	-4.618	< .001	-.416	-.176
	year2001	-.231	-3.956	< .001	-.356	-.120
	year2004	-.277	-4.525	< .001	-.403	-.156
	year2007	-.457	-7.762	< .001	-.576	-.349
	year2010	-.362	-6.301	< .001	-.478	-.251
	year2013	-.481	-9.501	< .001	-.582	-.387
	age	-.002	-2.093	.036	-.004	-.0001
	interest	-.117	-2.080	.038	-.221	-.003
	income	.005	.088	.930	-.104	.114
	female	-.024	-.815	.415	-.083	.031
competence	econ_socio	.170	20.815	< .001	.154	.186
	Ownparty_in	.113	23.594	< .001	.104	.123

	Ownparty_out	-.054	-9.977	< .001	-.065	-.043
	educationprimary	-.006	-1.138	.255	-.016	.004
	educationsecondary	.002	.517	.605	-.007	.011
	urbansmalltown	.010	1.143	.253	-.008	.026
	urbanmidtown	.010	1.169	.242	-.007	.028
	urbanlargetown	.007	.886	.376	-.008	.021
	urbancity	.008	1.302	.193	-.004	.019
	year1996	.022	2.579	.010	.006	.038
	year1998	-.087	-11.203	< .001	-.103	-.072
	year2001	-.068	-8.814	< .001	-.083	-.052
	year2004	-.052	-6.298	< .001	-.067	-.036
	year2007	-.037	-4.898	< .001	-.051	-.022
	year2010	-.048	-6.664	< .001	-.061	-.032
	year2013	-.045	-6.973	< .001	-.057	-.032
	age	.001	9.132	< .001	.001	.002
	interest	.100	12.043	< .001	.084	.115
	income	.048	6.805	< .001	.034	.063
	female	.005	1.369	.171	-.002	.012
warmth	econ_socio	.248	26.764	< .001	.232	.267
	ownpartyin	.207	33.220	< .001	.194	.219
	ownpartyout	-.104	-16.691	< .001	-.116	-.092
	educationprimary	.024	3.980	< .001	.012	.037
	educationsecondary	.027	4.748	< .001	.015	.037
	urbansmalltown	-.001	-.102	.919	-.021	.019
	urbanmidtown	-.00001	-.001	.999	-.022	.022
	urbanlargetown	.006	.626	.531	-.012	.024
	urbancity	-.003	-.462	.644	-.018	.011
	year1996	.019	2.132	.033	.001	.036
	year1998	.071	7.296	< .001	.051	.089
	year2001	.017	1.882	.060	-.001	.035
	year2004	-.068	-7.228	< .001	-.087	-.049
	year2007	-.071	-7.112	< .001	-.092	-.053
	year2010	-.042	-4.915	< .001	-.059	-.025
	year2013	-.112	-14.388	< .001	-.126	-.096
	age	.001	5.933	< .001	.001	.001
	interest	.015	1.607	.108	-.003	.034
	income	-.002	-.270	.787	-.019	.015
	female	.012	2.546	.011	.003	.022

TableD4 - Full main SEM model in DK (N = 5083)

LHS	RHS	Estimate	z.score	p.value	CI.lower	CI.higher
vote_incumb	competence	.932	6.867	< .001	.674	1.213
	warmth	1.589	19.815	< .001	1.433	1.747
	econ_socio	.550	3.895	< .001	.291	.842
	interest	-.457	-4.257	< .001	-.667	-.248
	income	.536	4.590	< .001	.311	.773
	age	.007	4.482	< .001	.004	.011
	female	.005	.103	.918	-.092	.108
	urban2	.034	.466	.641	-.112	.179
	urban3	.037	.514	.608	-.112	.177
	urban4	-.120	-1.523	.128	-.276	.035
	urban5	-.158	-1.909	.056	-.331	-.002
	year2007	-.214	-4.160	< .001	-.328	-.119
	partyOther	1.615	12.492	< .001	1.396	1.900
	partySoc.Dem	.290	1.595	.111	-.111	.619
	partyVenstre	3.469	22.945	< .001	3.226	3.811
	educationprimary	.179	2.799	.005	.057	.306
	educationsecondary	.217	3.485	< .001	.092	.340
competence	econ_socio	.188	11.780	< .001	.158	.219
	interest	-.001	-.101	.919	-.028	.023
	income	.045	3.190	.001	.017	.071
	age	.001	4.444	< .001	.0005	.001
	female	.001	.233	.816	-.011	.013
	urban2	-.008	-1.008	.313	-.024	.008
	urban3	-.017	-1.890	.059	-.035	-.001
	urban4	-.004	-.427	.669	-.022	.013
	urban5	-.030	-3.203	.001	-.049	-.012
	year2007	-.037	-6.137	< .001	-.049	-.025
	partyOther	-.077	-8.343	< .001	-.094	-.058
	partySoc.Dem	-.122	-11.265	< .001	-.144	-.099
	partyVenstre	.060	6.600	< .001	.043	.078
	educationprimary	-.002	-.263	.793	-.017	.013
	educationsecondary	.001	.085	.932	-.013	.015
warmth	econ_socio	.349	18.037	< .001	.311	.388
	interest	-.105	-6.266	< .001	-.136	-.070
	income	.113	6.299	< .001	.078	.146
	age	.001	3.754	< .001	.0004	.001
	female	-.037	-4.589	< .001	-.053	-.021
	urban2	-.010	-.887	.375	-.033	.011

urban3	-.004	-.362	.717	-.026	.019
urban4	.005	.375	.707	-.021	.028
urban5	-.047	-3.832	< .001	-.072	-.026
year2007	-.022	-2.631	.009	-.039	-.006
partyOther	-.193	-16.744	< .001	-.215	-.170
partySoc.Dem	-.311	-21.912	< .001	-.338	-.283
partyVenstre	.111	9.982	< .001	.089	.133
educationprimary	.010	.962	.336	-.010	.029
educationsecondary	.018	2.017	.044	-.0004	.035

Appendix E – Model 2: pocketbook evaluations

Table E1. Results from models 2 relying on pocketbook economic evaluations

	USA				Australia				Denmark			
	estimates	z	95% CI		estimates	z	95% CI		estimates	z	95% CI	
Competence <– Economy	0.08	7.51	0.06	0.10	0.13	15.28	0.11	0.14	0.11	7.53	0.08	0.14
Warmth <– Economy	0.15	12.42	0.12	0.17	0.19	18.97	0.17	0.21	0.17	8.58	0.13	0.20
Vote <– Competence	1.00	10.89	0.82	1.18	0.62	9.03	0.50	0.76	0.94	7.18	0.69	1.20
Vote <– Warmth	1.83	23.41	1.69	1.99	1.04	21.78	0.94	1.13	1.60	22.37	1.46	1.75
Direct effect	0.24	2.87	0.08	0.42	0.41	6.59	0.29	0.53	0.26	2.20	0.03	0.51
Indirect effect: Competence	0.08	6.07	0.06	0.11	0.08	7.58	0.06	0.10	0.10	5.09	0.07	0.14
Indirect effect: Warmth	0.27	10.86	0.22	0.32	0.20	14.27	0.17	0.23	0.27	7.95	0.21	0.34
Total effect	0.59	6.68	0.43	0.77	0.68	10.82	0.56	0.81	0.63	5.17	0.40	0.87
Prop. Mediated: Competence	14%	4.85	9%	21%	12%	6.58	9%	16%	16%	3.52	10%	28%
Prop. Mediated: Warmth	45%	6.45	34%	62%	29%	9.17	23%	36%	43%	4.47	29%	66%
Contrast	0.18	7.30	0.14	0.23	0.12	6.72	0.08	0.15	0.17	4.38	0.09	0.24

TableE2 - Full SEM model 2 (pocketbook economy) in USA (N = 6926)

