

Formal Verification Report: Deriverse Protocol v1

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About Deriverse Protocol

Deriverse is a decentralized exchange (DEX) built on Solana that combines automated market maker (AMM) liquidity pools with central limit order book (CLOB) functionality for both spot and perpetual futures markets.

Spot Trading uses a hybrid architecture where the constant-product AMM ($k = \text{asset_tokens} \times \text{crncy_tokens}$) provides baseline liquidity while limit orders on an RB-tree based order book offer price improvement. Traders can execute market orders, place limit orders, or swap tokens directly against the AMM & CLOB. Liquidity providers earn a share of trading fees distributed proportionally from protocol-collected fees.

Perpetual Futures operates on an isolated margin model with configurable leverage (dynamically capped based on daily volatility). The system includes funding rate mechanisms that periodically rebalance long/short positions, automated margin calls with penalty rates feeding an insurance fund, and a rebalancing mechanism for position management. Traders must purchase a "market seat" at a dynamic price based on current participant count before trading perpetuities; this seat can be sold back when exiting. Perpetual markets are created by upgrading existing spot instruments when they meet readiness criteria.

Tokenomics centers on the DRVS native token, which enables participation in on-chain governance voting (fee rates, discount parameters, pool ratios), earning of dividend distributions from protocol fees. Additionally, users can receive airdrop according to their spot/perp trading and LP activities.

Additional Features include a referral program providing fee discounts to referred traders with rewards to referrers, a points program that accumulates trading/LP activity rewards convertible to DRVS via airdrops, and a private mode for controlled launches with whitelisted participants. All protocol state is stored on-chain through Solana PDAs with no custodial control over user funds.

Formal Verification Approach

A reusable verification framework was developed to streamline property creation and maintenance. The framework provides the following capabilities:

1. Properties as simple Rust functions: Verification rules are written as regular Rust functions, while all prover configuration and boilerplate generation happens under the hood via declarative macros
2. Automatic rule generation by property type: Depending on the category (Valid State, Variable Transitions, State Transitions), rules are automatically generated and tested against all protocol instructions. Additionally, the framework supports targeted rules for specific functions with minimal configuration (High-Level, unit-test style)
3. Script-based config generation: Configuration files for all instructions and properties are generated automatically by a build script, eliminating manual setup

Correct prover operation requires a specific code structure, which is achieved through conditional compilation with the `certora` feature flag. This enables mock implementations and state capture mechanisms without modifying production code.

The verification effort focuses on the voting/governance system as an ideal candidate for isolated verification due to its well-defined boundaries and limited external dependencies.

Formal Verification Methodology

Certora Formal Verification (FV) provides mathematical proofs of smart contract correctness by verifying code against a formal specification. Unlike testing and fuzzing which examine specific execution paths, Certora FV examines all possible states and execution paths.

Assumptions

While comprehensive state exploration is powerful, it introduces a challenge: the prover can generate semantically invalid states that produce false positive violations. For example, an integer overflow may occur during increment when the prover assumes a variable already holds `MAX_UINT`. The solution is to constrain input data and state values for the prover, but these constraints must be applied carefully to avoid masking real bugs.

We classify assumptions into three categories:

Safe Assumptions

These reflect real-world constraints that don't impact security guarantees:

- Numeric values bounded to practical ranges (e.g., using effective `u128` range instead of `u256`, timestamps within reasonable bounds)
- Protocol constants honored (e.g., minimum voting token threshold is set at initialization and cannot decrease)
- Message sender (signer) assumed distinct from program accounts

Proved Assumptions

These are Valid State [invariants](#) that are **first verified by the prover**, then used as assumptions when verifying other properties. This creates a chain of trust where each assumption is backed by a mathematical proof:

- User's token balance cannot exceed total protocol token supply
- User's recorded vote references an existing voting round
- Account discriminators correctly identify account types
- Protocol version consistency across all accounts
- etc

Unsafe Assumptions

These reduce verification scope or work around prover limitations, potentially missing some execution paths. These modifications are implemented via conditional compilation (`#[cfg(feature = "certora")]`) — production code compiles the original implementation, while the `certora` feature flag enables prover-compatible alternatives.

- Mock Clock: Solana's `Clock` sysvar replaced with a symbolic mock that returns nondeterministic but bounded timestamp/slot values
- Bounded vectors: Dynamic `Vec<T>` replaced with fixed-size arrays (3 elements) to avoid symbolic length issues — affects `BoundedBaseCrnycy`, `BoundedAssets`, `BoundedClientCommunityRecords`, `BoundedOperators`

- Early panic attribute: `#[cvlr::early_panic]` added to instruction entry points for proper error path handling
- Simplified `finalize_voting()`: Voting finalization logic modified for prover compatibility
- `DirectStateAccess` trait: Enables direct memory access for state capture, bypassing standard account deserialization
- Public field visibility: Private struct fields exposed as `pub` for verification state inspection
- Signed integer conversion: `i64` fields converted to `NativeInt` with explicit bounds (`POSITIVE_I64_MAX`, `SAFE_BOUND`) due to prover treating signed comparisons as unsigned
- Loop unrolling: Capped at 3 iterations for array processing

The Certora Solana Prover is under active development. As the prover matures, some of these workarounds may become unnecessary and can be removed from the codebase. Additionally, support for certain complex instructions (such as `swap` or `deposit`) was not implemented as they would require an excessive amount of conditional compilation modifications, making maintenance impractical.

Types of Properties

When constructing properties in formal verification, we deal with five types according to [Certora's official classification](#). The first three (Valid State, Variable Transitions, State Transitions) are verified parametrically across all external instructions, while High-Level and Unit Tests target specific functions.

Valid State ([valid_state.rs](#))

Conditions that MUST always remain true throughout the protocol's lifecycle. The verification process defines valid state constraints, executes an external instruction, then confirms the invariant still holds.

Single-state invariants (`state_inv_*`) apply constraints on individual account types, while cross-state invariants (`state_inv_cross_*`) span multiple account types.

Example: "Protocol fee rates must be within governance bounds"

Variable Transitions ([variable_transitions.rs](#))

Verify that specific storage variables change only under expected conditions. The process captures a variable value before instruction execution, runs the instruction, then asserts the variable changed only as permitted or remained unchanged.

Example: "Protocol addresses (DRVS authority, USDC mint) can never change after initialization"

State Transitions ([state_transitions.rs](#))

Flexible checks for specific behaviors or conditions. These apply preconditions via `assume_pre()`, execute the instruction, then assert postconditions via `assert_post()`.

Example: "Only operators can change protocol settings"

High-Level ([high_level.rs](#))

Business logic properties verified against specific instructions rather than parametrically across all instructions. These target complex scenarios that require custom setup and assertions.

Example: "Vote with zero tokens has no effect on accumulators"

Unit Tests ([unit_test.rs](#))

Instruction-specific tests verifying expected behavior, revert conditions, and edge cases. Unlike invariants which verify properties across all instructions, unit tests focus on individual instruction semantics.

Example: "voting() reverts when user already voted in current round"

Verification Properties

Links to specific Certora Prover runs are provided for each property, with status indicators.

Valid State

Valid State properties define the fundamental invariants that must always hold true throughout the protocol's lifecycle. These properties are organized by account type and proven as invariants.

