

Lectures on optimal transport

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1 Roadmap

- L1. Discrete optimal transport
- L2. Inverse optimal transport
- L3. Optimal transport and quantile methods

2 Optimal transport in the discrete case

Central planner's solution

Workers characteristics $x \in X$

n_x workers of type x

Firms characteristics $y \in Y$

m_y firms of type y

$$\sum_x n_x = \sum_y m_y$$

A matching π_{xy} is the mass of workers of type x matched with firms of type y

Constraints:

$$\sum_y \pi_{xy} = n_x$$

$$\sum_x \pi_{xy} = m_y$$

Let Φ_{xy} be the productivity (in dollar terms) of a worker of type x matched with a firm of type y .

Central planner's problem:

$$\max_{\pi \geq 0} \sum_{xy} \pi_{xy} \Phi_{xy}$$

s.t.

$$\sum_y \pi_{xy} = n_x$$

$$\sum_x \pi_{xy} = m_y$$

$$\max_{\pi \geq 0} \sum_{xy} \pi_{xy} \Phi_{xy} + \min_{u_x, v_y} \sum_x u_x \left(n_x - \sum_y \pi_{xy} \right) + \sum_y v_y \left(m_y - \sum_x \pi_{xy} \right)$$

$$\max_{\pi \geq 0} \min_{u_x, v_y} \sum_{xy} \pi_{xy} (\Phi_{xy} - u_x - v_y) + \sum_x u_x n_x + \sum_y v_y m_y$$

$$\min_{u_x, v_y} \max_{\pi \geq 0} \sum_{xy} \pi_{xy} (\Phi_{xy} - u_x - v_y) + \sum_x u_x n_x + \sum_y v_y m_y$$

$$\min_{u_x, v_y} \sum_x u_x n_x + \sum_y v_y m_y + \max_{\pi \geq 0} \sum_{xy} \pi_{xy} (\Phi_{xy} - u_x - v_y)$$

This becomes

$$\min_{u_x, v_y} \sum_x u_x n_x + \sum_y v_y m_y + \max_{\pi \geq 0} \sum_{xy} \pi_{xy} (\Phi_{xy} - u_x - v_y)$$

hence we arrive at the **dual to the central planner's problem**

$$\begin{aligned} \min_{u_x, v_y} & \sum_x u_x n_x + \sum_y v_y m_y \\ \text{s.t. } & u_x + v_y \geq \Phi_{xy} \end{aligned}$$

Complementary slackness

$$\pi_{xy} > 0 \implies u_x + v_y = \Phi_{xy}$$

The dual problem can be interpreted as the equilibrium in the wage market.

Indeed, consider the dual

$$\begin{aligned} \min_{u_x, v_y} & \sum_x u_x n_x + \sum_y v_y m_y \\ \text{s.t. } & u_x + v_y \geq \Phi_{xy} \end{aligned}$$

Rewrite the constraint into

$$v_y \geq \max_x \{\Phi_{xy} - u_x\}$$

Claim: the dual can rewrite as

$$\begin{aligned} \min_{u_x, v_y} & \sum_x u_x n_x + \sum_y v_y m_y \\ \text{s.t. } & v_y = \max_x \{\Phi_{xy} - u_x\} \end{aligned}$$

Equation

$$v_y = \max_x \{\Phi_{xy} - u_x\}$$

interprets as profit maximization by the firm.

2.1 Becker's theory of marriage

Becker's model of heterosexual marriage market

$x \in X$ man's characteristics in number n_x

$y \in Y$ woman's characteristics in number m_y

Assume that if x matches with y then

- x enjoys utility α_{xy}
- y enjoys utility γ_{xy}

Becker assumed **fully transferable utility**: if x gives up a quantity τ of utility to y , then after transfers

x gets $\alpha_{xy} - \tau$

y gets $\gamma_{xy} + \tau$

Note: we could get $\gamma_{xy} + f(\tau)$ but this would not be optimal transport. This is called matching with imperfectly transferable utility.

The limit without any possible transfers is called non-transferable utility model, this is Gale-Shapley's model.

Back to Becker's model

No matter the transfer, x and y if they match get joint surplus $\Phi_{xy} = \alpha_{xy} + \gamma_{xy}$.

