

Testing and Isolation Efficacy: Insights from a Simple Epidemic Model

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1 Abstract

The effect of testing processes, including testing and test reporting, on an epidemic dynamics, involving infection and recovery, can be studied at the individual level or the community level (e.g., nursing homes, long-term-care facilities, etc.). Gaining insights to determine the sensitivity of the epidemic dynamics with respect to the testing processes will depend on underlying factors including the level of focus (individual or community), assumptions (model), and the interplay between these factors. In particular, the fast testing and test reporting may be beneficial at the community-level, supported by many studies, as it gives a rapid assessment of the situation, identifies hot spots, and may enable rapid contact-tracing. However, the potential advantage of a slow rate of test return on the dynamics of an epidemic is real, often neglected, and needs to be quantified. At the individual level, this advantage can manifest in the following sense: individuals awaiting their test results or who have tested positive may partially or fully self-isolate, thus reducing or eliminating their potential in the transmission process. In this paper, we investigated this individual-level effect of testing processes on the epidemic dynamics by developing a SIR-type model. Although the model development was motivated by the COVID-19 epidemic, the model has general epidemiological and testing structures. The realistic components of the model include *per capita* testing intensity, test sensitivity and specificity, rate of test return, and isolation efficacy in reduction of the probability of transmission. The novel component is the compartment-specific relative testing weights, which reflect the testing strategies—surveillance, diagnosis, or control. Here, we compare two testing strategies, random vs. targeted, and concluded that increasing testing “focus” from random to targeted always decreases \mathcal{R}_0 . Further, the following processes always decreases \mathcal{R}_0 ; increasing the isolation efficacy parameters for tested and confirmed individuals, higher testing intensity if testing is random or testing intensity is small, and a higher rate of test return if the isolation efficacy for tested-awaiting individuals is low.

2 Introduction

The observed dynamics of the COVID-19 epidemic are driven by both epidemiological processes (infection and recovery) and testing processes (testing and test reporting). In addition

to shaping epidemic observations (via case reports), testing processes can also affect epidemiological dynamics. In particular, individuals with confirmed infections (positive tests) are likely to self-isolate, and individuals who are awaiting the results of a test may do so also (possibly to a lesser extent). We developed a mechanistic model that incorporates epidemic processes and testing in order to explore the effects of testing and isolation on epidemic dynamics.

If testing influences behavior, then epidemic dynamics will depend on patterns of who gets tested. The impacts of testing will depend on intensity (tests performed per day), and on how strongly testing is focused on people who are infectious. This level of focus depends in turn on the purpose and design of testing programs. When testing is done for the purposes of disease surveillance (Foddai et al., 2020) tests should be assigned randomly across the population, possibly with a stratified design for statistical efficiency (Graubard and Korn, 1996) [Ali: a better ref everyone?].

Over the course of the COVID-19 pandemic, however, the vast majority of testing has been done with other goals – primarily diagnosis (determining the infection status for clinical purposes), or control (determining the infection status in order to quickly isolate cases that have been found by contact tracing), which we characterize as *targeted* testing strategies. In these cases, testing probabilities vary widely across epidemiological compartments; in our dynamical model, we will characterize these probabilities by assigning a *per capita* testing weight to each compartment that determines the *relative* probability that an individual in that compartment will be selected for testing (see Methods).

When testing is used primarily for diagnosis it will focus on people with infection-like symptoms; thus the relative testing weights for infected people will depend on the relative probability of infected people having symptoms. For COVID-19 infection, the testing weights will depend on the relative asymptomatic infections, time spent pre-symptomatic vs. symptomatic infections – and also the incidence of COVID-19-like symptoms among people in the population *not* infected with COVID-19. Testing for epidemic control will focus on people who are known to have been in contact with known infected cases; in this case the testing weights for infected vs. uninfected people will depend on the probability of infection given contact, as well as the thoroughness and effectiveness of the system for identifying suspicious contacts.

The main interest from the epidemiological point of view is to know whether the number of infected individuals goes through an exponential growth phase, following the introduction of an infection in a totally susceptible population, before the disease becomes extinct. This is determined by studying the basic reproduction number \mathcal{R}_0 . It is defined as the expected number of secondary infections arising from a typical infective individual in a completely susceptible population (Dietz, 1993). In the early stages of an epidemic the number of infected individuals is expected to grow exponentially over time when $\mathcal{R}_0 > 1$, and to decline over time when $\mathcal{R}_0 < 1$. Although the value of \mathcal{R}_0 cannot completely characterize the dynamics of even the simplest epidemic model (Shaw and Kennedy, 2021), it does give a simple and widely accepted index for the difficulty of control, as well as some indication of the likely final size of an epidemic (Ma and Earn, 2006).

In order to understand the effect of testing processes on an epidemic dynamics, we developed a mechanistic SIR-type model with epidemic and testing components. This model provides a sensible platform to link the modeling of epidemic and testing components and




Figure 1: Flowchart of the SIR (Susceptible-Infectious-Recovered) model, A1. Here, the disease-based status of a compartment X , where $X \in \{S, I, R\}$, is combined with the testing-based status including X_u , X_p , X_n and X_c , for *untested*, waiting-for-*positive*, waiting-for-*negative*, or *confirmed positive*, respectively. Also, Λ is the force of infection with definition in Eq. (3), γ is the recovery rate, ω is the rate of test return, F_X (defined in Eq. (2)) and p_X represent the *per capita* testing rate and the probability of positive tests, respectively, for compartment X . For further description of the parameters see Table 1.

study their interaction. Here, we studied the the effect of testing intensity, rate of test re-
turn and the isolation efficacy in reduction of the probability of transmission on the epidemic
dynamics when different levels of testing “focus” (from random to highly targeted) are in
place. Our model provides insights to the sensitivity of the epidemic dynamics, through \mathcal{R}_0 ,
with respect to the undelying testing and isolation parameters. [Ali: edited in response to
David comments.]

