Gilles Deleuze

and the Theater of Philosophy

EDITED BY CONSTANTIN V. BOUNDAS
& DOROTHEA OLKOWSKI

ROUTLEDGE New York • London

Published in 1994 by

Routledge
29 West 35th Street
New York, NY 10001

Published in Great Britain by

Routledge
11 New Fetter Lane
London EC4P 4EE

Copyright acknowledgments

Alain Badiou, "Gilles Deleuze, The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque," translated from *Annuaire Philosophique, 1988–89* by permission of *Editions du Seuil*: Copyright 1988 by *Editions du Seuil.*

Gilles Deleuze, "Begaya-t-il" ("He Stuttered . . . ") was first published in 1993 by Les Edition De Minuit.

Elizabeth Grosz, "A Thousand Tiny Sexes" was first published in TOPOI, 1993, vol. 12/2 (Kluwer Academic Publishers).

Marie-Claire Ropars-Wuilleumier, "The Cinema, Reader of Gilles Deleuze," reprinted from *Camera Obscura: A Journal of Feminism and Film Theory,* September 1989, No. 18 by permission of *Camera Obscura:* Copyright *Camera Obscura*, 1988.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Deleuze and the theater of philosophy / edited by Constantin V. Boundas and Dorothea Olkowski.
p. cm.
ISBN 0-415-90504-4 (cloth). — ISBN 0-415-90505-2 (pbk.)
1. Deleuze, Gilles. 2. Philosophy, Modern—20th century. 3. Aesthetics, Modern — 20th century. I. Boundas, Constantin V. II. Olkowski, Dorothea.
B2430.D454D45 1993
194—dc20 92-41492
CIP

British Library Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Deleuze and the Theater of Philosophy
I. Boundas, Constantin V. II. Olkowski, Dorothea
801.092

ISBN 0-415-90504-4

British Library Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Deleuze and the Theater of Philosophy
I. Boundas, Constantin V. II. Olkowski, Dorothea
801.092

ISBN 0-415-90505-2

For Choi Ke Ryang

For Max and Kurt

Contents

1 Editors' Introduction
Constantin V. Boundas and Dorothea Olkowski 1

2 He Stuttered
Gilles Deleuze 23

I Difference and Repetition

3 Difference and Unity in Gilles Deleuze
Todd May 33

4 Gilles Deleuze, *The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque*
Alain Badiou 51

II Subjectivity

5 The Crack of Time and the Ideal Game
Peter Canning 73

6 Deleuze: Serialization and Subject-Formation
Constantin V. Boundas 99

III Desire and the Overturning of Platonism

7 Nietzsche's Dice Throw:
Tragedy, Nihilism, and the Body without Organs
Dorothea Olkowski 119

8 Anti-Platonism and Art
Paul Patton 141

IV The Question of Becoming-Woman

9 Toward a New Nomadism:
Feminist Deleuzian Tracks; or, Metaphysics and Metabolism
Rosi Braidotti 157

10 A Thousand Tiny Sexes:
Feminism and Rhizomatics
Elizabeth Grosz 187

V Minor Languages and Nomad Arts

11 On the Concept of Minor Literature:
From Kafka to Kateb Yacine
Réda Bensmaia 213

12 Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation
Dana Polan 229

13 The Cinema, Reader of Gilles Deleuze
Marie-Claire Ropars-Wuilleumier 255

VI Lines of Flight

14 Cartography of the Year 1000:
Variations on *A Thousand Plateaus*
Jean-Clet Martin 265

15 The Society of Dismembered Body Parts
Alphonso Lingis 289

Selected Critical References to Gilles Deleuze and His Works 305

Contributors 337

Acknowledgments

SHAPING THIS VOLUME has taken several years, many hours, and much patience, not just on the part of the editors, but also on the part of the many individuals who participated in the effort and share the commitment to Deleuze's work. All of the contributors to the volume have labored to produce essays that reflect the complex and timely concerns addressed by Deleuze and, for this, we, the editors wish to thank each of them. We particularly thank Gilles Deleuze for the moving essay which leads off this collection.
are the individuals who helped us carry out the labor of producing this volume, especially Lee Duren and Marg Tully, and who also earned our thanks. Our families extended much good will toward us, encouraging us and giving us the understanding needed to carry out our task, and we are grateful for their support. We wish also to acknowledge the generous support of the Canadian Social Science and Humanities Research Council which made possible the 1992 Trent University Deleuze Conference—the dress rehearsal of the production displayed in this volume. Finally, we wish to thank especially Maureen MacGrogan, our editor at Routledge, and her assistant Katherine Lieber for their constancy, good humor, and kindness in the face of what must have seemed like constant delays and changes in this book.

1

Editors' Introduction

Constantin V. Boundas and Dorothea Olkowski

> From an always nomadic and anarchical difference to the unavoidably excessive and displaced sign of recurrence, a lightning storm was produced which will, one day, be given the name of Deleuze: new thought is possible; thought is again possible . . . genital thought, intensive thought, affirmative thought, acategorical thought—each of these an unrecognizable face, a mask we have never seen before; differences we had no reason to expect, but which nevertheless lead to the return, as masks of their masks, of Plato, Duns Scotus, Spinoza, Leibniz, Kant, and all other philosophers. This is not philosophy as thought, but as theatre . . .
>
> —Michel Foucault, *Theatrum Philosophicum*[1]

FROM DELEUZE'S EARLY WORK on Hume, Masoch, and Nietzsche to his later collaborations with radical psychoanalyst Félix Guattari, Deleuze's thought *is* startling—a lightning storm for thinkers like those who have contributed to this volume of critical essays. But in what sense are Deleuze's works of philosophy theater? For one, these works are marked by the constant invention of conceptual characters: the inquirer, the judge, the friend, and the rival are such conceptual characters invented and put on stage by Deleuze. They are not meant to resemble the philosophers (Hume, Kant, Plato) whose work they stage. But they are meant to assist in the arrival of a new image of thought. Unlike Platonism, which determines the question of the Idea in the form "What is F?," Deleuze brings Ideas closer to accidents and argues that they can be determined only with questions like "Who?," "How?," "How many?," "When and where?," that is, with questions that plot their true spatiotemporal coordinates.[2]

If, as Deleuze says, philosophy is the activity that traces a prephilosophical plane of immanence (reason), invents prophilosophical characters (imagi-

nation), and creates philosophical concepts (understanding), it is with the invention of the conceptual characters that the creation of concepts and the tracing of the processes that form the plane of immanence begins in earnest.[3] It is through "dramatization" that the virtual Idea is incarnated and actualized (Deleuze 1967, p. 96).[4] Without it, the concept would never be divided and specified. Pure spatiotemporal dynamisms have the power to dramatize concepts because they are the ones that incarnate and actualize Ideas: "There is a drama beneath every logos" (p. 101).

Deleuze makes it clear that this drama is taking the place of the Kantian schema. It constitutes "a strange theatre made up of pure determinations, agitating space and time, acting directly on the soul, having larvae as actors—a theatre for which Artaud has chosen the expression 'theatre of cruelty'" (p. 95)—all this, of course, provided that the conceptual character is not mistaken for the philosopher's representative. "The philosopher is the envelope of his main character, and of all the other characters who are the real subjects of his philosophy" (Deleuze 1991, p. 62). If then Deleuze's philosophy is a theater, as Foucault thought, it is most certainly a minor theater. Only a minor theater can address the sense in which Deleuze's work always opens up an area of inquiry that had been thought to be completely exhausted and long since abandoned by philosophy or, at least, by any novel inquiry. Only a minor theater can retrace these abandoned philosophies so as to transform each one so completely that it is barely recognizable and bears no resemblance to the old exhausted ideas.

The present collection of essays—the first, we believe, in any language—is intended as a tribute to Deleuze. One, of course, does not pay Deleuze a tribute by canonizing his texts or by fencing them in with commentaries and annotations. This is the reason why we solicited essays that would be like gusts of fresh air from the outside. We tried to trade off the search for hidden signifieds for a better understanding of how Deleuze's texts work. We wanted to trace the diagram of the series that make up his work, instead of "representing" it or blurring its lines altogether, making it totally unrecognizable. The essays that we included enact a variety of research styles and ambitions. American, Canadian, French, and Australian scholars, fairly well distributed among philosophers, literary theorists, sociologists, and women's studies specialists came together to form the diverging, yet resonant, series that made this volume possible. Deleuze, with his usual grace, responded to our intrusive request for participation with his never before published essay "Begaya-t-il," which we decided to place at the beginning of the collection, in order to avoid creating the impression that this essay in any sense stands for the customary "response" to one's critics. In the beginning was the stuttering, and the stuttering was

of the outside. *Stutterer, thinker of the outside*—what better way is there for registering the passage of a philosopher?

Delimiting even the six areas that constitute this volume was, for us, the editors, an arduous task. Although our six chosen "themes" resonate throughout Deleuze's writings, these themes (difference and repetition, subjectivity, desire and the overturning of Platonism, becoming-woman, minor languages and nomad thought, and lines of flight) are not developed *thematically* in any sense by Deleuze himself. Deleuze's nomadic thought cannot give way to thematic organization because so much of what Deleuze thinks and writes has to do with the overturning of all familiar themes and of thematization itself.

The first section of our collection consists of two essays that analyze discuss the Deleuzian themes of difference, sameness, and singularity. Todd May's essay, "Difference and Unity in Gilles Deleuze," attempts to disentangle Deleuze from the nets of a total affirmation of alterity and anarchism. Redescribing this affirmation, May argues that Deleuze cannot coherently maintain the primacy of difference over unity without lapsing into the kind of transcendentalism that his entire philosophy was poised to denounce, reducing language to unintelligible verbiage, or letting the very surfaces upon which thought is supposed to happen break up into a host of unrelated molecules. "Difference," May writes, "must be thought of alongside unity, or not at all!" May does not deny that there is a tendency in Deleuze's thought toward pure difference and its resounding affirmation, but he is struck by what he takes to be the presence in it of an opposite tendency that makes Deleuze appeal constantly throughout his work to writers whose work is "unitary and monistic" (Scotus, Spinoza, Bergson). In order to resolve this "tension," May finds it necessary, first, to ponder over the role that Deleuze assigns to philosophy (the creation of concepts), in order to decide subsequently what a typical Deleuzian philosophical claim looks like, given that the primary task of philosophy is normative. Philosophy, on this reading, is a practice that can be evaluated only on the basis of the effects that it brings about, and this evaluation can have no recourse to any transcendental standpoint. From such considerations about the nature of philosophy, May concludes that the correct approach to the Deleuzian concept of difference is the investigation of how it functions, and not of how one can ground its metaphysical priority. Difference, he concludes, functions as a concept that resists transcendence in all its forms. Positive in maintaining the irreducibility and contingency of singularity, and disruptive in resisting all principles of unification, Deleuze's difference, according to May, is not mobilized against unity, but only against those transcendental principles of unification that preclude difference and rele-

gate it to the status of the negative. With Deleuze, May finds in Spinoza's expressionism the best guarantor of the compossibilty of difference and unity, provided that, as in Spinoza, expressionism is put in the service of univocity. In the figure of the rhizome, May reads the univocity of being, that is, "the affirmation neither of difference nor of unity but of the surface which is the intertwining of the two."

Deleuze's choice and affirmation of alterity requires the creation of new concepts, and our inclusion of Alain Badiou's essay—a long meditation on *Le pli: Leibniz et le baroque*—is dictated by the fact that it explores in an exemplary fashion the function and resonances of such a concept. From a position proximate to, and yet distant from Deleuze's own, Badiou discusses the concept of the fold and finds it to be an antiextensional concept of the multiple, an antidialectical concept of the event, and an anti-Cartesian concept of the subject. According to Badiou, the cross of metaphysics has been the impossible choice between the animal and the number. Against this background, Deleuze's fold, a figure of the multiple anchored in an anti-set-theoretical ontology, a continuist horror of vacuum, and an organicist vision, opts without hesitation for the animal. Deleuze's multiple, argues Badiou, "is a *living tissue* which folds and unfolds as if under the effect of its organic expandings and contractings, in perfect opposition to the Cartesian concept of extension which is punctual and regulated by the shock." The fold is the triumph of the wave over the particle. Badiou realizes, of course, that such an organicist vision of the multiple puts the singular at risk. This is why he reminds us that singularities and events are not, for Deleuze, points of rupture, but rather "what singularizes continuity in each one of its local folds." The event is an immanent activity against the "dark" background of a preexisting world; it is a creation, a novelty, that is thinkable only inside the interiority of a continuum. It follows, argues Badiou, that the multiple and the concept (the multiple and the one) are not opposed to each other, since the multiple exists by the concept and is warranted by the universality of continuity; but, at the same time, the multiple is the condition of the possibility of concepts. As for Deleuze's organicism, Badiou adds, it is not built around the Leibnizian compossibility of worlds, but rather around Nietzsche's (and Mallarmé's) resonant and vibrant diverging series.

In the sequence, Badiou's essay assimilates the Deleuzian fold to the concept of a subject that is neither Cartesian (reflection, cogito) nor Husserlian (focus, relation to, intentionality) nor Lacanian (eclipse). The articulation of this concept of the subject requires the outside to be thought as the exact inversion of the inside, the world as a texture of the intimate, and the macroscopic as the torsion of the microscopic. For Badiou, the advantages of such a concept are obvious: the subject emerges as multiple series, a veritable

unfolding of predicates, and not as a substance; it is a point of view from which there is a truth, and an "objectless subject," since it frees knowledge from all relations to objects. Badiou's essay concludes with an extremely nuanced and yet thorough critique of Deleuze's "ontological choice"—a critique based on his own alternative choice, focusing on number, set theory, and the admission of the vacuum. We leave it to the reader to assess the advantages and disadvantages of this choice over Deleuze's.

For the second section of our collection, we chose two essays that promise to initiate discussion concerning the role and function that subjectivity has in the writings of Deleuze. We think that the North American reception of the poststructuralist "death of man," or "death of the subject," thematics and rhetoric has not been adequately discussed. The Deleuzian inflections of the problem and our assemblage aim at filling this deplorable lacuna.

Peter Canning's essay, "The Crack of Time and the Ideal Game," returns to the questions of multiplicity, time as the multiplicity of the eternal return, and subject as the kind of multiplicity that one finds suspended over the crack of time. His essay is itself a multiplicity, successfully preventing its own forms of expression and content from sedimenting around any one unifying principle, rhythm, or theme. Deleuze's multiplicity, argues Canning, is not the One turning into many, but rather an assemblage that changes dimensions and mutates constantly, according to its own lines of flight. Real time has nothing to do with the passing present; it starts when the present stops: it affects itself not with itself, but with becoming, and emerges as pretime from the crack between times. Repetition is the power of the rhythmic idea that produces differences, intensities, and disparities as its own excess. As the repetition of the future, it has nothing to do with the return to the past, which is accomplished in memory. It begins with metamorphosis and forgetting—*Chaosmos*, the between of chaos and order where structures form and dissolve—and has its own rhythms that account for the intensities and originary differences produced by repetition. Canning argues for the proviso that repetition is not to be seen as the function of the subject, because the subject is the result of the rhythm that creates and selects the intensive traits and the directional components of the plane of immanence. Under these circumstances, is it still possible to speak about the subject? Canning does not address this question directly, but he does speak, nonetheless, of the subject as an intervention and interval. The subject, for Canning, who echoes the Deleuze of *Foucault,* is the splitting between the virtual (Idea-multiplicity) and the actual (individual-multiplicity), and the folding of the one upon the other. The human subject is a being suspended over the caesura of time.

Constantin V. Boundas's essay makes the claim that a powerful theory of subjectivity can be teased out from Deleuze's texts, provided that the processes of serialization and subject formation were to be explored together. Boundas proposes to read Deleuze the way Deleuze reads others, that is, according to the series he creates, the ways in which these series converge and become compossible, and the means by which they diverge and begin to resonate together. The author's proposal is made in the context of recent discussions attempting to elucidate subjectivity in terms of narrativity, but it stays clear of the phenomenological and hermeneutic postulate of the unity of the self or the assumed coherence of lived-time consciousness. Deleuze, for whom narrativization is serialization and for whom the conjunctive linkages among series are subordinated to their disjunctive resonances, is able to provide us with a theory of subject formation liberated from old phenomenological trappings. For this purpose, Boundas spreads Deleuze's contributions to a theory of subjectivity across several series, each one of which he identifies by means of the question/problem that the series helps to introduce: the *Hume series* (how does the mind become a subject?), the *Bergson series* (how can a static ontological genesis of the subject be worked out beginning with prepersonal and preindividual singularities and events?), the *Leibniz series* (how can there be a notion of individuality that is neither a mere deduction from the concept "subject"—in which case it would be contradictory—nor a mere figure of an individuality deprived of concept—in which case it would be absurd and ineffable?), the *Nietzsche-Foucault series* (how can a dynamic genesis of subjectivity be given, with the subject as the fold and the internalization of outside forces, without giving in to a philosophy of interiority?), the *Michel Tournier series* (how is the field of subjectivity affected by the presence or absence of the other?), and the *Nietzsche-Klossowski series* (how is it possible to think the subject in terms of inclusive disjunctions and simultaneously affirmed incompossible worlds?). Boundas then goes on to show that the formation of the subject, in Deleuze, is indissolubly linked with the question of the becoming world. In fact, the series listed here would have run along their own lines of flight without ever permitting the construction of planes of consistency, were it not for Deleuze's concepts *chaosmos (= chaos + cosmos)* and "cracked I" (= *Je fêlé*), which in their capacity as portmanteau words circulate among the series and make possible the inclusive, disjunctive affirmation of all of them at once. It is *chaosmos,* that is, the becoming-world, that posits the constitution of the subject as a task, and *chaosmos* again that guarantees that the constituted subject will not emerge as a substantive *hypokeimenon,* but rather as an always already "cracked I."

Sections three through six of our volume make a turn, not just in the direction of *chaosmos,* but toward becomings, insofar as they articulate desiring production, minoritarian groups and their discourses, nomadic distributions, and lines of flight, and insofar as becoming is no longer the simple reversal of Platonism. In "Theatrum Philosophicum," Foucault had asked, "What philosophy has not tried to overturn Platonism?" (p. 166). In the history of philosophy, the overturn of Platonism has always meant nihilism: the necessity of embracing nothingness as well as the nullity of all values, even the highest. Understood in these terms, all philosophy subsequent to Plato might be nothing more than anti-Platonism. However, there is another way to take measure of this limit: active destruction of everything that is passive in oneself. As Deleuze writes, "Destruction becomes active to the extent that the negative is transmuted and converted into affirmative power: the 'eternal joy of becoming.'"[5] Such a strategy amounts to accounting for a philosophy in terms of its "Platonic differential, an element absent in Platonism but present in other philosophies" (Foucault 1977, p. 166). Indeed, the question of a differential at the origin is fundamental to any Deleuzian encounter with philosophy. But the organization of this difference is also a key factor in Deleuze's work.

Foucault points to Deleuze's articulation of Plato's "delicate sorting operation which precedes the discovery of essence, because it necessitates the world of essences in its separation of false simulacra from the multitude of appearances" (p. 167). It is the process of division that enables Plato to discover true being, establish its *identity,* separate it once and for all from all impostors, which are "reduced to nonexistence" by the mere presence of the Idea (p. 167). Deleuze sees Plato's philosophy organized in accordance with two dimensions: (1) that of limited and measured things including the establishment of "presents" and of "subjects" with a certain size at a certain moment or "present"; and, opposed to this, in fact, subsisting beneath it, (2) pure becoming without measure, escaping the present, thus escaping identity and making past and future coincide.[6] Deleuze's philosophy is organized not as a simple reversal of impostors and true being, but as an element of the Platonic differential, the pure becoming that is a divergence from the Platonic series.

With this, Deleuze leads us to the surface where it is not possible either to signify or to denote. That is, if we are looking for language and sense, we will find it only at the surface, between the Platonic heights of signifiers (Ideas) and the depths of designation (of bodies). On the surface there are only pure events, and it is on the surface that Deleuze locates language, and not only language, but all regimes of signs: cinema, painting, literature,

social organizations, cultural life. Without significations and designations, whatever takes place between these two realms can only be wholly contingent, thus wholly singular. Independent of Ideas, which will actualize them, and bodies, in which they are manifested, events are the expressed or expressible of bodies. It is these considerations that are addressed variously in the remainder of this collection.

Partly in response to what she takes to be a current misreading of Deleuze's working out of desire and partly as an exploration of issues centering on the body assemblage in Deleuze, Dorothea Olkowski has written "Nietzsche's Dice Throw: Tragedy, Nihilism, and the Body without Organs." Olkowski begins with Deleuze's discussion of the body in *Nietzsche and Philosophy*. What stands out in this discussion, according to Olkowski, is Deleuze's insistence that the 'body' is no medium and does not designate a substance, rather, "it expresses the relationship between forces," and "it becomes . . . semiological, a question of different regimes of signs." Olkowski discovers that Nietzsche's conception of the body remains coded by a certain image of the body as force. Not even the Heraclitean image of forces prevents Nietzsche from inscribing the name of the Greek hero on the qualities of force. Olkowski goes on to argue that such inscription does not take place with regard to the Deleuzian body assemblage. In *Différence et répétition*, Deleuze has certainly left behind the image of the Greek hero. What is at stake there, she notes, is the ontological proposition that "Being is univocal." Being is univocal, but it is "said" of difference itself. Such metaphysical flux is the Nietzschean dicethrow wherein the relation between forces (body assemblages) is subject to chance. This, then, is the meaning of "tragedy" in Nietzsche's work. "Every body is nothing but the arbitrary relation of force with force; every body, every difference between forces . . . is chance and nothing but chance." Not only does this make existence radically innocent and just, but also it releases it from any specific purpose or end. Thus when Deleuze reads Nietzsche's claim that forces affirm or deny, he *does not read this oppositionally*, nor does he read it with the Greek heroic inscription Nietzsche gave it; rather, it is a question of the action and reaction of forces, of body assemblages.

With this, the essay turns to the question of how active body assemblages become reactive. The answer Deleuze provides, says Olkowski, is Law. "Law, by separating active force from what it can do, leads to nihilism." For Deleuze, desire, which *experiments* with forces, is the limit of a power in that "every body extends its power as far as it is able"; so a limit is nothing but the point from which a force deploys all its power. Such a deployment is measured not by Law but by a *nomadic nomos*, which is without property, enclosure, or measure and distributed in a space without precise limits

so as to make possible experimentation, wandering distribution, and even delirium. Olkowski concludes by noting that in this context, the Nietzschean question of "how one becomes what one is" brings forth the body assemblage, and with it the inquiry: What forces have taken hold of each series and struggle for domination? Given Nietzsche's insight that base evaluations dominate Western culture, the only possible solution to this is total nihilism. Deleuze, Olkowski believes, ever aware of Nietzsche's cultural inscriptions, turns instead to the "real," and "Deleuze's reading of Nietzsche," she states, "is part of a line of flight that eventually commits him to that aspect of the body assemblage which is called the Body without Organs, what remains when all is taken away, when the dice are thrown and only enough organism is kept for it to reform each day." For, she concludes, the removal of codes and inscriptions leaves nothing to interpret; there is only the real.

Concluding this section is Paul Patton's essay, "Anti-Platonism and Art," which is directed specifically to the overthrow of Platonism in Deleuze's writing. Overturning Platonism, Patton writes, is part of a larger task in *Différence et répétition*; that task is a critique of representation. In turn, such a critique, even while overturning Platonism, nonetheless, conserves certain aspects of Plato's thought. Such is Deleuze's larger strategy—to develop the neglected aspects of major thinkers, which themselves constitute "minor traditions." Patton notes that for Plato, difference is only understood as the comparison between Ideas and their copies, which are similar to the Ideas themselves; in other words, in terms of Plato's foundations of representation. But simultaneously, the ensuing ordered hierarchy of representation is threatened by mimicry: the production of semblances and the mere imitation of appearances. Patton points out that while a philosopher like Jacques Derrida sees the reproduction of the real (Ideas) on a continuum with the reproduction of appearances (simulacra), Deleuze finds no possible common ground between the two. The distinction Deleuze finds here, Patton insists, is between figures (copies), which internally and spiritually resemble what they reproduce (Forms), and those "simulacra" that resemble only superficially. Simulacra are so different from copies that they internalize dissimilarity.