2.2 Koopmans-Beckmann's model of transportation

$x \in X$ the locations of plants. Production (of a commodity) by plant x is n_x per day.

$y \in Y$ the locations of cities. Consumption of the same commodity by city y is m_y per day.

Total production = total consumption

(unit) Transportation cost from plant x to city y is c_{xy} per unit of mass.

Tolstoi's problem (1920).

Define π_{xy} the mass of commodity which will route from x to y . The optimal shipping plan is given by

$$\min_{\pi \geq 0} \sum_{xy} \pi_{xy} c_{xy}$$

s.t.

$$\sum_y \pi_{xy} = n_x$$

$$\sum_x \pi_{xy} = m_y$$

The dual of this problem is

$$\max_{p_x, p_y} \sum_y m_y p_y - \sum_x n_x p_x$$

$$p_y - p_x \leq c_{xy}$$

$\sum_y m_y p_y = \sum_x n_x p_x + \sum_{xy} \pi_{xy} c_{xy}$: total price at destination = total price at origin + total shipping cost

The constraint in the dual

$$p_y \leq c_{xy} + p_x$$

says that there is no pair xy such that

$$p_y > c_{xy} + p_x$$

this is a no-arbitrage conditions.

3 Computation of the optimal matching

$$\text{In } \Phi(x, y) = x^\top A y = \sum_{kl} A_{kl} x^k y^l$$

Most LP solvers compute

$$\max_{z \geq 0} c^\top z$$

$$\text{s.t. } Mz = d$$

$$\begin{aligned}
& \max_{\pi \geq 0} \sum_{xy} \pi_{xy} \Phi_{xy} \\
& \text{s.t.} \\
& \sum_y \pi_{xy} = n_x \\
& \sum_x \pi_{xy} = m_y
\end{aligned}$$

$$\text{vec}(\pi)$$

$$\begin{aligned}
I_X \pi 1_Y &= n \\
1_X^\top \pi I_Y &= m^\top
\end{aligned}$$

$$\text{Get } \text{vec}(\pi 1_Y) = (\dots) \text{vec}(\pi) \text{ and } \text{vec}(1_X^\top \pi) = (\dots) \text{vec}(\pi)$$

We have

$$\text{vec}(AXB^\top) = (A \otimes B) \text{vec}(X)$$

This gives

$$\text{vec}(I_X \pi 1_Y) = n$$

$$\text{vec}(1_X^\top \pi I_Y) = m$$

therefore

$$(I_X \otimes 1_Y^\top) \text{vec}(\pi) = n$$

$$(1_X^\top \otimes I_Y) \text{vec}(\pi) = m$$

The OT problem can be computed as

$$\max_{\pi \geq 0} \text{vec}(\pi)^\top \text{vec}(\Phi)$$

s.t.

$$(I_X \otimes 1_Y^\top) \text{vec}(\pi) = n$$

$$(1_X^\top \otimes I_Y) \text{vec}(\pi) = m$$

4 Entropic regularization

$$\max_{\pi \geq 0} \sum_{xy} \pi_{xy} \Phi_{xy} - \sigma \sum_{xy} \pi_{xy} \ln \pi_{xy}$$

s.t.

$$\begin{aligned}
\sum_y \pi_{xy} &= n_x \quad [u_x] \\
\sum_x \pi_{xy} &= m_y \quad [v_y]
\end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
& \max_{\pi \geq 0} \sum_{xy} \pi_{xy} \Phi_{xy} - \sigma \sum_{xy} \pi_{xy} \ln \pi_{xy} + \min_{u_x, v_y} \sum_x u_x (n_x - \sum_y \pi_{xy}) + \\
& \sum_y v_y (m_y - \sum_x \pi_{xy}) \\
& \max_{\pi \geq 0} \min_{u_x, v_y} \sum_{xy} \pi_{xy} (\Phi_{xy} - u_x - v_y - \sigma \log \pi_{xy}) + \sum_x u_x n_x + \sum_y v_y m_y \\
& \min_{u_x, v_y} \max_{\pi \geq 0} \sum_{xy} \pi_{xy} (\Phi_{xy} - u_x - v_y - \sigma \log \pi_{xy}) + \sum_x u_x n_x + \sum_y v_y m_y \\
& \min_{u_x, v_y} \sum_x u_x n_x + \sum_y v_y m_y + \max_{\pi \geq 0} \sum_{xy} \pi_{xy} (\Phi_{xy} - u_x - v_y - \sigma \log \pi_{xy})
\end{aligned}$$

