

# Evaluating the Attention-Based View in Risk Management and Proposing the New “Top-Down” Continuous and Proactive Security Assessment Model (CAPSAM)



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# Abstract

This paper evaluates the Attention-Based View (ABV) theory in the context of information security risk management and proposes a new model called the Continuous and Proactive Security Assessment Model (CAPSAM). The ABV theory explains how Top Management Teams (TMT) allocate attention to cybersecurity issues, particularly in response to costly breaches. It suggests that TMTs have limited attention capacity and prioritise issues based on perceived importance. The theory is composed of three key principles: focus of attention, structural distribution of attention, and situated attention. While ABV effectively explains heightened TMT attention following a breach, it is limited by its reactive approach, focusing on responses after a breach and overlooking proactive security planning.

This paper introduces CAPSAM to address the limitations of ABV and traditional risk assessment approaches. CAPSAM is a top-down model that promotes a proactive, continuous approach to security. The model is built on five pillars: Culture, Continuous Assessment, Auditing, Response, and Proactive Mitigation (CCARP). It operates within the FAMRM cycle (New Feature, Information Security Risk Assessment, Proactive Mitigation Strategies, Incident Response Planning, and Continuous Threat Monitoring), integrating security at every stage of system development.

CAPSAM emphasises a security-first mindset, embedding security into agile development cycles and DevSecOps practices, with a strong focus on customer data protection. The model also highlights the importance of executive leadership in establishing a robust security posture, ensuring strategic alignment, and fostering organisational commitment to security. At the core of CAPSAM is its continuous improvement cycle, driven by ongoing risk assessments and feedback loops, which ensure that security remains adaptive in the face of emerging threats.

While CAPSAM offers significant advantages, it also presents challenges, including the need for continuous updates to risk assessments and reliance on top management's commitment. Nevertheless, CAPSAM's proactive nature, focus on continuous improvement, and integration of security across an organisation make it a powerful framework for enhancing cybersecurity. By shifting from a reactive to a proactive approach, CAPSAM aims to reduce the likelihood of successful cyberattacks and enhance long-term resilience.

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# Chapter 1

## Introduction

### 1.1 Background on Cybersecurity Risks

Cybersecurity is a rapidly growing field focused on safeguarding digital devices, networks, and information from unauthorised access and preventing data theft or alteration (Mijwil et al., 2023). It employs a range of techniques, processes, and practices to protect sensitive information and deter cyber attacks. Tactics for protecting against cyber attacks include firewalls, encryption, secure passwords, and threat detection and response systems, and employees should be trained on these strategies.

Cybersecurity risk is determined by the combination of vulnerabilities, threats, and the potential impact of cyber-attacks. Vulnerabilities are the weaknesses present in the system, and threats are the possibilities of cyber-attacks that exploit these vulnerabilities (Prasad et al., 2020). The Internet and the Internet of Things (IoT) are significant sources of threats, while phishing attacks are becoming increasingly sophisticated, and passwords alone are no longer sufficient for ensuring security. Raising awareness about cybersecurity risks is imperative for effectively handling digital environments and safeguarding them against electronic threats (Mijwil et al., 2023).

### 1.2 The Role of Information Security Risk Assessments (ISRAs)

Information Security Risk Assessments (ISRAs) are a key tool for identifying and managing vulnerabilities. ISRAs help organisations to identify their security risks and provide a measured analysis of their critical information assets, which informs the development of plans to mitigate these risks (Shedden, Smith and Ahmad, 2010). These assessments are essential for protecting IT assets and form the basis for a secure information system. Shedden, Smith and Ahmad (2010) also say ISRAs enable organisations to prioritise their security efforts, focusing on the most important assets and vulnerabilities as well as helping organisations determine the most cost-effective way to reduce risks.