The purpose of this distinction, according to Patton, is purely moral. Hence, to overturn Platonism is to deny the primacy of originals over copies to the benefit of the simulacra and to the detriment of representation, which is ultimately denied legitimacy. What then are the consequences of the denial of representation? Patton answers this by turning to an examination of contemporary art. In the work of Andy Warhol, for example, he finds that art is made to be simulation, the production of an "effect of resem-

blance by means of difference," and not even the reproduction of an appearance. Difference, then, becomes the primary relation, and "'[a]rt does not imitate . . . because it repeats.'" Warhol's "serial" works, for example, deliberately draw attention to the reproductions of newspaper or publicity photographs, which they reproduce. By repeating these images, Warhol is engaged in the production of difference insofar as "simulation is a matter of displaced or disguised repetition. The moral issue in these works is the loss of hierarchy and privilege in a world of simulacra. Without a hierarchy of representation guiding one's encounter with the work of art, it becomes possible to make sense of a work of art not only in terms of its conceptual framework, but also as "'an encounter, a passion.'" Here Deleuze's minor theater comes into full play. Any nonrepresentational conception "embraces precisely that power of poetry which rendered it most dangerous in Plato's eyes," and this, Patton makes clear, is an encounter that is possible, not only with regard to art, but with regard to all thought.

Section four extends these lines of thought to Deleuze's articulation of the practices of minoritarian groups. This aspect of his thought has been of particular interest to feminists insofar as Deleuze (along with Guattari) maintains, in *A Thousand Plateaus*,[7] that of all processes "the becoming-woman of everything, the whole," which is never a representation, imitation, or conformation to a model of any sort, is the key to all other becomings. Luce Irigaray and Alice Jardine are preeminent among feminists who have addressed this with some concern. Jardine has asked if it is not the case that "to the extent that women must 'become woman' first . . . might that not mean that she must also be the *first* to disappear . . . There would remain only her simulacrum: a female figure caught in a whirling sea of male configurations . . . necessary only for *his* metamorphosis?"[8]

Ever mindful of these words, Rosi Braidotti, in her essay, "Towards a New Nomadism, Feminist Deleuzian Tracks, or: Metaphysics and Metabolism," seeks to both meet these criticisms and to extend them in the depth of her own research on feminist political practice and feminist discursive, methodological, and epistemological premises: in short, the political practice of sexual difference insofar as it intersects with the Deleuzian project. Given this, the question of the moment for feminist thinkers is, according to Braidotti, how to reconcile historicity and, so, agency with "the political will to change, which entails the (unconscious) desire for the new, which, as Deleuze teaches, implies the construction of new desiring subjects." For Braidotti, "women's desire to become," as opposed to their will-to-have, which produced an objectification of the subject, is what is at stake in articulating new definitions of female subjectivity that seek to express women's structural need to posit themselves as female subjects, as corporeal and

sexed beings. Such a move requires that thought start with the body and with subjectivity rooted in a body, the site of physical, symbolic, and material overlappings. It is then a site of differences rather than a universal, ungendered, knowing subject. "[T]his puts a great deal of emphasis on the question of how to rethink alterity and otherness . . . so as to allow differences to create a bond, i.e., a political contract among women, so as to affect lasting political changes." In this project, Braidotti argues, feminists can profit from the inclusion of the Deleuzian project of transforming the image of thinking as well as that of the subject. In fact, Deleuze's vision of thought and subjectivity as an intensive, multiple, and discontinuous process has much to offer feminists willing to look at it concretely.

For Deleuze, notes Braidotti, the body is not a natural biological materiality; it is the play of forces (affects) and a surface of intensities, mobile and transitory. This is of great help to the feminist attempt to deessentialize the body and sexuality. Given the absence of any interiority in this thought of the body, thinking is the process whereby a multiplicity of impersonal forces establish connections with one another. Such an image undermines both Lacan's negative vision of desire and psychoanalysis's metaphysics of the unconscious. Instead, for Deleuze, the unconscious is a process of "displacement and production," desire and affirmation. This conception has the advantage of replacing the traditional (allegedly neutral) writer/reader coupling in philosophy with writers and readers in an "intensive mode," and who act as "transformers" and "processors" of intellectual energies and extratextual experiences.

Eschewing the polarizations and "ex-communications" of feminist debate, Braidotti hopes to bring Deleuze's "rhizomatics" into feminist practice. However, this cannot be done blindly or without addressing the concerns of materialist feminists like Luce Irigaray, Judith Butler, Monique Wittig, and Donna Haraway. Braidotti argues that "one cannot deconstruct a subjectivity one has never been fully granted control over." And yet—insofar as 'woman' has been excluded from masculine systems of representation, she is unrepresentable; she is the site of "an-other system of representation." Braidotti thinks that Butler is saying the same thing when she writes that "Deleuze's post-Lacanian reading of the subject as a libidinal entity, in constant displacement in language, situates desire not only as a positive force, but also as the point of vanishing of the willful, conscious self." In the work of Haraway, more than any other contemporary feminist, Braidotti discovers the Deleuzian impetus at work. Like Deleuze, she finds that Haraway is interested in rethinking the "unity" of the human subject without resorting to humanism, dualism, or the divine. Haraway's image of the cyborg, like Deleuze's machinic couplings and Body without Organs, is

a figure of "inter-relationality, receptivity, and global communication that deliberately blurs categorical distinctions." Still, Braidotti concludes her essay with a warning that the new "nomadism" she advocates is not simply a question of willful practice (a position, of course, that Deleuze never takes). It requires working through our historical condition, in particular, the mass of images, concepts, and representations of women, before women can hope to emerge into difference and, especially, into the difference that is becoming-woman.

Like Braidotti, Elizabeth Grosz takes up "feminist suspicions" concerning Deleuze's rhizomatics and becoming-woman. In "A Thousand Tiny Sexes: Feminism and Rhizomatics," Grosz voices the concern expressed by Jardine that "'becoming-woman,' desiring machines, and other similar concepts are merely excuses for male forms of appropriation of whatever is radical and threatening about women's movements." Grosz takes it upon herself to determine whether or not such reservations and suspicions are warranted, and to determine whether rhizomatics is simply the future (as Braidotti implies), or whether it provides a "powerful ally and theoretical resource for feminist challenges" to philosophy now. For one, Grosz points to the overthrow of Platonism, and along with this, the "displacement of the centrality and pervasiveness of the structure of binary logic." Grosz recognizes that for Deleuze and Guattari, "metaphysical identities and theoretical models" are repositioned. The insight operating here is that, rather than being ultimate and global phenomena, such identities and models are merely the "effects or consequences of processes of sedimentation." What she reveals at work in Deleuze and Guattari is not only a new image of philosophy, but a way to look at the entire history of philosophy that does not mire contemporary thinkers in the residue of absolute interpretations and systems out of which new images could never be forthcoming. The provisionality of such "alignments"—though "deeply implicated in regimes of oppression and social subordination," especially with regard to women—nevertheless guarantees that such oppression and subordination can be "problematized" and even rendered "anachronistic." Thus, Grosz has seen clearly how Braidotti's reservations are met and answered by Deleuze and Guattari.

Grosz goes on to locate various conjunctions between key feminist notions and those of Deleuze and Guattari. Most common among these is the conceptualization of a difference that is in no way subordinated to identity or the same, and which makes way for the being of becoming and a radical form of multiplicity defined by the outside: "the abstract line, the line of flight, or deterritorialization." Along with this arises a notion of political struggle that is decentered, molecular, multiple, diversified, and only provisionally aligned in temporary and nonhierarchical networks.

Following this line of thought, the "body" is a discontinuous and non-totalized series of processes, organs, flows, energies, corporeal substances and incorporeal events, intensities and durations, a body of affects, not will, yet defined by what it can do. This makes way for the sense of desire as affirmative, immanent, positive, and productive, a desire which "forges connections, creates relations, produces machinic alignments." Finally, Grosz finds that this articulation of the body, inspired by a Spinozist frame of reference "resurrect[s] the question of the centrality of ethics, of the encounter with otherness," in ways not unrelated to feminist rethinking of the relations between dominant and subordinated groups, oppressor and oppressed. Given Deleuze and Guattari's conception of the body, ethics distances itself from the "rampant moralism underlying ecological and environmental politics, which also stresses interrelations, but does so in a necessarily prescriptive and judgmental fashion," ultimately, subordinating them to some hierarchical and totalizing order.

Grosz remains troubled by Deleuze and Guattari's use of "the most notoriously phallic and misogynist writers" to exemplify fields of becoming, and by the dubious privileging of women's bodies when becoming could have been less conspicuously articulated in terms of some "asubjective and asignifying becoming." This is why, she concludes, as long as they are able to see in "becoming-woman" only a stage in the movement of microscopic and fragmenting processes, feminists may yet view Deleuze and Guattari with suspicion.

The fifth section of our volume puts together three essays that deal with the question of "minor" languages and "nomad" arts. Derrida's theory of the deconstructive efficacy of language and the practice that this theory entails are already well-entrenched in our intellectual landscape. But Deleuze's (and Guattari's) "minor deconstructive" approaches to language and literature are more timidly involved in the context of our local discussions. Réda Bensmaia's and Dana Polan's essays have, therefore, been selected to remedy this deficiency.

Bensmaia has often and with subtlety written on minor literature.[9] In the essay included in this volume, "On the Concept of Minor Literature: From Kafka to Kateb Yacine," after a brief characterization of minor literature and its function, and after devoting some time to defending Deleuze and Guattari against misreadings and misappropriations of their writings on this subject, he assesses the potential of minor literature through an appeal to the work of the Algerian writer and theater producer, Kateb Yacine. For Bensmaia, the strength of Deleuze and Guattari's notion of minor literature lies in their demonstration that minorization is not the problem only of immigrants, marginals, and minorities. It is the problem of all those who

seek to open "the question of 'literature' to the forces and the differences (of class, race, language, or gender) that run through it." Moreover, Bensmaia argues, being a minor writer, from Deleuze and Guattari's perspective, is not a matter of an aesthetic choice made by a subject transparent to itself, but rather of the response to the exigencies of an existential situation. Minor literatures are characterized by the search for a language that could conjugate the lines of flight of the minority with the lines of flight of the majority in such a way that the combination could precipitate the minorization of the majority itself. Minor literatures are, therefore, political in the sense that the individual is always an arrangement whose function depends on its connections with other "machines." As such, minor literatures refer to a collectivity that is virtual (and real), albeit not yet actual. Bensmaia shows his subtle appreciation of Deleuze and Guattari when he states that minor literatures exist because peoples, races, and cultures have been reduced to silence. As the practical manifestation of this (absent) voice, minor literatures cannot adequately be thought as the products of our transgressive and anarchic (anti-Oedipal) thrust, as Louis Renza has tried to do.[10] They are not mere alternatives to the existing canon, on the way to establish their own canon. On this issue, Bensmaia quotes with approval David Lloyd, for whom the fact that the literary canon is not imposed today as a necessary and sufficient system of values is due, not only to the fact that literature has changed but also to the fact that institutions that used to shore it up are now in the process of disintegration.[11] We leave it to the reader to savor Bensmaia's discussion of minor literature in the context of Yacine's productions.

It is worth recalling here that in *Différence et répétition,* Deleuze argued that the idea, in order to be grasped, requires a chain reaction of plateaus of intensity that can only start with sensible encounters. Only the violence of the *sentiendum* stands a chance to bring about the resonance and the compossibility of Ideas. In 1981, Deleuze decided to face this violence seriously, choosing the paintings of the British artist Francis Bacon.[12] Struck by the powerful tensions that run through these paintings (tension between figuration and defiguration; between unsettling, convulsive forces and an emerging balance; between motion and rest; contraction and expansion; destruction and creation) Deleuze concluded that their function is "to produce resemblances with nonresembling means." The violence of sensation tormenting Bacon's canvases trades off representation for the exploration of a world never before seen, and yet strangely familiar and near.

Dana Polan's essay reads Deleuze's *Francis Bacon: Logique de la sensation* as a "pedagogy of the image," undertaken for the sake of a painterly practice that deforms the world in order to make it visible again. "How to make visible forces that are invisible?" is the question with which Bacon struggles

and on account of which Deleuze makes him the object of his meditation, in his attempt to build a general logic of sensation. Deleuze, according to Polan, chooses Bacon as the painter who defigures representation in search of a sensation that would give itself, in itself and for itself. This search constitutes a major revision of the kind of subjectivity that underwrites phenomenology. In Bacon, subjectivity is broken up, traversed by intensities, and hystericized. Deleuze suggests that sensation emerges in the encounter between a perceiving subject and the disintegrating figure of the painting. Bacon's practice, indebted to the Gothic tradition, is directed against the organic representation of classical art, but also against the kind of abstraction that moves toward geometric form. In between the two, Deleuze, according to Polan, focuses his attention on Bacon's modulation and gradation of significations, and on the slow meltings away of the body as the exemplary form of painting this modulation. In search of modulation, Bacon pursues the special project of undoing the face, and of rediscovering the head beneath the face. None of this would be possible, if sensation were a mere representation of the interaction of an eye and an object. But sensation is the response not to a form, but rather to a force, and Bacon's paintings aim at the capture of force. Since a force must itself exist on a body for there to be sensation, force is the necessary condition of sensation, provided, of course, that sensation is not asked to represent the force. Deleuze calls the logic of sensation that he finds in Bacon "haptic," in order to designate its ability to surpass simultaneously eye and hand into a singular logic of sensation—not of sensations. Sensations are extensive and contiguous, whereas sensation is intensive. In Polan's view, Deleuze's book on Bacon deserves high marks for its acute awareness of the problems generated by the attempt to speak in one medium about the practices of another; thus Polan particularly appreciates Deleuze's concern to overcome the verbal/visual dichotomy by making use of intensely imagistic and tableauesque language.

It is important to notice what Deleuze *never* does in his discussion of nomad arts. Deleuze is not visiting the artist's studio for themes and symbols capable of recharging dull senses and slumbering thought. In this sense, it is instructive to contrast Marcuse's *Eros and Civilization,* for instance, with Deleuze's writings on nomad art. *Eros and Civilization* witnesses, melancholically, the advancing colonization of all life activities by the performance principle; laments its dehumanizing and commodifying effects; and gratefully zeros in on the marginalized arts, which, because of their marginality, have preserved the dreams of the pleasure principle and the means (thematic and symbolic) to emancipation. But for Deleuze nomadism is the ability to be displaced in a certain way, transver-

sally or diagonally across all life activities—that is, an ability we encounter on all levels and in all territories. Hence, the laboratories of the artists are entered, by Deleuze, not for emancipatory potentials exclusively their own, but for the sake of a "confirmation of aparallel evolutions." In laboratories of research adjacent to one another, the painter, the cinematographer, the philosopher, and the scientist experiment with their own materials. Sometimes the porousness of the walls of the laboratories permit us to see that we have all been working with the same problems. But more often, an outside, which is the outside of all these laboratories, asserts itself, allowing an unstable, resonant communication, without wiping out the differences or the discordance of the "regional" concerns.[13]

It is because it speaks convincingly about aparallel evolutions that Marie-Claire Ropars-Wuilleumier's essay, "The Cinema, Reader of Gilles Deleuze," is included in this volume. It is faithful to Deleuze's warning: "[a] theory of cinema is not 'about' cinema but about the concepts that cinema gives rise to and which are themselves related to other concepts corresponding to other practices." Far from shutting himself within cinematic space, Deleuze asks cinema to intervene as accelerator of reflection. His cinematophilia, according to Ropars-Wuilleumier, is due to his perception of the aparallel evolution of world and cinema. His reflection on the seventh art is an attempt to show that cinema corroborates Bergson's pluralistic vision and that it makes possible the intuition of *durée* according to spatial and temporal flows that are no longer static surfaces or immobile points. Despite Bergson's skepticism, Deleuze's cinema has made possible our ascent to the nonhuman or superhuman moving images-*durées*. "Like the world," writes Ropars-Wuilleumier, "the cinema is Bergsonian . . . because it reactivates the concept of duration . . . [M]atter (which is image-movement) changes into memory (thus into image-time)." Or again, like the world, the cinema is Nietzschean, because in both "the circular becoming of time precipitates . . . short circuits, bifurcations, and detours, and irrational divisions where the notion of intensity is substituted for that of truth."

The author is convinced that Deleuze-Bergson's world can be conceived on the basis of the cinematic model, because cinema helps us recognize the world: Deleuze finds a kind of "catholicity" in cinema, a kind of universality that accepts, arranges, and reconciles everything inside an open-ended whole. The plane of consistency, therefore, which allows differences to resonate together without dulling their edges, is being modeled in and on the cinema. In fact, Ropars-Wuilleumier suggests that there is a conciliation, in cinema, that would make it possible to "negotiate[ ] an exchange between the image and the real." Such a conciliation, she argues, takes place

in the realm of belief (rather than certitude): there is an adumbration of redemption with the "wholeness of the aesthetic . . . responding to the nothingness of the ethical."

In Ropars-Wuilleumier's opinion, Deleuze's preoccupation with cinema highlights his preoccupation with the prelinguistic, that is, with a material that bears, without expressing, everything "prior to all processes of signification." Deleuze's choice of Peirce against Metz makes this preoccupation very clear: it marks the yielding to the appeal of sight, and to the asignifying and asyntactic plentitude of the image against all operations of a signifying nature. The two volumes on cinema and, in fact, the way in which they are written, testify, according to the author, to Deleuze's desire to break "with the empire of the sign and with the exact coincidence of signifier and signified." Much more than in any of his other books, Deleuze seems now ready to borrow the completed analyses of other researchers, and despite his unfailing recognition of his debts, to mix and match them until they become fully inscribed in his own system of thought, as if he wants in this sort of inscription to cause viewpoints, hypotheses, and ideas to shed their initial sense and origin, and to circulate rhizomatically. But in the last analysis, Ropars-Wuilleumier observes, the reconciliation of Peirce's classificatory logic with Nietzschean displacing strategies is not an easy task. In fact, according to the author, to the extent that Deleuze leans heavily on Peirce for his analysis of classical cinema (in *Cinema 1*), and then on Nietzsche for his discussions of modern cinema (in *Cinema 2*), "the foundations of the first volume tumble down in the second." It is certainly the case that Deleuze describes an aesthetic and historical break that, around 1950, separates a cinema marked by a temporality based on the movement of action and the linearity of narration (organic cinema) from a cinema whose time is built on serialization, repetition, and discontinuity (crystalline cinema). But in Ropars-Wuilleumier's reading, Deleuze allows the two temporalities to coexist, without accounting for the contradiction between them or coping with the aporias that the contradiction generates.

The final section of our collection, "Lines of Flight," consists of two exemplary essays that take the work of Deleuze as their starting point and engage in lines of flight, movements of "deterritorialization" and "destratification," the dismantling of organic hierarchies and organisms.

Jean-Clet Martin's "Cartography of the Year 1000, Variations on *A Thousand Plateaus*," brilliantly works out the parameters of monastic space in Romanesque architecture. Within this configuration, Martin discovers experimentation: the dome is being developed and a new space is opening, a space of overlap, incompatibilities, proliferations, heterogeneities, and change. Such a space is a patchwork where "the rules of distribution and

dispersion change nature, without any law or superior principle capable of legislating and extending its homogeneous jurisdiction over them." Romanesque architecture is a matter, then, not of a theorem, but of a "problem" that can receive a variety of solutions whose outlines can be diagramed. Thus, in monastic art, one finds a singular and eccentric choice, the giving up of wooden frames for stone, a choice not separable from the agitations in Europe in the year 1000 A.D. "[P]eregrinations and crusades determine changes of itineraries, halts, and deviations, which are related to technical innovations; they also determine mutations of forms that participate in the same movement of deterritorialization." Simply put, the need to house travelers opens the monastery.

Thus, Gothic art demands more light and attaches itself to the psalmodic model with its fluid outline and variable flow of acoustic singularities in nonmeasured musical time—the kyrielle: tonic accents repeated in unequal intervals creating unequal and heterogeneous points. It is here, argues Martin, that Deleuze's philosophy comes alive. Monastic art is not the offspring of the royal science of geometry, but the art of a problem, a proto-geometric choice "following heterogeneous bifurcations of the lines of material forces" such as those found in the proliferation of unclassifiable animal forms and subject to the forces of the material used. Insofar as the material is like a vein animated from the inside, matter and energy are in continual variation and even the artist must follow their plan. This intermediate zone between matter and form is the site of "creative dicethrows," which release their singularities in all possible directions—countless, diverging arabesques.

Within the social field of monastic art, Martin locates spreading, smooth space in the holy relics that challenge organized, striated space and its hierarchies of similarities, analogies, categories, resemblances, and identities. The relics deploy a plane of consistency around a function that cuts across the irreducible and incommensurate objects which are accounted for primarily in terms of pragmatics and semantics, not linguistics. These relics are expressed inside sign regimes marked by a particular proper name—the name of a saint—though with frightful, incorporeal effects. Such sign regimes, however, are everywhere. The despotic sign regime of the pope is successful in its drive to make Rome the center of holy places, and the pope the despotic center of significance, the site of absolute unity. Such unity is completely feasible insofar as the people see that "a God who dies on the Cross is not a sign of powerlessness." Instead, the message is that there are "plenty of other dreadful, atrocious, and eternal sufferings" available to those who might resist. Not surprisingly, this regime invents the face of the tortured, and blocks every line of flight and deterritorialization, except the

negative, the heretical—the scapegoat whose deviation is always already inscribed within the despotic sign regime.

Yet, this is not to say that there is not a mixture of semiotics operating here. There are at least three intersecting lines that guarantee the formation of ever-new assemblages. There is a line of deterritorialization from which emerges the hordes and packs of pilgrims and crusaders producing architectural, scientific, and political mutations. The despotic regime of the church is itself carried along this vector, deterritorialized, and barbarized, while the passional system of relics and saints' names migrates in all directions. Meanwhile, the "pontifical and imperial language begins to stutter," as the invaders begin to speak a vulgar form of Latin, minorizing the very language of church power, and the hordes continue the production of relics marked with the names of saints. What remains of this project, for Martin, is to develop the ethical, juridical, and political thresholds of monastic and Gothic space, to cleanse them of constraining theorems, and to constitute them as "problems." Such a move will enable continuous deviation on the "trajectories of a nomadic philosophy."

It is certainly on these nomadic trajectories that the work of Alphonso Lingis falls. His essay, "The Society of Dismembered Body Parts," begins by citing social contract theory's organic image of society as an integrated hierarchy of terms defined by function, and as individuals integrated as functions of an organism. But Lingis's purpose here is to dismiss such conceptions of the society and its body in favor of the "libidinal body of the primary process," the "anorganic-orgasmic body" derived from a structuralist model of interchangeable terms, a body that guides what Deleuze and Guattari have to say about society.

What is the anorganic body? Take, for example, the infant body, writes Lingis. It "closes its orifices, curls up upon itself, closes its eyes and ears to outside fluxes, makes itself an anorganic plenum, a 'body without organs,'" a state of "primary catatonia." The body of the infant does not consist of organs that lead to the inner functional body. Rather, they are themselves productive, as Freud had already noted, functioning "polymorphously perversely to extend pleasure surfaces." Such surfaces, however, are not a closed plenum. Vital systems are coded and the anorganic plenum is the site of inscription, as is the social system, the "socius." Lingis refers to the three kinds of codings that Deleuze and Guattari cite. The socius is determined as the body of the earth in nomadic society, the body of the despot in imperial society, and the body of capital in capitalist society.

In savage, hunter-gatherer societies, the earth is the Body without Organs, the undivided plenum to which humans' organs are attached. As such, humans are not separated from the earth and experience their own

bodies not as individual wholes, but as attached to the earth. Social interaction, rather than being a case of rights and responsibilities, is a matter of initiation, of being marked as belonging in some way to the earth. Membership in the society is "attachment to the earth," organs are "attached to the full body of the earth." And such attachments, Lingis informs us, are a matter of couplings: couplings of voice with hearing (there are over 700 languages among hunter-gatherers in New Guinea), hand with surfaces of inscription (hand craft and the immediate imitation of physical skills), and eye with pain (the excitement, even jubilation, at the spectacle of pain). When savage society is transformed and incorporated into sedentary and imperial societies whose organs converge on the body of a despot that has been detached from the earth, barbarian society arises. The hand is coupled onto the voice and the voice coupled with hearing by means of graphics (the signs of spoken words necessary for legislation, accounting, tax collecting, state monopoly, imperial justice, historiography), while the eye is uncoupled from the vision of pain. "[T]he eye no longer winces when it sees the mark . . . it does not see the incision, the wound, it passes lightly over the page." The eye becomes the passive receptor of abstract patterns. Lingis's analysis evokes Martin's exposition of the Kyrielle and the pontifical power that pursued it: "Now the voice no longer resonates, chants, invokes, calls forth; one hears only the voice of the law." And to make sense of this voice, one must subject oneself to the law.