3 Methods

We developed a deterministic model, Eqs. (A1), which groups individuals based on disease
status and testing status. Disease states include Susceptible, Infectious and Recovered (thus
this is an SIR-type model), and testing status categorizes people as *untested*, waiting-for-
positive, waiting-for-*negative*, or *confirmed positive* (Fig. 1). Symbolically, the testing status
of an individual in the disease compartment X , where $X \in \{S, I, R\}$, is reflected in the
subscript, namely X_u , X_p , X_n and X_c , for *untested*, waiting-for-*positive*, waiting-for-*negative*,
or *confirmed positive*, respectively. Note that the top-to-bottom order of the testing-based
compartments of each disease-based comparmenet X in the flowchart (Fig. 1) and the model
equations (A1) should match. However, we switched X_u and X_n in the flowchart (Fig. 1)
for the sake of tidiness of the flowchart. Further, two ‘accumulator’ compartments, N and
 P , were also incorporated in the model in order to collect cumulative reported negative or
positive tests. The model equations and details of calculation of the basic reproduction
number \mathcal{R}_0 are presented in the appendix (see Sec. 5.1).

Table 1 defines the model parameters, which are generally straightforward *per capita*

flows between compartments, or modifiers to these flow rates. The novel component of the model comes in through the compartment-specific relative testing weights w_S , w_I and w_R ; these give the relative rates at which people in the S , I , and R compartments are tested, respectively. Thus, we can specify different levels of testing “focus” from random to highly targeted. For example, $w_I/w_S = 3$ means that infected individuals are tested at three times the *per capita* rate of susceptible individuals.

In order to link to more applied models, we constructed this model so we could specify the total *per capita* testing rate. We do this by defining the weighted size of the testing pool $W = w_S S_u + w_I I_u + w_R R_u$, and calculating a scaling parameter for testing as:

$$\sigma = \frac{\rho N_0}{W}, \quad (1)$$

where ρ is the *per capita* testing intensity for population and defined as the number of daily tests taken in a population of size N_0 . Thus, the *per capita* testing rate for compartment X is

$$F_X = \sigma w_X, \text{ where } X \in \{S, I, R\}. \quad (2)$$

For a high-sensitivity test, infected people typically flow through to the “confirmed positive” (I_c , R_c) compartments and are thus unavailable for further testing. Over the course of the epidemic, a fixed testing rate as specified in (1) can (if large enough) exhaust the pool of people available for testing, leading to a singularity when no one is left untested. Although this phenomenon does not affect our analysis of \mathcal{R}_0 , it can affect the temporal dynamics (we discuss an adjustment to the model that solves this problem in the appendix).

The classical SIR model is based on the following implicit assumptions; well-mixed population, homogeneity of the population (i.e., all individuals are equally susceptible and equally infectious for the same length of time when infected), exponentially distributed duration of infection and large population size (see, e.g., Keeling and Rohani (2011)). In addition to these standard assumptions, our model assumes:

- (i) there is a single force of infection (new cases per unit time), Λ , defined as follows

$$\Lambda = \frac{\beta}{N_0} (I_u + (1 - \theta_w)(I_n + I_p) + (1 - \theta_c)I_c), \quad (3)$$

across all susceptible pools with transmission rate β and isolation efficacy in reduction of the probability of transmission for three testing-based compartments “waiting” and *confirmed positive* individuals, θ_w and θ_c respectively, (see Table 1 for further details),

- (ii) the efficacy of isolation is higher in confirmed individuals relative to the individuals awaiting test results. That is,

$$0 \leq \theta_w \leq \theta_c \leq 1.$$

Thus, for instance when the awaiting people follow the isolation perfectly, θ_w is closer to 1, while when they less follow the isolation, θ_w is closer to 0. For the simplicity of analysis, we also assume a perfectly specific test ($p_S = 0$). This last assumption combined with the assumption that no susceptible individual is in waiting-for-*positive* or *confirmed positive*

Symbol	Description	Unit	Value
N_0	Total population size	people	10^6
ω	Rate of test return, i.e., rate of onward flow from “waiting” to “confirmed” or “untested” compartments	1/day	-
γ	Recovery rate	1/day	1/3
ρ	<i>per capita</i> testing intensity	1/day	-
θ_w	Isolation efficacy in reduction of the probability of transmission for “waiting” individuals	-	-
θ_c	Isolation efficacy in reduction of the probability of transmission for “confirmed positive” individuals	-	-
β	Transmission rate	1/day	0.339
Λ	Force of infection	1/day	-
p_S	Probability of positive tests for S ($= 1 - \text{specificity}$)	-	0
p_I	Probability of positive tests for I ($= \text{sensitivity}$)	-	1
p_R	Probability of positive tests for R ($= 1 - \text{specificity}$)	-	0.5
w_S, w_I, w_R	Relative testing weights	-	Random: $\{1, 1, 1\}$ Targeted: $\{0.3, 1, 1\}$

Table 1: Parameters of the model (A1).

compartments, i.e., $S_p(0) = S_c(0) = 0$, reduces the model to 10 equations where equations c and d in model (A1) are eliminated.

