EPITECH M-TRC-853- May. 30, 2022

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FOUERZIO

Powerzio penetration testing presentation

PRÆSÆNTATION HIGHLIGHTS


Focus areas

- Methodology
- fileshare.powerzio.lan
- thermo2.powerzio.lan
- thermo7.powerzio.lan
- workstation1101.powerzio.lan
- web.powerzio.lan
- sql.powerzio.lan
- tserge-ubuntu.powerzio.lan

Powerzio penetration

METHODOLOGY

- Foot Printing
- Network Scanning
- Enumeration
- Exploitation



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FOOT PRINTING

Here is the list of all available IPs in the Powerzio lan

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	Na	me			lp				type	e: port	:		typ	e: po	rt			
		untu			10.10					(22/to			htt	p (80.	tcp)			
		untu irkstat	ion3		10.10.10.9				ssh (22/tcp)									
	dn	s1			10.10	.10.10)		ssh	(22/to	p)		dor	main	(53/tc	p)		
	dn	dns2				10.10.10.11				ssh (22/tcp)				domain (53/tcp)				
		fileshare			10.10.10.22					netbios-ssn (139/tcp)				Microsoft-ds (445/tcp)				
		Thermo2			10.10.10.48				http (80/tcp)									
		Worksation1101				10.10.10.53				ftp (21/tcp)				ssh (22/tcp)				
		hermo7			10.10.10.55				_	http (80/tcp)							_	
		serge-ubuntu			10.10.10.84					ssh (22/tcp)							_	
		/eb WordPress			10.10.10.222					http (80/tcp)							_	
	Sql	Sql database			10.10.10.223 10.10.10.24				MySQL (3306/tcp) Unknown 23023/tcp								_	
																	_	
	44				10.10.10.26					Unknown 15042/tcp							_	
			g serve	er	10.10.10.34 10.10.10.132					Mgtt (1883/tcp) Redis (6379/tcp)							$-\parallel$	
	Re	dis db			10.10	. 10. 13) <u>Z</u>		Red	12 (03/	9/ (C))]						


FILESHARE.POWERZIO.LAN

What we found

- Run on Windows, ports open with SMB protocol
- SMB version with vulnerabilities
- Public files available on the SMB (Myles' card with user id)
- Password "hunter22" found (from hash.txt file)
- Myles' user id and password permits access to private session

Remediation advice

 The administrator needs to avoid getting sensible information like his card on his computer or to restrain access to public shared files.




THERMOZ.POWERZIO.LAN THERMOJ.POWERZIO.LAN

What we found

- NodeJS app
- They are displaying the reactor core and the reactor pool of Powerzio
- We got a report with ZAP from OWASP
- We can obtain the request to the server with injecting command with burp

Remediation advice

- The administrator needs to check the security with ZAP more often and before deploying his app.
- He needs to secure his POST methods and how we can access his API




WORKSTATION1101.POWERZIO.LAN

What we found

- Ftp server
- Sensible data accessible in public
- Ftp critical backdoor vsftpd 2.3.4
- Run exploit with metasploit
- We can enter the ftp in root
- We obtain the /etc/passwd and /shadow
- We crack the password with john
- Password is naruto1 and user is fern11

Remediation advice

 The administrator needs to check the security of the version of what tools he uses. He needs to upgrade his version of ftp.



W&B.POW&RZIO.LAN

What we found

- Wordpress 5.2.4
- wpscan, dirb, robot.txt
- 5.2.4 version vulnerability
- akismet vulnerability
- wp-file-manager vulnerability

Remediation advice


- The administrator needs to update his version of the WordPress and the plugins of his project.
- Trying to hide vulnerable plugins in robot.txt does not work



SQL.POWERZIO.LAN

What we found

- Wordpress database
- mysql
- We found nothing




DATABASE.POWERZIO.LAN

What we found

- redis accessible in anonymous, unprotected
- not renamed basic command like KEYS *
- on pmanager: analysis of the binary, with gdb, decompiler from internet and tutorials
- understood how the password is generated
- python script to show the pass

Remediation advice

- Only the manager should be capable of generate a password for the user.
- Only approved ip address could connect to the Redis database.
- Myles should have renamed basics commands.




TSERGE-UBUNTU.POWERZIO.LAN

What we found

- tserge password with the dump of redis
- by entering the password in pmanager, it returns the pass of the machine
- We found nothing in the machine

Remediation advice

 Not generate the password with the id of the employee and store the id of the employee and the password at the same place



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THANK YOU FOR YOUR TIME

