

Food Policy in a Warming World

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Three perspectives on India's export ban

**Indian Ministry of
Commerce & Industry**
May 13 statement

Spike in wheat prices
threatens “**food security**
of India”

**Farmer Ranbeer Singh
Sirsa of Punjab**
May 14 *New York Times*

“If the price wants to go
up ... who are they trying
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“These measures could
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Questions

- ① How do governments intervene in response to agricultural climate shocks?
- ② What are the aggregate and distributional consequences?

This paper

- ① **Empirics:** new global data by country, crop, year (1980-2011)
 - Domestic shocks lead to consumer aid, especially during elections
 - Foreign shocks lead to producer aid, possibly offsetting consumer aid
 - Persistent effects, including for longer-run changes
- ② **Theory:** model of agricultural policy and trade
 - To rationalize policy response to climate shocks
- ③ **Quantification:** how policy responses affect incidence of climate damages
 - Policy responses shield domestic consumers by fully stabilizing prices

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Data and Measurement

Shocks: extreme heat exposure

- Capture that extreme heat drives yield variability (Schlenker & Roberts 2009)
 - ERA-5 re-analysis data on temperatures
 - EarthStat data on geography of crop production (Monfreda et al. 2008)
 - ECOCROP data on crop-specific temperature sensitivity (Moscona & Sastry 2022)
- Exposure by country ℓ , crop k , year t , aggregating over cells c

$$\text{ExtremeHeat}_{\ell k t} = \sum_{c \in \ell} \frac{\text{Area}_{ck}}{\sum_{c' \in \ell} \text{Area}_{c'k}} \cdot \text{DegreeDays}_{ct}(T_k^{\max})$$


Policy: nominal rate of assistance

- “Distortions to Agricultural Incentives” project (Anderson & Valenzuela 2008)
 - 80 products, 82 countries, 85% of global production (1955-2011)
 - Wedge between domestic and international prices
 - “Pro-consumer” if $NRA_{\ell kt} < 0$
- Captures multiple dimensions of policy
 - Quantity instruments, input-market interventions, temporary measures
 - But some subjectivity in measurement


Alternatives

Example: staples in India

Wheat



Rice



— NRA —— Extreme Heat Exposure

— NRA —— Extreme Heat Exposure

NRA variation

Shock variation

Yield effects


Empirical Results

1. How does extreme heat affect trade policy?

$$\text{NRA}_{\ell kt} = g(\text{ExtremeHeat}_{\ell kt}) + \gamma_{\ell t} + \delta_{kt} + \mu_{\ell k} + \varepsilon_{\ell kt}$$

- Country ℓ , crop k , year t , quartile dummies $g(\cdot)$
- Fixed effects by country-year, crop-year, country-crop
- **Identification:** some crops get worse shocks due to physiology, geography


Extreme heat induces pro-consumer policy



$$\text{NRA}_{\ell kt} = g(\text{ExtremeHeat}_{\ell kt}) + \gamma_{\ell t} + \delta_{kt} + \mu_{\ell k} + \varepsilon_{\ell kt}$$

Country level


Effects concentrated in border policies




$$\text{NRA}_{\ell kt}^{\text{type}} = g(\text{ExtremeHeat}_{\ell kt}) + \gamma_{\ell t} + \delta_{kt} + \mu_{\ell k} + \varepsilon_{\ell kt}$$

With lower import tariffs and more export restrictions

TRAINs import tariffs



GTA export restrictions




$$\text{Policy}_{\ell kt} = g(\text{ExtremeHeat}_{\ell kt}) + \gamma_{\ell t} + \delta_{kt} + \mu_{\ell k} + \varepsilon_{\ell kt}$$

2. How do foreign adverse shocks affect trade policy?

$$\text{NRA}_{\ell kt} = g(\text{ExtremeHeat}_{\ell kt}) + h(\text{ForeignExtremeHeat}_{\ell kt}) + \gamma_{\ell t} + \delta_{kt} + \mu_{\ell k} + \varepsilon_{\ell kt}$$


- Country ℓ , crop k , year t , quartile dummies $g(\cdot)$ and $h(\cdot)$ International prices
- Fixed effects by country-year, crop-year, country-crop
- ForeignExtremeHeat: trade partner shocks, weighted by pre-period import shares

