

NETWORK INFORMATION HIDING

CH. 4: INTRODUCTION TO NETWORK INFORMATION HIDING

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Definition





Fig.: W. Mazurczyk, S. Wendzel, S. Zander et al.: Information Hiding in Communication Networks, Wiley-IEEE, 2016

Differences to traditional digital media steganography

- **Inconsistent terminology:** no clear distinction between **steganography** and **covert channel**
 - See Ch. 1 for definitions of the terms steganography and covert channel and that both are considered as different research domains (covert channels in MLS context!).
 - Thus, in the network context: **network covert channel** or **network steganographic channel** handled separately
 - Unified: a steganographic **method** creates such a **covert channel** [1, Chapter 3]
- A bit more terminology:
 - Covert data is hidden in *overt* network transmissions
 - The „cover object“ is now called „carrier“ in the network context
 - Advantage of a constant transmission (e.g. permanent data leakage)
- Advantages:
 - Difficult to analyze **all** network data; smaller delay; with the growth of the Internet, the options for network IH grew and grow, too.

[1] W. Mazurczyk, S. Wendzel, S. Zander et al.: Information Hiding in Communication Networks, Wiley-IEEE, 2016

Example 1: Trivial Network Covert Channel via IPv4 Reserved Bit, sending message "1001"



The image shows a Wireshark packet capture and a terminal window. The Wireshark packet list shows four ICMP Echo (ping) requests from 10.0.2.15 to 10.0.2.2. The packet details for the first packet (No. 1) show the following fields:


- Frame 9: 42 bytes on wire (336 bits), 42 bytes captured (336 bits)
- Ethernet II, Src: PcsCompu_5b:06:a4 (08:00:27:5b:06:a4), Dst: Real
- Internet Protocol Version 4, Src: 10.0.2.15, Dst: 10.0.2.2
 - 0100 = Version: 4
 - 0101 = Header Length: 20 bytes (5)
 - Differentiated Services Field: 0x00 (DSCP: CS0, ECN: Not-ECT)
 - Total Length: 28
 - Identification: 0x0001 (1)
 - Flags: 0x8000, Reserved bit
 - 1... = Reserved bit: Set
 - .0.. = Don't fragment: Not set
 - ..0. = More fragments: Not set
 - ...0 0000 0000 0000 = Fragment offset: 0
 - Time to live: 64
 - Protocol: ICMP (1)
 - Header checksum: 0xe2cf [validation disabled]
 - [Header checksum status: Unverified]
 - Source: 10.0.2.15
 - Destination: 10.0.2.2
- Internet Control Message Protocol
 - Type: 8 (Echo (ping) request)
 - Code: 0
 - Checksum: 0xf7ff [correct]
 - [Checksum status: Good]

The terminal window shows the following commands and output:

```
>>> send(IP(src='10.0.2.15',dst='10.0.2.2',flags=0x04)/ICMP())
.
Sent 1 packets.
>>> send(IP(src='10.0.2.15',dst='10.0.2.2',flags=0x00)/ICMP())
.
Sent 1 packets.
>>> send(IP(src='10.0.2.15',dst='10.0.2.2',flags=0x00)/ICMP())
.
Sent 1 packets.
>>> send(IP(src='10.0.2.15',dst='10.0.2.2',flags=0x04)/ICMP())
.
Sent 1 packets.
>>> 
```

The bottom status bar of the Wireshark window indicates: "Reserved bit (ip.flags.rb), 2 Bytes" and "Pakete: 22 · Angezeigt: 4 (18.2%)"


Example 2: Ping Tunnel



Analysis and improvements:
 Jaspreet Kaur, Steffen Wendzel,
 Omar Eissa, Jernej Tonejc, Michael
 Meier: [Covert Channel-internal
 Control Protocols: Attacks and
 Defense](#), *Security and
 Communication Networks (SCN)*,
 Vol. 9(15), Wiley, 2016.