If you were able to listen, Lingis continues, to the voices of the Quechua people without knowing their language or anything about "imperial society," what you would hear is the vocalizing of their togetherness. But as soon as you know that they are speaking about drug deals with Colombians, hearing is transformed, incorporated into the "codings of imperial society," an international code established in "Washington and Bonn and Tokyo." Now, these voices mean "crime," while you, listening, mean "tourist," an observer of the empire. The only possible resistance is to speak the language of the imperial code against itself: words lose consistency, become nonsensical, and turn against their own order. Thus the question, for Lingis, seems to be how not to speak the law of imperial discourse; how, instead, to speak the language of becoming-minor, even if your own language is English, German, or Japanese.

Yet capitalism, insofar as it subordinates the body of the entire productive enterprise (including the limbs and members of others) to the "integral body of the individual," responds primarily with privatization. Capitalist privatization is the removal of organs from the social field, "decoding their couplings with their immediate objects, and making their flows of substance and energies abstract." As a result, we "individuals" have substi-

tuted for the real pleasures of the body the imaginary or symbolic pleasures of meaning. Lingis complains that "[i]n our societies the flows for pubescent semen and blood are decoded, deterritorialized, privatized: it is supposed to take place behind locked doors at night." Individual privacy, then, is constituted around such privatized organs and flows, and Marx's "integral man" is nothing but a moment in capitalist coding. While Lingis seems to lament the loss of primitive public territorializations of the body, he nonetheless recognizes that Deleuze and Guattari do not seek primitive coding but, rather, seek even greater deterritorialization and decoding, freeing organs for ever more diverse couplings, and in this too, he finds much to lament.

With Martin and Lingis, our volume passes through the primitive territorial machine, the imperial despotic machine, and the capitalist machine, and the image of a theater of philosophy gives way to that of rhizomatic mapping, minoritarian becomings, packs, waves, intensities, and lines of flight. As editors, we have a sense that this is not simply possible, but necessary, given the new image of thought, the creation of concepts, and the mapping of processes that form the plane of immanence that we predicted at the beginning of this introduction. The "theater of cruelty" is cruel insofar as even the concept of the theater has been discarded in the very moment of its articulation. Just as, in the Deleuzian process, life is continuously phased out for something new, so philosophy as theater is phased out in the face of new modes of thought, new deterritorializations, destabilizations, and becomings that also cannot be stopped.

Notes

1. Michel Foucault, "Theatrum Philosophicum," *Language, Counter-Memory, Practice*, trans. Donald F. Bouchard and Sherry Simon (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977).
2. Gilles Deleuze, "La Methode de dramatisation," *Bulletin de la Société Française de Philosophie*, 61.3 (1967).
3. Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *Qu'est-ce que la philosophie?* (Paris: Editions de Minuit, 1991), p. 74.
4. See also Gilles Deleuze, *Différence et répétition* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1968), pp. 276–285.
5. Gilles Deleuze, *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, trans. Hugh Tomlinson (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983), p. 174.
6. Gilles Deleuze, *The Logic of Sense*, trans. Mark Lester with Charles Stivale, ed. Constantin V. Boundas (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990), p. 1.
7. Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, vol. 2 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987; orig. published in 1980).

8. Alice Jardine, "Woman in Limbo: Deleuze and His Br(others), *Substance* 44/45 (1984): 46–59, p. 54.
9. See Réda Bensmaia, "L'effect-Kafka," *Lendemains*, no. 53 (1989): 63–71; "Un philosophe au cinema," *Magazine Littéraire*, no. 257 (1988): 57–59.
10. Louis Renza, *"A White Heron" and the Question of Minor Literature* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1984).
11. David Lloyd, *Nationalism and Minor Literature: James Clarence Mangan and the Emergence of Irish Cultural Nationalism* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987).
12. Gilles Deleuze, *Francis Bacon: Logique de la sensation*, 2 vols. (Paris: Editions de la Différence, 1987).
13. See Constantin V. Boundas, "Editor's Introduction," *The Deleuze Reader*, Constantin V. Boundas, ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), esp. pp. 1–3.

2

He Stuttered

Gilles Deleuze

PEOPLE LIKE TO SAY that poor novelists experience the need to alternate their dialogic markers and to replace "he said" with "he murmured," "he stumbled," "he sobbed," "he sneezed," "he cried," or "he stuttered"—all of them being expressions that mark different voice modulations. It seems, in fact, that the writer, faced with such modulations, has only two possibilities: either to do it[1] (as did Balzac, who used to make Father Grandet stutter, whenever the latter said anything at all, and Nucingen speak in a distorting patois—cases in which Balzac's pleasure is easily felt); or else to say it without doing it, and to be satisfied with a mere indication that the reader will have to actualize: this is the case with characters who always whisper with a voice that *must* be a scarcely audible murmur. Melville's Isabelle has a voice that is little more than a whisper, and the angelic Billy Budd does not stir without us having to reconstitute his stutter; Gregor, in Kafka's *Metamorphosis,* warbles more than he speaks, but this again is according to the testimony of others.

It seems, however, that there is a third possibility: the performative. This is what happens when the stuttering no longer affects preexisting words, but, rather, itself ushers in the words that it affects; in this case, the words do not exist independently of the stutter, which selects and links them together. It is no longer the individual who stutters in his speech, it is the writer who *stutters in the language system* (*langue*): he causes language as such to stutter. We are faced here with an affective and intensive language (*langage*) and not with an affection of the speaker. Such a poetic undertaking seems to be very different from the previous cases, but it is perhaps less different from the second case than is usually thought. The fact is that in the cases where the writer is satisfied with a merely external marker, leaving the form of expression intact ("he stuttered . . . "), we understand the efficacy of this operation poorly unless a corresponding form of content,

an atmospheric quality, or a milieu functioning as the conductor of discourse brings together the quaver, the whisper, the stutter, the tremolo, or the vibrato and imparts upon words the resonance of the affect under consideration. We are able to witness this in the best writers like Melville, where the humming of forests and caves, the silence of the house, and the presence of the guitar bear witness to Isabelle's whispers and to her soft, "foreign intonations." Kafka confirms Gregor's warbling through the trembling of his paws and the oscillations of his body. As for Masoch, he doubles the stuttering of his characters through the heavy suspenses of the boudoir, the buzzing of the village, and the vibrations of the steppe. The affects of the language system are here the objects of an actualization that is indirect and yet still close to what is happening directly when there are no longer any characters other than the words themselves.

> What did my family want to say? I do not know. It was stuttering since birth, and yet it had something to say. Upon me and many of my contemporaries the stuttering of birth weighs heavily. We learned to mumble—not to speak—and it was only after paying attention to the increasing noise of the century, and after we got whitened by the foam of its crest, that we acquired a language.[2]

Make the language system stutter—is it possible without confusing it with speech? Everything depends on the way in which language is thought: if we extract it like a homogeneous system in equilibrium, or near equilibrium, and we define it by means of constant terms and relations, it is evident that the disequilibriums and variations can only affect speech (nonpertinent variations of the intonation type). But if the system appears to be in perpetual disequilibrium, if the system bifurcates—and has terms each one of which traverses a zone of continuous variation—language itself will begin to vibrate and to stutter, and will not be confused with speech, which always assumes only one variable position among others and follows only one direction. Language merges with speech only in the case of a very special speech, a poetic speech realizing all the power of bifurcation and variation, of heterogenesis and modulation that characterize language. For example, the linguist Guillaume considers every term of the language system not as a constant in relation to other terms, but as a series of differential positions or points of view upon a dynamism that can be specified: the indefinite article "a" covers the entire zone of variation generated by the movement of particularization, and the definite article "the" covers the entire zone generated by the movement of generalization.[3] We are faced here with stuttering, since every position of "a" or of "the" constitutes a vibration. Language quivers in all its limbs, and we discover at this point the

principle of a poetic understanding of language itself: it is as if language were carving a line to stretch—both abstract and infinitely varied.

This is then how the question is posed, even with respect to pure science: can we make any progress without entering those regions that lie far from the equilibrium? Keynes caused political economy to advance because he submitted it to a situation of "boom" and not to an equilibrium. This is the only way to introduce desire into various fields. How about placing language in a state of boom, close to a state of bust? We admire Dante for having "listened to the stutterers," and for having "studied all the mistakes of elocution," not only in order to assemble discursive effects, but rather in order to undertake a vast phonetic, lexical, and even syntactic creation.[4]

This is not a matter of bilingualism or multilingualism. It is possible to think in two languages, blending, with constant transitions from the one to the other: they are no less homogeneous systems in a state of equilibrium; their blending is accomplished in speech. But the great authors do not proceed in this manner, even though Kafka is a Czech writing in German, and Beckett an Irishman (often) writing in French. They do not mix two languages together, not even a minor language and a major language, although many of them have made their linkage to minorities the sign of their vocation. Rather, what they do is invent a *minor use* for the major language within which they express themselves completely: they *minorize* language, as in music, where the minor mode refers to dynamic combinations in a state of perpetual disequilibrium. They are big by virtue of minorization: they cause language to flee, they make it run along a witch's course, they place it endlessly in a state of disequilibrium, they cause it to bifurcate and to vary in each one of its terms, according to a ceaseless modulation.

All this goes beyond the possibilities of speech and attains the power of a language system—and even of language. This means that a great writer is always like a stranger in the language in which he expresses himself, even if this is his mother tongue. In the last analysis, he finds his strength in a silent and unknown minority that belongs only to him. He is a foreigner in his own language: he does not mix another language with his, he shapes and sculpts a foreign language that does not preexist *within* his own language. "The beautiful books are written in a sort of foreign language."[5] The point is to make language itself cry, to make it stutter, mumble, or whisper. What better compliment is there than the one of a critic saying of *Seven Pillars of Wisdom* that it is not written in English. Lawrence made English stumble in order to draw out of it the melodies and the visions of Arabia. And Kleist? What kind of language was he awakening in the depths of German by means of grins, slips of tongue, grinding of teeth, inarticulate sounds, elongated connections, brutal speeding up and slowing down, risking always to

provoke Goethe's horror—Goethe, the most important representative of the major language—and reaching for strange goals, petrified visions, and vertiginous melodies?[6]

Language is subject to a double process of choices to be made and sequences to be established: disjunctions or selection of similars; connection or sequel of combinables. As long as language is considered as a system in a state of equilibrium, disjunctions will necessarily be exclusive (we do not say "passion," "ration," "nation" all at once, we must choose) and connections progressive (we do not combine a word with its elements with the gearshift in the neutral or by alternating between drive and reverse). But away from the state of equilibrium, *disjunctions become included and inclusive and connections become reflexive* on the basis of a rolling gait that affects the process of language and no longer the flow of discourse. Each word is now divided, but it is divided in itself (fat-cat fatalist-catalyst); and it is also combined, but combined with itself (gate-rogate-abrogate). It is as if the entire language had begun to roll from left to right, and to toss from back to front: *the two stutterings*. Gherasim Luca's speech is extremely poetic because he makes the stutter an affect of language instead of an affection of speech. The entire language runs and varies in order to liberate an ultimate sound block, a single gasp reaching the cry "I love you passionately . . . "

Passione nez passionnem je
je t'ai je t'aime je
je je jet je t'ai jetez
je t'aime passionnem t'aime.[7]

Luca the Romanian, Beckett the Irishman. It is Beckett who perfected the art of the inclusive disjunction; this art no longer chooses but rather affirms the disjointed terms in their distance and, without limiting or excluding one disjunct by means of another, it criss-crosses and runs through the entire gamut of possibilities. Notice, for example, in *Watt*, the way in which Knott puts on his shoes, moves about in his room, or changes his furniture.[8] It is true that these affirmative disjunctions, more often than not in Beckett, refer to the air and the gait of his characters: an indescribable way to walk, by rolling and tossing. The transfer from the form of the expression to the form of the content has been completed. But we can equally well bring about the reverse transition, if we suppose that people speak as they walk or stumble: the one is no less a movement than the other, they both transcend speech toward language, and the organism transcends itself toward a body without organs. We find confirmation of this in one of Beckett's poems that deals specifically with the connections of language and turns stuttering to the

poetic or linguistic strength par excellence.[9] Beckett's method differs from Luca's and is the following: he places himself in the middle of the sentence, he makes the sentence grow from the middle, adding one particle to another (*que de ce, ce ceci-ci, loin la là-bas à peine quoi*) in order to direct the course of a block of a single, expiring gasp (*voulais croire entrevoir quoi . . .*). Creative stuttering is what makes language grow from the middle, like grass; it is what makes language a rhizome instead of a tree, what puts language in a state of perpetual disequilibrium: *Ill Seen, Ill Said* (content and expression). Fine words have never been the characteristic or the concern of great writers.

There are many ways to grow from the middle and to stutter. Péguy does not necessarily operate with asignifying particles, but rather with highly signifying terms; he operates with substantives each one of which defines a zone of variation; the latter reaches the neighborhood of another substantive, which, in turn, determines another zone (*Mater purissima, castissima, inviolata, Virgo potens, clemens, fidelis*). Péguy's retakes give words a vertical thickness and make them resume the "irresumable" without end. With Péguy, stuttering fits language so well that it leaves the words intact, complete and normal, but it makes use of them as if they were themselves the disjointed and decomposed members of a superhuman stuttering. Péguy is like a frustrated stutterer. In the case of Roussel, we have a different procedure again, because his stuttering does not affect particles or complete terms, but it affects propositions, perpetually inserted in the middle of a sentence, each one of them again inserted in the one before, according to a proliferating system of parentheses: often we have up to five parentheses one inside the other so that "[w]ith each additional increase this internal development couldn't fail to overwhelm the language it enriched. The invention of each verse was the destruction of the whole and stipulated its reconstitution."[10]

We are, therefore, talking about a ramified variation of the language system. Each state of a variable is a position on a crest line which bifurcates and prolongs itself in other lines. It is a syntactic line, whereby syntax is constituted by means of the curves, links, bends, and deviations of this dynamic line as it passes by positions with a double perspective on disjunctions and on connections. It is no longer the formal or superficial syntax that presides over the equilibrium of language, but a syntax in the process of becoming, a veritable creation of a syntax that gives birth to a foreign language within language and a grammar of disequilibrium. But in this sense syntax is inseparable from an end, it tends toward a limit that is no longer syntactic or grammatical, even if, from a formal point of view, it still seems to be: take, for example, Luca's formula, "I love you passionately," which explodes like a cry at the end of long stuttering series (or Bartleby's "I would prefer not to," which has absorbed all previous variations, or

Cummings's "he danced his did," which is freed from variations that are supposed to be merely virtual). Such expressions are considered to be inarticulate words, blocks of a single breath. This final limit sheds all grammatical appearances and bursts forth in its brute state in Artaud's gasp-words: Artaud's deviant syntax, to the extent that it wants to take by force the French language, finds the destination of its own tension in these gasps or pure intensities that mark the limits of language. Sometimes all this happens in different books: in the case of Céline, *Le Voyage au bout de la nuit* puts the native tongue in a state of disequilibrium; *Mort à credit* develops the new syntax according to affective variations; whereas *Guignol's Band* finds the ultimate goal, that is, the exclamatory sentences and suspensions that do away with all syntax to the advantage of a pure dance of words. Nevertheless, the two aspects can be correlated: the tensor and the limit, tension inside language and the limit of language.

The two aspects are realized according to an infinity of tonalities, but always together: a limit of language subtending the entire language system, and a line of variation or subtended modulation that brings the language system to this limit. And just as the new language is not external to the language system, the asyntactic limit is not external to language either: it is *the outside* of language, not outside of it. It is a painting or a piece of music, but a music of words, a painting with words, a silence within words, as if words were not disgorging their content—a grandiose vision or a sublime audition. The words paint and sing, but only at the limit of the path that they trace through their divisions and combinations. Words keep silent. The sister's violin takes over Gregor's warbling, and the guitar reflects (on) Isabelle's whisper; the melody of a singing bird about to die drowns out the stuttering of Billy Budd, the sweet "barbarian." It is when the language system overstrains itself that it begins to stutter, to murmur, or to mumble; then the entire language reaches the limit that sketches the outside and confronts silence. When the language system is so much strained, language suffers a pressure that delivers it to silence. Style—the foreign language system inside language—is made by these two operations; or shall we rather speak, with Proust, of a nonstyle, that is, of "elements of a style to come which do not yet exist"? Style is the parsimony of language.[11] Face to face, or face to back, to cause language to stutter, and at the same time to bring language to its limit, to its outside, and to its silence—all this will be like the boom and the bust.

—Translated by Constantin V. Boundas

Notes

1. [Translator's note.] These two possibilities facing the writer, as well as the third introduced in the next paragraph, allude to the French translation of J. L. Austin's *How to Do Things With Words* as *Quand dire c'est faire.*
2. Ossip Mandelstam, *Le Bruit du temps* (Lausanne: L'age d'homme, 1983), p. 77.
3. Cf. Gustave Guillaume, *Foundations for a Science of Language*, trans. W. Hirtle and J. Hewson (Philadelphia: Benjamins, 1984). Not only articles in general, or verbs in general, have dynamisms and zones of variation, but also each particular verb, and each particular substantive.
4. Ossip Mandelstam, *Entretien sur Dante* (Geneva: Dogana, 1989), p. 8.
5. Marcel Proust, *Contre Sainte-Beuve, on Art and Literature: 1856–1919*, trans. Sylvia Townsend Warner (New York: Meridian, 1958).
6. Pierre Blanchaud is one of the rare translators of Kleist who correctly raised the problem of style; see Heinrich von Kleist, *Le Duel* (Paris: Presses-Pocket, 1985). This problem can be extended to all translations of great writers: it is obvious that translation is treason if it takes as its model the norms of equilibrium of the standard language to which the translation is made.
7. This is Luca's most famous poem, "Passionément" *Le chant de la carpe* (Paris: J. Corti, 1986).
8. See François Martel, "Jeux formels dans Watt," *Poétique* 10 (1972).
9. Samuel Beckett, "Comment dire" *Poemes* (Minuit).
10. On this procedure of *Nouvelle impressions d'Afrique*, see Michel Foucault, *Death and the Labyrinth: The World of Raymond Roussel* (New York: Doubleday, 1986), pp. 129–30.
11. On the problem of style, his relationship with the language system, and these two aspects, see Giorgio Passerone, *La linea astratta: Pragmatico dello stile* (Milano: Edizioni Angelo Guerini, 1991).

I. Difference and Repetition

3.

Difference and Unity in Gilles Deleuze

Todd May

> How could there be a "play of the Same" if alterity itself was not already *in* the Same, with a meaning of inclusion doubtless betrayed by the word *in*?
>
> —Jacques Derrida, *Writing and Difference*

IT IS ONE OF THE IRONIES of Gilles Deleuze's thought that although it counts itself as a rigorous thought of difference, it often uses for its models philosophers whose own work has been considered tightly unitary or monistic. Deleuze's studies on Spinoza, Bergson, and even Kant, for instance, cannot be considered external to the heart of the Deleuzian project; indeed, it can be argued that those studies constitute its very heart. The thinker who wrote "difference is behind everything, but behind difference there is nothing"[1] is also the thinker who praises Scotus and Spinoza for discovering the univocity of being, and especially the latter for revealing it as "an object of pure affirmation."[2] How is it that the thinker of multiplicities, of haecceities, disjunctions, and irreducible intersecting series, is also the thinker of the univocity of being and untranscendable planes of immanence?

It is the argument of this paper that such juxtapositions of unity and difference are not accidental, but are indeed the requirements of Deleuze's thought. Indeed, these juxtapositions are symptoms of a concomitance so necessary that it will not be overstating the case to claim that, in the end, Deleuze is not a thinker of difference at all, if by that is meant that he is a thinker who should be read as considering difference to be privileged over unity. The claim here is not that Deleuze understands himself as anything other than a thinker of difference; in fact, there are numerous instances in

which he seems to consider himself exactly that. Instead, I will try to make the case that he cannot coherently be a thinker of difference. In that sense, this text can be considered a deconstruction, if by that term we mean that we are to find the suppressed term of a binary opposition (unity) internal to the possibility of privileging the other term (difference). I will also argue, though, that Deleuze need not be a thinker who privileges difference at the expense of unity. He can commend to us a way of thinking that values difference and that allows him to engage in the multifarious experiments into thinking with difference that have been his legacy without having to go beyond what he can reasonably allow himself with respect to claims about the status of difference.

The attempt to assess Deleuze's claims about difference cannot proceed, however, in a traditional philosophical fashion. We cannot merely ask ourselves what his claims are, and then proceed to evaluate them. This is because Deleuze's conception of what it is to do philosophy, and thus what it is to make a philosophical claim, are hardly straightforward. When it seems in his texts that Deleuze is making a claim about the way things are, most often he is not—and he does not take himself to be—telling us about the way things are. Instead, he is offering us a way of looking at things. Thus, in order to begin to assess the Deleuzian claims of difference, it will be necessary to understand what it is to be a Deleuzian claim; that is, it will be necessary to understand what Deleuze is doing when he does philosophy. It will be seen here that Foucault's suggestive remark that *Anti-Oedipus* is "a book of ethics"[3] is in fact a fitting epigram for the entirety of Deleuze's corpus.

Only when we have understood Deleuze's conception of philosophy can we proceed to inquire about the place of the concept of difference in Deleuze's work, and from there to an understanding of the necessary chiasm of difference and unity that urges itself upon, although never definitively establishes itself within, Deleuze's texts. Here the touchstone will be Spinoza, the thinker of unity most often referred to—and referred to as such—in Deleuze's articulation of his position regarding unity. Finally, we can show what Deleuze can and cannot claim for difference within his own work, and indicate briefly why the strictures we set upon it should not be deeply troubling for his project, but only for certain realizations of it.

For Deleuze, the project of philosophy is one of creating, arranging, and rearranging perspectives; it is, as he puts it, "the discipline that consists in *creating* concepts."[4] To engage in philosophy is to develop a perspective, by means of concepts, within which or by means of which a world begins to appear to us. Such has been Deleuze's position from his first extended text, his book on Hume, in which he writes:

> . . . a philosophical theory is an elaborately developed question, and nothing else; by itself and in itself, it is not the resolution to a problem, but the elaboration, *to the very end*, of the necessary implications of a formulated question. It shows us what things are, or what things should be, on the assumption that the question is good and rigorous.[5]

This tells us much about what Deleuze thinks philosophy is not, but less about what he thinks it is. Philosophy is not the attempt, as Quine would have it, "to limn the world"; it is not the discipline that tries to "get things right," in the sense that it would offer an account of how things are that would be able to replace numerous other accounts. To conceive philosophy as a project of truth is, in Deleuze's view, to misconceive it. "Philosophy does not consist in knowledge, and it is not truth which inspires philosophy, but rather categories like the interesting, the remarkable or the important which decide its success or failure."[6] Although he does not tell us why philosophy ought not to be concerned with truth, his positive articulation of philosophy's task leaves little doubt that the reason is ethical rather than metaphysical or epistemological. It is not for the reason that there is no truth that philosophy ought not to be concerned with it (and it is a superficial reading that finds Deleuze engaged in a self-defeating denial of truth); rather, it is that philosophy ought to be about something else: specifically, about creating concepts.

In Deleuze's recent collaboration with Félix Guattari on the nature of philosophy, he articulates three central and intertwined characteristics that concepts possess. First, a concept is defined by its intersections with other concepts, both in its field and in surrounding fields. This is an idea that Deleuze speaks of elsewhere when he writes that "philosophical theory is itself a practice, as much as its objects. . . . It is a practice of concepts, and it must be judged in the light of other practices with which it interferes."[7] Second, a concept is defined by the unity it articulates among its constituent parts. This is called by Deleuze and Guattari the "consistence" of the concept.[8] It occurs when heterogeneous elements are brought together into a whole that is at once distinct and inseparable from those composing elements. Last, a concept is "an intensive trait, an intensive arrangement which must be taken as neither general nor particular but as a pure and simple singularity."[9] By this, we must understand the concept as a productive force that reverberates across a conceptual field, creating effects as it passes through and by the elements and other concepts of that field.

