Gendered Conflict*

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This study quantitatively tests the relationship between state militarism and domestic gender equality. International relations literature on the impact and potential impact of women on foreign policy suggests that women are more peaceful in that they are less likely than men to support the use of international violence. Other research indicates that a domestic environment of inequality results in state militarism on the international level. Both lines of inquiry suggest that a domestic environment of equality between women and men would lead toward greater state pacifism, and four hypotheses are developed to test this relationship. The Militarized Interstate Dispute dataset is used with hostility level as the dependent variable to measure the level of militarism employed by any given state to resolve international conflicts. Independent variables for gender equality include percent women in parliament, duration of female suffrage, percent women in the labor force, and fertility rate. Several control variables (alliances, contiguity, wealth, and democracy) are added to the multivariate logistic regressions, and all four hypotheses are confirmed. This study substantiates the theory that domestic gender equality has a pacifying effect on state behavior on the international level.

The debate rages within and beyond feminist theory[1] as to the existence of a gender gap between women's and men's support for the use of violence to resolve international disputes, and the impact or, in many cases, the potential impact of domestic gender equity on international behavior. Specifically, scholars have identified women, in relation to men, as being less likely to support the use of force (deBoer, 1985; Fite et al., 1990; Frankovic, 1982; McGlen & Sarkees, 1993; Mueller, 1973, 1994; Shapiro & Mahajan, 1986; Smith, 1984; Togeby,

1994). International relations scholars studying the impact of women on foreign policy suggest that increased gender equality, resulting in women's equal political, economic, and social power, will result in more pacific foreign policy behavior.[2] The inclusion of women as equal members of society will, therefore, result in fewer and less violent militarized international disputes.

Ample work also exists within international relations literature linking domestic factors and state bellicosity in that states externalize domestic political culture to international behavior (Doyle, 1986; Maoz & Russett, 1992; Russett, 1990). Similarly, feminists advocate the analysis of relationships between and within states to explain

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[1] There exists a wealth of feminist theory across disciplines. In this project, feminist theory is used as a general term while recognizing the breath within feminist theory and the dialogue between feminist theorists and disciplines.

[2] The speculated change in policy outcome would not be limited to foreign policy, which is the focus of this research.

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international relations (Harrington, 1992). Indeed, research suggests that domestic social factors may have greater explanatory potential in predicting state militarism than do traditional measures (Brandes, 1994; Fite et al., 1990; Forsythe, 1992; Iannello, 1992; McGlen & Sarkees, 1993; Peterson, 1992; Tickner, 1992; Togeby, 1994). This domestic–international political link is based on the premise that states duplicate patterns of domestic politics in the international arena and apply the same political norms in both domestic and international politics. States that typically exhibit discrimination and violence in their domestic affairs will, theoretically, rely on the same tools in the international arena. We may, therefore, expect the international behavior of states to vary among states with more gender-neutral value systems.

This analysis draws on both feminist research and conflict studies in an attempt to lend greater predictability and accuracy to the study of peace. This research will analyze the fundamental question as to whether domestic gender equality correlates with fewer and less violent military solutions to resolve international disputes. After first laying out the basic theoretical and conceptual material of relevance to this study, my empirical analysis will examine the degree to which domestic gender equality impacts states' international behavior. An analysis of gender should begin with a common understanding of the term. Next, the assumption that women differ from men in their support for international violence necessitates identifying these value differences. Lastly, the gender gap will be explored.

Gender

It is on the basis of gender that access and power are limited and inequality is justified and maintained. Gender issues determine access to resources and control – as a result

of gender-defined rights – roles, power relationships, responsibilities, and expectations (Sadik, 1997). Although the power and role of women vary across cultures, women are always unequal in both the economic and political spheres (Scott, 1986: 1069), thus making gender equality a useful cross-national variable.

Theorists seeking to understand women's relative lack of power compared to that of men subscribe to one of two general schools of thought. Scholars explain the gendered power deficit with two competing theories: biological reductionism or biological determinism versus social constructivism. According to both theoretical perspectives, foreign policy would be altered with less gender-based value systems, but for different reasons.

Biological determinism posits physiological differences between men and women as the basis of social roles. Scholars supporting the concept of biological determinism argue that women have an essential nature that is based on their natural reproductive capacity (Daly, 1984; Elshtain, 1986; Griffin, 1981; Rich, 1976; Rossi, 1970; Ruddick, 1987). According to this perspective, women's behavior is instinctive and not learned. The inclusion of women in foreign policy decisionmaking, therefore, would alter policy output – not women's nature, which is biologically determined.

