

## Topic 7

### Public Key Infrastructure (PKI)

Understand the main components of PKI technology

## Overview

- ❑ Public Key Infrastructures (PKI) Overview
- ❑ Digital Certificates
- ❑ Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs)
- ❑ Top-down Certificate Hierarchy
- ❑ Conclusions
- ❑ *source: chapter 14 of Cryptography and Network Security*

Lots of docs on this  
subject on the Internet!

## PKI Overview

- ❑ PKI provides functions, technologies, policies and services that enable practical deployment and wide-scale application of **public-key cryptography**.
- ❑ **Security services** supported:
  - Certificate-based user/entity authentication.
  - Digital signing of electronic documents, emails, software for authentication, integrity and non-repudiation protections.
  - Encryption, typically for symmetric key distributions.

## PKI Overview

- ❑ **Applications of PKI** around us:
  - Web browsers, servers and services, e.g. SSL (secure socket layer).
  - Virtual Private Networks (VPNs), e.g. IPsec.
  - Secure email services, e.g. S/MIME, PGP (Pretty Good Privacy).
  - Secure file storage services, e.g. PGP.
  - Secure electronic transactions, e.g. SET.
  - Visa/Master smartcards.
  - Copyright protection (DRM).
  - ..... etc.

## PKI Overview


- ❑ The major problem with wide-scale application of public-key cryptography is:
  - How could we trust that a given public key belongs to the claimed entity, i.e. **secure public key distribution**.
- ❑ The solution is to have **some one** or **some authority** to sign one's public key → **digital certificate**.
- ❑ A digital certificate is a **statement**:
  - certifying that this public key belongs to this identity, and
  - the owner with this identity possesses the corresponding private key.

## PKI Overview – Two trust models

- ❑ **SPKI** (Simple PKI): a bottom-up approach
  - Uses a Web-of-trust model.
  - Public keys are signed/certified by friends or friends' friends.
  - You are supposed to trust some of the friends.
  - Used in the PGP (Pretty Good Privacy) solution.
- ❑ **X509 PKI**: a top-down approach
  - Public keys are signed/certified by trusted authorities, Certification Authorities (CAs)
  - A CA or CA hierarchy digitally sign keys in a top-down manner.

## PKI Overview

□ Typical PKI entities:



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## PKI – Main functions

- **SystemSetup:** a credential service provider (usually CA) should get the policy, procedures and services ready, including key generation/update, certificates issuance, distribution and revocation, possibly key recovery, and potential interaction with other providers, e.g. with a registration authority (RA) and other CAs.
- **SubjectRegistration:** during this process, a subject makes itself known to a CA.
- **KeyGeneration:** a pair of crypto keys are generated either by the subject or by the CA, and the CA will certify the public key of the pair.

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### PKI Overview – Main functions

- ❑ **CredentialIssuance** (Certification): the CA issues a certificate for a subject's public key.
- ❑ **CredentialVerification** (proving the possession of credentials): this is performed when a credential is used to access a service or to perform a transaction.
- ❑ **CredentialRevocation**: if the private key associated to the public key certified in the certificate is compromised or suspected compromised, then the certificate should be revoked.
- ❑ **Cross-certification**: is an operation to allow a pair of CAs to establish a trust relationship through the signing of each other's public keys in a certificate called **cross-certification**.

### PKI Overview – Main functions


- ❑ **SubjectRegistration**:
  - **Enrollment**: An applicant, e.g. *Alice*, may need to provide the following information (*depending on classes of certificates*):
    - Proof of *Alice*'s identity (email address, driving license, birth certificate, fingerprints, passport, NI number, etc).
    - *Alice*'s public key,  $KU_{Alice}$
  - **Authenticates applications**
    - share information with a third-party database.
    - personal appearance (use of Local Registration Authority).
- ❑ Data Repository, typically a LDAP directory, is where certificates and revocation status are *officially* stored.