Root Account Invariants

Property	Name	Description	Status
VS-R-01	<code>root_account_valid</code>	Root account has correct type identifier (TAG = ROOT)	
VS-R-02	<code>referral_rewards_within_limits</code>	Referral discounts and ratios are within allowed limits	
VS-R-03	<code>protocol_has_clients</code>	Protocol always has at least one registered client	

Client Primary Account Invariants

Property	Name	Description	Status
VS-CP-01	<code>referral_rewards_within_limits</code>	Client account has correct type identifier (TAG = CLIENT_PRIMARY)	
VS-CP-02	<code>client_referral_rewards_within_limits</code>	Client's referral rewards are within allowed limits	
VS-CP-03	<code>user_cannot_refer_themselves</code>	User cannot set themselves as their ownreferrer	
VS-CP-04	<code>client_update_timestamp_valid</code>	Client's last update is not in the future	

Community Account Invariants

Property	Name	Description	Status
VS-C-01	<code>community_account_valid</code>	Community account has correct type identifier (TAG = COMMUNITY)	✓
VS-C-02	<code>protocol_fees_within_limits</code>	Protocol fee rates and parameters are within governance bounds	✓
VS-C-03	<code>voting_round_started_in_past</code>	Voting round cannot start in the future	
VS-C-04	<code>no_votes_before_first_round</code>	All voting fields are zero before first round starts	
VS-C-05	<code>active_round_has_deadline</code>	If voting round exists, it has a valid deadline	

Client Community Account Invariants

Property	Name	Description	Status
VS-CC-01	<code>client_community_account_valid</code>	Client community account has correct type identifier	
VS-CC-02	<code>user_token_balances_valid</code>	User's token balances are non-negative and within valid range	
VS-CC-03	<code>user_sync_timestamp_valid</code>	User's last synchronization is not in the future	
VS-CC-04	<code>user_vote_timestamp_valid</code>	User's last vote timestamp is not in the future	✓
VS-CC-05	<code>uninitialized_user_has_no_tokens</code>	User without sync history has no governance tokens	✓

Holder Account Invariants

Property	Name	Description	Status
VS-H-01	<code>holder_account_valid</code>	Holder account has correct type identifier (TAG = HOLDER)	

Token Account Invariants

Property	Name	Description	Status
VS-T-01	<code>token_account_valid</code>	Token account has correct type identifier (TAG = TOKEN)	

Instrument (Market) Account Invariants

Property	Name	Description	Status
VS-I-01	<code>market_account_valid</code>	Market account has correct type identifier (TAG = INSTR)	
VS-I-02	<code>market_has_distinct_tokens</code>	Market's base and quote tokens must be different	
VS-I-03	<code>token_decimals_valid</code>	Token decimal counts are within valid range (<32)	
VS-I-04	<code>perp_open_interest_valid</code>	Perpetual open interest is non-negative and within valid range	
VS-I-05	<code>market_risk_params_valid</code>	Market risk parameters (variance, volatility, leverage) are within bounds	
VS-I-06	<code>market_update_timestamp_valid</code>	Market's last update is not in the future	

Spot Trade Account Invariants

Property	Name	Description	Status
VS-ST-01	<code>spot_trade_account_valid</code>	Spot trade account has correct type identifier	
VS-ST-02	<code>spot_trade_timestamp_valid</code>	Spot trade timestamp is not in the future	

Perp Trade Account Invariants

Property	Name	Description	Status
VS-PT-01	<code>perp_trade_account_valid</code>	Perp trade account has correct type identifier	
VS-PT-02	<code>perp_trade_timestamp_valid</code>	Perp trade timestamp is not in the future	

Candles Account Invariants

Property	Name	Description	Status
VS-CA-01	<code>candles_account_valid</code>	Candles account has correct type identifier	
VS-CA-02	<code>candles_timestamp_valid</code>	Candles timestamp is not in the future	

Private Client Account Invariants

Property	Name	Description	Status
VS-PC-01	<code>private_client_account_valid</code>	Private client account has correct type identifier (or uninitialized)	

Cross-State Invariants: Balance

Property	Name	Description	Status
VS-X-01	community_balances_valid	Community token balances are non-negative and within valid range	
VS-X-02	previous_round_votes_within_supply	Previous round votes cannot exceed token supply at that time	
VS-X-03	votes_cannot_exceed_supply	Total votes cast cannot exceed available token supply	
VS-X-04	base_currencies_within_limit	Base currency count doesn't exceed token count	✓

Cross-State Invariants: ID Validation

Property	Name	Description	Status
VS-X-05	user_id_valid	User ID is within valid range	✓
VS-X-06	token_id_valid	Token ID is registered in protocol	✓
VS-X-07	market_id_valid	Market ID is registered in protocol	✓
VS-X-08	market_tokens_valid	Market's base and quote tokens are registered	✓
VS-X-09	spot_order_ids_valid	Spot order references valid market and tokens	✓
VS-X-10	perp_order_ids_valid	Perp order references valid market and tokens	✓
VS-X-11	user_referral_links_valid	User's referral links reference valid referrers	✓
VS-X-12	user_assets_within_limit	User's asset count doesn't exceed available tokens	
VS-X-13	candles_market_valid	Candles data references valid market	✓
VS-X-14	referrer_id_valid	Referrer ID is a valid user	✓

Cross-State Invariants: Account Consistency

Property	Name	Description	Status
VS-X-15	community_account_matches_user	Community account belongs to correct user	✓
VS-X-16	user_community_state_valid	User's community state references valid round	

Property	Name	Description	Status
VS-X-17	<code>all_accounts_same_version</code>	All protocol accounts use same version	
VS-X-18	<code>private_client_registration_valid</code>	Private client entries have valid timestamps	

Cross-State Invariants: Voting

Property	Name	Description	Status
VS-X-19	<code>user_voted_in_existing_round</code>	User's recorded vote is in a round that exists	✓
VS-X-20	<code>user_synced_to_existing_round</code>	User is synchronized to a round that exists	
VS-X-21	<code>user_tokens_within_protocol_total</code>	User cannot have more tokens than exist in protocol	✓
VS-X-22	<code>user_voting_power_within_supply</code>	User's voting power cannot exceed total supply	✓
VS-X-23	<code>user_vote_weight_within_supply</code>	User's vote weight cannot exceed total supply	
VS-X-24	<code>vote_weight_snapshot_at_round_start</code>	Vote weight is fixed at round start (tokens deposited after don't count)	✓
VS-X-25	<code>vote_requires_tokens</code>	User must have tokens to vote	✓
VS-X-26	<code>vote_has_timestamp</code>	Every vote has a recorded timestamp	
VS-X-27	<code>no_vote_before_sync</code>	User cannot vote before synchronizing with round	
VS-X-28	<code>vote_weight_not_inflated</code>	Vote weight cannot exceed user's available tokens	
VS-X-29	<code>vote_weight_consistent_in_round</code>	Vote weight stays the same throughout a round	
VS-X-30	<code>deadline_requires_active_round</code>	Voting deadline only exists for active rounds	✓
VS-X-31	<code>sufficient_tokens_for_active_voting</code>	Minimum token threshold met for active voting	

Variable Transitions

Variable Transition properties verify that specific storage variables change only under expected conditions.

Root Account Transitions

Property	Name	Description	Status
VT-R-01	<code>new_entities_one_at_a_time</code>	New users, tokens, markets, and referral links are added one at a time	
VT-R-02	<code>points_program_cannot_shorten</code>	Points program expiration can only be extended, never shortened	
VT-R-03	<code>protocol_addresses_unchangeable</code>	Core protocol addresses (holder, LUT, DRVS mint, operator) cannot change after setup	

Client Primary Account Transitions

Property	Name	Description	Status
VT-CP-01	<code>user_identity_unchangeable</code>	User's wallet address, LUT, and ID cannot change after registration	
VT-CP-02	<code>user_trades_one_at_a_time</code>	User's spot, perp, LP trades and assets increase one at a time	
VT-CP-03	<code>user_points_never_decrease</code>	User's earned points can only increase	
VT-CP-04	<code>user_activity_moves_forward</code>	User's activity timestamp only moves forward	
VT-CP-05	<code>referral_benefits_preserved</code>	User's referral links and expirations can only improve	

