

# AMPC18 Schedule

**Wednesday 2018-02-14**

## Morning

Time	Authors	Title
09:00		Welcome
09:10	<b>Amy Perfors</b> , Nicholas van Dam	Decision-making in black swan environments
09:30	<b>John C. Dunn</b> , Li-Lin Rao	Models of risky choice: A signed difference analysis
09:50	<b>Christina Van Heer</b> , Robert Hester, David K. Sewell, Philip L. Smith	The role of prediction error and confidence in sequential decisions
10:00	<b>Jared M. Hotaling</b> , Andreas Jarvstad, Chris Donkin, Ben R. Newell	The effects of outcome information during sampling on decisions from experience
10:20	<b>Yiyun Shou</b> , Michael Smithson	How Do People Think About the Probability of Human Extinction?
10:40		<b>Coffee</b>
11:10	<b>Ashley Luckman</b> , Sebastian Gluth, Jorg Rieskamp.	Using Response Times to distinguish between attribute-wise and alternate-wise models of inter-temporal choice.
11:30	<b>Yonatan Vanunu</b> , Jared M. Hotaling, Ben R. Newell	The Impact of Goal and Cognitive Load on Decisions from Experience.
11:40	<b>Timothy Ballard</b> , David Sewell, Andrew Neal	Human information processing in the face of reward versus punishment
11:50	Rachel Mullard, Marc Adam, <b>Ami Eidels</b>	Competitive Decision Making in Dutch Auctions
12:00	<b>Alice Mason</b> , Mark Hurlstone, Geoff Ward, Gordon Brown, Simon Farrell	Evaluating bundles of numbers: assessing the trade-off between memory and online updating in retrospective evaluation
12:10	<b>Luke Strickland</b> , David Elliott, Michael David Wilson, Shayne Loft, Andrew Heathcote	Modelling Prospective Memory in Simulated Maritime Surveillance: Cognitive Control and Competition for Capacity
12:30	<b>Russell J. Boag</b> , Luke Strickland, Andrew Heathcote, Shayne Loft	Modelling Cognitive Control Mechanisms in Simulated Air-Traffic Control
12:40		Lunch

## Afternoon

Time	Authors	Title
14:00	<b>Brett K. Hayes</b> , Rachel G. Stephens, Jeremy Ngo, John C. Dunn	The dimensionality of reasoning: Inductive and deductive inference can be explained by a single process
14:20	<b>Dani Navarro</b> , Alison McCann, Alexandra Tingey, Nicole Baz, Michelle Keshwa, Amy Perfors	Extensional and intensional reasoning: A Bayesian perspective on the conjunction fallacy
14:40	Mike Le Pelley, <b>Ben R. Newell</b> , Robert Nosofsky	Once more, with feeling: deferred feedback does not “sharply dissociate” ‘implicit’ and ‘explicit’ category learning.
14:50	<b>Rachel. G. Stephens</b> , Dora Matzke, Brett K. Hayes	Disappearing dissociations in experimental psychology: Using state-trace analysis to test for multiple processes
15:10	<b>Guillermo Campitelli</b>	The prediction game: A simple pedagogical tool to introduce Bayesian inference
15:30		<b>Coffee</b>
16:00	<b>Paul Dudgeon</b> , Mariska Barendse, & Yves Rosseel	Leverage-based confidence intervals for structural equation modelling.
16:20	<b>Nicolas Fay</b> , Bradley Walker	Applying the Cultural Ratchet to a Social Artefact: The Cumulative Cultural Evolution of a Language Game
16:40	<b>Bradley Walker</b> , Nicolas Fay	An Egocentric Bias is Important to Adaptive Social Learning
16:50	<b>Matthew B. Thompson</b> , Rachel A. Searston, Gianni Ribeiro, Jason M. Tangen	Alternative statistical frameworks for communicating the strength of forensic evidence in court
17:10	<b>Matthew Kaesler</b> , John Dunn, Carolyn Semmler	Evaluating Signal Detection Models for Eyewitness Identification
17:20	<b>Simon De Deyne</b> , Amy Perfors	Near neighbour judgements as an efficient way to estimate semantic similarity.
17:30		Soccer

## Thursday 2018-02-15

### Morning

Time	Authors	Title
09:00	<b>Chi-Fai Lo</b> , Kwok-Kwan Wong and Ho-Yan Ip	Lie-algebraic Approach for the Leaky Competing Accumulator Model of Decision Making
09:20	Yakov Ben-Haim, <b>Michael Smithson</b>	Assessing Robustness of Statistical Models: Info-Gap Theory
09:40	<b>Don van Ravenzwaai</b> , Casper Albers, Henk Kiers	Credible Confidence: A pragmatic view on the frequentist vs Bayesian debate
10:00	<b>Trisha Nowland</b>	Mathematical Set Theory for Latent Variable Modelling in Psychology Research

Time	Authors	Title
10:10	<b>Daniel Feuerriegel</b> , Daniel Bennett, Phillip M. Alday, Stefan Bode	The Decision Decoding Toolbox (DDTBOX) - A multivariate pattern analysis toolbox for event-related potentials
10:30		<b>Coffee</b>
11:00	<b>Klaus Oberauer</b> , Hsuan-Yu Lin	An Interference Model of Visual Working Memory: Applications to Change Detection
11:20	Anthea G. Blunden, Dylan Hammond, Piers D. L. Howe, <b>Daniel R. Little</b>	Characterising the architecture and integration rule of change detection decisions
11:40	<b>Chris Donkin</b>	Inferring task-specific psychological representation
11:50	<b>Marton Kocsis</b> , Simon Farrell	The Role of Working Memory in Free Recall: The Effect of Preload at Retrieval
12:00	<b>Adam F. Osth</b> , Simon Farrell	Modeling response time distributions of free recall initiation with race models
12:20	<b>Kevin D. Shabang</b> , D. J. K. Mewhort, Donald R. J. Franklin,	Semantic contrast effects: a holographic interface linking episodic and semantic memory
12:30		Lunch

