(but it is equally Nietzsche's Dionysus, Spinoza's man of beatitude, or the painter him or herself—Pollock "in" his painting) the one who has received a shock, and has seen a vision of the world in its infinite becoming. What to do in the face of such an image? Of course we react, we feel and we see, but no longer with eyes which can represent, or a mind which can explain. "The spiritual automaton is in the psychic situation of the seer," Deleuze writes, "who sees better and further than he can react, that is, think. Which, then, is the subtle way out? To believe, not in a different world, but in a link between man and the world, in love or life, to believe in this as in the impossible, the unthinkable, which none the less cannot but be thought" (C2, 170/221). The visionary sees more than his or her humanity can bear, the inhuman univocity of the reciprocal construction/expression of the seer and the world. Here all organic complementarities between man and world are broken, and must be replaced with something else, with belief. There is, and Deleuze is at his most affirmative here, "the erasure of the unity of man and the world, in favour of a break which now leaves us with only a belief in this world" (C2, 188/245). Any construction, any expression of this world, of the world as new, requires belief, and belief becomes the complete bliss of pure immanence. We discover in a sensation, in art as it is understood by Deleuze and Guattari, the necessity for a mystical and yet atheistic belief in man *and* the world, in their irreducible and incomprehensible link, nothing less than the belief in "the identity of thought and life" (C2, 170/221). Of course, this is a certain sort of thought, and a certain sort of life, the particular expression and most cosmic construction of a mystical aesthetics, the atheism of art. But art in these terms is precisely what cannot be thought or lived; it exceeds our human life and thoughts and must be believed in. Belief as inorganic thought, chaosmic thought, is what comes after man's organic relation to the world is broken. Our connection to the world has changed ontological co-ordinates, and is now "the impossible which can only be restored within a faith. [. . .] Only belief in the world can reconnect man to what he sees and hears" (C2, 172/223). It is the belief of Dionysus, who alone has, according to Nietzsche, "the *faith* that only what is separate and individual may be rejected, that in the totality everything *is* redeemed and affirmed—*he no longer denies*. . . ." (TI, "Expeditions of an Untimely Man," 49). This is the faith of the truly intoxicated, an atheistic belief in this world as a being-in-the-world, a mystic materialism without any transcendental dimension. This is the belief that our sensation encompasses man and the world in a cosmic co-creation, and is, finally, our belief in art, the belief necessary to art. An art that fulfils Deleuze and Guattari's fundamental ontological, aesthetic and ethical condition—to create. But believing in art in this post-modern world is not so easy. As

Deleuze and Guattari warn us: "It may be that believing in this world, in this life, becomes our most difficult task, or the task of a mode of existence still to be discovered on our plane of existence today" (WP, 75/72). The art of belief waits to be created. Again.

So perhaps this book has been nothing but a statement of belief. Could there be a more perverse ending to a book of philosophy than a statement of belief? No doubt this is not the first. But as the expression of a life, sometimes painful, often uplifting, it exists, if as nothing else, then at least as an expression of belief.

Notes

NOTES TO THE INTRODUCTION

1. Gilles Deleuze, "Cold and Heat," *Photogenic Painting, Gerard Fromanger*, p. 64.
2. I use "Deleuze and Guattari" here, as I do in the book's title, to refer to the work done by Deleuze alone, by Guattari alone, and by the two together. Where I am discussing the work Deleuze or Guattari have done separately this will be indicated in the text, as will any divergences between their oeuvres, or across them, when they are relevant to our discussion.
3. We need only think of Professor Challenger from *A Thousand Plateaus*: "Disarticulated, deterritorialized, Challenger muttered that he was taking the earth with him, that he was leaving for the mysterious world, his poison garden" (ATP, 73/93).
4. Gilles Deleuze, "Mysticism and Masochism," *Desert Islands and Other Texts, 1953—1974*, p. 134. ("Mystique et masochisme," *L'île Déserte et Autres Textes, textes et entretiens, 1953—1974*, p. 186)
5. This formulation comes from Éric Alliez who has explored its implications from his earliest work in *La Signature du monde: Ou qu'est-ce que la philosophie de Deleuze et Guattari?* (a translation is forthcoming from Continuum) where it is stated at the end of the first appendix, to his latest, *L'Oeil-cerveau. De la peinture moderne* (with Jean-Clet Martin) and *La Pensée-Matisse* (with Jean-Claude Bonne) (both are forthcoming from Seuil and Gallimard respectively) where he develops its implications in terms of a new genealogy of modern art. I was fortunate enough to attend Éric Alliez's seminar at the Akademie der bildenden Künste Wien from 2000—2003, and my understanding of this point, and many others concerning Deleuze and Guattari's philosophy of art, pays an immeasurable debt to his work.
6. Michel de Certeau, "Mysticism," *Diacritics*, 22.2, summer 1992, p. 12. See also *The Mystic Fable, Volume I, The Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries*. De Certeau's work retrieves mystical expressions from their scientific objectification, and considers them instead as "formalities" (i.e. abstract machines) existing across a wide range of discourses and practices. It provided an initial