Community Account Transitions

Property	Name	Description	Status
VT-C-01	<code>voting_rounds_progress_forward</code>	Voting round counter and base currency count only increase	
VT-C-02	<code>minimum_stake_unchangeable</code>	Minimum token threshold for voting is set once and never changes	
VT-C-03	<code>fee_changes_gradual</code>	Protocol fees can only change by ± 1 per voting round (no sudden jumps)	
VT-C-04	<code>voting_rounds_never_restart</code>	Voting round start time only moves forward	

Client Community Account Transitions

Property	Name	Description	Status
VT-CC-01	<code>user_community_id_unchangeable</code>	User's community account ID cannot change after creation	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
VT-CC-02	<code>user_community_sync_moves_forward</code>	User's community sync timestamp only moves forward	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
VT-CC-03	<code>user_voting_progress_forward</code>	User's voting round tracking only moves forward (no going back)	

Holder Account Transitions

Property	Name	Description	Status
VT-H-01	<code>operators_added_one_at_a_time</code>	New protocol operators are added one at a time	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>

Token Account Transitions

Property	Name	Description	Status
VT-T-01	<code>token_config_unchangeable</code>	Token ID, address, program, mask, and base currency are set once and never change	

Instrument (Market) Account Transitions

Property	Name	Description	Status
VT-I-01	<code>market_config_unchangeable</code>	Market's tokens, ID, creator, addresses, and decimals cannot change after creation	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
VT-I-02	<code>market_activity_grows</code>	Market's trade counters and derivative count only increase	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
VT-I-03	<code>market_history_preserved</code>	Market's all-time trade counts and timestamp only increase	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>

Spot Trade Account Transitions

Property	Name	Description	Status
VT-ST-01	<code>spot_order_market_unchangeable</code>	Spot order's market and token references cannot change	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
VT-ST-02	<code>spot_order_timestamp_moves_forward</code>	Spot order's timestamp only moves forward	

Perp Trade Account Transitions

Property	Name	Description	Status
VT-PT-01	<code>perp_position_market_unchangeable</code>	Perp position's ID and token references cannot change	
VT-PT-02	<code>perp_position_timestamp_moves_forward</code>	Perp position's timestamp only moves forward	

Candles Account Transitions

Property	Name	Description	Status
VT-CA-01	<code>candles_market_unchangeable</code>	Candles' market reference cannot change	
VT-CA-02	<code>candles_data_grows</code>	Candles timestamp and count only increase	
VT-CA-03	<code>candles_buffer_wraps_correctly</code>	Candles circular buffer index increases or wraps to zero	

State Transitions

State Transition properties verify the correctness of transitions between valid states.

Access Control Properties

Property	Name	Description	Status	Notes
ST-A-01	<code>only_operator_changes_protocol_settings</code>	Only the protocol operator can modify admin settings		
ST-A-02	<code>only_owner_modifies_account</code>	Only the wallet owner can modify their account data		
ST-A-03	<code>admin_state_protected</code>	If any admin-only field changed, the operator must have signed		Issue: #7, #117. Passed after fix
ST-A-04	<code>new_private_client_matches_protocol_version</code>	New private client accounts use the same version as the protocol		
ST-A-05	<code>private_client_version_match</code>	When a private client is added, root and private_client header versions must match		Issue: #17. Passed after fix

Voting System Properties (Transitions)

Property	Name	Description	Status
ST-V-01	<code>votes_accepted_before_deadline</code>	Votes are only accepted before the voting deadline	X
ST-V-02	<code>user_voting_progress_only_forward</code>	User's voting round tracking only moves forward	✓
ST-V-03	<code>user_vote_timestamp_only_increases</code>	User's vote timestamp only increases	✓
ST-V-04	<code>total_votes_grow_or_reset</code>	Total votes can only increase during a round or reset at round end	✓
ST-V-05	<code>new_round_updates_start_time</code>	When a new voting round starts, the start time is updated	
ST-V-06	<code>fee_changes_require_new_round</code>	Protocol fee changes only happen when a new voting round completes	
ST-V-07	<code>voting_power_snapshot_at_round_start</code>	Total voting power is only recalculated when a new round starts	✓
ST-V-08	<code>previous_round_results_preserved</code>	Previous round results are preserved when new round starts	
ST-V-09	<code>new_round_extends_deadline</code>	Voting deadline extends when new round starts	✓

High-Level

High-Level properties verify business logic and end-to-end scenarios for specific instructions.

Voting System Properties

Property	Name	Description	Status
HL-V-01	<code>vote_rejected_for_wrong_round</code>	User's vote is rejected if they specify a round that doesn't match the current active round	✓
HL-V-02	<code>double_voting_rejected</code>	User cannot submit two votes in the same voting round	
HL-V-03	<code>vote_affects_correct_accumulator</code>	User's vote actually affects the correct accumulator based on choice	

Property	Name	Description	Status
HL-V-04	<code>voting_is_reachable</code>	Voting is reachable - user can actually cast a vote	✓
HL-V-05	<code>no_votes_after_deadline</code>	After voting deadline passes, no new votes are recorded	
HL-V-06	<code>zero_tokens_no_vote_effect</code>	User with zero tokens cannot affect vote tallies	

Business Logic Properties

Property	Name	Description	Status	Notes
HL-B-01	<code>user_dividends_synced_with_protocol</code>	After claiming dividends, user's base currency list matches the protocol's supported currencies	✗	Issue: #80 . ✓ Passed after fix
ST-B-01	<code>votes_accepted_before_deadline</code>	Voting accumulators only increase when current time <= voting_end_time	✗	Issue: #16 . ✓ Passed after fix

Unit Tests

Unit tests verify specific behavior of individual instructions, testing exact input/output relationships and revert conditions. Unlike invariants (which verify properties across all instructions), unit tests target one instruction at a time.

Defined in `specs/unit_test.rs`. Added to `confs/unit_tests/` configs.

Voting Unit Tests (9)

Tests for the `voting()` instruction behavior.

Property	Name	Description	Status
UT-V-01	<code>voting_requires_matching_counter</code>	voting() requires voting_counter to match community	
UT-V-02	<code>voting_requires_not_already_voted</code>	voting() requires user hasn't voted yet in current round	
UT-V-03	<code>voting_sets_last_counter_correctly</code>	voting() sets last_voting_counter to community.voting_counter	
UT-V-04	<code>voting_sets_last_tokens_correctly</code>	voting() sets last_voting_tokens equal to current_voting_tokens	
UT-V-05	<code>voting_sets_choice_correctly</code>	voting() sets last_choice to match instruction data	
UT-V-06	<code>voting_accepts_at_exact_deadline</code>	voting() at exact deadline still accepts vote	

Property	Name	Description	Status
UT-V-07	voting_with_minimum_tokens	voting() with minimum tokens still affects accumulators	
UT-V-08	voting_syncs_counter_when_slot_old	voting() syncs current_voting_counter when slot <= voting_start_slot	
UT-V-09	voting_uses_drvs_tokens_when_slot_old	voting() uses drvs_tokens as voting_tokens when slot <= voting_start_slot	

Change Voting Unit Tests (8)

Tests for the `change_voting()` instruction behavior.

Property	Name	Description	Status
UT-CV-01	change_voting_requires_matching_counter	change_voting() requires voting_counter to match community	
UT-CV-02	change_voting_requires_has_voted	change_voting() requires user has voted in current round	
UT-CV-03	change_voting_updates_choice	change_voting() updates last_choice to new_choice	
UT-CV-04	change_voting_preserves_last_counter	change_voting() does NOT change last_voting_counter	
UT-CV-05	change_voting_preserves_last_tokens	change_voting() does NOT change last_voting_tokens	
UT-CV-06	change_voting_moves_between_accumulators	change_voting() moves tokens from old to new accumulator	
UT-CV-07	change_voting_noop_after_deadline	change_voting() after deadline doesn't modify accumulators	
UT-CV-08	change_voting_same_choice_allowed	change_voting() to same choice is allowed (no-op)	

Next Voting Unit Tests (8)

Tests for the `next_voting()` instruction behavior.