FOC in the inner problem

$$(\Phi_{xy} - u_x - v_y - \sigma \log \pi_{xy}) - \sigma = 0$$

thus

$$\pi_{xy} = \exp\left(\frac{\Phi_{xy} - u_x - v_y - \sigma}{\sigma}\right)$$

and the value of the inner problem is $\sigma \sum_{xy} \pi_{xy} = \sigma \sum_{xy} \exp\left(\frac{\Phi_{xy} - u_x - v_y - \sigma}{\sigma}\right)$.

The outer problem becomes

$$\min_{u_x, v_y} F(u, v) := \sum_x u_x n_x + \sum_y v_y m_y + \sigma \sum_{xy} \exp\left(\frac{\Phi_{xy} - u_x - v_y - \sigma}{\sigma}\right)$$

Foc yield

$$\text{wrt } u_x: n_x = \sum_y \exp\left(\frac{\Phi_{xy} - u_x - v_y - \sigma}{\sigma}\right)$$

$$\text{wrt } v_y: m_y = \sum_x \exp\left(\frac{\Phi_{xy} - u_x - v_y - \sigma}{\sigma}\right)$$

(Blockwise) Coordinate descent.

Given v_y 's compute u_x by $\min_{u_x} F(u, v)$

$$n_x = \sum_y \exp\left(\frac{\Phi_{xy} - u_x - v_y - \sigma}{\sigma}\right)$$

yields

$$\exp(u_x/\sigma) = \sum_y \exp\left(\frac{\Phi_{xy} - v_y - \sigma}{\sigma}\right) / n_x$$

similarly Given u_x 's compute v_y by $\min_{v_y} F(u, v)$

yields

$$\exp(v_y/\sigma) = \sum_x \exp\left(\frac{\Phi_{xy} - u_x - \sigma}{\sigma}\right) / m_y$$

Sinkhorn's algorithm / Iterated Proportional Fitting Procedure

<https://arxiv.org/abs/1609.06349>

Write $A_x = \exp(-u_x/\sigma)$ and $B_y = \exp(-v_y/\sigma)$

and $K_{xy} = \exp\left(\frac{\Phi_{xy} - \sigma}{\sigma}\right)$, we have

$$A_x = n_x / \sum_y K_{xy} B_y$$

similarly Given u_x 's compute v_y by $\min_{v_y} F(u, v)$

yields

$$B_y = m_y / \sum_x K_{xy} A_x$$

When σ is small

$$u_x = \sigma \log\left(\sum_y \exp\left(\frac{\Phi_{xy} - v_y - \sigma}{\sigma}\right)\right) - \sigma \log n_x$$

log-sum-exp trick

When computing numerically

$$\sigma \log \sum_y \exp\left(\frac{z_y}{\sigma}\right)$$

you should

$$m = \max_y \{z_y\}$$

and use the fact that for any c

$$\sigma \log \sum_y \exp\left(\frac{z_y - c}{\sigma}\right) + c = \sigma \log \sum_y \exp\left(\frac{z_y}{\sigma}\right)$$

use this with $c = m$ and get

$$\sigma \log \sum_y \exp\left(\frac{z_y}{\sigma}\right) = \sigma \log \sum_y \exp\left(\frac{z_y - m}{\sigma}\right) + m$$

5 Inverse optimal transport

Go back to the labor market, but this time introducing unmatched agents

Consider primal problem

$$\begin{aligned} \max_{\pi \geq 0} \quad & \sum_{xy} \pi_{xy} \Phi_{xy} \\ \text{s.t.} \quad & \\ & \sum_y \pi_{xy} \leq n_x \\ & \sum_x \pi_{xy} \leq m_y \end{aligned}$$

which has dual

$$\begin{aligned} \min_{u_x \geq 0, v_y \geq 0} \quad & \sum_x n_x u_x + \sum_y m_y v_y \\ \text{s.t.} \quad & \\ & u_x + v_y \geq \Phi_{xy} \end{aligned}$$

Introduce unobserved heterogeneity.