LHS	RHS	Estimate	z.score	p.value	CI.lower	CI.higher
vote	competence	1.002	10.887	< .001	.820	1.183
	warmth	1.829	23.411	< .001	1.686	1.985
	economy_pocket	.238	2.872	.004	.084	.418
	pid_incumb	2.494	33.081	< .001	2.370	2.659
	age	-.0004	-.290	.772	-.003	.002
	income	.031	1.990	.047	-.00003	.060
	white	.175	3.603	< .001	.085	.274
	interest	-.123	-2.009	.045	-.236	-.001
	year1988	-.310	-4.475	< .001	-.455	-.182
	year1992	-.585	-8.878	< .001	-.715	-.460
	year1996	-.395	-5.748	< .001	-.537	-.268
	year2000	-.548	-8.333	< .001	-.678	-.424
	year2004	-.159	-2.134	.033	-.316	-.023
	year2008	-.465	-4.615	< .001	-.661	-.275
	female	-.025	-.642	.521	-.103	.053
	educationprimary	-.065	-.563	.573	-.300	.155
	educationsecondary	.014	.291	.771	-.091	.106
	educationsomehigher	.058	1.131	.258	-.043	.158
competence	economy_pocket	.083	7.507	< .001	.060	.104
	pid_incumb	.260	35.547	< .001	.246	.274
	age	.0005	2.831	.005	.0002	.001
	income	.0005	.230	.818	-.004	.004
	white	.008	1.163	.245	-.005	.021
	interest	.032	3.856	< .001	.016	.049
	year1988	-.013	-1.547	.122	-.030	.004
	year1992	.015	1.735	.083	-.002	.031
	year1996	.054	5.850	< .001	.037	.074
	year2000	.011	1.249	.212	-.005	.031
	year2004	-.144	-12.241	< .001	-.167	-.120
	year2008	.004	.271	.787	-.024	.034
	female	.012	2.296	.022	.002	.022
	educationprimary	.039	2.711	.007	.012	.066
	educationsecondary	.049	7.407	< .001	.036	.062
	educationsomehigher	.033	5.031	< .001	.021	.046
warmth	economy_pocket	.145	12.417	< .001	.122	.167
	pid_incumb	.452	58.784	< .001	.437	.467
	age	.001	6.802	< .001	.001	.002
	income	.002	.997	.319	-.002	.007
	white	.030	4.137	< .001	.016	.045
	interest	.015	1.672	.094	-.002	.032

	year1988	-.001	-.159	.874	-.019	.017
	year1992	-.019	-2.229	.026	-.036	-.003
	year1996	.025	2.761	.006	.008	.044
	year2000	-.006	-.571	.568	-.026	.013
	year2004	-.066	-5.548	< .001	-.088	-.044
	year2008	-.036	-2.355	.019	-.065	-.005
	female	.035	6.090	< .001	.023	.046
	educationprimary	.059	3.851	< .001	.029	.088
	educationsecondary	.038	5.225	< .001	.024	.052
	educationsomehigher	.018	2.421	.015	.004	.032

TableE3 - Full SEM model 2 (pocketbook economy) in AUS (N = 14413)

LHS	RHS	Estimate	z.score	p.value	CI.lower	CI.higher
cand_vote	competence	.624	9.026	< .001	.501	.762
	warmth	1.040	21.782	< .001	.939	1.130
	econ_pocket	.408	6.588	< .001	.286	.532
	ownpartyin	1.445	41.536	< .001	1.385	1.521
	ownpartyout	-.832	-21.441	< .001	-.914	-.758
	educationprimary	.061	1.649	.099	-.009	.137
	educationsecondary	.074	2.087	.037	.004	.142
	urbansmalltown	.036	.558	.577	-.091	.157
	urbanmidtown	.062	.989	.322	-.067	.178
	urbanlargetown	.134	2.463	.014	.027	.240
	urbancity	.203	4.900	< .001	.124	.285
	year1996	-.494	-8.854	< .001	-.611	-.391
	year1998	-.235	-3.971	< .001	-.357	-.121
	year2001	-.172	-3.027	.002	-.287	-.060
	year2004	-.127	-2.291	.022	-.234	-.017
	year2007	-.335	-6.213	< .001	-.444	-.235
	year2010	-.250	-4.724	< .001	-.347	-.147
	year2013	-.428	-9.331	< .001	-.519	-.333
	age	-.002	-2.563	.010	-.004	-.001
	interest	-.101	-1.796	.073	-.203	.007
	income	-.038	-.688	.492	-.147	.069
	female	-.038	-1.372	.170	-.091	.018
competence	econ_pocket	.127	15.276	< .001	.111	.144
	ownpartyin	.126	26.509	< .001	.116	.135
	ownpartyout	-.063	-12.038	< .001	-.073	-.052
	educationprimary	-.007	-1.328	.184	-.016	.003

	educationsecondary	.001	.223	.824	-.009	.010
	urbansmalltown	.009	1.075	.282	-.007	.025
	urbanmidtown	.011	1.255	.209	-.006	.028
	urbanlargetown	.009	1.216	.224	-.005	.023
	urbancity	.010	1.747	.081	-.002	.022
	year1996	.032	4.053	< .001	.017	.048
	year1998	-.066	-8.471	< .001	-.082	-.050
	year2001	-.053	-6.740	< .001	-.067	-.038
	year2004	-.017	-2.169	.030	-.034	-.002
	year2007	-.008	-.975	.330	-.024	.007
	year2010	-.023	-3.034	.002	-.037	-.008
	year2013	-.035	-5.278	< .001	-.048	-.022
	age	.001	8.705	< .001	.001	.001
	interest	.101	12.155	< .001	.083	.117
	income	.036	4.833	< .001	.022	.051
	female	.004	1.114	.265	-.003	.011
warmth	econ_pocket	.189	18.974	< .001	.170	.209
	ownpartyin	.224	35.196	< .001	.211	.236
	ownpartyout	-.116	-17.957	< .001	-.129	-.103
	educationprimary	.025	4.159	< .001	.013	.037
	educationsecondary	.027	4.476	< .001	.015	.038
	urbansmalltown	-.001	-.103	.918	-.021	.020
	urbanmidtown	.001	.118	.906	-.019	.021
	urbanlargetown	.010	1.130	.258	-.007	.027
	urbancity	.002	.282	.778	-.011	.015
	year1996	.030	3.325	< .001	.012	.049
	year1998	.098	10.368	< .001	.080	.117
	year2001	.037	3.932	< .001	.017	.056
	year2004	-.022	-2.258	.024	-.041	-.002
	year2007	-.030	-3.048	.002	-.049	-.011
	year2010	-.011	-1.265	.206	-.026	.007
	year2013	-.100	-12.632	< .001	-.116	-.084
	age	.001	5.337	< .001	.001	.001
	interest	.015	1.583	.113	-.003	.033
	income	-.021	-2.367	.018	-.038	-.003
	female	.010	2.249	.025	.001	.019

TableE4 - Full SEM model 2 (pocketbook economy) in DK (N = 5247)

LHS	RHS	Estimate	z.score	p.value	CI.lower	CI.higher
vote_incumb	competence	.936	7.180	< .001	.692	1.202
	warmth	1.605	22.367	< .001	1.463	1.749
	econ_pocket	.258	2.203	.028	.028	.507
	interest	-.385	-3.799	< .001	-.605	-.211
	income	.535	4.811	< .001	.324	.755
	age	.008	4.958	< .001	.005	.011
	female	-.013	-.264	.792	-.107	.091
	urban2	.044	.616	.538	-.087	.187
	urban3	.047	.648	.517	-.091	.190
	urban4	-.145	-1.900	.057	-.297	.010
	urban5	-.161	-2.042	.041	-.317	-.011
	year2007	-.182	-3.639	< .001	-.277	-.086
	partyOther	1.590	12.663	< .001	1.376	1.882
	partySoc.Dem	.291	1.544	.123	-.086	.633
	partyVenstre	3.449	24.013	< .001	3.211	3.785
	educationprimary	.210	3.259	.001	.084	.333
	educationsecondary	.226	3.790	< .001	.102	.336
competence	econ_pocket	.110	7.526	< .001	.081	.138
	interest	.003	.227	.820	-.022	.028
	income	.034	2.304	.021	.005	.062
	age	.001	5.406	< .001	.001	.001
	female	-.002	-.303	.762	-.014	.010
	urban2	-.010	-1.242	.214	-.027	.004
	urban3	-.014	-1.660	.097	-.031	.003
	urban4	-.006	-.597	.551	-.023	.012
	urban5	-.032	-3.270	.001	-.051	-.014
	year2007	-.029	-4.755	< .001	-.042	-.017
	partyOther	-.084	-9.558	< .001	-.102	-.066
	partySoc.Dem	-.138	-13.387	< .001	-.158	-.119
	partyVenstre	.061	6.974	< .001	.045	.080
	educationprimary	-.002	-.258	.796	-.016	.013
	educationsecondary	.004	.621	.534	-.009	.018
warmth	econ_pocket	.167	8.579	< .001	.129	.204
	interest	-.100	-6.188	< .001	-.133	-.070
	income	.100	5.374	< .001	.065	.136
	age	.001	5.028	< .001	.001	.002
	female	-.051	-6.576	< .001	-.066	-.035
	urban2	-.013	-1.208	.227	-.036	.009
	urban3	-.005	-.406	.684	-.026	.017
	urban4	-.0005	-.037	.970	-.024	.024

urban5	-.050	-3.917	< .001	-.077	-.025
year2007	-.007	-.813	.416	-.024	.011
partyOther	-.212	-17.901	< .001	-.233	-.187
partySoc.Dem	-.343	-24.627	< .001	-.370	-.315
partyVenstre	.114	10.288	< .001	.094	.137
educationprimary	.009	.884	.377	-.012	.029
educationsecondary	.023	2.357	.018	.002	.041