Property	Name	Description	Status
UT-NV-01	next_voting_requires_sufficient_tokens	next_voting() requires drvs_tokens > min_amount	
UT-NV-02	next_voting_increments_counter	next_voting() increments voting_counter by 1	
UT-NV-03	next_voting_preserves_previous_results	next_voting() preserves previous round results in prev_* fields	

Property	Name	Description	Status
UT-NV-04	<code>next_voting_resets_accumulators</code>	next_voting() resets current voting accumulators to zero	
UT-NV-05	<code>next_voting_snapshots_supply</code>	next_voting() updates voting_supply to current drvs_tokens	
UT-NV-06	<code>next_voting_updates_start_slot</code>	next_voting() updates voting_start_slot to current slot	
UT-NV-07	<code>next_voting_extends_deadline</code>	next_voting() extends voting_end_time	
UT-NV-08	<code>next_voting_is_permissionless</code>	next_voting() is permissionless (any signer can call)	

Real Issues Properties

This section documents vulnerabilities discovered during the manual audit (by all participants) and formal verification process. Each issue demonstrates how formal properties detected the vulnerability and confirmed its resolution after applying the fix.

[HIGH] Missing Signer Verification in `voting_reset` Function Allows Unauthorized Execution (#117)

The `voting_reset` function only verifies that the `admin` account's public key matches the operator address, but does not verify that the `admin` account is actually a signer of the transaction. This allows an attacker to execute the `voting_reset` instruction by passing an account that matches the operator address but no signing is required, resetting critical voting parameters without proper authorization.

✖ Violated (in `voting_reset()`): <https://prover.certora.com/output/52567/034d832c88f047849b04856c7063192a/?anonymousKey=b7a9454433a41df515c7e8b721fa34ddd9b43b4d>

```
// If any admin-only field changed, the operator must have signed
// transitions__admin_state_protected_{instruction}
fn admin_state_protected(
    before: &AllStatesProp,
    after: &AllStatesProp,
    _ctx: &TransitionContext
) -> bool {
    let root_changed = match (&before.root.state, &after.root.state) {
        (Some(b), Some(a)) => b.admin_fields_changed(a),
        _ => false,
    };
    let community_changed = match (&before.community.state, &after.community.state) {
        (Some(b), Some(a)) => b.admin_fields_changed(a),
        _ => false,
    };
    let instr_changed = match (&before.instrument.state, &after.instrument.state) {
        (Some(b), Some(a)) => b.admin_fields_changed(a),
        _ => false,
    };
}
```

```

        _ => false,
    };
    let admin_field_changed = root_changed || community_changed || instr_changed;
    if !admin_field_changed {
        return true; // No admin fields changed, no auth required
    }
    // 1. Admin account is a signer (is_signer=true)
    let is_signer = after.signer_account.is_signer;
    // 2. Admin pubkey matches root_state.operator_address
    let key_matches = match &before.root.state {
        Some(root) => after.signer_account.key == root.operator_address,
        None => false, // Root state required for admin instructions
    };
    is_signer && key_matches
}

```

Passed after the fix (tested with 2.58.3): <https://prover.certora.com/output/52567/745d13da8b5a4a55803e38670010745a/?anonymousKey=b7d2382e683caeaa9c29264477f4c2391c04705d>

```

diff --git a/src/program/processor/voting_reset.rs b/src/program/processor/voting_reset.rs
index 4c1de8d..ecbd4a3 100644
--- a/src/program/processor/voting_reset.rs
+++ b/src/program/processor/voting_reset.rs
@@ -55,6 +55,12 @@ pub fn voting_reset(program_id: &Pubkey, accounts: &[AccountInfo]) ->
DeriverseR
    })
}

+    if !admin.is_signer {
+        bail!(MustBeSigner {
+            address: *admin.key
+        })
+    }
+
    let mut community_state = CommunityState::new(community_acc, program_id,
root_state.version)?;

    let header = community_state.header.upgrade()?;

```

[HIGH] Missing Version Validation for Private Clients Account in new_private_client (#17)

The `new_private_client()` function fails to validate that the provided `private_clients_acc` account matches the protocol version specified in `root_state`. Since different protocol versions use different PDA seeds (which include the version), each version has its own isolated `private_clients_acc`. However, the function does not verify this correspondence, potentially allowing cross-version account misuse.

Violated (in `new_private_client()`): <https://prover.certora.com/output/52567/269716a15d4943729d3f503f687108ab/?anonymousKey=c873dc261cd33662659bc5e856520b045c98d4d7>

```

// When a private client is added, root and private_client header versions must match
(new_private_client.rs)
// transitions_prop__private_client_version_match_{instruction}
transitions_prop! { private_client_version_match,
    fn assume_pre(states: &AllStatesProp, ctx: &TransitionContext) -> bool {
        true
    }
    fn assert_post(
        before: &AllStatesProp,
        after: &AllStatesProp,
        ctx: &TransitionContext
    ) -> bool {
        let before_has_client = before.private_client.clients[0].has_any_non_zero_field();
        let after_has_client = after.private_client.clients[0].has_any_non_zero_field();
        // Only check if client was added to slot 0
        if before_has_client || !after_has_client {
            return true;
        }
        // Client was added - verify versions match
        match (&before.root.state, &before.private_client.state) {
            (Some(root), Some(pc)) => {
                root.discriminator.version == pc.discriminator.version
            }
            _ => true
        }
    }
}

```

✓ Passed after the fix: <https://prover.certora.com/output/52567/ae105778951d4dc09fd2f342dd2e0c0d/?anonymousKey=5fe9ec986b540d2e8e9bca1af24a76e88a8c9353>

```

diff --git a/src/program/processor/new_private_client.rs
b/src/program/processor/new_private_client.rs
index b025504..24b74d2 100644
--- a/src/program/processor/new_private_client.rs
+++ b/src/program/processor/new_private_client.rs
@@ -108,6 +108,9 @@ pub fn new_private_client(
);
}

+ let _: &mut PrivateClientHeader =
+     FromAccountInfo::from_account_info(private_clients_acc, program_id,
root_state.version)?;
+
let current_time = Clock::get()
.map_err(|err| drv_err!(err.into()))?
.unix_timestamp as u32;

```

[MEDIUM] change_points_program_expiration is permissionless (#7)

The `change_points_program_expiration` function fails to verify that the `admin` account has actually signed the transaction. While the function checks that the provided admin account key matches the expected `operator_address` in the root state, it does not verify that the account is a signer using `admin.is_signer`. Any normal user can pass admin pubkey and execute this instruction without the real admin signing it.

✗ Violated (in `change_points_program_expiration()`): <https://prover.certora.com/output/52567/63fe983cbd4542229ef43d7fa5390ca0/?anonymousKey=1d47a4d8fa7642f1cf64cca16b1ef06248881397>

```
// If any admin-only field changed, the operator must have signed
// transitions__admin_state_protected_{instruction}
fn admin_state_protected(
    before: &AllStatesProp,
    after: &AllStatesProp,
    _ctx: &TransitionContext
) -> bool {
    let root_changed = match (&before.root.state, &after.root.state) {
        (Some(b), Some(a)) => b.admin_fields_changed(a),
        _ => false,
    };
    let community_changed = match (&before.community.state, &after.community.state) {
        (Some(b), Some(a)) => b.admin_fields_changed(a),
        _ => false,
    };
    let instr_changed = match (&before.instrument.state, &after.instrument.state) {
        (Some(b), Some(a)) => b.admin_fields_changed(a),
        _ => false,
    };
    let admin_field_changed = root_changed || community_changed || instr_changed;
    if !admin_field_changed {
        return true; // No admin fields changed, no auth required
    }
    // 1. Admin account is a signer (is_signer=true)
    let is_signer = after.signer_account.is_signer;
    // 2. Admin pubkey matches root_state.operator_address
    let key_matches = match &before.root.state {
        Some(root) => after.signer_account.key == root.operator_address,
        None => false, // Root state required for admin instructions
    };
    is_signer && key_matches
}
```