Now we assume that n_x and m_y are very large.

Individual worker $i \in I$ has type $x_i \in X$

Individual firm $j \in J$ has type $y_j \in Y$

Assume that the joint output generated by i and j together is

$\Phi_{ij} = \Phi_{x_i y_j} + \varepsilon_{i y_j} + \eta_{x_i j}$. (Separability assumption).

The dual is

$$\begin{aligned} \min \quad & \sum_{i \in I} u_i + \sum_{j \in J} v_j \\ \text{s.t.} \quad & \\ & u_i + v_j \geq \Phi_{ij} := \Phi_{x_i y_j} + \varepsilon_{i y_j} + \eta_{x_i j} \\ & u_i \geq \varepsilon_{i0} \\ & v_j \geq \eta_{0j} \end{aligned}$$

Take a look at the constraint

$$u_i + v_j \geq \Phi_{x_i y_j} + \varepsilon_{i y_j} + \eta_{x_i j}$$

rewrtie this as

$$u_i - \varepsilon_{i y} + v_j - \eta_{x j} \geq \Phi_{xy} \text{ for all } i : x_i = x \text{ and for all } j : y_j = y$$

$$\min_{i: x_i = x} \{u_i - \varepsilon_{i y}\} + \min_{j: y_j = y} \{v_j - \eta_{x j}\} \geq \Phi_{xy}$$

define $U_{xy} = \min_{i: x_i = x} \{u_i - \varepsilon_{i y}\}$ and $V_{xy} = \min_{j: y_j = y} \{v_j - \eta_{x j}\}$, in which case the constraints become

$$U_{xy} + V_{xy} \geq \Phi_{xy}$$

We have $U_{xy} = \min_{i: x_i = x} \{u_i - \varepsilon_{i y}\}$, therefore $u_i \geq \max_y \{U_{xy} + \varepsilon_{i y}, \varepsilon_{i0}\}$ and similarly $v_j \geq \max_x \{V_{xy} + \eta_{x j}, \eta_{0j}\}$

The micro problem rewrites

$$\begin{aligned} \min \quad & \sum_{i \in I} u_i + \sum_{j \in J} v_j \\ \text{s.t.} \quad & \\ & U_{xy} + V_{xy} \geq \Phi_{xy} \\ & u_i \geq \max_y \{U_{xy} + \varepsilon_{i y}, \varepsilon_{i0}\} \\ & v_j \geq \max_x \{V_{xy} + \eta_{x j}, \eta_{0j}\} \end{aligned}$$

and in fact

$$\begin{aligned} & \min \sum_{i \in I} u_i + \sum_{j \in J} v_j \\ & \text{s.t.} \\ & U_{xy} + V_{xy} \geq \Phi_{xy} \\ & u_i = \max_y \{U_{xy} + \varepsilon_{iy}, \varepsilon_{i0}\} \\ & v_j = \max_x \{V_{xy} + \eta_{xj}, \eta_{0j}\} \end{aligned}$$

which can rewrite

$$\begin{aligned} & \min \sum_{i \in I} \max_y \{U_{xy} + \varepsilon_{iy}, \varepsilon_{i0}\} + \sum_{j \in J} \max_x \{V_{xy} + \eta_{xj}, \eta_{0j}\} \\ & \text{s.t.} \\ & U_{xy} + V_{xy} \geq \Phi_{xy} \end{aligned}$$

that is

$$\begin{aligned} & \min \sum_x n_x \sum_{i: x_i=x} \frac{1}{n_x} \max_y \{U_{xy} + \varepsilon_{iy}, \varepsilon_{i0}\} + \sum_y m_y \sum_{j: y_j=y} \frac{1}{m_y} \max_x \{V_{xy} + \eta_{xj}, \eta_{0j}\} \\ & \text{s.t.} \\ & U_{xy} + V_{xy} \geq \Phi_{xy} \end{aligned}$$

We shall assume a statistical behaviour of ε_{iy} and η_{xj} 's. Assume that $(\varepsilon_{iy})_y$ is distributed according to P

and that $(\eta_{xj})_x$ is distributed according to Q .