Appendix F – Model 3: feeling thermometer

Table F1. Results from the models relying on feeling thermometer as main DV

	USA				Australia				Denmark			
	estimates	z	95% CI		estimates	z	95% CI		estimates	z	95% CI	
Competence <– Economy	0.15	16.42	0.13	0.17	0.17	22.33	0.15	0.18	0.19	11.67	0.15	0.22
Warmth <– Economy	0.25	25.00	0.23	0.27	0.25	25.52	0.23	0.27	0.35	18.55	0.31	0.38
Thermometer <– Competence	0.22	21.00	0.19	0.24	2.13	22.87	1.94	2.31	2.21	14.89	1.93	2.53
Thermometer <– Warmth	0.42	44.84	0.40	0.44	4.76	59.36	4.60	4.92	5.69	48.71	5.44	5.92
Direct effect	0.12	15.70	0.11	0.14	1.08	13.45	0.92	1.24	0.91	6.09	0.60	1.19
Indirect effect: Competence	0.03	12.86	0.03	0.04	0.36	15.81	0.32	0.40	0.41	9.54	0.33	0.49
Indirect effect: Warmth	0.10	21.12	0.09	0.11	1.18	23.54	1.08	1.28	1.98	17.24	1.75	2.20
Total effect	0.26	27.99	0.24	0.28	2.62	27.91	2.42	2.80	3.30	17.48	2.91	3.67
Prop. Mediated: Competence	12%	13.11	11%	14%	14%	15.48	12%	16%	12%	9.47	10%	15%
Prop. Mediated: Warmth	40%	23.07	37%	44%	45%	25.21	42%	49%	60%	18.72	54%	67%
Contrast	0.07	13.32	0.06	0.08	0.82	15.87	0.72	0.92	1.57	13.36	1.34	1.80

TableF2 - Full SEM model 3 (feeling thermometer) in USA (N = 11119)

LHS	RHS	Estimate	z.score	p.value	CI.lower	CI.higher
thermometer	competence	.216	21.000	< .001	.195	.236
	warmth	.421	44.845	< .001	.402	.440
	economy	.122	15.700	< .001	.107	.138
	pid_incumb	.246	38.629	< .001	.234	.258
	age	.0002	1.512	.131	-.0001	.0004
	income	.002	1.469	.142	-.001	.004
	white	-.024	-5.235	< .001	-.033	-.015
	interest	-.024	-4.565	< .001	-.035	-.013
	year1988	.006	1.056	.291	-.005	.018
	year1992	-.027	-4.643	< .001	-.038	-.015
	year1996	-.073	-12.681	< .001	-.084	-.061
	year2000	-.067	-11.702	< .001	-.078	-.055
	year2004	.005	.766	.443	-.008	.019
	year2008	-.007	-.750	.453	-.026	.012
	female	.004	1.206	.228	-.003	.010
	educationprimary	.019	1.918	.055	-.001	.037
	educationsecondary	.015	3.488	< .001	.006	.024
	educationsomehigher	.005	1.187	.235	-.003	.014
competence	economy	.149	16.418	< .001	.133	.169
	pid_incumb	.215	36.014	< .001	.202	.226
	age	.001	5.460	< .001	.0004	.001
	income	.003	1.560	.119	-.001	.006
	white	.006	1.189	.235	-.004	.016
	interest	.034	5.580	< .001	.023	.047
	year1988	-.015	-2.268	.023	-.029	-.002
	year1992	.029	3.908	< .001	.014	.042
	year1996	.014	1.895	.058	-.001	.028
	year2000	-.010	-1.364	.172	-.024	.005
	year2004	-.127	-13.131	< .001	-.146	-.107
	year2008	.018	1.484	.138	-.006	.042
	female	.015	3.699	< .001	.007	.023
	educationprimary	.014	1.342	.180	-.007	.035
	educationsecondary	.040	7.517	< .001	.029	.051
	educationsomehigher	.030	5.149	< .001	.019	.041
warmth	economy	.247	25.005	< .001	.228	.266
	pid_incumb	.389	57.197	< .001	.375	.402
	age	.001	7.528	< .001	.001	.001
	income	.002	1.021	.307	-.002	.005

white	.019	3.394	< .001	.007	.029
interest	.029	4.387	< .001	.017	.042
year1988	.023	3.094	.002	.009	.038
year1992	.041	5.670	< .001	.027	.056
year1996	.015	1.992	.046	-.0001	.030
year2000	-.006	-.778	.436	-.022	.010
year2004	-.026	-2.783	.005	-.045	-.008
year2008	.029	2.249	.025	.005	.056
female	.043	9.495	< .001	.034	.051
educationprimary	.044	3.922	< .001	.020	.064
educationsecondary	.033	5.638	< .001	.022	.045
educationsomehigher	.014	2.154	.031	.001	.026

TableF3 - Full SEM model 3 (feeling thermometer) in AUS (N = 14299)

LHS	RHS	Estimate	z.score	p.value	CI.lower	CI.higher
thermometer	competence	2.128	22.868	< .001	1.942	2.311
	warmth	4.760	59.363	< .001	4.599	4.920
	econ_socio	1.076	13.454	< .001	.922	1.242
	ownpartyin	1.430	27.795	< .001	1.336	1.533
	ownpartyout	-.946	-19.407	< .001	-1.037	-.845
	educationprimary	.040	.814	.416	-.061	.131
	educationsecondary	.084	1.795	.073	-.009	.173
	urbansmalltown	.028	.363	.717	-.118	.183
	urbanmidtown	.024	.308	.758	-.140	.171
	urbanlargetown	.020	.306	.760	-.110	.148
	urbancity	.005	.101	.919	-.099	.108
	year1996	-.641	-7.940	< .001	-.799	-.482
	year1998	.279	3.749	< .001	.137	.435
	year2001	.600	8.535	< .001	.466	.745
	year2004	.621	8.023	< .001	.474	.778
	year2007	.391	5.112	< .001	.242	.547
	year2010	.309	4.468	< .001	.179	.455
	year2013	-.195	-3.092	.002	-.307	-.064
	age	-.005	-4.111	< .001	-.007	-.002
	interest	-.479	-6.571	< .001	-.620	-.333
	income	-.151	-2.234	.026	-.284	-.014
	female	-.035	-1.011	.312	-.106	.033
competence	econ_socio	.169	22.332	< .001	.154	.184

	ownpartyin	.114	24.939	< .001	.105	.123
	ownpartyout	-.052	-10.084	< .001	-.062	-.042
	educationprimary	-.004	-.787	.431	-.013	.006
	educationsecondary	.003	.716	.474	-.006	.012
	urbansmalltown	.008	.904	.366	-.010	.024
	urbanmidtown	.005	.634	.526	-.012	.021
	urbanlargetown	.006	.805	.421	-.009	.019
	urbancity	.006	.977	.329	-.006	.017
	year1996	.022	2.863	.004	.007	.038
	year1998	-.087	-10.781	< .001	-.102	-.070
	year2001	-.067	-8.829	< .001	-.082	-.051
	year2004	-.050	-6.116	< .001	-.067	-.035
	year2007	-.036	-4.669	< .001	-.053	-.021
	year2010	-.050	-7.001	< .001	-.064	-.036
	year2013	-.045	-6.875	< .001	-.057	-.032
	age	.001	9.938	< .001	.001	.002
	interest	.099	12.037	< .001	.084	.115
	income	.049	6.553	< .001	.033	.063
	female	.005	1.281	.200	-.003	.012
warmth	econ_socio	.248	25.522	< .001	.229	.267
	ownpartyin	.207	32.542	< .001	.194	.219
	ownpartyout	-.102	-16.822	< .001	-.115	-.091
	educationprimary	.026	4.278	< .001	.015	.039
	educationsecondary	.028	4.586	< .001	.016	.040
	urbansmalltown	-.004	-.403	.687	-.025	.016
	urbanmidtown	-.003	-.331	.741	-.024	.017
	urbanlargetown	.006	.630	.529	-.012	.024
	urbancity	-.003	-.468	.639	-.017	.011
	year1996	.018	1.977	.048	.0002	.036
	year1998	.070	7.447	< .001	.052	.089
	year2001	.017	1.877	.060	-.001	.035
	year2004	-.068	-6.923	< .001	-.086	-.047
	year2007	-.072	-7.330	< .001	-.090	-.052
	year2010	-.044	-5.058	< .001	-.061	-.027
	year2013	-.113	-14.847	< .001	-.129	-.097
	age	.001	6.324	< .001	.001	.001
	interest	.015	1.591	.112	-.004	.034
	income	-.001	-.145	.884	-.018	.017
	female	.010	2.194	.028	.001	.019

TableF4 - Full SEM model 3 (feeling thermometer) in DK (N = 5276)

