COMP 5970: Firmware Homework

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11/13/14

1 Define Each of the following extensions:

```
* **.img**: This is a disc image file, which contains image data for a system. This includes
* **.bin**: This is a firmware file for some models of routers.
* **.trx**: This is a firmware image file for some embedded systems and routers.
```

What is the difference between firmware exten

What is the difference between firmware extensions?:

At their core, firmware files hold basically the same information. The different file extensions just distinguish different organizational structures or header information

What is the model number that correlates with each of the files?

• .img: R6950

• .bin: dir300

```
HEXADECTMAL
                                                                                                     DESCRIPTION
 ECTMAI
) 0x0 TRX firmware header, little endian, image size: 3801116 bytes, CRC32: 0xF4D6C223, flag:
0X1, version: 1, header size: 28 bytes, loader offset: 0x1C, linux kernel offset: 0x0, rootfs offset: 0x0
28 0x1C LZMA compressed data, properties: 0x6D, dictionary size: 8388608 bytes, uncompressed si
re: 2488040 bytes
551996 0xD001C Squashfs filesystem, little endian, version 4.0, compression:xz, size: 2945894 bytes, 6
86 inodes, blocksize: 131072 bytes, created: 2019-08-06 03:16:06
```

.trx: RT-N56U found in etc_ro/xml folder

- # What file system is being used by the file system?
- .img: This uses a squash file system, found by using dd to pull out a zip file, then using binwalk after unzipping the file:

```
root@kali:-/Firmware# binwalk AC2100-V1.2.0.42_1.0.1.img

DECIMAL HEXADECIMAL DESCRIPTION

0 x0 Sercomm firmware signature, version control: 256, download control: 0, hardware ID: "BZ V", hardware version: 0x42, starting code segment: 0x0, code size: 0x7300 flamware version: 0x42, starting code segment: 0x0, code size: 0x7300 ox200 vacane: 83886080, name: R6950.bin parchive data, at least v2.0 to extract, compressed size: 32712621, uncompressed size: 0x153A2D End of Zip archive, footer length: 22
```

```
DECIMAL HEXADECIMAL DESCRIPTION

Ox0 UImage header, header size: 64 bytes, header CRC: 0xADA6C902, created: 2018-11-29 19:46
:01, image size: 207800 bytes, Data Address: 0xA0200000, Entry Point: 0xA0200000, data CRC: 0xD58A6B6F, OS: Linux, CP
J: MIPS, image type: Standalone Program, compression type: none, image name: "NAND Flash I"
170624 0x29A80 U-Boot version string, "U-Boot 1.1.3 (Nov 29 2018 - 14:45:51)"
3822970 0xEFFBA Sercomm firmware version: 0x42, starting code segment: 0x0, code size: 0x7300
0y97152 0x200000 UImage header, header size: 64 bytes, header CRC: 0xA6A44421, created: 2019-01-21 08:12
:38. image size: 3351268 bytes, Data Address: 0x81001000, Entry Point: 0x81000100, data CRC: 0xB743A7B0, OS: Linux, CP
UN MIPS, image type: 0S Kernel Image, compression type: LTma, image name: "Linux Renel Image"
209715 0x200040 LZMA compressed data, properties: 0x50, dictionary size: 33554432 bytes, uncompressed size: 8456576 bytes
5291456 0x600000 Squashfs filesystem, little endian, version 4.0, compression:xz, size: 28037611 bytes, 2406 inodes, blocksize: 131072 bytes, created: 2019-01-21 08:12:29
```

• .bin: This uses a squash file system, found using binwalk:

• .trx: This uses a squash file system, found using binwalk: root@kali:-/Firmware# binwalk RT-AC51U_3.0.0.4_380_8497-g179ec32.trx

```
root@kali:~/Firmware# binwalk RT-AC51U_3.0.0.4_380_8497-g179ec32.trx

DECIMAL HEXADECIMAL DESCRIPTION

64 0x40 LZMA compressed data, properties: 0x6E, dictionary size: 8388608 bytes, uncompressed s: 25: 3551984 bytes

174784 0x1ED00 Squashfs filesystem, little endian, version 4.0, compression:xz, size: 13390458 bytes, 1501 inodes, blocksize: 131072 bytes, created: 2019-11-01 02:54:11
```

What compression scheme is being used by the firmware?