A concept, then, is not a representation in any classical sense. Rather, it is a point in a field—or, to use Deleuze's term, on a "plane"—that is at once logical, political, and aesthetic. It is evaluated not by the degree of its truth

or the accuracy of its reference, but by the effects it creates within and outside of the plane on which it finds itself. The concept, write Deleuze and Guattari, "does not have *reference*: it is autoreferential, it poses itself and its object at the same time that it is created."[10] Thus philosophy, as the creation of concepts, is to be conceived less as articulation or demonstration than as operation. Philosophy brings together or introduces new points onto the planes with which it is involved, and by this means either rearranges a plane, articulates a new plane, or forces an intersection of that plane with others. To evaluate a philosophy, then, is to gauge its operation, to understand the effects that it introduces, rather than to assess its truth.

There is another part of philosophy's operation to which we shall return later but which must be introduced now. "Philosophy is a constructivism, and its constructivism possesses two complementary aspects which differ in nature: creating concepts and tracing a plane."[11] As Deleuze and Guattari note, the plane traced by the concepts that create it is not reducible to those concepts. Rather, the concepts outline a plane that must be conceived as an open whole (which is not to say a totality[12]): a whole in the sense that there is a relatedness among the concepts that exist on or within it, open in the sense that those concepts do not exhaust the plane but leave room for development and retracing. Deleuze calls the planes that are traced by philosophy "planes of immanence" in order to indicate that there is no source beneath or beyond the plane that can be considered its hidden principle. Unlike traditional views of philosophy, then, Deleuze's view rejects all forms of transcendence as descriptions of the nature or goal of philosophical work. In fact, first among the illusions that characterize philosophy's account of itself is "the illusion of transcendence."[13]

An illustration of the plane of immanence is offered in Spinoza's philosophy of the univocity of being. "What is involved," Deleuze writes, "is the laying out of a *common plane of immanence* on which all minds, all bodies, and all individuals are situated."[14] Spinoza's concepts do not exhaust the plane of immanence of which they seek to be the principles; nevertheless, taken together they constitute its geometry. In fact, for Deleuze the famous "geometrical method" of the *Ethics* is nothing other than the geometry of a plane of immanence.

Given this reading of the philosophical project, Deleuze's claim that it is a "practice" becomes clear. Philosophy is a practice whose operations are to be evaluated by the effects that they give rise to. Thus we can see both that there is a place for truth in philosophy—although it is a secondary, derivative place—and that the primary task of philosophy is normative. The place of truth on this reading lies in the assessment of effects. If a philosophy is to be evaluated on the basis of its effects, there must be some agreement as to what

those effects are. This does not mean that there is an objective fact of the matter outside of all planes of discourse; what analytic philosophers call realism is not a commitment of this approach. Rather, if two people are to agree on an evaluation, they must also agree on what effects a philosophy has had, that is, on what has happened as a result of the concepts it has created.

This agreement, however, is only a means to the end of evaluating a philosophical practice. As Deleuze and Guattari note, such evaluation must itself be immanent in some sense:

> We do not have the least reason to think that the modes of existence need transcendental values which would compare, select, and decide which among them is "better" than another. On the contrary, there are only immanent criteria, and one possibility of life is valued in itself by the movements it traces and the intensities it creates on a plane of immanence.[15]

The sense of immanence that Deleuze seeks for evaluation, however, remains ambiguous, between two possibilities. The rejection of transcendental values can be read either as a rejection of all evaluation outside the specific plane of immanence on which the concepts are being created; or it can be read as a rejection of moral realism, of the idea that ethical evaluation is anchored in a moral reality divorced from all planes of immanence. It is important, although I believe unpalatable for Deleuze, that the rejection be of the second sort. To reject the possibility of the evaluation of a philosophy outside of the plane that it traces is to lapse into an aestheticism that allows for the possibility of a barbaric set of philosophical commitments that cannot be called such because to do so would constitute an evaluation lying outside the plane of immanence on which those concepts are traced. However, it is both coherent and plausible to claim that the very concept of barbarism lies on its own plane of immanence without which we would be able neither to understand nor to utilize it. This latter possibility, a more or less anti-Platonic one, although far more modest in scope, seems both necessary and undamaging for Deleuze's approach to philosophical evaluation.

The concept of "life" that Deleuze invokes periodically in his writings reflects his ambiguity about evaluation. When he writes, for instance, that "[t]here is, then, a philosophy of 'life' in Spinoza; it consists precisely in denouncing all that separates us from life, all these transcendent values that are turned against life, these values that are tied to the conditions and illusions of consciousness"[16], Deleuze utilizes the concept of life both as a term—albeit nascent—within Spinoza's philosophy through which it affirms itself and as a value by which the entire philosophy is judged. The concept of life, then, is, for Deleuze, always partially transcendent to the plane to which it is

being applied; although this does not mean that it is transcendent to all planes, but instead that it is irreducible to the plane of application. Thus, when Deleuze claims that for Spinoza "Ethics, which is to say a typology of immanent modes of existence, replaces Morality, which always refers existence to transcendent values,"[17] we must understand the term "immanent" as referring broadly to all planes of discourse and "transcendent" as referring to the outside of all planes of discourse.[18]

Such a move privileges normative planes in relation to other planes by making them the axes around which evaluation revolves. This, however, is precisely the Deleuzian view of philosophy, which sees philosophy as a creation rather than reflection, and theory as a practice rather than a pure speculation.[19] If his concept of life brings evaluation closer to the planes that are being evaluated, it does not dispense altogether with a move outside those planes, as indeed it cannot without being committed to the endorsement of many values that Deleuze's philosophy has constituted a ceaseless struggle against. All of this, however, is not meant to claim that nonnormative planes are reducible in any sense to normative ones (a point whose importance will become clear below), but rather to insist on the general importance of normative planes in Deleuze's view of philosophical practice.[20]

Philosophy, then, is a project of creation, of bringing into being concepts that define new perspectives. It is primarily a normative endeavor, a discipline whose effects are to be judged normatively.[21] And it is within this context that we need to assess the role of Deleuze's concept of difference and the claims made for it in his work.

Deleuze, of course, privileges difference. The claims he makes on its behalf are both ethical and metaphysical, and in most cases the ethical and the metaphysical claims are entwined. Throughout his philosophy, he has tried to yoke a metaphysics of difference with an ethics of experimenting with difference in a way that can leave one uncertain where the metaphysical claims leave off and the ethical ones begin. In *Différence et répétition*, for example, Deleuze claims that "in its essence, difference is the object of affirmation, affirmation itself. In its essence, affirmation is itself difference."[22] Here the nature of affirmation and difference and the evaluation of each are indistinguishable. One wants to ask here, is Deleuze claiming that we ought to affirm difference because that is what difference is—it is affirmation? Assuming we could make sense of this claim, it would seem to run perilously close to a naturalist fallacy. On the other hand, is Deleuze claiming that when we affirm, we are always affirming difference? If so, then the normative force that Deleuze would seem to want for this claim is lost.

In fact, Deleuze is making neither of these claims. When Deleuze privileges difference, he is engaging in the practice he calls philosophy. He is creating a concept that he hopes will help shape a perspective from which we see things in a new way. His metaphysical claims are not claims about the way things are; rather, they are the structure of a new perspective. And his ethical claims—which are indeed ethical claims—are the articulation of a framework for thinking about other practices when one has taken up the perspective created by the concepts of a given metaphysics. What we must ask, then, regarding the concept of difference is not whether difference indeed does possess some sort of metaphysical priority, but how such a concept is meant to function, what effects it is designed to have. Concepts are like texts, we must treat them thus: "We will never ask what a book means, as a signified or a signifier; we will not look for anything to understand in it. We will ask what it functions with, in connection with what other things it does or does not transmit intensities, in which other multiplicities its own are inserted and metamorphosed, and with what bodies without organs it makes its own converge."[23]

The function of the concept of difference is at once to attack the unifying forces that have abounded in philosophical discourse and to substitute for such forces a new perspective by means of which one can continue to think philosophically. "It is necessary that a system is constituted on the basis of two or three series, each series being identified by the differences between the terms which compose it."[24] Systems should not be thought of as unities, but rather as compositions of series, each of which is itself defined on the basis of difference. The thought of such difference at the level of compositions of series Deleuze calls "singularities." Thus, in *The Logic of Sense*, if we are to consider meaning as a product of sense (and whether we should do so Deleuze calls "an economic or strategic question"[25]), and if sense is composed by the two heterogeneous series of words and things, then words and things are composed of prepersonal, preindividual singularities:

> What is neither individual nor personal are, on the contrary, emissions of singularities insofar as they occur on an unconscious surface and possess a mobile, immanent principle of auto-unification through a *nomadic distribution*, radically distinct from fixed and sedentary distributions as conditions of the syntheses of consciousness. Singularities are the true transcendental events, and Ferlinghetti calls them "the fourth person singular."[26]

Thus Deleuze asks us to think of difference as constitutive all the way down, and of unity as a product of the play of difference.

But if difference is to be thought of as constitutive, this is in order to rid philosophy not of unities, but of unifying forces or principles that either preclude difference or relegate it to a negative phenomenon. After all, Deleuze sees philosophical discourse, and indeed all discourse, as a process of *both* deterritorializing and reterritorializing. Therefore, it is not the fact of unities that fossilizes the creation of concepts, but the necessity that attaches to unifying principles, principles that dictate a necessary structure of concepts or an unsurpassable perspective. In this sense, Deleuze's notion of difference is distinct from Derrida's notion of *différance*. The latter involves an inevitable play of presence and absence, a specific economy of the two, which, although issuing in any number of philosophical possibilities, nevertheless governs them with a certain type of logic that is necessary to all discourse. Deleuze grants both that the intersection of different series may determine a specific structure, and that neither the structure nor the intersecting series that produced it are subject to alteration by a being in virtue of that being possessing a "free will." None of this implies, however, that there is a guiding principle that underlies structures and that would thus be a unifying force determining them. This is why Deleuze cites the Stoical distinction between destiny and necessity:[27] the former is subject to slippages of contingency of which the latter is incapable.

The concept of difference, then, is both positive and disruptive: positive in taking series (as well as singularities, desire, active forces, rhizomatic stems, etc.) as irreducible, contingent, constituting forces; disruptive in resisting all accounts of these constituting forces that would bring them under the sway of a unifying principle that would make them—or the phenomena they constitute—merely derivations from or reflections of one true world or source. These two characteristics converge on what may be called the essential role of the concept of difference: to resist transcendence in all of its forms.

As noted earlier, the "illusion of transcendence" is the primary philosophical illusion. That illusion consists in the idea that there is some unifying principle—or small set of principles—outside the planes on which discourse—and other practices—take place that gives them their order and their sense, and that the task of philosophy is to discover that principle or that set of principles. The history of philosophy is replete with such principles, from Forms to God to the cogito to language to *différance*. To recognize difference in its Deleuzian form is to reject the illusion of transcendence, and to philosophize from the surfaces rather than from the depths or the height of transcendence. "The idea of positive distance belongs to topology and to the surface. It excludes all depth and all elevation, which would restore the negative and identity."[28] To think in terms of

difference is to affirm surfaces, which can only occur when one ceases trying to take those surfaces as derivative from or secondary to something lying outside of them, and begins to see them as constitutions of series, etc. that come to form them and that, in some sense, they are. And in this sense, the concept of difference is inextricable from the project of philosophy; for if philosophy is to remain a practice of creation, it cannot be bound to a transcendence that would stultify it. Philosophy is a practice of difference, which is at once an art of surfaces. "The philosopher is no longer the being of the caves, nor Plato's soul or bird, but rather the animal which is on a level with the surface—a tick or a louse."[29]

The question remains, however, of the relationship of surfaces to their constituting series, forces, desire, etc. If difference is taken as our sole guiding concept, then it seems difficult to understand how there could be planes or surfaces at all. By what principle or for what reason do we call one collocation of points a series, or one or several sets of series the articulation of a plane, if pure difference is our only guiding concept? On the other hand, how are surfaces to be introduced without their becoming a reduction of difference, without their becoming a new principle of transcendence? It would seem that any priniciple of unity that could be invoked to explain surfaces would have to be transcendent, at least to the difference it balances. It is at this level of questioning that Spinoza's thought of the univocity of being becomes crucial.

"The philosophy of immanence appears from all viewpoints as the theory of unitary Being, equal Being, common and univocal Being."[30] This claim, which applies equally to both Spinoza and Deleuze, must be understood if we are to see how a Deleuzian philosophy of surfaces and differences is to be coherent. What must be kept sight of is that Deleuze's concept of difference is essentially an antitranscendental one; he is trying to preserve the integrity of surfaces of difference from any reduction to a unifying principle lying outside all planes of immanence.

The attraction of Spinoza for Deleuze lies precisely in the fact that, for Spinoza, there can be no transcendental principle of explanation precisely because there can be no transcendence. There is no outside from which a source (whether that source be a metaphysical one or merely an explanans[31]) could come to exercise sway. The philosophical problem Spinoza sets himself is one of developing a perspective within which the antitranscendental position can be coherently realized. For Deleuze, the central concept—concept in accordance with Deleuze's use of the term—is "expression." Expression is the relation among substance, attributes, essences, and modes that allows each of these elements to be conceived as distinct from, and yet part of, the others:

> [T]he idea of expression accounts for the real activity of the participated, and for the possibility of participation. It is in the idea of expression that the new principle of immanence asserts itself. Expression appears as the unity of the multiple, as the complication of the multiple, and as the explication of the One.[32]

Expression is Spinoza's concept, then, for characterizing the relationship among the traditional concepts of the philosophical discipline of his time. Although the term itself is introduced by Scotus, it achieves maturity only with Spinoza, for whom it is not merely a neutral description of being, but at the same time a revealing of being as an object of affirmation.[33] It is this concept that, by substituting itself for emanation and by displacing all forms of dualism, introduces into philosophy the antitranscendental notion of the univocity of being. "What is expressed has no existence outside its expressions; each expression is, as it were, the existence of what is expressed."[34]

The concept of expression comprises three related aspects: explication, involvement, and complication.[35] Explication is an evolution; attributes explicate substance in the sense of being evolutions of substance. By evolution, however, we must understand not a chronological development, but rather a logical one. As Deleuze notes elsewhere in a discussion of the relationship of substance's production, "God in understanding his own essence produces an infinity of things, which result from it *as properties result from a definition.*"[36] Attributes thus explicate substance; and in explicating it they necessarily involve it. Attributes, as logical rather than chronological evolutions of substance, involve substance in a fashion similar to the way the conclusion of a syllogism involves its premises. Given this relationship of evolution and involvement, complication also follows. "Precisely because the two concepts are not opposed to one another, they imply a principle of synthesis: *complicatio.*"[37] There are distinctions to be drawn among the attributes of substance, and those distinctions are real, but they are not numerical; the multiple is part of—indeed, *is*—the one, as the one is the multiple.

Expression, then, is a concept that removes the possibility of transcendence from the philosophical field of Spinoza's time. Throughout all its expressions, being remains univocal. It must be seen at once, however, that to be univocal is not to be identical:

> The significance of Spinozism seems to me this: it asserts immanence as a principle and frees expression from any subordination to emanative or exemplary causality. *Expression itself no longer emanates, no longer resembles anything.* And such a result can be obtained only within a perspective of univocity.[38]

What univocity implies is not that everything is the same, or that there is a principle of the same underlying everything, but, instead, precisely the opposite. With univocity comes difference, difference for the first time taken seriously in itself.

If there is nothing outside of the surface, if all there is is surface, then what characterizes the surface is inescapable, unsurpassable. There is no looking elsewhere in order to discover or understand our world or our worlds.[39] This thought, at once Spinozist and Nietzschean, returns us to the complexity and irreducibility that characterize surfaces, but does so with the affirmation that such complexity and such irreducibility are precisely *the characteristics of a surface.* Differences do not float ethereally as pure singularities, in the manner that Deleuze would sometimes have it. In such a state they would be nothing, not even differences. Deleuzian difference can arise as such only in relationship to surfaces, which are nontranscendable, only on the basis of an ontological univocity. And it is in this way that difference can be both posited and affirmed. It is posited as the result of a perspective—that is, a creation of concepts—that denies transcendence and returns us to surfaces and their differences. It is affirmed because those surfaces and differences are seen no longer merely as derivative from or parasitical upon a unifying transcendent source or principle.

Such a result is in keeping with Deleuze's view of the philosophical project as the normative endeavor of creating concepts. At another level, however, it is also in keeping with the necessity of his own philosophical creation. In order to develop the perspective that has been emerging here, Deleuze has had to create, not a number of distinct and unrelated philosophical concepts, but rather a surface composed of different but related concepts: concepts such as difference, expression, surface, and univocity. The perspective itself is at once the creation of concepts and the tracing of a plane of immanence that is distinct from the concepts populating that plane. The plane is the unity of different concepts, but not in the sense of being their product. Instead it is a unity without which these concepts would not be the concepts they are; indeed, they would not be concepts at all. Alternatively, without the differential nature of the concepts, there would be no plane. At this level—and at all levels—a perspective is not the product of difference but the product coequally of unity and difference.

This dual necessity, the necessity of unity and difference in the formation of any perspective, is the horizon within which Deleuze's and Guattari's notion of the rhizome must be understood. The rhizome is a testimony neither to pure difference nor to pure unity. Unlike the arboreal perspective the authors eschew, which is the embodiment of the transcendental project of reducibility to a unifying principle, the rhizome is reducible neither to

some central point that forms its source or place of nourishment, nor to the stems that shoot out from it. The rhizome is a play of the unity of its stems and their difference, and it is only because of this play that it offers a view of difference as a positive rather than negative phenomenon. The rhizome, in short, is the univocity of being, a univocity that, rightly understood, is the affirmation neither of difference, nor of unity, but of the surface that is the intertwining of the two. In this sense, we must understand Deleuze himself to be practicing the geometrical art inaugurated by Spinoza when he writes that:

> Spinoza thinks that the definition of God as he gives it is a real definition. By a proof of the reality of the definition must be understood a veritable generation of the object defined. This is the sense of the first propositions of the *Ethics*: *they are not hypothetical, but genetic.*[40]

This necessity of Deleuze's thought means that we can no longer consider him to be a thinker of difference, if by that we intend that he is a thinker who privileges difference. Rather, we must come to consider Deleuze to be a holist, in the Wittgensteinian sense.[41] By this, we mean that philosophical perspectives, viewed in a Deleuzian fashion, must be considered neither as realizations of a single driving principle by which our world can be explained—that is, as the will to truth—nor as a product of pure difference upon which unities are created as secondary phenomena. The antitranscendental path that Deleuze has trodden requires him to reject the primacy of difference at the same moment that he rejects the primacy of unity. As the latter reduces all difference to the tired repetition of a received pattern of discourse, the former renders all discourse impossible.

Deleuze, it seems, recognized this requirement on his thought in many places throughout his work. However, he wanted to circumvent it at crucial moments as well, in order to give the privilege to difference. There is, then, at the core of his thought a tension that he is never entirely able to move beyond. We must turn in the last section to that tension, in order to sketch out the limits of Deleuze's claims, and to show where he fell prey to the temptation to surpass them.

There are two places in Deleuze's thought where the tension between his recognition of the inseparability of unity and difference and his temptation to privilege difference raise questions that threaten the coherence of his thought. The first place is in his critique of representation, the second—already briefly noted—is in his positing of singularities at the base of metaphysics. We will address each of these in turn.

The critique of representation is bound to Deleuze's critique of resemblance and unifying principles. Representation is the practice in which the prejudices of the primacy of identity have become sedimented, where differences are either reduced, marginalized, or denied altogether. Moreover, in being the site upon which identity comes to dominate difference, it is, as well, the place where Nietzsche's "all the names of history" are frozen into a single one (itself called an "identity") and where the fluid and contingent nature of the philosophical project is forced to unify itself into a single and precise set of defensible claims oriented toward truth rather than remaining a plane of concepts oriented toward creation. Thus the task of a philosophical project that would reassert the irreducibility of difference must also involve the subversion of the representationalist practice of language:

> Representation allows the world of difference to escape . . . [i]nfinite representation is inseparable from a law which renders it possible: the form of the concept as an identity-form, which constitutes sometimes the in-itself of representation (A is A), sometimes the for-itself of representation (I=I). The prefix "re-" in the word representation signifies this conceptual form of the identical which subordinates differences.[42]

This subversion, although its effects appear throughout Deleuze's texts,[43] is performed in the most sustained fashion in *The Logic of Sense.*

The concept of sense when introduced (an introduction that, as noted above, Deleuze made for reasons that are "economic or strategic" rather than epistemic[44]) attempts to demonstrate that linguistic meaning is founded not upon a representationalist relationship between words and the world, but rather upon a play of words and world that itself escapes representation. Sense "is exactly the boundary between propositions and things."[45] It is thus incorporeal, escaping the possibility of being brought into representation by virtue of escaping the very categories of being upon which representation is founded. In fact, "we cannot say that sense exists, but rather that it inheres or subsists."[46] Meaning is founded on this sense, this happening or event of sense, rather than upon any correspondence between words and the world. "What renders language possible is the event insofar as the event is confused neither with the proposition which expresses it, nor with the state of the one who pronounces it, nor with the state of affairs denoted by the proposition . . . The event occurring in a state of affairs and the sense inhering in a proposition are the same entity."[47] Moreover, sense itself is founded on nonsense, which, as Deleuze notes, is not an absence of sense but rather a play of different series of singularities.

Such an analysis of sense reflects the tension in Deleuze's thought between a desire to give primacy to difference, here embodied in the event of sense,

and a recognition of the inseparability of unity and difference by the attempt to preserve unity—but as a second-order phenomenon composed of differences. Here, however, as elsewhere, where the primacy is given to difference the thought becomes incoherent. When the identity of representationalist theories of language is rejected in favor of its opposite, difference embodied in the concept of sense, then it is discourse itself that is abandoned. If meaning were merely the product of difference, there would be no meaning, only noises unrelated to each other. In order for meaning to occur, identity must exist within difference, or better, each must exist within the other. To speak with Saussure, if language is a system of differences, it is not only difference but system as well; and system carries within it the thought of identity. To put the matter baldly, a thought of pure difference is not a thought at all.

Deleuze's problem here is that he has cast the issue in terms of a binary opposition between the primacy of identity and that of difference. However, as the concept of the plane of immanence testifies, unity is not equivalent to a transcendent reducibility. Here the unity—that of linguistic identity—can occur on the plane of immanence, as long as the conception of language as a strict correspondence between words and world is abandoned. Such an abandonment, which is the abandonment of transcendence at the level of linguistic meaning, does not imply the rejection of identity, but rather a rejection of its subsumption under a transcendental principle. The project of an account of meaning, then, would be to construct a narrative about meaning that relied neither upon a principle of identity nor upon the subversion of such a principle.[48]

In the course of the discussion of meaning, another set of terms arise that constitute the second tension of Deleuze's thought regarding unity and difference. These are terms that vary throughout Deleuze's corpus, but occupy similar roles in each case. The term used above is "singularities," but "haecceities"[49] and perhaps "constituents"[50] perform the same functions. For Deleuze, it is these concepts which are invoked in order to name the primary differential components whose collocation traces a plane of immanence. It is by means of these concepts, then, that the primacy of difference emerges in Deleuzian philosophy. These concepts, which are, strictly speaking, placeholders for what lies beneath all qualities, which compose but do not themselves have qualities, are the positive differences that subtend all unities. For Deleuze, they exist—or better, subsist—beneath sense, language, concepts, bodies, consciousness, in short beneath all phenomena of experience. They are unexplained explainers, in that they must be brought into play if we are to offer an account of the world that gives primacy to difference, but precisely because there is a primacy of difference that lies beneath linguistic practice, they themselves escape all accounting.

It should be clear at this point that such a strategic move is bound to fail. To posit a concept whose function is to give primacy to difference is to violate the necessary chiasmic relationship between unity and difference. Such a positing betrays the univocity of being by merely inverting the picture of a philosophy that would give primacy to identity; in doing so it renders incomprehensible the concept of surfaces without which transcendence cannot coherently be denied. Only a philosophy that finds difference on the surface rather than in a source beneath or beyond it—even when that source eventually becomes the constitution of the surface—can articulate a role for difference that possesses both coherence and normative power. In allowing a place, often a constitutive place, for positive differences that are not themselves already differences of a surface, Deleuze allows his thought to lean exclusively on one half of the intertwining that is necessary in order to prevent his fragile project from collapsing.[51]

Of the tensions cited here, neither Deleuze's antirepresentationalism nor his privileging of differential elements are necessary or inextricable aspects of his thought. What Deleuze's reliance on Spinoza—and I believe his equally important reliance on Bergson—demonstrates is a recognition (if at times a concealed one) that a thought of difference cannot give primacy to difference. The fact that Deleuze sees himself as creating concepts rather than offering metaphysical truth-claims does not exempt him from the problem of the primacy of difference, because the dilemma of such a primacy is that it either renders the thought incoherent or returns to the transcendence it sought to avoid. The Deleuze we must bear in mind when we read him is the rhizomatic Deleuze, the Spinozist Deleuze, the Deleuze of surfaces of difference, and not the Deleuze of singularities or haecceities. There can be no thought that takes difference seriously—and indeed we live in an age that desperately needs a thought that does so—that can avoid the unity that attaches itself to such a project of thought. Difference, in short, must be thought alongside unity, or not at all.