inspiration for my project here. De Certeau also rejects any separation of the ontological elements of mystical discourse from their expressions, suggesting a constructivist understanding of mysticism that I have also tried to pursue. De Certeau argues: "The Other that organizes the text is not an outside of the text. It is not an imaginary object that one might distinguish from the movement by which it is sketched. To locate it apart, to isolate it from the texts that exhaust themselves trying to express it, would be tantamount to exorcising it by providing it with its own place and name" (*The Mystic Fable*, p. 15). This is a precise definition of mysticism in terms of the expressionism=constructivism equation.

7. John Rajchman for example, has written: "It is a shame to present him [Deleuze] as a metaphysician and nature mystic." ("Introduction," Gilles Deleuze, *Pure Immanence, Essays on A Life*, p. 7) Similarly, if less categorically, Ronald Bogue writes: "Though this blending of bodies and sensations, of people, art-works, and cosmos, may sound like sheer mysticism, it is based on a coherent theory of nature as creation" (*Deleuze on Music, Painting, and the Arts*, p. 170).
8. This is part of the rather hilarious interview "Faces and Surfaces," *Desert Islands and Other Texts, 1953–1974*, p. 281. ("Faces et Surfaces," *L'île déserte et autres texts, textes et entretiens 1953–1974*, p. 392)
9. Gilles Deleuze, "Mysticism and Masochism," *Desert Islands and Other Texts, 1953–1974*, p. 134. ("Mystique et masochisme," *L'île déserte et autres texts, textes et entretiens 1953–1974*, p. 186)