On the other hand, social constructivists argue that gender differences are socially constructed and that gender is not synonymous with sex differences (Gailey, 1987; MacCormack & Strathern, 1980; Ortner & Whitehead, 1981; Stacey, 1986; Tickner, 1992). Gender is viewed as the product of social relationships within society (Rosaldo, 1980; Rubin, 1975; Sadik, 1997). According to the social constructivist perspective, there is no inherent difference based on gender, as both males and females are forced into stereotypical roles. The

inclusion of women in foreign policy, therefore, would not necessarily alter policy output unless society were freed from gender stereotypes. In which case, foreign policy output might become less bellicose as both genders become free to act on their beliefs rather than being tied to roles that require males to be aggressive and females passive.

Gender Values

Both perspectives – social constructivist and biological determinism – lead to the conclusion that gender equality would affect foreign policy decisionmaking and would account for the existence of a gender gap. At the most basic level, scholars have identified distinct values for women and men. Some studies, relying on assumptions about feminine and masculine qualities,[3] suggest that the inclusion of women in foreign policy analyses will affect outcomes (Peterson, 1992; Tickner, 1992). Page & Shapiro (1992: 295) declare that '[I]n practically all realms of foreign and domestic policy, women are less belligerent than men.'

Women's relative pacifism may be a result of women seeing moral dilemmas in terms of conflicting responsibilities rather than competing rights, and of their valuing community and connectedness over autonomy and individuation (Flax, 1978; Gilligan, 1982). Similarly, Ford & Lowery (1986) argue that women prioritize care and mutually acceptable solutions, whereas men favor justice. In general, women are less competitive and more focused on issues of interdependence and egalitarianism (Gidengil, 1995; Miller, 1988; Welch & Hibbing, 1992). White (1988) corroborates studies highlighting the egalitarian nature of women with her research showing that males engage in power struggles for personal gain, whereas females attempt to minimize power

differences, to share resources, and to treat others equally. According to some feminist literature, therefore, value differences[4] between women and men result in a gender gap in support for the international use of violence. Domestic gender inequality, therefore, may yield increased state militarism on the international level.

Feminists analyze power, defined as equal access, and theorize that gender and power hierarchies are inextricably intertwined (Tickner, 1992: 19). Control is often used as the rationale for female subjugation. Feminists claim that power should be conceptualized as a divisible, infinite resource and/or as the ability to reach goals (Iannello, 1992: 43). States that are not organized according to strict hierarchical models based on gender[5] would be socialized to treat others, regardless of differences, as equal and due equal treatment. Feminism involves a commitment to freedom, equality, and self-government (Dietz, 1985) and rejects hierarchical domination, the use of military force, and other forms of exploitation (Brock-Utne, 1990).

Gender Gap

Thus far, scholars have concentrated on measuring gender differences in public opinion. Most of the research testing for the existence of a gender gap focuses on the difference between the level of female and male support for war and willingness to use force (de Boer, 1985; Fite et al., 1990; Frankovic, 1982; McGlen & Sarkees, 1993; Shapiro & Mahajan, 1986; Smith, 1984; Togeby, 1994). If women are less likely to support the use of force, the inclusion of women as equal members of society, with equal pol-

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[3] Combinations of masculine and feminine qualities exist in all people. For the majority of women, the feminine qualities are assumed to predominate.

[4] These value differences may be either the result of biology or socialization. In either case, value differences would exist.

[5] This argument applies to any hierarchical organization based on any number of factors including race, gender, ethnicity, or caste. This project, however, is focused on women.

itical, social, and economic access, would impact foreign policy. This implies that the higher a state's level of gender equality, the more peaceful that state is likely to be.

In a public opinion study on support for war in the USA, Mueller (1973: 146) concludes that '[W]omen generally are less favorable to escalation than men, but only slightly more opposed to it; and women are less opposed to withdrawal than men, but only slightly more in favor of it.' This observation held for World War II, the Korea War, the Vietnam War, and the Gulf War. Mueller (1973) cautions, however, that not voicing support for a war is not the same as opposing it. To extend the gender gap study beyond the US experience, Welch & Thomas (1988) studied the British experience. They found no gap in ideology or partisan affiliation between men and women, yet discovered a substantial difference toward the use of force but not in maintaining military power, nuclear determent, or military spending.