The Disease-Free Equilibrium (DFE) for the SIR model (Eqs. A1) is found by setting the infected compartments to 0 and solving for the unknowns. The DFE is

$$S_n^* = \frac{\rho}{\omega} N_0, \quad S_u^* = \frac{\omega - \rho}{\omega} N_0, \quad \text{and} \quad I_j = R_j = 0 \quad \text{for all } j. \quad (4)$$

The corresponding *per capita* testing rate (Eq. 2) for the infected compartment I at DFE is one of the key analysis parameters and can be simplified as

$$\hat{F}_I = (\omega\rho/(\omega - \rho))w_I/w_S. \quad (5)$$

The basic reproduction number, \mathcal{R}_0 , was calculated by using the next-generation matrix method developed by van den Driessche and Watmough (2002). We present \mathcal{R}_0 in the following form.

$$\mathcal{R}_0 = \frac{\beta}{\gamma}(1 - \Delta), \quad (6)$$

where the term $\frac{\beta}{\gamma}$ is the classical basic reproduction number for a SIR model without testing and isolation (see, e.g., Keeling and Rohani (2011)), and the positive quantity Δ is the “effectiveness of control” effectiveness of control due to testing and isolation processes defined as follows.

$$\Delta = \frac{1}{C N_0} (C_1 S_u^* + (C_2(1 - \theta_w) + C \theta_w) S_n^*), \quad (7)$$

where

$$C = (\omega + \gamma) \left(\gamma(\omega + \gamma) + (\gamma + \omega p_I) \hat{F}_I \right), \quad (8)$$

$$C_1 = (\omega + \gamma) (\theta_w \gamma + \theta_c \omega p_I) \hat{F}_I, \quad (9)$$

$$C_2 = \left(\omega \gamma (1 + p_I) \hat{F}_I + \gamma^2 (\omega + \gamma + \hat{F}_I) \right) \theta_w + \omega^2 p_I \hat{F}_I \theta_c. \quad (10)$$

Further details of derivation of \mathcal{R}_0 are provided in appendix, Sec. 5.1. The explicit formula of \mathcal{R}_0 , enables us to study the effect of parameters of interest, on \mathcal{R}_0 mathematically and through numerical simulation. These parameters, i.e., parameters that could be manipulated by public-health policy include the isolation efficacy, θ_c and θ_w , *per capita* testing intensity, ρ , and the rate of test return, ω . In particular, we look at the partial derivative of Δ with respect to these parameters (see details in appendix, Sec. 5.2). It is notable that the derivative of Δ with respect to θ_w , θ_c and ρ was derived explicitly and for the whole domain of the parameter space. However, we analyzed the effect of ω on \mathcal{R}_0 for the case when testing intensity is very small relative to the population size, N_0 . Specifically, we used the Taylor approximation of Δ at $\rho = 0$ to illustrate the unexpected nonmonotonic relationship between \mathcal{R}_0 and ω , and also to avoid unnecessary complicated computations for making this point.

The analytical calculation of the next-generation matrix and simplifying the expression of \mathcal{R}_0 was carried out in Maple (Maplesoft, 2010). We used R (R Core Team, 2020) for simulations, in particular, for plotting the contours of Δ (7) over a range of selected set of parameters of interest. The rest of model parameters kept fixed at sensible values (see

Table 1 for the parameter values). Note that all plots are illustrated in the scale of the mean test return time $1/\omega$ (day) and testing intensity ρ (1/day per 1000). Results are shown in Fig. 2 and Fig. 3 with two sets of panels; panel set (a) represents the random testing, identified by $w_S = w_I = w_R = 1$, and panel set (b) represents targeted testing, identified by $w_S = 0.3$ and $w_I = w_R = 1$. Each panel set partitions a plot into a matrix of panels, namely facets, in which rows are specified by a value of θ_w and columns are specified by a value of θ_c . In our simulation, θ_w and θ_c vary in a discrete scale from 0 to 1 with 0.25 increment. Note that we are only plotting facets with $\theta_w \leq \theta_c$ which is an assumption of our model.

To illustrate the changes in \mathcal{R}_0 with respect to *per capita* testing intensity ρ , two sets of plots are presented. Fig. 2 reflects the changes in \mathcal{R}_0 when ρ is small relative to the population size. Specifically, $\rho \in [0, 0.013]$, and the test return rate $\omega \in [1/12, 2]$. This is a more realistic scenario of testing as we have observed in COVID-19 pandemic. That is, 1% of a population are tested per day at maximum capacity, so in a population of size $N_0 = 10^6$, 10000 individuals will be tested per day at maximum. In order to illustrate the non-monotonic changes in \mathcal{R}_0 with respect to ρ , Fig. 3 with maximum capacity of ρ is larger relative to the population size, $\rho \in [0, 1/5]$, and the test return rate $\omega \in [1/5, 2]$. Note that the critical contour of $\Delta = 1 - \frac{\gamma}{\beta}$, corresponding to the threshold $\mathcal{R}_0 = 1$, is plotted in dotted line in the panels. Thus, a combination of ρ and ω above this critical contour results in reducing \mathcal{R}_0 . Also realize that $\mathcal{R}_0 = \frac{\beta}{\gamma}$, about 1.017 here, for the classical SIR model which can be achieved in the context of our model when no testing and no isolation are implied, that is $\rho = 0$ or $\theta_w = \theta_c = 0$.

4 Results

Examining our formula for \mathcal{R}_0 (6) gives the following results. See the appendix, Sec. 5.2, Sec. 5.3 and Sec. 5.5 for details.