• .img: This uses a zip for compression:

```
root@kali:-/Firmware# binwalk AC2100-V1.2.0.42_1.0.1.img

DECIMAL HEXADECIMAL DESCRIPTION

0 0X0 Sercomm firmware signature, version control: 256, download control: 0, hardware ID: "BZ

V", hardware version: 0x400, firmware version: 0x42, starting code segment: 0x0, code size: 0x7300

512 0x200 Zip archive data, at least v2.0 to extract, compressed size: 32712621, uncompressed size: 838860800, nae: R6950.bin

2713261 0x1F32A2D End of Zip archive, footer length: 22
```

• .bin: This uses a zip for compression:

```
root@kali:-/Firmware# binwalk AC2100-V1.2.0.42_1.0.1.img

DECIMAL HEXADECIMAL DESCRIPTION

0 0x0 Sercomm firmware signature, version control: 256, download control: 0, hardware ID: "BZ
V', hardware version: 0x4100, firmware version: 0x42, starting code segment: 0x0, code size: 0x7300

0x200 Zip archive data, at least v2.0 to extract, compressed size: 32712621, uncompressed siz
e: 83886080, name: R6950.bin
32713261 0x1F32A20 End of Zip archive, footer lenath: 22
```

• .trx: This uses LZMA for compression:

```
root@kali:~/Firmware# binwalk RT-AC51U_3.0.0.4_380_8497-g179ec32.trx

DECIMAL HEXADECIMAL DESCRIPTION

64 0x40 LZMA compressed data, properties: 0x6E, dictionary size: 8388608 bytes, uncompressed s: 2e: 355194 bytes
174784 0x11ED00 Squashfs filesystem, little endian, version 4.0, compression:xz, size: 13390458 bytes, 1501 inodes, blocksize: 131072 bytes, created: 2019-11-01 02:54:11
```

What information in a file system can be used during a penetration test?

From the file system, attackers can gather a litany of information including firewall information, hashed passwords, private keys, and network configurations.

When looking through the bin's squash file system, I came across the etc configurations directory that contains some useful information:

```
sputnik.webhotspot
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      pptpd_client.options
pptpd_client.sh
pptpd_client.startup
pptpd_client.vpn
proxywatchdog.nvramconfig
                                                                                                     http-redirect.webhots
language.nvramconfig
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     schedulerb.webalive
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      smtp-redirect.firewall
smtp-redirect.nvramconfig
smtp-redirect.webhotspot
                                                                                                   language.nvramconrig
language.startup
language.webconfig
networksettings.brcm.nvramconfig
necat.nvramconfig
nocat.nvramconfig
nocat.webhotspot
notifier.nvramconfig
notifier.websecurity
   vifidog.webhotsp
ase.nvramconfig
pase.nvramconfig
pase.webconfig
chillispot.nvramconfig
chillispot.webhotspot
chillispot.webhotspot
chillispot.webbotspot
chillispot.webservices
cop-tunnel.firewall
cop-tunnel.prewall
con.nvramconfig
con.webhotspot
cotss.nvramconfig
tttp-redirect.firewall
tttp-redirect.nvramconfi
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      sputnik.nvramconfig
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       proxywatchdog.nvramconfig
proxywatchdog.sh
proxywatchdog.startup
proxywatchdog.webalive
radiooff.nvramconfig
radiooff.webservices
routerstyle.nvramconfig
routerstyle.webconfig.orig
schedulerb.nvramconfig
schedulerb.sh
schedulerb.sh
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    sshd.webservices
syslog.webservices
telnet.webservices
ttraff.nvramconfig
ttraff.webservices
wdswatchdog.nvramconfig
                                                                                                    olsrd.nvramconfig
overclocking.webconfig
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      wdswatchdog.sn
wdswatchdog.startup
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    wdswatchdog.webalive
wifidog.nvramconfig
```