### 1.3 Top Management Team (TMT) Involvement

The Top Management Team (TMT) involvement is vital for effective risk management as they are ultimately responsible for ensuring that due diligence is undertaken in identifying risk and implementing effective systems of controls (Fazlida and Said, 2015). TMT engagement can ensure that cybersecurity is viewed as an integral part of the organisation rather than a technical issue handled solely by IT. This involvement ensures a holistic approach to security, with the TMT championing risk assessment exercises and ensuring that cybersecurity receives the necessary resources and attention (Shaikh and Siponen, 2023). Fazlida and Said (2015) also state that TMT attention to security is important to ensure that risk is reduced and the organisation meets its legal obligations.

### 1.4 Purpose of the Report

This report evaluates the use of the Attention-Based View (ABV) Theory by Shaikh and Siponen (2023), exploring its strengths and limitations. The report will then introduce a new Continuous and Proactive Security Assessment Model (CAPSAM) as a solution. This model addresses the need for a proactive approach to cybersecurity, in contrast to the reactive focus of the ABV. The aim of this report is to critically appraise the ABV, revealing its shortcomings in proactive security planning, and then present CAPSAM as a proactive alternative.

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The body of this report is 3,287 words long, excluding headings, captions, and references.



## Chapter 2

# Case Study Paper – Appraisal of Theoretical Model and Hypothesis

### 2.1 Summary of the Case Study

In the case study, Shaikh and Siponen (2023) ask: “How do cybersecurity breach costs and Top Management Team (TMT) attention to cybersecurity influence a firm’s decision to carry out an Information Security Risk Assessment (ISRA)?”. The research found that higher breach costs result in greater TMT attention to cybersecurity. Additionally, they find that TMT attention to cybersecurity partially mediates the relationship between breach costs and the decision to conduct an ISRA. Further elaborating that while an ISRA might sometimes be initiated by the cybersecurity function independently, the TMT plays a significant role in the decision, especially after high-cost breaches.

### 2.2 Explanation of the Attention-Based View (ABV) Theory

The case study uses the attention-based view (ABV) to explain how TMT attention is directed toward cybersecurity issues. The ABV theory suggests that firm behaviour is shaped by how decision-makers allocate their attention. This theory is built on the idea that human rationality is limited, and decision-makers must focus on specific issues to make effective choices. The ABV is composed of three key principles: focus of attention, structural distribution of attention, and situated attention.

#### 2.2.1 *Focus of Attention*

The principle of the focus of attention explains that due to limited attention capacity, individuals prioritise issues based on their perceived importance and relevance within a given context. Senior managers must be selective about which issues they focus on because they cannot effectively attend to everything. Negative events such as high-cost cybersecurity breaches become salient, thus requiring TMT attention. This focus then dictates the actions decision-makers take.

### ***2.2.2 Structural Distribution of Attention***

The principle of structural distribution of attention posits that an individual's position within an organisation's hierarchy influences what they pay attention to. TMTs have a fiduciary duty to stakeholders to oversee and assess firm performance and must protect the firm's reputation. As the ultimate decision-makers, they are responsible for oversight. The TMT's hierarchical position means they are expected to pay closer attention to security issues, especially in the face of higher breach costs.

### ***2.2.3 Situated Attention***

The principle of situated attention argues that an individual's attention is a result of the immediate situation. Urgent issues, such as high-cost cybersecurity breaches that cause material damage to the firm, draw the focus of the TMT. While minor breaches might be handled by IT personnel, breaches with substantial financial or reputational consequences require managerial attention and follow-up.

## **2.3 Statement of Hypotheses**

The case study tested the following four hypotheses related to the impact of cybersecurity breach costs and TMT attention on the decision to carry out an ISRA:

1. Higher cybersecurity breach costs have a positive effect on the decision to carry out an ISRA.
2. Higher cybersecurity breach costs have a positive effect on TMT attention to cybersecurity.
3. TMT attention to cybersecurity has a positive effect on the decision to carry out an ISRA.
4. TMT attention to cybersecurity mediates the positive effect of cybersecurity breach costs on the decision to carry out an ISRA.

