On deRosset's Collapse Problem

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1 Abstract

In "*Grounding Explanations*"[1], deRosset introduces two accounts to support an argument which he calls the collapse problem. Those two accounts are LINK and CORR. LINK says if an entity is grounded in some other entities, then its existence or its features are solely explainable by its grounds. CORR says that if an entity's features or its possession of some features are fundamental, then the mentioned entity is fundamental. In this paper, I will show that the collapse problem is unsound by bringing some counterarguments for rejecting LINK and CORR.

2 Introduction

2.1 What is Grounding

Recently there are a plethora of papers publishing around the subject of grounding. Philosophers characterize grounding by using various terms, such as a non-causal dependence, an "in virtue of" relation, and non- causal priority relation.[2] They claim that a fact or entity is prior to another entity or fact regarding the layers of reality. Grounding is a relation which we can use to represent the structure of reality. Grounding reveals that reality comes in layers. By showing what grounds what, we can find out what entity is more basic and relates to a more fundamental layer of reality. The adherent of grounding, refer to some instances of grounding talk that we use in our ordinary conversations. To address a few, when we say that roses are red in virtue of being scarlet, or when we say the mental facts obtain in virtue of physical facts, etc.

I should mention that considering grounding, philosophers divide into three distinct groups. Some think we should dismiss discussing it due to being unreal or esoteric.[3]

[1] (deRosset, 2013)

[2] You can find a thorough survey on the notion of grounding in (Correia & Schnieder, 2012).

[3] (Hofweber, 2009)

They are called skeptics about grounding. They think we have enough notions in metaphysics for us to do the job, hence talking about grounding would help no one.[4]

The second group, on the contrary, think it is one of the most important notions in contemporary metaphysics which we can trace it back to Aristotle, Plato, Leibniz, Bolzano, etc.[5] They are called realists about grounding. For example, Schaffer[6], claims that the answer to the question that "what there is?" would be everything. It means that if we ask "do numbers exist?" Or "do tables exist?" Our answer to both of them would be the same, which is a simple yes. So, in metaphysics, instead of questioning what there is[7], we should ask about what grounds what.

The last group, agree with skeptics objections to grounding, but they still defend the usefulness of this notion; accordingly, they claim that grounding notion is unreal yet the propositions about grounding can be true or false. Their view is analogous to antirealists about the metaphysics who claim the same about metaphysics. This position is called irrealism about grounding. For example, in this view, we can say that according to the fiction of grounding, the proposition that "a grounds b" is true. This irrealism camp has been recently introduced by Thompson[8] and Dasgupta[9].

An adherent of grounding, usually, defines fundamentality and derivativeness with the help of grounding. Schaffer[10], and also deRosset[11], state it like this:

Fundamentality	a fact/entity is fundamental if it is ungrounded
Derivativeness	Something is derivative if it is not fundamental

Usually, there are two kinds of fundamentality which we talk about. The one mentioned above is absolute fundamentality, and the other is relative fundamentality. When we say that something is more fundamental than something else, we are using the second notion. So, by the use of grounding, we can say that if a is grounded in b, then b is more fundamental than a.[12] it means that it is in a more fundamental layer of the reality.

[4] Wilson (Wilson J. , 2014), make a distinction between small-g grounding relations and big-G grounding relations. She says that small-g relations are the familiar ones, such as supervenience, reduction, etc. she claims further that big-G relations have no use in metaphysics and she prefer to reject them.
[5] You can read the history of grounding in Metaphysical grounding (Correia & Schnieder, 2012)
[6] (Schaffer J. , 2009)
[7] Schaffer's solution is a response to the Quine's view of metaphysics in "on what there is" (Quine, 1948)
[8] (Thompson N. , 2018)
[9] (Dasgupta, 2017)
[10] (Schaffer J. , 2009)
[11] (deRosset, 2013)
[12] Bennet (Bennet, 2017) discusses absolute and relative fundamentality in more details.

Metaphorically, an entity is more fundamental than the other if it is closer to the root of the tree of the layers of reality.