*Homework: try an on-line CA and find out what procedures are necessary for you to acquire a certificate for your public key, and how much does each issue cost!*

## Digital Certificates - Overview

- Certification is a secure and scalable way of distributing public keys.
- A **digital certificate** (or *public-key certificate*, *digital ID*, *certificate*)
  - binds an entity's **public key** (+ one/more attributes) to **its identity** (the entity = person, hardware device, software process).
  - is **digitally signed** by the CA so you need CA's public key to verify the certificate.
  - its contents are **application dependent**, e.g. a certificate for secure email contains the entity's email address, a certificate for financial purpose may contain credit card number and credit limit, etc.

## Digital Certificates - the X.509 v3 certificate format



### Digital Certificates - the X.509 v3 certificate format

- ◆ **Version:** current values are v1, v2, v3.
- ◆ **SN:** a number unique to the issuer (CA).
- ◆ **SAI:** identifies the algorithm, such as RSA or DSA, used by the CA to sign the certificate.
- ◆ **Issuer:** the issuer's name.
- ◆ **VP:** a range of time when the certificate is valid.
- ◆ **Subject:** the subject's name.
- ◆ **SPK:** the subject's public key and parameters, and the identifier of the algorithm with which the key is used.
- ◆ **IUI:** to allow the reuse of issuer names over time.
- ◆ **SUI:** to allow the reuse of subject names over time.
- ◆ **Ext:** provide a way to associate additional information for subjects, public keys, managing the certification hierarchy and certification revocation lists.


### Digital Certificates - An example

<b>Version: 3</b>
<b>Serial Number (SN):</b> 02:41:00:00:01
<b>Signature Algorithm Identifier (SAI):</b> MD5 digest with RSA encryption
<b>Issuer:</b> C=US, O=RSA Data Security, Inc., OU=Secure Server Certification Authority
<b>Validity Period (VP):</b> ---Not Before Date: 16/5/96 12:00:00 AM ---Not After Date: 17/5/96 11:59:59 PM
<b>Subject:</b> C=GB, O=Manchester Univ, OU=Computer Science
<b>Subject Public Key (SPK):</b> <b>Public key algorithm:</b> RSA Encryption <b>Public key:</b> Modulus: 00:92:.....(typically 200 digits) Exponent: 65537
<b>CA's Signature:</b> 88:d1:.....

## CRLs - Why do we need it?

- ❑ A certificate has a validity period, {*notBeforeDate*, *notAfterDate*}.
  - But what if a private key corresponding to a public key certified in a certificate is compromised before the expiration date?
  - Vulnerable to repudiation attacks.
- ❑ **Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs)**
  - CRL is a mechanism to let the world know that a certificate is no longer valid. It is a black list of revoked certificates (i.e. prematurely terminated certificates).
  - A **CRL** is a **data structure**, **digitally signed** by the issuing CA, containing:
    - **date and time** of the CRL publications.
    - **name** of the issuing CA.
    - **serial numbers** of all the revoked certificates.

## CRLs - X.509v2 CRL format





### CRLs - X.509v2 CRL format

- ◆ **Version:** v2 should be used if any extension field are present. Otherwise, it can be omitted.
- ◆ **Issuer Name:** the entity that issued and signed the CRL.
- ◆ **This Update:** the date/time of issue of this CRL.
- ◆ **Next Update:** the date/time of issue of next CRL. The next CRL could be issued prior to, but not after, the indicated date.
- ◆ **User Certificate SN:** certificate serial number of a revoked certificate.
- ◆ **Revocation Date:** the effective date of a revocation.
- ◆ **Extension:** X.509 v2 CRL Entry Extension fields have the same sub-fields as X.509 v3 certificates.

### CRLs – Deployment issues

- Using CRL is not that straightforward
  - The issuing CA needs to keep the CRL up-to-date.
  - A certificate-using application should obtain the most recent CRL and ensure that the certificate serial number is not on the CRL list; in other words, a certificate is said to be valid *iif* the following verifications are positive:
    - It has a valid CA signature,
    - It has not expired, and
    - It is not listed in the CA's most recent CRL.
  - There are some scalability issues.
- That is why short expiration policies are important.