NOTES TO CHAPTER ONE

1. Friedrich Nietzsche, *Thus Spake Zarathustra*, "Of the Bestowing of Virtue," 3. All reference to this book now found in the text following the abbreviation "Z."
2. Gilles Deleuze, "Nomad Thought," *The New Nietzsche*, p. 145. ("Pensée Nomade," *L'île Déserte et Autres Textes, textes et entretiens, 1953—1974*, p. 357)
3. Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Gay Science*, 290. All references to this book now found in the text following the abbreviation "GS."
4. Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Will to Power*, 795. All references to this book now found in the text following the abbreviation "WtP."
5. Friedrich Nietzsche, *Twilight of the Idols*, "Expeditions of an Untimely Man," 33. All references to this book now found in the text following the abbreviation "TI."
6. Friedrich Nietzsche, *On the Genealogy of Morals*, I, 6. All references to this book now found in the text following the abbreviation "GM."
7. Gilles Deleuze, "Coldness and Cruelty," *Masochism*, p. 14. Similarly, Deleuze has written that "symptomatology is located almost outside medicine, at a neutral point, a zero point, where artists and philosophers and doctors and patients can come together." "Mysticism and Masochism" *Desert Islands and Other Textes, 1953—1974*, p. 134. ("Mystique et masochisme," *L'île Déserte et Autres Textes, textes et entretiens, 1953—1974*, p. 186) It would be as an art of symptomatology that we can understand Deleuze's table of types and qualities in his book on Nietzsche. (NP, 146/166) Similarly, his discussion of the "clinical essence" of each art is also a symptomatology (FB,54/55). As he writes elsewhere: "There is always a great deal of art involved in the grouping of symptoms, in the organisation of a *table* where a particular symptom is dissociated from another, juxtaposed to a third, and forms the new figure of a disorder or illness. Clinicians who are able to renew a symptomatological table produce a work of art; conversely, artists are clinicians, [. . .] they are clinicians of civilisation" (LS, 237/276). This introduces the necessity of a taxonomy of symptoms, a *critical and clinical* taxonomy, which I shall examine in chapters 3 and 6.
8. The passage these quotations come from acts as a succinct Deleuzian gloss to the lines from *Twilight of the Idols* cited above: "According to physicists," Deleuze writes, "noble energy is the kind capable of transforming itself, while the base kind can no longer do so. There is will to power on both sides, but the latter is nothing more than will-to-dominate in the exhausted becoming of life, while the former is artistic will or 'virtue which gives,' the creation of new possibilities, in the outpouring becoming" (C2, 141/185).
9. Hence Nietzsche's famous line: "*Beyond Good and Evil*—At least this does *not* mean 'Beyond Good and Bad'" (GM, I, 17). Beyond the weak man's "bad" morality of good and evil, the strength of the eagle is good.
10. The Nietzschean art of creative critique will remain a condition of Deleuze's project till the end, and is affirmed in the last book he wrote with Guattari: "Criticism implies new concepts (of the thing criticised) just as much as the most positive creation" (WP, 83/80).
11. Gilles Deleuze, "Nietzsche," *Pure Immanence, Essays on A Life*, p. 73. (*Nietzsche*, p. 24)
12. Gilles Deleuze, "Nietzsche," *Pure Immanence, Essays on A Life*, p. 74. (*Nietzsche*, p. 25)
13. "To interpret," Deleuze writes, "is to determine the force which gives sense to a thing. To evaluate is to determine the will to power which gives value to a thing. We can no more abstract values from the standpoint from which they draw value than we can abstract meaning from the standpoint from which it draws its signification. The will to power as genealogical element is that from which senses derive their significance and values their values" (NP, 54/61).
14. As Deleuze writes: "Nietzsche replaced the ideal of knowledge, the discovery of the true, with *interpretation and evaluation.*" Gilles Deleuze, "Nietzsche," *Pure Immanence, Essays on A Life*, p. 65. (*Nietzsche*, p. 17)

15. As Nietzsche puts it: "For assuming that one is a person, one necessarily also has the philosophy that belongs to that person; but there is a big difference. In some it is their deprivations that philosophise; in others, their riches and strengths" (GS, preface, 2). Similarly, Nietzsche writes: "It has gradually become clear to me what every great philosophy has hitherto been: a confession on the part of its author and a kind of involuntary and unconscious memoir; moreover, that the moral (or immoral) intentions in every philosophy have every time constituted the real germ of life out of which the entire plant has grown. To explain how a philosopher's most remote metaphysical assertions have actually been arrived at, it is always well (and wise) to ask oneself first: what morality does this (does he-) aim at?" (*Beyond Good and Evil*, 6) This means, as Deleuze is fond of pointing out, we always get the thoughts and feeling we deserve. See; NP, 104/119, DR, 159/206–7, and "How Do We Recognise Structuralism?" C.S. Stivale, *The Two-Fold Thought of Deleuze and Guattari: Intersections and Animations*, p. 270. ("A quoi reconnaît-on le structuralisme?," *L'île Déserte et Autres Textes, textes et entretiens, 1953—1974*, p. 254)
16. Henry Miller, *The World of Sex*, p. 94, New York: Grove Press, 1965.
17. This passage clearly marks the differences between Deleuze and Martin Heidegger's well-known interpretation of Nietzsche. For Deleuze the immanence of being and becoming is central to his univocal ontology, not just in relation to Nietzsche, but throughout his oeuvre. For Heidegger, interpreting Nietzsche as the "last metaphysician," this passage "suggests that Becoming only is if it is grounded in Being as Being." This implies, Heidegger argues, that "for Nietzsche will as will to power designates the essence of Being." Because art is the way will to power, or Being, becomes "genuinely visible," it will be possible to "grasp will to power itself in its essence, and thereby being as a whole with regard to its basic character" in art. As we shall see, for Deleuze will to power has no basic character and is not a metaphysical category because it is always under construction, always creating the perspectives constituting its becoming. The Heidegger quotations are from *Nietzsche vol.1, Will to Power as Art*, p. 19, 39, 72, and 92.
18. T. S. Eliot, "Preludes," *The Wasteland and other poems*, p. 10, London: Faber and Faber, 1972.
19. One of Deleuze's most important arguments, his anti-Hegelian affirmation of difference, is therefore entirely Nietzschean. Deleuze writes: "Difference is not the negative; on the contrary, non-being is difference [. . .]. This (non)-being is the differential element in which affirmation, as multiple affirmation, finds the principle of its genesis. As for negation, this is only a shadow of the highest principle, the shadow of difference alongside the affirmation produced. Once we confuse (non)-being with the negative, contradiction is inevitably carried into being; but contradiction is only the appearance or the epiphenomenon, the illusion projected by the problem, the shadow of a question which remains open and of a being which corresponds as such to that question (before it has been given a response)" (DR, 64/89).