1. Increasing the isolation efficacy parameters for tested and confirmed individuals decreases \mathcal{R}_0 ;
2. Higher testing intensity ρ always decreases \mathcal{R}_0 **if**: testing is random; **or** ρ is small.
3. A higher rate of test return always decreases \mathcal{R}_0 , **if** $\theta_w = 0$.
4. Increasing testing “focus” $\frac{w_I}{w_S}$ from random, $w_S = w_I$, to targeted, $w_S < w_I$, always decreases \mathcal{R}_0 .




Figure 2: **A comparison of effectiveness control on \mathcal{R}_0 at low level of *per capita* testing intensity ρ .** We numerically evaluate the effectiveness control parameter, Δ (Eq. 7), with respect to testing and isolation. We use the following parameters (see Table 1 for a brief description): $N_0 = 1 \times 10^6$, $\omega \in [1/12, 2]$ 1/day, $1/\gamma = 3$ days, $\rho \in [0, 0.013]$ 1/day, θ_w and θ_c vary between 0 and 1 with 0 for no effect and 1 for the full effect of isolation on the transmission probability, $\beta = 0.339$ 1/day, $p_S = 0$, $p_I = 1$ and $p_R = 0.5$. Contours of Δ are plotted for two testing strategies identified by a set of relative testing weights; (a) random testing where $w_S = w_I = w_R = 1$ and (b) targeted testing where $w_S = 0.3$ and $w_I = w_R = 1$. The black dotted line in each panel represents the critical contour of $\Delta = 1 - \frac{\gamma}{\beta}$, i.e., the Δ corresponding to the threshold of $\mathcal{R}_0 = 1$.

Numerical results are shown in Figs. 2 and 3. When $\theta_w = 0$ (top row of each panel), we see that shorter test-waiting times reduce \mathcal{R}_0 (Δ increases as we move to the left in each plot in this row). For non-zero Δ , however, we mostly see the opposite effect: less waiting leads to more transmission. This is because returning negative tests leads people to stop distancing; this applies both to susceptibles, and to infectious people who receive negative test results because they were sampled when susceptible (or because of imperfect test sensitivity, which is not modeled in this figure).

We also see that greater test intensity ρ increases the effectiveness of control Δ (Δ increases as we move up in each plot in this Figure). Mathematically speaking, we did find a counter-vailing effect, but this can only be seen when we allow ρ to take unrealistically large values, and only for weighted/targeted testing (see Fig. 3). The explanation here is that more rapid testing leaves more susceptibles in the “waiting-for-no” category at the DFE; these people must then wait for their tests to be returned before they can be tested again, receive a positive test, and become cautious. This effect is usually weak compared to the helpful effects of testing, but if testing is weighted, θ_w is low, and test returns are slow, it is possible for increasing ρ to reduce Δ (see upper-right part of upper-right plot of Fig. 3(b)).

Lastly, we show that increasing the focus of testing from random to targeted, always




Figure 3: **A comparison of effectiveness control on \mathcal{R}_0 at high level of *per capita* testing intensity ρ .** We numerically evaluate the effectiveness control parameter, Δ (Eq. 7), with respect to testing and isolation. We use the following parameters (see Table 1 for a brief description): $N_0 = 1 \times 10^6$, $\omega \in [1/5, 2]$ 1/day, $1/\gamma = 3$ days, $\rho \in [0, 1/5)$ 1/day, θ_w and θ_c vary between 0 and 1 with 0 for no effect and 1 for full effect of isolation on the transmission probability, $\beta = 0.339$ 1/day, $p_S = 0$, $p_I = 1$ and $p_R = 0.5$. Contours of Δ are plotted for two testing strategies identified by a set of relative testing weights; (a) random testing where $w_S = w_I = w_R = 1$ and (b) targeted testing where $w_S = 0.3$ and $w_I = w_R = 1$. The black dotted line in each panel represents the critical contour of $\Delta = 1 - \frac{\gamma}{\beta}$, i.e., the Δ corresponding to the threshold of $\mathcal{R}_0 = 1$.

increases Δ , thus decreases \mathcal{R}_0 . This can be seen in Fig. 2 and Fig. 3. In particular, we realize higher Δ levels, i.e., darker colors in corresponding plots/facets as we go from panel (a) to panel (b) in the figures.

5 Discussion

1. A potential advantage of slow test reporting ω , result 3;

- Whether increasing ω lowers \mathcal{R}_0 depends on the precise combination of model parameters including ρ , testing strategies represented by compartment-specific testing weights, test sensitivity and specificity, and the level of isolation efficacy.
- The potential advantage of slow test reporting is in the individual level as opposed to the community level, but seems unapplicable as a strategy.
- May be this mechanism combined with increasing testing intensity ρ can be considered alongside other prevention methods, eg., social distancing etc, when the transmission is in the exponential-growth phase (in order to increase the generation interval).
- One reason in favor of prolonging $1/\omega$ is that it is easy to manipulate while increasing ρ can be limited to the resources.

