# Secure Execution

Lecture 10

# Secure Execution

- ARM TrustZone
  - Memory Attributes
  - Bus Attributes
- Trusted Firmware
- OTP

# Security Extension

ARM TrustZone

# Bibliography

for this section

**Joseph Yiu**, *The Definitive Guide to ARM® Cortex®-M23 and Cortex-M33 Processors*

- Chapter 7 - *TrustZone support in the memory system*
  - Section 7.1 - *Overview*
  - Section 7.2 - *SAU and IDAU*
  - Section 7.5 - *Memory protection controller and peripheral protection controller*

**Raspberry Pi Ltd**, *RP2350 Datasheet*

- Chapter 10 - *Security*
  - Section 10.2 - *Processor Security Features (Arm)*

# Secure Execution Mode

*two execution modes*

- **Secure**
  - unprivileged (user)
  - privileged (supervisor)
- **NonSecure**
  - unprivileged (user)
  - privileged (supervisor)

*memory attributes*

- each bus transfer has an attribute label

*secure gates*

# Memory Attributes

each memory region is labeled with one of the attributes

| Type | Symbol | Description | Transfer Attribute |
|------|--------|-------------|--------------------|
| *Secure* | **S** | can be accessed only by code running in **secure mode** | secure |
| *Non Secure Callable* | **NSC** | code running in **non-secure mode** can make function calls into it with some restrictions | non-secure |
| *NonSecure* | **NS** | any code running in **any mode** can access it | non-secure |
| *Exempt* | **E** | any code running in **any mode** can access it (with no execution) | *executing code mode* |

> bus transfers are labeled base upon the execution mode and memory attribute

# Implementation Defined Attribution Unit (IDAU)

hard wired by the microcontroller's manufacturer

RP2350's IDAU setup

| Start Address | End Address | Region | Access |
|---|---|---|---|
| 0x00000000 | 0x000042ff | Arm boot | Exempt |
| 0x00004300 | 0x00007dff | USB/RISC-V boot | Non-secure (instruction fetch), Exempt (load/store) |
| 0x00007e00 | 0x00007fff | BootROM SGs | Secure and Non-secure-Callable |
| 0x10000000 | 0x1fffffff | XIP | Non-secure |
| 0x20000000 | 0x20081fff | SRAM | Non-secure |
| 0x40000000 | 0x4fffffff | APB | Exempt |
| 0x50000000 | 0x5fffffff | AHB | Exempt |
| 0xd0000000 | 0xdfffffff | SIO | Exempt |

# Security Attribution Unit (SAU)

software defined



- allows the definition of maximum 8 *memory regions*

- regions cannot overlap

- regions have access permissions (similar to rwx)

$$region\_size = 32 \times N$$

$$base\_address = 32 \times N$$

# Address Attribute Resolution



Attributes from IDAU and SAU are merged, using the most restrictive.

# The Bus

secured

1. **Memory Controller** asks for data transfer or instruction fetch
2. **IDAU** and **SAU** determine the access attributes
3. **External Bus Routes** the request
   1. **MPC** for RAM or Flash
   2. Secure Aware Peripheral
   3. **PPC** for Non Secure Aware peripherals

# Memory Protection Controller (MPC)

**optional** - depends on vendor

RAM and Flash are aliased - they both appear at two different addresses

- one alias defined (in IDAU and SAU) as **NonSecure**
- one alias defined as **Secure**

RAM and Flash are split in pages

- usually 256 B or 512 B
- each page is defined as **NonSecure** or **Secure**

The two aliases have page holes in them.

# Peripheral Protection Unit

protects peripherals that are not *secure aware*

**optional** - depends on vendor

Each peripheral is marked as **NonSecure** or **Secure**.

- this includes interrupts that are fired

*may be implemented similar to the MPC*

| PPC | |
|---|---|
| GPIO / pin | S / NS |
| ADC x | S / NS |
| PWM x | S / NS |
| SPI x | S / NS |
| USB x | S / NS |
| . . . . . . . | |

# Switching modes

Calling *Secure API* from Non Secure code

- **Secure** code's compiler defines a *secure gateway entry* point in **NonSecure Callable** memory for every function that can be called from **Non Secure**
- **NonSecure** code calls the *secure gateway entry* point for the API
  - the instruction there has to be `SG`
  - the next instruction is the call to the actual API function
- **Secure** code returns using the `BXNS` instruction

# Switching modes

Calling *NonSecure functions* from Secure code

- **Secure** code calls the **Non Secure** function using `BLXNS`
  - the processor stacks the return address (linked address) and jumps to the function
- **NonSecure** code returns using the `BX FNC_RETURN` instruction
  - `FNC_RETURN` is a value in `LR` when the function starts

```
                  BLX FNC_RETURN
                                        ┌──────────────────┐
        ┌──────────────────┐            │    Secure Code   │
        │                  │            │                  │
        │  NonSecure Code  │◄─ BLXNS ───┘                  │
        │                  │            └──────────────────┘
        └──────────────────┘
                  │
                  │
            BLX secure_code ────►  ┌──────────┐
                                   │  Fault   │
                                   └──────────┘
```