2.2 What is the collapse problem?

I will call any fact expressed by a sentence of the form "a grounds b" a grounding fact. So, when I say "grounding fact" I mean the fact that it is about a grounding relation which is obtained. The Meta-Ground Question (MGQ) is the question that asks what, if anything, grounds the grounding facts? Some can answer this question by saying that these facts do not have any further grounds; however, as deRosset, as well as Sider, points out, this assumption will lead us to a problem which he calls *the collapse*. He introduces an account that links different entities by grounding notion and another account for relating grounding with fundamentality. The first account is *LINK*. It says if an entity is grounded in some other entities, then its existence or its features are solely explainable by its grounds. The second account is *CORR*. It says that if an entity's features or its possession of some features are fundamental, then the mentioned entity is fundamental. I will discuss these two accounts in the following sections. After justifying these two accounts, deRosset concludes that if we accept there is the lowest level in the layers of reality in which the entities have no further grounds, by the plausibility of these accounts, we will face the collapse problem and all the entities would go into this layer. He calls this layer the fundamental layer. Therefore, there would be only one layer regarding the entities, and we cannot talk about different layers of entities by using the grounding talk. Therefore, grounding entities should reduce to only facts. He finds this view incorrect and proceeds to give an account for the grounds of grounding facts to avoid this collapse. His collapse argument goes like this:

D1 Beijing is a city;
D2 Beijing is derivative;
FUND Grounding facts are fundamental;
FACTS Beijing is derivative only if no fact involving Beijing is fundamental.

D1 and D2 are our data and assumed to be true. Since Beijing is derivative, there is a grounding relation between Beijing and a fundamental entity. Therefore, there is a grounding fact involving Beijing. Now since FUND states that grounding facts are fundamental, there is a fact involving Beijing, which is fundamental. So, applying FACTS imply that Beijing is fundamental, which is contradictory to D2. Because we accepted D1 and D2 to be true, we must dismiss FUND or FACTS. Then, he argues for the plausibility of FACTS due to being contrapositive of CORR.[13] Accordingly, he rejects FUND and introduces a ground for grounding facts.

[13] (deRosset, 2013, p. 15)

The answer deRosset gives to the MGQ has one other assumption which is shared with the most proponents of grounding. That is the feature of upward necessitation (UN). It says that if a grounds b, then necessarily if a exists, b exists. As deRosset puts it:

UN if a grounds b then, □ (<a exists> → <b exists>)

On the other hand, I should mention that some philosophers disagree with the view that there is a necessitation implied by grounding.[14]

In this paper, I will use some other definitions which should be mentioned here. The first view I use is the *free modal recombination* view. It says, granting the existence of the fundamental layer, in reality, we can freely recombine the entities in it in other possible worlds. For example, if a, b and c are the fundamental entities, in another possible world, it is possible that we only have the entity a and the entity c. Although some philosophers assume this view to be true, like Bennett and Schaffer.[15] Others, like deRosset[16], disagree on the plausibility of this account. In this paper, I assume the truth of this view.

The second view is an argument from the philosophy of mind. It is *multiple realizability*. It says that higher-level entities, in the structure of reality, are multiply realizable by different entities from the lower level of reality. For example, the mental state P can be realized by neuron x in humans, and also it can be realized by neuron z in some other animals.[17] This view has its opponents too[18]; however, in this paper, we assume its truth.

Another useful notion in this paper is the debate between the adherent of *trialism* about the entities of reality and the adherent of entities' *dualism*. Dualists, like deRosset[19], divide the entities of reality into two categories, namely fundamental and derivative. On the other hand, Trialists, like Schaffer[20], divide the fundamental entities into two further categories: grounding facts and basic entities. In this paper, I will examine trialism and give a revised version of it that I think works against deRosset's dualism.

In the following sections, I will examine the plausibility of LINK by the usage of the free modal recombination account and the multiple realizability view. Next, I will examine the plausibility of CORR by arguing for a revised version of trialism, which I call trialism*. Then, I will conclude that the collapse argument is not sound. By doing this, I do not want to argue that grounding facts should be fundamental or collapse problem is not

[14]Trogdon, in his paper, points to a few (Trogdon, 2013)
[15] Bennett uses it in his book, (Bennett, 2017), for justifying the argument that grounding facts should be grounded. Schaffer, (Schaffer J. , 2008), uses it for his priority monism view.
[16] (deRosset, 2009)
[17] You can see different applications of this view in (Bickle, 2008)
[18] You can find a thorough survey on the notion of realization and its debates in (Baysan, 2015).
[19] (deRosset, 2013)
[20] (Schaffer J. , 2009)

correct at all. We may still find other arguments that work for collapse. Furthermore, even if we reject the collapse problem, it does not mean that grounding facts are fundamental due to the existence of some other possible problems for grounding facts being fundamental.[21]

