

TOPICS IN EQUILIBRIUM TRANSPORTATION

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This talk is based on the following two papers:

- ▶ AG, Scott Kominers and Simon Weber (2015a). Costly Concessions: An Empirical Framework for Matching with Imperfectly Transferable Utility.
- ▶ AG, Scott Kominers and Simon Weber (2015b). The Nonlinear Bernstein-Schrödinger Equation in Economics, GSI proceedings.

Agenda:

1. Economic motivation
2. The mathematical problem
3. Computation
4. Estimation

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Section 1

ECONOMIC MOTIVATION

- ▶ Consider a very simple model of labour market. Assume that a population of *workers* is characterized by their type $x \in \mathcal{X}$, where $\mathcal{X} = \mathbb{R}^d$ for simplicity. There is a distribution P over the workers, which is assumed to sum to one.
- ▶ A population of *firms* is characterized by their types $y \in \mathcal{Y}$ (say $\mathcal{Y} = \mathbb{R}^d$), and their distribution Q . It is assumed that there is the same total mass of workers and firms, so Q sums to one.
- ▶ Each worker must work for one firm; each firm must hire one worker. Let $\pi(x, y)$ be the probability of observing a matched (x, y) pair. π should have marginal P and Q , which is denoted

$$\pi \in \mathcal{M}(P, Q).$$

- In the simplest case, the utility of a worker x working for a firm y at wage $w(x, y)$ will be

$$\alpha(x, y) + w(x, y)$$

while the corresponding profit of firm y is

$$\gamma(x, y) - w(x, y).$$

- In this case, the total surplus generated by a pair (x, y) is

$$\alpha(x, y) + w + \gamma(x, y) - w = \alpha(x, y) + \gamma(x, y) =: \Phi(x, y)$$

which does not depend on w (no transfer frictions). A central planner may thus like to choose assignment $\pi \in \mathcal{M}(P, Q)$ so to

$$\max_{\pi \in \mathcal{M}(P, Q)} \int \Phi(x, y) d\pi(x, y).$$

But **why would this be the equilibrium solution?**

- ▶ The equilibrium assignment is determined by an important quantity: the **wages**. Let $w(x, y)$ be the wage of employee x working for firm of type y .
- ▶ Let the indirect surpluses of worker x and firm y be respectively

$$u(x) = \max_y \{ \alpha(x, y) + w(x, y) \}$$

$$v(y) = \max_x \{ \gamma(x, y) - w(x, y) \}$$

so that (π, w) is an equilibrium when

$$u(x) \geq \alpha(x, y) + w(x, y) \text{ with equality if } (x, y) \in \text{Supp}(\pi)$$

$$v(y) \geq \gamma(x, y) - w(x, y) \text{ with equality if } (x, y) \in \text{Supp}(\pi)$$

- ▶ By summation,

$$u(x) + v(y) \geq \Phi(x, y) \text{ with equality if } (x, y) \in \text{Supp}(\pi).$$

- One can show that the equilibrium outcome (π, u, v) is such that π is solution to the primal Monge-Kantorovich Optimal Transportation problem

$$\max_{\pi \in \mathcal{M}(P, Q)} \int \Phi(x, y) d\pi(x, y)$$

and (u, v) is solution to the dual OT problem

$$\begin{aligned} \min_{u, v} \int u(x) dP(x) + \int v(y) dQ(y) \\ \text{s.t. } u(x) + v(y) \geq \Phi(x, y) \end{aligned}$$

- Feasibility+Complementary slackness yield the desired equilibrium conditions

$$\begin{aligned} \pi &\in \mathcal{M}(P, Q) \\ u(x) + v(y) &\geq \Phi(x, y) \\ (x, y) \in \text{Supp}(\pi) &\implies u(x) + v(y) = \Phi(x, y) \end{aligned}$$

“Second welfare theorem”, “invisible hand”, etc.

- ▶ Is equilibrium always the solution to an optimization problem?
- ▶ **It is not.** This is why this talk is about “Equilibrium Transportation,” which contains, but is strictly more general than “Optimal Transportation”.