By the law of large numbers the above expression converges to

$$\begin{aligned} & \min_{U,V} \sum_x n_x E_P [\max_y \{U_{xy} + \varepsilon_y, \varepsilon_0\}] + \sum_y m_y E_Q [\max_x \{V_{xy} + \eta_x, \eta_0\}] \\ & \text{s.t.} \\ & U_{xy} + V_{xy} \geq \Phi_{xy} \end{aligned}$$

Define $G_x(U) = E_P [\max_y \{U_{xy} + \varepsilon_y, \varepsilon_0\}]$ and $H_y(V) = E_Q [\max_x \{V_{xy} + \eta_x, \eta_0\}]$ and $G(U) = \sum_x n_x G_x(U)$ and $H(V) = \sum_y m_y H_y(V)$ the problem becomes

$$\begin{aligned} & \min_{U,V} G(U) + H(V) \\ & \text{s.t.} \\ & U_{xy} + V_{xy} = \Phi_{xy} \end{aligned}$$

$$\min_U G(U) + H(\Phi - U)$$

FOC

$$\frac{\partial G(U)}{\partial U_{xy}} = \frac{\partial H}{\partial V_{xy}} (\Phi - U)$$

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\partial G(U)}{\partial U_{xy}} &= n_x \frac{\partial G_x(U)}{\partial U_{xy}} = n_x \Pr(y \in \arg \max \{U_{xy} + \varepsilon_y, \varepsilon_0\}) \\ \frac{\partial H(V)}{\partial V_{xy}} &= m_y \Pr(x \in \arg \max \{V_{xy} + \eta_x, \eta_0\}) \end{aligned}$$

Dual problem:

Start from the penalized problem

$$\begin{aligned} & \min_{U,V} G(U) + H(V) + \max_{\pi \geq 0} \sum \pi_{xy} (\Phi_{xy} - U_{xy} - V_{xy}) \\ & \max_{\pi \geq 0} \sum \pi_{xy} \Phi_{xy} + \min_{U,V} \{G(U) + H(V) - \sum \pi_{xy} (U_{xy} + V_{xy})\} \\ & \max_{\pi \geq 0} \sum \pi_{xy} \Phi_{xy} - \max_U \{\sum \pi_{xy} U_{xy} - G(U)\} - \max_V \{\sum \pi_{xy} V_{xy} - H(V)\} \end{aligned}$$

Define the convex conjugates / Legendre-Fenchel transforms of G and H as

$$G^*(\pi) = \max_U \{ \sum \pi_{xy} U_{xy} - G(U) \}$$

$$H^*(\pi) = \max_V \{ \sum \pi_{xy} V_{xy} - H(V) \}$$

and the problem becomes

$$\max_{\pi_{xy} \geq 0} \{ \sum \pi_{xy} \Phi_{xy} - G^*(\pi) - H^*(\pi) \}$$

FOC yield

$$\Phi_{xy} = \frac{\partial G^*(\pi)}{\partial \pi_{xy}} + \frac{\partial H^*(\pi)}{\partial \pi_{xy}}$$

When P (the distribution of $(\varepsilon_{iy})_y$) is the Gumbel distribution (extreme-value type 1 – distribution with cdf $\exp(-\exp(-z))$)
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gumbel_distribution

then $G_x(U) = \log(1 + \sum_y \exp U_{xy})$, and therefore $G(U) = \sum_x n_x \log(1 + \sum_y \exp U_{xy})$.