## Afternoon

Time	Authors	Title
13:50	<b>Roger Ratcliff</b>	Modeling Numeracy Decisions on a Continuous Scale
14:10	<b>Philip L. Smith</b> , Elaine A. Corbett	Modelling Speeded Multielement Decision Making as Diffusion in a Hypersphere
14:30	<b>Guy E. Hawkins</b> , Nathan J. Evans, Scott D. Brown	Normative theories are nice, but people aren't always normative: Comparing collapsing and fixed threshold models of speeded decision making
14:50	<b>Andrew Heathcote</b> , Mathieu Servant, Kirsty Hannah, Dora Matzke	Priming and Variable Control in Choice Conflict Tasks
15:10	<b>Quentin F. Gronau</b> , Andrew Heathcote, Dora Matzke	Warp-III Bridge Sampling for Comparing LBA Models
15:20		<b>Coffee</b>
15:50	<b>Simon Dennis</b> , Paul Garrett, Hyungwook Yim, Nathan Evans, Vishnu Sreekumar	Predicting memory for WHEN
16:10	<b>Julian Fox</b> , Adam Osth & Simon Dennis	Modelling condition order effects: Interference, learning, and decision strategies
16:20	<b>Amy H. Criss</b> , Jack Wilson	Output Interference and Release in Cued Recall: The role of learning during test and a response filter
16:40	<b>Christopher R. Brydges</b> , Gilles E. Gignac, Ullrich K. H. Ecker	Working memory capacity predicts ongoing reliance on misinformation: A latent-variable analysis

Time	Authors	Title
16:50	<b>Hyungwook Yim</b> , Adam F. Osth, Vladimir M. Sloutsky, Simon J. Dennis	Decomposing Different Sources of Interference in Recognition Memory Development - a Computational Modeling Approach
17:10	<b>Jason Zhou</b> , Philip Smith, Adam Osth, Simon Lilburn	Decision-Making in Source Memory: Re-evaluating the Thresholded Nature of Source Memory Retrieval
17:20		Business Meeting and End of Formal Proceedings
18:00		Dinner

## Abstracts

### Human information processing in the face of reward versus punishment

Timothy Ballard, David Sewell, & Andrew Neal

*University of Queensland*

Whilst much is known about the effects of rewards and punishments on motivation and behavior, far less is known about their effects on the underlying information processing structures. A view held by many is that the human information processing system has a limited capacity. The system must therefore manage its resources efficiently, taking into account the supply of and demand for resources when deploying them to various tasks. According to this perspective, reward and punishment might increase the rate of information processing, because it makes the allocation of resources to a task a more worthwhile investment. An alternative perspective is that the potential for reward or punishment may slow the processing of information, because they increase the need for resources to be deployed toward off-task activities such as self-monitoring.

We examined these predictions using a random dot motion detection task in which participants viewed clouds of moving dots and had to determine whether the dots were moving mostly left or mostly right. For each block, the participants were given the goal of being more accurate and faster than the average participant in a pilot study. In the reward condition, participants gained money for achieving the goal. In the punishment condition, participants lost money for failing the goal. The rate of information processing was measured by estimating the drift rate parameter using the LBA model within a hierarchical Bayesian framework.

When participants were given an opportunity for reward, the average rate of information processing did not change from baseline. However, the amount of information required to make a decision (i.e., response threshold) increased. When participants were under threat of punishment, the average rate of information processing decreased, and the amount of information required to make a decision also decreased. These findings demonstrate the need to consider the context when attempting to understand how information processing will unfold.

### Modelling Cognitive Control Mechanisms in Simulated Air-Traffic Control

Russell J. Boag [1], Luke Strickland [2], Andrew Heathcote [2], & Shayne Loft [1]

[1] *University of Western Australia*, [2] *University of Tasmania*

This project uses Bayesian Linear Ballistic Accumulator (LBA) models of decision-making to model the cognitive control mechanisms that aid prospective memory (PM) and ongoing task performance in a complex and dynamic air-traffic control (ATC) simulation. We aim to explain how operators balance competing demands from ongoing and PM tasks under different levels of time pressure, task load, and relative response importance. The ATC task involved classifying pairs of moving aircraft as either ‘in-conflict’ or ‘not in-conflict’. On some trials aircraft also contained a PM target which required execution of an atypical PM response. These decisions require the integration of multiple information sources (e.g., relative distance, airspeed) on a dynamic display while balancing several competing task requirements (e.g., time pressure, PM demands, relative response importance). Moreover, decisions typically unfolded over relatively long time-scales (up to

10 seconds). Initial work suggests that models of simple choice such as the LBA can account for ongoing and PM task performance in these complex, long time-scale, less controlled applied settings. Our modelling shows evidence of both proactive and reactive control mechanisms. In terms of proactive control, response thresholds were higher under PM load. This suggests individuals proactively raise ongoing task thresholds when holding PM intentions. This effect was larger when the importance of the PM task was emphasised and smaller when the importance of the ongoing task was emphasised. This suggests that holding PM intentions encourages operators to make deliberate strategic adjustments to how they perform their primary ongoing task, and that these adjustments vary systematically as a function of PM task importance. In terms of reactive adaptation, accumulation rates for ongoing task stimuli were lower when they also contained a PM target compared to when the same stimuli did not contain a PM target. For example, the rate for the in-conflict accumulator was lower for in-conflict PM targets compared to in-conflict aircraft that were not PM targets. The same pattern was observed for non-conflict aircraft, suggesting PM stimuli automatically inhibit or suppress the evidence accumulation process for congruent on-going task responses. In line with a dual-mechanisms theory of cognitive control, our modelling suggests PM performance is a function of both deliberate ‘proactive’ and automatic ‘reactive’ cognitive control mechanisms. w they perform their primary ongoing task, and that these adjustments vary systematically as a function of PM task importance. In terms of reactive adaptation, accumulation rates for ongoing task stimuli were lower when they also contained a PM target compared to when the same stimuli did not contain a PM target. For example, the rate for the in-conflict accumulator was lower for in-conflict PM targets compared to in-conflict aircraft that were not PM targets. The same pattern was observed for non-conflict aircraft, suggesting PM stimuli automatically inhibit or suppress the evidence accumulation process for congruent on-going task responses. In line with a dual-mechanisms theory of cognitive control, our modelling suggests PM performance is a function of both deliberate ‘proactive’ and automatic ‘reactive’ cognitive control mechanisms.