## **2.4 Critical Appraisal of the ABV**

### ***2.4.1 Merits/Strengths***

The Attention-Based View (ABV) provides a strong framework for understanding why Top Management Team (TMT) attention to cybersecurity is heightened following a costly breach. The ABV effectively explains this through its core principles: focus of attention,

structural distribution of attention, and situated attention. The focus of attention principle highlights how negative events like significant breaches become salient, compelling the TMT to prioritise cybersecurity, while the structural distribution of attention principle emphasises that the TMT’s hierarchical position and fiduciary duty make them responsible for addressing major security failures. Situated attention further reinforces this by illustrating how immediate, severe breaches demand urgent managerial action.

The ABV also explains why some firms might not act on security until a crisis emerges. According to the model (see Figure 2.1), TMTs have a limited attention capacity and will only focus on issues that are deemed the most important. This limited attention capacity means that cybersecurity may not receive sufficient attention until a significant breach forces the TMT to recognise it as a priority. This is further supported by the idea that organisations may only react to failures rather than carry out preventive security measures due to difficulty in justifying security investments. The ABV also theorises that breaches can act as a learning opportunity, as they provide inputs to enhance the quality of future security risk assessments.




Figure 2.1: The Attention-Based View (ABV) Theory of TMT attention allocation, illustrating how breaches and organisational hierarchy influence decision-makers’ focus (Shaikh and Siponen, 2023).

#### 2.4.2 Demerits/Weaknesses

Despite its strengths, the ABV has some notable weaknesses. A significant limitation is that it primarily focuses on a reactive response to breaches, overlooking proactive security planning. The model is designed to explain how TMT attention is drawn to cybersecurity after a breach has occurred, but it does not adequately address how to prevent breaches in the first place. The ABV’s emphasis on learning from failures shows its reactive stance, meaning that firms are continually playing catch up, rather than staying ahead of emerging threats.

Additionally, the model assumes that TMT attention is driven primarily by negative events, ignoring other influences. While high-cost breaches undoubtedly capture the TMT's attention, Gale, Bongiovanni and Slapnicar (2022) state that regulatory changes and industry standards are the most influential driver of board director's involvement in cybersecurity oversight. The ABV's narrow focus on breach-driven attention may lead to an incomplete understanding of the broader factors influencing security governance.

Furthermore, the ABV does not provide a framework for proactive security measures. The model explains why TMTs react to breaches, but it offers little guidance on how to implement a security posture that anticipates threats. The model's focus on how the TMT reacts after a breach also overlooks the need for continuous monitoring, security by design, and other proactive strategies.

## **2.5 Transition to New Model**

The limitations of the ABV indicate the need for a new, proactive model. While the ABV explains how firms respond to crises, a more comprehensive approach is required to prevent them. The next section will present a new model for information security risk assessment that shifts from a reactive to a proactive approach and addresses the limitations of the ABV. This new model is intended to help organisations implement security at every stage, rather than after they have already suffered a costly breach.

## Chapter 3

# New “Top Down” Model Selection for Information Security Risk Assessment

### 3.1 Introduction to the New Model

This chapter introduces a new “top-down” Continuous and Proactive Security Assessment Model (CAPSAM) framework as a response to limitations in traditional risk assessment approaches. The case study by Shaikh and Siponen (2023) addressed the reactive nature of the TMT’s attention in its influence on the decision to carry out an ISRA. This reveals the need for a new proactive, continuous security model that integrates information security across all layers of an organisation.

### 3.2 Overview of the CAPSAM Framework

#### 3.2.1 *Purpose, Goals, and Intended Outcomes*

The CAPSAM framework is designed to address the limitations of cybersecurity models by emphasising a proactive and continuous approach to risk assessment. Its primary purpose is to integrate information security considerations from the earliest stages of system development and throughout its lifecycle.

The main goal of CAPSAM is to minimise the likelihood and impact of cybersecurity breaches through vigilant, ongoing risk management. The model aims to integrate information security across all layers of an organisation and focuses on continuous improvement, ensuring a resilient security posture that adapts to the ever-changing threat landscape. By doing this, CAPSAM prioritises the protection of all stakeholders—especially the customer and their data—strengthening overall organisational security and trust.