2. **The counter-vailing effect of *per capita* testing intensity, ρ , on \mathcal{R}_0 ;** - The explanation here is that more rapid testing leaves more susceptibles in the “waiting-for-no” S_n category at the DFE and delay them to get to I_c where they are subject to a full isolation, thus no transmission. - We are missing out on community-level advantages of fast testing. - What is the explanation for having this counter-vailing effect of ρ in targeted testing and not in the random one? - May because in the targeted testing more I_u s are tested compared to S_u s, given that higher ω leaves more people in S_n and I_n which results in more transission. - While targeted testing strategies, including targeting people with infection-like symptoms or the contacts of confirmed cases, are always more effective than random testing, as expected, we find that in some cases the direct effect of testing is that viral spread is greater for a slow test than for a fast test. This counter-intuitive effect can occur when people are cautious when awaiting a test result, and may not be robust to second-order effects of fast testing (such as better contact tracing).
3. **Specifying the compartment-specific relative testing weights, Specifically $\frac{w_I}{w_S}$;**
 - More targeted testing is always good in viral control, - We incorporated the compartment-specific relative testing weights, w_S , w_I and w_R , to model random testing and *targeted* testing strategies. Here, in the case of targeted testing and for the simplicity and illustration purposes, we assumed that infected and recovered individuals are tested at three times the *per capita* rate of susceptible individuals, thus $w_I/w_S = 3$ and $w_R = w_I$. Note that we have not specified a methodology to assign particular relative testing weights corresponding to a particular targeted testing scenario. Modeling different targeted testing strategies, equivalently test-specific testing weights in our framework, requires prior information of the conditional probabilities of getting tested for people in a given compartment. This can be implied when we would like to quantify and compare the effect of different levels of test focus for infectious people on the basic reproduction number \mathcal{R}_0 , and conclude about the disease spread management. For example, when people are tested for “screening”, the individuals with potential higher mobility, eg. people who are getting on flights, get more tested and thus the coresponding heavier testing weight is assigned than people awaiting for a surgery and are probably going to stay in a long-term-care facility and consequently less mobile and more isolated to begin with. With our model, we would be able to compare the sensitivity of the disease dynamics, through \mathcal{R}_0 , with respect to testing different high-risk groups in the population. This part needs to be developed further in future work.
4. What can we say in the context of strength and speed paradigm?

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Appendix

5.1 Model and calculation of \mathcal{R}_0

The model in the form of a system of ordinary differential equations is

$$dS_u/dt = -\Lambda S_u - F_S S_u + \omega S_n, \quad (\text{A1a})$$

$$dS_n/dt = -(1 - \theta_w)\Lambda S_n + (1 - p_S)F_S S_u - \omega S_n, \quad (\text{A1b})$$

$$dS_p/dt = -(1 - \theta_w)\Lambda S_p + p_S F_S S_u - \omega S_p, \quad (\text{A1c})$$

$$dS_c/dt = -(1 - \theta_c)\Lambda S_c + \omega S_p, \quad (\text{A1d})$$

$$dI_u/dt = \Lambda S_u - F_I I_u + \omega I_n - \gamma I_u, \quad (\text{A1e})$$

$$dI_n/dt = (1 - \theta_w)\Lambda S_n + (1 - p_I)F_I I_u - \omega I_n - \gamma I_n, \quad (\text{A1f})$$

$$dI_p/dt = (1 - \theta_w)\Lambda S_p + p_I F_I I_u - \omega I_p - \gamma I_p, \quad (\text{A1g})$$

$$dI_c/dt = (1 - \theta_c)\Lambda S_c + \omega I_p - \gamma I_c, \quad (\text{A1h})$$

$$dR_u/dt = \gamma I_u - F_R R_u + \omega R_n, \quad (\text{A1i})$$

$$dR_n/dt = \gamma I_n + (1 - p_R)F_R R_u - \omega R_n, \quad (\text{A1j})$$

$$dR_p/dt = \gamma I_p + p_R F_R R_u - \omega R_p, \quad (\text{A1k})$$

$$dR_c/dt = \gamma I_c + \omega R_p, \quad (\text{A1l})$$

$$dN/dt = \omega(S_n + I_n + R_n), \quad (\text{A1m})$$

$$dP/dt = \omega(I_p + R_p), \quad (\text{A1n})$$

where parameters are specified in Table 1. The next generation matrix for this model is $G = FV^{-1}$, where matrix F represents the inflow of new infection to the infected compartments and matrix V represents the flow in the infected compartments when the population is totally susceptible. Matrices F and V are

$$F = \beta/N_0 \begin{bmatrix} S_u^* & (1 - \theta_w) S_u^* & (1 - \theta_w) S_u^* & (1 - \theta_c) S_u^* \\ (1 - \theta_w) S_n^* & (1 - \theta_w)^2 S_n^* & (1 - \theta_w)^2 S_n^* & (1 - \theta_w)(1 - \theta_c) S_n^* \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \end{bmatrix} \quad (\text{A2})$$

$$= \beta/N_0 \begin{bmatrix} S_u^* \\ (1 - \theta_w) S_n^* \\ 0 \\ 0 \end{bmatrix} [1, 1 - \theta_w, 1 - \theta_w, 1 - \theta_c], \text{ and} \quad (\text{A3})$$

$$V = \begin{bmatrix} \hat{F}_I + \gamma & -\omega & 0 & 0 \\ -(1 - p_I)\hat{F}_I & \omega + \gamma & 0 & 0 \\ -p_I\hat{F}_I & 0 & \omega + \gamma & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & -\omega & \gamma \end{bmatrix}. \quad (\text{A4})$$

The matrix inverse of V is

$$V^{-1} = \frac{1}{\gamma C} \begin{bmatrix} \gamma(\omega + \gamma)^2 & \gamma\omega(\omega + \gamma) & 0 & 0 \\ \gamma(\omega + \gamma)(1 - p_I)\hat{F}_I & \gamma(\omega + \gamma)(\hat{F}_I + \gamma) & 0 & 0 \\ \gamma(\omega + \gamma)p_I\hat{F}_I & \gamma\omega p_I\hat{F}_I & C\gamma/(\omega + \gamma) & 0 \\ \omega(\omega + \gamma)p_I\hat{F}_I & \omega^2 p_I\hat{F}_I & C\omega/(\omega + \gamma) & C \end{bmatrix}, \quad (\text{A5})$$

where $C = (\gamma(\omega + \gamma) + (\gamma + \omega p_I)\hat{F}_I)(\omega + \gamma)$ and \hat{F}_I is the *per capita* testing rate for the infected people and represented in Eq. (5). Note that all the columns of matrix V^{-1} sum up to $1/\gamma$.