Foreign shocks induce pro-producer policy



$$\text{NRA}_{\ell kt} = g(\text{ExtremeHeat}_{\ell kt}) + h(\text{ForeignExtremeHeat}_{\ell kt}) + \gamma_{\ell t} + \delta_{kt} + \mu_{\ell k} + \varepsilon_{\ell kt}$$

Global shocks also induce pro-producer policy



$$\text{NRA}_{\ell kt} = \textcolor{orange}{g}(\text{ExtremeHeat}_{\ell kt}) + \textcolor{brown}{h}(\text{GlobalShock}_{kt}) + \gamma_{\ell t} + \mu_{\ell k} + \varepsilon_{\ell kt}$$

3. How does extreme heat affect longer-run policy?


- Longer-run policy: country ℓ , crop k , years $t + s$

$$\text{NRA}_{\ell k t} = \sum_{s=-3}^3 \text{ExtremeHeat}_{\ell k t+s}^{Q4} + \gamma_{\ell t} + \delta_{k t} + \mu_{\ell k} + \varepsilon_{\ell k t}$$

- Longer-run shocks: country ℓ , crop k , decade \bar{t}

$$\text{NRA}_{\ell k \bar{t}} = \beta \text{YearsHeat}_{\ell k \bar{t}}^{Q4} + \alpha \text{YearsForeignHeat}_{\ell k \bar{t}}^{Q4} + \gamma_{\ell \bar{t}} + \delta_{k \bar{t}} + \mu_{\ell k} + \varepsilon_{\ell k \bar{t}}$$

Annual shocks have persistent effects



$$\text{NRA}_{\ell k t} = \sum_{s=-3}^3 \text{ExtremeHeat}_{\ell k t+s}^{Q4} + \gamma_{\ell t} + \delta_{k t} + \mu_{\ell k} + \varepsilon_{\ell k t}$$

Decadal shocks have similar effects

	All Policy	Output Policy	Output Policy (Border)	Output Policy (Farm)
Years of Extreme Heat (Local)	-0.0252** (0.0110)	-0.0251** (0.0111)	-0.0204** (0.00897)	-0.00468 (0.00471)
Years of Extreme Heat (Foreign)	0.0179* (0.00969)	0.0180* (0.00968)	0.0131*** (0.00463)	0.00491 (0.00727)
Observations	1,951	1,951	1,951	1,951

$$NRA_{\ell k \bar{t}} = \beta \text{YearsHeat}_{\ell k \bar{t}}^{Q4} + \alpha \text{YearsForeignHeat}_{\ell k \bar{t}}^{Q4} + \gamma_{\ell \bar{t}} + \delta_{k \bar{t}} + \mu_{\ell k} + \varepsilon_{\ell k \bar{t}}$$

4. Does political economy drive policy effects?

$$\text{NRA}_{\ell kt} = g(\text{ExtremeHeat}_{\ell kt}) + h(\text{ExtremeHeat}_{\ell kt} \times \text{Election}_{\ell t}) + \gamma_{\ell t} + \delta_{kt} + \mu_{\ell k} + \varepsilon_{\ell kt}$$

- Country ℓ , crop k , year t , $g(\cdot)$ and $h(\cdot)$ quartile dummies Other heterogeneity
- Fixed effects by country-year, crop-year, country-crop
- $\text{Election}_{\ell t}$: election year or one year before (Database for Political Institutions)
- Elections erode fiscal responsibility \Rightarrow negative interaction coefficients Debt burden
 - Political cycles, e.g. Alesina & Roubini 1992, Akhmedov & Zhuravskaya 2004

Stronger effects before elections

	Full sample		Major crops	
	Estim	SE	Estim	SE
Q2 Extreme Heat × No Election	-0.0249	(0.0299)	-0.0541	(0.0375)
Q3 Extreme Heat × No Election	-0.0114	(0.0387)	-0.0853	(0.0661)
Q4 Extreme Heat × No Election	-0.0996	(0.0698)	-0.155	(0.0974)
Q2 Extreme Heat × Election	-0.0234	(0.0196)	-0.0908***	(0.0280)
Q3 Extreme Heat × Election	-0.0576**	(0.0258)	-0.0991**	(0.0377)
Q4 Extreme Heat × Election	-0.145**	(0.0695)	-0.340**	(0.163)
Observations	10,711		5,580	

$$\text{NRA}_{\ell kt} = g(\text{ExtremeHeat}_{\ell kt}) + h(\text{ExtremeHeat}_{\ell kt} \times \text{Election}_{\ell t}) + \gamma_{\ell t} + \delta_{kt} + \mu_{\ell k} + \varepsilon_{\ell kt}$$