Notes

I would like to thank Bruce Baugh, Constantin Boundas, and especially Dorothea Olkowski for comments on an earlier version of this paper.

1. Gilles Deleuze, *Différence et répétition* (Paris: Presses Universitaire de France, 1968), p. 80. Translations from this text and *Qu'est-ce que la philosophie?* are my own; all others are from the translations cited below.
2. *Différence et répétition*, p. 58. See pp. 52–61 for a discussion of Scotus and Spinoza on the univocity of being. See also Gilles Deleuze, *Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza*, trans. Martin Joughin (New York: Zone Books, 1990), esp. Chapter 3.
3. Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, vol. 1, *Anti-Oedipus*, trans. R. Hurley, M. Seem, and H. R. Lane (New York: The Viking Press, 1977; orig. pub. 1972), p. xiii.
4. Gilles Deleuze, *Qu'est-ce que la philosophie?* (Paris: Les Editions de Minuit, 1991) p. 10.
5. Gilles Deleuze, *Empiricism and Subjectivity: An Essay on Hume's Theory of Human Nature*, trans. Constantin V. Boundas (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991; orig. pub. 1953), p. 106.
6. *Qu'est-ce que la philosophie?*, p. 80.
7. Gilles Deleuze, *Cinema 2: The Time-Image*, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Robert Galeta (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989; orig. pub. 1985), p. 280.
8. *Qu'est-ce que la philosophie?*, p. 25.
9. *Ibid*, p. 25.
10. *Ibid*, p. 27.
11. *Ibid*, p. 38.
12. See below, note 41.
13. *Qu'est-ce que la philosophie?*, p. 50.
14. Gilles Deleuze, *Spinoza: Practical Philosophy*, trans. Robert Hurley (San Francisco: City Lights Books, 1988; orig. pub. 1981), p. 122.
15. *Quest-ce que la philosophie?*, p. 72.
16. *Spinoza*, p. 26. Cf. the continuation of the quote cited in the footnote above: "A mode of existence is good or bad, noble or vulgar, full or empty, independent of the Good and the Evil, and of all transcendent values: there is never any other criterion than the tenor of existence, the intensification of life" (*Qu'est-ce que la philosophie?*, p. 72).
17. *Spinoza*, p. 22. See also *Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza*, where Deleuze says of the *Ethics* that "*A method of explanation by immanent modes of existence* thus replaces the recourse to transcendent values. The question is in each case: Does, say, this feeling, increase our power of action or not? Does it help us come into full possession of that power?" (p. 269). This assessment fails to address the question of which powers are to be increased and which diminished, a question that he answers by means of the concept of life.

18. This discussion has avoided the question of whether we ought to consider Deleuze as holding that there is more than one plane of immanence at a given time. There is a tension in his thought around this question; for instance, in the Spinoza texts we discuss below, he seems to identify the univocity of being with the plane of immanence. However, in some later discussions, e.g., *Qu'est-ce que la philosophie?*, he seems to believe that there can be many at the same time. The truth may be, as he indicates on pp. 51–52 of the latter text, that the answer is a matter of interpretation. In any case, nothing in the current discussion hinges on it; ethical evaluation can be another plane, or at another place on the same plane. Its importance remains central.
19. It is not entirely clear that Deleuze would always ratify the distinction that has been drawn here between the ethical and the metaphysical. In fact, in some of his passages regarding naturalism, it seems that his philosophy moves toward effacing this distinction. However, both the drift of his philosophy, especially in his latest collaboration with Félix Guattari, and the incoherence of the alternative render this the most fruitful way to interpret Deleuze's conception of the philosophical project. The incoherence would devolve upon the attempt to engage in a metaphysics that posits a realm inaccessible to thought and proceeds to tell us what it is like.
20. For more on the concept of life in Deleuze's thought, see my "The Politics of Life in the Thought of Gilles Deleuze", *SubStance* 66, 1991, pp. 24–35.
21. Thus his focus upon values and evaluation in his text on Nietzsche. "Nietzsche's most general project is the introduction of the concepts of sense and value into philosophy" (*Nietzsche and Philosophy*, trans. Hugh Tomlinson [New York: Columbia University Press, 1983; orig. pub. 1962], p. 1).
22. *Différence et répétition*, p. 74.
23. Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, vol. 2* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987; orig. pub. 1980), p. 4.
24. *Différence et répétition*, p. 154.
25. *The Logic of Sense* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990; orig. pub. 1969), p. 17.
26. *The Logic of Sense*, pp. 102–3.
27. *Ibid*, p. 6.
28. *Ibid*, p. 173.
29. *Ibid*, p. 133.
30. *Expressionism in Philosophy*, p. 167.
31. The difference here is immaterial, because, as Spinoza notes throughout the *Ethics*, there is an indifference between being and being conceived. Cf., e.g., Part 1, definitions 1–3 and 5.
32. *Expressionism in Philosophy*, p. 176.
33. For a brief history of the concept of the univocity of being, see *Différence et répétition*, pp. 57–61. There, in fact, Deleuze cites Nietzsche as the crowning moment of the thought of the univocity of being, whose concept of the eternal return overcomes the problem that "the Spinozist substance appears to be independent of its modes, and the modes dependent on substance as if on another thing"(p. 59): in a word, a residual transcendence. Deleuze seems to have revised this assessment since then.
34. *Expressionism in Philosophy*, p. 42.
35. Cf. *ibid*, pp. 15–16.

36. *Ibid*, p. 100.

37. *Ibid*, p. 16.

38. *Ibid*, p. 180.

39. For a political development of this thought, see Antonio Negri's book—much admired by Deleuze—*The Savage Anomaly: The Power of Spinoza's Metaphysics and Politics*, trans. Michael Hardt (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1991; orig. pub. 1981). Although Negri finds the crux of this thought in the third and fourth books of the *Ethics*, the development articulated here suggests that it is equally characteristic of the earlier books.

40. *Expressionism in Philosophy*, p. 79.

41. For Wittgensteinian holists, for example Wilfrid Sellars, Robert Brandom, and at moments Richard Rorty, a linguistic or epistemic whole is characterized not by its closure, but rather by the fact that for any element to have a meaning, there must be other elements to which it refers. This does not imply that those elements form a closed totality. Rather, since both language and knowledge are practices that are engaged with and by other practices, closure is impossible. This is the significance of Wittgenstein's claim that "the end [of epistemic questioning] is not an ungrounded presupposition: it is an ungrounded way of acting." *On Certainty*, trans. Denis Paul and G. E. M. Anscombe; G. E. M. Anscombe and G. H. von Wright, eds. (New York: Harper and Row, 1969), p. 17e. For Wittgenstein's epistemic holism, see *On Certainty* generally; his linguistic holism is contained in *Philosophical Investigations*, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe (Oxford: Blackwell, 1953).

42. *Différence et répétition*, p. 79.

43. Cf., for example, *Anti-Oedipus* ("The whole of desiring-*production* is crushed, subjected to the requirements of *representation*, and to the dreary games of what is representative and represented in representation" [p. 54]).

44. See above, note 23.

45. *The Logic of Sense*, p. 22.

46. *Ibid*, p. 21.

47. *Ibid*, p. 182.

48. Although the outline of such an account would be well beyond the scope of this paper, the works of Ludwig Wittgenstein, Wilfrid Sellars, and recently Robert Brandom go a long way in this direction.

49. Cf., e.g., *A Thousand Plateaus*, pp. 260–265, and *Dialogues*, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987; orig. pub. 1977), pp. 92–93.

50. This is the term—*composantes*—Deleuze uses in discussing the parts that make of a concept in *Qu'est-ce que la philosophie?*, e.g. pp. 25–26.

51. On the interpretation of Deleuze offered here, one might wonder what becomes of his notion of "intensities." Intensities should not be thought of as transcendent constitutive singularities, but as both produced and producing. Intensities arise when two or more planes of immanence come into contact, and often either force changes on those planes or become part of the site of a new, emerging plane.

4

Gilles Deleuze, *The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque*[1]

Alain Badiou

THERE IS A BOOK that proposes a concept (that of the fold). The concept is seized within its history, varied within the fields of its application, ramified by its consequences. It is furthermore distributed in accordance with the *description* of the site where it is thought[2] and the *narration* of its uses. It is recorded as a law of the place, and of what takes place. It is *what it is about.* These are the last words of the last page: "What always matters is folding, unfolding, refolding" (p. 189).

An attentive and discerning exposition of Leibniz, leaving unexplored not even the most subtle detail, might serve as a vector to Deleuze's conceptual proposition. The next to last statement of the book is: "We remain Leibnizian" (p. 189). What is important finally is not Leibniz, but that, compelled to folding, unfolding, and refolding, we moderns remain Leibnizian.

This raises the question as to what is meant by "remain."

We might here open an academic discussion on Deleuze's exactitude as historian (an exemplary and subtle exactitude: he is a perfect reader). We might again oppose a wily, nominalist Leibniz, a shrewd eclectic, to the exquisitely profound and mobile Leibniz of Deleuze's paradigm. Or work our way through the details of the text. Or simply treat it as a genealogical quarrel.

But all this aside. This rare, admirable book offers us a vision and a conception of *our* world. We must address it as one philosopher to another: for its intellectual beatitude, the pure pleasure of its style, the interlacing of writing and thought, the fold of the concept and the nonconcept.

Nonetheless, a discussion is necessary, but it will be a very difficult one in that it must begin with a debate on discord; on the *being* of discord. Because for Deleuze, as for Leibniz, it is not to be found between true and false, but between possible and possible. Leibniz justified this by something of a divine measure (the principle of the best). Deleuze, not at all. Our world, that of an

"enlarged chromatism," is an identical scene "where Sextus both rapes *and* does not rape Lucretia" (p. 112). A discord is the "and" of the concord. To perceive the harmony of this, we need only stay within the musical comparison of "unresolved discords."

If we wish to maintain the vigilant tension of the philosophic *disputatio*, we have no choice but follow the thread of the central concept, even if it means abandoning Deleuze's equanimous sinuosity. It is absolutely necessary to unfold the fold, to force it into some immortal unfold.

We shall operate within the yoke of a triplet, a triple loosening of the lasso Deleuze uses to capture us.

The fold is first of all an *antiextensional* concept of the multiple, a representation of the multiple as a labyrinthine complexity, directly qualitative and irreducible to any elementary composition whatever.

The fold is yet again an *antidialectic* concept of the event, or of singularity. It is an operator that permits thought and individuation to "level" each other.

The fold is finally an *anti-Cartesian* (or anti-Lacanian) concept of the subject, a "communicating" figure of absolute interiority, equivalent to the world, of which it is a point of view. Or again: the fold allows us to conceive of an enunciation without "enouncement,"[3] or of knowledge without an object. The world as such will no longer be the fantasy of the All, but the pertinent hallucination of the inside as pure outside.

All these *antis* are put forth with moderation, the marvelous and captious moderation of Deleuze's expository style. Forever asserting, forever refining. Dividing unto infinity in order to lead division itself astray. Enchanting the multiple, seducing the One, solidifying the implausible, citing the incongruous. But we shall stop here. Stop short.

I. The Multiple, Organicity

It is not by abruptly imposing an order that we might hope to overcome the Deleuzian dodge. An example: We need to read no further than twenty lines before coming across this: "The multiple is not what has many subsets, but also what can be folded in many ways" (p. 5). One is immediately tempted to make an objection: to begin with, a multiple is not composed of its *subsets,* but of its *elements*. Furthermore, the *thought* of a fold is its spread-as-multiple, its reduction to elementary belonging, even though the thought of a knot is given in its algebraic group. Finally, how can "what is folded many ways" be *exposed* to the folding, topologized into innumerable folds, if it was not innumerable to begin with in its pure multiple-being, its Canto-

rian being, its cardinality, indifferent to any fold, because containing within itself the being of the fold, as a multiple *without qualities*?

But what is the value of this punctuation in terms, or parameters, of Leibniz-Deleuze? He is challenging a set-theory ontology of elements and belonging, and there is in that a classical line of *disputatio* on the one and the multiple. Leibniz-Deleuze's thesis is that the point, or element, cannot have the value of a unit of matter: "The unit of matter, the smallest element of the labyrinth, is the fold, not the point" (p. 9). There is thus a constant ambivalence between the "belonging" (of an element) and the "inclusion" (of a subset). Leibniz-Deleuze's ontology apprehends the multiple as a *point-subset*, that is, as an extension (an unfold) or a contraction (a fold), with neither atom nor vacuum. This is diametrically opposed to a resolute "set-theory ontology," which *weaves out of the vacuum* the greatest complexities, and *reduces to pure belonging* the most entangled topologies.

And yet, this line of examination is hardly established before it is unfolded and complicated. Deleuze-Leibniz's ruse is to leave uncovered no pair of oppositions, to be overtaken or taken over by no dialectic scheme. What can be said of the point, the element? We know that Leibniz-Deleuze distinguishes between three kinds: the material or physical point-fold, which is "elastic or plastic"; the mathematical point, which is both pure convention (as representing the end of the line) and "site, focus, locus—locus of the conjunction of the curve vectors"; and finally the metaphysical point, the mind, or subject, which occupies the point of view or position that the mathematical point designates at the conjunction of the point-folds. So that, Deleuze concludes, you must distinguish "the point of inflection, the point of position, the point of inclusion" (p. 32). But he also concludes, as we have just seen, that it is impossible to think of them separately, each supposing the determination of the other two. What figure of the multiple "in itself" can be opposed, without appearing foolish, to this ramified evasion of the point under the sign of the fold?

Philosophy, according to Deleuze, is not an inference, but rather a *narration.* What he says about the baroque (p. 174) can be applied admirably to his own style of thought: "the description takes the place of the object, the concept becomes narrative, and the subject [becomes] point of view or subject of the enunciation." You will then not find a case of the multiple, but a description of its figures, and, even more so, of the constant passage from one figure to another; you will not find a concept of the multiple, but the narration of its being-as-world, in the sense that Deleuze says very rightly that Leibniz's philosophy is the "signature of the world" and not the "symbol of a cosmos" (p. 174); and neither will you find a theory of the subject, but an attentiveness to, a registering of the point of view that every

subject can be resolved into and which is itself the term of a series that is likely to be divergent or without reason.

Thus, when Deleuze credits Leibniz with a "new relation between the one and the multiple" (p. 173), it is principally for what is diagonal, subverted, indistinct in this relation, in as much as "in the subjective sense" (and so the monadic), "there must also be multiplicity of the one and unity of the multiple." Finally, the "relation" One/Multiple is untied and undone to form the quasi relations One/One and Multiple/Multiple. These quasi relations, all subsumed under the concept-without-concept of fold, the One-as-fold, reversal of the Multiple-as-fold, are dealt with by description (which is what the theme of the baroque is used for), narration (the world as a game), or enunciating position (Deleuze neither refutes nor argues, he states). They can neither be deduced, nor thought within the fidelity of any axiomatic lineage or any primitive decision. Their function is to avoid distinction, opposition, fatal binarity. The maxim of their use is the chiaroscuro, which for Leibniz-Deleuze is the *tincture of the idea*: "in the same way the clear plunges into the obscure and never ceases plunging into it; it is chiaroscuro by nature, development of the obscure, it is *more or less* clear as revealed by the sensible" (p. 120).

The method is typical of Leibniz, Bergson, and Deleuze. It marks a position of hostility (subjective or enunciating) with respect to the ideal theme of the clear, which we find from Plato (the Idea-as-sun) to Descartes (the clear Idea), and which is also the metaphor of a concept of the Multiple that demands that the elements composing it can be exposed, by right, to thought in full light of the distinctiveness of their belonging. Leibniz-Bergson-Deleuze does not say that it is the obscure that predominates. He does not meet the debate head-on. No, he shades. Nuance is here the antidialectic operator par excellence. Nuance will be used to *dissolve* the latent opposition, one of whose terms the clear magnifies. Continuity can then be established locally as an exchange of values at each real point, so that the couple clear/obscure can no longer be separated, and even less brought under a hierarchical scheme, except at the price of a global abstraction. This abstraction is itself foreign to the life of the world.

If the thought of the Multiple put forth by Deleuze-Leibniz is so fleeting, if it is the narration, devoid both of gap and outside, of the folds and unfolds of the world, this is because it is neither in opposition to an other thought, nor set up on the outskirts of an other. Its aim is rather to *inseparate itself from all thoughts*, to multiply *within* the multiple all possible thoughts of the multiple. For "the really distinct is not necessarily either separated or separable," and "nothing is separable or separated, but everything conspires" (p. 75).

This vision of the world as an intricate, folded, and inseparable totality such that any distinction is simply a local operation, this "modern" conviction that the multiple cannot even be discerned as multiple, but only "activated" as fold, this culture of the divergence (in the serial sense), which compossibilizes the most radical heterogeneities, this "opening" without counterpart ("a world of captures rather than enclosures" [p. 111]): all this is what founds Deleuze's fraternal and profound relationship to Leibniz. The multiple as a large animal made up of animals, the organic respiration inherent to one's own organicity, the multiple as *living tissue*, which folds as if under the effect of its organic expandings and contractings, in perfect contradiction with the Cartesian concept of extension as punctual and regulated by the shock: Deleuze's philosophy is the capture of a life that is both total and divergent. No wonder he pays tribute to Leibniz, who upholds, more than any other philosopher, "the assertion of one sole and same world, and of the infinite difference and variety found in this world" (p. 78). No wonder he defends this audacity, "baroque" par excellence: "a texturology which is evidence of a generalized organicism, or of the presence of organisms everywhere" (p. 155).

In fact, there have never been but two schemes, or paradigms, of the Multiple: the mathematic and the organicist, Plato or Aristotle. Opposing the fold to the set, or Leibniz to Descartes, reanimates the organicist scheme. Deleuze-Leibniz does not omit remarking that it must be separated from the mathematic scheme: "in Mathematics, it is individuation which constitutes a specification; this is not so with physical things or organic bodies" (p. 87).

The animal or the number? This is the cross of metaphysics, and the greatness of Deleuze-Leibniz, metaphysician of the divergent world of modernity, is to choose without hesitation for the animal. After all, "it is not only animal psychology, but animal monadology which is essential to Leibniz's system" (p. 146).

The real question underlying this is that of singularity: where and how does the singular meet up with the concept? What is the paradigm of such an encounter? If Deleuze likes the Stoics, Leibniz, or Whitehead, and if he does not much like Plato, Descartes, or Hegel, it is because, in the first series, the principle of individuation occupies a strategic place, which it is denied in the second. The "Leibnizian revolution" is greeted with rare stylistic enthusiasm in Deleuze's supple narration, as the "wedding of concept and singularity" (p. 91).

But to begin with, what is singular? In my opinion, it is this question that dominates throughout Deleuze's book, and it is as a *spokesman for the singular* that Leibniz is summoned. He who has sharpened thought on the grindstone of the infinity of occurrences, inflections, species, and individuals.

II. The Event, Singularity

The chapter "What is an event?" occupies the center of the book (pp. 103–112) and is more about Whitehead than Leibniz. But in both what precedes and what follows, the category of event is central, because it supports, envelopes, dynamizes the category of singularity. Deleuze-Leibniz considers the world as "a series of inflections or events: it is a pure *transmission of singularities*" (p. 81).

Once again, the question central to the thought of the event attributed by Deleuze to Leibniz-Whitehead is intriguing and provoking. We quote: "What are the conditions of an event if everything is to be event?" (p. 103).

The temptation is great to counter with this: if "everything is event," how can the event be distinguished from the *fact*, from what-happens-in-the-world according to its law of presentation? Shouldn't we rather ask: "What are the conditions of an event for *almost nothing* to be event?" Is what is presented really singular just as being presented? It can be argued just as reasonably that the course of the world in general displays nothing but generality.

How then can Leibniz-Whitehead-Deleuze extract from the organicist scheme of the Multiple a theory of the singular-*as-event*, when event means: everything that happens, in as much as everything happens?

This enigma can be expressed simply: while we often understand "event" as the singularity of a rupture, Leibniz-Whitehead-Deleuze understands it as *what singularizes continuity in each of its local folds*. But on the other hand, for Leibniz-Whitehead-Deleuze, "event" nonetheless designates the origin, always singular, or local, of a truth (a concept), or what Deleuze formulates as the "subordination of the true to the singular and the remarkable" (p. 121). Thus the event is both omnipresent and creative, structural and extraordinary.

As a result, the series of notions related to the event are continually disseminated and contracted into the same point. Take three examples.

1. From the moment Leibniz-Deleuze thinks[4] the event as an immanent inflection of the continuous, he must simultaneously suppose it is from the *point of this immanence* that we speak of the event (never "before," nor "from outside"); and yet, that an essential preexistence, that of the global law of the world, *must* elude us if we are to speak of it: "Leibniz's philosophy . . . requires this ideal preexistence of the world . . . this mute and shadowy part of the event. We can only speak of the event when we are already at one with the mind which expresses it and the body which accomplishes it, but we could not speak of it at all without this part which is subtracted from it" (p. 142).

This image of the "mute and shadowy part of the event" is admirable and

adequate. Yet, we can see that what is excessive—shadowy—in the event for Leibniz-Deleuze is *the All that preexists it.* This is because in an organicist ontology of the Multiple, the event is like a spontaneous gesture over a dark *background* of an enveloping and global animality. Deleuze explains that there are two aspects to Leibniz's "mannerism," and that this mannerism opposes him to Cartesian classicism: "The first is the spontaneity of the manners which is opposed to the essentiality of the attribute. The second is the omnipresence of the dark background which is opposed to the clarity of the form, and without which the manners would have no place to emerge from" (p. 76).

For Leibniz-Deleuze, the preexistence of the world as a "dark background" designates the event as *manner*, and this is coherent with the organicity of the Multiple. According to this conception it is a combination of immanence and excessive infinity which authorizes us to "speak of" an event. Thinking the event, or making a concept of the singular, always requires that a commitment and a substraction be conjoined, the world (or the situation) and the infinite.

2. The most highly dense chapter of Deleuze's book, and in my opinion the most accomplished, is chapter 4, which deals with "sufficient reason." Why is it that Deleuze is particularly skillful and (faithful) in this passage? Because the version he gives of the principle as "the identity of the event and the predicate" (p. 55), which is even better summarized when he states: "Everything has a concept!," is in reality the maxim of his own genius, the axiom without which he would be discouraged from philosophizing.

Once again, Deleuzian determination is assembled to blur an established dialectic through the play of nuances: this principle of reason allows him to superimpose at each point nominalism and universalism. Here we find the most profound of Deleuze's programs of thought:

> For the Nominalists, only individuals exist, concepts being only well regulated words; for the Universalists, the concept can be infinitely specified, the individual only referring to accidental or extra-conceptual determinations. But for Leibniz, it is both true that the individual exists *and* that this is in virtue of the power of the concept: monad or mind. Thus this power of the concept (to become subject) does not consist in infinitely specifying a genre, but in condensing and prolonging singularities. These are not generalities, but events, drops of events. (p. 86)

We grant that the couple universalism/nominalism must be subverted. But can it be to the extent of the "monadic" statement: "Everything has a concept"?

In fact, Deleuze *reverses* the implicit axiom common to nominalism and universalism, an axiom that says that nothing *of the Multiple* has a concept.

For the nominalist, the Multiple exists, while the concept, and so the One, is nothing but language; for the universalist, the One exists in accordance with the concept, and the Multiple is inessential. Leibniz-Deleuze says: the Multiple exists by concept, or: the Multiple exists *in the One*. This is precisely the function of the monad: to extract the one from within the Multiple so that there may be a concept of this multiple. This will establish a fertile equivocity between "to be an element of," or "belong to," ontological categories, and "to possess a property," "have a certain predicate," categories of knowledge. Deleuze expresses this precisely: "Finally, a monad has as its property, not an abstract attribute . . . but other monads" (p. 148).