In addition, Fite et al. (1990) found a difference in men and women's support for the use of force, as did Wilcox et al. (1996) and Gallagher (1993). In a study of the Gulf War, Gallagher identified a large gap, with women in support of attacking Iraqi forces at 22% versus men's 48%, and with women opposed to attacking Iraqi forces at 73% versus men's 48%. Even though both men's and women's identified goal was the same (to get Iraqi troops out of Kuwait), there existed a distinct difference in support for attacking Iraqi forces. Similarly, Hart & Teeter (1991) also found men to be more likely to support war continuation.

Controversy does exist within international relations literature between those who hold that women have similar values to those of men and those who identify a gender gap (Holsti & Rosenau, 1988; Wittkopf & Maggiotto, 1983). In a study conducted in the USA, McGlen & Sarkees

(1993) found varying degrees of a gender gap amongst the masses but none with women working within the State Department or the Defense Department. The absence of a gender gap within the State and Defense Departments may be a result of pressure to conform to traditional institutional perspectives or may be tied to socio-economic status. Studies controlling for socio-economic status, however, have failed to alter the size of the resultant gender gap,[6] thus suggesting a more robust relationship than critics believe (Fite et al., 1990; Gallagher, 1993; Tessler & Warriner, 1997; Welch & Thomas, 1988).

The hypothesized reasons for the gender gap, when found, are many. Conover (1988) suggests that the gender gap is created only by those women who identify with the women's movement. Furthermore, Grant & Newland (1991) argue that any current gender gap associated with support for the commitment of forces or for war would be eradicated by the inclusion of more women in active duty within the armed forces. The inclusion of women in the armed forces, on the other hand, might result in an alteration of the armed forces, not of women's opinion. And there is support for this supposition, as Carson (1993) offers evidence that the police force has become less violent with an increased number of female officers integrated at all levels of the police force, rather than having the female officers become more violent.

Tessler & Warriner (1997) argue that there is no evidence that women are less militaristic than men. They do, however, find that individuals who are more supportive of

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[6] It is important to remember that these studies analyzed the USA or Great Britain – two countries in which all receive public education and have a certain standard of living that is not necessarily representative of other countries. Thus, the scope of the observation that a gender gap exists on the use of military force regardless of socio-economic status cannot be considered valid in a cross-cultural analysis.

equality between women and men are also less supportive of violence to resolve conflict. This suggests that the relationship between more pacifist attitudes and international conflict rests upon the degree of gender equality that characterizes a society (Tessler & Warriner, 1997). Those who express greater concern for the status and role of women, and particularly for equality between women and men, are more likely than other individuals to believe that the international disputes in which their country is involved should be resolved through diplomacy and compromise (Tessler & Warriner, 1997: 280; see also Boling, 1991; Conover, 1988; Conover & Sapiro, 1993; Cook & Wilcox, 1991; Dietz, 1985; Gidengil, 1995; Ruddick, 1989). In other words, societies that have internalized values that are less gender-based and apply them to their interstate and interpersonal relations should exhibit less militaristic international behavior.

Violence Begets Violence

Beyond the existence of a gender gap over the use of force to warrant an analysis of women's impact on state bellicosity lie theories linking domestic and international violence. Societies with high levels of family violence are more likely to rely on violent conflict resolution and are more likely to be involved in wars compared to societies with lower levels of family violence (Brumfield, 1994; Erchak & Rosenfeld, 1994; Levinson, 1989). Higher levels of societal violence may be explained by Rummel's (1997: 170) conclusion that 'when political power is centralized, nondemocratic, and highly dependent upon one's social group membership, be it race, religion, ethnicity, or some cultural division [gender?], then collective violence is also highly likely.'

Indeed, Ember & Ember (1994) depict the causal relationship between international

behavior and domestic behavior by arguing that the nature of a state's international behavior both legitimates and is reflected in its domestic behavior. There may, however, be a mutually supportive relationship between international and domestic behavior, not a simple unidirectional causation; e.g. domestic behavior might legitimate and be reflected in a state's international behavior.

Although the link between international behavior and domestic behavior may be driven by a myriad of inequalities and violence within society, scholars have found in particular a correlation between a state's level of militarism and sexism, manifested by women's inequality in relation to that of men (Brownmiller, 1975; Elshtain, 1987; Reardon, 1985; Ruddick, 1983). Other scholars have linked masculinity with militarism (Cohn, 1989; Enloe, 1989). The hypothesized link between masculinity and militarism is maintained by men's higher social status in relation to that of women. Based on these theories, we would expect a state's level of militarism – use of military action – to decrease in conjunction with increased gender equality.