20. Friedrich Nietzsche, *Human, All Too Human*, 51. All references to this book now found in the text following the abbreviation "HH."
21. Friedrich Nietzsche, Letter, 2 December 1887, *Unpublished Letters*, p. 125.
22. In this sense, Nietzsche writes, anti-art gives witness to "a specific anti-artisticality of instinct—a mode of being which impoverishes and attenuates things and makes them consumptive. And history is in fact rich in such anti-artists, in such starvelings of life, who necessarily have to take things to themselves, impoverish them, make them leaner" (TI, "Expeditions of an Untimely Man," 9).
23. Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Antichrist*, 14. All references to this book now found in the text following the abbreviation "A."
24. Affirmation in itself, Deleuze argues, is becoming, or will to power. But as the object of another affirmation, of an interpretation, will to power takes on being: "It is primary affirmation (becoming) which is being, but only as the object of the second affirmation" (NP, 186/214). The song of the artist-philosopher: "*Eternal affirmation of being, eternally I am your affirmation*" (Nietzsche, quoted, NP, 187/215).
25. These words are spoken by Birkin, who is considered a self-portrait of Lawrence. *Women in Love*, p. 48, London: Penguin, 1985.
26. Gilles Deleuze, "Nietzsche," *Pure Immanence, Essays on A Life*, p. 85. (*Nietzsche*, p. 34)
27. Deleuze and Guattari suggest a kind of intoxicated sobriety, quoting Henry Miller: "To succeed in getting drunk, but on pure water" (ATP, 286/350). Intoxication is not the same as inebriation, as Nietzsche often stressed. See *Daybreak*, 50, 188, 269.
28. Nietzsche introduces the concept of the Dionysian in his first book, *The Birth of Tragedy*, where the indiscernibility of art-work and artist in intoxication is already present. Nietzsche writes of the Dionysian artist: "No longer *artist*, he has himself become a *work of art*, the productive power of the whole universe is now manifest in his transport, to the glorious satisfaction of the primordial One" (*The Birth of Tragedy*, p. 24). In *The Birth of Tragedy* the Dionysian is opposed to an Apollonian art of representational forms, an opposition Nietzsche tries to sublate in the Greek art of tragedy: "Tragedy is an Apollonian embodiment of Dionysiac insights and powers" (*The Birth of Tragedy*, p. 8). This sublation will mean that *The Birth of Tragedy* "smells offensively Hegelian" to Nietzsche by the end of his working life. (*Ecce Homo*, "Birth of Tragedy," 1. References to this book now found in the text following the abbreviation "EH.") Nietzsche progressively distances himself from this early oppositional formulation and its Romantic influences and gestures (especially in the second Preface, the "Attempt At A Self Criticism" of 1886),

and replaces it with a concept of the Dionysian as the critical animal artistic state necessary to will to power's transvaluation.

