

# CleanINTERNET<sup>®</sup> Service Report

April 10<sup>th</sup>, 2020

REPORT PREPARED FOR: Traffic Observed Circumventing Palo Alto Firewall

REPORTING PERIOD: March 19<sup>th</sup> – April 10<sup>th</sup>

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TURNING INTELLIGENCE INTO ACTION

# Summary

The data behind this report was collected from **Monday, March 16<sup>th</sup> through Friday, April 10<sup>th</sup>, 2020** across the RuleGATE® protected location(s). The report reflects continuously updated risk models and policy tuning to maximize protection through the network shielding function. This is an interim weekly report. The individual events of interest which are specifically analyzed below represent a small subset (<1%) of the total collected threat data and are intended to provide insight on samples with actionable recommendations along with context.

CleanINTERNET service leverages the expertise of thousands of security analysts worldwide by harnessing their work-product: threat intelligence. The insight provided through our intelligence sources is massive and enables our ability to provide both automatic Shielding and Advanced Threat Detection on your behalf. The findings identified herein do not represent a deficiency of your security teams, but rather a deficiency of conventional security tools. This level of protection and visibility is only possible due to the RuleGATE filter technology and the real-time threat intelligence provided by up to 88 partners, 3,000+ risk-specialized feeds, and over 6 billion unique indicators of compromise.

## OPERATIONAL NOTES

- This report with supporting data is located on the CleanINTERNET customer portal located at <https://portal.centripetalnetworks.com>
- Each highlighted event of interest has a corresponding EventID which you can use to identify the event in QuickTHREAT® analytics within the CleanINTERNET cloud portal at [www.quickthreat.com](http://www.quickthreat.com)
- The RuleGATE enables packet capture for each event for full traffic analysis. For data security this requires retrieval directly from the RuleGATE. Please contact us if you need assistance with the retrieval of the PCAP which is currently disabled in your environment.

## ONGOING RECOMMENDATIONS

- Commence the CleanInternet service to start maximizing your Shielding posture to eliminate unneeded cyber risks and the workload associated with them.
- Evaluate the Advanced Threat Detection events presented in the report and provide feedback to your Centripetal SOC team to aid in investigation, risk profiling, and policy tuning. Please contact us if you need assistance.

## ATD Event — Possible Brute Force Login against Enterprise Remote Access System

### Classification:

Possible Exploitation

### Matching Policies:

BDE-blocklist\_de-ip

### Observed Risk:

**HIGH**

### Notable EventID:

97EA0AD289

### Client IP:

[redacted]

### Trigger:

183.95.84.150

On **April 6<sup>th</sup>, 2020** between **03:39:23.900 UTC** and **05:15:07.600 UTC** the RuleGATE identified 14 allowed inbound events from the triggering IP to the client IP. These events were observed establishing a full TCP connection and were seen transferring anywhere from **111 to 361 packets per event, indicating that an authenticated session existed**. Unsuccessful SSH brute forcing events are expected to have less than 20 packets, as SSH servers terminate connections after three invalid logins. The extended packet counts, and matching threat intelligence are suspicious and deserve further investigation.

The triggering IP is **well known for brute forcing attacks across the Internet** (Figs. 1 & 2). There are reports on AbuseIPDB as recent as three hours ago stating that this IP is continuing to brute force connections. The combination of suspicious packet counts and known intelligence for the triggering IP suggests that there may have been unauthorized SSH logins.




Fig 1 | Recorded Future analysis of the triggering IP




Fig 2 | AbuseIPDB analysis of the triggering IP

**CENTRIPETAL RECOMMENDATIONS** | Promote the matching policy to shielding. Check authentication logs for unauthorized logins. Change passwords for compromised accounts.

## ATD Event — TOR Traffic Identified

### Classification:

TOR  
Bad Web Traffic  
Potential Infection (TorBot)

### Matching Policies:

TOR-Active\_Relays\_24\_Hours-md

### Observed Risk:

**HIGH**

### Notable EventID:

97E9C7A570

### Client IPs:

XX.XX.XX.XX

### Trigger:

95.216.118.16:4223  
46.28.207.107:443  
46.166.185.53:22

Starting at 11:59am on Thursday March 12<sup>th</sup> and continuing until the last event on Friday March 13<sup>th</sup> at 7:57pm, the RuleGATE observed **49 events of bi-directional traffic** from the listed client IPs to the listed TCP socket combinations. Analysis of the TCP handshakes as well as domain information in the event show **full sessions were established**. The triggering IPs are known to be active TOR relays within 24 hours of detection, which Centripetal has verified against at least one other list (Fig 1). When inspected in VirusTotal the triggering IPs have **several recent records** of malicious Windows executables communicating, including generic **trojan downloaders** and **Win32/TorBot**.