At this point thought is submitted to the most extreme tension:

—either the Multiple is pure multiple of multiples, and there is no One from which it can be held that "everything has a concept";

—or the Multiple "possesses" properties, and this cannot be only in the name of its elements, or its subordinate multiples: there must be conceptual inherence, and therefore essences.

Deleuze congratulates G. Tarde for having spotted in Leibniz a sort of substitution of having for being: the being of the monad is the sum, the nuanced, hierarchized, continuous inventory of what it "possesses": "what is new is having brought the analysis to bear on the species, the degrees, the relations and variables of possession, making of it the content or the development of the notion of Being" (p. 147).

Of course, Deleuze knows that "possession," "having," "belonging" are metaphorical operations here. But the analysis of being within the register of having (or domination) allows him to *slip* concepts into the web of the Multiple without having to take a clear position on the question of the One. The problem is even greater for Deleuze than for Leibniz, because for the latter there is a total language, an integrating series of all multiplicities, God. At this stopping point, dissemination, through default of the One, necessarily makes a fiction of the concept (just as the crucial concept of vanishing quantity, or the infinitely small, is a fiction for Leibniz).

A solution probably does exist and Deleuze uses it *by segments*. It involves distinguishing the operations of knowledge (or *encyclopedic* concepts) from the operations of truth (or concepts *as events*). From the point of the situation, and so in "monadic" immanence, it is true that everything has an (encyclopedic) concept, but *nothing* is event (there are only facts). From the point of the event, *there will have been* a truth (of the situation) that is *locally* "forcible" as an encyclopedic concept, but globally indiscernible.

It is within this distinction that Deleuze-Leibniz discerns "two levels" of the thought of the world, the level of *actualization* (monads), and the level of *realization* (bodies)(p. 41). It might be said that, in infinity, the monadic

dimension of a given thing proceeds with the verification-as-truth of what its corporeal dimension is the carrying out of. Or that the monad is a functor of truth, while bodies are encyclopedic arrangements. Particularly since actualization corresponds to the mathematical metaphor of an "infinitely inflected curve" (p. 136), and realization to "coordinates that determine extremes" (p. 136). The "open" transit of truth, in relation to the stability "in situation" of knowledge.

But *at the same time*, Deleuze tries to "sew back up" or fold one onto the other, the two levels thus discerned. To keep them apart, the event would have to break up *at some point* the "everything has a concept." There would have to be a break-down of meanings. But Leibniz-Deleuze thoroughly intends to establish that any apparent breakdown, any separate punctuality, is in fact a high-level ruse of continuity.

Deleuze is at his most brilliant when he is devoted to "repairing" the apparent gaps in Leibnizian logic.

The traditional objection to Leibniz is that his monadology prevents any thought of the relation. Deleuze shows that it is not the case. Leibniz "has done nothing but think the relation" (p. 72). In passing he produces this stupefying definition of a relation: "the unity of the non-relation with a matter structured by the couple: the whole and its parts" (p. 62), which subjugates and persuades—except that, in mathematical ontology, the whole and its parts would have to be replaced by the multiple and the vacuum.

There seems to be an unsustainable contradiction between the principle of sufficient reason (which requires that everything possess a concept and the requisites of its activity, thus binding everything to everything else) and the principle of indiscernibles (which claims there is no real being identical to an other, thus unbinding everything from everything else). Deleuze gives an immediate response: no, the connection of reasons and the interruption of indiscernibles only engender the best flux, a higher type of continuity: "The principle of indiscernibles establishes cuts; but the cuts are not gaps or ruptures in the continuity. On the contrary, they redistribute continuity in such a way that there is no gap, that is, in the 'best' way" (p. 88). It is for the same reason that "we cannot know *where the sensible finishes and the intelligible begins*" (p. 88). It is clear that the universality of events is also the universality of continuities for Deleuze-Leibniz. Or we can say that for Leibniz-Deleuze, "everything happens" means nothing is interrupted, and *therefore* everything has a concept, that of its inclusion in continuity, as an inflection-as-cut, or fold.

3. What a joy to see Deleuze mention Mallarmé so naturally, as a poet-thinker, and to feel he places him among the greatest!

On page 43, Deleuze calls him "a great baroque poet." Why? Because "the fold . . . is Mallarmé's most important operatory act." And he mentions the fan, "fold upon fold," the leaves of the book as "folds of thought" . . . the fold in "unity which gives rise to being multiplicity which gives rise to inclusion, collectivity become consistent" (p. 43).

This topology of the fold is descriptively unchallengeable. Pushed to its logical consequences, it brings Deleuze to write: "The book, as fold of the event."

On page 90, Mallarmé is evoked once more, in the company of Nietzsche, as a "revelation of a world-as-thought, which emits a throw of dice." The throw of dice, Deleuze says, "is the power to assert chance, to think all chance, which is certainly not principle, but the absence of all principle. He thus renders to absence or nothingness what escapes chance and pretends to elude it by limiting it in principle." Deleuze's aim is clear: show that beyond the Leibnizian baroque there is our world, where a gamble "causes the incompossibles to enter into the same shattered world" (p. 90).

It is paradoxical to summon Mallarmé in service of such an aim, but I shall come back to that. This paradoxical reference permits us, however, to understand why the list of thinkers of the event according to Deleuze (the Stoics, Leibniz, Whitehead . . .) is only made up of names that could just as well be cited for their *opposition* to any concept of the event: declared adversaries of the vacuum, of the clinamen, of chance, of disjunctive separation, of the radical break, of the idea, in short, of everything that opens onto thinking the event as rupture, and to begin with what has neither inside nor connection: a separated vacuum.

Fundamentally, "event" means just the contrary for Deleuze: an immanent activity over a background of totality, a creation, a novelty certainly, but thinkable within the interiority of the continuous. *Un élan vital.* Or a complex of extensions, intensities, singularities, which is both punctually reflected and accomplished in a flux (p. 109). "Event" names a predicate-as-gesture of the world: "predicates or events" Leibniz says. "Event" is only the pertinence for language of the subject-verb-complement system, as opposed to the essentialist and eternitarian judgment of attribution, with which Plato or Descartes are reproached. "*Leibnizian inclusion reposes on a subject-verb-complement schema, which has resisted since antiquity the schema of attribution*: a baroque grammar, where the predicate is above all relation and event, not attribute" (p. 71).

Deleuze maintains immanence, excludes interruption or caesura, and only moves the qualification (or concept) of the judgment of attribution (and so of the One-as-being) to the active schema, which subjectivizes and complements.

This is because Deleuze-Leibniz, deprived of the vacuum, wants to read the "what happens" in the flesh of the full, in the intimacy of the fold. The last key to what he says is thus: interiority.

III. The Subject, Interiority

Deleuze intends to follow Leibniz in his most paradoxical undertaking: establish the monad as "absolute interiority" and go on to the most rigorous analysis possible of the relations of exteriority (or possession), in particular the relation between mind and body. Treating the outside as an exact reversion, or "membrane," of the inside, reading the world as a texture of the intimate, thinking the macroscopic (or the molar) as a torsion of the microscopic (or the molecular): these are undoubtedly the operations that constitute the true effectiveness of the concept of Fold. For example: "the unilaterality of the monad implies as its condition of enclosure, a torsion of the world, an infinite fold, which can only unfold, according to the condition, by restoring the other side, not as exterior to the monad, but as the exterior or the outside *of* its own interiority: a wall, a supple and adhesive membrane, coextensive with the entire inside" (p. 149). We can see that with the fold, Deleuze is searching for a figure of interiority (or of the subject) that is *neither* reflection (or the cogito), *nor* the relation-to, the focus (or intentionality), *nor* the pure empty point (or eclipse). Neither Descartes, nor Husserl, nor Lacan. Absolute interiority, *but* "reversed" in such a way that it disposes of a relation to the All, of a "primitive non-localized relation which bound the absolute interior" (p. 149). Leibniz calls this primitive relation, which folds the absolute interiority onto the total exterior, the *vinculum*, and it is what allows the monadic interior to subordinate, or illuminate, the "exterior" monads, without having to "cross over" the boundaries of its interiority.

The analysis of the axial concept of vinculum proposed by Deleuze, in the light of the fold, is pure wonder (all of chapter 8). His intelligence is visibly excited by the challenge, by the tracking down of an entirely new piste: a subject *directly* articulating the classical closure of the reflexive subject (but without reflexive clarity) and the baroque porosity of the empiricist subject (but without mechanical passivity). An intimacy spread over the entire world, a mind folded everywhere within the body: what a happy surprise! This is how Deleuze recapitulates the requisites:

1) *Each* individual monad possesses *one* body from which it is inseparable;
2) each possesses a body in as much as it is the constant subject of the

> vinculum attached to it (*its* vinculum); 3) the variables of the vinculum are the monads taken as a mass; 4) this mass of monads cannot be separated from an infinity of material parts, to which they belong; 5) these material parts make up the organic part of *one* body, of which the vinculum, considered in relation to the variables, assures the specific unity; 6) *this* body is the one that belongs to the individual monad, it is *its* body, in that it already disposes of individual unity, thanks to the vinculum, now considered in relation to the constant (p. 152).

This conception of the subject as interiority whose own exterior forms a primitive link to the infinite Multiple or the world has three principal effects.

First, it releases knowledge from any relation to an "object." Knowledge operates through the summoning up of immanent perceptions, as an interior "membrane" effect, a subsumption or domination, of multiplicities taken "as a mass." Knowing is unfolding an interior complexity. In this sense, Leibniz-Deleuze is in agreement with what I have called the contemporary question of an "objectless subject": "I always unfold between two folds, and if perceiving is unfolding, I always perceive within the folds. *Any perception is hallucinatory, because perception has no object*" (p. 125).

Second, Deleuze-Leibniz's conception makes of the subject a series, or an unfolding of predicates, and not a substance, or a pure empty reflexive point, whether it be as an eclipse or as the transcendental correlate of an object = x. Leibniz-Deleuze's subject is *directly multiple*, and this is its strength. For example: "Everything real is a subject whose predicate is a character submitted to a series, the set of predicates being the relation between the limits of these series" (p. 64). And Deleuze adds: "we must avoid confusing the limit and the subject," which is far from being a simple statement of Leibnizian orthodoxy: contemporary humanism, what is called "the rights of man," is literally poisoned by an unexpressed conception of the subject as limit. But the subject is in fact, at most, what provides multiple supports for the relation of several serial limits.

Third, Leibniz-Deleuze's conception makes of the subject the point (of view) from which there is a truth, a *function of truth*. Not the source, or the constituent, or the guarantee of truth, but the point of view from which the truth is. Interiority is above all the occupation of such a point (of view). The vinculum is also the ordering of the cases of truth.

Deleuze is perfectly right in showing that if "relativism" is involved, it does not affect the truth. For it is not the truth which varies according to, or with, the point of view (the subject, the monad, interiority). It is the fact that *truth is variation* which demands that it can be so only *for* a point (of view): "This is not a variation of the truth from subject to subject, but the condition under which the truth of a variation appears to the subject" (p. 27).

This conception of the truth as "varying" (or undergoing a process) does demand that it always be ordered at one point, or from case to case. The true is only manifest in the movement that examines the variation that it is: "the point of view is *the power to order cases* in each domain of variation, a condition for the manifestation of the true" (p. 30).

The problem is undoubtedly that these considerations remain linked to an "inseparated" vision of the event, and *therefore of points (of view).* Deleuze points this out with his customary perspicacity: "of course there is no vacuum between two points of view" (p. 28). But this absence of a vacuum introduces a complete continuity between the points of view. The result is that the continuity, which depends on the whole, is opposed to the singularity of the variation. But a truth could very well be, on the contrary, the becoming-varied. And because this becoming is separated from any other by emptiness, a truth is a trajectory *left to chance.* This is what neither Leibniz nor Deleuze can consent to in the end, because ontological organicism forecloses the vacuum, according to the law (or desire, it is the same thing) of the Great Animal Totality.

IV. Nature and Truth

The extreme amplitude of Deleuze's philosophic project contrasts with the modesty and accessibility of his prose. Deleuze is a great philosopher. He wants and he creates a real quantity of philosophic greatness.

Nature is the paradigm of this greatness. Deleuze wants and creates a philosophy "of" nature, or rather a philosophy as nature. This can be understood as a *description in thought of the life of the world,* such that the life thus described might include, as one of its living gestures, the description itself.

I do not use lightly the word *life.* The concepts of flux, desire, fold, are captors of life, descriptive traps that thought sets for the living world and the present world. Deleuze likes the baroque, those for whom "the principles of reason are actual cries: All is not fish, but there are fish everywhere . . . The living is not universal, but ubiquitous" (p. 14).

A concept must undergo the trial of its biological evaluation, or its evaluation by biology. So for the fold: "What is essential is that the two conceptions (epigenesis and preformation) have in common their conception of the organism as an original fold, folding or creasing (and never will biology relinquish this determination of the living, as can be witnessed today in the fundamental pleating of globular proteins)" (p. 15).

The question of the body, of the specific mode through which thought is affected by the body, is essential for Deleuze. The fold is an adequate image

of the incomprehensible tie between thought and body. The entire third part, which concludes Deleuze's book, is entitled "Having a body." We read there that "[the fold] also passes between mind and body, but after having already passed between the inorganic and the organic for the bodies, and the monad 'species' for the minds. It is an extremely sinuous fold, a zigzag, a primitive unlocalizable link" (p. 162).

When Deleuze mentions "modern mathematicians," he is of course talking about Thom or Mandelbrot, or of those who (outside of being great mathematicians in their own fields) have attempted the morphological and descriptive projection of a model based on certain mathematical concepts onto geological, organic, social, or other empirical data. Mathematics is only touched on or mentioned in as much as it claims to be included without mediation in a natural phenomenology (pp. 22–23).

Nor do I use lightly the term *description*. We saw that Deleuze requires the style of thought implicit in description and narration, in opposition to the essentialist argument or dialectic development. Deleuze lets thought roam through the labyrinth of the world; he lays down marks and lays out threads, sets mental traps for beasts and shadows. Monadology or nomadology: he proposes this literal permutation himself. He likes the question to be indirect and local, the mirror to be tinted. He likes there to be a tight-woven screen that forces us to squint to perceive the outline of being. The aim is to sharpen perception, to make hypothetical assurances move about and stray.

When you read Deleuze, you never know exactly who is speaking, nor who assures what is said, or declares himself to be certain of it. Is it Leibniz? Deleuze? The well-intentioned reader? The passing artist? The (really inspired) matrix Deleuze gives of Henry James's novels is an allegory of the detours of his own philosophic work: "*That which* I am talking of and *which* you are thinking of too, do you agree to say *it* of *him*, providing we know what can be expected from *her* in relation to *it* and we can also agree on which is *he* and which is *she*?" (p. 30). This is what I call a description *for thought*. What is important here is not so much to decide (on him, her, that which, etc.), but to be led to the point of capture or of focus where these determinations define a figure, a gesture, or an occurrence.

If Deleuze were less prudent, or more direct, he might have chanced vast and culminated descriptions in the style of Plato's *Timaeus*, Descartes' *Monde*, Hegel's *Philosophy of Nature*, or Bergson's *Creative Evolution*. This is a tradition. But he suggests, rather, the vain possibility (or the contemporary impossibility) of these attempts. He suggests this while presenting the concepts, the operations, the "formatives." The fold might be most important of all (after difference, repetition, desire, flux, the molecular and the molar, the image, movement, etc.). Deleuze submits it to us through partial

descriptions, as that which possibly *describes* a great description, a general capture of the life of the world, which will never be accomplished.

V. Five Punctuations

The author of these lines has made *the other ontological choice*, that of subtraction, of the empty set and the matheme. Belonging and inclusion play for him the role Deleuze attributes to the fold and the world.

However, the word "event" signifies for both of us an edge, or border, of Being, such that the True is assigned to its singularity. For Deleuze as well as for myself, truth is neither adequation nor structure. It is an infinite process, which has its origin randomly *in a point.*

The result is a strange mixture of infinitesimal proximity and infinite distance. I shall only give here a few examples, which will also serve as a contrasting reexposition of Deleuze's thought.

1. The Event

That there be excess (indifferently shadow or light) in the occurrence of the event, that it be creative, I agree. But my distribution of this excess is opposed to Deleuze's, who finds it in the inexhaustible fullness of the world.

For me, it is not from the world, even ideally, that the event gets its inexhaustible reserve, its silent (or indiscernible) excess, but *from its not being attached to it*, from its being separated, interrupted, or—as Mallarmé would say—"pure." And it is, on the contrary, what *afterward* is named by minds or accomplished in bodies that brings about the global or ideal situation in the world of the event (a suspended effect, that I call a truth). The excess of the event is never related to the situation as an organic "dark background," but as a multiple, so that the event *is not counted for one by it*. The result is that its silent or subtracted part is an infinity *to come*, a postexistence that will bring back to the world the pure separated point of the supplement produced by the event, under the laborious and unachievable form of an infinite inclusion. Where Deleuze sees a "manner" of being, I say that the worldly postexistence of a truth signals the event as *separation*, and this is coherent with the mathematicity of the multiple (but effectively is not so if we suppose its organicity).

"Event" means: there is some One, in the absence of continuity, in the suspension of significations, and *thus* there are some truths, which are chance trajectories subtracted—by fidelity to this supernumerary One—from the encyclopedia of the concept.

2. Essence, Relation, All

In his war against essences, Deleuze promotes the active form of the verb, the operation of the complement, and sets this "dynamism"—opposed to the judgment of attribution—against the inexhaustible activity of the All.

But is the relational primate of the verb over the attributed adjective sufficient to save the singularity, to free us of essences? Must not the event rather be subtracted from any relation *just as* from any attribute, from the doing of the verb *just as* from the being of the copulative? Can the taking-place of the event support being in continuity, or in intermittence, between the subject of the verb and its complement?

The great All annuls just as surely the local gesture of singularity, as the transcendent essence crushes individuation. Singularity demands that the separating distance be absolute and thus that the vacuum be a *point* of Being. It can support the internal preexistence, neither of the One (essence), nor of the All (world).

3. Mallarmé

Although descriptively exact, the phenomenology of the fold cannot be used to think what is crucial to Mallarmé's poem. It is only the secondary moment, a local passing through, a descriptive stasis. If it is the case for Mallarmé that the world is folds, a folding, an unfolding, the aim of the poem is never the world-as-fan or the widowed stone. What must be counterposed to the fold is the stellar point, the cold fire, which places the fold in absence and eternalizes that which, being precisely "pure notion," counts no fold. Who can believe that the man of the "calm block," of the constellation "cold with forgetfulness and disuse," of the "cold gems," of the severed head of Saint Jean, of Midnight, etc. has taken on the task of "folding, unfolding, refolding"? The "operatory act" essential to Mallarmé is that of detaching, of separating, of the transcendent occurrence of the pure point, of the Idea that eliminates all chance, in short, it is the contrary of the fold, which metaphorizes obstacle and intricacy. The poem is the *scissor* of the fold.

The book is not "the fold of the event," it is the pure notion of the event as singularity, or the poetic isolation of *what is absent from any event.* More generally, Mallarmé cannot be used for Deleuze's aim (to certify the divergence of the series of the world, to enjoin us to fold, unfold, refold), for the following reasons:

1. Chance is not the *absence* of any principle, but "the *negation* of any principle," and this "nuance" separates Mallarmé from Deleuze by the entire distance that brings him closer to Hegel.

2. Chance, as a figure of the negative, is the principal support of a dialectic ("The infinite is the result of chance, which you have denied") and not of a gamble (in the Nietzschean sense).

3. Chance is the *autoaccomplishment* of its Idea, in any act in which it is at stake, so that it is an affirmative, delimited power, and not at all a correlation of the world (the term "world-as-thought" is totally inadequate).

4. The accomplishment, by thought, of chance, which is also the pure thought of the event, does not give rise to "imcompossibles" or whimsical chaos, but to "a constellation," an isolated Idea, whose scheme is a number ("the only number which cannot be an other"). It is a question of matching the Hegelian dialectic and the Platonic intelligible.

5. The question is not to reduce to nothingness whatever is opposed to chance, but to get rid of nothingness so that the transcendent stellar isolation, which symbolizes the absolute separation of the event, might emerge. Mallarmé's key concept, which is certainly not the fold, might just be purity. And his central maxim, the conclusion of *Igitur*: "Nothingness gone, the castle of purity remains."

4. The Ruin of the Category of Object

One of Deleuze's strong points is to have thought with Leibniz an objectless knowledge. The ruin of the category of object is a major process of philosophic modernity. And yet, Pascal would say, Deleuze's strong point only holds "up to a certain point." Caught up in the twists and turns of the All and the denial of the vacuum, Deleuze assigns the absence of object to (monadic) interiority. But the lack of object is a result of truth's being a process of making holes in what constitutes knowledge, rather than a process of unfolding. And also of the subject's being the differential of the perforating path, rather than the One of the primitive tie to worldly multiplicities. Deleuze seems in fact to keep, if not the object, at least the *traces of objectivity*, in as much as he keeps the couple activity/passivity (or fold/unfold) at the center of the problem of knowledge. And he is forced to keep it there, because his doctrine of the Multiple is organicist, or vitalist. In a mathematized conception, the genericity (or the hole) of the True implies neither activity nor passivity, but rather *paths* and *encounters*.

5. The Subject

Deleuze is a thousand times right to think the subject as "relation-as-multiple," or as a "relation of limits," and not as simple limit (which would reduce it to the subject of humanism).

However, we cannot avoid formally distinguishing the subject as multiple configuration, from other "relations of limits," which are constantly being inscribed in some situation or other. I have proposed a criterion for this, which is the *finite* fragment: a subject is a finite difference in the process of a truth. It is clear that in Leibniz what we have is on the contrary an interiority—one whose vinculum subordinates *infinite* multiplicities. Deleuze's subject, the subject-as-fold, has as its numeric formula $1/\infty$, which is the formula for the monad, even if its clear part is 1/n (p. 178). It articulates the One with the infinite. My conviction is rather that *any finite formula* expresses a subject, if it is the local differential of a procedure of truth. We would then be referred to the characteristic numbers of these procedures, and of their types. In any case, the formula $1/\infty$ certainly brings us within the toils of the subject, the paradigm of which is God, or the One-as-infinite. This is the point where the One makes up for its excessive absence in the analysis of the event: if the event is reduced to the fact, if "everything is event," *then* it is the Subject who must take on both the One and the infinite. Leibniz-Deleuze cannot escape this rule.

In face of which, pure interiority must be abandoned, even if it is reversed to coextensive exteriority, in favor of the local differential of chance, which has neither interior nor exterior, being the matching up of a finitude and a language (a language which "forces" the infinite of the variation of the subject-as-point from its finite becoming-varied). There is still too much substance in Leibniz-Deleuze's subject, too much concave folding. There is only the point, and the name.

In Conclusion

Deleuze cumulates the possibilities of a "descriptive *mathesis*," whose performances he tests locally, without engaging its systematic value.

But can and must philosophy remain within the immanence of a description of the life of the world? An other road, which it is true must relinquish the world, is that of the salvation of truths. It is subtractive and active, while Deleuze's is presentifying and diverting. To the fold it opposes the motionless intricacy of the empty set. To the flux, the stellar separation of the event. To description, inference, and axiom. To the gamble, to the experiment, it opposes the organization of fidelities. To creative continuity, it opposes the founding break. And finally, it does not join together, but separates, or opposes, the operations of life and the actions of truth.

Is it Deleuze or Leibniz who assumes the following: "The mind is a principle of life by its presence and not by its action. *Strength is presence and not*

action" (p. 162)? In any case, this is the concentration of everything from which philosophy, in my opinion, must preserve us. It should be possible to say: "A truth is the principle of a subject, by the empty set whose action it supports. A truth is action and not presence."

Unfathomable proximity, within what bears the name "philosophy," of its intimate other, of its internal adversary, of its royal misappropriation. Deleuze is right on one point: we cannot cut ourselves off from it without perishing. But should we merely content ourselves with it convivially, we shall nonetheless perish, but by it.