#### 3.2.2 *The Five Pillars of CAPSAM*

The core philosophies of CAPSAM can be summarised in five pillars: Culture, Continuous, Auditing, Response, Proactive (CCARP). These pillars form the foundation of the model’s approach to information security risk management, with further details on their

components provided in Table 2 in the appendices. The pillars are illustrated in Figure 3.1.




Figure 3.1: The Five Pillars of CAPSAM: Culture, Continuous, Auditing, Response, and Proactive (CCARP) and their components, explained in Table 2 in appendices.

### 3.2.3 FAMRM Cycle

The CAPSAM framework operates within the FAMRM cycle, which stands for New *Feature*, Information Security Risk *Assessment*, Proactive *Mitigation* Strategies, Incident *Response* Planning, and Continuous Threat *Monitoring*. This cycle ensures that each new feature or system development undergoes proactive mitigation strategies and continuous risk assessments, with feedback loops informing the next ISRA. The entire process is visually represented in Figure 3.2, which illustrates how the cycle integrates each of these components.




Figure 3.2: FAMRM Cycle for Integrating Security into New Feature Development, Highlighting Continuous Risk Assessment, Proactive Mitigation, and Feedback Loops in Agile and DevSecOps Environments.

### 3.3 Justification for a Top-Down Approach

#### 3.3.1 *Establishing a Strong Security Posture through Executive Leadership*

A top-down approach to information security risk management ensures strategic alignment and organisational commitment to security. By prioritising executive leadership, strategic priorities are set, resources allocated, and security policies enforced, framing information security as a core corporate governance issue rather than merely a technical concern (Linkov et al., 2014; Fazlida and Said, 2015). This alignment mirrors CAPSAM’s emphasis on integrating security into organisational culture and fostering a “security-first mindset” among all stakeholders, as outlined in the ‘Culture’ pillar.

In contrast, bottom-up approaches focus on identifying technical vulnerabilities but often lack strategic direction, executive support, and adequate resource allocation (Fazlida and Said, 2015). Without such oversight, efforts may neglect broader risks, including human and social factors, hindering a cohesive and effective security strategy (Shedden, Smith and Ahmad, 2010).

### ***3.3.2 Corporate Governance and Strategic Integration***

A top-down approach aligns with corporate governance by ensuring the Board of Directors (BOD) and executive management recognise their responsibility to safeguard information assets. Fazlida and Said (2015) explain that executive involvement integrates security into organisational strategies, enhancing competitive advantage, client satisfaction, and trust. This perspective aligns with CAPSAM's goal of embedding security considerations at all organisational levels, enabling seamless integration of security measures into daily operations. CAPSAM's FAMRM cycle, along with the 'Culture' pillar, reinforce this integration by ensuring top management's active engagement and resource allocation.

### ***3.3.3 Addressing the Limitations of Bottom-Up Approaches***

Bottom-up approaches face significant challenges, including limited management buy-in and insufficient coordination across departments (Shaikh and Siponen, 2023). This results in an overemphasis on technical controls while neglecting non-technical factors, such as human error and social engineering risks (Shedden, Smith and Ahmad, 2010). Furthermore, these strategies often fail to address the complex interactions of technical, social, and economic factors shaping an organisation's risk profile (Cai and Arney, 2017). CAPSAM's top-down emphasis mitigates these issues by aligning policies with organisational needs and fostering a culture of security awareness through its 'Culture' and 'Proactive' pillars, ensuring holistic risk management.

## **3.4 Theoretical Foundations for CAPSAM**

### ***3.4.1 ABV and CAPSAM's Culture Pillar***

The ABV theory highlights the importance of prioritising issues that are contextually relevant and salient (Shaikh and Siponen, 2023). CAPSAM operationalises this theory by maintaining continuous focus on cybersecurity, thereby ensuring top management prioritises and allocates resources for proactive security measures. The 'Culture' pillar reinforces this by securing top management involvement and embedding security as a core organisational value. This approach aligns with findings that management attention significantly increases the likelihood of conducting robust ISRAs (Shaikh and Siponen, 2023).