TOR is frequently abused by malicious actors to perform command and control functions, and by users inside the enterprise to circumvent web content filtering and other security measures. It is **typically prohibited in enterprise environments**.

The screenshot shows the 'Relay Search' interface on TorProject.org. The search bar at the top contains the IP address '46.166.185.53'. Below the search bar, the details for a relay named 'matcha' are displayed. The 'Configuration' section shows the nickname 'matcha' and the OR addresses, with '46.166.185.53:22' highlighted. The 'Properties' section shows the fingerprint '349257D1A068B3EDCBF6E1DD45B077C1020436EF', the uptime '94 days 5 hours 11 minutes and 36 seconds', and various flags including 'Fast', 'Guard', 'HSDir', 'Running', 'Stable', 'V2Dir', and 'Valid'.

Fig 1 | Relay Verified at TorProject.org

| Day       | Time (EST) | Source IP  | Dest. IP      | Port | Domain                          |
|-----------|------------|------------|---------------|------|---------------------------------|
| 3/12/2020 | 11:59:29   | [Redacted] | 46.28.207.107 | 443  | www.xxvzaulovgbc4k3.com         |
| 3/12/2020 | 12:52:29   | [Redacted] | 95.216.118.16 | 4223 | www.5pstkid7bsrksxd.com         |
| 3/12/2020 | 14:35:29   | [Redacted] | 46.28.207.107 | 443  | www.36fucus62nqyose7gl2g3e.com  |
| 3/12/2020 | 16:05:29   | [Redacted] | 95.216.118.16 | 4223 | www.e4yttwols.com               |
| 3/12/2020 | 17:24:29   | [Redacted] | 95.216.118.16 | 4223 | www.5x6zib7pvo5m.com            |
| 3/12/2020 | 19:29:29   | [Redacted] | 46.28.207.107 | 443  | www.2vb7qrj.com                 |
| 3/12/2020 | 20:08:35   | [Redacted] | 46.166.185.53 | 22   | www.hol4vrnzdo.com              |
| 3/12/2020 | 20:09:29   | [Redacted] | 46.28.207.107 | 443  | www.kjepi27kg25rh4.com          |
| 3/12/2020 | 20:50:29   | [Redacted] | 95.216.118.16 | 4223 | www.tmia5sj2ey45ibd2sf7p2eh.com |
| 3/12/2020 | 22:24:29   | [Redacted] | 46.166.185.53 | 22   | www.s7qcm.com                   |

Table 1 | Top 10 Domains Recorded

**CENTRIPETAL RECOMMENDATIONS** | Promote the matching policy to Shielding. Identify the internal host and run a full AV scan.

## ATD Event — Internal Hosts Participating in Possible Botnet C2

### Classification:

Command and Control  
Potential Botnet Infection

### Matching Policies:

ThreatSTOP-BOTNET2E\_block-ip  
XF-Bots\_Block-ip  
14 Others

### Observed Risk:

**HIGH**

### Notable EventID:

97E9CE91C9  
97E9C91345

### Client IPs:

10.59.82.162  
10.64.28.9  
10.76.89.1  
10.76.89.2  
10.76.89.3  
10.76.89.5  
10.76.89.7

### Trigger:

95.171.210.66:26881  
584 Other Unique IPs

Since installation, the RuleGATE has observed 5,371 events of unsolicited outbound traffic on **TCP and UDP ports 26881 and 26882** which fits the profile for ZBot C2. This communication occurs to **known botnet hosts** in seventeen threat intelligence feeds and forty-eight different countries including Tanzania, Niger, Vietnam, Venezuela and others. The triggering IPs are in threat intelligence for observed botnet activity such as service scanning, SSH brute forcing, and emitting spam. Approximately **85% of all outbound TCP communications** are blocked by the client firewall; one of these blocked hosts Centripetal identified as a **compromised HikVision DVR** (See red trigger in table 1). **Successfully established sessions were detected by Geo only**, with the triggering IPs not being in any sort of threat intelligence, blacklists, or public abuse reports.