—Translated by Thelma Sowley

Notes

1. Gilles Deleuze, *The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque*, trans. Tom Conley (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1992). Originally published in French as *Le Pli: Leibniz et le baroque* (Paris: Les Édition de Minuit, 1988). All page references in this essay refer to the French volume.
2. "[S]on site de pensée": "Pensée" can (and in French philosophical language often does) have a more verbal and creative sense than "thought" in English. I think the ambiguous noun/past participle of *thought* in "the site where it is thought" captures something of this. For other occurrences of "thought," e.g., "the thought of the event," the reader will sometimes want to force the English toward this more creative sense. *—Translator*
3. For *enouncement*, I follow Ann Banfield's translation in J. C. Milner's *For the Love of Language* (New York: Macmillan, 1990), p. 77. She authorizes her translation from Beckett's in *The Unnameable*: "Suppositions are equally vain. It's enough to enounce them, to regret having spoken . . . ," *Three Novels by Samuel Beckett* (New York: Grove Press, 1955), p. 375 *—Translator*
4. And not "thinks of the event." "Penser" has here a creative sense ("creates by his thought a new concept of the event"), somewhat parallel to the difference between "conceives" and "conceives of." I have preferred, throughout my translation, keeping the relatively strange construction with "think" in English to avoid other confusions that can arise from the difference in French between "pense l'évènement" and "conçoit l'évènement" as well as between "pensée" and "concept." *—Translator*

II. Subjectivity

5.

The Crack of Time and the Ideal Game

Peter Canning

I. Why a Multiplicity

DELEUZE DEFINES PHILOSOPHY as a "theory of multiplicities that refer to no subject as preliminary unity,"[1] but why—if a multiplicity is not a subject, nor unity of object "referred" to a subject, what is the relation? Kant defined the subject as "transcendental unity of apperception," but from a multiplicity the One always has to be subtracted, making it a purely dimensional, or rather directional and eventful, formation of variable (and fractional) dimensions.[2] A human-multiplicity *consists* in changing dimensions, mutating all the time. It increases dimensions with every connection, combination, or *agencement*, every "synthesis" it makes, by assembling the dimensions it persists in changing. So an *agencement* (assemblage) is an "increase in the dimensions of a multiplicity that necessarily changes in nature as it expands its connections" (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, p. 8, cf. 21). An event-multiplicity may, according to the Leibnizian reading of the real (God's eye or the Monad), be described by a tensor through which its complete predicate or lifeline is included in its individual notion. But this complete predicate does not exist, however it may insist by way of the virtual and multiple Idea it actualizes by *differenciation*.[3] We may say, following Leibniz, that the complete idea exists in the mind of god, but for us to find it we must search for it, invent, create, or assemble it, and so subtract its given presupposition as "our" "nature" changes. Always subtract one, precisely the One that would lock in the overcoding command program and transcend all other dimensions and directions.

So much for the infinite individual "analytic" monad; but how can I withdraw the transcendental subject of synthetic finitude? Don't I need it to synthesize the unity of "my manifold" (multi-pli), the event of my poly-

morphous existence? Perhaps, since we are programmed to imagine we can't do without, can't live without that unity, which is nevertheless everywhere lacking (transcendent), but in any event the unity of composition of a multiplicity (inventing its plan of consistency) can be had only by subtracting the specious One-over-All dimension of Identity bound to its rigid designator (limitative or exclusive use of Proper Name): to inform an informal "flat [or plane] multiplicity" (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, passim) of n–1 dimensions. Are we not giving up the indispensable operation of transcendental unification of our world by subjective synthesis? By denying identity don't we essentially open the world to anarchy and schizophrenia?[4] Rather, to the "real inorganization" of desiring assemblages.[5] In fact, *the* One (the Signifier of the missing One) can never really overcode or transcend the multiple, because when it does increase or change dimensions (through a *pointe de déterritorialisation*), a multiplicity mutates, it "undergoes metamorphosis, changes in nature" (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, p. 21).[6] The immanence of a unifying force consists in its potential ubiquity throughout the multiple system (transcendental field) of which it is a nomadic presence.

Multiplicities are dimensional events, our dimensions are drawn by directional vectors, tensions, or tendencies, "directions in motion" (p. 21) urging and driving assemblages to face the chaos, the supreme music, and turn us into something, always something else, other than the one intended. These happenings form tensors or "lines of flight" emerging from points of deterritorialization, the hazards and risks one takes to break out of a habitual mold and to *become*, to modulate. The *pointes* or emergences involve changes of plan, direction, or plane of the multidimensional, introducing mutant lines and new figures into the assemblage—for example, to alter the normal sequence of one's movements, habitual pattern of behavior, rhythm of speech, accent, tone, or attitude, to throw open the itinerary or hour of a regular excursion, thus encountering a new situation and doubling oneself with another of whose existence I had no Idea because it did not make me until now . . . A vector of deterritorialization (tensor: spacetime diagram—Spatium-Aion, depth of field-time—describing a roaming vector modulating forms, assembling connections) opens a new dimension (periodic function) by drawing out and stretching the coordinates of an assemblage according to shifting force relations in the field or plane of encounter.[7] An assemblage is defined by its lines of escape rather than by fixed coordinates or rules of structure, because the "thing" (event) as tensor-multiplicity is of time or between-time and can express itself for the time being only by offering itself to immanent mutation (variation) as its ownmost potential. "The line of flight is part of the rhizome" (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, p. 9) or multiplicity, which it transforms or relays—"translates"—to another dimension; so the

dimensional is a static consideration of the dynamic or directional (tensor). And the *pointe*, while it is breaking out, thus defines from its outside edge (becoming) the assemblage as "increase in dimensions" of the changing multiplicity. Human being, language, or society; book or brain, event or concept—these are formations of mutability including alteration (line of flight), variation of component lines, within their definition, because they are beings of becoming, tensors whose "properties are independent of the chosen system" of spatiotemporal coordinates—and of axioms. Thus, a language is a tensor-matrix in a multiplicity of dialects, isotopic wave-fronts emitting (included) divergent budding singularities (idiolects) in a semiotic rhizome-tissue. An "atypical expression" is a language-event that alters the syntax or usage-pattern of the matrix, responding to historical actualities and preparing them by fabulating. The semiotic tensor varies expressive forms and combines them with metamorphic content forms in a *compositif*. But content and expression become, in their folding together, distinct, indiscernible, a semiotic double (matter-function) that "causes language to tend toward the limit of its elements, forms, or notions, toward a near side or a beyond of language. The tensor effects a kind of transitivization of the phrase, causing the last term to react upon the preceding term back through the entire chain" (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, p. 99)—retroaction of flight or invention as new dimension.

Our language is regulated by ordering words and slogans and phrases, which propagate in waves, but *and* is the password, "tensor for all of language," the traveling semiotic point-fold connecting the thought of any topic in the language-rhizome to any other—or to some time to come—breaking out and circling back to a new conjunction (encounter) in the transverse spacetime of the "book" or life under perpetual reconstruction.

Every line of escape or *pointe* potentially folds back upon its rhizome-multiplicity to become one of its dimensions; that is, the being's indetermination coupled with its memory, its "virtuality," enables any movement to become periodic and repeatable, thus a component-dimension of its pattern of existence. This holds for any event affected with "life" or with the capacity of a memory of acts.

A human, considered topologically or geometrodynamically, consists in affect-multiplicities or waves of emotions, bands of intensities varying to form neighborhood zones and shifting alliances, polymorphous assemblies: assemblages differentiate qualitatively each time we change connections with people or animals, vegetables or things, techniques . . . society as manifold of complying and refractive "social forces," all implicated with each other and complicated in the same Natura or Multiple City. Social beings can be defined by their "involutionary" potential, Body without Organs, the way they fold back into past times and futures with each other,

multiplying through their immanent horizon, Idea, or n-dimensional plane (n–1, discounting the transcendental subject). *The line of flight is part of the rhizome.* The BwO is the variable interval of death within lifetime, antimetric, always undoing and redoing the habit of measures: "the interval is substance" (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, p. 478). It acts from within the period or cycle of regular transformations, which accomplishes and maintains the structure, "substance," or essence of a being in its identity (repetition of component transformations). It is rhythm, "the link between truly active moments" (p. 313); in a key text, Deleuze-Guattari (quoting Bachelard) affirms the incommensurability of the rhythmic plane between assemblages and abstract machine(s), the actual variations and the virtual variability potential. We realize we are approaching the limit of the subject when we can "comprehend" the concept only by introducing the incomprehensible—Death, BwO, *forgetting*, escape-outside—within our theory of consciousness and memory. Rhythm plays the role of forgetting—the virtual or potential action—in relation to the memory of metric time, its measure.

The "laws" of a society or group or language or individual character (ethos), considered in their becoming, are defined by variation, mutation—how they come apart and go together again, informing new composites, new assemblages, the way they "change nature with every division" or connection. A connection is thus never just "another one," never defined numerically, it is always qualitative or durational. The radical Bergsonian continuum, *durée* as qualitative multiplicity, is not divisible for it is itself a cut or *pointe*, a line of becoming. When it does divide, or division happens, the continuum changes its nature, mutating into another essence or "species" (bifurcation). A duration is an incommensurable span of internally regular time across which the "substance" (BwO) travels as it reemerges. When a genetic-transformational "character" (or group—but every subject is already a group) gives up or takes on a habit, a behavior, cops an attitude, it changes nature. Characters are like languages in that variety is their idea and essence. Every true being is, in this way, a simulacrum.[8]

Deleuze follows Kant, Bergson, and Leibniz in creating an ever varying concept of time, a play of syntheses culminating in a Nietzschean outcome. But isn't Nietzsche the philosopher of eternal recurrence, and isn't that the end of time altogether, "nothing new under the sun"? Deleuze constantly warns against confusing "his," Deleuze-Nietzsche's, notion of eternal return with the "cyclic hypothesis" supposedly entertained by the Greeks and eclipsed by the modern linear theory of time. In fact, it is Kant who sprang time from hinging upon movement, more precisely upon the periodicity of a cyclic movement of reference, a model and standard measure for time. The "relation" of time to movement is ultimately as complex as theoretical

physics itself, which must deal with the problem in its way, quantum mechanically or geometrodynamically. But it is in cosmological, biological, and especially semiotic domains that the theory of time is thrown altogether "out of joint," off of its hinges on periodic movement. In effect, nothing can ever begin as a function of movement, for movement itself is powerless to begin at any certain time—whence the continuing potential of Lucretian-Epicurian fluid dynamics, the *incerto tempore* of the clinamen, the smallest deviation from linearity into the elementary vortex, and, too, of the Kantian definition of time as *self-affection*, time as "subject," which has dominated the theory of the pragmatic subject since Kant, especially through Heidegger's interpretation.[9] A living being, even more, a human subject-multiplicity assemblage is not *in* preexisting empty time or space, it *creates* the spatiotemporal milieu, which it expresses like a spider exuding a web.

What happens when time gets thrown off its dependency on movement and into "deregulation"? Deleuze's answer reveals one of the secrets of his method, which is to carry and push an idea to its extreme consequences; out of a rigorous sense of play, certainly, but also in pursuit of raw truths that his predecessors did not care to expose (that is, create). Kant determined time as "order, set, and series"[10] of pure singularities (events), which enter into strange relation with each other in mutual determination. The *order* of time is defined by a *static synthesis* in which time-without-movement freezes into place, or rather, crystallizes into its pure and empty form (Aion), past-(present)-future—but where the present is determined to disappear into the absolute interval splitting past *and* future whence it reappears as an event, emerging in the image of an action "adequate to the whole of time," a "set" or ensemble not closed, nor bounded, but determined in the image of the split or "caesura" itself (Deleuze 1968, p. 120). The "whole of time" is (in) the interval, the cut. Now the crack or split (*fêlure*) is the simple effect of a static ordering, a self-relation whereby "I affect myself" in the emptiness of an absolute (in)determination or "abandonment" to freedom.[11] Past/future, the order of time means "this purely formal distribution of the unequal as a function of a caesura"—unequal because time no longer makes ends meet in the cyclic return of the end to the beginning, rebeginning at the end: time ceases to rhyme (Deleuze 1968, p. 120). It is "the form of the most radical change, but the form of change does not change"—mutability can drive a body mad with freedom. But "having abjured its empirical content," this empty form remains to be determined in its transcendental "content" by the action—while the action consists or insists in doubling the caesura, in becoming capable of the crack one already is becoming, "an event unique and formidable," such as "taking time off its hinges, making the sun blast, jumping headfirst into the volcano,

killing god or the Father" (p. 120). Or "Anti-Oedipus" (to kill the complex)—to release the singularities of desire from their signifying chains. The action is a symbol that "gathers the caesura, the before and the after" into an "ensemble of time" in its constituent disparity, its internal difference (dy/dx or t/c). The caesura extends into a before- and after-image of itself becoming, a time-series that "operates the distribution" of the lines and surfaces of time on either side of the fissure. The past is defined as the action's being "too much for me," I can't take it, I'm not up to it (even if it has already happened). The present is the gaping, sheer metamorphosis of a changing nature, shifting dimensions and becoming equal to the unequal (to the task), a Nietzschean or Dionysian release wherein "all it was becomes 'thus I willed it, thus I shall will it'" (Zarathustra) and all hatred of the past, all "responsibility" dissolves into an event, a turning point without equal in any history (the becoming of history prior to actual eventuation). The past as "repetition by default" has prepared this transformation, "metamorphosis in the present" (Deleuze 1968, p. 121). This begins the new Game, "schizophrenic" reconstruction of a world in ruins, with a throw or drawing of singularities, to link back, from out over the abyss, to unconscious renaissance (the third synthesis, eternal return).

This has something to do with writing and composition. In effect, the Deleuzian synthesis (the future beginning in "disjunction," "eternal return") prepares a new image of thought and of the concept. Where movement stops, where time stops moving, "passing," there it starts to *become*. The passing present gives a false image of "real time" as succession—as though the real of time could ever be clocked and captured by letting the camera run. Real time has nothing to do with the passing present, it starts when the present stops and we are thrust into the interior, the Milieu.[12] Let us call Brain or Rhizome this kind of inside-time (inside is the fold of outside) that affects itself, not with itself (time), but with becoming, a pretime emerging from the crack between times. "It is no longer time which is between two instants [as with Bergson], it is the event which is a between-time [*entre-temps*, 'meanwhile, meantime']: the between-time is not of the eternal, but it is not (of) time either, it is (of) becoming . . . it coexists with the instant or the time of accident . . . in the strange indifference of an intellectual intuition. *All the between-times superimpose themselves*, while the times succeed each other."[13] The "meantime" of becoming comes strictly *between* the time of the event's occurrence, of actualization in a state of things. It does not itself occur or "happen" (*se passer*) but comes between time, not just between the times that pass and follow each other, but *between time and itself*, within itself, as the outside (future) within ourselves, our "subject" as time.[14]

It is not that time comes to a halt; only the movement stops or becomes "aberrant" (Deleuze 1985, passim) where time begins: in eternal return (the "being of becoming"). For the image of self-affection means self-affection by "one's own" image in a crystal medium, but the image is an Other, a virtual self or I that affects itself as me (in me), according to the Rimbaldian formula, "I is an Other." This virtual-actual circuitry, or I-me loop of automatism forms the primordial image of time, even recurring to approximate the traditional notion of substance, *causa sui*. They say that "nothing can come of nothing": then the "cause of itself" is absurd—no less than Freedom or time's affection of itself by the transcendental Other, free automaton, or desiring machine. It forms the originary nonsense from which sense proceeds.[15] Deleuze-Guattari insists the strings of the marionette or the body of the actor are not connected to the will of the puppeteer or actor or author, but to the second order automaton of the human body-brain rhizome (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, p. 8). From virtual to actual and back, in the ever-renewing feedback loop of self-motivation, self-communication, self- . . . (the Other), the regime of the crystal engages its subject in a pure order of succession in which past and present, present and future, become distinct but indiscernible; past and future begin to revolve and "turn about the different," the *dispars* or simulacrum, "the symbol itself, that is, the sign in as much as it interiorizes the conditions of its own repetition." The present ceases to be determined as substance and duration ("the identity of things is dissolved") as it hinges or "seizes upon the disparity" between times that it takes as its "unit of measure, that is, always a difference of difference as immediate element" (Deleuze 1968, pp. 92–94). The sign-image we are (becoming), the Double. Rhythm.

This difference "of" immediacy "with" itself "in" time forms the smallest internal circuit between the self and itself, "a perpetual *Se-distinguer* [Self-distinguishing]" (Deleuze 1985, p. 109), as in the mirror or the mime, "*ici devançant, là remémorant, au futur, au passé, sous une apparence fausse de présent.*"[16] It is a mere nothing in terms of metric time, the slightest disparity, which consists in being aware of an internal, intervallic vacuum, outside-in, future-past just arriving, just departing, which it is the task of philosophy to diagram in concepts gathered and selected, recombining and returning, the thing's self-created concept of its own event, thinking image as simulacrum self-diverging, overflying time (*survol*).

The crystal may begin as a simple mirror image, which starts a short-circuit recoiling into the vortex of its being, uncoiling back to where expanding strata of the past are superimposed in continuous layers, folding each over into the next, a brain-rhizome-affect-percept-concept continuum with "one single side whatever the number of its dimensions, which remains

co-present to all its determinations . . . runs through them at infinite speed" and maintains "a state of overflight without difference, at ground or earth level, self-overflight [*auto-survol*] which no abyss, no fold or hiatus escapes" (Deleuze and Guattari 1991, p. 198). With the rhizome, Deleuze-Guattari has transformed and subverted Bergson's memory-perception cone, the inverted spiraling pyramid of *Matter and Memory*. Of this image of time, Deleuze retains (in *L'image-temps*) the continuity of "sheets of past" with the "peaks [*pointes*] of present," implying that the cone is a vortical continuum; each sheet is a disk but also a winding stair continuing up and around in the "next" one, according to the Bergsonian formula of the flux, "interpenetration without succession." But de jure the loop of the present itself "contains all the past" in its "smallest circuit" (Deleuze 1985, p. 130), so the loop or circuit itself must practice a cross-section or cut a *transversal* through the entire past, through all the (apparently) "successive" layers (moving past and following each other according to the passage of presents). This diagonal line or cross-cutting plane is immanent to the whole of time, and yet it is not given; it must be created. And therefore it is precisely not made of "the" continuum, the same cone, but of a selection of sheets, planes, and points, which the philosopher-schizo-artist must assemble: "we constitute a continuum with fragments of different ages, we make use of transformations which operate between sheets to constitute a sheet of transformation" (Deleuze 1985, p. 161). This transverse operation occurs in reading or writing, the composition of the plane of immanence, but the plane sweeps across and transects all the past, gathers elements from the ages, and returns them to present their metamorphic configuration, a quasi-aleatory feedback loop, back from the void, "perhaps a constellation" (Mallarmé). The Deleuzian model of the history of philosophy, its use and abuse for life. The transformation sheet "invents a sort of transverse continuity or communication between several sheets, and weaves between them a set of nonlocalizable relations" (p. 161). This ensemble or set is "thought, the brain . . . the continuity which enrolls and unrolls them like so many lobes" in "superimposition," and even creates new lobes, "recreation of matter in the manner of styrene . . . the cerebral membrane where past and future, interior and exterior confront each other immediately, directly, without assignable distance" (p. 164). For time-life or Remembrain is a book made of one double-sided scrolling sheet in which the reader begins anywhere, connecting and condensing (dia)grammatical singularities, always sensing the meaning on the other side or between the lines, cutting through sedimental stratospheres of cosmic library dust. God the Monad-Lector is the ideal reader who hangs on the other side of time where he connotes all the eventual figures (*chiffres*) shaping and breaking on the crest of actuality.

Thus the real of time has nothing to do with the movement of the present that passes, *nor with anything given* in the form of intuition. It consists first in a past coexistent with the present and preexisting itself as present ("time consists in this splitting [*scission*]" (Deleuze 1985, p. 109); then in perpetually distinguishing itself into the indiscernible virtual (past-future) and actual (present) of the circuit or feedback loop in which I affect myself as an Other, the Subject; finally, in a rhizome-multiplicity, a neuronal labyrinth of virtual connections, synaptic disjunctions, and polyphrenic conjunctions, live assemblages eternally renewing and changing with every encounter, every singularity from the outside thus included in or as the form of cerebral time. Deleuze's answer to Kant, Lacan, and all dualisms is categorical, or rather, diagrammatical: everything, as Spinoza said, is double, at once thing and idea, "body and mind," although we ourselves have only "the idea of that which happens to our body, the idea of our body's affections." Each thing is double, virtual (idea) and actual (thing), though the complete and adequate idea exists only "in God."[17] Deleuze perhaps no longer believes in God (the refrain or *cri de guerre* of *Cinema II* is: "how can we believe in *this* world?") and yet, with Whitehead and Nietzsche, he insists still upon the immanence of the idea in "this world." Thus everything is doubled with itself in its becoming, its metamorphosis, of which the splitting of the human subject (*dédoublement*) is only the most developed figure. Deleuze does not wallow in the finitude of "castration" and "transcendence," because everything is becoming-idea, becoming-body, becoming-virtual, becoming-actual in a circuit without end or beginning, the new world-image of absolute immanence. It is we who become what is becoming and returning, for we, and everything in the universe, are at once thinking and being, idea and thing, united in the indiscernible image passing in and out of time between times. We may say that death is the other side of time, the virtual that actualizes itself in our "self"-consciousness and negativity (work), and which hollows our interiority. But beyond time and death ("a shallow stream") it is Becoming that, through death, reaches the Body without Organs between lives. "The BwO is the model of death" (Deleuze and Guattari 1983, p. 329), but also its virtual medium of "nonlocalizable connections" to life (p. 309), the region where death and rebirth become indiscernible in the dispersion of lives, "lottery drawings . . . depending on one another only by the order of the random drawings, and holding together only by the absence of a link" (p. 309). Death, the absolute outside, the unthought that forces us to think? Violence? Outside of any diagram, "the outside is always opening a future, with which nothing ends, because nothing has begun, but everything metamorphoses" (Deleuze 1986, p. 95). For Affect means transition on the plane.

It is true that Deleuze has attained the plane of immanence at the price of

allowing the Object to disappear into its own double, its *description*, and the becoming of object and subject, into an absolute *narration*, the power of the false (Deleuze 1985, pp. 165–202). The circuit between indiscernibles draws a diagram that transects the time of the object and grasps it in its becoming, which thus merges with my own becoming.[18] The diagram—a concept developed by Deleuze-Foucault (by now we realize that Deleuze "himself" is double, "double-articulated" as they say somewhere)—is an image of the concept in "perpetual becoming" (Deleuze 1986, p. 91) on the plane. With the diagram we reach the throw of dice, the singularities, and the ideal game (see below). For the "drawing" of singularities, their distribution, comes always from outside, that is, from the future, from Thought ("for to think is to emit a throw of dice" [p. 93]) which breaks into our "clichés" precisely when habitual "schemata" break down (Deleuze 1985, p. 62ff). The diagram consists in the virtual matrix of its spontaneous transformations, its self-variations, the concept "prison" (for example) as quasi-immanent matrix of a "disciplinary diagram" composed of multiple variations: school, factory, hospital, camp, barracks . . . "concrete machines," "assemblages" actualizing the "immanent cause" or "abstract machine" of discipline.[19] Unlike the abstract possibility of classical thought, the Deleuze-Bergsonian virtual (diagram) results from a continual—even when interrupted—act of creation and thought, a "mental vision, almost a hallucination" (Deleuze 1985, p. 65): to create the concept, to think what must be thought through time and is precisely impossible to think, or to see what cannot be perceived (a becoming-imperceptible), to imagine the unimaginable, etc. (cf. Deleuze 1968, p. 182ff.). Into these direct images of time and thought, these diagrams of becoming, this Battle (Deleuze 1986, p. 129), subject and object merge and lose their boundaries; the world becomes its own image, "cinema," hallucination. Heidegger and, more recently, Christian Jambet have explored this region of the indiscernible under the name of Kant's "transcendental imagination."[20] Deleuze draws his own path through his preferred series of allies and doubles: Leibniz, Nietzsche, Bergson, Klossowski, Foucault, Guattari—always recreating the distinct indiscernible, the thing thought as two faces of a double-sided image (or a single-sided Möbius dyad); and furthermore, an entire world-multiplicity: not the multiplicity of different things in this world, but the multiplicity of worlds in a single thing or image in self-transformation according to the rules of thought or the ideal game, the regulative idea that has become the only thing(-hallucination), the only thought (-delirium), the imperative question whose self-regulations change with every move, every self, every emission of singularities gathered from the future and dispersed into an "other present" (Deleuze 1969, pp. 196, 78) in the passion of the subject, the metamorphosis of agency.