### **Working memory capacity predicts ongoing reliance on misinformation: A latent-variable analysis**

Christopher R. Brydges, Gilles E. Gignac, & Ullrich K. H. Ecker

*University of Western Australia*

Misinformation often affects inferences and judgments even after it has been retracted and discredited. This is known as the continued influence effect. Memory processes have been theorized to contribute to the continued influence effect, and much previous research has focussed on the role of long-term memory processes at the time misinformation is retrieved during inferential reasoning and judgments. Recently, however, experimental research has focussed upon the role of working memory (WM) processes engaged in the updating and integration of information, when the retraction is encoded. From an individual differences perspective, susceptibility to continued influence effects should be predicted by a person’s WM abilities, if continued reliance on misinformation is influenced, at least in part, by insufficient integration of the initial misinformation and its subsequent retraction. Consequently, we hypothesized that WM capacity would predict susceptibility to continued influence effects uniquely, positively, and more substantially than short-term memory (STM) capacity. Participants ( $N = 216$ ) completed a continued-influence task, as well as a battery of WM and STM capacity tasks. Based on a latent variable model, our hypothesis was supported (WM capacity:  $\beta = .36$ ,  $p = .013$ ; STM capacity:  $\beta = -.22$ ,  $p = .187$ ). Consequently, we suggest that WM capacity is a measurable “risk factor” for continued reliance on misinformation.

### **The prediction game: A simple pedagogical tool to introduce Bayesian inference**

Guillermo Campitelli

*Edith Cowan University*

In this talk I will present the prediction game, a pedagogical tool to introduce Bayesian inference. The purpose of presenting the prediction game is to provide a pedagogical tool to introduce Bayesian inference to researchers or students who do not have any knowledge of Bayesian inference. Moreover, this tool aims to solve a number of shortcomings of introductory tutorials to Bayesian inference. (At least, all those I examined). The main problem of introductory tutorials is that they start too complex. They present the Bayes theorem very early on, losing most readers in the first page. Another shortcoming is that a number of

useful components of Bayesian inference are missing. For example, the prior predictive distribution is almost never presented. The prediction game consists of a grid with two margins: the bottom margin represents the values of one parameter, and the right-hand side margin represents possible values of data. By putting poker chips into the bottom margin the player creates something equivalent to a prior probability distribution. By sliding the poker chips through each column of the grid the player generates a joint probability of parameter values and possible data values. And, by adding the number of poker chips on each row and indicating the number of poker chips in the right margin the player develops the prior predictive distribution. When the observed data value is announced the corresponding row is highlighted, and the player with more chips in that row is the winner. The right margin of that row is the marginal likelihood. The posterior distribution is obtained by dividing all the values on that row of the grid by the marginal likelihood. Obtaining the ratio of the marginal likelihood of two players is the equivalent to calculating a Bayes factor.

### **Output Interference and Release in Cued Recall: The role of learning during test and a response filter**

Amy H. Criss & Jack Wilson

*Syracuse University*

Output interference is the finding that performance declines with test trial. In cued recall tasks, participants are presented with a cue word and tasked to output the target word studied alongside. Participants may choose to respond or not, and a response if given may be correct or incorrect. We aim to understand the empirical pattern of output interference in cued recall and the underlying theoretical mechanisms. We first analyzed published cued recall data and found fewer correct and incorrect responses across test trial. Next, we tested the contribution of cue and target memories on output interference through a release from output interference paradigm: one member of each pair was an exemplar from one of two categories, and that member was either the cue word or target word (post-cued). The critical comparison was when one category was tested in a blocked fashion and the blocking was either by cue category or by target category. We found that release from output interference only occurred when the test probe included information about the blocked words. Specifically, release occurred for blocked cues; release occurred for blocked targets only when the test probe included the target category, in effect treating the target category like an extra cue. Together these data suggest that interference is driven both by learning the test probe and by imperfect filtering of already provided responses.

### **Near neighbour judgements as an efficient way to estimate semantic similarity.**

Simon De Deyne & Amy Perfors

*University of Melbourne*

A popular way to estimate how words are similar involves asking participants to assign a magnitude judgement of similarity for a pair of words using a rating scale. This method has various limitations associated with the use of rating scales and lack of context when only two items are compared. Moreover, from a practical point of view, the procedure becomes prohibitively expensive for a large number of items. For example, for 1,000 items, obtaining one observation per pair would require nearly half a million judgements.

In two studies, we explore an alternative procedure in which participants either generate or rank a small number of near neighbours to a natural language concept. To evaluate the validity of this new task, we used pair-wise similarities collected for 15 basic level categories such as “birds” or “tools”. For each of the categories, we construct a sparse near neighbour graph and show that a mechanism of spreading activation based on random walks (see De Deyne, Navarro, Perfors & Storms, 2016) can be used to accurately predict pair-wise similarity judgements using a limited amount of information.

While these results suggest excellent external validity at a fraction of the cost, we also discuss some theoretical implications about the number of near neighbours and fundamental differences between similarity-based and feature-based inference in natural language concepts.