Theory

Model

- Terms-of-trade manipulation (Johnson 1951)
- Redistributive motives (Grossman & Helpman 1994; Bates 2014)
- Market clearing $q = y + m$

$$\underbrace{q = Q_0 p^{-\epsilon_d}}_{\text{Demand}}$$

$$\underbrace{y = Y_0 e^{-\omega} p^{\epsilon_s}}_{\text{Domestic supply, shock } \omega}$$

$$\underbrace{m = M_0 p^{\epsilon_m}}_{\text{Foreign net supply}}$$

- Tax wedge α between domestic price p^* and international price $\frac{p^*}{1+\alpha}$
- Government maximizes weighted sum of surplus

$$\max_{\alpha \in [-1, \infty)} \left\{ \lambda^C CS + \lambda^P PS + \lambda^G G \right\}$$

Microfoundations
Optimal Policy

Response to shocks depends on constituent vs. revenue focus

The government is **constituent-focused** if

$$\epsilon_s(\lambda^C - \lambda^G) + \epsilon_d(\lambda^P - \lambda^G) > 0$$

revenue-focused if the opposite holds strictly, and **neutral** at equality.

Proposition: Food Policy and Climate Shocks

- ① In the neutral case, policy is invariant to shock ω .
- ② Under revenue focus, adverse shock \rightarrow producer assistance (higher α)
- ③ Under constituent focus, adverse shock \rightarrow consumer assistance (lower α)

Intuition for both cases

- **Revenue focus:** high import share \Rightarrow more profitable to tax imports
- **Constituent focus:** high import share \Rightarrow best time to subsidize imports
 - Smaller losses for domestic producers, bigger gains for domestic consumers
 - Note political economy effects
- Corollary: opposite policy responses to foreign production shocks
 - Domestic and foreign shocks have opposite effects on import share
 - Distinguish this model from others (e.g., pure price stabilization)
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Counterfactuals

Quantitative model

- Many countries + **estimated impacts** of climate shocks on policy and production
 - Policy responds to shocks in the empirically observed way
 - Calibrate $\epsilon_d = 2.82$, $\epsilon_s = 2.46$ from Costinot, Donaldson, and Smith (2016)

demand $\log q_{\ell k} = \log q_{\ell k}^0 - \epsilon_d \log[(1 + \alpha_{\ell k}) p_k]$

supply $\log y_{\ell k} = \log y_{\ell k}^0 + \epsilon_s \log[(1 + \alpha_{\ell k}) p_k] - f(\text{ExtremeHeat}_{\ell k})$

NRA $\alpha_{\ell k} = \alpha_{\ell k}^0 - g(\text{ExtremeHeat}_{\ell k}) + h(\text{ForeignExtremeHeat}_{\ell k})$

equilibrium $\sum_{\ell} q_{\ell k} = \sum_{\ell} y_{\ell k} \quad \forall k$

How does trade policy affect global adaptation to climate shocks?

- ① “Baseline” of minimum observed heat (1991-2010)
 - In-sample shocks as observed heat (1991-2010)
 - Out-of-sample shocks as projected heat (2090-2100 from GFDL-ESM4)
- ② Apply shocks to 1991-2010 data, then compute
 - Trade policy, equilibrium prices, production, and consumption
- ③ Compare changes in prices, surplus, and welfare relative to baseline
 - Under responsive vs. fixed trade policy


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
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
Stabilizing domestic prices offloads losses to rest of the world




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
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
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Shocked countries protect consumers at expense of producers




$\Delta\mathcal{C}^R - \Delta\mathcal{C}^U$: Consumer surplus effects
under responsive vs. unresponsive policy (%)




$\Delta\mathcal{P}^R - \Delta\mathcal{P}^U$: Producer surplus effects
under responsive vs. unresponsive policy (%)

Aggregate effects net out in sample




Aggregate effects net out in sample but are negative for climate change

Historical extreme heat



Projected extreme heat



In projections, policy changes amplify pre-existing distortions

	Baseline distortion is:	Historical		Projected	
		Increases $ \alpha $			
	Positive ($\alpha > 0$)	18%		33%	
	Negative ($\alpha \leq 0$)	23%		58%	