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- ▶ **It is not.** This is why this talk is about “Equilibrium Transportation,” which contains, but is strictly more general than “Optimal Transportation”.

- Consider the same setting as above, but instead of assuming that workers' and firm's payoffs are linear in surplus, assume

$$u(x) = \max_y \{ \mathcal{U}_{xy}(w(x, y)) \}$$

$$v(y) = \max_x \{ \mathcal{V}_{xy}(w(x, y)) \}$$

where $\mathcal{U}_{xy}(w)$ is nondecreasing and continuous, and $\mathcal{V}_{xy}(w)$ is nonincreasing and continuous.

- Motivation: taxes, decreasing marginal returns, risk aversion, etc. Of course, Optimal Transportation case is recovered when

$$\mathcal{U}_{xy}(w) = \alpha_{xy} + w$$

$$\mathcal{V}_{xy}(w) = \gamma_{xy} - w.$$

- For $(u, v) \in \mathbb{R}^2$, let

$$\Psi_{xy}(u, v) = \min \{ t \in \mathbb{R} : \exists w, u - t \leq \mathcal{U}_{xy}(w) \text{ and } v - t \leq \mathcal{V}_{xy}(w) \}$$

so that Ψ is nondecreasing in both variables and

$(u, v) = (\mathcal{U}_{xy}(w), \mathcal{V}_{xy}(w))$ for some w if and only if $\Psi_{xy}(u, v) = 0$.

Optimal Transportation case is recovered when

$$\Psi_{xy}(u, v) = (u + v - \Phi_{xy}) / 2.$$

- As before, (π, w) is an equilibrium when

$$u(x) \geq \mathcal{U}_{xy}(w(x, y)) \text{ with equality if } (x, y) \in \text{Supp}(\pi)$$

$$v(y) \geq \mathcal{V}_{xy}(w(x, y)) \text{ with equality if } (x, y) \in \text{Supp}(\pi)$$

- We have therefore that (π, u, v) is an equilibrium when

$$\Psi_{xy}(u(x), v(y)) \geq 0 \text{ with equality if } (x, y) \in \text{Supp}(\pi).$$

Section 2

THE MATHEMATICAL PROBLEM

- We have therefore that (π, u, v) is an equilibrium outcome when

$$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \pi \in \mathcal{M}(P, Q) \\ \Psi_{xy}(u(x), v(y)) \geq 0 \\ (x, y) \in \text{Supp}(\pi) \implies \Psi_{xy}(u(x), v(y)) = 0 \end{array} \right. .$$

- Problem: existence of an equilibrium outcome? This paper: yes in the discrete case (\mathcal{X} and \mathcal{Y} finite), via entropic regularization.

As soon as Ψ_{xy} is strictly increasing in both variables, $\Psi_{xy}(u, v) = 0$ expresses as

$$u = G_{xy}(v) \text{ and } v = G_{xy}^{-1}(u)$$

where the generating functions G_{xy} and G_{xy}^{-1} are decreasing and continuous functions. In this case, relations

$$u(x) = \max_{y \in \mathcal{Y}} G_{xy}(v(y)) \text{ and } v(y) = \max_{x \in \mathcal{X}} G_{xy}^{-1}(u(x))$$

generalize the Legendre-Fenchel conjugacy. This pair of relations form a Galois connection; see Singer (1997) and Noeldeke and Samuelson (2015).

REMARK 2: TRUDINGER'S LOCAL THEORY OF PRESCRIBED JACOBIANS

Assuming everything is smooth, and letting f_P and f_Q be the densities of P and Q we have under some conditions that the equilibrium transportation plan is given by $y = T(x)$, where mass balance yields

$$|\det DT(x)| = \frac{f(x)}{g(T(x))}$$

and optimality yields

$$\partial_x G_{xT(x)}^{-1}(u(x)) + \partial_u G_{xT(x)}^{-1}(u(x)) \nabla u(x) = 0$$

which thus inverts into

$$T(x) = e(x, u(x), \nabla u(x)).$$

Trudinger (2014) studies Monge-Ampere equations of the form

$$|\det De(., u, \nabla u)| = \frac{f}{g(e(., u, \nabla u))}.$$

(more general than Optimal Transport where no dependence on u).