**Homework:** check your browser and see whether this facility has been enabled!

### Top-down Certificate Hierarchy


- ❑ In most cases, we use more than one CAs, as using one root key to sign certificates
  - is too risky if that one key is compromised.
  - is not scalable when user base is large.
- ❑ In some cases, certificate managements may resemble the management structure of an organisation, as depicted in the next slide.
- ❑ **Certificate hierarchy**
  - Start with a root CA with a root cert/key.
  - Create more keys, sign them with root key, and delegate them to subordinate CAs.
- ❑ Validating a cert possibly involves validating a chain of certs (called **chain of trust**).

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### Top-down Certificate Hierarchy

- ❑ Certificate chain validation:  
verify all the digital signatures signed by all subordinate CAs in a bottom-up manner until you reach the root CA's signature, or until you reach a subordinate CA that you can trust!



- ❑ **Alice's Certificate Chain:**  $\{CERT_{Alice}\}S_{DeptQ} + \{CERT_{DeptQ}\}S_{1stCorp} + \{CERT_{1stCorp}\}S_{RootCA}$
- ❑ If Bob wishes to authenticate a message signed by Alice, he can proceed 'up' the certificate chain until he finds a certificate he can trust.

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
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### Top-down Certificate Hierarchy - Cross certification

- ❑ In this example, the 3rd Corp's Dept S has certified the 1st Corp's Dept Q.
- ❑ So, Alice's Certification Chain with **cross certification** is:  

$$\{CERT_{Alice}\}S_{DeptQ} + \{CERT_{DeptQ}\}S_{1stCorp} + \{CERT_{DeptQ}\}S_{DeptS} + \{CERT_{1stCorp}\}S_{RootCA} + \{CERT_{DeptS}\}S_{3rdCorp} + \{CERT_{3rdCorp}\}S_{RootCA}$$
- ❑ Now Bob only has to go up Alice's Certificate Chain to find his dept's certificate.
- ❑ Cross certification provides efficient certificate verification.

### Top-down Certificate Hierarchy - An Example (SET)



### Exercise 7(a)

Suppose that  $KU_A$  and  $KR_A$  are the public and private keys of a party  $A$  respectively, that  $KU_B$  and  $KR_B$  are those of a party  $B$ , and that each of  $A$  and  $B$  can use any cryptosystems.

- (i) If  $A$  wants to send a very long message to  $B$ , suggest an encryption method by which only  $B$  can decrypt the message and the encryption/decryption processes are the most efficient.
- (ii) Can  $A$  encrypt a message so that anyone receiving the message will be assured that the message came only from  $A$  (i.e. authenticity protection)? If yes, give your method; and if not, explain why not.
- (iii) Suggest an *efficient* method by which both confidentiality and authenticity protections are provided.

### Exercise 7(b)

- ❑ **PKCS** refers to a set of public-key cryptography standards, defined and published by RSA Security; visit <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/PKCS> and **read about** PKCS#12 and public-key certificates.
- ❑ **Investigate procedures/protocols for PKI certificate acquisition.**
- ❑ Use the *PKI* module in CrypTool to generate and import an RSA key pair, and use the keys to do encryption and signature generation and verification.
- ❑ Again you can find this module via Menu: “Digital Signatures/PKI” \ “Generate/Import Keys”.

## Conclusion

- ❑ **Digital certificates** allows us to bind a public key to its rightful owner.
- ❑ This **binding of key with identity** allows us to solve the problem of how to distribution authentic public keys.
- ❑ Various PKI systems have been proposed - X509 works in a top-down manner.
- ❑ A *CA* is responsible for issuing certificates and periodical publishing *CRL* - **revocation** notification of compromised corresponding private keys.