### **Predicting memory for WHEN**

Simon Dennis [1], Paul Garrett [2], Hyungwook Yim [1], Nathan Evans [3], & Vishnu Sreekumar [4]

[1] *University of Melbourne*, [2] *University of Newcastle*, [3] *Vanderbilt University*, [4] *NIH Research Laboratories*

We present a model that predicts when people will believe events from their lives occurred on a person by person and stimulus by stimulus basis. Participants wore a smartphone in a pouch around their necks for two weeks. The smartphone collected timestamps, GPS, accelerometry, audio segments and images. These data sources were augmented with weather conditions, temperature, moon phase and tags derived from the audio using a machine learning model. A week later they were shown a selection of images and were required to indicate on which day each was taken. A conditional logit model predicted leave one person out judgements, leave one day out judgements and leave one observation out judgements. We highlight the advantages of using cross validation over other methods of model selection.

### **Inferring task-specific psychological representation**

Chris Donkin

*University of New South Wales*

Most psychological theories of cognition propose that when an individual encounters a task, they rely on a mental representation of the stimuli used in that task. Standard approaches for measuring the mental representation of such stimuli are explicit and subjective. For example, observers may be asked to rate what they believe to be the similarity between pairs of items. One of the major issues with this approach is that one must assume that the stimuli have the same mental representation in the similarity rating task as in any other task. Our approach is to subvert this problem, by directly extracting the mental representation of stimuli from the cognitive task of interest. Specifically, we use the Generalized Context Model to infer the mental representation of a set of 20 colors from responses in a visual working memory task. Along the way, we also use the model to infer the strength of memories for items on the current and previous trial, thus investigating the role of recency, primacy, and proactive interference in visual working memory. Finally, we also use the model to infer the mental representation of 20 letter stimuli in a verbal working memory task.

### **Leverage-based confidence intervals for structural equation modelling.**

Paul Dudgeon[1], Mariska Barendse[2], & Yves Rosseel[2]

[1] *The University of Melbourne*, [2] *Ghent University*

Leverage is a measure of how far away one individual's set of scores of 2 or more variables is from the scores of all other individuals. Besides its usage in regression diagnostics, leverage is also used in estimators of the covariance matrix of regression parameters when standard assumptions of homoscedasticity and/or normality are violated—these are called heteroscedastic-consistent (HC) estimators in the literature, and they were originally proposed by Huber in the 1970s and by White in the 1980s. Because linear regression is a particular form of structural equation modelling (SEM), HC-type estimators are theoretically possible in SEM also. However, only White's HCO estimator is currently available in SEM. It is often referred to as a robust estimator or a sandwich estimator in the SEM literature. This presentation develops leverage-based sandwich estimators for deriving standard errors and confidence intervals (CIs) in SEM. These new estimators correspond to the HC3 estimator used in linear regression. Our research shows that the current "robust" estimator used in SEM is not as robust as the appellation given to it implies. More importantly, we show that the incorporation of leverage into the current sandwich estimator used in SEM results in much better coverage in CIs, even for samples sizes as low as 50 (where current estimator's robustness bombs badly).

### **Models of risky choice: A signed difference analysis**

John C. Dunn [1] & Li-Lin Rao [2]

[1] *University of Western Australia*, [2] *Chinese Academy of Sciences*

Risky choice involves selection between two or more options each of which is a set of  $n$  ordered pairs,  $(x_i, p_i)$ , where  $x_i$  is a (positive, negative, or zero) payoff and  $p_i$  is its probability of occurrence, with  $\sum p_i = 1$ . There are a large number of different models of risky choice that fall into two broad classes; fixed utility models that satisfy the condition of simple scalability and everything else. A prominent example of the former is Cumulative

Prospect Theory (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992); a prominent example of the latter is Decision Field Theory (Busemeyer & Townsend, 1993). While it is known that behaviour can be observed that inconsistent with all models, this has largely been based on the construction of special cases. We decided to test the class of fixed utility models against a set of relatively unselected risky choices using signed difference analysis (SDA). The advantage of this approach is that there is no requirement to posit a particular form for the error function that links the difference in the utility of two gambles, A and B, with the probability of choosing A over B, . We presented groups of participants with 30 variable gambles (A) each paired with one of four fixed gambles (B) and tested the prediction of fixed utility models that has the same order over A for all B using the statistical test developed by Kalish, Dunn, Burdakov and Sysoev (2016). We discuss the implications of the results and explore a relatively simple extension to a (minimally) more complex model. References Busemeyer, J. R., & Townsend, J. T. (1993) Decision Field Theory: A dynamic cognition approach to decision making. *Psychological Review*, 100, 432–459. Kalish, M. L., Dunn, J. C., Burdakov, O. P., & Sysoev, O. (2016). A statistical test for equality of latent orders. *Journal of Mathematical Psychology*, 70, 1-11 Tversky, A. & Kahneman, D. (1992). Advances in prospect theory: Cumulative representation of uncertainty. *Journal of Risk and Uncertainty*, 5(4), 297–323.

### **Competitive Decision Making in Dutch Auctions**

Rachel Mullard, Marc Adam, & Ami Eidels

*University of Newcastle*

Dutch Auction is a descending price auction where an item begins at a set maximum price. This price is gradually lowered over a fixed amount of time until a bidder makes a bid, at which point that bidder is guaranteed the purchase, at the current price. Bidders must consider (‘trade-off’) certainty and price: bid early and you secure the commodity but pay a premium; bid later and the price is lower but you risk losing the bid to another. These properties make Dutch Auction a fascinating context for the study of competitive decision making. We conducted a set of experiments in which triplets of participants took part in a computerised Dutch Auction, playing against each other in various conditions. In another experiment, the same participants played individually against a computer opponent. I shall present our methods and preliminary results, and discuss necessary assumptions for the computer opponent.