We have

$$G_x^*(\pi) = \sum_{y \in Y} \frac{\pi_{xy}}{n_x} \log \frac{\pi_{xy}}{n_x} + \frac{\pi_{x0}}{n_x} \log \frac{\pi_{x0}}{n_x} \text{ where } \pi_{x0} = n_x - \sum_y \pi_{xy}$$

Therefore the primal problem in this case rewrites

$$\max_{\pi_{xy} \geq 0} \left\{ \sum \pi_{xy} \Phi_{xy} - \sum_x n_x \sum_{y \in Y} \frac{\pi_{xy}}{n_x} \log \frac{\pi_{xy}}{n_x} - \pi_{x0} \log \frac{\pi_{x0}}{n_x} - \sum_y m_y \sum_{x \in X} \frac{\pi_{xy}}{m_y} \log \frac{\pi_{xy}}{m_y} - \pi_{0y} \log \frac{\pi_{0y}}{m_y} \right\}$$

which yields

$$\max_{\pi_{xy} \geq 0} \left\{ \sum \pi_{xy} \Phi_{xy} - \sum_{xy} \pi_{xy} \log \frac{\pi_{xy}^2}{n_x m_y} - \pi_{x0} \log \frac{\pi_{x0}}{n_x} - \pi_{0y} \log \frac{\pi_{0y}}{m_y} \right\}$$

First order conditions wrt π_{xy} :

$$\Phi_{xy} = 2 + 2 \log \pi_{xy} - \log(n_x m_y) - (1 + \log \pi_{x0} - \log n_x) - (1 + \log \pi_{0y} - \log m_y).$$

This is Choo and Siow's formula (Journal of Political Economy, 2006)

$$\Phi_{xy} = \log \frac{\pi_{xy}^2}{\pi_{x0} \pi_{0y}}.$$

6 Continued, 9/2/2021

Today:

- * structural estimation of matching models
- * quantile methods

$$\text{Parameterize } \Phi_{xy}^\lambda = \sum_k \lambda_k \phi_{xy}^k$$

Use of generalized linear models.

Start from the primal problem we wrote yesterday

$$W(\lambda) = \max_{\pi_{xy} \geq 0} \left\{ \sum_{xy} \pi_{xy} \Phi_{xy}^\lambda - \sum_{xy} \pi_{xy} \log \frac{\pi_{xy}^2}{n_x m_y} - \pi_{x0} \log \frac{\pi_{x0}}{n_x} - \pi_{0y} \log \frac{\pi_{0y}}{m_y} \right\}$$

$$\frac{\partial W}{\partial \lambda_k} = \sum_{xy} \pi_{xy}^\lambda \phi_{xy}^k = \text{predicted moment of order } k$$

Look for λ such that predicted moments = observed moments

Observed moment of order k : $\sum_{xy} \hat{\mu}_{xy} \phi_{xy}^k$ where $\hat{\mu}_{xy}$ is the ** observed ** number of pairs xy .

Look for λ such that $\frac{\partial W}{\partial \lambda_k} = \sum_{xy} \hat{\mu}_{xy} \phi_{xy}^k$. This can be interpreted as the first order conditions of

$$\min_{\lambda} \left\{ W(\lambda) - \sum_k \sum_{xy} \lambda_k \hat{\mu}_{xy} \phi_{xy}^k \right\}$$

Link with generalized linear models. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Generalized_linear_model

The convex dual problem above is

$$W(\lambda) = \min_{u_x, v_y} \left\{ \sum_x n_x u_x + \sum_y m_y v_y + 2 \sum_{xy} \exp \left(\frac{\Phi_{xy} - u_x - v_y}{2} \right) + \sum_x \exp(-u_x) + \sum_y \exp(-v_y) \right\}$$

The estimation problem then becomes

$$\min_{\lambda, u, v} \left\{ \sum_x n_x u_x + \sum_y m_y v_y + 2 \sum_{xy} \exp \left(\frac{\Phi_{xy} - u_x - v_y}{2} \right) + \sum_x \exp(-u_x) + \sum_y \exp(-v_y) - \sum_k \sum_{xy} \lambda_k \hat{\mu}_{xy} \phi_{xy}^k \right\}$$

$$\min_{\lambda, u, v} \left\{ \sum_x n_x u_x + \sum_y m_y v_y + 2 \sum_{xy} \exp \left(\frac{\Phi_{xy} - u_x - v_y}{2} \right) + \sum_x \exp(-u_x) + \sum_y \exp(-v_y) - \sum_k \sum_{xy} \lambda_k \hat{\mu}_{xy} \phi_{xy}^k \right\}$$

$$\pi_{xy} = \exp \left(\frac{\Phi_{xy} - u_x - v_y}{2} \right)$$

$$\pi_{x0} = \exp(-u_x)$$

$$\pi_{0y} = \exp(-v_y)$$

This model is a generalized model with 2-way fixed effects.