### ***3.4.2 Agile and DevSecOps Principles in the Continuous Pillar***

Agile methodologies and DevSecOps principles form a foundation for CAPSAM’s ‘Continuous’ pillar, promoting adaptability, speed, and integration of security into the development lifecycle (IBM, 2021; Dingsøy et al., 2012). Agile’s iterative approach enables rapid adjustments to evolving threats, while DevSecOps emphasises visibility and auditability. The FAMRM cycle embodies these principles by incorporating ongoing risk assessments and iterative feedback loops, aligning security measures with the dynamic threat landscape (IBM, 2021).

### ***3.4.3 ISO 31000: Risk Management Standard and the FAMRM Cycle***

ISO 31000 provides a comprehensive framework for risk management, emphasising communication, monitoring, and continuous improvement (Purdy, 2010). CAPSAM integrates these principles through the FAMRM cycle, ensuring a proactive and iterative approach to risk management. By focusing on dynamic assessments and mitigation strategies, CAPSAM addresses the limitations of static risk models, aligning with ISO 31000’s definition of risk as the “effect of uncertainty on objectives” (Purdy, 2010).

### ***3.4.4 Organisational Learning and Feedback in CAPSAM***

CAPSAM emphasises continuous learning through feedback loops, refining security measures based on insights from incident responses, audits, and risk assessments. This iterative approach, central to the FAMRM cycle, aligns with organisational learning principles advocating adaptation and sustained improvement (Murray and Chapman, 2003). Regular audits and third-party reviews further support this dynamic model, enhancing resilience against evolving threats.

### ***3.4.5 Trust and Customer-Focused Security***

CAPSAM prioritises customer-focused security by embedding data protection at every stage of system development, reflecting stakeholder theory and corporate social responsibility (CSR) principles (Moir, 2001; Parmar et al., 2010). The Culture pillar’s emphasis on transparency and proactive incident response aligns with trust theory, which underscores the role of organisational credibility in fostering stakeholder trust (Castelfranchi and Falcone, 2010). Trust is treated as relational capital, benefiting both the organisation and its stakeholders by enhancing credibility and reliability (Castelfranchi and Falcone, 2010).

### 3.5 Real-World Cases Supporting CAPSAM

Several high-profile data breaches underscore the necessity for a proactive security model like CAPSAM. The *Target* breach, which was deemed easily preventable, highlights the need for robust security measures and the importance of implementing cybersecurity best practices (Shu et al., 2017; Manworren, Letwat and Daily, 2016). The *Yahoo* breaches, which exposed the personal information of hundreds of millions of users, illustrate how a failure to disclose incidents promptly and a lack of transparency can severely damage a company’s reputation and market value (Trautman and Ormerod, 2016; Wang and Park, 2017). Moreover, Yahoo’s failure to empower their cybersecurity expert demonstrates the importance of integrating security at every level (Trautman and Ormerod, 2016). Similarly, the *Sony PlayStation* breach, along with the *TJX* breach, demonstrates how neglecting basic security protocols can lead to massive data exposure (Fisher, 2013; Bonner, 2012). The *Equifax* data breach, which compromised the personal information of over 145 million consumers, exposed the vulnerability of credit bureaus and their potential for negligence (Zou and Schaub, 2018; Gaglione Jr, 2019). The lack of consumer action and awareness following the breach further highlights the need for increased consumer protection, transparency, and better usability of protective measures (Zou and Schaub, 2018; Zou, Mhaidli et al., 2018; Robbins and Secholler, 2018). Finally, *Uber’s* concealment of a data breach, along with their lack of transparency, demonstrates how such actions can result in severe penalties and damage a company’s reputation (Paljug and Mikac, 2020; Robbins and Secholler, 2018).

In all of these cases, a failure to adopt a ‘security-first’ mindset, coupled with a reactive approach to incident response and a lack of transparency, eroded consumer trust and resulted in significant financial and reputational damage. These breaches all serve to reinforce the need for the CAPSAM model.