✓ Passed after the fix (tested with 2.58.3): <https://prover.certora.com/output/52567/ac4a784a33a94ef59eb4ec703d03a692/?anonymousKey=81fa0cedaf781019c7eb0c898b00ab596e5a19ee>

```
diff --git a/src/program/processor/change_points_program_expiration.rs
b/src/program/processor/change_points_program_expiration.rs
index db63d20..1e703b9 100644
--- a/src/program/processor/change_points_program_expiration.rs
+++ b/src/program/processor/change_points_program_expiration.rs
@@ -46,6 +46,12 @@ pub fn change_points_program_expiration(
```

```

let data = PointsProgramExpiration::new(instruction_data)?;
let root_state: &mut RootState = RootState::from_account_info(root_acc, program_id)?;

+   if !admin.is_signer {
+       bail!(MustBeSigner {
+           address: *admin.key,
+       });
+   }
+
if root_state.operator_address != *admin.key {
    bail!(InvalidAdminAccount {
        expected_address: root_state.operator_address,
}

```

[MEDIUM] Voting is allowed even after voting period's end time (#16)

The `voting()` function does not validate whether the voting period has ended before processing and recording votes. The function only checks the voting end time in the `finalize_voting()` call at the very end, but by that point the user's vote has already been cast and included in the voting tallies. This allows the last user to submit a vote even after the official voting period has expired.

✖ Violated (in `voting()`): <https://prover.certora.com/output/52567/f6588e7157604236b166ff7e0d15e1d9/?anonymousKey=1cc62f91c3cebd5b5e7d3508fa47ed2d1354bebb>

```

// Voting accumulators only increase when current time <= voting_end_time
// transitions_voting_only_before_end_time_{instruction}
fn voting_only_before_end_time(
    before: &AllStatesProp,
    after: &AllStatesProp,
    _ctx: &TransitionContext
) -> bool {
    let clock_time = get_certora_timestamp();
    match (&before.community.state, &after.community.state) {
        (Some(b), Some(a)) => {
            // If any voting accumulator increased, time must be <= voting_end_time
            let voting_increased =
                a.voting_decr > b.voting_decr ||
                a.voting_incr > b.voting_incr ||
                a.voting_unchange > b.voting_unchange;
            if !voting_increased {
                return true; // No voting occurred, rule trivially holds
            }
            // Voting occurred, so time must have been <= voting_end_time
            clock_time <= b.voting_end_time
        }
        _ => true // No community state, rule trivially holds
    }
}

```

✓ Passed after the fix (tested with 2.58.3): <https://prover.certora.com/output/52567/d8bbaaf0ca5c490b9903111584277a63/?anonymousKey=c2d3ee7a7a39dfc01df3e6507bf0bc8ff9961ba4>

```

diff --git a/src/program/processor/voting.rs b/src/program/processor/voting.rs
index 795efc0..25bb64d 100644
--- a/src/program/processor/voting.rs
+++ b/src/program/processor/voting.rs
@@ -105,6 +105,7 @@ pub fn voting(
    let clock = Clock::get().map_err(|err| drv_err!(err.into()))?;
    let time = clock.unix_timestamp as u32;

+    if community_account_header.voting_end_time >= time {
        match data.choice {
            VoteOption::DECREMENT => {
                community_account_header.voting_decr += voting_tokens;
@@ -128,6 +129,7 @@ pub fn voting(
            client_community_state.header.last_choice = data.choice as u32;
            client_community_state.header.last_voting_tokens = voting_tokens;
            client_community_state.header.last_voting_time = time;
+        }
    }

#[cfg(not(feature = "certora"))]
community_state.finalize_voting(time, clock.slot as u32)?;

```

[MEDIUM] Missing Array Synchronization in dividends_claim Prevents Users from Claiming Dividends for Newly Added Base Currencies (#80)

The `dividends_claim` instruction does not synchronize `client_community_state.data` with `community_state.base_crncy` before processing dividends. If a new base currency is added to the community and a user hasn't performed any operations (like `deposit` or `trading`) that trigger synchronization, the user's `client_community_state.data` array will be shorter than `community_state.base_crncy`. This causes the zip iterator to stop early, preventing users from claiming dividends for newly added base currencies.

✖ Violated (before the fix): <https://prover.certora.com/output/52567/0da9e9ee1b91424f892dc1895b79544d/?anonymousKey=80f4cc8482c707b3e2d6277928d96e326e3c953e>

```

// After claiming dividends, user's base currency list matches the protocol's supported currencies
#[rule]
pub fn user_dividends_synced_with_protocol() {
    let program_id = nondet_program_id();
    let accounts = nondet_accounts_dividends_claim();
    log_accounts(&accounts, &mut new_logger());
    let ctx = PropertyContext::new(FunctionName::DividendsClaim, &program_id, &accounts, &[]);
    let pre = AllStatesProp::capture(&accounts, FunctionName::DividendsClaim);
    pre.log("PRE", &mut new_logger());
    pre.safe_assume_all();
    // Additional constraint for this specific rule
    if let Some(cc) = &pre.client_community.state {
        let client_community_acc = &accounts[4];
        let expected_size = CLIENT_COMMUNITY_ACCOUNT_HEADER_SIZE
            + CLIENT_COMMUNITY_RECORD_SIZE * u64::from(cc.count) as usize;
    }
}

```

```

    cvlr_assume!(client_community_acc.data_len() == expected_size);
}

pre.proved_assume_all(&ctx);
dividends_claim(&program_id, &accounts).unwrap();
let post = AllStatesProp::capture(&accounts, FunctionName::DividendsClaim);
post.log("POST", &mut new_logger());
if let (Some(community), Some(cc)) = (&post.community.state,
&post.client_community.state) {
    cvlr_assert_eq!(cc.count, NativeInt::from(community.count));
}
}
}

```

Passed after the fix (tested with 2.58.8): <https://prover.certora.com/output/52567/ef89a6989ef545ffa3cc58fcbb6ae70/?anonymousKey=01aef27465f8f97ddb51cfb810ee54a2be7c693f>

Developer's Guide

This section provides practical guidance for developers working with the formal verification framework.

Installation

For Certora Solana Prover installation, refer to the official [documentation](#).

Requirements:

- Rust toolchain (stable)
- Python 3.8+
- Certora Prover license key (set `CERTORAKEY` environment variable)

Project Setup

The verification setup is based on Certora's [solana-spec-template](#). Below are the integration steps used for this project.

1. Initialize template

```

cd src
git clone https://github.com/Certora/solana-spec-template certora
cd certora
python3 certora-setup.py --workspace /path/to/project --package-name smart-contract --
execute

```

Add the module to `src/lib.rs`:

```

#[cfg(feature = "certora")]
pub mod certora;

```

2. Configure build script

Modify `certora_build.py` to support Solana v2 and skip dev-dependencies:

```
cargo_cmd = ['cargo', 'certora-sbf', '--tools-version', 'v1.43', '--cargo-args=--lib']
```

3. Update Cargo.toml

Add Certora dependencies and feature flag:

```
[features]
certora = ["alpha", "dep:cplr", "dep:cplr-solana"]

[workspace.dependencies.cplr]
version = "0.4.1"

[workspace.dependencies.cplr-solana]
git = "https://github.com/Certora/cplr-solana"
branch = "v0.5"

[dependencies.cplr]
workspace = true
optional = true

[dependencies.cplr-solana]
workspace = true
optional = true

[package.metadata.certora]
sources = [ "Cargo.toml", "src/**/*.rs" ]
solana_inlining = [ "src/certora/envs/cplr_inlining_core.txt" ]
solana_summaries = [ "src/certora/envs/cplr_summaries_core.txt" ]
```

4. Downgrade incompatible crates

The `certora-sbf v1.43` ships with rustc 1.79.0-dev, requiring some dependency downgrades:

```
# indexmap 2.12.x requires rustc 1.82
cargo update indexmap@2.12.1 --precise 2.11.4

# ahash 0.8.12 pulls in getrandom 0.3.4 which doesn't support BPF targets
cargo update ahash --precise 0.8.11
```

Conditional Compilation

All verification-specific code is gated behind the `certora` feature flag. This ensures production builds remain unaffected.