### **Applying the Cultural Ratchet to a Social Artefact: The Cumulative Cultural Evolution of a Language Game**

Nicolas Fay & Bradley Walker

*The Univeristy of Western Australia*

Material artefacts evolve by cumulative cultural evolution (CCE) - the accumulation of adaptive We present a large-scale experiment investigating the CCE of a social artefact in transmission chains, each containing 8 adult human participants (N=408). The social artefact is what Wittgenstein[Office1] calls a language game, the subset of language used to perform a particular activity; in the present study, communicating a route on a map. Two social learning conditions were compared: Observation and Social Interaction. Participants were tasked with accurately communicating a route on a map to the next person in the chain. Over the experimental generations the routes were reproduced with progressively higher accuracy in both conditions, demonstrating the CCE of the language game. The rate of CCE was comparable across the conditions, but route reproduction accuracy was consistently higher in the Social Interaction condition compared to the Observation condition. In both conditions performance improved due to the accumulation of adaptive patterns of verbal route descriptions, and the progressive elimination of non-adaptive patterns. Whereas the change in content was similar across the conditions, the change in process was fundamentally different between the Observation and Social Interaction conditions. In conclusion, social artefacts, like material artefacts, are subject to cumulative cultural evolution.

### **The Decision Decoding Toolbox (DDTBX) - A multivariate pattern analysis toolbox for event-related potentials**

Daniel Feuerriegel [1], Daniel Bennett [2,1], Phillip M. Alday [3], & Stefan Bode [1,4]



[1] *University of Melbourne*, [2] *Princeton University*, [3] *Max Planck Institute for Psycholinguistics*, [4] *University of Cologne*

In recent years, model-based cognitive neuroscience has increasingly used electroencephalographic (EEG) data to characterize the timing of processes related to parameters in cognitive models. This approach has been successfully applied based on well-known ERP components (e.g. Ravenzwaaij, Provost & Brown, 2017, *J. Math. Psychol.*). However subtle multivariate patterns of EEG data, revealed by multivariate pattern analysis (MVPA), can also provide useful neural correlates of model parameters. Here we present DDTBOX, an open-source MVPA toolbox for EEG data. DDTBOX runs under MATLAB and is well integrated with the EEGLAB/ERPLAB and Fieldtrip toolboxes. It trains support vector machines (SVMs) on patterns of event-related potential (ERP) amplitude data, following or preceding an event of interest, for classification or regression of experimental variables. ERP amplitude patterns can be extracted across space/electrodes (spatial decoding), time (temporal decoding), or both (spatiotemporal decoding). DDTBOX can also extract SVM feature weights, generate empirical chance distributions based on permuted-labels decoding, provide estimates of the prevalence of decodable information in the population, and perform a variety of corrections for multiple comparisons. DDTBOX complements conventional model-based analyses of ERP components, as subtle multivariate patterns can be detected that would be overlooked in standard ERP component-based analyses. These multivariate patterns can be used to predict model parameters directly (e.g. Grootswagers et al., 2017, *J. Cogn. Neurosci.*) or to provide complementary information to inform behavioural modelling results (e.g. Bode et al., 2012, *J. Neurosci.*). In summary, DDTBOX is an easy-to-use and open-source toolbox that allows for characterising the time-course of information related to perceptual and cognitive processes. It can be applied to data from a large number of experimental paradigms and is expected to be a valuable tool for model-based cognitive neuroscience.

### **Modelling condition order effects: Interference, learning, and decision strategies**

Julian Fox, Adam Osth, & Simon Dennis

*University of Melbourne*

The list length effect (LLE) – that recognition is poorer for items from long lists than short lists – is a benchmark finding in memory research. Recently, however, its existence has been debated. Dennis, Lee and Kinnell (2008) highlighted that previously observed LLEs were due to various confounding factors, and that when these are controlled, there is a null LLE. This finding of a null LLE was used to argue against the common belief that items are the primary source of interference in recognition. Contrary to this, Brandt and colleagues demonstrated that when analysis is restricted to the first study-test cycle in an experiment, a LLE results; and that it's only once performance is averaged across multiple study-test cycles that a null LLE results. They explained that in the first study-test cycle, participants commit a short or long list of items to memory (e.g., 20 or 80 items); but that in the second study-test cycle, participants often study the opposite list type, meaning that each would have committed an equal amount of items to memory (i.e., 100 items). Their proposal was that this gradual equating of items that participants experience throughout testing effectively masks the LLE. The present study replicated Brandt's results and used computational modelling to investigate the condition order effects, particularly whether they are caused by (1) the accrual of item-noise, (2) changes in learning or (3) changes in response thresholds. The data was fit with variants of the Osth and Dennis (2015) model, now extended to include the decision-making and RT components of the drift diffusion model.

### **Warp-III Bridge Sampling for Comparing LBA Models**

Quentin F. Gronau [1], Andrew Heathcote [2], & Dora Matzke [1]

[1] *University of Amsterdam*, [2] *University of Tasmania*

The Linear Ballistic Accumulator (LBA; Brown & Heathcote, 2008) model is one of the most popular choice response time models in mathematical psychology. When fitting the LBA to experimental data, researchers are often interested in comparing two or more possibly non-nested model versions. The principled Bayesian solution to this problem is to compute posterior model probabilities and Bayes factors. Both quantities rely on the marginal likelihood of the models which is in many applications a high-dimensional integral that

usually cannot be evaluated analytically. Here we illustrate how Warp-III bridge sampling (Meng & Schilling, 2002) can be used to estimate the marginal likelihood for (hierarchical) LBA models. Warp-III sampling is an advanced version of bridge sampling that enables the efficient estimation of the marginal likelihood, even for cases in which the posterior distribution is skewed.

### **Normative theories are nice, but people aren't always normative: Comparing collapsing and fixed threshold models of speeded decision making**

Guy E. Hawkins [1], Nathan J. Evans [2], & Scott D. Brown [1]

[1] *University of Newcastle*, [2] *Vanderbilt University*

Theories of perceptual decision making have been dominated by the notion of evidence accumulation to a fixed threshold; the assumption of a process of accumulating evidence in favor of different alternatives until some fixed threshold level is reached, which triggers a decision. Recent theories have suggested that thresholds may not be fixed during each decision, but rather decrease as time passes - an assumption known as "collapsing thresholds". Collapsing thresholds have been proven to lead to better performance than fixed thresholds in tasks where the difficulty of decisions changes randomly, and in tasks where decision speed is emphasized, for example using deadlines. Despite the theoretical advantages of collapsing thresholds, reviews of data from typical decision-making paradigms have supported the traditional assumption of fixed thresholds. With data from three experiments, we investigated whether participants adopt collapsing thresholds in those paradigms where doing so is the optimal decision strategy. We find that strong emphasis on decision speed - particularly the use of response deadlines - encourages the adoption of collapsing thresholds, but this is not the case when simply instructing people to respond speedily or when decision difficulty varies randomly from one trial to the next. Our results suggest that collapsing threshold models may be most useful in deadline experiments, and this might also explain previous results regarding the difference between humans and non-human primates on this topic.