29. Jacques Derrida, *Spurs*, p. 77. It must be pointed out however, that Derrida's interpretation of Nietzsche differs markedly from Deleuze's. For Derrida will to power is a Heideggerean Being, whose productive presence is forever veiled/unveiled in an artists work. Art, on this account, is a mechanism of deference that "writes" will to power's presence/absence in a work. In this sense, an artists "style," Derrida writes, "uses its spur as a means of protection against the terrifying, blinding, mortal threat (of that) which *presents* itself, which obstinately thrusts itself into view. And style thereby protects the presence, the content, the thing itself, meaning, truth—on the condition at least that it should not *already* be that gaping chasm which has been deflowered in the unveiling of difference. *Already*, such is the name for what has been effaced or subtracted beforehand, but which has nevertheless left behind a mark, a signature which is retracted in that very thing from which it is withdrawn" (*Spurs*, p. 39). Style, for Derrida, unveils the difference between that which presents itself and its presentation, and is the signature of the formers withdrawal from the latter. For Deleuze, style is the expression of the immanence of will to power and form, its intoxicating presence in the self-overcoming—the becoming—of forms.
30. Similarly, Deleuze writes, "man is in the image and likeness of God, but through sin we have lost the likeness while remaining in the image . . . simulacra are precisely demonic images, stripped of resemblance" (DR, 127/167).
31. Deleuze is ever the generous adversary however, and in the concept of the simulacra Deleuze will find Plato escaping himself. By affirming the simulacrum, Deleuze writes, he is "demonstrating the anti-Platonism at the heart of Platonism" (DR, 128/167).
32. Alain Badiou, in a fascinating attack on Deleuze, attempts a "reversal" of Deleuzianism on the site of the simulacra, by reinserting the distinction between essence and appearance (idea and copy) into the heart of Deleuze's account of univocal being. Badiou writes, "if one classes—as one should—every difference without a real status, every multiplicity whose ontological status is that of the One, as simulacrum, then the world of beings is the theatre of the simulacrum of Being.

    Strangely, the consequence has a Platonic, or even Neoplatonic, air to it. It is as though the paradoxical or super-eminent One immanently engenders a procession of beings whose univocal sense it distributes, while they refer to its power and have only a semblance of being. But in this case, what meaning is to be given to the Nietzschean program Deleuze constantly validates: the overturning of Platonism? [. . .] Deleuzianism is fundamentally a Platonism with a different accentuation. [. . .] it is necessary to affirm the rights of simulacra *as so many equivocal cases of univocity* that joyously attest to the univocal power of Being"(*Deleuze: The Clamour of Being*, p.26–7). Badiou's "reversal" of Deleuze is ironically Deleuzian, inasmuch as he attempts to produce a "mutant child" through this ventriloquism. Badiou's key suggestion is that simulacra are merely equivocal cases of univocity, ("simulacrum *of* Being") and so conform to a Neoplatonic metaphysics of expression in which the univocal One remains transcendent. This is the crucial point, and where Badiou broadens his critique to suggest Deleuze must sacrifice a real multiplicity in order to maintain a Univocal Being. As I shall argue however, for Deleuze the simulacrum is not *of* Being, but is being in its becoming. This implies, as we have already shown, that it is only in being constructed by will to power that "this" world expresses will to power. In other words, there is no Being apart from becoming, and there is no supplementary dimension to the plane of immanence (will to power) on which the One and the many, being and becoming are continually constructed and expressed. This expressive/constructive power of univocity Deleuze finds in Nietzsche is nothing but the power of the eternal return, where "Returning is being but only the being of becoming." (DR, 41/59) Éric Alliez has attempted his own "reversal" of Badiou's rejection of Deleuze's work with Guattari. Alliez argues: "Badiou erects an image of Deleuze as a metaphysician of the One, whose essential *monotony—in itself indifferent to differences*, subtracted as it is from the 'inexhaustible variety of the concrete' and from the anarchic confusion of the world—can and must cause us to dismiss the works co-authored with Félix Guattari, beginning with the *Anti-Oedipus*." "The Politics of the *Anti-Oedipus*—Thirty Years On," in *Radical Philosophy*, no.124, march-april 2004. Alliez on the other hand, argues that Deleuzian philosophy becomes truly alive, becomes a "bio-politics" that overcomes his earlier "bio-philosophy," *after* Deleuze begins to work with Guattari. See "The BwO Condition or, The Politics of Sensation," in *Biographien des organlosen Körpers*.
33. "Overturning Platonism," Deleuze writes, "means denying the privacy of original over copy, of model over image; glorifying the reign of simulacra and reflections" (DR, 66/92).
34. Pierre Klossowski, *Nietzsche and the Vicious Circle*, p. 132. Klossowski goes on to say, "every authentic artist is conscious of producing something that is *false*, namely a *simulacrum*." p. 223. Klossowski's book was very influential for Deleuze.
35. This is the problem with philosophers as opposed to artists, they don't know how to lie. As Nietzsche says about philosophers: "They know what they have to prove, they are practical in that—they recognise one another by their agreement over 'truths.'—'Thou shalt not lie'—in plain words: take care, philosopher, not to tell the truth . . ." (TI, "Expeditions of an Untimely Man," 42).
36. Of course, it is not only philosophers who become artists in these terms, as artists have often understood their work as simulacra. Van Gogh, for example,

