



**conseil d'analyse  
économique**

# **Trajectory of the French public finances**

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
# Plan

1. Debts and deficits
2. Forecast assumptions
3. Long-term forecasts
4. Short-term forecasts
5. The 2023 deficit


# Debt and deficits

# Continuous growth in public debt since the 70s

Public debt % PIB



Public deficit en % PIB



Source : Insee (comptes nationaux) et base de données historique Jordà-Schularick-Taylor

# Debt dynamics

Dynamic debt equation:

$$B_t = (1 + i_t) B_{t-1} + D_t$$

$B(t)$ : nominal debt –  $b(t)=B(t)/Y(t)$

$i(t)$  : effective nominal interest rate

$D(t)$ : primary deficit (inclusive of stock-flow adjustment)

-> **Change in debt-to-GDP ratio  $b(t)$**

$$b_t - b_{t-1} = d_t + \left( \frac{i_t - g_t^n}{1 + g_t^n} \right) b_{t-1}$$


$g(t)^n$  nominal GDP growth,  $d(t)$  = primary deficit-to-GDP

$d(t)^n$  nominal deficit to GDP:

$$d_t^n \equiv d_t + \frac{i_t}{1 + g_t^n} b_{t-1} \qquad b_t - b_{t-1} = d_t^n - \frac{g_t^n}{1 + g_t^n} b_{t-1}$$

# French history for $i$ and $g^n$

## Growth and effective nominal rate



# The importance of the primary deficit

- In the 60s and 70s:  $g^n > i$
- In the 80s and 90s :  $i > g^n$
- Since 2000 :  $i - g^n$  is about 0

➔ *On average over 1970-2022 :  $i - g^n$  is around 0*

**When  $(i - g^n) = 0$ , the debt accumulation equation simplifies to**

$$b_t - b_{t-1} \simeq d_t$$

**To stabilize the debt-to-GDP ratio, must target a primary deficit of 0**


In this  $i = g^n$  scenario, the nominal deficit is  $d^{\text{nom}} = g^n / (1 + g^n) * b_t$ .

Maastricht:  $b = 60\%$  and  $g^n = 5\%$ , so need a  $\sim 3\%$  deficit


More realistic:  $b = 100\%$  et  $g^n = 3\%$ , which yields the same

# A historic $i=g^n$ counterfactual explains today's level of debt (note 2 crises in 10 years)

Public debt and trajectory with  $i-g^n = 0$



Primary deficits (plus stock-flow adjustment)






# Forecast assumptions


# Spending and revenue composition in France

Public spending (share of GDP)



- Old age & Survivors
- Health and Sickness
- Other social protection
- Education
- Economic affairs
- General public services
- Defence
- Public order and safety
- Environmental protection
- Housing and community amenities
- Recreation, culture and religion
- Public debt transactions

Public revenue (share of GDP)



- Other revenue
- Capital taxes
- Other current taxes
- Other taxes on production
- Other Taxes on products
- Taxes on the income or profits of corporations
- Taxes on individual or household income
- Value added type taxes (VAT)
- Net actual social contributions

# Forecasting spending and revenue

Primary deficit to GDP:


$$d_t = \frac{G_t}{Y_t} - \frac{T_t}{Y_t}$$

- $G_t$  public spending (excluding interest),  $Y_t$  GDP
- $T_t/Y_t$  public revenue/GDP

What do we know about  $G$  and  $T$  that helps us forecast  $d$ ?

1. Population aging
2. Role of output gap and crises
3. Climate transition and defense spending in the short run

# Share of pensions in GDP (from French COR)



Source : Conseil orientation des retraites (rapport juin 2023)

# Why these trends?

In spite of population aging, in a central scenario, pensions/GDP are stable

Why?

$$\text{Pensions/GDP} = (\text{Retirees-to-worker ratio}) * (\text{average pension/average wage}) * (\text{average wage / GDP-to-worker})$$

The first term grows by 20% but the second falls by the same amount

Productivity is critical, since pensions are indexed to CPI not wages, so the semielasticity of the pension/wage ratio to productivity equals minus life expectancy at retirement

1pp productivity growth -> 20% decline in the Pension/GDP ratio in the long-term

-> This is very sensitive to productivity assumptions

# Role de la conjoncture et des crises

$$d_t = \frac{G_t}{Y_t} - \frac{T_t}{Y_t}$$

**1. Usual scenario:** Semielasticity of  $d_t$  to output gap of 0.6 (European Commission)

-  $T/Y$  semielasticity about 0 (level of  $T$  has elasticity of 1 so 0 for  $T/Y$ )

-  $G/Y$  seminelasticity around  $G/Y=0.55$  with no  $G$  response.  $G$  does decline a little due to unemployment benefits.