Usage pattern:

```

#[cfg(feature = "certora")]
use crate::certora::mocks::clock::Clock;

#[cfg(not(feature = "certora"))]
use solana_program::clock::Clock;

```

Build commands:

```

# Production build (no verification code)
cargo build-sbf

# Verification build
python3 src/certora/scripts/certora_build.py -l -v

# Or directly with cargo
cargo build --features certora

```

Project Structure

The verification framework is organized under `src/certora/`:

```

src/certora/
├── specs/                      # Property specifications
│   ├── valid_state.rs           # Valid State invariants (state_inv_*, state_inv_cross_*)
│   ├── variable_transitions.rs  # Variable Transition properties (variable_prop_*)
│   ├── state_transitions.rs    # State Transition properties (transitions_prop!)
│   ├── high_level.rs           # High-Level rules for specific instructions
│   ├── unit_test.rs             # Unit tests for individual instruction behavior
│   └── base/                   # Shared verification infrastructure
        ├── mod.rs
        ├── base.rs                # FunctionName enum, PropertyContext
        ├── setup.rs               # nondet_accounts_*, setup_* functions
        ├── state/
            ├── mod.rs
            └── {account}.rs          # Per-account Clone structs (root.rs,
                                         community_account_header.rs, etc.)
                ├── valid_state/      # Property wrappers, AllStatesProp, proved_assume_all()
                │   └── mod.rs
                └── {account}.rs        # Per-account property wrappers and macros
        └── parametric_rules.rs     # Macro-generated rules for all instructions
        └── log/                  # Logging utilities for debugging

    └── mocks/                  # Prover-compatible replacements
        ├── mod.rs
        ├── clock.rs              # Symbolic Clock with bounded timestamp/slot
        └── bounded_vec.rs         # Fixed-size arrays replacing Vec<T>

    └── confs/                  # Prover configuration files
        ├── base.conf             # Base configuration inherited by all others
        └── properties/           # Generated configs organized by property type
            └── valid_state/

```

```

    |   └── root/          # Root account invariants
    |   └── community/     # Community account invariants
    |   └── client_primary/
    |       └── cross/      # Cross-state invariants
    └── variable_transitions/
        └── root/
            └── community/
                └── ...
    └── state_transitions/
    └── high_level/
    └── unit_tests/

    └── scripts/           # Build and generation scripts
        ├── certora_build.py    # Build script for prover
        └── generate_confs_all.py # Config generator from spec files

    └── envs/              # Prover environment configuration
        ├── cvlr_inlining_core.txt    # Functions to inline
        └── cvlr_summaries_core.txt    # Function summaries

```

The `specs/` directory is organized by property classification type at the top level (matching the five categories described in [Types of Properties](#)), while all supporting infrastructure — state capture, account generation, macros, and logging — resides in the `base/` subdirectory.

Key Files

File	Purpose
<code>specs/base/base.rs</code>	Defines <code>FunctionName</code> enum listing all verified instructions and <code>PropertyContext</code> for rule execution
<code>specs/base/setup.rs</code>	Contains <code>nondet_accounts_*</code> () functions that create symbolic accounts and <code>setup_*</code> () helpers for each instruction
<code>specs/base/state/</code>	Per-account Clone structs for state capture, <code>safe_assume()</code> bounds, <code>DirectStateAccess</code> trait
<code>specs/base/valid_state/</code>	Per-account property wrappers and macros; <code>AllStatesProp</code> struct, <code>proved_assume_all()</code>
<code>specs/base/parametric_rules.rs</code>	Macros generating rules for each instruction from property definitions
<code>mocks/clock.rs</code>	Symbolic <code>clock</code> returning nondeterministic but bounded values via lazy initialization
<code>mocks/bounded_vec.rs</code>	<code>BoundedBaseCrnacy</code> , <code>BoundedAssets</code> , etc. — fixed-size arrays (3 elements) replacing dynamic vectors
<code>scripts/generate_confs_all.py</code>	Parses spec files and generates <code>.conf</code> files for each property × instruction combination

File	Purpose
confs/base.conf	Base prover settings inherited by all generated configs

Running Verification

Configuration System

Prover configurations are JSON files that specify which rules to verify. The system uses inheritance: all configs extend `base.conf` which contains common settings.

Config generation: The script `scripts/generate_confs_all.py` automatically parses spec files and generates configs for each property × instruction combination. It reads:

- Property definitions from `specs/*.rs` files
- Supported instructions from `specs/base/parametric_rules.rs`

To exclude an instruction from verification, simply comment it out in `parametric_rules.rs`.

```
# Generate all configs to generated_all/ directory
python3 src/certora/scripts/generate_confs_all.py
```

Voting-specific generation: The script `scripts/generate_confs_voting.py` generates configs only for voting-related instructions:

```
VOTING_FUNCS = ["voting", "change_voting", "next_voting"]
```

This is useful for focused verification of the governance system without running unrelated instruction combinations.

```
# Generate configs for voting instructions only
python3 src/certora/scripts/generate_confs_voting.py
```

Current configs: The `src/certora/confs/properties/` directory was also generated by this script, but then manually edited to comment out instructions unrelated to specific invariants. This avoids verifying unnecessary combinations and reduces overall verification time.

Example of a generated config (`valid_state/community/protocol_fees_within_limits.conf`):

```
{
  "override_base_config": "../../base.conf",
  "build_script": "../../scripts/certora_build.py",
  "msg": "state_inv_community_protocol_fees_within_limits",
  "rule": [
    "state_inv_community_protocol_fees_within_limits_fees_deposit",
    "state_inv_community_protocol_fees_within_limits_next_voting",
    "state_inv_community_protocol_fees_within_limits_dividends_allocation",
    "state_inv_community_protocol_fees_within_limits_dividends_claim",
    "state_inv_community_protocol_fees_within_limits_voting",
```

```

    // "state_inv_community_protocol_fees_within_limits_deposit", // commented - not
    relevant
    "state_inv_community_protocol_fees_within_limits_voting_reset",
    "state_inv_community_protocol_fees_within_limits_change_voting"
]
}

```

Rule naming convention: {property_name}__{instruction_name}

Filtering Generated Configs

The generator supports filtering by properties or instructions:

```

# Generate configs only for specific properties
python3 generate_confs_all.py --filter_props voting_props.txt

# Generate configs only for specific instructions
python3 generate_confs_all.py --filter_funcs voting_funcs.txt

# Both filters
python3 generate_confs_all.py --filter_props props.txt --filter_funcs funcs.txt

```

Filter files use simple format: one name per line, # for comments.

Running Verifications

Configs must be run from the directory containing the config file:

```

# Navigate to config directory and run
cd src/certora/confs/properties/valid_state/community
certoraSolanaProver protocol_fees_within_limits.conf

```

Specific rule within a config:

```

cd src/certora/confs/properties/valid_state/community
certoraSolanaProver protocol_fees_within_limits.conf \
--rule state_inv_community_protocol_fees_within_limits_voting

```

Using generated run scripts (can be run from any directory):

```

# Run all properties in a category
python3 src/certora/confs/properties/valid_state/run_all.py

# Run all properties
python3 src/certora/confs/properties/run_all.py

```

Understanding Results

Prover Execution Flow

When you run the prover, it compiles the code locally and submits it along with source files to a remote server. The server returns a link to the job dashboard where you can monitor progress and view results.