Equality

Both theories – gender gap and the domestic–international violence link – rely on a concept of equality. Pateman (1970) defines equality to mean that all people must have equal political, economic, and social access in order for each person to be able to participate equally in society. Equal participation relies on equality of opportunity, which 'means that no illegitimate criteria are imposed and no indefensible and avoidable background conditions are permitted that impede, restrict, or deny a person a chance to compete for or enjoy some good that is available to others' (Cauthen, 1987: 100).

All citizens should benefit from social,

political, and economic equality. People must have equal access and equal influence, i.e. all people must be assumed equal. In most societies, there exists a wide disparity in political, social, and economic access. Those states in which access is restricted by any measure (wealth, lineage, race, and gender) will necessarily violate the equality assumption.

Gender equality must be measured based on social equality, which can be understood as the relationship between and among individuals in which individuals do not constrain one another (Oppenheim, 1961). A person's social position accords not only status, but also access to political and economic systems (United Nations, 1984: 17). Formal access to the political and economic spheres translates into power and opportunities that enable a person to choose a way of life and to experience equality of opportunity.

Social equality is, unfortunately, quite difficult to measure in a cross-cultural study. Even when not overtly subordinated, women operate in a society that gives men vast influence. No adequate measures exist to gauge the social pressures that keep women from certain employment or out of the labor force entirely. Women, for example, may earn high wages but may not be allowed to control their wealth. Similarly, it is difficult to determine if women choose to become homemakers or if being a wife and mother is their only alternative.

In theory, each measure of gender equality captures a different aspect of equality – social, political, or economic. In practice, however, the three measures are highly correlated, for social, political, and economic access are interdependent. If a woman has low social standing, for example, she is unlikely to gain political office. As a result, each gender equality variable does not represent a discrete measure of social, political, or economic equality but represents a

combination of all three, with each measure having a different emphasis.

Research Design

This research is based on the theories that women and men's values differ in that women are less likely to advocate a military response to resolve international disputes, and that gender equality correlates with lower levels of state militarism internationally. This project tests whether higher levels of gender equality yield lower levels of militarism, measured by the use of military action as a foreign policy tool from 1960 through 1992. Data availability and reliability limit the time-frame for this analysis, as statistics for gender equality are neither widely available nor reliable prior to 1960; and the 1992 end year is a constraint of the dataset.

Multivariate logistic regression[7] is performed to test the hypothesis using the Militarized Interstate Dispute dataset (MID) (Bremer, 1996), which measures interstate conflict. MID identifies 2187 incidences of states involved in international disputes, representing the total number of militarized, international disputes by country during this time-frame. There were a total of 159 states involved in militarized international disputes; a dispute between two states counted twice, once for each country involved.

Definitions and Measures of Variables

Independent Variables
Gender equality serves as the independent variable, and militarism as the dependent variable in this analysis. Militarism is measured by the level of military action employed by a state for each militarized international dispute in which it becomes

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[7] The SAS statistical package is used to run the analyses. The parameter estimates given in the tables have been multiplied by −1, to aid in interpreting the results and to conform with other statistical packages.

involved. The unit of analysis is a state in a particular militarized dispute matched, for each dispute, with independent variables calculated for each calendar year. Thus, any changes in the independent variables are determined yearly. Several control variables are used: contiguity, alliances, wealth, and democracy. The independent variables do not change significantly over the course of each dispute and are coded for each country for the start year of each dispute.

Measures of Gender Equity

The level of gender equality is determined by evaluating women's social, political, and economic equality in relation to that of men.

Social Equality

Fertility Rate This variable represents a complex combination of interrelated social, political, and economic aspects of women's lives, and is available from the World Bank. Women's lives are generally described in terms of motherhood in societies in which women have low social status. Fertility rate, therefore, becomes an important measure of women's social equality, of opportunities beyond motherhood. Indeed, fertility rate captures the interrelation among social, economic, and political access: 'women's access to reproductive health services is constrained by their broader social deprivation, including the lack of resources for or priority to their health, restrictions on social participation, and limited access to information due to illiteracy' (Sadik, 1997).

In addition, women who have no control over their own fertility rate are less likely to participate in the labor force than women who exercise more control over their reproduction (Dixon-Mueller, 1993: chs 5 and 6). Fertility is related to women's status in that high fertility rates result in poorer health, and lower levels of education, employment, and decisionmaking in both the family and community (UN, 1995: 15). In general, lower fertility rates result in women's empowerment in that they have greater control over their own lives and more free time (UNDP, 1995: 111).