➔ Since output gap averages to 0, this does not affect average  $d_t$

**2. Recurring crises.** Almost 10 points to  $d$  every 10 years (2008 et 2020)

➔ We should expect there to be more such episodes

# Climate and defense

- Climate: Pisany-Mahfouz report
    - +1 point of GDP/year to 2040
    - Then linearly falling to 2050
  - Defense
    - 1% per year to 2040 (getting back to the Cold War era defense spending)
- ➔ Of course there are large standard errors

# Long term forecasts




# Assumptions


- Start in 2031 (after the short-term adjustment):
  - Public debt (b) = 114%
  - Primary surplus = 1%
  - $i = g = 3\%$  (2% inflation, 1% growth)
  - Output gap = 0%
  - Crisis every 10 years adds +5% to deficit
  - Start without crises or climate/defense transition, then add

# Long-term forecast

Primary and nominal deficit/GDP




Debt to GDP ratio




-> With primary surplus at 1%, slow convergence to 60% Maastricht target

# Role of recurring crises

Primary and nominal deficit




Debt to GDP ratio




-> Even with moderate crises, debt remains under control in this scenario

# Adding climate and defense transition

Deficit primaire et deficit nominal



Dette



-> Excluding climate/defense, want a primary surplus at 3%

# Short term scenarios

# European fiscal rules

- An adjustment period of 4 years that can be extended up to 7 years subject to a commitment to structural reforms and an investment program meeting a certain number of conditions
- Corrective arm : EDP procedure
  - ✓ reduction of the primary structural balance by at least 0,5 pt of GDP per year (2025 to 2027)
  - ✓ reduction of the structural balance by at least 0,5 pt of GDP per year from 2028
- Preventive arm
  - ✓ Debt safeguard : reduction of the public debt by at least 1 pt of GDP per year (if the debt ratio exceeds 90% of GDP)
  - ✓ Deficit safeguard : reduction of the structural balance by 0,25 pt of GDP per year (7 years adjustment) if the structural deficit is higher than 1,5% of GDP
  - ✓ No backloading safeguard : the annual fiscal adjustment cannot increase during the adjustment period

# European fiscal rules : application to France

- Starting point 2024
  - ✓ 5% overall deficit
  - ✓ Output gap = 0 -> structural balance = public balance
- Adjustment period of 7 years : from 2025 to 2031

From 2026,  $r - g = +0,5\%$


	2024	2025	2026	2027	2028	2029	2030	2031
primary balance	-2,90	-2,4	-1,9	-1,4	-0,9	-0,4	0,1	0,4
public balance	-5,00	-4,9	-4,7	-4,3	-3,8	-3,3	-2,8	-2,5
public debt	111,90	113,4	114,7	115,6	115,9	115,7	115,0	114,0

Debt safeguard  
doesn't bite in 2031  
Overall adjustment  
= 0,47 per year

From 2026,  $r - g = 0\%$

primary balance	-2,9	-2,4	-1,9	-1,4	-0,9	-0,3	0,2	1,0
public balance	-5,0	-4,9	-4,7	-4,3	-3,8	-3,3	-2,8	-2,0
public debt	111,9	114,0	115,9	117,3	118,1	118,5	118,3	117,3

Debt safeguard bites in  
2031  
Overall adjustment =  
0,55 per year



# Plausibility: 2023 deficit




# Understanding the 2023 unexpected deficit (1/2)

The 2023 nominal deficit was 5.5% of GDP, much higher than the expected 4.9%: Unexpected shock, even for the government. What happened?

At the general level :

- growth forecast was correct. Tax return is lower than expected : the **elasticity of taxes to growth lower than expected**:
- ✓ In the long run, the elasticity is 1.
- ✓ It fell to **0,5 in 2023**
- ✓ This low elasticity is observed after years of *high* elasticity (1.3 and 1.4) : back to normal?



# Understanding the 2023 low elasticity (2/2)

-0.6% of GDP increase in deficit has to be explained.

Spending under control : Public spending growth is 3.7% (government forecast was 3.4%).

Tax return is lower than expected:

- Return on tax on energy providers : - 0.1% GDP
- **Corporate income tax** : - 0.4% of GDP
- Real estate tax (DMTO) : -0.1% of GDP (frozen housing market)
- +/- minor changes (VAT).

Where does this change in elasticity comes from :

- *change in inflation* (GDP deflator, production price, import price, consumer price): Inflation (CPI) : 4.9% in 2023 to 2.4% in 2024.
- Firms have to repay some emergency loans (PGE)

Can expect elasticity in 2024 to be closer to 1.

# The projected French fiscal path

Government forecast :

	2024	2025	2026	2027
<i>Growth</i>	1%	1.4%	1.7%	1.8%
<i>Deficit</i>	5.1%	4.1%	3.6%	2.9%