7 Quantiles

7.1 A model of CEOs and firms

Now workers = CEOs are measured by their talent $x \in R$ =extra return on capital. Assume that x is distributed according P (continous)

Firms are captured by their asset size $y \in R$, drawn from a distribution Q (continuous)

$$\Phi(x, y) = xy.$$

Optimal matching of CEOs and firms:

$$\begin{aligned} & \max_{\pi(x,y) \geq 0} \int \Phi(x, y) \pi(x, y) dx dy \\ & \text{s.t. } \int \pi(x, y) dy = p(x) \end{aligned}$$

and $\int \pi(x, y) dx = q(y)$

the dual

$$\begin{aligned} \min & \int u(x) p(x) dx + \int v(y) q(y) dy \\ \text{s.t. } & u(x) + v(y) \geq \Phi(x, y) = xy \end{aligned}$$

Agenda:

1. Use common sense to guess a solution to the primal
2. Use the primal solution to find the dual solution
3. Predict wages accordingly

Intuitively, try to assign the top CEOs to the largest firms, ie. $y = T(x)$ where T is increasing.

Take (X, Y) be the optimal coupling. We would like to have $Y = T(X)$ and $X \sim P$ and $Y \sim Q$.

$$\begin{aligned} \Pr(X \leq x) &= F_P(x) \\ \Pr(Y \leq y) &= F_Q(y) \\ \Pr(T(X) \leq y) &= F_Q(y) \\ \Pr(X \leq T^{-1}(y)) &= F_Q(y) \\ F_P(T^{-1}(y)) &= F_Q(y) \\ T(x) &= F_Q^{-1}(F_P(x)). \end{aligned}$$

This is called the comonotone solution.

Remark: this solution implies that $F_Q(Y) = F_P(X)$. This is called positive assortative matching.

Theorem. When Φ is supermodular, ie when $\partial^2 \Phi(x, y) / \partial x \partial y \geq 0$, the the comonotone solution is optimal.

Definition: The quantile is the inverse of the cdf.

F_Q^{-1} is called the quantile function associated with the distribution Q .

$F_Q^{-1}(1/2)$ is the median.

2. Dual solution.

$$\begin{aligned} \min & \int u(x) p(x) dx + \int v(y) q(y) dy \\ \text{s.t. } & u(x) + v(y) \geq xy \end{aligned}$$

Assume u, v is optimal.

Yesterday we saw that if u, v is optimal then

$$v(y) = \max_x \{xy - u(x)\}$$

and

$$u(x) = \max_y \{xy - v(y)\}$$

that implies that u and v are convex.

Assume u and v are differentiable.

Firm y matches with CEO x which satisfies FOC that is

$$y = u'(x).$$

Therefore $u'(x) = F_Q^{-1}(F_P(x))$ and thus we can construct

$$u(x) = \int_0^x F_Q^{-1}(F_P(z)) dz + c$$

and

$$v(y) = \int_0^y F_P^{-1}(F_Q(w)) dw - c'$$

Consider in particular the case $P = \mathcal{U}([0, 1])$. Then

$$T(x) = F_Q^{-1}(F_P(x)) = F_Q^{-1}(x)$$

and we have that

$T(x) = u'(x)$ where u is part of the dual solution to

$$\min \int_0^1 u(x) dx + \int v(y) dQ(y)$$

s.t. $u(x) + v(y) \geq xy$.