### **The dimensionality of reasoning: Inductive and deductive inference can be explained by a single process**

Brett K. Hayes [1], Rachel G. Stephens [1], Jeremy Ngo [1], & John C. Dunn [2]

[1] *University of New South Wales*, [2] *University of Western Australia*

Three-experiments examined the number of latent dimensions needed to account for inductive and deductive reasoning. In each study, participants were presented with arguments that varied in logical validity and consistency with background knowledge (believability), and evaluated them according to deductive criteria (whether the conclusion was necessarily true given the premises) or inductive criteria (whether the conclusion was plausible given the premises). We examined factors, which, according to dual-processing theories, modulate the contribution of heuristic and analytic processes to reasoning: working memory load (Experiments 1 and 2), individual working memory capacity (Experiments 1 and 2) and decision time (Experiment 3). A number of empirical dissociations were found. Argument validity affected deduction more than induction. Argument believability affected induction more than deduction. Lower working memory capacity reduced sensitivity to argument validity and increased sensitivity to argument believability, especially under induction instructions. Reduced decision time led to decreased sensitivity to argument validity. State-trace analyses of each experiment, however, found that only a single underlying dimension was required to explain patterns of inductive and deductive judgments. This was true even when partial-order constraints were applied. This shows that functional dissociations, which have traditionally been seen as evidence for dual-processing accounts, are consistent with a single-process model of reasoning.

### **Priming and Variable Control in Choice Conflict Tasks**

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We propose a theory of how priming caused by choice conflict, and variability in control deployed to resolve the conflict, affects decision processes. We derive a measurement model with analytic likelihoods from the theory that is able to account for the fine-grained time course of both response speed and accuracy as quantified

by delta functions and conditional-accuracy functions. We show it provides a unified and parametrically coherent account of behavior in the Stroop, Simon and Flanker tasks in fits to data from two experiments each reported by Pratte, Rouder, Morey and White, Ratcliff and Starns (2011) as well as new data that enables conflict effects in the Simon task to be broken into interference and facilitation components relative to a carefully calibrated neutral condition. We then show that the theory fails for some participants in Simon-task data collected by Forstman, van den Wildenberg and Ridderinkhof (2008). We extend the theory’s concept of variable control to allow complete failures to exercise any control on some trials, causing participants to perform the wrong task, and show the measurement model derived from the extended theory provides a parsimonious, coherent and accurate account of data from all participants. We end by discussing the increasing evidence for the important role of variability in understanding cognitive control.

### **The effects of outcome information during sampling on decisions from experience**

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Decisions from experience often differ from decisions based on described alternatives. This may stem from the fact that decisions from experience require that individuals learn about their choice alternatives by observing potential outcomes. We investigated the roles of attention and memory in the choice process by comparing two types of decision procedures: a) one where monetary value information is present during sampling, and b) one where values are revealed after sampling. In three experiments participants made a series of choices between pairs of risky gambles represented as urns containing different mixtures of blue and red balls. They began each trial by sampling balls from each urn. After observing a representative sample from each urn, participants chose which urn they would like to draw from for a consequential payment. In Experiment 3 some outcome samples were highlighted to increase visual and auditory salience. Results from all three experiments suggest that individuals place greater weight on rare events when outcome values are absent during sampling. This pattern is roughly consistent with the ‘description-experience gap’, in which decisions from description – which likewise involve separable representations of value and probability information – also indicate greater weighting of rare events relative to decisions from experience – which do not. In Experiment 3, we found that highlighting a rare reward increased its salience when outcome values were present, but not when they were absent, suggesting that highlighting rare outcome values during sampling led participants to place greater weight on these outcomes when making their choices. Parameter estimates from a hierarchical Bayesian prospect theory model supported the conclusion that value-absent choices involved greater overweighting of rare events. We discuss the implications of these findings on our understanding of the interplay between attention, memory, and choice.

### **Evaluating Signal Detection Models for Eyewitness Identification**

Matthew Kaesler [1], John Dunn [2], & Carolyn Semmler [1]

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Eyewitness identification researchers have only recently employed signal detection theory (SDT) to understand witness performance on the police lineup task, in which a witness to a crime must either select one member from a (typically) six-person array who matches their memory of the perpetrator, or indicate that the perpetrator is not present. In addition to calculating empirical SDT measures from lineup data using Receiver Operating Curve analysis, researchers have fit a model called SDT-compound detection (SDT-CD) in attempt to discover the underlying theoretical parameters. However, SDT-CD has been selected for use without quantitative comparison against other potential SDT models. Of particular relevance to model selection is the contentious proposition that the sequential, rather than simultaneous, presentation of lineup members leads to superior witness decision performance, as the sequential lineup task challenges the plausibility of many SDT models that assume simultaneous presentation of items. This work compares the performance of three competing models; SDT-CD, a “maximum familiarity” model (MAX) and a novel sequential model (SDT-SEQ), in characterising sequential lineup data by using the Parametric Bootstrap Cross-fitting Method (PBCM). We tested both general model types (i.e. landscaping) and specific instances of the models as fit to 26 datasets in order to examine issues of model mimicry. Preliminary results highlight the challenges of using

this approach to select between highly similar models and indicate that competing models strongly mimic each other.