I also found a private key:

Talso found a private key:

root@kali:-/Firmware/bin_squash/etc# cat key.pem
----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY----MITEPAIBAMKCAQEA2GSZMETKHKRYANAYJDSinLmTuJiqrqFnW5Fj1j6XgGz1DIV
42J2VgmwvofL16nBRQXOtdb5IwEsFE9+1F7K0KulD73N7ek90FSV78z2wznrV1G0
42J2VgmwvofL16nBRQXOtdb5IwEsFE9+1F7K0KulD73N7ek90FSV78z2wznrV1G0
42J2VgmwvofL16nBRQXOtdb5IwEsFE9+1F7K0KulD73N7ek90FSV78z2wznrV1G0
42J2VgmwvofL16nBRQXOtdb5IwEsFE9+1F7K0KulD73N7ek90FSV78z2wznrV1G0
42J2VgmwvofL16nBRQXOtdb5IwEsFE9+1F7K0KulD73N7ek90FSV78z2wznrV1G0
42J2VgmwvofL16nBRQXOtdb5IwEsFE9+1F7K0KulD73N7ek90FSV78z2wznrV1G0
42JR3F3S9b01singf1FSpgibNtcbhUCnj50latePtlkWzEBIqlH1ZSZsqhrcgVb-DdG1D
43JR3TSHVJMUNDH0H+jFNXH50erkDnz0AX4q050Mh0VMNKTBHBNDPHDFURBYERB2H9
51JR3TSHVJMUNDH0H+jFNXH50erkDnz0AX4q050Mh0VMNKTBHBNDPhUAgVNX1UA
UUUTy6riWEbv0XADPVbjWsMED0Z8Pcxhlcq6XE6SBZtacp-mBDq5TwsKq4REBur
50JR3TSHVJAyo10n5AefFC204ZJk1gWb3AEB9TjSwbxordsXpzLCXWMTg7FyqUS
CHmqaJ381rq4PmvxizW5Kc9g9+0MLolisnTlqKoah9X0n80TPv6rLGVT7U/s/1d
SXXAVUOGgYATGGmayFtqARPHJHWJUPURK,F8Hsq2F9VYMi3AnqmrcIw00cXyEf
1kFF70hhV0ccQTByRynbPZ3GEmB3St8IEMijqNZFyDC7706/ZUT371CD206h3PA7
CQGGWYDQPJVYrxL5L2NKYKSlxgfhzd1mEURfu/KNMnScWni+h3a-382GYEA61uF
CQUQ23FbnsT/NAeX25oxpJT0XJV0i3dama7Ke45sLKDbMsRedjefTvdcmirnRel
jUKxRnr/OuhLXUEJK8AMUBHNXwldKy9bGsKGK101GcvrRnV9ZBNU4zE7THTKtiY0
Ctr1gbo0HSicyVd623F60cPdellydy/VPC-+691sGyFEA0YHV7snbcOpg0HE8SuSy
MmC4L2xrTP+En65jZgH37605rCl312c23+65eU2K6hfPKo2RFCJ4/s/gt00WhpIr
GKE5E2plEiCqSq0ng-6FDbucRF9GamstAARPCjHyW/MWN+ZV5MVVOW+qz5yimM
qRR0DWBLtJmsgNkIUTvLpLsCgYA38iMfp9Rmf6hu5G1sF864X2YZYY/+ns681FsT
HRRNRjLPFpLlWybmST75nebD2G6565EFTEWATXjB1s/JtAmpBetyA2PNaSBM6vf
CBA1706zyf6101RduiDtHdqVZ0gjdZ1E4hp0JD+umk84ywrn6fHLD6PmPX49a2q
FFRNLJhpWXZXIn328ZsxJ09nxwh0dKwSkwfpkov4u6yZTiUkuZ4uZyuIIwEYwaa5
NSMqjqzMj/eAXX2uq131zS88S8GhLrFrdTg7FaJblORyomsv/f4A==
------END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----