LHS	RHS	Estimate	z.score	p.value	CI.lower	CI.higher
thermometer	competence	2.215	14.894	< .001	1.930	2.533
	warmth	5.690	48.707	< .001	5.438	5.921
	econ_socio	.912	6.095	< .001	.603	1.191
	interest	-.548	-4.614	< .001	-.762	-.316
	income	-.013	-.101	.920	-.252	.240
	age	.007	4.127	< .001	.004	.010
	female	-.202	-3.669	< .001	-.315	-.098
	urban2	.015	.190	.850	-.131	.180
	urban3	.124	1.471	.141	-.043	.281
	urban4	-.028	-.312	.755	-.196	.153
	urban5	-.192	-2.182	.029	-.359	-.018
	year2007	-.400	-6.764	< .001	-.516	-.282
	partyOther	-1.062	-11.763	< .001	-1.249	-.896
	partySoc.Dem	-1.781	-15.280	< .001	-2.015	-1.541
	partyVenstre	.434	4.835	< .001	.259	.616
	educationprimary	.049	.700	.484	-.086	.189
	educationsecondary	.155	2.189	.029	.016	.294
competence	econ_socio	.185	11.674	< .001	.154	.218
	interest	.006	.455	.649	-.020	.029
	income	.046	3.413	< .001	.018	.073
	age	.001	4.558	< .001	.0004	.001
	female	.002	.362	.717	-.009	.014
	urban2	-.011	-1.296	.195	-.027	.006
	urban3	-.017	-2.059	.040	-.033	-.0004
	urban4	-.006	-.679	.497	-.024	.012
	urban5	-.032	-3.398	< .001	-.050	-.013
	year2007	-.036	-5.829	< .001	-.049	-.024
	partyOther	-.078	-8.780	< .001	-.095	-.061
	partySoc.Dem	-.122	-11.379	< .001	-.142	-.100
	partyVenstre	.059	6.832	< .001	.044	.077
	educationprimary	-.002	-.294	.769	-.017	.013
	educationsecondary	.001	.132	.895	-.013	.013
warmth	econ_socio	.347	18.549	< .001	.309	.384
	interest	-.096	-5.917	< .001	-.130	-.066
	income	.107	6.014	< .001	.072	.142
	age	.001	3.461	< .001	.0004	.001
	female	-.034	-4.343	< .001	-.049	-.018

urban2	-.011	-.967	.334	-.030	.011
urban3	-.002	-.195	.845	-.022	.019
urban4	.003	.260	.795	-.019	.027
urban5	-.044	-3.514	< .001	-.067	-.018
year2007	-.023	-2.806	.005	-.038	-.007
partyOther	-.196	-17.612	< .001	-.220	-.175
partySoc.Dem	-.308	-22.280	< .001	-.335	-.282
partyVenstre	.109	10.150	< .001	.088	.130
educationprimary	.005	.474	.636	-.015	.024
educationsecondary	.019	2.096	.036	.002	.037

Appendix G – Model 4: dropping nontrivial incumbents

Table G1. Results from models dropping nontrivial cases of incumbents

	USA - Drop 2008				**USA - Drop 1988, 2000, 2008**				**Australia - Drop 2010, 2013**			
	estimates	z	95% CI		estimates	z	95% CI		estimates	z	95% CI	
Competence <– Economy	0.15	12.04	0.13	0.17	0.18	10.78	0.15	0.21	0.19	19.83	0.17	0.21
Warmth <– Economy	0.24	18.57	0.21	0.26	0.28	17.15	0.25	0.31	0.28	24.25	0.26	0.30
Vote <– Competence	0.99	10.22	0.80	1.18	1.00	8.61	0.78	1.23	0.55	6.23	0.37	0.73
Vote <– Warmth	1.80	20.28	1.63	1.98	1.88	16.83	1.67	2.11	1.08	17.45	0.97	1.21
Direct effect	0.69	7.62	0.52	0.87	0.90	7.16	0.66	1.15	0.75	9.98	0.60	0.89
Indirect effect: Competence	0.15	7.92	0.11	0.19	0.18	6.60	0.13	0.23	0.11	5.81	0.07	0.14
Indirect effect: Warmth	0.43	13.60	0.37	0.49	0.52	11.90	0.44	0.61	0.30	14.18	0.26	0.34
Total effect	1.26	13.14	1.09	1.45	1.59	12.06	1.35	1.87	1.15	15.39	1.01	1.30
Prop. Mediated: Competence	12%	7.45	9%	15%	11%	6.33	8%	15%	9%	5.59	6%	13%
Prop. Mediated: Warmth	34%	11.06	28%	40%	33%	9.90	26%	40%	26%	11.07	22%	31%
Contrast	0.28	7.51	0.21	0.35	0.34	6.60	0.24	0.45	0.19	6.27	0.13	0.25

TableG2 - Full SEM model 4 (drop 2008) in USA (N = 6546)

LHS	RHS	Estimate	z.score	p.value	CI.lower	CI.higher
vote	competence	.988	10.217	< .001	.798	1.180
	warmth	1.802	20.283	< .001	1.631	1.982
	economy	.689	7.620	< .001	.518	.870
	pid_incumb	2.489	33.277	< .001	2.359	2.657
	age	-.001	-1.137	.255	-.004	.001
	income	.031	1.861	.063	-.0002	.067
	white	.139	2.675	.007	.041	.243
	interest	-.156	-2.510	.012	-.278	-.037
	year1988	-.242	-3.439	< .001	-.381	-.096
	year1992	-.368	-5.147	< .001	-.509	-.218
	year1996	-.391	-6.031	< .001	-.514	-.263
	year2000	-.531	-7.703	< .001	-.668	-.389
	year2004	-.062	-.812	.417	-.211	.094
	female	.008	.195	.846	-.074	.091
	educationprimary	-.034	-.260	.795	-.300	.208
	educationsecondary	.031	.605	.545	-.071	.137
	educationsomehigher	.094	1.855	.064	-.003	.200
competence	economy	.150	12.037	< .001	.126	.174
	pid_incumb	.235	29.909	< .001	.220	.251
	age	.0004	2.116	.034	.00002	.001
	income	.001	.657	.511	-.003	.005
	white	.002	.259	.796	-.012	.016
	interest	.028	3.340	< .001	.011	.044
	year1988	.002	.263	.793	-.015	.019
	year1992	.058	5.941	< .001	.038	.078
	year1996	.053	5.822	< .001	.036	.071
	year2000	.016	1.723	.085	-.001	.035
	year2004	-.123	-10.368	< .001	-.147	-.100
	female	.013	2.393	.017	.001	.024
	educationprimary	.044	2.894	.004	.013	.072
	educationsecondary	.055	7.908	< .001	.041	.068
	educationsomehigher	.035	4.982	< .001	.021	.049
warmth	economy	.237	18.570	< .001	.210	.262
	pid_incumb	.414	50.259	< .001	.399	.430
	age	.001	4.496	< .001	.0005	.001
	income	.004	1.661	.097	-.001	.008
	white	.022	3.090	.002	.007	.035
	interest	.012	1.274	.203	-.007	.029
	year1988	.024	2.800	.005	.007	.041
	year1992	.046	4.886	< .001	.027	.064

	year1996	.024	2.610	.009	.006	.041
	year2000	.001	.068	.946	-.019	.021
	year2004	-.032	-2.752	.006	-.056	-.009
	female	.042	7.312	< .001	.031	.054
	educationprimary	.067	4.583	< .001	.038	.095
	educationsecondary	.041	5.672	< .001	.026	.055
	educationsomehigher	.018	2.433	.015	.003	.033

TableG3 - Full SEM model 4 (drop '88, '00, '08) in USA (N = 4386)

LHS	RHS	Estimate	z.score	p.value	CI.lower	CI.higher
vote	competence	1.003	8.611	< .001	.777	1.233
	warmth	1.881	16.833	< .001	1.674	2.111
	economy	.896	7.158	< .001	.657	1.151
	pid_incumb	2.397	23.538	< .001	2.219	2.620
	age	.0001	.032	.974	-.003	.003
	income	.040	1.932	.053	-.001	.082
	white	.131	1.911	.056	-.001	.267
	interest	-.243	-2.925	.003	-.414	-.087
	year1992	-.300	-3.731	< .001	-.456	-.139
	year1996	-.400	-5.681	< .001	-.544	-.262
	year2004	-.025	-.308	.758	-.183	.143
	female	.014	.287	.774	-.080	.110
	educationprimary	-.148	-.845	.398	-.486	.204
	educationsecondary	.078	1.198	.231	-.052	.206
	educationsomehigher	.151	2.220	.026	.018	.288
competence	economy	.177	10.780	< .001	.147	.212
	pid_incumb	.244	24.225	< .001	.224	.262
	age	.0004	1.958	.050	-.00002	.001
	income	.0003	.123	.902	-.005	.006
	white	-.002	-.243	.808	-.020	.017
	interest	.012	1.184	.236	-.007	.031
	year1992	.070	6.919	< .001	.052	.091
	year1996	.056	6.068	< .001	.038	.075
	year2004	-.114	-9.836	< .001	-.136	-.090
	female	.019	2.866	.004	.006	.032
	educationprimary	.077	4.178	< .001	.041	.113
	educationsecondary	.085	9.754	< .001	.067	.101
	educationsomehigher	.050	5.521	< .001	.032	.068
warmth	economy	.277	17.146	< .001	.247	.309

	pid_incumb	.429	42.125	< .001	.409	.449
	age	.001	4.005	< .001	.0004	.001
	income	.003	1.080	.280	-.002	.008
	white	.017	1.962	.050	.0004	.033
	interest	.010	.978	.328	-.010	.029
	year1992	.061	6.027	< .001	.039	.080
	year1996	.024	2.528	.011	.004	.042
	year2004	-.024	-2.102	.036	-.045	-.001
	female	.041	6.113	< .001	.028	.054
	educationprimary	.079	4.228	< .001	.046	.119
	educationsecondary	.060	6.934	< .001	.044	.078
	educationsomehigher	.032	3.540	< .001	.013	.049