### 3.6 Critical Analysis of CAPSAM

#### 3.6.1 Strengths of CAPSAM

CAPSAM stands out due to its proactive nature, allowing organisations to address potential threats before they manifest, thus reducing the likelihood of successful cyberattacks. It fosters a “security-first mindset”, ensuring security is a shared responsibility across the organisation. By integrating security into agile development cycles and DevSecOps practices,

CAPSAM supports iterative, security-conscious development. Its continuous improvement cycle, driven by ongoing risk assessments and feedback loops, ensures that security remains robust in the face of emerging threats. Additionally, CAPSAM's focus on customer data protection builds trust by embedding security throughout the system development process.

### ***3.6.2 Limitations of CAPSAM***

Despite its advantages, CAPSAM presents several challenges. The model requires continuous updates to risk assessments, which can be resource-intensive. Ongoing monitoring demands significant resources and may lead to over-reliance on specific teams or individuals. CAPSAM's success hinges on top management's commitment to allocating resources for cybersecurity, which can be a hurdle. Regular internal audits and third-party reviews, including penetration testing, are necessary but can be time-consuming and require external expertise. Consistent application of CAPSAM's principles in large organisations can also prove difficult (Purdy, 2010).

### ***3.6.3 Comparison with Case Study Approach***

CAPSAM's proactive approach contrasts with the reactive strategy of the case study, which focuses on addressing issues after a breach has occurred. CAPSAM integrates security from the earliest stages of development, embedding it across all organisational levels. In contrast, reactive approaches often prioritise technical fixes without addressing underlying managerial issues (Shedden, Smith and Ahmad, 2010; Shaikh and Siponen, 2023). CAPSAM's continuous nature allows for dynamic responses to emerging threats, while reactive methods are limited to incident response and do not ensure long-term resilience. By addressing vulnerabilities early and continuously, CAPSAM avoids many issues seen in reactive models.

### ***3.6.4 Challenges in Implementing CAPSAM***

Implementing CAPSAM requires securing top management support to allocate resources and prioritise cybersecurity as a strategic objective (Shedden, Smith and Ahmad, 2010). Fazlida and Said (2015) highlight that gaining board of directors (BOD) support can be difficult, as cybersecurity is often viewed solely as an IT issue, with some boards lacking the expertise to address risks and being overwhelmed by "technical jargon" (Hartmann and Carmenate, 2021). CAPSAM also necessitates consistent cross-department commu-

nication, ongoing training, and significant resources for continuous monitoring, including staffing and tools. Overcoming resistance to change from those accustomed to reactive approaches is another challenge (Murray and Chapman, 2003), and regular audits and penetration tests require additional expertise and time.

### **3.7 Implementation of CAPSAM**

#### ***3.7.1 Phase 1: Planning and Preparation***

The first phase involves securing commitment from top management to allocate resources and prioritise cybersecurity as a core strategic objective. It is essential to conduct an initial risk assessment, identify stakeholders, define roles and responsibilities, and establish clear communication channels. Aligning the security risk management policy with the organisation's overall strategy ensures that security is integrated into the organisation's broader objectives. This phase also involves fostering a cultural shift towards security and collaboration across departments, breaking down silos and encouraging organisation-wide engagement.

#### ***3.7.2 Phase 2: Implementation***

In this phase, organisations adopt a DevSecOps approach, integrating security throughout the software development lifecycle. Organisations conduct risk assessments to identify vulnerabilities, prioritise risks, and develop mitigation strategies. Security must be addressed from the start and continuously monitored to maintain a proactive security posture. Mitigation strategies should be implemented to manage identified risks, and regular training should be provided to ensure employees understand their role in managing security risks, reinforcing a shared responsibility across the organisation.

