# CMPSC 390 Decentralization

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Credit: Authors of "Bitcoin and Cryptocurrency Technologies"

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### Decentralization in Bitcoin

- Who maintains the ledger?
- Who has authority over which transactions are valid?
- 3 Who creates new bitcoins?
- 4 Who determines how the rules of the system change?
- 5 How do bitcoins acquire exchange value?

### Decentralization in Bitcoin

#### Peer-to-peer:

Open to anyone, low barrier to entry.

### Mining:

Open to anyone, but inevitable concentration of power often seen as undesirable.

#### Updates to software:

Core developers trusted by community, have great power.

### Distributed Consensus

The protocol terminates and all correct nodes decide on the same value.

This value must have been proposed by some correct node.

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### How consensus could work in Bitcoin

#### At any given time:


- All nodes have a sequence of blocks of transactions they have reached consensus on.
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### Consensus is hard

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- Nodes may crash.
- Nodes may be malicious.
- Network is imperfect:
  - Not all pairs of nodes connected.
  - Faults in network.
  - Latency.

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- But theory is important, can help predict unforeseen attacks.

#### Introduces incentives

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#### Embraces randomness:

- Does away with the notion of a specific end-point.
- Consensus happens over long time scales about one hour.

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Every block contains hash of the block it extends.

New transactions are broadcast to all nodes.


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- Solution
  Nodes express their acceptance of the block by including its hash in the next block they create.


### Malicious node?



Double-spe nding attack

Honest nodes will extend the longest valid branch

## From merchant's point of view




## Summary

- Protection against invalid transactions is cryptographic, but enforced by consensus.
- Protection against double-spending is purely by consensus.
- You are never 100% certain a transaction is in consensus branch.
   Guarantee is probabilistic.


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
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# Assumption of honesty is problematic

Can we give nodes incentives for behaving honestly?



Everything so far is just a distributed consensus protocol ... but now we utilize the fact that the currency has value.

### Incentive 1: block reward

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Block creator gets to "collect" the reward only if the block ends up on long-term consensus branch!

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- Remainder is a transaction fee and goes to block creator.
- Purely voluntary, like a tip.

### Remaining Problems

We still need to answer:

- 1 How to pick a random node?
- ② How to avoid a free-for-all due to rewards?
- 3 How to prevent Sybil attacks?

### Proof of Work

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
In proportion to computing power: proof-of-work.

In proportion to ownership: proof-of-stake.

### Hash Puzzles

To create a block, find nonce such that:  $H(nonce||prev_hash||tx||...||tx)$  is very small or

 $H(nonce||prev_hash||merkleRoot < target.$ 



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### Property 3: Trivial to verify.

Nonce must be published as part of block.

Other miners simply verify that  $H(nonceprev_hashtx...tx) < target$ 

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- State
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#### Next time:

- How do we get from consensus to currency?
- What else can we do with consensus?