TableG4 - Full SEM model 4 (drop '10, '13) in AUS (N = 9020)

LHS	RHS	Estimate	z.score	p.value	CI.lower	CI.higher
cand_vote	competence	.552	6.230	< .001	.373	.727
	warmth	1.078	17.454	< .001	.971	1.206
	econ_socio	.746	9.985	< .001	.603	.894
	ownpartyin	1.442	31.953	< .001	1.357	1.537
	ownpartyout	-.783	-16.397	< .001	-.878	-.693
	educationprimary	.050	1.015	.310	-.049	.148
	educationsecondary	.095	1.951	.051	-.003	.187
	urbansmalltown	.012	.139	.889	-.162	.170
	urbanmidtown	.040	.502	.615	-.125	.195
	urbanlargetown	.117	1.607	.108	-.026	.261
	urbancity	.161	3.090	.002	.059	.259
	year1996	-.555	-9.505	< .001	-.672	-.442
	year1998	-.312	-4.837	< .001	-.440	-.183
	year2001	-.251	-4.036	< .001	-.369	-.123
	year2004	-.300	-4.707	< .001	-.432	-.179
	year2007	-.478	-7.798	< .001	-.601	-.358
	age	-.002	-1.365	.172	-.004	.001
	interest	-.259	-3.642	< .001	-.400	-.113
	income	.099	1.483	.138	-.045	.223
	female	-.063	-1.749	.080	-.137	.011
competence	econ_socio	.193	19.826	< .001	.174	.213
	ownpartyin	.121	19.520	< .001	.109	.134
	ownpartyout	-.046	-6.885	< .001	-.059	-.033
	educationprimary	.013	1.938	.053	-.0002	.025

	educationsecondary	.024	3.980	< .001	.011	.036
	urbansmalltown	.013	1.202	.230	-.009	.034
	urbanmidtown	.012	1.124	.261	-.009	.031
	urbanlargetown	.008	.823	.410	-.010	.027
	urbancity	.005	.707	.480	-.009	.019
	year1996	.020	2.509	.012	.004	.036
	year1998	-.090	-11.344	< .001	-.106	-.075
	year2001	-.070	-9.083	< .001	-.086	-.056
	year2004	-.057	-7.051	< .001	-.073	-.042
	year2007	-.041	-5.227	< .001	-.056	-.025
	age	.001	7.969	< .001	.001	.002
	interest	.100	9.388	< .001	.079	.120
	income	.065	7.435	< .001	.049	.083
	female	.00002	.004	.997	-.009	.009
warmth	econ_socio	.277	24.252	< .001	.255	.301
	ownpartyin	.231	28.721	< .001	.215	.247
	ownpartyout	-.097	-12.250	< .001	-.112	-.081
	educationprimary	.029	3.764	< .001	.013	.045
	educationsecondary	.032	4.326	< .001	.017	.046
	urbansmalltown	-.006	-.459	.646	-.032	.019
	urbanmidtown	-.012	-.991	.322	-.038	.011
	urbanlargetown	-.002	-.148	.882	-.022	.020
	urbancity	-.011	-1.378	.168	-.026	.004
	year1996	.021	2.328	.020	.004	.038
	year1998	.073	7.239	< .001	.054	.093
	year2001	.018	1.923	.054	-.0001	.037
	year2004	-.075	-7.106	< .001	-.096	-.053
	year2007	-.077	-7.683	< .001	-.097	-.056
	age	.002	8.748	< .001	.001	.002
	interest	.040	3.330	< .001	.016	.062
	income	.035	3.284	.001	.014	.057
	female	.012	2.106	.035	.0004	.022

Appendix H – Model 5: no controls

Table H1. Results from the models without individual level controls

	USA				Australia				Denmark			
	estimates	z	95% CI		estimates	z	95% CI		estimates	z	95% CI	
Competence <– Economy	0.27	22.98	0.24	0.29	0.27	36.75	0.25	0.28	0.27	17.90	0.24	0.30
Warmth <– Economy	0.45	35.73	0.42	0.47	0.42	45.79	0.40	0.43	0.54	27.21	0.50	0.57
Vote <– Competence	0.94	15.36	0.82	1.06	0.92	19.63	0.82	1.01	1.09	10.57	0.87	1.29
Vote <– Warmth	2.13	46.87	2.04	2.22	1.46	50.86	1.41	1.52	1.83	36.28	1.73	1.93
Direct effect	0.84	13.99	0.73	0.95	0.92	23.06	0.84	1.00	0.38	4.02	0.20	0.57
Indirect effect: Competence	0.25	12.81	0.21	0.29	0.25	16.92	0.22	0.27	0.29	9.04	0.23	0.36
Indirect effect: Warmth	0.95	28.51	0.89	1.02	0.61	33.06	0.58	0.65	0.98	21.75	0.90	1.08
Total effect	2.04	29.68	1.91	2.18	1.78	42.83	1.70	1.86	1.65	16.12	1.46	1.87
Prop. Mediated: Competence	12%	13.26	10%	14%	14%	16.69	12%	15%	18%	8.32	14%	22%
Prop. Mediated: Warmth	47%	26.05	43%	50%	34%	30.46	32%	37%	60%	16.11	53%	67%
Contrast	0.70	17.59	0.63	0.78	0.36	14.62	0.32	0.41	0.69	11.67	0.58	0.82

TableH2 - Full SEM model 5 (no controls) in USA (N = 7420)

LHS	RHS	Estimate	z.score	p.value	CI.lower	CI.higher
vote	competence	.935	15.364	< .001	.825	1.065
	warmth	2.128	46.865	< .001	2.035	2.216
	economy	.842	13.995	< .001	.726	.953
	year1988	-.073	-1.685	.092	-.158	.010
	year1992	-.085	-1.894	.058	-.175	.009
	year1996	-.207	-4.711	< .001	-.297	-.124
	year2000	-.224	-4.798	< .001	-.315	-.134
	year2004	.178	4.030	< .001	.093	.267
	year2008	-.015	-.256	.798	-.134	.098
competence	economy	.267	22.981	< .001	.244	.289
	year1988	.017	1.896	.058	-.001	.033
	year1992	.088	9.401	< .001	.070	.108
	year1996	.060	6.596	< .001	.043	.078
	year2000	.021	2.140	.032	.001	.040
	year2004	-.105	-8.518	< .001	-.127	-.080
	year2008	.085	6.692	< .001	.060	.109
warmth	economy	.448	35.732	< .001	.425	.474
	year1988	.050	5.069	< .001	.031	.070
	year1992	.099	9.475	< .001	.079	.121
	year1996	.039	3.513	< .001	.020	.061
	year2000	.018	1.562	.118	-.004	.042
	year2004	.002	.169	.866	-.024	.029
	year2008	.090	6.301	< .001	.061	.118

TableH3 - Full SEM model 5 (no controls) in AUS (N = 16277)

LHS	RHS	Estimate	z.score	p.value	CI.lower	CI.higher
cand_vote	competence	.920	19.635	< .001	.825	1.008
	warmth	1.464	50.862	< .001	1.408	1.525
	econ_socio	.921	23.056	< .001	.841	.999
	year1996	-.454	-11.749	< .001	-.535	-.380
	year1998	-.470	-11.885	< .001	-.548	-.391
	year2001	-.305	-8.385	< .001	-.376	-.235
	year2004	-.321	-8.454	< .001	-.396	-.247
	year2007	-.456	-11.935	< .001	-.534	-.384
	year2010	-.325	-8.766	< .001	-.399	-.252
	year2013	-.304	-9.933	< .001	-.365	-.244
competence	econ_socio	.267	36.752	< .001	.254	.281
	year1996	.003	.396	.692	-.012	.019
	year1998	-.113	-14.638	< .001	-.128	-.097
	year2001	-.088	-11.533	< .001	-.102	-.072
	year2004	-.071	-9.143	< .001	-.087	-.056
	year2007	-.055	-7.323	< .001	-.069	-.039
	year2010	-.055	-7.742	< .001	-.069	-.041
	year2013	-.055	-8.917	< .001	-.067	-.043
warmth	econ_socio	.416	45.785	< .001	.398	.434
	year1996	-.009	-.979	.328	-.027	.010
	year1998	.024	2.588	.010	.005	.042
	year2001	-.010	-1.004	.315	-.029	.009
	year2004	-.111	-10.805	< .001	-.130	-.091
	year2007	-.115	-11.262	< .001	-.133	-.094
	year2010	-.066	-7.388	< .001	-.085	-.049
	year2013	-.132	-17.514	< .001	-.148	-.117

TableH4 - Full SEM model 5 (no controls) in DK (N = 5578)

LHS	RHS	Estimate	z.score	p.value	CI.lower	CI.higher
vote_incumb	competence	1.088	10.573	< .001	.872	1.288
	warmth	1.832	36.281	< .001	1.734	1.933
	econ_socio	.377	4.018	< .001	.199	.567
	year2007	-.073	-2.130	.033	-.142	-.004
competence	econ_socio	.270	17.903	< .001	.239	.298
	year2007	-.031	-5.287	< .001	-.042	-.019
warmth	econ_socio	.538	27.209	< .001	.498	.574
	year2007	-.015	-1.765	.078	-.030	.002