II. Rhythm as Differential Element (Repetition in Eternal Return)

In the beginning was the repetition, and that made all the difference. Intensity, "difference of intensity," begins to actualize the differential Idea, making a difference "by which the given is given as diverse" (Deleuze 1968, p. 286); while repetition "in the Idea, [which] runs through the varieties of relations and the distribution of singular points . . . is the power-potential [*puissance*] of difference and differentiation: whether it condenses the singularities, precipitates or slows down the times, or varies the spaces" (p. 284). Repetition is the power of the rhythmic Idea to produce a difference, an intensity, a "disparity" (p. 287) as its *excess* (the third time-synthesis begins in rhythm as repetition-variation). The "intensive system" induces a *simulacrum* (chaosmos)—"signal-sign system"—in which everything communicates through mutual difference and distance, "reciprocal determination," and every phenomenon is a "sign," which passes or "fulgurates" across "disparate orders" (p. 286, pp. 355–56). The virtual-actual (ideal-incarnate, -individual) complex forms two sides of a "Symbol": "an ideal half plunging into the virtual, and constituted by differential relations and corresponding singularities; an actual half constituted by qualities actualizing these relations, and by parts actualizing these singularities" (p. 358).

Can we continue to speak of a subject in such a case, the ideal I and the actual me? The subject began in "passive synthesis," the first form of repetition, which "withdraws" from itself the difference of spacetimes and intensities that would have caused it to divide and mutate into another. This is the synthesis of contraction, governing the present and constituting the production of a duration, from which, subtracting difference, we derive the permanence of an identity ("self-recognition" follows as the active reflection based on the prior passive synthesis). It makes the foundation of time. The second passive synthesis inaugurates the splitting of time, of the subject in self-affection by its own coexisting, preexisting past (the past is not a function of the present but is always contemporaneous with the present it "has been"). But what justifies positing the preexistence of a past that was never present, a time immemorial, beyond the active synthesis of memory, a forgetting coextensive with memory and prior to it, making of memory itself something passive and given by that which gives but is not itself given? The answer is the intensity at the origin, Spatium, the dark depth, and the Multiplicity (virtual Idea) which distributes itself—its singularities of thought—through all of time, "a Long thought" (Deleuze 1969, p. 76). The Idea that produces the intensity is the third synthesis, of productive repetition or rhythm.[21]

Where is the subject, is it still to come or already dissolved? Deleuze never gives up entirely on the subject concept, because of his demand for absolute

interiority ("internal multiplicity": Deleuze 1968, p. 237) or, rather, continuity, the continuum of the manifold with its cut—so that the subject is not a void, but a cut, an intervention, or an *interval.* But the interval is the brain itself ("the brain becomes subject": Deleuze and Guattari 1991, p. 198), fold of the world, as in the moving image-novel of *St. Petersburg* by Biely, which Deleuze cites in *Cinema II, L'image-temps.* Or the entire cerebral-nervous system as interior milieu in topological contact with its own exterior, according to Gilbert Simondon, whom Deleuze cites continually. The Remembrane. We therefore determine the subject as the splitting between virtual (Idea-multiplicity) and actual (individual-multiplicity) and the folding of one upon the other, as in a categorical imperative, as well as the genesis of the individual from the transcendental field of singularities in their nomadic distribution (without identity or resemblance: cf. Deleuze 1969, pp. 124–142). For "the genesis [goes] . . . from the virtual to its actualization . . . from the differential elements and their ideal linkages to the diverse real relations which constitute at each moment the actuality of time" (Deleuze 1968, pp. 237–238). Finally, in the disjunctive-synthetic moment of deindividuation, the subject reopens at a point of bifurcation, "ambiguous sign of singularities . . . which stands for several of these [individual, analytic] worlds, and at the limit for all, beyond their divergences and the individuals who people them" (Deleuze 1969, p. 139). This "quasi cause" opens the future and thus communicates with the origin of time and world, will-to-power.[22]

> Repetition in the eternal return [tells itself] of the will to power . . . of its imperatives and its throws of the dice, and of the problems issuing from the act of throwing . . . reprise of pre-individual singularities . . . dissolution of all prior identities. All origin is a singularity . . . a beginning on the horizontal line . . . where it prolongs itself [into a world]. But it is a re-beginning on the vertical line which condenses the singularities, where [the eternally disguised] repetition weaves itself, the line of affirmation of chance (Deleuze 1968, pp. 260–261).

The world thus disclosed by Deleuze-Leibniz-Bergson spirals to infinity at its inverted base, which communicates directly, transversally with its *pointe* of thought throwing and condensing singularities from actual to virtual and back into time.[23]

How can we maintain the priority of the "will-to-power" or "imperative" while dissolving the ego into a field of empiricities themselves going back (*renvoi*) to transcendental singularities or differential elements, since this transcendental field is not yet unified by the form of the I, "subject of enunciation" of the imperative? What are these elements? Are they the same as

intensities, differences of intensity? How are they "produced" by differential repetition or rhythm?

The ideal linkages (*liaisons*) of singularities are said to be "non-localizable" (Deleuze 1968, p. 237) because they are liaisons of time *between times*, the becoming or genesis of time, which is rhythm. When and where does everything begin? The abyss; but "chaos is not without directional components, which are its own ecstasies" (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, p. 313, translation modified), where it stands out, or points into order and sends out singularities to connect or "prolong themselves to the neighborhood of another singularity," forming time-series and multiple ensembles, dissipative structures hooking back into swirling chaos. A tangled tale. A milieu is defined by "periodic repetition of the component," constituting a "vibratory . . . block of space-time" (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, p. 313), a musical shape or coded dimension (code = "periodic repetition"); the codes are in "perpetual transcodage" or passage from one milieu to another, one dimension to another, as their lines change direction at a singularity or turning point (the Big Bang is also the event horizon or Singularity). "The milieus are open (in)to chaos . . . but the retort or riposte of milieus to chaos is rhythm" (p. 313, translation modified), and *in-between rhythm and chaos*, Chaosmos. This is where we are alive and transposed at all times ("the living being . . . passes constantly from one milieu to another") between "communicating" milieus. They communicate through the timeless chaos between them, with which they form a potential, a power gap, and in the rhythm between periodic times, "between two intermilieus," where the living being "changes direction" to create and shape a new component or dimension: a mutant form, or perhaps a malformation, *entre chien et loup*, anyway a monster (according to the norm or axiom). Rhythm is a tensor synchronizing multiple, overlapping coordinate (metric) systems it expresses through actualization-individuation but also conversely by sweeping all components into its potential. This holds for modulating tonal series and domains into a line of escape, which (part of the rhizome—to hazard an error in improvising) loops and folds back into the intense, nonextended chaosmic Spatium transforming each component, sending it into another dimension. For chaosmos is a membrane, or modulating *crible* (winnowing screen), facing chaos and countering with *nonlocalizable* rhythms and webs. These cannot be located in time or space, whose measure they originate or spring loose again. Aion, nonchronological time, in overflying itself (surface) condenses singularities to begin again. This Aion (lifetime) we are disjunctively continuing, immersed in strange waters of the afterlives.

The between chaos and order where quasi-stable elements take shape and dissipate, where we are still today constituting and dissolving our milieus and

abodes and patterns of existence, these "ecstasies" are the intensities or originary differences produced by repetition, in the third synthesis of time. We saw that this synthesis of the future implied the metamorphosis of the subject-agent. We can now begin to tell what this transformation involves. First there is a receptivity to the violence of an encounter that forces one to think and to create, to pose and solve problems, matters of life and death. Whereas the past is defined by the complaint of insufficiency ("It's too much, I can't"), the future is determined by an excess produced by repetition. The world itself is such an excess or "reste" (Deleuze 1968, p. 286), an irrational remainder after all calculations are done with.

Deleuze's reply to Kant, his "critical solution to the antinomy" of time—the paradox of "preexistence": how can time begin with the first "event" or singularity "in" a presupposed and preexistent time, etc.?—is this *disjunctive* synthesis that replaces or remodels a prior empty time with an a priori chronogenic and aionomorphic repetition "in the beginning." The agent/thinker must undergo metamorphosis to become "equal" to the task of thinking such a thought that "*transforms all of a sudden even the identity* of the one to whom it reveals itself."[24] But metamorphosis means forgetting: "isn't forgetting the source at the same time as the indispensible condition" of a revelation that overcomes its agent and dissolves "all identities into being"? Klossowski determines the "antinomy" in terms of forgetting and memory, *oubli et anamnèse*, "supplemented" by a "will (to power)," as a *commanding* paradox; what must be lived (again) of necessity ("for you will have to relive and begin again"). The eternal return is an ontological ontoethical imperative, a "necessity that must be willed"—a will to forgetting, to living, to being born: a paradox as old as Pythagoras, perhaps, or beginning with Nietzsche-Klossowski: "for such an oblivion [*oubli*] will be equal to a memory outside my own limits: and my present [*actuelle*] consciousness has to have established itself in the forgetting of my other possible identities."

Is forgetting not the *source* . . . of all time? Forgetting means mutation, becoming; but "the being of becoming is returning" (refrain of Deleuze's Nietzsche book): a necessity that must be willed. An ontoethical game: "to affirm becoming and to affirm being of becoming," two moments of the "game of becoming" in which "the being of becoming also plays the game with itself; the aeon (time), says Heraclitus, is a child who plays . . . eternal return . . . third term, identical to the two moments and valid for the whole." We get carried into being, born to play the game "chaosmos."[25] Livable cosmic milieus form by composing or synthesizing a periodic repetition of the component, but remain open to chaos through the fault of time, the crack where the future (power of the false, to change rules and shift metrics)

intercedes and the past (fixed lines of Truth) defaults, while sifting nodal lines reemerge disguised as waves wherever rhythm makes a riposte, to disjoin "rhythm-chaos" (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, pp. 311–313).

The human is a being suspended in a caesura of time, "the intrusion of an outside which hollows out the interval," cerebral-nervous milieu . . . interior? But "the interior presupposes a beginning and an end, an origin and a destination capable of coinciding, of making whole, the all. When there are only milieus and in-betweens" (Deleuze 1986, p. 93), when the caesura or the wavy crack of time takes over and overboards the interior, it forces one to think what cannot and must be thought . . . The mind or spirit or subject becomes affected with itself, but itself is outside, in the forgotten future; the subject has the form of time or self-affection, in that "time as subject . . . is memory," but "the 'absolute memory' which doubles the present, which redoubles the outside . . . is one with forgetting, since it is ceaselessly forgotten in order to be remade, redone" (Deleuze 1986, p. 115). Deleuze's book in memoriam of Foucault is also a treatise on oblivion and eternal return, mourning and memory, for if time as subject is defined as the "folding of the outside," implex which "makes every present pass into oblivion," it also "preserves the entire past in memory, forgetting or oblivion as the impossibility of returning, and memory as the necessity to begin again" (Deleuze 1986, p. 115). The actual and the virtual, memory and forgetting, "this" life and "all" the lives and souls in endless recirculation. When one side is present (actual) the other is absent (virtual), but both are inseparably real at the same time: to remember to live, to forget to die, or is it when I forget to live that I think of death? When indiscernibly the being begins to live, then it is "putting time outside, under the condition of the fold" (Deleuze 1986, p. 115).

Forgetting or oblivion, in its rhythmic alternation with remembering, is still too much the concern of a subject. We cannot determine repetition as the function of a subject, for the subject—as personality or even as concept—results from the rhythm that creates, that gathers and selects the intensive traits or directional components of chaos to synthesize a consistency and plane of immanence. The plane carries its concepts as "multiple waves," but the plane itself, "unique wave which enfolds and unfurls them," is made of "*diagrammatic traits*," "absolute directions" or *intuitions*. The plane is a connective tissue, diagram, or "abstract machine" of which concepts or events are the "concrete assemblages"; it is the "event horizon" or "reservoir" of event-concepts. The concepts are not yet actualizations of events in states of affairs, things, or bodies; they are "*intensive traits*" that may proceed to individuation in actual multiplicities, haecceities (Deleuze and Guattari 1991, pp. 38–42; cf. *A Thousand Plateaus*).

If an assemblage is an "increase in dimension" of a multiplicity that "changes its nature" and rules of formation, then the relation between dimension and direction comes into focus around the plane—or rather, the plane is the impossibility of "clear focus" for the concept or *agencement* in the anexact "neighborhood zones" or "thresholds of indiscernability" that define its "interior consistency" (Deleuze and Guattari 1991, p. 25). Topology of the concept: chiasmus or Möbius strip, its "interior" plane of consistency is distinct but indiscernible from its (exterior?) plane of immanence, a virtual section of chaos establishing a *Grund* in the *Abgrund*. *Who* establishes? It is still rhythm, perhaps the immanent "conceptual character" (Deleuze and Guattari 1991, pp. 60–81). For haecceities are characters, *personnages* in their incarnation-individuation, but everyone who ever lived or thought is a rhythm and sustains a tempo. Rhythm, then, makes a change in dimension (assemblage) on the plane of immanence continuous with the interior consistency of the subject-concept in its variations. Rhythm is the *crible* itself, the plane of planes, riposte to chaos, the virtual idea "of" repetition (compare Deleuze and Guattari 1991, p. 45, and Deleuze and Guattari 1987, pp. 311–313). It is the fluid milieu of thought and life ("for [thought] needs a milieu which moves in itself infinitely, the plane, the void, horizon": Deleuze and Guattari 1991, p. 38), the rhizome "without beginning or end" but only "a milieu through which it grows and overflows [*déborde*] (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, p. 21 translation modified). "Rhythm-chaos or the chaosmos" (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, p. 313) is the planing of the plane, the line of escape from chaos commutating with a virtual multiplicity of timelines, series of events, an idea—the *Inbegriff* of time.[26] The Idea is not the concept, it is the plane of immanence or *problematic horizon* of "everything that happens [*arrive*] or appears" (Deleuze 1969, p. 70). The horizon is the fold of thought or life coming back to itself from the source.

With the virtual Idea of the virtual concept . . . of becoming (on) the plane of immanence, Deleuze has shaped his finest creation, the Body without Organs. The BwO is the plane "substance" of which the intensities are the living concepts (cf. Deleuze and Guattari 1987, p. 153f.). But "the interval is substance (whence come rhythmic values)" (p. 478, translation modified); it is in its constitutive rhythm that the interval—musical brain, book, rhizome between—becomes or comes back, comes to, always another as the substance begins to turn upon the modes and identity "turns about the Different" (Deleuze 1968, pp. 59, 388); for intensity is the turning point, the singularity or change of interval which makes the "conformation of the inside space with outside space" (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, p. 418 translation modified)—interval as variation of substance. All is variation, "trajectory," *trajet* or trait; "the interval takes all" (p. 418).

We are playing with chaos, playing with fire, with water, with elementary "mad particles" (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, p. 40) on the plane of immanence; for the plane "is like a cut or section [*coupe*] of chaos, and acts like a sieve or screen [*crible*]," while in chaos there are no lasting "determinations" of things because "one does not appear without the other having already disappeared, and the one appears as vanishing when the other disappears in outline [*ébauche*, rough sketch]" (Deleuze and Guattari 1991, pp. 44–45; cf. Deleuze 1968, p. 96). The play of memory and forgetting, itself predetermined to forget itself and to begin again "ceaselessly weaving itself, gigantic shuttle" (Deleuze and Guattari 1991, p. 41)—chaos or immanence? Thinking or horizon? Matter or Idea?[27]

Chaos is the a priori of time, the inseparability, indiscernibility (limit) of memory and forgetting "in the infinite." It is the prior repetition, which "implies by rights a perfect independence of each presentation," where the harsh "rule of discontinuity or instantaneity" requires that "the one does not appear without the other having disappeared" (Deleuze 1968, p. 96). By the synthesis of contraction two "times" are linked into one "habit" or self, milieu or central nervous system. Then the self discovers the preexistence of pure empty time before creation, before the multiuniverse "self-caused" itself by chance or was given the chance by its nature or god. The *causa sui* is the absurd, self-causing agent described by Deleuze, characterized by "heterogeneous series of singularities which organize themselves into a system . . . provided with a potential energy [intensity] where differences distribute themselves between series" (Deleuze 1969, p. 125). It is the transcendental field-unconscious where singularities undergo or undertake "a process of self-unification" in this potential "energy of the pure event," of the virtual, unconscious Idea—doubled with (distinct, indiscernible) consciousness of itself ("consciousness . . . is the double . . . and each thing is consciousness because it possesses a double": Deleuze 1968, p. 284), Idea of Idea. For there is no thing without "its own" idea, no matter how confused (because too clear) or obscure (distinct) or complicated. At the limit, the membrane between them, the plane of immanence forms an idea of chaos, a rhythmic idea (chaos takes shape in the Idea of itself). The Idea is remembrane, the riddle, the *crible* ("the song is a kind of sketch of a . . . center in the heart of chaos . . . it jumps from chaos to the beginning of order . . . this involves an activity of selection, elimination and extraction . . . to borrow something from chaos through the filter or sieve [*crible*] of the space that's been drawn" (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, p. 311 translation modified). The *crible*, screen or filter, is the immanent plane cut or cross-section of chaos with variable grid, modular webbing, Chaosmic Communications Network. It is the potential from god-knows-where, *sponte sua*, the "thread . . . from which the

spider descends" (Deleuze and Guattari 1991, p. 116). But god is dead(?) and the reason for that is . . . *repetition.* Thus repetition cannot be discerned before it begins to link up with another instance of itself in disguise or displacement (with a working memory), "a paradoxical element," which "makes the series resonate . . . in an aleatory point . . . in a single throw" for all throws (Deleuze 1969, p. 125). What is this *unique lancer* or "longest thought" in an interval shorter than time?

III. The Aionic (Ideal) Game

Repetition 0123 is of the chaos (disappearing apparition, oblivion), of self-linkage (the habit-of-living milieu), of contemporaneous preexistence (Memory) . . . and of the future (eternal return). The Idea is repetition, which produces intensity by varying its metric, which leaves memory behind, passes (back) through chaos, and reemerges from the crack of time (Ideas "swarm in the crack" and emerge from its rims, but the Idea also "interiorizes the crack and its inhabitants, its ants": Deleuze 1968, p. 220) through the filtering screen of remembrane. It is both inherence of the predicate in notion (monad) and absolute opening, the outside, because of its Möbius topology, Klein bottle or human being, inside-out, thinking itself ahead, leaving itself behind, encountering the "savage singularities" it draws and binds and strategically diagrams, the thinking line, folding point, "line of the outside" (Deleuze 1986, pp. 125–130). It is not a pretty sight, this (a)rhythmic-aleatory idea of infinite "chaoerrance" (Deleuze 1969, p. 305), that "terrible line that brews all the diagrams" (Deleuze 1986, p. 130). Homeless, pointless, without identity; absolute position without location ("in a sense, everything is everywhere at all times": Whitehead): it is utter nonsense, the pointless origin of all sense and sensibility. It is a jumping point, "leaping over itself" into a line (Klee; cf. Deleuze and Guattari 1987, pp. 311ff.), sweeping across itself onto a surface, folding its self-surface into a volume (cf. the Baker's transformation of Prigogine: Deleuze 1985) without ceasing to be a plane surface, the surface a line, the line a point, the point a fractalescent chaos.

It takes a leap of thought to make a connection, a resonance between two . . . series that did not exist until now. For example, to write connecting letters and echoing phrases; to draw connecting points, lines, planes, and volumes, resonating shapes and colors; to think connecting and reflecting thoughts into each other; to feel connecting intensities resonating in synesthesia; to imagine linking the source with the abyss, always making up shapes out of singularities of whatever nature, disappearing apparitions, protoplasmic powers. In chaosmos the splitting of the monad performs a disjunc-

tive synthesis. Past and future become indiscernible as virtual and actual. In the realm of creation, of (non)sense, time the event has no predictable direction.[28] The monad is a nomad (Deleuze 1988, p. 189). Aion: time is a child playing . . . throwing singularities. On this earth which does not move, where movement stops, there time (*durée*, life) begins; and there is no entropy without potential, thus no "arrow of time" direction to the time becoming.

I can do no more here than sketch a description of the ideal game, the game of becoming (of returning). "Begin" with the formula of the Body without Organs: the interval is substance. The intervallic, interstitial substance synchronizes all the periods of the milieu components, their rates of synthesis, of transformation. All is metamorphosis, but substance is the enduring interval, lifetime, or Aion. Aion is the variable, nonmetric or "nonpulsed" (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, pp. 262, 267, 296, etc.) time of life "that has abandoned points, coordinates, and measure," "deterritorialized rhythmic block" that "no longer forms a localizable connection" *since it creates its own coordinates* (p. 296), that is, tensors, the tensor that it is—not having or referring to any subject or substance transcending the process of its self-prehension in the other; self-construction, drawing the diagram, the abstract machine. According to the ontology of Whitehead and Berkeley, all being is perception (prehension); and the object of perception is always the imperceptible, the noncategorizable (BwO): "Perception will no longer reside in the relation between a subject and an object, but rather in the movement serving as the limit of that relation, in the *period* associated with them. Perception will find itself confronting its own limit; it will be in among things, throughout its own proximity [*dans l'ensemble de son propre voisinage*], as the presence of one haecceity in another, the prehension of one by the other or the passage from one to the other" (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, p. 282, my emphasis, translation modified). But perception, prehension, is becoming, is metamorphosis, is being itself. Being, becoming, is the interval of substance, the returning or the repetition of component transformations, forever synchronizing periods and rhythms in the passage between milieus: Affect = Transition. To become is to jump into the middle or milieu where we are already (being born), in this zone of indiscernibility we are just now reconstructing (Deleuze and Guattari, cf. p. 293).

Music, as "deterritorialization of the voice," provides us with a "model" or rather, module of becoming, because the voice is territorialized by language and signification, the regimes of memory and discipline, but music is the art of forgetting, of changing memory and metric, of reaching the becoming of history prior to historification and measurement. *Desire directly invests the field of perception* (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, p. 284; cf. Jambet 1985, n. 17). Or painting as deterritorialization of figure, face, and image.

Anarchy means (etymologically) "without governing principle or foundation." In this sense the Deleuzian synthesis of disjunction is a rule of anarchism or (as he says) the system of "anarchy crowned." Anarchy rules, but what does this mean? It does not mean no rules, but, as we have seen, that the rules change with every move, every act of speech, every question or problem formation, every thought or drawing of the singularities. As in Sartre's "situational ethics"—but without even the form of consciousness or the regulative gaze to hold the game in check. What are we in for in the coming "Deleuzian era" that Foucault foretold? It is already here, in the encounter, the shape of our meeting with the outside-thought, the future.

Freud wrote a fabulous essay consummating the tradition of tradition, of principle, of the family. In "Dynamics of the Transference" he calmly lays out the coordinates and transmits a method of diagnosis and treatment of the typical neurotic haunted by familiar phantoms or "imagos." Every human being, he says, is a composite determined by a combination of destiny (*Daimon*) and chance encounter (*Tyche*). Destiny is comprised of genetic inheritance and symbolic tradition (which Lacan formally introduced into the equation), but what is chance, what is *Tyche*? *Tyche* is chance or fate, the singularity whose rules of composition (desire) must be reinvented with every move, every meeting with another being or with itself. Where then is the place of repetition? How can repetition "synthesize" the future?

The repetition of the future has nothing whatsoever to do with any return to the past or memory. It begins in the milieu of metamorphosis and forgetting—whence the past may certainly return, but as a component or trait of the disjunctive synthesis, of transformation, as an act or action of throwing time off its hinges, off its periodic cycle (try a simple Deleuze-Guattarian remedy for neurosis: dismount your dada, get off the complexes, throw up your childhood memories, blow out your fantasies, and get a clock that keeps "a whole assortment of times" [Deleuze and Guattari 1987, p. 271]). Aion is the name of the game, Igo I deal, Jeu Idéal. Repeat: it is not without rules . . . (not without rules, anarchy rules). Everything depends on the variation (concept) of the interval (subject-substance-multiplicity). Repetition governs the game, composition of the plane.

No foundation, on sky or on earth, the gaming tables? Not even below the earth (archeology, geology, biostratigraphy)? In the fold of the twins, heaven and earth, the third synthesis comes throwing the dice of time, brewing all the epochs and churning up epistemai, shuffling singularities for a new drawing of time: universal *effondement*.[29] All identities are dissolved, personal, individual components redistributed. The ethics of situation (a phrase Deleuze does not use and would perhaps refuse) commands affirmation of a world "constituted by divergent series (chaosmos) [of events