### **The Role of Working Memory in Free Recall: The Effect of Preload at Retrieval**

Marton Kocsis & Simon Farrell

*University of Western Australia*

Existing empirical evidence that suggests that working memory (WM) is involved in free recall of information from long-term memory primarily comes from examination of individual differences in WM capacity that — due to their correlational nature — are unable to distinguish effects at encoding from those at retrieval. In two experiments, we experimentally manipulated WM load via an informational preload during free recall. Participants were presented with a list of 8 words, followed by a 4 (study 1) or 6 (study 2) digit sequence (the preload). Participants were then asked free recall the word-list while maintaining the digit sequence, which was then reported in serial order after free recall of the word-list. While the preload had a small but consistent decrement on recall accuracy across all serial positions, there was no reliable effect on other benchmark measures of free recall. An ex-Gaussian model was fitted to free recall response time distributions, and it was found that preload was found to specifically affect the delay in retrieval onset, but did not influence the rate of memory search. Simulations of response time distributions via random-sampling-with-replacement model of memory retrieval suggest that preload may have influenced the recoverability of word-lists in memory. Given previous studies has found that attention-based manipulations at retrieval tend to impair free recall, our findings extend this research by suggesting that attentional components of WM are more critical to free recall than the storage capacity of WM.

NA

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University of Melbourne

We propose an adaptation of the logical rule-based models (Fific, Little & Nosofsky, 2010) in order to characterise decision making based on information held in visual short term memory. Specifically, we seek to diagnose decision making processes in a one-shot multi-element change detection task, as either serial, parallel, or coactive in nature. We additionally seek to characterise whether the integration rule for each change decision is based on the maximum evidence strength or the sum of strengths across elements. The logical rule models assume that each element is represented as a Gaussian distribution of perceptual effects. To model changes, we assume that the strength of the change is represented as a folded-normal distribution. We factorially manipulate the magnitude of change for a given element and whether a change decision requires an OR or an AND decision rule. This approach is novel in that it provides a way to unify signal detection models of change detection (Maximum Difference and Summed Difference models) with models of information process.

### **Lie-algebraic Approach for the Leaky Competing Accumulator Model of Decision Making**

Chi-Fai Lo, Kwok-Kwan Wong, & Ho-Yan Ip

*The Chinese University of Hong Kong*

In this talk we have proposed a new method, namely the Lie-algebraic approach, to tackle the Leaky Competing Accumulator (LCA) model of decision making with multiple alternatives and time-dependent model parameters. By exploiting the Lie symmetry of the Fokker-Planck equation (or the Backward Kolmogorov equation) associated with the model, we have succeeded to solve the equation and derive the joint probability density function (p.d.f.) and marginal p.d.f. for each alternative in closed form, subject to the natural boundary condition. With this joint p.d.f. a likelihood function can be explicitly constructed and thus model-fitting procedures become feasible. We have generated some time series of the model by Monte-Carlo simulations, and applied the maximum-likelihood analysis to examine the efficiency and accuracy of the calibration of model parameters. The preliminary results are satisfactory and encouraging. So far as the authors know, currently the LCA model can be applied to cases of two or three alternatives only because

of the lack of a closed-form joint p.d.f. for the case of  $N$  alternatives. Hence, the authors believe that the new approach will help shed light on further studies of the LCA model.

Using Response Times to distinguish between attribute-wise and alternate-wise models of inter-temporal choice.

Ashley Luckman, Sebastian Gluth, & Jörg Rieskamp.

*University of Basel*

An important distinction in the inter-temporal choice literature is between models which rely on attribute-wise comparisons, and those which rely on alternate-wise comparisons. The former assume that decisions are made by comparing attribute levels across options, i.e. comparing the delays involved and the amounts involved, and weighting each of these dimensions. The later, such as discounted utility, instead assume the decision is made by calculating a holistic value for each option separately, then comparing these values. Recent research has found mixed support for attribute-wise models using process tracing measures, such as eye-tracking and mouseover designs. We suggest a new method using response time predictions from race models of evidence accumulation to distinguish between these two processes. Race models assume that two streams of evidence are being accumulated. In an alternate-wise race model we assume that each of the two accumulators is based on the value of one of the options under consideration, while in attribute-wise race models we assume each accumulator corresponds to one of the differences in attributes (i.e. delay or amount) which is being considered. These assumptions allow the two processes to make divergent response time predictions under simple manipulations. For instance, in a choice between an option yielding a smaller amount of money received sooner and an option yielding a larger amount received later, both models predict that preference for the smaller-sooner option will increase, as its amount increases. However, whereas an alternate-wise model will predict a decrease in response times, because the drift rate of the smaller-sooner option's accumulator will increase, an attribute-wise model will predict an increase in response times, as the drift rate for the amount difference will decrease. We present simulations confirming these predictions, while also considering behavior under single accumulator diffusion models and models with inhibition. Finally, we present preliminary data from an experiment testing these predictions against each other.

### **Evaluating bundles of numbers: assessing the trade-off between memory and online updating in retrospective evaluation**

Alice Mason [1], Mark Hurlstone [1], Geoff Ward [2], Gordon Brown [3], & Simon Farrell [1]

[1] *University of Western Australia*, [2] *University of Essex*, [3] *University of Warwick*

NA

### **Extensional and intensional reasoning: A Bayesian perspective on the conjunction fallacy**

Daniel Navarro [1], Alison McCann [1], Alexandra Tingey [1], Nicole Baz [1], Michelle Keshwa [1], & Amy Perfors [2],

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The conjunction fallacy is one of the most striking findings in the heuristics and biases literature, in which people rate a pair of propositions (e.g. Linda is a bank teller and a feminist) as more probable than one of the constituents (e.g. Linda is a bank teller). This is especially likely to occur when the description of Linda is more representative of one category (feminist) than the other. An extensive literature on the conjunction fallacy demonstrates that the effect is robust, but also sensitive to linguistic and pragmatic factors.