Appendix I – Model 6: latent variables

Table I1. Results from the models without latent variables

	USA				Australia			
	estimates	z	95% CI		estimates	z	95% CI	
Competence <– Economy	0.16	11.17	0.13	0.19	0.16	21.16	0.14	0.17
Warmth <– Economy	0.27	16.56	0.24	0.30	0.25	26.49	0.23	0.27
Vote <– Competence	0.72	3.53	0.31	1.12	0.79	7.24	0.58	1.02
Vote <– Warmth	2.94	15.57	2.58	3.30	0.96	17.35	0.85	1.07
Direct effect	0.52	4.45	0.31	0.78	0.66	10.87	0.54	0.77
Indirect effect: Competence	0.12	3.37	0.05	0.19	0.13	6.93	0.09	0.16
Indirect effect: Warmth	0.79	11.52	0.66	0.93	0.24	14.41	0.21	0.27
Total effect	1.43	12.07	1.22	1.69	1.02	16.87	0.90	1.14
Prop. Mediated: Competence	8%	3.31	3%	13%	12%	6.52	9%	16%
Prop. Mediated: Warmth	55%	9.61	45%	67%	23%	11.54	20%	28%
Contrast	0.67	7.67	0.51	0.85	0.11	3.86	0.05	0.17
CFI	0.99				1.00			
SRMR	0.02				0.01			
RMSEA	0.03				0.01			
Chi^2 (df)	149 (29)	0.00			34 (21)	0.04		

The primary contribution of these models is that by relying on latent variables, they demonstrate that trait impressions (warmth and competence in the US and competence in Australia) remain a significant mediator of the economic vote once measurement error is reduced. But relying on latent variables also frees up degrees of freedom, which allows to estimate model fit in our otherwise saturated models. Table I1 shows several model fit indices. Although the CFI, SRMR and RMSEA estimates indicate acceptable model fit, it is important to note that the Chi-square estimates are statistically significant in both countries (although it is close to the threshold in the Australian case).

Inspection of the modification indices from these models highlight that the main source of misfit are the noisy indicators for warmth and competence. In particular, indicators for one trait (such as compassion of caring for warmth in the US) correlate with indicators of the other trait (e.g. intelligent and knowledgeable for competence). Reassuringly, this limitation of the SEM models is at least partially addressed by the two experimental studies, which rely on much more precisely measured indicators to create stimuli that tease apart the two effects (see also the note on the relative role of the two paths in Appendix K).

TableI2 - Full SEM model 6 (latent variables) in USA (N = 4547)

LHS	RHS	Estimate	z.score	p.value	CI.lower	CI.higher
vote	competence	.720	3.526	< .001	.306	1.117
	warmth	2.939	15.573	< .001	2.584	3.300
	economy	.524	4.452	< .001	.310	.777
	pid_incumb	1.950	20.213	< .001	1.769	2.157
	age	-.002	-1.312	.190	-.005	.001
	income	.044	2.160	.031	.007	.086
	white	.184	2.797	.005	.053	.320
	interest	-.226	-2.950	.003	-.375	-.074
	year1988	-.271	-3.749	< .001	-.414	-.128
	year1992	-.359	-4.500	< .001	-.514	-.190
	year1996	-.399	-5.618	< .001	-.545	-.271
	female	-.009	-.185	.854	-.108	.087
	educationprimary	.027	.204	.838	-.242	.296
	educationsecondary	.054	.878	.380	-.060	.185
	educationsomehigher	.153	2.308	.021	.026	.289
competence	economy	.162	11.172	< .001	.134	.190
	pid_incumb	.209	21.904	< .001	.191	.227
	age	.0004	1.893	.058	0.00000	.001
	income	.004	1.752	.080	-.001	.009

	white	-.003	-.413	.680	-.020	.014
	interest	.025	2.675	.007	.006	.043
	year1988	.011	1.275	.202	-.006	.028
	year1992	.065	6.485	< .001	.046	.086
	year1996	.058	6.415	< .001	.039	.076
	female	.016	2.722	.006	.004	.028
	educationprimary	.044	2.758	.006	.013	.075
	educationsecondary	.056	7.169	< .001	.041	.072
	educationsomehigher	.036	4.394	< .001	.020	.051
warmth	economy	.268	16.558	< .001	.236	.299
	pid_incumb	.423	40.130	< .001	.402	.446
	age	.001	4.242	< .001	.0005	.001
	income	.003	.927	.354	-.003	.008
	white	.025	2.773	.006	.007	.044
	interest	.020	1.921	.055	.001	.041
	year1988	.028	2.854	.004	.008	.047
	year1992	.049	4.812	< .001	.029	.070
	year1996	.026	2.669	.008	.007	.045
	female	.039	5.701	< .001	.026	.052
	educationprimary	.086	4.968	< .001	.052	.120
	educationsecondary	.051	5.921	< .001	.034	.067
	educationsomehigher	.023	2.624	.009	.006	.039

TableI3 - Full SEM model 6 (latent variables) in AUS (N = 14029)

LHS	RHS	Estimate	z.score	p.value	CI.lower	CI.higher
cand_vote	competence	.790	7.237	< .001	.581	1.022
	warmth	.958	17.355	< .001	.846	1.066
	econ_socio	.657	10.868	< .001	.538	.771
	ownpartyin	1.417	40.586	< .001	1.350	1.489
	ownpartyout	-.831	-20.255	< .001	-.918	-.753
	educationprimary	.072	1.844	.065	-.007	.147
	educationsecondary	.086	2.303	.021	.009	.158
	urbansmalltown	.040	.609	.542	-.085	.166
	urbanmidtown	.050	.812	.417	-.071	.173

	urbanlargetown	.132	2.360	.018	.020	.242
	urbancity	.205	4.752	< .001	.127	.292
	year1996	-.541	-8.785	< .001	-.674	-.425
	year1998	-.281	-4.580	< .001	-.404	-.167
	year2001	-.222	-3.714	< .001	-.343	-.105
	year2004	-.274	-4.562	< .001	-.391	-.155
	year2007	-.453	-7.949	< .001	-.561	-.335
	year2010	-.358	-6.556	< .001	-.466	-.245
	year2013	-.481	-9.705	< .001	-.577	-.385
	age	-.002	-2.166	.030	-.004	.00002
	interest	-.137	-2.354	.019	-.265	-.029
	income	-.003	-.051	.960	-.112	.102
	female	-.023	-.811	.417	-.077	.037
competence	econ_socio	.160	21.162	< .001	.144	.174
	ownpartyin	.107	23.262	< .001	.098	.116
	ownpartyout	-.050	-10.490	< .001	-.060	-.041
	educationprimary	-.006	-1.194	.232	-.015	.004
	educationsecondary	.002	.474	.636	-.007	.012
	urbansmalltown	.008	1.049	.294	-.007	.025
	urbanmidtown	.010	1.231	.218	-.006	.025
	urbanlargetown	.005	.731	.465	-.008	.019
	urbancity	.008	1.347	.178	-.004	.019
	year1996	.021	2.780	.005	.007	.036
	year1998	-.083	-10.990	< .001	-.098	-.068
	year2001	-.064	-8.647	< .001	-.078	-.049
	year2004	-.048	-6.229	< .001	-.062	-.032
	year2007	-.034	-4.442	< .001	-.049	-.019
	year2010	-.045	-6.690	< .001	-.059	-.032
	year2013	-.042	-6.716	< .001	-.055	-.030
	age	.001	9.525	< .001	.001	.001
	interest	.093	11.920	< .001	.077	.108
	income	.045	6.705	< .001	.032	.058
	female	.004	1.012	.312	-.004	.011
warmth	econ_socio	.248	26.488	< .001	.230	.265
	ownpartyin	.207	32.931	< .001	.195	.221
	ownpartyout	-.103	-17.069	< .001	-.114	-.091
	educationprimary	.024	3.979	< .001	.012	.036
	educationsecondary	.026	4.427	< .001	.014	.038
	urbansmalltown	-.002	-.158	.874	-.022	.017
	urbanmidtown	.0002	.018	.985	-.020	.020
	urbanlargetown	.005	.558	.577	-.012	.023

urbancity	-.004	-.579	.562	-.017	.010
year1996	.019	2.081	.037	-.001	.036
year1998	.070	7.416	< .001	.052	.089
year2001	.019	2.075	.038	.002	.037
year2004	-.068	-7.124	< .001	-.087	-.049
year2007	-.071	-7.204	< .001	-.091	-.051
year2010	-.042	-4.857	< .001	-.057	-.024
year2013	-.112	-14.760	< .001	-.126	-.097
age	.001	6.334	< .001	.001	.001
interest	.015	1.561	.119	-.004	.034
income	-.003	-.310	.757	-.020	.014
female	.012	2.531	.011	.003	.021

