

ETHICS TUTORIALS

Please email your essay to me and your tutorial partner **24 hours in advance of your tutorial**.

I will read and comment on your essays, and please read your tutorial partner's essays before the tutorial. If you don't send your essay by 24 hours in advance, you'll need to read your essay out at the beginning of the tutorial (this is not a punishment; it's just the tutorial group needs to know the content of your essay for the discussion).

You should also come to the tutorial with at least one question about your tutorial partner's essay. That could be, among other things, a request for clarification on a key issue, or a possible counterargument or counterexample, or a suggested fix or modification for an argument. You should also feel free come to the tutorial with questions to ask which you might not have covered in your essay.

One of the key things you'll have been doing in your philosophy tutorials so far, and which you'll continue to do in these tutorials, is learning how to write a philosophy essay. If you're interested, I've written a set of writing tips (aimed at 1st years taking General Philosophy tutorials), which you can find [here](#).

Questions and Readings

B=Background Reading E=Essential Reading F=Further Reading

Section One: Ethical Theories

Week 1. Consequentialism and Friendship

Question: Can a good consequentialist be a good friend?

- B. Krister Bykvist. 2010. [Utilitarianism: A Guide for the Perplexed](#) (Continuum): 16-22; 106-10.
- E. Peter Railton. 1984. "[Alienation, Consequentialism, and the Demands of Morality](#)." *Philosophy & Public Affairs* 13 (2): 134-171.
- E. Dean Cocking and Justin Oakley. 1995. "[Indirect Consequentialism, Friendship, and the Problem of Alienation](#)." *Ethics* 106 (1): 86-111.
- E. Elinor Mason. 1998. "[Can an Indirect Consequentialist Be a Real Friend?](#)" *Ethics* 108 (2): 386-393.
- F. Michael Stocker. 1976. "[The Schizophrenia of Modern Ethical Theories](#)." *The Journal of Philosophy* 73 (14): 453-466.

Week 2. Kantianism and Acting from Duty

Question: Is there anything wrong with acting from the motive of duty?

- B. Onora O'Neill. 1993. "Kantian Ethics." In Peter Singer (ed.) [A Companion to Ethics](#) (Wiley-Blackwell): 175-85.
- E. Immanuel Kant. 1785. [Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals](#). Translated and edited

- by Mary Gregor (CUP, 1998): sec I.
- E. Bernard Williams. 1976. "[Persons, character, and morality](#)." In *Moral Luck* (CUP, 1981): 1-19.

NB. *This paper and Stocker's from last week include discussion of what have become the canonical examples alleged to illustrate the repugnance of acting from duty. Neither paper focuses centrally on acting from duty, so you only need to focus on these examples (17-18 in the Williams; 462 in the Stocker).*

- E. Marcia Baron. 1984. "[The Alleged Moral Repugnance of Acting from Duty](#)." *The Journal of Philosophy* 81 (4): 197-220.
- F. Barbara Herman. 1981. "[On the Value of Acting from the Motive of Duty](#)." *The Philosophical Review* 90 (3): 359-382.

Week 3. Virtue Ethics

Question: Can virtue ethics provide a credible criterion of right action? Should it?

- B. Roger Crisp. 1998. "[Modern Moral Philosophy and the Virtues](#)." Introduction to his (ed.) *How Should One Live?: Essays on the Virtues* (OUP): 1-18.
- E. Aristotle. [Nicomachean Ethics](#), translated and edited by Roger Crisp (CUP, 2000): 2.1-9 (i.e. bk. 2, chs. 1-9); 6.1-7, 6.12-13.
- E. G. E. M. Anscombe. "[Modern Moral Philosophy](#)." *Philosophy* 33 (124): 1-19.
- E. Rosalind Hursthouse. 1998. "[Normative Virtue Ethics](#)." In Roger Crisp (ed.) *How Should One Live?: Essays on the Virtues* (OUP): 19-36.
- F. Julia Driver. 2006. "Virtue Theory." In James Dreier (ed.) [Contemporary Debates in Moral Theory](#) (Blackwell): 113-123.

Week 4. Theories of Well-Being

Question: What makes someone's life go well?