In this talk we present a Bayesian perspective on the problem. Extending earlier work on the pragmatics of conjunction effects, we argue that there is a degree of ambiguity to the inference problem that people need to solve. In an extensional reasoning scenario the problem is assumed to be to infer the properties that Linda has (in the world) and it cannot be the case that Linda is a feminist bank teller without also being a bank teller. In an intensional reasoning scenario the goal is to identify the meaning of the ideas being described or communicated. Intensional reasoning allows a conjunction to be more likely than a constituent: if my intent is to communicate “red circle” to you, and you infer “circle”, a communication failure has occurred.

In an effective communicative system, it is necessary to be able to specify (and to infer) the smaller of two nested sets, and conjunction ‘fallacies’ are necessarily permitted. Consequently, while probabilistic reasoning models based on extensional logic do not produce conjunction fallacies, it is entirely possible for an intensional reasoning system to do so.

Motivated by this theoretical perspective we present a series of experiments showing that people’s behaviour in these tasks is highly sensitive to the distinction between extensional and intensional semantics. When a reasoning problem is framed in a way that emphasises the communicative and social aspect to the situation, strong conjunction effects appear. When the task is reframed to emphasise the extensional and non-social aspects, the fallacy is either attenuated or absent. This sensitivity occurs across many different social categories (e.g. feminist bank tellers) as well as reasoning about purely physical events (dice rolls). We argue that this sensitivity to framing occurs because people switch between solving different inference problems, both of which are sensible but are not equivalent to each other.

### **Once more, with feeling: deferred feedback does not “sharply dissociate” ‘implicit’ and ‘explicit’ category learning.**

Mike Le Pelley [1], Ben R. Newell [1], & Robert Nosofsky [2]

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The controversy over multiple category-learning systems rolls on with proponents of the multiplicity view seemingly impervious to evidence suggesting that single system interpretations can accommodate large tranches of the available data. In 2014, Smith et al. published a Psychological Science paper in which they claimed to have found one of the “strongest explicit-implicit dissociations yet seen in the categorization literature”. In the spirit of pursuing theoretical development, we present empirical and modelling results that appear to categorically rule out Smith et al’s key claim that deferring feedback has a deleterious effect on tasks that require ‘Information-Integration’, while leaving rule-based learning intact. We find, perhaps unsurprisingly, that delaying feedback causes a performance decrement in tasks which require holding information about more than one dimension in memory – for both information-integration AND rule-based tasks.

### **Mathematical Set Theory for Latent Variable Modelling in Psychology Research**

Trisha Nowland

*Macquaire University*

The latent variable model has described as psychology’s most successful export to other fields; yet the problem of factor indeterminacy, known to Spearman since the earliest mathematical developments in latent variable modeling, remains unsolved. In this presentation I explore how the historical development of set theory, which emerged in mathematics at roughly the same time as the latent variable model in psychometrics may support us in drawing conclusions from our research on more sturdy ground than is otherwise truly possible with the latent variable model. Philosophical, methodological and direct applications will be shown to each contribute to a unifying account for the mathematical, statistical and psychological aspects of psychometric practices which draw on latent variable modelling techniques.

### **An Interference Model of Visual Working Memory: Applications to Change Detection**

Klaus Oberauer & Hsuan-Yu Lin

*University of Zurich*

Popular models of visual working memory assume that working memory is limited by a constant resource, which is conceived as either quantized (as in slot models) or infinitely divisible. These models share the assumption that the probability and quality of retrieval depends on the resource assigned to a representation in working memory. We will present an alternative model that incorporates the principles of general theories of memory: Retrieval is cue-based, and performance is limited by interference arising from several sources. Representations compete for retrieval according to the amount of activation each of them receives at retrieval. Activation arises from three sources: Persistent activation of representations of recently encoded items,

activation from the retrieval cue, and background noise. One item is held in the focus of attention; this item is represented with higher precision, and suffers less interference from competing items and from noise. So far the model has been applied successfully to the continuous-reproduction paradigm. Here we will apply the model to recognition/change detection; testing how well it fares in comparison to competing models of visual working memory.

### **Modeling response time distributions of free recall initiation with race models**

Adam F. Osth [1] & Simon Farrell [2]

[1] *The University of Newcastle*, [2] *The University of Western Australia*

Memory models have characterized retrieval in free recall as multialternative decision making. However, the majority of these applications have only been applied to mean response times (RTs) and not to complete RT distributions, which offer more constraint. We fit RT distributions of free recall initiation with both a racing diffusion model and the linear ballistic accumulator (LBA: Brown & Heathcote, 2008) model in a hierarchical Bayesian framework. We applied models with various psychological assumptions about how drift rates for each serial position are generated. Recency was either a power law or an exponential function. Primacy was treated either as a strength boost to the early list items so that both primacy and recency items jointly compete to be retrieved, or as a mixture model where on some proportion of trials, the start context is reinstated and primacy items race with little competition from recency items. Results from a large number of datasets strongly favor the start context reinstatement model with an exponential recency function.

### **Decision-making in black swan environments**

NA

*University of Melbourne*

In the real world we are often faced with decisions in which the possible outcomes are extremely good or bad but the probability of that outcome is extremely low: winning the lottery or being struck by lightning are prototypical examples. Should you buy a lottery ticket? Should you climb to the top of a hill in a rainstorm? These kind of situations are known colloquially as Black Swan scenarios and create a particularly hard decision problem. However, despite decades of research, decision theory is relatively silent about how people do (or should) reason about them: most of the standard tasks involve probabilities ranging between 10 to 90 percent and the outcomes are a manageable fraction of existing savings. In this study we evaluate how people reason in situations when one or both options involve extremely low probabilities (from 0.1 to 1.5 percent) of very bad outcomes (losing all of the points accumulated so far). We explore how decisions change as a function of the number of points available and the number of black swan options available. In addition, we evaluate if people's approach varies based on whether they are making a single bet or planning a strategy of bets over multiple games. Finally, we present some exploratory research investigating whether individual differences in anxiety and tolerance of uncertainty predict differences in behaviour in black swan situations.