# Secure Execution in Rust

unstable feature, use nightly version

Define a function that can be called from **Non Secure** code

```
1    #![feature(cmse_nonsecure_entry)]
2
3    #[no_mangle]
4    #[cmse_nonsecure_entry]
5    pub extern "C" fn entry_function(v: u32) -> u32 {
6        v + 6
7    }
```

Limitations

- parameters can only be sent via registers, non secure code has no access to the secure stack
- uses C ABI

# Secure Execution in Rust

unstable feature, use nightly version

## Call a **Non Secure** function

```
1    #![feature(abi_c_cmse_nonsecure_call)]
2    #![no_std]
3
4    unsafe extern "C-cmse-nonsecure-call" non_secure_function(u8, u16, u32) -> f32;
5
6    fn run() {
7      unsafe { non_secure_function(1, 100, 300) };
8    }
```

## Limitations

- parameters should only be sent via registers, secure code should not access the non-secure stack
- uses C ABI

# Boot



The processor starts in **Secure** mode

If it enables *SAU* it can switch to **NonSecure** mode

# Trusted Firmware

# Bibliography

for this section

**Raspberry Pi Ltd**, *RP2350 Datasheet*

- Chapter 10 - *Security*
  - Section 10.1 - *Overview (Arm)*
- Chapter 13 - *OTP*

**ARM**, *Trusted Firmware-M Documentation*

- *Introduction*
- *Getting Started*
- *Security*

# Trusted Firmware-M

what it does

- Secure Boot
- Secure Update
- Secure API

Requires

- ARM microcontrollers that provide TrustZone
- Examples
  - STM32L5, STM32U5
  - RP2350

# Secure Firmware / Bootloader

provided by the vendor

Depends on the MCU

- implements the TF-M standard (Trusted Firmware - Cortex M)
- certification levels 1 - 3
  - **Level 1**: Software-based isolation; foundational crypto, attestation, and secure boot.
  - **Level 2**: Adds protection against non-invasive attacks.
  - **Level 3**: Adds protection against side-channel and invasive attacks; often requires hardware features like tamper detection and secure key storage.

# ARM TF-M Reference Implementation

open source

# STM32 Implementation

Provided in SDK

# RP2350

- provides a ROM bootloader:
    - Secure Boot
    - Secure Update
    - Try-before-you-by
    - A/B partitioning
    - Rollback

# Public Key Infrastructure

*key pair*

- private key 🔐

- public key 🔓

- algorithms

  - Rivest–Shamir–Adleman (*RSA*)

  - Elliptic Curves (*ECS*)

- hashing function

  - SHA 256

**Bob**

| Hello Alice! | → | **Encrypt** | ← | Alice's public key |

**6EB69570 08E03CE4**

**Alice**

| Hello Alice! | ← | **Decrypt** | ← | Alice's private key |

# Digital Signatures

needs a *key pair* (RSA or ECS) and a *hashing algorithm*

## Signing

1. data is **hashed**
2. the **hash** is **encrypted** using the **private key**
3. the **encrypted hash** is added to the data

## Verifying

1. data is **hashed**
2. the **encrypted hash** is decrypted using the **public key**

# Signed Firmware

The firmware contains a digital signature

- `.vector_table`
- `.start_block` and `.end_block`
- `.text` and `.data`



RP2350 has a bootloader that knows how to securely boot, other chips need custom secure firmware



* drawing is not at scale, code and data are significantly greater than the interrupt vector

# OTP

one time programmable

# OTP

flash memory that can be programmed only once

- Usually has three lock levels
    - Read/Write - works as normal flash
    - Read Only - works as ROM
    - Inaccessible - cannot be accessed
- The lock is not reversible
- Different vendors have different naming for these levels

# Information in OTP

Stores information that:

- should not be modifiable
- should not be read *from the outside* using a debugger or using **Non Secure** software that reads and sends the information
- Secure Boot Enabled
- Debug in **Secure** mode Enabled
- Debug in **NonSecure** mode Enabled
- Bootloader's public keys
- Bootloader's public keys
- OTP's Pages Lock Level
- OTP's (read) key
- Debug key
- Secure Access Permissions

# Provisioning Devices

how to securely provision a new device for production

| Generate a key pair | → | Digitally Sign the Secure Firmware | → | Write Secure Firmware | → | Write Public Key to OTP | → | Enable Secure Boot | → | Disable Secure Debug | → | Lock OTP |

- Generate a different key pair for every device
  - store the private key securely
- Disabling debugging in secure mode will prevent any debugger from reading the OTP with the stored key
- Locking the OTP will prevent any writes to the key
- Enabling Secure Boot will prevent any unsigned Secure Firmware update
- **NonSecure** debug is still available, but it cannot replace the **Secure** Firmware
- Flashing **NonSecure** firmware is still possible

# Decommissioning Devices

- Add the capability to the **Secure** firmware to increase the Lock Level to OTP

    - this will render OTP unusable

    - the system will not boot anymore as it cannot read the public keys

- Some OTP memories allow reversing locks:

    - they erase all the OTP

    - they erase the whole Flash

This prevents reading the keys and secure firmware as secure debug becomes available

# Use Cases

- POS devices
  - payment software should not be tempered with
- Smart Cards
  - keys should never be read from the device
  - software in these devices should not be tampered with
  - JavaCard (applets are uploadable)

# Conclusion

- ARM TrustZone
  - Memory Attributes
  - Bus Attributes
- Trusted Firmware
- OTP