The particular form of F with two rows of zeros at the bottom results in the following blocked form of matrix G .

$$G = \begin{bmatrix} G_{11} & G_{12} \\ 0 & 0 \end{bmatrix}, \quad (\text{A6})$$

where both blocked matrices G_{11} and G_{12} are 2 by 2. Given the upper triangular form of matrix G , the basic reproduction number \mathcal{R}_0 (defined as the spectral radius of matrix G) is only determined by the blocked matrix G_{11} ,

$$G_{11} = \frac{\beta}{\gamma C} \begin{bmatrix} (\omega - \rho)/\omega \\ (1 - \theta_w)\rho/\omega \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} 1, 1 - \theta_w, 1 - \theta_w, 1 - \theta_c \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} \gamma(\omega + \gamma)^2 & \gamma\omega(\omega + \gamma) \\ \gamma(\omega + \gamma)(1 - p_I)\hat{F}_I & \gamma(\omega + \gamma)(\hat{F}_I + \gamma) \\ \gamma(\omega + \gamma)p_I\hat{F}_I & \gamma\omega p_I\hat{F}_I \\ \omega(\omega + \gamma)p_I\hat{F}_I & \omega^2 p_I\hat{F}_I \end{bmatrix}. \quad (\text{A7})$$

It is notable that matrix F (A2) has rank one and consequently G_{11} does so. That is G_{11} has only one non-zero eigenvalue which is \mathcal{R}_0 .

The expression of \mathcal{R}_0 has a complicated form with all of the model parameters involved. This expression can be simplified and represented given the specific form of matrix G_{11} (A7). For the purpose of simplicity we present \mathcal{R}_0 in the manuscript in terms of expressions C , $C1$ and $C2$, specified in (8).

It remains hard to show that the reproduction number \mathcal{R}_0 is decreasing with respect to *per capita* testing intensity, ρ , and the speed of the test return, ω , for the feasible ranges of the parameters, that is

$$\omega > 0, \quad (\text{A8})$$

$$0 \leq \rho < \omega, \quad (\text{A9})$$

$$0 \leq \theta_w \leq \theta_c \leq 1, \quad (\text{A10})$$

$$\frac{w_I}{w_S} \geq 1. \quad (\text{A11})$$

One way to do such an analysis is based on the fact that ρ is *per capita* rate so for a large population size, $N_0 \gg 1$, ρ is very small or close to 0, comparing to N_0 . This provides a base to linearly approximate \mathcal{R}_0 when ρ is close to 0, and use this approximation to analyze the behaviour of \mathcal{R}_0 with respect to ω (see section 5.3). In the next section we provide an equivalent representation of \mathcal{R}_0 to provide a ground to prove that more testing intensity decreases \mathcal{R}_0 for a general range of parameters.

5.2 More testing intensity may decreases \mathcal{R}_0

This is to provide a mathematical materials to prove that $\frac{\partial}{\partial \rho} \Delta$ can be positive or negative, with Δ defined in Eq. (8), and thus $\frac{\partial}{\partial \rho} \mathcal{R}_0 < 0$, where \mathcal{R}_0 is the basic reproduction number, given in Eq. (6). We can rewrite matrix G_{11} in (A7) in the following form to simplify the calculations.

$$G_{11} = \frac{\beta}{\gamma C} \begin{bmatrix} S_u^*/N_0 \\ (1 - \theta_w) S_n^*/N_0 \end{bmatrix} [C - C_1, C - C_2], \quad (\text{A12})$$

where C is the same as the one in Eq. (8), i.e.,

$$C = (\omega + \gamma)(\gamma(\omega + \gamma) + (\omega p_I + \gamma) \hat{F}_I),$$

and C_1 and C_2 are

$$\begin{aligned} C_1 &= (\omega + \gamma)(\theta_w \gamma + \theta_c \omega p_I) \hat{F}_I, \\ C_2 &= (\omega \gamma (1 + p_I) \hat{F}_I + \gamma^2 (\omega + \gamma + \hat{F}_I)) \theta_w + \omega^2 p_I \hat{F}_I \theta_c, \end{aligned}$$

where \hat{F}_I is given in Eq. (5). Note that for analysis brevity, we let $N_0 = 1$, thus S_u^* and S_n^* are in the scale of 0 to 1. \mathcal{R}_0 is in the same form as in Eq. (6)

$$\mathcal{R}_0 = \frac{\beta}{\gamma} (1 - \Delta),$$

where

$$\Delta = \frac{1}{C} (C_1 S_u^* + (C_2 (1 - \theta_w) + C \theta_w) S_n^*).$$

The first goal is to explore how changes in isolation, θ_w and θ_c , affects \mathcal{R}_0 . Mathematically we would like to verify the sign of $\frac{\partial \mathcal{R}_0}{\partial \theta_w}$ and $\frac{\partial \mathcal{R}_0}{\partial \theta_c}$. We start with simplifying Δ (7) by factoring θ_w and θ_c in Eq. (7). Thus, Δ can be rewritten as