- Our work (GKW 2015a and b) focuses on the discrete case, when P and Q have finite support. Call p_x and q_y the mass of $x \in \mathcal{X}$ and $y \in \mathcal{Y}$ respectively.
- In the discrete case, problem boils down to looking for (π, u, v) such that

$$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \pi_{xy} \geq 0, \sum_y \pi_{xy} = p_x, \sum_x \pi_{xy} = q_y \\ \Psi_{xy}(u_x, v_y) \geq 0 \\ \pi_{xy} > 0 \implies \Psi_{xy}(u_x, v_y) = 0 \end{array} \right. .$$

Section 3

COMPUTATION

- Take temperature parameter $T > 0$ and look for π under the form

$$\pi_{xy} = \exp \left(-\frac{\Psi_{xy}(u_x, v_y)}{T} \right)$$

- Note that when $T \rightarrow 0$, the limit of $\Psi_{xy}(u_x, v_y)$ is nonnegative, and the limit of $\pi_{xy} \Psi_{xy}(u_x, v_y)$ is zero.

- If $\pi_{xy} = \exp(-\Psi_{xy}(u_x, v_y) / T)$, condition $\pi \in \mathcal{M}(P, Q)$ boils down to set of nonlinear equations in (u, v)

$$\begin{cases} \sum_{y \in \mathcal{Y}} \exp\left(-\frac{\Psi_{xy}(u_x, v_y)}{T}\right) = p_x \\ \sum_{x \in \mathcal{X}} \exp\left(-\frac{\Psi_{xy}(u_x, v_y)}{T}\right) = q_y \end{cases}$$

which we call the *nonlinear Bernstein-Schrödinger* equation.

- In the optimal transportation case, this becomes the classical B-S equation

$$\begin{cases} \sum_{y \in \mathcal{Y}} \exp\left(\frac{\Phi_{xy} - u_x - v_y}{2T}\right) = p_x \\ \sum_{x \in \mathcal{X}} \exp\left(\frac{\Phi_{xy} - u_x - v_y}{2T}\right) = q_y \end{cases}$$

- ▶ Note that $F_x : u_x \rightarrow \sum_{y \in \mathcal{Y}} \exp\left(-\frac{\Psi_{xy}(u_x, v_y)}{T}\right)$ is a decreasing and continuous function. Mild conditions on Ψ therefore ensure the existence of u_x so that $F_x(u_x) = p_x$.
- ▶ Our algorithm is thus a nonlinear Jacobi algorithm:
 - Make an initial guess of v_y^0
 - Determine the u_x^{k+1} to fit the p_x margins, based on the v_y^k
 - Update the v_y^{k+1} to fit the q_y margins, based on the u_x^{k+1} .
 - Repeat until v^{k+1} is close enough to v^k .
- ▶ One can proof that if v_y^0 is high enough, then the v_y^k decrease to fixed point. Convergence is very fast in practice.

Section 4

STATISTICAL ESTIMATION

- ▶ In practice, one observes $\hat{\pi}_{xy}$ and would like to estimate Ψ . Assume that Ψ belongs to a parametric family Ψ^θ , so that $\pi_{xy}^\theta = \exp(-\Psi_{xy}^\theta(u_x^\theta, v_y^\theta)) \in \mathcal{M}(P, Q)$.
- ▶ The log-likelihood $l(\theta)$ associated to observation $\hat{\pi}_{xy}$ is

$$\begin{aligned} l(\theta) &= \sum_{xy} \hat{\pi}_{xy} \log \pi_{xy}^\theta \\ &= - \sum_{xy} \hat{\pi}_{xy} \Psi_{xy}^\theta(u_x^\theta, v_y^\theta) / T \end{aligned}$$

and thus the maximum likelihood procedure consists in

$$\min_{\theta} \sum_{xy} \hat{\pi}_{xy} \Psi_{xy}^\theta(u_x^\theta, v_y^\theta) / T.$$