Appendix J – Mediation package

Table J1. Causal mediation estimates from Mediation R package

	USA		Australia		Denmark	
	competence	warmth	competence	warmth	competence	warmth
Total Effect	0.67	0.67	0.60	0.60	0.21	0.21
	[0.63 ; 0.72]	[0.62 ; 0.71]	[0.57 ; 0.62]	[0.57 ; 0.62]	[0.17 ; 0.25]	[0.17 ; 0.26]
Avg. Causal Med. Effect	0.19	0.41	0.15	0.27	0.05	0.12
	[0.16 ; 0.21]	[0.38 ; 0.44]	[0.14 ; 0.16]	[0.26 ; 0.29]	[0.04 ; 0.06]	[0.11 ; 0.14]
Avg. Direct Effect	0.49	0.26	0.45	0.32	0.16	0.09
	[0.45 ; 0.53]	[0.22 ; 0.3]	[0.42 ; 0.48]	[0.3 ; 0.35]	[0.12 ; 0.2]	[0.05 ; 0.13]
Proportion Mediated	0.27	0.61	0.24	0.46	0.24	0.58
	[0.25 ; 0.3]	[0.57 ; 0.65]	[0.23 ; 0.27]	[0.43 ; 0.48]	[0.18 ; 0.32]	[0.47 ; 0.72]
N	6963	6898	14235	14055	5099	5121

Note: Quasi-Bayesian Confidence Intervals are in squared brackets. All estimates are significant at $p < .001$

Appendix K – Experimental materials and additional analyzes related to the mediation hypotheses

Experimental materials

Economy manipulations: Booming (left) & Struggling economy (right)

Prime Minister running for reelection in a booming economy	**Prime Minister running for reelection in a struggling economy**
The country is approaching the elections later in the spring amidst an increasingly **booming** economy. **Careful optimism** has characterized experts' opinions about the economy for most of the Bennett premiership. Key economic indicators such as the gross domestic product (GDP) and unemployment rate have consistently shown signs of a **healthy** economy with **dynamic** growth and a **growing** job market. Last quarter's numbers, published recently suggest that these trends may escalate. In fact, these economic trends had an impact on your personal life too. In the past few years **you bought a new car although your old was still functioning well and you finally went on a long-planned vacation abroad.** Prime Minister Bennett announced his reelection effort very early in the campaign and remains a major candidate, but experts believe his reelection is far from certain.	The country is approaching the elections later in the spring amidst an increasingly **struggling** economy. **Slight pessimism** has characterized experts' opinions about the economy for most of the Bennett premiership. Key economic indicators such as the gross domestic product (GDP) and unemployment rate have consistently shown signs of a **unhealthy** economy with **sluggish** growth and a **struggling** job market. Last quarter's numbers, published recently suggest that these trends may escalate. In fact, these economic trends had an impact on your personal life too. In the past few years, **you could not afford to replace your car even though it is having more and more problems. Neither could you go on a long-planned vacation abroad.** Prime Minister Bennett announced his reelection effort very early in the campaign and remains a major candidate, but experts believe his reelection is far from certain.

Trait treatments

Control condition had no information beyond economy manipulation from above.

Placebo condition (Study 3) is in the first column.

Warmth cue condition is in the second column.

Competence cue condition is in the third column.

Bennett has two serious challengers: John Sullivan and Stanley Smith. Mr. Sullivan is building his campaign primarily around his **pleasant and engaging personality** holding many public rallies and meetings with voters. Meanwhile, Mr. Smith has distinguished himself by being **knowledgeable in a wide range of policy areas**. The apparent contrast between the two challengers has been pointed out by multiple commentators who frequently criticize both candidates for **lacking in qualities** mastered by the other.	The Prime Minister is considered to be a **pleasant and engaging person** who thrives in public rallies and meetings with voters. He has repeatedly showed **concern for the well-being of people**. Close associates anonymously commenting on the daily life of the PM told colorful stories reinforcing impressions of his **helpfulness**. That said, the PM **is less successful when it comes to policy debates and received criticism for lacking good insights in some policy areas**. Your personal impression is that PM Bennett is a **caring leader**.	The Prime Minister is considered to be **a highly competent politician** who thrives in public debates always giving the impression that he is **knowledgeable in a wide range of policy areas**. Close associates anonymously commenting on the daily life of the PM told colorful stories reinforcing impressions of his **savviness and aptitude**. That said, the PM **attended some campaign rallies cold and impatient and received criticism for being more interested in laws and regulations than in helping people.** Your personal impression is that PM Bennett **is among the smartest leaders you have ever seen.**

Dependent variables

How likely would you be to vote for Prime Minister Bennett? 1 not at all likely – 7 very likely.

Using a scale that runs from 1 to 7, where 1 means strongly dislike and 7 means strongly like, how do you feel about Prime Minister Bennett? 1 Strongly dislike – 7 Strongly like

The effect of the economic manipulation on trait impressions in the pilot experiments

The moderation-of-process design employed in Study 2 and 3 offers unbiased causal mediation estimates and hence constitute the most appropriate experimental design for testing the two mediation hypotheses. Yet, the causal relationship between economic perceptions and trait impressions is of interest in its own right. Luckily, the pilot tests designed to ensure that the two trait treatments are symmetrical and do not spill over the other dimension offer an opportunity to test this relationship.

The pilots were conducted on MTurk and followed a procedure similar to the main experiments. Participants were first exposed to one of the eight experimental vignettes (2 – economy: booming or struggling x 4 – no trait cues, irrelevant trait cues, warmth cues, competence cues). Instead of the dependent variable measuring vote choice, however, they were asked to evaluate the candidate on a battery of traits, which were tapping into warmth impressions (trustworthy, warm, dishonest, unfair), or competence impressions (intelligent, qualified, mindless, naïve). The primary goal of these pilots was to ensure that the specific trait treatments have a distinct effect on the specific trait dimension and therefore the economy manipulations were ignored. It is also possible, however to investigate whether the economy manipulation have a causal effect on competence and warmth impressions.

Table K1 reports the marginal effect of the economy manipulation on competence impressions (Models 1-2) and warmth impressions (Models 3-4) for the pooled data and the data excluding the trait treatment conditions, respectively. Results show that participants reading about a booming economy have substantially and significantly higher trait impressions of incumbents than participants reading about a struggling economy. Indeed, this effect is particularly strong in the control and placebo conditions, where participants get no relevant trait cues, and thus infer the incumbent's qualities from the economy. These results further increase our confidence that in line with the ultimate explanation of economic voting outlined in the manuscript, people rely on the

economy to form trait impressions of the incumbent political leader. That said, future research should further investigate the robustness of these causal relationships with alternative designs and methods.

Table K1. Economy's effect on trait impressions

	Dependent variable:			
	Competence impressions		Warmth impressions	
	Pooled data	Control & Placebo	Pooled data	Control & Placebo
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Booming economy	0.177***	0.212***	0.125***	0.170***
	(0.023)	(0.033)	(0.022)	(0.030)
Constant	0.593***	0.541***	0.564***	0.497***
	(0.016)	(0.024)	(0.016)	(0.022)
Observations	240	118	240	118
Adjusted R^2	0.195	0.259	0.115	0.214

Note: ***p<0.001

A note on the relative role of the warmth and competence paths

There is an interesting difference between Study 1 and the two experimental studies considering the relative mediating role of warmth and competence impressions. Whereas Study 1 finds consistently and significantly stronger effects for warmth, the experiments find no significant difference between the two paths. What could explain these findings? On the one hand, Study 2 and 3 necessarily ignored factors that may influence the weight of the two causal mechanisms. One example is variation in partisan identity of the leader and the followers. In real life, coalitional (de)alignment may increase the salience of warmth. Another limitation of Study 2 and 3 is their focus on positive manipulations of both traits. Unsurprisingly, the average trait impressions of the incumbent in the control and placebo groups (without providing any information about their traits) were relatively high, which were further increased by the manipulations. It is plausible that the effect of trait impressions on vote is non-linear and that people are particularly sensitive to low warmth. Accordingly, the experiment might have ignored the condition when warmth matters the most (CF Fiske et al., 2007). On the other hand, it is also plausible that warmth impressions are more endogenous with vote choice than competence, and therefore in Study 1 they picked up most of the variance due to motivated reasoning. Another well-known limitation of observational data on candidate trait impressions concerns the noisiness of indicators. Whereas warmth and competence

are conceptually distinct, they are substantially correlated in most election studies. Accordingly, estimates from Studies 2 and 3 may offer more accurate results, as they experimentally separated the effect of warmth and competence. Future research should investigate if any of these can explain the differences between the observational and the experimental data.