### RESULTS OF LOOKUP

**119.250.88.202 is listed**

This IP address was detected and listed 2 times in the past 28 days, and 1 times in the past 24 hours. The most recent detection was at Wed Mar 18 05:05:00 2020 UTC +/- 5 minutes

This IP is infected with Hajime, Wopbot, Mirai or similar malware, primarily used for DDOS attacks via IoT devices. See [Mirai: The IoT Bot That Took Down Krebs and Launched a Tbps DDoS Attack on OVH](#) for more information.

Fig 1 | Botnet Tracking from Spamhaus CBL for triggering IP

| Trigger         | Blacklists | Abuse Reports | Known Botnet | Event Count |
|-----------------|------------|---------------|--------------|-------------|
| 124.236.56.233  | 4          | 11            | Yes          | 11          |
| 221.194.160.35  | 3          | 4             | Yes          | 9           |
| 119.250.88.202  | 3          | 12            | Yes          | 8           |
| 101.20.221.136  | 2          | 10            | Yes          | 7           |
| 101.230.193.200 | 2          | 6 (aged)      | Yes          | 7           |
| 103.17.213.98   | 5          | 179           | Yes          | 7           |
| 113.160.117.28  | 6          | 1             | Yes          | 7           |
| 117.187.12.126  | 5          | 1,922         | Yes          | 7           |
| 125.234.116.6   | 2          | 0             | No           | 7           |
| 49.231.5.82     | 0          | 1             | No           | 7           |

Table 1 | Threat Intelligence Stats for Top 10 Destination IPs Port 26881 and 26882 Traffic

**CENTRIPETAL RECOMMENDATIONS** | Promote the matching policy to Shielding. Allow Centripetal to pull PCAP, if available. Identify the internal host and run a full AV scan.

## ATD Event —Partial Indicator Identifies Potential Ransomware

### Classification:

Potential Ransomware  
Command and Control

### Matching Policies:

ET-CnC\_Block-fqdn

### Observed Risk:

**HIGH**

### Notable EventIDs:

97E9EDB0B8  
97E9EDB0B9

### Client IPs:

10.56.92.11

### Trigger:

IPLogger[.]org

On **Thursday March 26<sup>th</sup> at 10:51:26.400am EST**, the RuleGATE observed an outbound session between the listed client IP and triggering domain on TCP port 443. This traffic represents an aberration against the site baseline as this service has **never been previously contacted**. The triggering domain is listed by threat intelligence partner Emerging Threats as being observed in **IDS hits for several ransomware family C2 activity**. Pivoting to other intelligence shows that **Recorded Future's threat hunting group, Insikt, released a flash report** based on research from ThreatPost and LastLine Security which also lists the triggering domain as an IoC for a new variant of Paradise Ransomware's C2<sup>[1, 2]</sup>.

| IDS Events      |    |         |    |   |                           |             |    |            |      |
|-----------------|----|---------|----|---|---------------------------|-------------|----|------------|------|
| Showing 30 days |    |         |    |   | 11 Signature Events found |             |    |            |      |
| Last Seen       | ↓↑ | SID     | ↑↓ | Signature   | ↑↓                        | Src/Dst     | ↑↓ | Categories | ↑↓   |
| 2020-03-30      |    | 2029299 |    | ET POLICY HTTP Request to IP Logging Service (2no .co)            |                           | Destination |    | IPCheck    | 65   |
| 2020-03-30      |    | 2027446 |    | ET TROJAN Buran Ransomware Activity M1                            |                           | Destination |    | CnC        | 1    |
| 2020-03-30      |    | 2828706 |    | ETPRO POLICY IP Check Domain (iplogger .org in TLS SNI)           |                           | Destination |    | IPCheck    | 3615 |
| 2020-03-30      |    | 2839361 |    | ETPRO TROJAN Buran Ransomware Activity M3                         |                           | Destination |    | CnC        | 70   |
| 2020-03-30      |    | 2829079 |    | ETPRO POLICY HTTP Request to iplogger .ru for External IP Address |                           | Destination |    | IPCheck    | 9    |
| 2020-03-30      |    | 2027443 |    | ET TROJAN Observed Buran Ransomware UA (BURAN)                    |                           | Destination |    | CnC        | 1    |
| 2020-03-29      |    | 2836146 |    | ETPRO TROJAN Suspicious Computer Name in User-Agent               |                           | Destination |    | CnC        | 115  |
| 2020-03-18      |    | 2026897 |    | ET POLICY IP Logger Redirect Domain in SNI                        |                           | Destination |    | IPCheck    | 2    |
| 2020-03-15      |    | 2028966 |    | ET TROJAN Win32/AnteFrigus Ransomware Activity                    |                           | Destination |    | CnC        | 4    |
| 2020-03-14      |    | 2029306 |    | ET TROJAN Observed Thanatos Ransomware Variant Pico User-Agent    |                           | Destination |    | CnC        | 1    |
| 2020-03-12      |    | 2029064 |    | ET TROJAN Legion Loader Activity Observed (suspira)               |                           | Destination |    | CnC        | 4    |