3 Against LINK

Some adherents of grounding agree on the relata of grounding relations to only be the facts; however, some others, think that we can talk about grounding relations between other entities too. deRosset agrees with the latter. So, in the first part of his paper, he introduces an account by which he links different entities by using grounding. He calls this account LINK, and he formulates it like this:

> **LINK** $e_1,\ldots,\ldots, e_n$ are the entities that ground entity e only if e's existence and features are all explicable solely by reference to the existence and features of $e_1,\ldots,\ldots, e_n$.[22]

He claims that this account is analogous to Schaffer's view about the grounding relations between facts. In that account, a fact is grounded in some other fact if its existence and its features depend on that fact.[23]

After giving this account, he introduces another account, CORR, by which he shows how an entity could be fundamental, given the ungroundedness of possession of its features and its existence. Here is how CORR goes:

> **CORR** An entity e is fundamental if e's existence or its possession of some feature is fundamental.

deRosset claims that CORR is plausible for two reasons. Firstly, LINK implies CORR. Secondly, even without accepting LINK, CORR is still intuitively plausible.[24] By mentioning these two accounts, he goes on to justify them by answering various objections available to them. Then, when he shows the truth of CORR and LINK, he claims that accepting them will lead to a collapse if we believe the grounding facts to be fundamental. His argument is like this:

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[21] You can find some another arguments which shows that the "grounding facts" should be grounded in (Bennett, 2017)

[22] (deRosset, 2013, pp. 6-7)

[23] (Schaffer J. , The Internal Relatedness of All Things, 2010, p. 345)

[24] In the next section, I will illustrate how he articulates his view about the CORR.

Collapse argument

1- LINK is true.
2- CORR is Intuitively plausible
3- LINK Implies CORR
4- (2 or (1&3)) imply CORR is true.
5- Grounding facts are ungrounded (assumption)
6- All entities are either derivative (grounded) or fundamental (ungrounded). (the account of Dualism)
7- By definition, Grounding facts are explanations of a relation between one grounded entities to another grounded entity, or one grounded entity to an ungrounded entity.
8- There are some entities in reality which are grounded. (entities are layered)
9- 7 implies that grounded entities have a feature which is a grounding fact explaining their relation to a grounded or ungrounded entity.
10- 1&4&5&9 imply that grounded entities are ungrounded.
11- 6&10 imply that all the entities are ungrounded which leads to a collapse (there is only one layer for all of the entities)
12- 8 and 11 contradict each other
Therefore, ***5 is false*** because he thinks 1,3,4,5,6,7 and 8 are plausible.

By this conclusion, he goes on to search for the ground of the grounding facts. He states that if a grounds b, then the ground for that grounding fact would be the ground entity, namely a. So, the answer to MGQ would be like this: a grounds (a grounds b).

Firstly, this argument has no problem regarding its validity. Secondly, I should say that I find 1,2,3 and 6 questionable. In this section, I will argue for the falsity of number 1. Then in the next section, I will show the implausibility of 2 and 3, which needs showing the implausibility of 6.

For showing the implausibility of LINK, we can show an example in which some entities are the grounds of an entity e; however, e is not solely explainable by them. I can show some arguments for this task. I name them the argument from *strong free modal recombination* and the argument from *multiple realizability*. I define strong free modal recombination as a thesis that says, in reality, an entity which is derivative at some world w_1 can be fundamental at some other world like w_2. It means that we can freely recombine all the entities of reality. Now, a weaker claim of this allowance of recombination of entities is *weak free modal recombination* which says only the entities in the fundamental layer can be freely recombined. It means that we can have some entity in the fundamental layer at w_1 while it does not exist at w_2. Multiple realizability is the thesis that says entities can have different grounds; for example, pain can be realized

by neurons in humans while it can also be realized by some other entities in dogs. Firstly, we should look at the argument from strong free modal recombination:

1- Strong free modal recombination is true
2- LINK is true
3- Assume the entity b to be derivative(grounded) at w_1
4- 2&3 imply b's features are solely explainable by the entities which ground it (let us say the entity a is the ground of b at w_1)
5- 1 suggests b is fundamental at an arbitrary world like w_2.
6- Any fact about an entity is the feature of that entity
7- 5&6 imply the fact that [b is fundamental at w_2] is a feature of b
8- The fact that [b is fundamental at w_2] is not explainable by a
9- 7&8 imply at least one of b's features is not solely explainable by a
10- 9&4 contradict each other
Therefore, 2, namely LINK, is false.