Dashboard: <https://prover.certora.com/>

Result Statuses

After verification completes, each rule displays one of the following statuses:

Status	Meaning
Verified (green)	Property holds for all possible execution paths
✗ Violated (red)	Counterexample found — property can be broken
⚠ Timeout	Verification exceeded time limit — consider simplifying the property or adding assumptions
✗ Error	Prover encountered an error (compilation issue, unsupported operation, etc.)

Local vs Remote Execution

The prover can run on Certora's remote servers (default) or locally using [CertoraProver](#). Logs displayed in the remote dashboard are also available in the local console during execution.

Reading Counterexamples

When a property is violated, the prover provides a counterexample (calltrace) showing the exact execution path that breaks the invariant. To debug these, the framework includes logging utilities that capture:

- Input instructions
- All account metadata (keys, signers, writability)
- State field values for each captured account before and after execution

Logging is implemented in `specs/base/log/`.

Adding New Properties

Choosing Property Type

Before creating a property, determine its type based on what you want to verify:

If you want to...	Use	Notes
Verify a condition that must always hold	Valid State	Simple, single-account constraints. Also used as assumptions in other properties — keep these short and focused

If you want to...	Use	Notes
Track how a single variable changes	Variable Transitions	Focus on one variable's allowed mutations
Verify complex state changes with dependencies	State Transitions	Multiple variables, cross-account dependencies. Uses all Valid State invariants as assumptions
Test specific instruction behavior	High-Level or Unit Test	Targets specific functions, not parametric. High-Level for complex scenarios, Unit Test for edge cases and reverts

How Properties Work Under the Hood

Each property type has a different execution model. Understanding this helps write correct specifications.

Valid State (`state_inv_*`, `state_inv_cross_*`)

Two variants exist:

- `state_inv_*`: Works with a single account type. Only that account's state is initialized with nondeterministic values.
- `state_inv_cross_*`: Works across multiple accounts. All account states are initialized.

Execution flow:

1. Instruction inputs (accounts, parameters) filled with nondeterministic values
2. Pre-state snapshot captured and logged
3. `safe_assume()` applied — bounds on nondeterministic data
4. Instruction executed (prover discards all paths that revert)
5. Post-state snapshot captured and logged
6. Same invariant checked via `cvlr_assert!`

The key insight: Valid State properties use the same constraint for both assumption (pre) and assertion (post). This proves the property is *inductive* — if it holds before, it holds after.

Variable Transitions (`variable_prop_*`)

Execution flow:

1. Nondeterministic setup + pre-state snapshot
2. `safe_assume()` + `proved_assume()` for the specific account being tested
3. Instruction executed
4. Post-state snapshot
5. Post-block receives `(before, after)` states — verify how the variable changed

Example check: "variable only increases or stays the same"

```
fn assert_post(before: &State, after: &State) -> bool {
    after.counter >= before.counter
}
```

State Transitions (`transitions_prop!`)

Similar to Variable Transitions but with two key differences:

1. Pre-block applies ALL Valid State invariants as assumptions (not just for one account)
2. Two macro variants:
 - o Full macro: separate `assume_pre()` and `assert_post()` blocks
 - o Simplified macro: only `assert_post(before, after)` block

Execution flow:

1. Nondeterministic setup + pre-state snapshot
2. `safe_assume_all()` — bounds on all accounts
3. `proved_assume_all()` — all Valid State invariants as assumptions
4. Instruction executed
5. Post-state snapshot
6. `assert_post(before, after)` — verify transition correctness

High-Level & Unit Tests (`##[rule]`)

Direct rule functions targeting specific instructions. No parametric expansion — you explicitly call the instruction you want to test.

```
#[rule]
pub fn my_test() {
    // 1. Setup
    let (ctx, accounts, pre) = setup_voting();

    // 2. Assumptions
    pre.safe_assume_all();
    pre.proved_assume_all(&ctx);
    cvlr_assume! /* additional constraints */;

    // 3. Execute
    voting(&ctx.program_id, &accounts, &ctx.instruction_data).unwrap();

    // 4. Capture post-state
    let post = AllStatesProp::capture(&accounts, FunctionName::Voting);

    // 5. Assert
    cvlr_assert! /* expected condition */;
    // or cvlr_satisfy!() for reachability
}
```

Step-by-Step: Adding a Valid State Property

1. Open `specs/valid_state.rs`

2. Add property function inside appropriate macro block:

```
state_inv_community! {
    // Existing properties...

    // New property: voting deadline must be in the future during active round
    fn voting_deadline_in_future(_ctx: &PropertyContext, s: &CommunityAccountHeaderClone) -> bool {
        let clock_time = get_certora_timestamp();
        s.voting_counter == NativeInt::from(0u64) ||
        s.voting_end_time > NativeInt::from(clock_time)
    }
}
```

3. Regenerate configs:

```
python3 src/certora/scripts/generate_confs_all.py
```

4. Run verification:

```
cd src/certora/confs/generated_all/valid_state/community
certoraSolanaProver voting_deadline_in_future.conf
```

Step-by-Step: Adding a State Transition Property

1. Open `specs/state_transitions.rs`

2. Add property using the macro:

```
transitions_prop! { voting_increases_total_votes,
    fn assume_pre(_states: &AllStatesProp, _ctx: &TransitionContext) -> bool {
        true // No additional assumptions
    }

    fn assert_post(
        before: &AllStatesProp,
        after: &AllStatesProp,
        _ctx: &TransitionContext
    ) -> bool {
        match (&before.community.state, &after.community.state) {
            (Some(b), Some(a)) => {
                // Total votes can only increase or stay the same
                let before_total = b.voting_incr + b.voting_decr + b.voting_unchange;
                let after_total = a.voting_incr + a.voting_decr + a.voting_unchange;
                after_total >= before_total
            }
            _ => true
        }
    }
}
```

```
    }  
}
```

3. Regenerate configs and run.

Step-by-Step: Adding a Unit Test

1. Open `specs/unit_test.rs`

2. Add the rule:

```
#[rule]  
pub fn voting_with_max_tokens() {  
    let (ctx, accounts, pre) = setup_voting();  
  
    // Assume user has maximum possible tokens  
    if let Some(cc) = &pre.client_community.state {  
        cvlr_assume!(cc.current_voting_tokens == NativeInt::from(u64::MAX / 2));  
    }  
  
    pre.safe_assume_all();  
    pre.proved_assume_all(&ctx);  
  
    voting(&ctx.program_id, &accounts, &ctx.instruction_data).unwrap();  
  
    // Verify no overflow occurred  
    let post = AllStatesProp::capture(&accounts, FunctionName::Voting);  
    if let Some(community) = &post.community.state {  
        cvlr_assert!(community.voting_incr < NativeInt::from(u64::MAX));  
    }  
}
```

3. Add rule name to `confs/properties/unit_tests/voting.conf`:

```
{  
    "rule": [  
        "voting_with_max_tokens",  
        // ... other rules  
    ]  
}
```

4. Run:

```
cd src/certora/confs/properties/unit_tests  
certoraSolanaProver voting.conf --rule voting_with_max_tokens
```

Maintaining Specifications

This section describes what changes are needed in the verification framework when the protocol code evolves.