Ethernet Frame
IP Header
ICMP Header
ICMP Echo Payload

Secret data is embedded into the ICMP echo payload.
 In addition, a small protocol of the following format is used:



Figs.: <http://www.cs.uit.no/%7Edaniels/PingTunnel/>


Types of (Network) Covert Channels

Fundamental:

- **Local** and **network** covert channels
- **Storage** and **timing** channels
- **Noisy** and **noise-free** covert channels

Types of (Network) Covert Channels


- **Active** and **passive** Covert Channels (passive elements have a different sender/receiver than the legitimate sender/receiver)




Types of (Network) Covert Channels

- Semi-active and semi-passive Covert Channels [1]

- Semi-active:



- Semi-passive:




[1] K. Lamshöft, J. Dittmann: *Assessment of Hidden Channel Attacks: Targetting Modbus/TCP*, IFAC-PapersOnLine, 53(2), 2020.

Types of (Network) Covert Channels

- Intentional (covert) and unintentional (side) channels
 - e.g. side channels in web applications, see [talk by S. Schinzel](#)


- Example:



* Traffic must be sent many times and measured exactly to gain any useful information out of this.

Types of (Network) Covert Channels

- **Direct** and **indirect** covert channels: direct channels do not rely on intermediate nodes (IN).
 - Example: via web page + server load
 - General illustration:



Further differentiation into **two major patterns** for the intermediate node (IN): **redirector** and **broker**.

- A broker can be a **proxy** or a **dead drop**.



⇒ **Reading Assignment:** T. Schmidbauer, S. Wendzel: *SoK A Survey of indirect network-level covert channels*, in Proc. 17th AsiaCCS, ACM, 2022. **Section 3.** <https://doi.org/10.1145/3488932.3517418> (PDF available through Moodle).

How to „measure“ covert channels?

Only in brief as this **will be covered in more detail in the course 01730 „Introduction to Information Hiding“ by J. Keller.**

- Capacity, Bitrate and Bandwidth (how much information or data can be transferred per time?)
- Undetectability / covertness (how detectable is the covert channel?)
- Robustness (for noisy channels: how fragile is the covert channel?)

How to „measure“ covert channels?

- Introduction of **Covertness** by Giani et al. [1]:

Covertness \propto (Capacity of the medium – Transmission Rate)

If the whole capacity of a transmission medium (e.g. network packets or an audio CD) is used, the covertness is zero, leading to a trivial detection. However, if only a tiny fraction of the capacity is used, the covertness can remain close to one.

[1] A. Giani, V. H. Berk, G. V. Cybenko: Data Exfiltration and Covert Channels, Sensors, and Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence (C3I) Technologies for Homeland Security and Homeland Defense V. Vol. 6201. International Society for Optics and Photonics, 2006.

How to „measure“ covert channels?

- **Steganographic Cost (SC)** by Mazurczyk et al. [1]:
 - Measure of degradation or distortion of a carrier caused by the application of a steganographic method.
 - Calculation depends on context. For instance, for *LACK* steganography, which exploits packet loss, the SC can be calculated using the *Mean Opinion Score* (MOS) as a difference in quality of the voice signal (RQ) without and with LACK applied (LQ):

$$SC_{T-LACK}(t) = \Delta MOS(t) = RQ(t) - LQ(t)$$

- For *Retransmission Steganography* (RSTEG), one can calculate the retransmission difference R_D instead:

$$SC_{T-RSTEG} = R_D = R_{N-RSTEG} - R_N$$

- $R_{N-RSTEG}$ denotes retransmissions in the network with RSTEG and R_N the network's retransmissions without applying RSTEG.

[1] W. Mazurczyk, S. Wendzel, I. Azagra Villares, K. Szczypiorski: On importance of steganographic cost for network steganography, SCN, 9(8), 781-790, Wiley, 2016.

How to „measure“ covert channels?

- Steganographic Cost by Mazurczyk et al. [1]:
 - If multiple steganographic methods exploit the same subcarrier **S1** of the carrier **C1**, the **total steganographic cost of the carrier $SC_{T(C1)}$** can be expressed as:

$$SC_{T(C1)}(n) = \sum_{n=1}^n SC_{S1-n}$$

- SC_{S1-n} is the steganographic cost of the **n'th** method applied to subcarrier **S1**.

[1] W. Mazurczyk, S. Wendzel, I. Azagra Villares, K. Szczypiorski: On importance of steganographic cost for network steganography, Security and Communication Networks (SCN), Vol. 9(8), 781-790, Wiley, 2016.