Fig 1 | ET IDS Hits for Triggering Domain

Fig 2 | Saint Security observations for Triggering Domain

|                       |                  |                                   |                                |  |                                     |
|-----------------------|------------------|-----------------------------------|--------------------------------|--|-------------------------------------|
| Malicious URL History | IP Usage History | Malicious Sample Download History | Normal Sample Download History | Malicious Sample Communication History | Normal Sample Communication History |
| 1,154                 | 2                | 18                                | 61                             | 855                                    | 192                                 |

**CENTRIPETAL RECOMMENDATIONS** | Promote the matching policy to Shielding. Identify the internal host and run a full AV scan.

[1] <https://www.lastline.com/labsblog/iqy-files-and-paradise-ransomware/>

[2] <https://threatpost.com/variant-of-paradise-ransomware-targets-office-iqy-files/153559/>

## ATD Event — Observed BitTorrent Activity

### Classification:

Brute Forcing  
Reconnaissance

### Matching Policies:

Emerging Threats P2P Block IP

### Observed Risk:

**HIGH**

### Last EventIDs:

97E9D961AF

### Client IP:

10.46.21.25  
10.56.82.2  
10.56.12.5  
10.56.11.1

### Trigger:

188.241.58.209  
102.68.77.114  
41.50.49.154  
and 189 more

Between 2:19pm and 3:27pm EST on Thursday, March 19<sup>th</sup> the RuleGATE identified 27,294 allowed outbound events from the Client IPs to the triggering IPs. The triggering IPs are known as Peer to Peer hosts and are geo-located in **Romania, South Africa, and Kenya**. The activity was observed communicating on several different ports, with **6969 and 6881 being the most prominent**. Counter intel and open source research show that these triggering IPs are well-known for hosting BitTorrent activity (Fig. 1). Additionally, this activity showed a significant spike in event volume over this hour-long period, indicating unusual or anomalous activity (Fig. 2). **Over 97% of the traffic came from host 10.46.21.25**, while the rest of the hosts were observed only with a handful of events.

## tracker.leechers-paradise.org - an open and free tracker

udp://tracker.leechers-paradise.org:6969/announce

Things you should know:

- We don't keep logs. Internet Protocol addresses are not recorded in any way.
- Random IP addresses are inserted into the peer list.
- We do not have any file content, we are not a bittorrent site, we don't have any torrent files.
- You cannot upload or download anything from here, only scrape.
- The tracker solely responds via UDP. Any client MUST support at least BEP:15. Any client SHOULD respect BEP:34.
- The tracker does not allow for the blacklisting (or whitelisting) of hashes.
- We do not know what is being tracked. Do not ask us, ask the tracker.
- We do not host any data associated with the tracker, so do not send any DMCA notice.
- If you would like to stop some data from being tracked, send a DMCA notice to the domain hosting the .torrent file. We don't host .torrent files.
- If the tracker is broken, it will be fixed eventually. We don't make service level promises.

contact / report abuse: admin [at] leechers-paradise [dot] org

Fig 1 | AbuseIPDB analysis of a triggering IP



Fig 2 | Timechart showing large spike of events

**CENTRIPETAL RECOMMENDATIONS** | Promote matching policy to shielding, scan hosts with A/V.

## About Centripetal

Centripetal is dedicated to protecting organizations from advanced threats by operationalizing intelligence-driven security. Centripetal delivers the market's only patented Threat Intelligence Gateway platform to customers via its CleanINTERNET solution, a comprehensive intelligence-led cyber service. With Centripetal, customers across every vertical and of every size can persistently prevent over 90% of known threats with applied threat intelligence, rapid correlation and automated enforcement of millions of IOC policies against live network traffic with live cyber analyst support.



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