When to Update Specifications

Event	Action Required
New instruction added	Update <code>parametric_rules.rs</code> , <code>setup.rs</code> , regenerate configs
Instruction removed	Update <code>parametric_rules.rs</code> , remove setup function, regenerate configs
Instruction accounts changed	Update <code>nondet_accounts_*</code> () and <code>setup_*</code> () in <code>setup.rs</code>
Instruction parameters changed	Update <code>setup_*</code> () function, possibly <code>PropertyContext</code>
Account struct fields added/removed	Update Clone struct in <code>state/{account}.rs</code> , update <code>safe_assume()</code> , update logging
Account struct field types changed	Update Clone struct, <code>safe_assume()</code> , logging, possibly invariants
New account type introduced	Create Clone struct, add to <code>AllStatesProp</code> , add logging, add invariants
Business logic changed	Review and update affected properties

Files to Modify

File	Responsibility	When to Modify
<code>specs/base/base.rs</code>	<code>FunctionName</code> enum, <code>PropertyContext</code>	New/removed instruction
<code>specs/base/parametric_rules.rs</code>	List of instructions for parametric verification	New/removed instruction
<code>specs/base/setup.rs</code>	<code>nondet_accounts_*</code> (), <code>setup_*</code> () functions	New instruction, account changes
<code>specs/base/state/</code>	Clone structs, <code>safe_assume()</code> , <code>DirectStateAccess</code>	Field changes, new account types
<code>specs/base/valid_state/</code>	<code>AllStatesProp</code> , <code>proved_assume_all()</code>	New account types, new invariants to assume
<code>specs/base/log/</code>	Logging functions for state and accounts	Field changes, new account types

File	Responsibility	When to Modify
specs/valid_state.rs	Valid State invariants	Field changes, new constraints
specs/variable_transitions.rs	Variable Transition properties	Field changes, new immutability requirements
specs/state_transitions.rs	State Transition properties	Logic changes, new transition rules
specs/high_level.rs	High-Level rules	Business logic changes
specs/unit_test.rs	Unit tests	Instruction behavior changes
mocks/bounded_vec.rs	Bounded vector types	New dynamic arrays in accounts

Step-by-Step: Adding a New Instruction

Example: Adding `withdraw_fees` instruction.

1. Update `base.rs` — add to `FunctionName` enum:

```
pub enum FunctionName {
    // ... existing variants
    WithdrawFees,
}
```

2. Update `parametric_rules.rs` — add instruction to the list:

```
parametric_rules! {
    // ... existing instructions
    [withdraw_fees, WithdrawFees, nondet_accounts_withdraw_fees],
}
```

3. Update `setup.rs` — add account generator and setup function:

```
pub fn nondet_accounts_withdraw_fees<'a, 'info>() -> [AccountInfo<'info>; 5] {
    [
        nondet_account_info(), // signer
        nondet_account_info(), // root_acc
        nondet_account_info(), // community_acc
        nondet_account_info(), // treasury_acc
        nondet_account_info(), // system_program
    ]
}

pub fn setup_withdraw_fees<'a, 'info>() -> (PropertyContext, [AccountInfo<'info>; 5],
AllStatesProp) {
    let program_id = nondet_program_id();
```

```

let accounts = nondet_accounts_withdraw_fees();
let instruction_data: Vec<u8> = vec![]; // or nondet if instruction has parameters

let ctx = PropertyContext::new(
    FunctionName::WithdrawFees,
    &program_id,
    &accounts,
    &instruction_data,
);

let pre = AllStatesProp::capture(&accounts, FunctionName::WithdrawFees);
pre.safe_assume_all();

(ctx, accounts, pre)
}

```

4. Regenerate configs:

```
python3 src/certora/scripts/generate_confs_all.py
```

5. Verify existing properties still pass with new instruction.

Step-by-Step: Adding a New Field to Account Struct

Example: Adding `last_withdrawal_time: u32` to `CommunityAccountHeader`.

1. Update Clone struct in `state/community_account_header.rs`:

```

pub struct CommunityAccountHeaderClone {
    // ... existing fields
    pub last_withdrawal_time: NativeInt,
}

```

2. Update `safe_assume()` in the Clone impl:

```

fn safe_assume(&self) {
    // ... existing assumptions
    let clock_time = get_certora_timestamp();
    cvlr_assume!(self.last_withdrawal_time <= NativeInt::from(clock_time));
}

```

3. Update capture logic (if using `DirectStateAccess`):

```

impl DirectStateAccess for CommunityAccountHeaderClone {
    fn capture(acc: &AccountInfo) -> Option<Self> {
        // ... existing field captures
        last_withdrawal_time: NativeInt::from(header.last_withdrawal_time),
    }
}

```

4. Update logging in `specs/base/log/`:

```

impl CommunityAccountHeaderClone {
    pub fn log(&self, prefix: &str, logger: &mut CvlrLogger) {
        // ... existing field logging
        logger.log_u64(&format!("{} community.last_withdrawal_time", prefix),
self.last_withdrawal_time.into());
    }
}

```

5. Add relevant invariants in `valid_state.rs`:

```

state_inv_community! {
    // Withdrawal timestamp cannot be in the future
    fn withdrawal_timestamp_valid(_ctx: &PropertyContext, s: &CommunityAccountHeaderClone) -> bool {
        let clock_time = get_certora_timestamp();
        s.last_withdrawal_time <= NativeInt::from(clock_time)
    }
}

```

6. Add variable transition if field has immutability constraints:

```

variable_prop_community! {
    // Withdrawal timestamp only moves forward
    fn withdrawal_time_moves_forward(before: &CommunityAccountHeaderClone, after: &CommunityAccountHeaderClone) -> bool {
        after.last_withdrawal_time >= before.last_withdrawal_time
    }
}

```

7. Regenerate configs and verify.

Common Issues & Debugging

Typical Problems

1. Prover Errors (Solana Prover Limitations)

The Certora Solana Prover doesn't support all Rust/Solana patterns. This is the most challenging issue to resolve.

Solutions:

- Rewrite the problematic code section using conditional compilation (`#[cfg(feature = "certora")]`)
- Adjust prover configuration parameters
- Add function summaries in `cblr_summaries_core.txt`
- Add functions to inline list in `cblr_inlining_core.txt`

2. Timeouts

The prover exceeds time limits when exploring too many execution paths.

Solutions:

- Simplify the property — break complex invariants into smaller ones
- Add more assumptions to reduce state space
- Reduce loop unrolling iterations
- Comment out unrelated instructions in the config file

3. False Positives

The prover finds a "violation" using a state that can never occur in practice. This happens when nondeterministic data isn't properly constrained.

Example: Integer overflow during increment because the prover assumes the variable already holds `MAX_UINT`.

Solutions:

- Add bounds in `safe_assume()` for the affected field
- Add cross-state constraints in `state_inv_cross_*` invariants
- Ensure all nondeterministic instruction data is bounded

4. Vacuity

Since the prover discards all execution paths that revert, it's possible that no valid path remains. The rule passes without actually executing the function — a meaningless result.

Common causes:

- Contradictory assumptions (e.g., `x > 100` and `x < 50`)
- Over-constrained state that fails validation checks
- Missing account initialization that causes early revert

Detection: Use sanity configs to verify that the function can execute at least once with all assumptions applied:

```
cd src/certora/confs/generated_all
certoraSolanaProver sanity.conf
```

The sanity check uses `cvlr_satisfy!(true)` after function execution — if this fails, no valid execution path exists.

Debugging Workflow

1. **Check the calltrace** in the prover dashboard — identify which execution path caused the violation
2. **Look for garbage values** — nondeterministic data without proper bounds appears as unexpected large numbers or invalid states
3. **Add logging** to capture state at key points:

```

let mut logger = new_logger();
log_accounts(&accounts, &mut logger);
pre.log("PRE", &mut logger);

// ... instruction execution ...

post.log("POST", &mut logger);

```

4. **Isolate the issue** — run with a single instruction to narrow down the problem:

```
certoraSolanaProver config.conf --rule property_name_specific_instruction
```

5. **Check assumptions** — verify that `safe_assume()` covers all fields and `proved_assume_all()` is called for State Transitions

Logging Infrastructure

The framework provides logging utilities in `specs/base/log/`:

Function	Purpose
<code>new_logger()</code>	Create a new logger instance
<code>log_accounts(&accounts, &mut logger)</code>	Log all account metadata (keys, signers, writability, data length)
<code>state.log(prefix, &mut logger)</code>	Log all captured state fields with a prefix ("PRE" or "POST")

Logs appear in:

- Local console during prover execution
- Remote dashboard under "CVL2_*" entries in the calltrace