Some may reject 1 or 6 instead of rejecting LINK. Although I cannot think of an argument for rejecting 6, 1 can be under some severe attacks. One can argue that the notion of fundamentality is bounded to the notion of necessity. So, whenever an entity is fundamental, it is necessarily fundamental. So, if b is fundamental at w_2 (number 5), it is necessarily fundamental. So, it would be fundamental at w_1.

Consequently, by assuming the fundamentality of an entity at some world and its derivativeness at the other, we are begging the question. Hence, the strong free modal recombination is false. Besides, Bennett[25] has an argument in her "Making Things Up", which we can use for rejecting 1. Given the entity b at w_1 and w_2, we cannot imagine these two qualitatively indiscernible objects, being derivative at some world and fundamental at the other. Accordingly, the same entity should be either in the fundamental layer or the derivative layer necessarily.

I should say that I cannot agree with this argument. For example, imagine that water is grounded in some entities like its hydrogen and oxygen molecules and etc. I think it is plausible that we can conceive water at some other world which has the exact same features except that it is not grounded in any entity. More specifically, imagine we have omitted all the fundamental entities at our world, and the new world contains water in its fundamental layer. Again, some may reject this by stating that once a derivative always a derivative. It means that if the water is grounded in w_1, it should be grounded in w_2 as well.

Although I cannot find the last objection to the strong free modal recombination intuitionally plausible, I can revise the strong free modal recombination claim by using

[25] (Bennett, 2017)

relative fundamentality. In the realm of derivative entities, if an entity grounds another, the first entity is more fundamental than the grounded entity. We call this relative fundamentality. Now for revising strong free modal recombination let us imagine a grounded entity like a which grounds another derivative entity like b. In this scenario, imagine that b also grounds c. Now, the revised strong free modal recombination, which we call SFMR*, is the thesis that says it is possible for an entity like b not to exist at some other world like w_2; however, a still grounds c at w_2. In this regard, we can revise the above argument like this:

1- SFMR* is true
2- LINK is true
3- Assume the entity c to be derivative (grounded) at w_1, and the entity a is a grounded entity which grounds b. Also, b grounds c.
4- 3 implies a grounds c at w_1. Because grounding relation is transitive[26],
5- 2&3 imply c's features are solely explainable by the entities which ground it, namely b.
6- 1 suggests it is possible that b does not exist in some arbitrary world like w_2. So, we do not have the "grounding fact" that [b grounds c] and the fact that [a grounds b]. However, it is still possible that a grounds c at w_2. Due to 4. (It is like that we omitted the layer in which b existed at w_1.)
7- Any fact about an entity is the feature of that entity
8- 4&6&7 imply the fact that [a solely grounds c at w_2] is a feature of c
9- The fact that [a solely grounds c at w_2] is not explainable by b
10- 8&9 imply that at least one of c's features is not solely explainable by b
11- 10&5 contradict each other

Therefore, 2, namely LINK, is false.

Some may reject 6 by saying that it is not possible that a can ground c at w_2 by appealing to the UN account. They would say that if a exists, then necessarily b exists, so we cannot omit a middle level while still saving the lower level. Consequently, they can also reject 1 by this implausible consequence. On the contrary, I should mention that we can say that UN is only applicable to the most fundamental level of reality and the freedom that we can have for recombining the derivative elements is still available to us. Some others may reject 9 by saying that b has the feature that says "if b does not exist, then the ground of b is also the ground of b's grounded entities". So, c's features will be solely explainable by a. Although I cannot agree that a counterfactual sentence like this can be a feature, I cannot reject the plausibility of this argument. That's why we should move on to the argument from multiple realisability:

[26] If aRb and bRc then, aRc.

1- Multiple realizability is true. This account says if a grounds b it is possible that in some other world like w_2 another entity grounds b. for this matter assume that "c grounds b"
2- LINK is true
3- Assume b to be multiply realizable
4- By definition, we know that 3 implies that b is grounded in some entity like a at w_1
5- 2&4 imply that b's features are solely explainable by a
6- 1 says that b is also grounded in some other entity like c at w_2
7- Any fact about an entity is the feature of that entity
8- 6&7 imply that the fact that [b is grounded in c at w_2] is a feature of b
9- The fact that [b is grounded in c at w_2] is not explainable by a
10- 8&9 imply at least one of b's features is not solely explainable by a
11- 10 & 5 contradict each other
Therefore, 2, namely LINK, is false.

I understand that multiple realizability, in this paper, is a strong assumption that links grounding, realization and modality. So, I will delve into this thesis to justify the truth of 1. In this part, I agree with the real existence of a relation which is realization.[27] This relation has the same properties as the grounding relation, namely transitivity, asymmetry and irreflexivity. It is also assumed that it has a property like the UN account. By considering these similarities, I am not suggesting that we can reduce realization to grounding; however, I am assuming that if a relation is a realization, then it is a grounding relation. Some may reject this assumption by stating that realization and grounding are completely distinct notions; however, by considering having the same properties, I think the burden of proof is on the shoulders of those objectors. The relation between realization and grounding being established, I should mention the modality. Some can say that just b having another ground in this world would be a counterexample to the LINK; however, it would be responded by a statement that we can say the real ground, in this case, is the totality set of all the grounds of b in this world. So, by bringing another world, we are avoiding this problem.

One response to these arguments is by saying that grounding would lead us to priority monism[28], the thesis that defends the priority of a monistic whole to all the other entities, which are its parts. By accepting monism, we can say that the fundamental ground of an entity is the whole cosmos. Therefore, in the last argument, we can say that the whole cosmos is the ground of b and b is solely explainable by the cosmos. Nevertheless, this answer has two flaws. Firstly, it has omitted the middle grounds, and it is looking at grounding relation just between a fundamental entity and other derivative

[27] You can find its opponents views in (Bickle, 2008).
[28] (Schaffer J. , 2010)

entities. So, by accepting it, we will not have the grounding relations between the derivative entities. Secondly, grounding is a relation by the use of which we can metaphysically theorize. Hence, it should be neutral regarding the debate between monism and pluralism.[29] So, accepting monism is a major assumption we do not want to have.

In the next section, I will examine the plausibility of premises 2,3 and 6 of the collapse argument.

4 Against CORR

Now we are going to examine the implausibility of CORR by using the plausibility of a revised version of trialism. Regarding the dualists' view in which entities are either fundamental or derivative, trialists divide fundamental entities into two further categories, basic entities and grounding relations. So, we cannot ask about the grounds of grounding facts because they are fundamental, and these facts with basic entities ground the derivative facts.

deRosset argues for the truth of CORR by two arguments, namely premises 2 and 3 in the *collapse argument*. Firstly, he claims CORR to be intuitively correct by stating that:

"CORR says that, if one were to detail all and only the fundamental facts, then one would mention only fundamental entities: derivative entities are not part of the fundamental story of the world." [30]

It means that we cannot have some facts in which there are some derivative entities. As deRosset argues himself, the collapse problem is analogous to the Sider's argument when Sider mentions the principle of purity.[31] Bennett, in "*Making Things Up*", objects to that principle. I think a similar objection can be made to deRosset's argument for CORR, that is CORR is question-begging. The collapse assumes grounding facts not being fundamental since grounding facts have a derivative entity in them. In addition to this objection, if I can show the plausibility of a different version of the CORR, then we cannot say that CORR is intuitively correct.

Secondly, deRosset uses a reductio ad absurdum to show how LINK implies CORR. deRosset's reductio goes like this: "Suppose that e's existence or its possession of some

[29] Schaffer disagrees with this view. He defends that grounding leads to the priority monism. (Schaffer J. , 2010)
[30] (deRosset, 2013, p. 8)
[31] (Sider, 2011)

feature is fundamental. Assume for reductio that e is derivative, and so grounded in other entities. If e is grounded, then the application of LINK implies that e's existence and its possession of each of its features are derivative, contradicting our supposition. QED."[32]

Now I will argue for a new version of trialism, namely trialism*, by which we can both reject premises 2,3 and 6 in the collapse argument. For this purpose, I begin by irrealism. Irrealists about grounding, take the relation of grounding not to be a real notion. Consequently, grounding facts cannot be real facts due to containing the grounding relations in them. By granting this irrealistic point of view, for the possibility of being grounded or not, we have two entities, namely grounded entities and ungrounded entities. Also, for involving in a grounding relation, an entity has two possibilities too. Either grounding another entity or not grounding anything. So, there would be four possible options:

1- Grounded entities which ground other entities.
2- Grounded entities which do not ground other entities.
3- Ungrounded entities which ground grounded entities.
4- Ungrounded entities which do not ground any entity.

The entities in numbers 1 and 2 are derivative entities. The entities in number two are in the most top layer of reality if it exists. The entities in number three are basic entities in the bottom layer, which is called the fundamental layer. The remaining, namely number four, is this other possibility which deRosset assumes not to exist; however, they are possible and can justify trialism*. The account of trialism which deRosset defines in his paper, has no entities like number four, because the grounding facts, even the ones that are not basic, help basic entities to ground derivative entities. As deRosset argues, trialism treat grounding facts differently from other facts just for the reason that they can solve the MGQ by avoiding the collapse problem. So, trialism cannot be a well-justified view.

On the contrary, adherents of trialism*, believe grounding facts to be in another realm of reality. Trialism* does not take grounding facts to be in the real world due to its irrealistic assumption. Trialism* is the account that says we have basic entities and derivative entities in the real world, while the grounding notion which relates them is an irrealistic entity belonging to another realm of fundamentality, namely grounding relation. Accordingly, the different treatment of the grounding facts is justified. Hence, trialism* is plausible.

By using trialism*, we can redefine a new version of CORR:

[32] (deRosset, 2013, p. 8)

T*-CORR An entity e is basic if e's existence or its possession of some feature is basic.

Considering T*-CORR, we cannot use the same reduction, as deRosset formulates, for showing how LINK implies CORR. Because, for reductio, we should assume the negation of e's being basic to be derivative; however, if e is not basic, it could either be a grounding fact or a derivative entity. So, firstly, trialism* rejects the plausibility of premise 6 in the collapse argument, which is the truth of dualism. Secondly, premise 3 in *the collapse argument* cannot be plausible regarding the truth of trialism*. Furthermore, premise 2 is not true because we have two options, CORR and T*-CORR, and we cannot choose between them just by using our intuition. All of this, the rejection of premises 2&3, is on the ground of rejecting premise number 6 form the collapse arguments which does not consider the plausibility of trialism*.

In this paper, I pointed to some challenges that LINK and CORR have. So, the *Collapse* may not follow from these accounts; however, it does not mean that the MGQ is not an important question. I mean, it does not follow that we have no reasons for rejecting the fundamentality of "grounding facts". On the contrary, Bennett[33] gives another reason which shows that grounding facts cannot be fundamental. This reason involves Bennett's claim that the fundamental layer can be freely recombined.

Regarding this, we would have grounding facts and other entities in the fundamental layer which we can freely recombine. According to Bennett, this view has three unpalatable consequences. Firstly, the built entities would not globally supervene on fundamental entities. Also, we would have some qualitatively indiscernible entities that are non-fundamental in our world, which would be in a fundamental layer in other worlds. Lastly, the grounding facts might end up to be the only fundamental entities.

The first one is implausible due to the UN account, which I talked about in section two. On this account, nothing grounds something else only if necessitates it. So they must supervene on each other when the grounds exist. The second one is unwarranted because Bennett argues it cannot be the case that two qualitatively indiscernible entities could be in two different layers when they are in different worlds. Moreover, for the last one, she argues that it is questionable why we should treat grounding relation differently and just put them in the fundamental layer. Due to this implausible consequences, given that entities can be modally recombined, Bennett rejects that grounding relations can be in a fundamental layer.

[33] (Bennett, 2017, p. 190)

Additionally, if we agree on irrealism about grounding, then treating grounding relations differently not only is plausible but also is the task we ought to do. Another reason for treating them differently should be the same reasons that I argued for trialism*'s view. Although I showed the implausibility of LINK and CORR, I should mention that by accepting realism about grounding and assuming UN, which both Bennett and deRosset agree on, the collapse will follow. So, we can conclude that we need to introduce the grounds of grounding facts by having these assumptions.

5 Conclusion

By assuming the truth of free modal recombination and multiple realizability, I showed that deRosset's LINK is implausible. Also, by introducing trialism* I argued that if grounding is an irrealistic notion, CORR would be implausible because LINK cannot imply T*-CORR which is the revised version of CORR by using trialism*. Also, the plausibility of CORR intuitively would be under attack due to the plausibility of T*-CORR. Accepting these will show that deRosset's collapse argument is not sound. This will bring the MGQ back to its first place. In this regard, we should introduce another collapse argument, or accept the fundamentality of "grounding facts", or even bring other arguments for showing that "grounding relations" should be grounded. Another noteworthy consequence of this paper is that we should check deRosset's answer to the MGQ, to find out whether it is consistence with trialism* and other arguments that showed the implausibility of the collapse argument.

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