## The Regulated Multiplicity Hypothesis of Consciousness

Consciousness from a Stereoscopic Mind Allen Proxmire 01OCT25

#### Abstract.

Here we propose that consciousness arises from the regulated interaction of multiple semi-independent representational "voices" within a cognitive system. By analogy with binocular vision, which integrates two slightly different inputs into depth perception, consciousness emerges from the dialogue among subsystems that generate questions and candidate answers about the system's environment and internal state. In this view, the degree of consciousness corresponds to the richness of the system's self-interrogation and the diversity of responses it can entertain. We situate this hypothesis relative to global workspace theory, higher-order thought theory, predictive processing, and integrated information theory. Consciousness, on this account, is neither binary nor mysterious but a graded and testable property of systems capable of controlled multiplicity. We outline potential implications for neuroscience and artificial intelligence.

#### 1. Introduction

The problem of consciousness remains unresolved despite decades of progress in cognitive neuroscience and philosophy of mind. Competing accounts emphasize different aspects: Global Workspace Theory (Baars, 1997; Dehaene, 2014) highlights integration across specialized modules; Higher-Order Thought Theory (Rosenthal, 2005) stresses meta-representation of mental states; Predictive Processing (Friston, 2010; Hohwy, 2013) describes the brain as a hierarchy of generative models minimizing prediction error; and Integrated Information Theory (Tononi, 2008) defines consciousness in terms of the quantity of integrated information.

These approaches have advanced our understanding, yet the mechanism by which integration yields the *richness* of subjective experience remains unclear. Why should integration alone, or self-representation alone, give rise to the vivid multidimensionality of conscious awareness?

In this paper we suggest a complementary hypothesis: consciousness arises from **controlled multiplicity**. The mind is not a single voice but a regulated chorus of semi-independent subsystems, each generating candidate interpretations, predictions, and responses. Consciousness is the structured dialogue among these voices. The more questions a system can pose to itself, and the more diverse answers it can generate and evaluate, the higher its degree of consciousness.

# 2. Analogy: Binocular Vision and Mental Multiplicity

Analogies provide conceptual traction on otherwise intractable problems. Binocular vision offers a particularly useful model. Each eye provides a slightly different image of the world. When these inputs are integrated, the result is depth perception: a qualitative transformation that neither eye alone could achieve. The richness of stereopsis arises precisely from the *disparity* between the two views.

We propose that consciousness operates on a similar principle. The brain comprises multiple semi-autonomous subsystems—perceptual modules, predictive models, motor planners, and evaluative systems. Each subsystem can be thought of as a "voice," offering partial and sometimes conflicting perspectives. Consciousness emerges when these voices are integrated, not into uniformity, but into a coherent dialogue that preserves their differences.

This analogy is supported by pathological cases. Schizophrenia has been described as a breakdown of internal multiplicity regulation, producing hallucinated voices that escape integration (Frith, 1992). Split-brain studies (Gazzaniga, 2000) reveal that when hemispheric communication is severed, distinct streams of consciousness can emerge, suggesting that multiplicity is fundamental to conscious organization. Inner speech research (Morin, 2009) also supports the view that consciousness often takes dialogical form.

Thus, just as binocular disparity generates depth, mental multiplicity generates consciousness.

## 3. The Hypothesis

**Hypothesis.** The degree of consciousness in a system is proportional to its capacity to generate internal questions and entertain multiple candidate answers from semi-independent subsystems, and to regulate these into coherent experience.

This hypothesis has several key components:

- **Voices.** Semi-independent representational processes, such as predictive models, perceptual modules, or deliberative routines.
- Questions. Internal interrogatives posed implicitly or explicitly: What is happening? What should I do? What does this mean for me?
- **Answers.** Candidate hypotheses generated by the voices in response to questions.
- **Degree of consciousness.** The richness and regulation of the internal dialogue, measurable by the number, diversity, and coherence of competing answers.