Level of education is a potential measure of women's social status; yet education, as a whole, has increased worldwide, resulting in little variation among states, and studies conducted by the UN, UNFPA, and the UNDP have linked women's education to lower fertility. This relation between education and fertility holds regardless of region, culture, or level of development and is a result of five or six years of schooling (Sadik 1997: ch. 2). A strong relationship between control over fertility rate and economic standing also exists. Access to reproductive health services 'enhances women's self-esteem, their confidence, their participation in political and community life, their decision-making power and their position in the family' (Sadik, 1997: ch. 2).

Political Equality

Percent Women in Parliament The percent women in parliament variable reflects the percentage of women in the upper house of parliament. The upper house of parliament is used as it has a greater impact on foreign policy than does the lower house and is most comparable to those states that are unicameral. The Inter-Parliamentary Union compiles statistics on women in parliament and provides dates for the year suffrage was extended to women.

Suffrage The suffrage variable is derived by subtracting the year women gained suffrage from the start year for the militarized dispute. The resulting figure is the number of years women have had political influence via voting at the onset of the militarized dispute. The longer women have had the vote, the greater should be their influence.

Formal political power best captures women's political equality. Beyond influence gained through voting in democracies, women obtain formal political power by serving as members of government. Theoretically, women's political power would increase with their level of equality within society. The second aspect of women's political influence is suffrage. The more politically powerful women are as a group, the more influence they should have on the decisions of leaders, at least in democratic states.

Female leaders were not used as an independent variable, for two important reasons. First, few women have held the position of president or prime minister, thus representing an inadequate sample. Perhaps more important, women in positions of power are compelled to use a style that conveys strength in traditional male terms (Sykes, 1993). This need to conform to traditional male styles may explain McGlen & Sarkees' (1993) finding that no gender gap existed between women and men working within the State Department or the Defense Department as noted earlier. Women such as Margaret Thatcher, Indira Gandhi, and Golda Meir who emulate men are often described as acting as though they were men. They prove more likely to succeed as national political leaders and are more likely in male-dominated societies to gain political power (Astin & Leland, 1991; Fukuyama, 1998; Sykes, 1993). These female leaders, therefore, do not necessarily represent the female gender or the possible effect of domestic gender equality on foreign policy.

Economic Equality

Percent Women in the Labor Force In this project, the World Bank's statistics on female percent share of the labor force are used.

Recognizing that economic access is largely determined by social access, economic access is measured by women's share of the adult labor force. Women gain a sense of empowerment through participation in industry, which increases individual political efficacy, thus fostering political participation. Active participants in society develop a new sense of efficacy, which ensures their continual and broadening participation in multiple spheres of their lives. Often, participation in industry, within the workplace, is the key to gaining a sense of efficacy that will translate into participation in the political arena (Pateman, 1970).

No perfect measurement of women's economic access exists cross-nationally. Labor statistics are the most reliable and are widely available, though these too offer no indication as to whether women have control of their wages. Labor statistics measure the number of women working, not the type of employment, average wage, or unpaid labor, such as housework and child rearing. However, the focus of this project is on economic participation, not on income or type of employment, as income was not found important in explaining the hypothesized dovish nature of women (Fite et al., 1990; Gallagher, 1993; Welch & Thomas, 1988).

Control Variables

Contiguity This variable is the total number of neighbors that are contiguous by land. The data come from the Correlates of War (COW) contiguity dataset (Gochman, 1991).

States are more likely to become engaged in an international dispute with a contiguous state (see Bremer, 1992; Diehl, 1991; Gleditsch, 1995; Goertz & Diehl, 1992; Maoz & Russett, 1992, 1993; Rummel, 1994; Siverson & Starr, 1991). The number of neighbors variable is used to control for contiguity, as the probability of

conflict is dependent on the number of neighbors (Gleditsch & Hegre, 1998).

Number of Alliance Partners This variable represents the number of states sharing membership in a defense pact or an entente. These data are available from the COW Alliance dataset (Singer & Small, 1993).

Some scholars have found alliance ties to diminish the likelihood of war (Bremer, 1992; Maoz & Russett, 1992; Weede, 1983), while others (Rousseau et al., 1996) report that alliance ties do not decrease the likelihood of conflict. The number of alliance partners may be sufficient to deter attack, thereby reducing the number of militarized disputes, or may increase the number of militarized disputes as alliance partners are drawn into an ongoing dispute.