- Responsive policy can increase (or decrease) trade barriers and deadweight loss

Heterogeneity

① In policy responses

- To domestic and foreign shocks
- By region, income, and agricultural share

② In climate shocks

- Pre-existing distortions
- Spatial correlation

Conclusion

Summary

- **Endogenous agricultural policy** complicates global adaptation
 - Domestic climate shocks induce pro-consumer policy
 - Redistributions losses and can intensify pre-existing distortions
- Broader implications
 - For global trade liberalization
 - And other adaptation mechanisms

Appendix

Crops

Major	Staple	Cash
maize	maize	cocoa
soy	soy	coffee
rice	rice	cotton
wheat	wheat	palm
potato	potato	sugar
tomato	tomato	tobacco
banana	onion	
cotton		
palm		
sugar		

Sign of optimal trade policy

Back

$$\alpha^* = \frac{1}{\epsilon_m} \left(\frac{\lambda^G ((1-s)\epsilon_s + \epsilon_d) + \epsilon_m (\lambda^P(1-s) + \lambda^G s - \lambda^C)}{\lambda^G ((1-s)\epsilon_s + \epsilon_d) - (\lambda^P(1-s) + \lambda^G s - \lambda^C)} \right)$$

where $s = m/q \leq 1$ is the import share.

Corollary


The government supports producers ($\alpha > 0$) if and only if

$$\lambda^C < \lambda^P(1-s) + \lambda^G s + \frac{\lambda^G}{\epsilon_m} ((1-s)\epsilon_s + \epsilon_d) \quad (1)$$

Result 0: extreme heat lowers yields

[Back](#)


$$\log(\text{yield}_{\ellkt}) = \underbrace{f(\text{ExtremeHeat}_{\ellkt})}_{\text{Four quantiles}} + \gamma_{\ellt} + \delta_{kt} + \mu_{\ellk} + \varepsilon_{\ellkt}$$



Result 0: extreme heat lowers yields

[Back](#)

$$\log(\text{yield}_{\ellkt}) = \underbrace{f(\text{ExtremeHeat}_{\ellkt})}_{\text{Four quantiles}} + \gamma_{\ellt} + \delta_{kt} + \mu_{\ellk} + \varepsilon_{\ellkt}$$



Weaker effects with high debt stress

[Back](#)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Dependent Variable is NRA			
	Full Sample	Major Crops		
Q2 Extreme Heat Exposure	-0.0403 (0.0343)	-0.0768 (0.0515)	-0.151** (0.0728)	-0.0925* (0.0548)
Q3 Extreme Heat Exposure	-0.0620 (0.0514)	-0.122* (0.0683)	-0.323** (0.123)	-0.142** (0.0623)
Q4 Extreme Heat Exposure	-0.163** (0.0712)	-0.399*** (0.146)	-0.614*** (0.180)	-0.434*** (0.150)
Q2 Extreme Heat Exposure x Central Government Debt	0.0366 (0.0510)	-0.00497 (0.0739)	0.0784 (0.105)	-0.00673 (0.104)
Q3 Extreme Heat Exposure x Central Government Debt	0.110 (0.103)	0.0648 (0.101)	0.314* (0.179)	0.0646 (0.0977)
Q4 Extreme Heat Exposure x Central Government Debt	0.261** (0.129)	0.327*** (0.119)	0.675*** (0.248)	0.370** (0.147)
Country x Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Crop x Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country x Crop Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country x Crop Fixed Effects x Central Government Debt	No	No	Yes	No
Interactions with change in debt	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	13,544	6,260	6,260	6,020
R-squared	0.861	0.862	0.840	0.867


Measuring policy: Direct measurement

Back

- ① United Nations' Trade Analysis Information System (TRAINS) database
 - Crop-level tariff measure for each country-year
 - Reported at the HS code level and linked to crops by hand
- ② Global Trade Alert (GTA) database
 - Sector-specific policy interventions broken down by HS code and policy type
 - Compute the total number of export-restricting and import-restricting policies
 - Shorter sample period: 2008-present


Extreme heat induces pro-consumer policy: country level

[Back](#)



Alternative measurement: border tariffs (TRAINs)


[Back](#)



⇒ Extreme heat leads to lower tariffs


Foreign shocks affect international prices

[Back](#)




