


From the Free Energy Principle to Active Inference

A Neuro-Inspired Route to (Super)Intelligent Systems

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Active Inference: *A Neuro-Inspired Blueprint for AGI*

Why this matters for AGI

Any system that *persists* must avoid disorganising (“surprising”) states. Biological agents do this by building models of their world, *inferring* hidden causes of sensory data, and *acting* to make future data match their predictions.

Active Inference in one sentence

Agents **update beliefs to explain data (perception)** and **select policies to make data predictable (action)**, jointly *minimising expected free energy*.

Core decision objective: Expected Free Energy (EFE)

$$G(\pi) = \underbrace{\mathbb{E}_{q(o,s|\pi)}[-\ln p(o)]}_{\text{pragmatic: reach preferred outcomes}} + \underbrace{\mathbb{E}_{q(o,s|\pi)}[D_{\text{KL}}(q(s|o, \pi) \parallel q(s|\pi))]}_{\text{epistemic: reduce uncertainty (learn)}}.$$

Why this matters for Superintelligence

Unified objective: One principle drives perception, learning, exploration, and control.

Built-in curiosity: Exploration emerges intrinsically.

Model-based & embodied: Learns a world model and uses it for inference, planning, and action.

Scalable architecture: Generalises to hierarchical, modular, self-modelled agents.

key:

$G(\pi)$: expected free energy

$\mathbb{E}[\cdot]$: expected value (average)

$q(o, s | \pi)$: predicted outcomes and states

$p(o)$: preferred outcomes

$q(s | o, \pi)$ vs. $q(s | \pi)$: posterior vs prior beliefs

Why FEP/Active Inference? *A biological must-do*

Core idea

Any system that *persists* - a cell, animal, robot... must keep its sensory states within viable bounds. If its encounters are too chaotic or surprising, it disintegrates. So it must *predict and control* its future sensations well enough to stay alive.

What follows from this

The system needs an **internal model** of how its sensations arise from hidden causes in the world.

It must **update beliefs** to better explain incoming data (perception/learning).

It must **act** to make incoming data more predictable and in line with what keeps it viable (control/policy selection).

Why it matters for AI

This gives a **single normative objective** for perception, learning and action rather than stitching separate objectives together. It also builds in **curiosity** (information-seeking) as part of staying within viable bounds.

Free Energy Principle (FEP): *inference as a survival tool*

The FEP

Under the FEP, a persisting agent behaves as if it *minimises variational free energy*: a quantity that upper-bounds how *surprising* (unlikely) its sensations are under its world model.

Equation

$$F(q) = \mathbb{E}_{q(s)}[\ln q(s) - \ln p(s, o)]$$

Components:

o : sensory observations (*what the agent senses*)

s : hidden states that cause sensations (*what's out there*)

$p(s, o)$: agent's *generative model* linking hidden states to observations

$q(s)$: agent's *approximate posterior* beliefs about hidden states

$\mathbb{E}_{q(s)}[\cdot]$: expected value (average) over states s according to current beliefs $q(s)$

$F(q)$: *variational free energy*; smaller F means beliefs better explain data

Immediate consequence

Minimising F is (approximately) equivalent to Bayesian inference: improve beliefs so sensations are less surprising under the model.

FEP: distance-to-posterior + evidence

Equivalent decomposition

$$F(q) = D_{\text{KL}}(q(s) \parallel p(s|o)) - \ln p(o)$$

Interpretation:

- $D_{\text{KL}}(q(s) \parallel p(s|o))$: how far the agent's beliefs $q(s)$ are from the exact Bayesian posterior.
- $-\ln p(o)$: (negative) model evidence for the observed sensations under the generative model.

Mean

Minimise the gap to the true posterior while making your sensations more expected under your model.
That's how a biological system avoids disorganising (“surprising”) states.

Active Inference: one objective for perception & action

Definition

Active Inference extends FEP to include *action*: the agent both
updates beliefs (perception/learning) to reduce free energy, and
selects policies (action sequences) that are expected to reduce future free energy.

Embodiment

Intelligence is *situated*: the agent's body, sensors, and effectors define the interface to the world (often framed via a *Markov blanket*). Morphology and environment constrain what the agent can sense, predict, and do; that is, *which* policies are even feasible.

Why this helps

Unlike pipelines that glue a perception module to a control module, Active Inference uses one principle for both. That makes **exploration** (information seeking) and **goal pursuit** two sides of the same coin.

Expected Free Energy (EFE): decisions that learn & achieve goals

Operational objective for choosing policies (fixed size, wrapped)

$$G(\pi) = \underbrace{\mathbb{E}_{q(o,s|\pi)}[-\ln p(o)]}_{\text{pragmatic value: prefer outcomes you want}} + \underbrace{\mathbb{E}_{q(o,s|\pi)}[D_{\text{KL}}(q(s|o, \pi) \parallel q(s|\pi))]}_{\text{epistemic value: expected information gain}}.$$

Components:

π : a *policy* (candidate sequence of actions)

$p(o)$: *preferences* over outcomes (\uparrow when outcomes are good/viable)

$q(o, s|\pi)$: predicted outcomes and states if the agent follows π

$q(s|o, \pi)$ vs. $q(s|\pi)$: posterior vs. prior beliefs about states under π

$G(\pi)$: *expected free energy*; choose policies that $\min G(\pi)$

Meaning

Pragmatic term: “Head toward outcomes I prefer/that keep me viable.”

Epistemic term: “Also choose actions that teach me most about hidden states (reduce uncertainty).”

One-minute recap

Biological must-do: Persisting systems must avoid “surprising” (disorganising) sensory states.

FEP: Do approximate Bayesian inference by minimising variational free energy.

Active Inference: Use the same principle to *act*, not just perceive.

EFE: Choose policies that both reach preferred outcomes *and* reduce uncertainty: *goal-seeking that learns*.

Cover image adapted from: Pezzulo, G., Rigoli, F., Friston, K. J. (2024), *Biological Psychology*, 175, 108741. DOI:10.1016/j.biopsycho.2023.108741