#### ***3.7.3 Phase 3: Review and Improvement***

The final phase focuses on regular assessments to review the effectiveness of CAPSAM and adapt it based on insights from risk assessments, incident responses, and business changes. This phase promotes continuous improvement, ensuring that the system's security posture evolves to meet emerging threats. Additionally, fostering a culture of ongoing vigilance and collaboration is essential to ensure that security remains a core value across the organisation, preventing a return to siloed working.

## Chapter 4

# Conclusion

### 4.1 Summary of the Case Study Evaluation

The case study effectively uses the ABV theory to explain how a significant cybersecurity breach captures the attention of the TMT. However, ABV is a reactive model, focusing on responses after a breach and lacking guidance on proactive measures. The model's emphasis on learning from failures highlights the need for a more comprehensive security governance approach, including prevention.

### 4.2 Key Features of CAPSAM

CAPSAM integrates security across an organisation through five core components: Culture (security-first mindset), continuous risk assessment, auditing (regular reviews), response plans for incidents, and a proactive approach (worst-case scenario planning). CAPSAM's iterative approach ensures a resilient security posture, offering a clear improvement over reactive models.

### 4.3 Role of the TMT

The TMT plays a crucial role in CAPSAM's success by championing security as a strategic objective and ensuring proper resource allocation. Unlike models that treat security as a technical issue, CAPSAM requires TMT involvement to create a security-first culture, making their commitment vital for effective implementation.

### 4.4 Benefits of CAPSAM

CAPSAM enhances cybersecurity by reducing the likelihood of successful cyberattacks through its proactive approach. Its continuous nature enables dynamic responses to emerging threats, ensuring resilience over time. By embedding security into all development stages, CAPSAM offers robust protection for organisational assets and consumer trust, making security a core component of the system and culture.

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# Appendices

## Appendix A: Glossary

Table 1: Glossary of Key Terms Relevant to the Attention-Based View, CAPSAM Framework, and Risk Management

Term	Definition
<b>ABV</b>	Attention-Based View (ABV): A theory that suggests that a firm’s behaviour is shaped by how decision-makers allocate their attention. This theory is built on the idea that human rationality is limited, and decision-makers must focus on specific issues to make effective choices.
<b>Focus of Attention</b>	A principle of ABV explaining that individuals prioritise issues based on their perceived importance and relevance within a given context due to limited attention capacity. Negative events, such as high-cost cybersecurity breaches, require attention from the Top Management Team (TMT).
<b>Structural Distribution of Attention</b>	A principle of ABV stating that an individual’s position within an organisation’s hierarchy influences what they pay attention to, such as TMTs focusing on security issues due to their fiduciary duty.
<b>Situated Attention</b>	A principle of ABV that posits an individual’s attention is shaped by the immediate situation, like focusing on urgent cybersecurity breaches causing material damage.
<b>ISRA</b>	Information Security Risk Assessment (ISRA): A key tool for identifying and managing vulnerabilities, providing a measured analysis of critical information assets to inform risk mitigation plans.
<b>TMT</b>	Top Management Team (TMT): The group of individuals at the highest level of an organisation responsible for ensuring due diligence in risk identification and control implementation.
<b>CAPSAM</b>	Continuous and Proactive Security Assessment Model (CAPSAM): A top-down framework designed for proactive and continuous risk assessment, integrating information security from the earliest stages of system development.
<b>FAMRM</b>	FAMRM Cycle: A cycle within CAPSAM that stands for New Feature, Information Security Risk Assessment, Proactive Mitigation Strategies, Incident Response Planning, and Continuous Threat Monitoring.