$$\Delta = \frac{1}{C} \left(-D_1 S_n^* \theta_w^2 + (-\omega^2 p_I \hat{F}_I S_n^* \theta_c + D_2 S_n^* + \gamma \hat{F}_I (\omega + \gamma)) \theta_w + (\omega + \gamma S_u^*) \omega p_I \hat{F}_I \theta_c \right), \quad (\text{A13})$$

where

$$D_1 = (\omega + \gamma) \gamma^2 + (\omega + \gamma + \omega p_I) \gamma \hat{F}_I, \quad (\text{A14})$$

$$D_2 = (3\omega + 2\gamma) \gamma^2 + (\omega + \gamma + 2\omega p_I) \gamma \hat{F}_I + (\gamma + p_I \hat{F}_I) \omega^2. \quad (\text{A15})$$

Δ , Eq. (A13), is linear in θ_c with a positive coefficient given by

$$1/C (\gamma S_u^* + \omega (1 - \theta_w S_u^*)) \omega p_I \hat{F}_I.$$

This results in increasing Δ , thus decreasing \mathcal{R}_0 with respect to θ_c , that is $\frac{\partial \mathcal{R}_0}{\partial \theta_c} \leq 0$. Note that C is independant of θ_c and θ_w .

With a similar logic, Δ (A13) is a concave-down quadratic equation in θ_w , given by

$$1/C \left(-D_1 S_n^* \theta_w^2 + (-\omega^2 p_I \hat{F}_I S_n^* \theta_c + D_2 S_n^* + \gamma \hat{F}_I (\omega + \gamma)) \theta_w \right). \quad (\text{A16})$$

We show that the feasible range of θ_w lies between 0 and the vertex of this parabola where the parabola is increasing in θ_w , and so does Δ which results in inferring $\frac{\partial \mathcal{R}_0}{\partial \theta_w} \leq 0$. It is enough to show that partial derivative of the expression (A16) with respect to θ_w at $\theta_w = 1$ is non-negative. It follows that

$$\left. \frac{\partial \Delta}{\partial \theta_w} \right|_{\theta_w=1} = 1/C \left((D_2 - 2D_1 - \omega^2 p_I \hat{F}_I \theta_c) S_n^* + \gamma \hat{F}_I (\omega + \gamma) \right) \quad (\text{A17})$$

$$= 1/C \left((\gamma(\omega + \gamma) + \gamma\omega^2 + (1 - \theta_c)\omega^2 p_I \hat{F}_I) S_n^* + \gamma(\omega + \gamma) \hat{F}_I (1 - S_n^*) \right), \quad (\text{A18})$$

which is a positive quantity, given that θ_c and S_n^* vary between 0 and 1.

The second goal is to explore how changes in *per capita* testing intensity ρ affects \mathcal{R}_0 . Mathematically we would like to verify the sign of $\frac{\partial \mathcal{R}_0}{\partial \rho}$, which specifically depends on $\frac{\partial \Delta}{\partial \rho}$. We use the derived expressions for S_u^* and S_n^* , given by Eqs. (4), in Δ (7). Also, we define $\phi = \hat{F}_S = \frac{\rho\omega}{\omega - \rho}$, to reparametrize ρ . This is mainly to avoid singularity in \hat{F}_I (5), when testing intensity ρ is very close to the rate of test return ω . Thus, ρ is reparametrized as

$$\rho = \frac{\omega\phi}{\omega + \phi}. \quad (\text{A19})$$

This one-to-one monotonic reparametrization enables us to simplify the mathematical expressions and explore the simpler $\frac{\partial \Delta}{\partial \phi}$ instead of the complicated $\frac{\partial \Delta}{\partial \rho}$. The derivative is

$$\partial \Delta / \partial \phi = \frac{1}{d_3} (a_3 \phi^2 + b_3 \phi + c_3), \quad (\text{A20})$$

where

$$\begin{aligned} a_3 = \frac{w_I}{w_S} \left((1 - \theta_w) \left(1 + \frac{w_I}{w_S} \right) \theta_w \gamma^3 + (1 - \theta_c) p_I^2 \theta_w \frac{w_I}{w_S} \omega^3 \right. \\ \left. + \left(\left((1 - \theta_w - \frac{w_I}{w_S}) \theta_c + (3 - 2\theta_w) \theta_w \frac{w_I}{w_S} \right) p_I + (1 - \theta_w) \left(1 + \frac{w_I}{w_S} \right) \theta_w \right) \omega \gamma^2 \right. \\ \left. + \left(\left((1 - \theta_w - \theta_w \frac{w_I}{w_S}) \theta_c + (2 - \theta_w) \theta_w \frac{w_I}{w_S} \right) p_I + (2\theta_w - \theta_w^2 - \theta_c) \frac{w_I}{w_S} p_I^2 \right) \omega^2 \gamma \right), \end{aligned} \quad (\text{A21})$$

$$b_3 = 2 \frac{w_I}{w_S} (\omega + \gamma) \gamma \left((\omega + \gamma + \omega p_I) (2 - \theta_w) \gamma \theta_w + (1 - \theta_w) \omega^2 p_I \theta_c + \omega^2 p_I \theta_w \right), \quad (\text{A22})$$

$$c_3 = (\omega + \gamma)^2 \gamma \left((2 - \theta_w) \gamma^2 \theta_w + \left(1 + \frac{w_I}{w_S} \right) \omega \gamma \theta_w + \frac{w_I}{w_S} \omega^2 p_I \theta_c \right), \quad (\text{A23})$$

$$d_3 = \frac{(\omega + \gamma)}{\omega} \left((\omega p_I + \gamma) \frac{w_I}{w_S} \phi + (\omega + \gamma) \gamma \right)^2 (\omega + \phi)^2. \quad (\text{A24})$$