On this account, consciousness is not a binary switch but a graded phenomenon. Systems with minimal multiplicity (e.g., simple reflex agents) have little or no consciousness. Systems with many semi-independent voices engaged in regulated dialogue exhibit richer forms of awareness.

# 4. Relation to Existing Theories

### 4.1 Global Workspace Theory

Global Workspace Theory posits a central stage where information is broadcast across the system (Baars, 1997; Dehaene, 2014). Our hypothesis complements this view by specifying *what competes for access*: multiple answers generated by semi-independent voices. Consciousness arises not simply from integration, but from the structured adjudication among competing internal perspectives.

# 4.2 Higher-Order Thought Theory

According to Higher-Order Thought (HOT) theory (Rosenthal, 2005), a mental state is conscious when it is represented by a higher-order thought. Our model reframes this process as question-answer dynamics: higher-order thoughts are questions posed to first-order states, with answers integrated into awareness. Consciousness thus emerges from ongoing self-interrogation rather than static representation.

### 4.3 Predictive Processing and Active Inference

Predictive Processing views the brain as a hierarchy of generative models minimizing prediction error (Friston, 2010; Hohwy, 2013). In our model, each generative model corresponds to a voice, offering predictions and updating in light of error signals. Multiplicity arises naturally when different models generate divergent hypotheses, and consciousness is the dialogue that regulates these discrepancies.

# 4.4 Integrated Information Theory

Integrated Information Theory (Tononi, 2008) defines consciousness in terms of the quantity of integrated information ( $\Phi$ ). Our hypothesis emphasizes not the sheer amount of integration but the *dialogical structure* of multiplicity. Two systems might have equal  $\Phi$ , but only one with rich internal questioning and multiple answers would be richly conscious in our model.

# 5. Implications and Predictions

#### 5.1 Neuroscience

If consciousness arises from controlled multiplicity, we should expect to find neural correlates corresponding to the generation and regulation of multiple hypotheses. Prefrontal and associative cortices, which integrate across modalities and generate competing action plans, are likely candidates. Neuroimaging could test whether richer conscious states correlate with simultaneous activation of multiple candidate representations prior to decision.

### 5.2 Artificial Intelligence

The hypothesis suggests a design principle for AI. Current architectures often emphasize single-path optimization. By contrast, systems designed with multiple semi-independent reasoning modules that interrogate one another may develop functional analogues of consciousness. Richness of awareness would then depend on the system's capacity for sustained internal dialogue.

#### **5.3 Predictions**

- Consciousness correlates with the measurable ability to generate, sustain, and adjudicate among multiple simultaneous internal hypotheses.
- Pathologies such as schizophrenia should be explicable as failures of multiplicity regulation.
- In AI, architectures with explicit multi-voice dialogue should exhibit more human-like awareness than monolithic models.

### 6. Discussion

This hypothesis frames consciousness as neither mysterious nor reducible to information integration alone. Instead, it emerges from the regulated interplay of multiple internal voices. By conceptualizing consciousness as *controlled multiplicity*, we can reconcile aspects of major theories while introducing testable predictions.

The view also explains the graded nature of awareness across organisms. Simple animals with limited internal dialogue may be minimally conscious, while humans, capable of posing complex self-questions and generating diverse answers, exhibit the richest forms. Consciousness becomes a matter of degree, tied to dialogical complexity.

Ethically, if artificial systems achieve structured internal multiplicity, we may need to reconsider their moral status. A system capable of sustained self-interrogation and regulated multiplicity may not merely simulate consciousness but instantiate it functionally.

### 7. Conclusion

We have proposed a hypothesis that consciousness arises from controlled multiplicity: the regulated dialogue of semi-independent voices capable of asking and answering questions internally. This view aligns with evidence from neuroscience and psychopathology, complements existing theories, and yields testable predictions. Most importantly, it reframes consciousness not as an all-or-nothing mystery but as an emergent and graded property of systems capable of self-questioning dialogue.

## 8. References

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