Appendix L – Additional analyzes exploring potential experimenter demand effects

Justification of the post-experimental inquiry

This section argues that even though post-experimental inquiries have been criticized as a tool for uncovering experimenter demand effects in laboratory experiments[1], they may prove more effective in the present context. Put briefly, short, double-blind survey experiments conducted online provide ideal conditions for a post-experimental inquiry to reveal experimenter demands. Next, I review the methodological concerns one-by-one following Zizzo's excellent review of the subject matter (2010, 93):

1. "Subjects may be aware 'that they ought not to catch on some aspects of the experimental procedure' and, if they reveal they do, 'their data cannot be used.'"
   Participants in Study 3 are offered a financial incentive (a bonus) if they correctly guess "what experimenters expected to find". I believe by offering such a financial incentive to reveal their understanding of the experimental procedure, participants can be effectively convinced that a) the experimenter has a genuine interest in their honest answers; b) participants self-interest propels them to ignore any remaining concerns and try to earn more money.
2. "Post-experimental inquiries are not incentivized."
   Again, the post-experimental inquiry in Study 3 was incentivized. This is made easy and relatively cheap by relying on MTurk's infrastructure to offer bonuses to participants beyond their normal pay.
3. "As they come at the end of the experiment, subject will typically be demotivated, possibly tired and simply wishing to get paid and leave the room."
   Although fatigue is a serious concern in laboratory experiments, it is much less pronounced in online survey experiments. Unlike in lab experiments, people participate in studies, taking as many tasks and breaks as they wish. Moreover, Study 3 is rather short (under 10 minutes)

[1] Zizzo, Daniel John. 2010. Experimenter Demand Effects in Economic Experiments. Experimental Economics 13:75–98.

and is not cognitively demanding (especially compared to most laboratory experiments). In short, there is little reason to believe that participants are demotivated or tired when they are invited in the post-experimental inquiry.

4. "Subjects directly provide feedback to the experimenter in providing responses." Perhaps the biggest benefit of online survey experiments is that they considerably reduce social demands by the double-blind nature of the design. Participants never meet the experimenter, nor are they exposed to too many cues about their identity, goal or even humanity. Participants are aware that for all practical purposes they remain anonymous, identified only by their worker ID, a long string of random characters. Thereby, the experimenter would be unable to influence participants during or after the inquiry, even if he or she wanted to do so.

Beyond the aforementioned methodological concerns, Zizzo (2010, 93) also raises a more fundamental issue: "Post-experimental debriefing also suffers from the frequent dissociation between explicit cognitive mechanisms and implicit cognitive mechanisms." In other words, some participants may experience "cognitive demand effects", which may influence participants without their conscious awareness and which therefore could not be revealed in a post-experimental inquiry. Such a cognitive task-construal is defined as "identifying the task at hand and behaving accordingly, by employing cues about what constitutes behavior that is appropriate to the task. This sensitivity to the cues provided may work through unconscious cognitive mechanisms: there is no reason for subjects to be explicitly aware of it" (ibid, 78). It is important to note here, however, that there are fundamental differences between experimental inquiries in economics and psychology. Whereas cognitive mechanisms triggered by various cues may be a nuisance for economics, they are the explicit subjects of inquiry in a psychological study like this.

Supplementary information on the coding of open-ended responses

Two research assistants blind to the study's goal and the experimental materials hand-coded all open-ended responses.[2] In the first round of coding, they were instructed to note whether a response contains references to the economy, to traits (both broadly defined), or to any other factor, which was allegedly being studied. The coders also marked whether the comment made a relational or conditional statement if it mentioned more than one factors. This latter category differentiates responses simply listing multiple factors from those, which make (potentially more interesting) statements about the relative importance or conditional relevance of factors. Table M1 reports interrater reliabilities for all categories. The reliability is good for each category except for

[2] The coding schemes are shared at the paper's OSF repository.

other. Whereas for *economy*, *trait* and *relational* categories a response was considered relevant if both raters agreed that it belongs to the given category, for *other* category all responses marked at least by one of the raters were considered in the analyses. The latter rule provides a more conservative test, although given the neutrality of the other category for the present analysis, it does not make a big difference.

Table L1. Interrater reliability and descriptives of open-ended responses

		Alpha	Mean	SD	N
Round 1	Economy	0.92	0.34	0.46	499
	Trait	0.83	0.33	0.43	499
	Other	0.47	0.15	0.29	499
	Relational	0.85	0.22	0.39	499
Round 2	Statement in Control groups	0.87	0.15	0.33	69
	Statement in Treatment groups	1	0.09	0.29	34

A second round of coding aimed to differentiate between responses, which indicated a reasonable research topic from those, which spelled out a hypothesis, which was believed to be tested. Here the inquiry was limited to responses, which mentioned the economy in the control and placebo conditions and those, which mention both the economy, trait and make a relational statement in the trait treatment conditions. Again, the ratings showed high interrater reliability (Table L1).

The analysis of closed-ended post-experimental inquiry question

Beyond the open-ended question analyzed in the manuscript, the post-experimental inquiry also included an additional closed-ended question. Such a question substantially reduces the cognitive resources required to guess the experimental objective and thus offers an opportunity to perform a conservative robustness check. This comes at a price, however: such a closed-ended question conflates perceiving experimenter demands with paying close attention to the experiment. Participants may select answers positively correlating with the true experimental objective because a) they made the same guess on their own during the experiment or b) because they paid close attention to the materials and thus could rule out most if not all alternative options. In other words, strictly speaking, making a guess in a closed-ended format is a much weaker signal for having made the same guess during the experiment than formulating the guess in an open-ended format. It is worth repeating that making a guess about the experimental objective is a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for engaging in demand-like behavior. These inquiries are better equipped to identify who did not engage in demand-like behavior than to identify who did.

Another benefit of the closed-ended question is that it lends itself easily to the analysis of negative experimenter demand effects. Whereas the hand-coding of the open-ended answers focused on positive demand effects (which may yield to false positives), it is equally if not more likely that the present design suffers from negative demand effects. In particular, because a large part of the stimulus was discussing the state of the economy, participants in the trait treatment groups could think that the experimenters were interested in finding an effect for the economy. Indeed, because the design predicts an interaction between economic and trait cues, even participants who thought that the experimenter seeks to find an (additive) effect for both could have engaged in behavior, which increases the likelihood of false negatives.

To investigate these possibilities, first I recoded each answer to reflect the relationship between the guessed and the true experimental objective, conditional on the experimental group (see Table L2 for an overview of the coding). In particular, guesses which inflate the economy manipulation's baseline effect in the control conditions or deflate it in the trait treatment conditions were coded as a positive answer. Conversely, guesses that deflate the baseline economy effect in the control condition or inflate it in the treatment conditions were coded as a negative answer. Finally, all the remaining answers were marked as neutral for being orthogonal to the true experimental objectives.

Table L2. Correlation between guessed and true experimental objectives

	Control conditions	Trait treatments
primarily depends on how well the economy is doing.	+	–
primarily depends on how good their personal qualities are.	0	+
depends both on the economy and their personal qualities.	0	–
is independent of how well the economy is doing.	–	+
is independent of how good or bad their personal qualities are.	0	–
depends more on how well the economy is doing if the PM is male rather than female.	0	0
depends both on their own and their challenger's personal qualities.	0	0

Note: Participants were asked the following question: "If you had to guess, which of the following options captures best what the researchers conducting this study expected to find?"

Table L3. Proportion of guessed objectives across experimental conditions

	positive	negative	neutral
Control	61%	6%	33%
Competent	21%	73%	6%
Warm	30%	59%	11%

Table M3 offers an overview of the distribution of guessed experimental objectives across three experimental conditions.[3] It shows that whereas in the control condition two out of three respondents made a guess which correlates positively with the true objectives, a similar proportion of participants made a guess which negatively correlates with the objectives in the two treatment groups.

Table L4. Robustness checks with closed-ended EDE inquiry

	Dependent variable:	
	Vote	
	All data	No EDE
	(1)	(2)
Booming economy	0.458***	0.320***
	(0.035)	(0.061)
Competent	0.286***	0.314**
	(0.035)	(0.120)
Warm	0.236***	0.201**
	(0.035)	(0.096)
Booming economy * Competent	-0.255***	-0.472***
	(0.050)	(0.155)
Booming economy * Warm	-0.175***	-0.179
	(0.050)	(0.121)
Constant	0.250***	0.394***
	(0.025)	(0.047)
Observations	499	83
Adjusted R^2	0.389	0.257
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

[3] These analyses combine the control and placebo conditions to create three groups of equal size and thus to improve the power of the tests reported.

Finally, I test the experimental effects on participants, who gave a neutral answer to the closed-ended inquiry question (Table L4). Importantly, this reduces the sample to a mere 83 participants, therefore the test becomes underpowered. Yet, as Table L3 attests, the results (Model 2) look reassuringly consistent with the original model (Model 1). The economy has a large and significant effect in the control group ($b = 0.32$, $p < 0.001$), which is substantially reduced by the competence cues ($b = -0.47$, $p < 0.01$)[4] and the warmth cues ($b = -0.18$, $p = 0.14$). Although the latter coefficient is not statistically significant, the point estimate is almost identical to the original estimate.

To sum up, this analysis shows that the present design leads many participants to believe that the experimenters are interested in the effect of the economy on vote. Whereas this could potentially inflate the estimates of the baseline economy effect, it is just as likely to inflate it in the trait treatment groups. In other words, it appears unlikely that the attenuation in the economy effect is due to experimenter demand effects. Consistent with these arguments, the predicted interactions are present even among the very few participants, whose guesses are orthogonal with the true experimental objectives.

[4] Although it may seem that the economy manipulation had a negative effect in the competence treatment group, this estimate is not statistically significant from zero.