Note that $\phi \geq 0$, also b_3 , c_3 and d_3 are all positive. However a_3 can be positive or negative. If $a_3 \geq 0$, $\partial \Delta / \partial \phi \geq 0$ for all feasible range of parameters, thus $\frac{\partial}{\partial \rho} \mathcal{R}_0 \leq 0$. It is straight forward to show that $a_3 \geq 0$ in case of random testing strategy, i.e., $w_S = w_I = 1$. If $a_3 < 0$, then the quadratic expression in the numerator of (A20) has a positive root, ϕ^* , such that for $\phi > \phi^*$, $\partial \Delta / \partial \phi < 0$.

An example of this counter-vailing effect of ϕ , and consequently ρ , on \mathcal{R}_0 occurs when $\theta_w = 0$ and $\theta_c = 1$. This is illustrated in the top-right panel of the Fig. 3 panel (b), where the strength of isolation for awaiting people is the least, but the most for the confirmed cases. In this case, simplifying a_3 in Eq. (A21) gives

$$a_3 = \frac{w_I}{w_S} \omega \gamma p_I ((\omega + \gamma) - \frac{w_I}{w_S} (\omega p_I + \gamma)).$$

Specifically, in the case of targeted testing which is identified by $\frac{w_I}{w_S} > 1$, and using a perfect sensitive test, thus $p_I = 1$, there exists a range for ρ over which $\frac{\partial \mathcal{R}_0}{\partial \rho} \leq 0$. Note that ρ and ω have a similar mechanism in delaying people to get into I_c , thus we would expect to see the non-trivial counter-vailing effect of these two parameters on \mathcal{R}_0 .

5.3 rate of returning tests

The third goal is to explore how changes in the rate of test return ω affects \mathcal{R}_0 . Mathematically we would like to verify the sign of $\frac{\partial \mathcal{R}_0}{\partial \omega}$, which specifically depends on $\frac{\partial \Delta}{\partial \omega}$. We use the linearization of \mathcal{R}_0 around $\rho = 0$ to show that there a non-monotonic relationship between \mathcal{R}_0 and ω . The Taylor expansion of Δ at $\rho = 0$ is

$$\Delta = \frac{\rho}{\omega \gamma (\omega + \gamma)} \left(\frac{w_I}{w_S} \omega^2 p_I \theta_c + \left(\frac{w_I}{w_S} + 1 \right) \gamma \omega \theta_w + \gamma^2 \theta_w (2 - \theta_w) \right). \quad (\text{A25})$$

This results in

$$\frac{\partial \Delta}{\partial \omega} = \frac{\rho}{\omega^2 (\omega + \gamma)^2} \left(\left(p_I \frac{w_I}{w_S} \theta_c - \left(1 + \frac{w_I}{w_S} \right) \theta_w \right) \omega^2 + 2 \theta_w \gamma (\theta_w - 2) \omega + \theta_w \gamma^2 (\theta_w - 2) \right), \quad (\text{A26})$$

around $\rho = 0$.

5.4 On Testing Rate and Numerical Singularity

In this work, we didn't do any numerical solutions for the trajectories in our analysis. However, if one tries to do so there would be a singularity issue to deal with. Specifically, the numerical singularity issue with the chosen σ (1) is that the population in S compartments appeared to blow up when the DFE is achieved. This is once the only untested people are susceptibles, the FOI will become $\Lambda = 0$, testing rate $F_s = \rho N_0 / S_u$. Thus, the first equation of the model (A1) will become $dS_u/dt = -\rho N_0 + \omega S_u$. Thus changes in S_u will be no longer dependent on S_u with a linear rate of leaving the S_u compartment. IN fact the testing rate, σ , should be formulated such that people from the untested compartments will not be tested if they are not there. One way to fix this issue, is to consider a maximum testing rate, τ (1/day). In general, we want to test at a rate of ρ across the whole population. This won't always be possible, so we impose a maximum rate of τ per testable person and redefine $\sigma = \frac{\tau \rho N_0}{\tau W + \rho N_0}$, with the assumption that $\tau \gg \rho$. This alteration in σ , does not change any results related to \mathcal{R}_0 , thus we only impose it in the simulation of the epidemic dynamic.

341 5.5 The effect of testing focus parameter $\frac{w_I}{w_S}$ on \mathcal{R}_0

We define $w_{IS} = \frac{w_I}{w_S}$.

$$\frac{\partial \Delta}{\partial w_{IS}} = \frac{(\omega - \rho)(\omega(\omega - \rho\theta_w) + \gamma(\omega - \rho))(\theta_w\gamma + \theta_c\omega p_I)}{(-\omega^2\gamma + \omega\gamma\rho - \gamma\rho\omega w_{IS} - \omega\gamma^2 + \gamma^2\rho - \omega^2 p_I\rho w_{IS})^2}, \quad (\text{A27})$$

342 which is a positive quantity. Thus, $\frac{\partial \mathcal{R}_0}{\partial w_{IS}} \leq 0$. Therefore, increasing the focus of testing on
 343 the infectious people will result in less transmission.