- B. Guy Fletcher. 2016. [The Philosophy of Well-Being](#) (Routledge): chs. 1-3 (excluding appendix to ch. 3).
- E. Aristotle. [Nicomachean Ethics](#): 1.1-13; 10.6-8.
- E. Derek Parfit. 1984. *Reasons and Persons* (OUP): [appendix I](#), 493-502.
- F. Roger Crisp. 2006. "[Hedonism Reconsidered](#)." *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 73 (3): 619-645.
- F. Stephen Darwall. 2004. [Welfare and Rational Care](#) (Princeton): ch. 2.

Section Two: Metaethics

Week 5. Moral Realism: Evolutionary Challenges

Question: Should the fact that we evolved make us doubt that things really are good or bad?

- B. Jonas Olson. 2013. "[Metaethics](#)." In Hugh LaFollette (ed.) *The International Encyclopedia of Ethics* (Wiley-Blackwell): esp. 5-9.
- E. Sharon Street. 2006. "[A Darwinian Dilemma for Realist Theories of Value](#)." *Philosophical Studies* 127 (1): 109-166.

And at least one of the following three responses to Street:

- F. David Copp. 2008. "[Darwinian Scepticism about Moral Realism](#)." *Philosophical*

- Issues* 18 (1): 186–206.
- F. Erik J. Wielenberg. 2010. "[On the Evolutionary Debunking of Morality](#)." *Ethics* 120 (3): 441–464.
- F. Louise Hanson. 2017. "[The Real Problem with Evolutionary Debunking Arguments](#)" *The Philosophical Quarterly* 67 (268): 508–33.

Week 6. Moral Non-Cognitivism: Semantic Challenges

Question: "[I]f I utter with full conviction the sentence, 'If gambling is bad, inviting people to gamble is bad', I do not thereby condemn either gambling or invitations to gamble" (Geach, "Ascriptivism"). Is this claim consistent with moral non-cognitivism?

- B. Jonas Olson. 2013. "[Metaethics](#)." In Hugh LaFollette (ed.) *The International Encyclopedia of Ethics* (Wiley-Blackwell): esp. 2–5.
- E. A. J. Ayer. 1946. *Language, Truth and Logic*, 2nd ed. (Dover): ch. 6 (pp. 102–12 only)
- E. Peter Geach. 1965. "[Assertion](#)." *The Philosophical Review* 74 (4): 449–465.
- E. Mark Schroeder. 2008. "[What is the Frege-Geach Problem?](#)" *Philosophy Compass* 3 (4): 703–720.
- F. Simon Blackburn. 1984. *Spreading the Word* (OUP): ch. 6, esp. sec 2.
- F. Mark van Roojen. 1996. "[Expressivism and Irrationality](#)." *The Philosophical Review* 105 (3): 311–335.

Section Three: Practical Ethics

Week 7. Abortion

Question: Is abortion morally permissible? Is this question settled by the question of whether a foetus is a person?

- B. Susan Dwyer. 2013. "[Abortion](#)." In Hugh LaFollette (ed.) *The International Encyclopedia of Ethics* (Wiley-Blackwell):
- E. Judith Jarvis Thomson. 1971. "[A Defense of Abortion](#)." *Philosophy & Public Affairs*, 1 (1): 47–66.
- E. Mary Anne Warren 1973. "[On the Moral and Legal Status of Abortion](#)." *The Monist* 57 (1): 43–61.
- F. Don Marquis. 1989. "[Why Abortion is Immoral](#)." *The Journal of Philosophy* 86 (4): 183–202.
- F. Ann E. Cudd. 1990. "[Sensationalized Philosophy: A Reply to Marquis's 'Why Abortion is Immoral'](#)." *The Journal of Philosophy* 87 (5): 262–264.

Week 8. Animal Ethics

Question: Is it permissible to do things to animals which it wouldn't be permissible to do to humans? If so, why? If not, why not?

- B. Lori Gruen. "[The Moral Status of Animals](#)." *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*: section 1.
- E. Peter Singer. 1975. *Animal Liberation* (Pimlico): chapter 1.
- E. Cora Diamond. 1978. "[Eating Meat and Eating People](#)." *Philosophy* 53 (206): 465–

- 479.
- F. Shelly Kagan. 2016. "[What's Wrong with Speciesism?](#)" *Journal of Applied Philosophy* 33 (1): 1-21.
- F. Jeff McMahan. 2008. "[Eating Animals the Nice Way.](#)" *Daedalus* 137 (1): 66-76.