Assume the distribution Q is not continuous. Eg assume that $Q = \frac{1}{N} \sum_{j=1}^N \delta_{y_j}$.

$$\min \int_0^1 u(x) dx + \frac{1}{N} \sum_{j=1}^N v(y_j)$$

s.t. $u(x) + v(y_j) \geq xy_j$

$$\min_{v \in R^N} \left\{ \int_0^1 \max_j \{xy_j - v_j\} dx + \frac{1}{N} \sum_{j=1}^N v_j \right\}$$

Problem has a unique (up to a constant solution) $(v_j) \in R^N$

Define

$$u_N(x) = \max_j \{xy_j - v_j\}$$

Classical definition:

$$F_Q^{-1}(t) = \inf \{x \in \mathbb{R} : F_Q(x) > t\}$$

which is nondecreasing and cadlag (right-continuous, left-limit)

we also could have taken a different definition and pose

$$\sup \{x \in \mathbb{R} : F_Q(x) < t\}$$

which is nondecreasing and caglad (left-continuous, right-limit)

The two definitions coincide on the points of continuity (where there is no jump).

7.2 Multivariate quantiles

Fundamental property of (univariate) quantiles.

Take Q a continuous distribution on R .

The quantile function F_Q^{-1} is the only function T such that:

* T is nondecreasing, and

* if $U \sim \mathcal{U}([0, 1])$, then $T(U) \sim Q$.

We would like to generalize the result in higher dimension.

Take Q a continuous distribution on R^d .

Is there a function T such that:

* T is cyclically monotone ie this is the gradient of a convex function, and

* if $U \sim \mathcal{U}^d = \mathcal{U}([0, 1]^d)$, then $T(U) \sim Q$.

Consider

$$\begin{aligned} \min & \int u(x) d\mathcal{U}^d + \int v(y) dQ(y) \\ \text{s.t. } & u(x) + v(y) \geq x^\top y. \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned} v(y) &= \max_x \{x^\top y - u(x)\} \\ \text{and} \\ u(x) &= \max_y \{x^\top y - v(y)\} \end{aligned}$$

And by foc, y is matched with x such that $y = \nabla u(x)$.
If $X \sim \mathcal{U}^d$, then $\nabla u(X) \sim Q$

When we have a sample y_j , we can define

$$\begin{aligned} \min_{v \in R^N} & \left\{ \int_{[0,1]^d} \max_j \{x^\top y_j - v_j\} dx + \frac{1}{N} \sum_{j=1}^N v_j \right\} \\ \text{and the multivariate quantile is such that} \\ T(x) &= \nabla u(x) \text{ where } u(x) = \max_j \{x^\top y_j - v_j\}. \end{aligned}$$

7.3 Quantile regression

The problem. Consider the t -quantile of Y conditional on X . This is the t -th quantile of the conditional distribution $F_{Y|X=x}^{-1}(t)$.

Quantile regression is about fitting a parametric form for this object, namely

$$F_{Y|X=x}^{-1}(t) = x^\top \beta_t$$

How do we compute β_t ?

Idea. Consider for now the unconditional quantile of Y , $q = F_Y^{-1}(t)$.
For $t = 1/2$, we know that q solves

$$\min_q E[|Y - q|]$$

indeed,

$$\min_q E \left[\tau (Y - q)^+ + (1 - \tau) (Y - q)^- \right]$$

and by FOC

$$\tau E[1\{Y \geq q\}] = (1 - \tau) E[1\{Y \leq q\}]$$

thus $\Pr(Y \leq q) = \tau$.

Taking loss function $\rho_\tau(z) = \tau z^+ + (1 - \tau) z^-$, then $q = F_Y^{-1}(t)$ is the minimizer of

$$\min_q E[\rho_\tau(Y - q)].$$

In particular, $x^\top \beta_t$ will minimize the conditional expectation of the loss function

$$\min_q E[\rho_\tau(Y - q) | X = x]$$

and therefore, β_t will minimize

$$\min_{\beta} E [\rho_{\tau} (Y - X^{\top} \beta) | X = x]$$

By integrating over x , we get that β_t minimizes

$$\min_{\beta} E [\rho_{\tau} (Y - X^{\top} \beta)] .$$

This is actually a linear programming problem. Indeed, introduce $P = (Y - X^{\top} \beta)^+$ and $N = (Y - X^{\top} \beta)^-$, the problem becomes

$$\begin{aligned} \min_{\beta, P \geq 0, N \geq 0} \quad & E [\tau P + (1 - \tau) N] \\ \text{s.t.} \quad & P - N = (Y - X^{\top} \beta) \end{aligned}$$