Democracy This variable is calculated from Jaggers and Gurr Polity III dataset (1996) and is a continuous term from −10 through 10, with 10 being the highest score for democracy. The continuous score was calculated by subtracting the autocracy score from the democracy score ([democracy score] minus [autocracy score]).

Although some research indicates the democratic peace thesis to be dyadic (Chan, 1984; Maoz & Russett, 1993; Russett, 1990; Small & Singer, 1976; Weede, 1984), other research (Benoit, 1996; Bremer, 1992; Bueno de Mesquita & Lalman, 1992; Gleditsch & Hegre, 1997; Ray, 1995; Rummel, 1995) hints at a possible monadic relation between democracy and militarism. A measure of democracy, therefore, is included based on elements of the democratic peace literature indicating that democracies may be less bellicose. In addition, many of the gender equity variables may be higher in democracies, thus necessitating a control variable to test whether democracy is affecting state mili-

tarism internationally rather than domestic gender equality.

Wealth The PENN World Table (Mark 5.6) (Summers & Heston, 1991) provides a variable for real GDP per capita in constant dollars using Chain index, 1985 international prices calculated yearly by state.

Wealth has been identified as an important variable in predicting war both as a direct factor (see Maoz & Russett, 1992) and as a factor in classifying major powers. Major powers are, in general, more likely to become involved in wars (Bremer, 1992, 1980; Small & Singer, 1982). On the contrary, satisfied powers and developed states have been found to be less bellicose (Brawley, 1993; Kacowicz, 1995; Lemke & Reed, 1996; Morgan & Campbell, 1991; Rousseau et al., 1996), as wealthy states have much to lose from violent conflict and little marginal utility to gain (Maoz & Russett, 1993; Mueller, 1989).

Relative power also matters, with a preponderance of power generally accepted as preventing war (see Sullivan, 1990). Democratic states, however, when initiating military violence, have done so against states with inferior military, economic, and political capabilities (Forsythe, 1992; Gartzke, 1998; James & Mitchell, 1995). A relative measure of power between states is not as important as wealth in predicting war. Indeed, the power capabilities variable has little explanatory capability, for every state is in a relative power position with regard to other states, yet these power disparities do not often result in war or militarized disputes (Gochman, 1998: 3). In addition, the gender equity variables may be higher in wealthier states, thus requiring a control variable for wealth.

China A dummy control variable is included with fertility in the logistic regression. This is necessary as China has an

artificially low fertility rate that is not necessarily a product of female equality.

Dependent Variable

The level of military action employed by a state creates a useful measure capturing a state's level of militarism through its reliance on force as defined by various levels of, or absence of, military action. A state's level of militarism is, perhaps, one of the better indicators of peace and is analogous to its emphasis on force as a means of international conflict resolution (Latham, 1993). Once again, women are less likely than men are to support the use of militarized force as a means of international conflict resolution, and high levels of domestic gender equity have been linked to lower levels of state militarism internationally. A state's emphasis on force, therefore, should be inversely related to the level of gender equity – the higher the level of gender equity, the lower the level of militarism.

Militarism

Hostility Level   The Militarized Interstate Dispute data (Bremer, 1996), used in this analysis, offer five different hostility levels coded as follows: (1) no militarized action, (2) threat to use force, (3) display of force, (4) use of force, and (5) war.

A single dispute involving two states would be coded twice because this analysis focuses on the level of international militarism employed relative to the level of domestic gender equality. For example, the Falklands War involved both Argentina and the UK. The militarized, international dispute is listed twice, once for each country. Because the Falklands War was a war between two countries, each state's level of military force was coded '5' for war. Although the Falklands War occurred only during one year, a multiple-year war would

not be coded more than once for each state involved.

Results

Before analyzing the data, a few matters should be discussed concerning the variables. This project tested the following operationalized hypotheses with regard to gender equity – all of which were confirmed:[8]

- *Political equality*
  Hypothesis 1: States with a higher percentage of women in parliament will experience lower levels of international violence.
  Hypothesis 2: States with a longer duration of female suffrage will experience lower levels of international violence.

- *Social equality*
  Hypothesis 3: States with lower fertility rates will exhibit lower levels of international violence.

- *Economic equality*
  Hypothesis 4: States with higher female participation in the labor force will exhibit lower levels of international violence.

As outlined above, the independent variables are fertility rate, female percent of the labor force, female percent of parliament, duration of female suffrage, contiguity, alliances, wealth, and democracy. The four measures of gender equality are correlated and introduce multicollinearity in the regression.[9] In order to correct for the bias of multicollinearity,

[8] These results were replicated with mulitvariate regression (SPSS statistical package) using the COW data set (Singer & Small, 1993) with identical independent variables and with a dependent variable of fatality level. The only notable difference was with economic equality/labor force, which failed to show significance ($p = 0.117$). This may be attributed to a small N (49).