Graphical proof and key intuition


(a) Neutral



(b) Revenue Focused



(c) Constituent Focused




- Shocks increase import share s for any level of policy
- Revenue focus: high $s \Rightarrow$ more profitable to tax imports
- Constituent focus: high $s \Rightarrow$ best time to subsidize consumers, because losses are shifted onto foreign producers

By country: % difference, responsive vs. unresponsive policy

Back

Observed 1991-2010



Optimal trade policy

Back

Proposition

The optimal trade policy satisfies:

$$\alpha^* = \frac{1}{\epsilon_m} \left(\frac{\lambda^G ((1-s)\epsilon_s + \epsilon_d) + \epsilon_m (\lambda^P(1-s) + \lambda^G s - \lambda^C)}{\lambda^G ((1-s)\epsilon_s + \epsilon_d) - (\lambda^P(1-s) + \lambda^G s - \lambda^C)} \right)$$

where $s = m/q \leq 1$ is the import share.

- Policy can assist producers ($\alpha > 0$) or consumers ($\alpha < 0$)
- If utilitarian (λ s equal), then $\alpha^* = \frac{1}{\epsilon_m}$ (Ramsey rule)
- Otherwise *distributional considerations matter*

Positive vs. negative

Microfoundations (I)

Back

- Households $i \in \{1, \dots, N\}$, consume agricultural good and money, operates farms
- Payoff in terms of agricultural consumption $q_i \in \mathbb{R}_+$, money consumption $m_i \in \mathbb{R}$, and production $y_i \in \mathbb{R}_+$ is

$$\mathcal{U}_i = \mu_i^{\frac{1}{\epsilon_d}} \frac{q_i^{1-\frac{1}{\epsilon_d}}}{1 - \frac{1}{\epsilon_d}} - f(\omega)^{-\frac{1}{\epsilon_s}} \psi_i^{-\frac{1}{\epsilon_s}} \frac{y_i^{1+\frac{1}{\epsilon_s}}}{1 + \frac{1}{\epsilon_s}} + m_i, \quad (2)$$

- Budget constraint $px_i + m_i \leq py_i + T_i$
- Transfer rule $T_i = \xi_i \mathcal{G}$
- Government objective $\mathcal{W} = \sum_{i=1}^N \lambda_i \mathcal{U}_i$, with $\sum_i \lambda_i = 1$.

Microfoundations (II)

Back

Lemma


The competitive equilibrium in this economy coincides with the “supply and demand” representation described in the main model, where $Q_0 = \sum_i^N \mu_i$ and $Y_0(\omega) = f(\omega) \sum_i^N \psi_i$. The government’s preferences coincide with those in the main model, with

$$\lambda^C = \sum_{i=1}^N \tilde{\mu}_i \lambda_i, \quad \lambda^P = \sum_{i=1}^N \tilde{\psi}_i \lambda_i, \quad \lambda^G = \sum_{i=1}^N \xi_i \lambda_i \quad (3)$$

and where $\tilde{\mu}_i = \mu_i / (\sum_{j=1}^N \mu_j)$ is household i ’s share of domestic consumption and $\tilde{\psi}_i = \psi_i / (\sum_{j=1}^N \psi_j)$ is household i ’s share of domestic production. If the social welfare function is utilitarian, such that $\lambda_i = 1$ for all i , then $\lambda^C = \lambda^P = \lambda^G = 1$.

Additional Heterogeneity


Back



The global variation in temperature shocks

[Back](#)


Change in Maize GDD, 1980s to 2010s



The global variation in temperature shocks

[Back](#)


Change in Wheat GDD, 1980s to 2010s



The global variation in temperature shocks

[Back](#)


Change in Rice GDD, 1980s to 2010s



The global variation in NRA

[Back](#)


Average Value of Maize NRA, 2001-2010



The global variation in NRA

[Back](#)


Average Value of Wheat NRA, 2001-2010



The global variation in NRA

[Back](#)

Average Value of Rice NRA, 2001-2010



Effect on policy persists for several years

[Back](#)

$$\text{NRA}_{\ell kt} = \sum_{s=-3}^3 g(\text{ExtremeHeat}_{\ell kt+s}) + \gamma_{\ell t} + \delta_{kt} + \mu_{\ell k} + \varepsilon_{\ell kt}$$