<b>Term</b>	<b>Definition</b>
<b>Culture Pillar</b>	A pillar of CAPSAM focusing on fostering a security-first mindset across the organisation, embedding security into agile development and DevSecOps practices, and prioritising customer data protection.
<b>Continuous Pillar</b>	A pillar of CAPSAM promoting regular risk assessments throughout a system's lifecycle, continuous monitoring of the threat landscape, and using feedback loops to refine security measures.
<b>Auditing Pillar</b>	A pillar of CAPSAM involving regular internal audits, third-party reviews, and penetration testing.
<b>Response Pillar</b>	A pillar of CAPSAM focusing on developing and regularly updating incident response plans, conducting post-incident analysis, and maintaining clear communication with stakeholders.
<b>Proactive Pillar</b>	A pillar of CAPSAM involving planning for worst-case scenarios, integrating security into every phase of system development, providing employee training, and identifying vulnerabilities.
<b>Agile</b>	An iterative approach enabling rapid adjustments to evolving threats, integrated into CAPSAM's 'Continuous' pillar.
<b>DevSecOps</b>	A practice emphasising visibility and auditability, integrated into CAPSAM's 'Continuous' pillar.
<b>ISO 31000</b>	A comprehensive framework for risk management, emphasising communication, monitoring, and continuous improvement.
<b>Cybersecurity Risk</b>	The combination of vulnerabilities, threats, and the potential impact of cyber-attacks. Vulnerabilities are weaknesses in the system, while threats exploit these vulnerabilities.

## Appendix B: CAPSAM Pillar Components

Table 2: Components of the CAPSAM Pillars as shown in Figure 3.1.

Pillar	Component	Explanation
<b>Culture</b>	Security-First Mindset	Cultivating a shared responsibility for security across the organisation, integrating it as a core value at all levels. This ensures that security is a primary consideration in all activities.
	Top Management Involvement	Securing commitment from top management to provide necessary resources and attention to cybersecurity, ensuring security is viewed as integral, not just a technical issue.
	Agile & DevSecOps Integration	Embedding security into agile development cycles and DevSecOps practices, ensuring that security is integrated throughout the entire development lifecycle with iterative, security-conscious practices.
	Customer-Focused Security	Prioritising consumer data protection and building trust by embedding security at every stage of system development, ensuring responsibility for security and customer service.
<b>Continuous</b>	Regular Risk Assessments	Conducting continuous and dynamic risk assessments that are automated, frequent, and responsive to system changes, allowing quick adaptation to emerging risks.
	Dynamic Threat Landscape	Continuously monitoring and adapting to the evolving threat landscape, ensuring security strategies remain resilient to new risks and attack vectors.
	Feedback Loop	Using insights from risk assessments, incident responses, and audits to inform and refine future security strategies, promoting continuous improvement.
<b>Auditing</b>	Regular Internal Audits	Conducting regular audits to ensure compliance with security policies, assess effectiveness, and uncover areas for improvement, providing internal teams with an opportunity to assess and refine security measures.
	Third-Party Reviews	Engaging external experts for unbiased evaluations, including penetration testing, to identify vulnerabilities that internal teams might overlook. This provides an objective perspective on security.

Pillar	Component	Explanation
	Penetration Testing	Conducting regular penetration tests to simulate real-world attacks and identify vulnerabilities, assessing how well the organisation can handle potential attacks.
Response	Incident Response Plans	Developing comprehensive, regularly updated incident response plans for various potential security incidents, ensuring preparedness and effectiveness through drills and simulations.
	Immediate Action	Taking swift and decisive action during a security breach to limit damage. Clear, actionable plans should guide responses to minimise impact.
	Post-Incident Analysis	Conducting thorough post-incident analyses to understand vulnerabilities, learn from breaches, and strengthen security measures to prevent future incidents.
	Transparency	Communicating clearly with stakeholders, including customers, about security incidents to maintain trust while balancing the need to protect sensitive information.
Proactive	Worst-Case Planning	Proactively planning for worst-case scenarios, conducting pre-emptive vulnerability assessments, and preparing for potential threats before they emerge. This approach helps prevent severe damage from cyber incidents.
	Security by Design	Ensuring security is integrated into every phase of system development, addressing vulnerabilities early and continuously throughout the process, making security an integral part of the system.
	Employee Training	Providing regular cybersecurity training for all employees to build security awareness and empower staff to be the first line of defence against internal threats and vulnerabilities.
	Threat Hunting	Actively searching for potential vulnerabilities within the system before they can be exploited, strengthening defences by identifying risks that might not yet be apparent.