

Ludwig  
**Wittgenstein**

Tractatus  
Logico-Philosophicus

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With an introduction by Bertrand Russell



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(It is clear that the logical product of two elementary propositions can neither be a tautology nor a contradiction. The statement that a point in the visual field has two different colours at the same time is a contradiction.)

- 6.4 All propositions are of equal value.
- 6.41 The sense of the world must lie outside the world. In the world everything is as it is, and everything happens as it does happen: in it no value exists—and if it did exist, it would have no value.
- If there is any value that does have value, it must lie outside the whole sphere of what happens and is the case. For all that happens and is the case is accidental.
- What makes it non-accidental cannot lie *within* the world, since if it did it would itself be accidental.
- It must lie outside the world.
- 6.42 So too it is impossible for there to be propositions of ethics.
- Propositions can express nothing that is higher.
- 6.421 It is clear that ethics cannot be put into words.
- Ethics is transcendental.
- (Ethics and aesthetics are one and the same.)
- 6.422 When an ethical law of the form, 'Thou shalt . . .', is laid down, one's first thought is, 'And what if I do not do it?' It is clear, however, that ethics has nothing to do with punishment and reward in the usual sense of the terms. So our question about the *consequences* of an action must be unimportant.—At least those consequences should not be events. For there must be something right about the question we posed. There must indeed be some kind of ethical reward and ethical punishment, but they must reside in the action itself.

(And it is also clear that the reward must be something pleasant and the punishment something unpleasant.)

6.423 It is impossible to speak about the will in so far as it is the subject of ethical attributes.

And the will as a phenomenon is of interest only to psychology.

6.43 If the good or bad exercise of the will does alter the world, it can alter only the limits of the world, not the facts—not what can be expressed by means of language.

In short the effect must be that it becomes an altogether different world. It must, so to speak, wax and wane as a whole.

The world of the happy man is a different one from that of the unhappy man.

6.431 So too at death the world does not alter, but comes to an end.

6.4311 Death is not an event in life: we do not live to experience death.

If we take eternity to mean not infinite temporal duration but timelessness, then eternal life belongs to those who live in the present.

Our life has no end in just the way in which our visual field has no limits.

6.4312 Not only is there no guarantee of the temporal immortality of the human soul, that is to say of its eternal survival after death; but, in any case, this assumption completely fails to accomplish the purpose for which it has always been intended. Or is some riddle solved by my surviving for ever? Is not this eternal life itself as much of a riddle as our present life? The solution of the riddle of life in space and time lies outside space and time.

(It is certainly not the solution of any problems of natural science that is required.)

- 6.432 How things are in the world is a matter of complete indifference for what is higher. God does not reveal himself in the world.
- 6.4321 The facts all contribute only to setting the problem, not to its solution.
- 6.44 It is not *how* things are in the world that is mystical, but *that* it exists.
- 6.45 To view the world *sub specie aeterni* is to view it as a whole—a limited whole.  
Feeling the world as a limited whole—it is this that is mystical.
- 6.5 When the answer cannot be put into words, neither can the question be put into words.  
The *riddle* does not exist.  
If a question can be framed at all, it is also *possible* to answer it.
- 6.51 Scepticism is *not* irrefutable, but obviously nonsensical, when it tries to raise doubts where no questions can be asked.  
For doubt can exist only where a question exists, a question only where an answer exists, and an answer only where something *can be said*.
- 6.52 We feel that even when all *possible* scientific questions have been answered, the problems of life remain completely untouched. Of course there are then no questions left, and this itself is the answer.
- 6.521 The solution of the problem of life is seen in the vanishing of the problem.  
(Is not this the reason why those who have found

after a long period of doubt that the sense of life became clear to them have then been unable to say what constituted that sense?)

- 6.522 There are, indeed, things that cannot be put into words. They *make themselves manifest*. They are what is mystical.
- 6.53 The correct method in philosophy would really be the following: to say nothing except what can be said, i.e. propositions of natural science—i.e. something that has nothing to do with philosophy—and then, whenever someone else wanted to say something metaphysical, to demonstrate to him that he had failed to give a meaning to certain signs in his propositions. Although it would not be satisfying to the other person—he would not have the feeling that we were teaching him philosophy—this method would be the only strictly correct one.
- 6.54 My propositions serve as elucidations in the following way: anyone who understands me eventually recognizes them as nonsensical, when he has used them—as steps—to climb up beyond them. (He must, so to speak, throw away the ladder after he has climbed up it.)  
He must transcend these propositions, and then he will see the world aright.
- 7 What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence.