#### Critical Minerals, Geopolitics, and the Green Transition

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October 4, 2025




#### Critical minerals will fuel the green transition

- Lithium, nickel, cobalt, and other minerals
  - Critical for producing advanced batteries
  - Geographic concentration, global trade, and active policy intervention
- What are the global impacts of industrial policy for minerals?
  - Highlighting policy spillover effects
  - With implications for geopolitics and green adoption


#### Data

- Annual, mine-level mineral production (GlobalData, Benchmark Minerals)
  - · Capacity, ore grade, ownership structure, mine type, mining method
- Annual, global (or continent-level) battery consumption (Benchmark Minerals)
  - By battery chemistry
- Annual prices + battery-mineral "recipes"
  - Battery prices (ICCSINO)
  - Mineral prices (Trading Economics)


# Critical minerals are geographically concentrated



#### Critical minerals power advanced batteries



## Mines have heterogeneous costs



## Theory

- Minerals  $\mathcal M$  with supply  $s^m$  and policy  $\tau^m$ 
  - $\ell$ : lithium produced by country  $\ell$
  - n: nickel produced by country n
- ullet Technologies  ${\mathcal J}$  with demand  $d_j$ 
  - *L*: lithium-heavy
  - N: nickel-heavy
- Recipes  ${\cal R}$ 
  - Yields derived demand  $d^m(d_L, d_N)$

## Policy spillovers

- Own-price demand elasticity
  - Higher  $p^{\ell} \to \text{lower } d^{\ell}$
  - ullet Partly offset by substitution to technology N, which still uses  $\ell$
- Cross-price demand elasticity
  - Higher  $p^n \to \text{lower } d^\ell$  or higher  $d^\ell$
  - Complements: lower  $d^{\ell}$  from joint use in technologies L and N
  - **Substitutes**: higher  $d^{\ell}$  from shift to technology L, which uses more  $\ell$
- On net, lithium and nickel can be gross complements or substitutes

#### Geopolitics and green adoption

- Consider country  $\ell$ , which sets policy  $\tau^\ell$  that restricts  $s^\ell$
- Geopolitics
  - Own-policy effect: lower  $s^\ell$ , higher  $p^\ell$
  - Cross-policy effect if **complements**: lower  $p^n$
  - Cross-policy effect if **substitutes**: higher  $p^n$
- Green adoption
  - **Complements**: higher or lower  $d_L + d_N$  (higher  $p^\ell$  but lower  $p^n$ )
  - Substitutes: unambiguously lower  $d_L + d_N$  (higher  $p^\ell$  and higher  $p^n$ )

## Empirical model

- **① Demand**  $d_i$  for technologies
- **2** Supply  $s^m$  of minerals
- **3** Equilibrium prices  $(p^m, p_j)$

## Demand by technology j, year t

ullet Almost ideal demand system with expenditure shares w at prices p

$$w_{jt} = lpha_{jt} + eta_j \log rac{lpha_t}{P_t} + \sum_{\hat{j}} \gamma_{j\hat{j}} \ln p_{\hat{j}t}$$
 $P_t = \sum_j lpha_{jt} \ln p_{jt} + rac{1}{2} \sum_{j,\hat{j}} \gamma_{j\hat{j}} \ln p_{jt} \ln p_{\hat{j}t}$ 

- Estimation: iterative linear least-squares
  - Instrumenting for prices with supply shocks

# Supply by mineral m(i), mine i, year t

• Ore extraction s for ore grade  $\gamma$ , crude extraction S

$$s^{it} = \gamma^{it} S^{it}$$

Quadratic crude costs, linear ore revenues (as price takers),

$$c^{it} = a^i + b^m \frac{S^{it}}{k^i} + \varepsilon^{it}, \quad r^{it} = p^{mt} \gamma^{it}$$

• **Estimation:** linear FOC with fixed effects  $(\mu^i, \mu^{mt})$ , mine-level variation  $\gamma^{it}$ 

$$\frac{S^{it}}{k^i} = \frac{p^{mt}\gamma^{it}}{b^m} - \frac{a^i}{b^m} - \frac{\varepsilon^{it}}{b^m}$$

## Equilibrium prices

- ullet Technologies derive from minerals according to **recipes**  $R_j^m$
- Mineral prices clear mineral markets

$$d^{mt} = \sum_{j} R_j^m d_{jt} + o^{mt}, \quad s^{mt} = \sum_{i \in I^{mt}} s^{it}$$


Technology prices follow from mineral prices

$$p_{jt} = \sum_{m} R_j^m p^{mt} + \eta_{jt}$$


#### Counterfactuals

- Indonesian nickel policy and Australian lithium policy
  - Impose optimal tax policy  $\tau^m$ , solve for equilibrium  $(p^m, s^m)$
  - Evaluate geopolitics and green adoption
- Decompose policy spillovers
  - With tech switching: complementarity + substitution
  - No tech switching: only complementarity


## Price effects of Indonesian nickel policy




#### Geopolitics under Indonesian nickel policy



## Green adoption under Indonesian nickel policy



## Green adoption under Australian lithium policy



#### Summary

- Critical minerals will fuel the green transition
- Industrial policy has policy spillovers
  - With implications for geopolitics and green adoption