[9] Each variable was systematically dropped from the equation and the coefficients and standard errors were affected, thereby indicating that multicollinearity was biasing the equation.

Table I. Military Disputes as a Function of Political Equality, Contiguity, Alliances, and Wealth, 1960–1992

Independent variables	Parameter estimates	Standard error
% women in parliament	−.0263	***.00769
Democracy score	−.0276	**.0102
Contiguity	−.0156	.00924
# of alliance partners	−.0212	****.0047
Wealth	−.29E4	.17E4
Intercept 1	−.6395	.1840
Intercept 2	−.4427	.1359
Intercept 3	−2.7498	.1952

$N = 1098$
Log Likelihood Differential Test: $\chi^2 = 69.1107$
Model significance = $p < .0001$
** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$; **** $p < .0001$

Table II. Military Disputes as a Function of Political Equality, Contiguity, Alliances, and Wealth, 1960–1992

Independent variables	Parameter estimates	Standard error
Suffrage	−.0121	**.00376
Democracy score	−.0126	.00928
Contiguity	−.0186	*.00913
# of alliance partners	−.0158	***.00421
Wealth	−.02E3	.18E4
Intercept 1	3.7412	.1841
Intercept 2	1.5477	.1407
Intercept 3	−2.6871	.1883

$N = 1316$
Log Likelihood Differential Test: $\chi^2 = 75.3090$
Model significance = $p < .0001$
* $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$

four separate logistic regressions are run with each having the four control variables. An additional dummy variable for China is introduced into the social equality model with fertility rate. The Durbin-Watson statistic indicates first-order autocorrelation, which was not significant in this analysis.

Political Equality

The results showed significance for the length of female suffrage prior to the dispute. Given two states, for example, the state having twice the number of years of female suffrage will be nearly five (4.94) times as likely to resolve international disputes without military violence. The percent women in parliament variable also showed significance, with states having lower percentages of women in parliament being more likely to use military violence to settle disputes. As an illustration, a 5% decrease in the proportion of women in parliament renders a state nearly five (4.91) times as likely to resolve international disputes using military violence. This variable may become even more important in the future, as states currently have a relatively small percentage of women in parliament. Only eight[10] of

[10] These states are the former Soviet Union, Romania, Norway, Cuba, Sweden, Albania, the German Democratic Republic, and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.

Table III.   Military Disputes as a Function of Social Equality, Contiguity, Alliances, and Wealth, 1960–1992

Independent variables	Parameter estimates	Standard error
Fertility rate	.1435	***.0408
Democracy score	−.00320	.00948
Contiguity	−.00879	.00954
# of alliance partners	−.0165	****.00434
Wealth	−.26E4	.02E3
China dummy variable	.1277	.4092
Intercept 1	2.6744	.2829
Intercept 2	.5087	.2603
Intercept 3	−3.7092	.3053

$N = 1281$
Log Likelihood Differential Test: $\chi^2 = 75.9355$
Model significance $= p < .0001$
*** $p < .001$; **** $p < .0001$

Table IV. Military Disputes as a Function of Economic Equality, Contiguity, Alliances, and Wealth, 1960–1992

Independent variables	Parameter estimates	Standard error
% women in labor force	−.0104	*.00477
Democracy score	−.00698	.00910
Contiguity	−.0140	.00933
# of alliance partners	−.0130	**.00423
Wealth	−.59E4	***.17E4
Intercept 1	3.7294	.2073
Intercept 2	1.5885	.1717
Intercept 3	−2.5808	.2105

$N = 1310$
Log Likelihood Differential Test: $\chi^2 = 67.6217$
Model significance $= p < .0001$
* $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$

which exceed or meet the 30% threshold established by the UN Commission on Status of Women 1990 in order for women to influence outcome – to influence key decisions and be taken seriously (UNDP, 1995: 108). Nevertheless, the percent women in parliament shows statistical significance, thus indicating its importance.

Social Equality
As expected, those states with high fertility rates, which represent a low social status for women, were more likely to use force in international disputes. For example,

decreasing the fertility rate by one-third makes a state nearly five (4.67) times less likely to use a military solution to settle international disputes. As discussed above, fertility rate encompasses a broad range of concepts including level of education, available economic opportunities, political rights, and overall social status. As such, fertility rates best measure a woman's overall status by capturing not only an aspect of education, but also a measure of self-empowerment through control over her own life. Expanding on Pateman (1970), a general sense of efficacy – political, economic, and

social – is gained from self-empowerment, being able to choose the number of children to have or deciding how far apart to space births.

Economic Equality

The percent women in the labor force showed statistical significance in explaining state bellicosity. These results are in keeping with literature identifying participation in the labor force as an important factor in explaining the hypothesized dovish nature of women (Fite et al., 1990; Gallagher, 1993; Welch & Thomas, 1988). The significance of percent women in the labor force seems to indicate that participation in the workforce alone is sufficient to empower women. Presumably, participation in the labor force results in other types of participation, including voting and other forms of political activism. Increasing the proportion of women in the labor force by 5%, for example, renders a state nearly five (4.95) times less likely to use military force to resolve international conflict.

Control Variables

Number of Neighbors   Contiguity shows no statistical significance. In reference to the contiguity variable, Gochman (1998: 3) argues that a 'static condition cannot, by itself be the cause of a nonstatic outcome'. Proximity in itself is not the cause of military disputes or wars, because every state has neighbors, yet states are not always in conflict with these neighbors. Furthermore, contiguity is linked with economic interdependence (Russett, 1967), and recent research argues that economic interdependence significantly counteracts the influences of contiguity on the likelihood of war (Oneal et al., 1996: 23). Further analysis would be necessary to draw any conclusions regarding contiguity. Such an analysis is beyond the scope of this project.

Number of Alliance Partners   This variable showed statistical significance in all four logistic regressions. The fewer the number of alliance partners, the greater level of militarism exhibited.

Wealth   Wealth showed significance in all but one multivariate logistic regression,[11] indicating that countries with higher levels of wealth as measured by real GDP per capita are less likely to rely on military solutions to international disputes. This finding fits well with theories arguing that satisfied powers and developed states are less bellicose (Brawley, 1993; Kacowicz, 1995; Lemke & Reed, 1996; Morgan & Campbell, 1991; Rousseau et al., 1996).

Conclusion

As evidenced by the statistical significance of all three measures of gender equality – political, social, and economic – gender equality is an important predictor of a state's level of international militarism. The conclusion, therefore, is that higher levels of gender equality correlate with lower levels of military action to settle international disputes. When contiguity, alliances, wealth, and democracy were controlled for, those states with higher levels of gender equality were less likely to rely on military force to settle international disputes.

Even at the most basic level, women's domestic equality impacts foreign policy. This research confirms that the inclusion of women as equal members of society will effect foreign policy, in that their domestic equality correlates with lower levels of international militarism. This analysis lends credence to the domestic–international violence theory in that domestic inequality

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[11] This result is likely a function of multicollinearity between fertility rate and the wealth variable. When run separately, each shows statistical significance. The better specified model, however, includes both variables.

represents a certain level of intolerance and a hierarchical organization, both of which translate into a world-view that necessarily places some people or states as superior to others. In addition, this evidence on the impact of gender equality on foreign policy does not necessarily contradict gender-gap scholars, for the inclusion of women as equal members of society seems to correlate with lower levels of international militarism. Whether this outcome is a function of a gender gap or of having a more gender-neutral value system, as Tessler & Warriner (1997) suggest, remains unclear.

A world-view based on prejudice (against women or other minorities) translates into a level of global intolerance resulting in higher levels of bellicosity against those states not perceived as equal. Drawing from the democratic peace literature (Weart, 1994), states do not go to war with other states that are perceived as equal. Foreign policy goals to ensure peace, therefore, should concentrate more on supporting organizations aimed at improving the status of women, including those aimed at lowering fertility rates and offering credit to women for business enterprises, especially in developing countries.

Future research should be directed at better understanding the impact of all types of domestic inequality on foreign policy behavior. As evidenced by this research, feminist theory has the potential to add to our understanding of international relations. We must try to refine our measures for gender equality, as they are rough and complex measures. The significance of these measures, despite their shortcomings, may indicate a fundamental link between domestic gender equality and international militarism. This link surely goes beyond gender equality to ethnic and racial disparities.

Indeed, Mueller (1973: 147–148; 1994: 43) found that African-Americans were more dovish in that as a group, they were largely against escalation and for withdrawal

during World War II, the Korean War, the Vietnam War, and the Gulf War. These various types of domestic inequalities should be analyzed in order to help scholars better understand both the domestic–international link in predicting states' international behavior and conflict behavior in general.

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