who wrote: "I long most of all to learn how to produce those very aberrations, reworkings, transformations of reality, as may turn into, well—a lie if you like—but truer than the literal truth" (Vincent van Gogh, Letter to Theo, July 1885, *The Letters of Vincent van Gogh*, p. 307, translated by A. Pomerans, London: Penguin, 1996). Van Gogh's paintings are no doubt a good example of simulacrum, inasmuch as their agitated colors and brush strokes, their writhing lines and vibrant colors embody in an immediate materiality the vital life they affirm. Indeed van Gogh often seems to echo Nietzsche in his letters, affirming at one point the necessary connection of a vital art to a vital life. He writes to his sister Wils, "remember that what people demand in art nowadays is something very much alive, with strong colour and great intensity. So intensify your own health and strength and life, that's the best study" (letter, summer or autumn 1887, in *The Letters of Vincent van Gogh*, p. 337). Van Gogh's paintings are not representational but processual, a vital sensation appears in which crows, the sky, the shimmering golden wheat field are nothing but matter in movement, forces vibrating the world, a material world of which I am a part, and whose life appears only in the inhuman affirmation which interprets it. Jean-Clet Martin has discussed van Gogh's work in these terms: "The wall that Vincent dreamed of passing through, of patiently eroding, this was finally the limit separating inside from outside, the surface of the painting that turned its back on things. Now this border is over with, since the brain is becoming world even as life enters painting. The membrane separating the seen from the seer has opened up, absorbing things into the heart of the eye that contemplates them." "Of Images and Worlds: Towards a Geology of the Cinema," in *The Brain is a Screen: Gilles Deleuze and the Philosophy of Cinema*, p. 75.

37. Aesthetics becomes an "apodictic" discipline, Deleuze writes, "only when we apprehend directly in the sensible that which can only be sensed, the very being of the sensible: difference, potential difference and difference in intensity as the reason behind qualitative diversity. It is in difference that movement is produced as an 'effect,' that phenomena flash their meaning like signs" (DR, 56–7/79–80).
38. Deleuze's gloss on this passage is helpful, and also gives his rather ingenious interpretation of the Nietzschean eternal return *of the same*. "We misinterpret the expression 'eternal return' if we understand it as 'return of the same.' It is not being that returns but rather returning itself that constitutes being insofar as it is affirmed of becoming and of that which passes. It is not some one thing that returns but rather returning itself is the one thing that is affirmed of diversity or multiplicity. In other words, identity in the eternal return does not describe the nature of that which returns but, on the contrary, the fact of returning for that which differs" (NP, 48/55).
39. Nietzsche writes something similar; "it is always well to divorce an artist from his work, and to take him less seriously than *it*. He is, after all, only a condition of the work, the soil from which it grows, perhaps only the manure of that soil. Thus he is, in most cases, something that must be forgotten if one wants to enter the full enjoyment of the work" (GM, III, 4).
40. This is the meaning of Nietzsche's affirmation of selection: "What does all art do? Does it not praise? Does it not highlight? By doing all of this it *strengthens* or *weakens* certain valuations. . . . Is this no more than incidental? An accident? Something in which the instinct of the artist has no part whatever? Or is it not the prerequisite for the artist being an artist at all . . . is his basic instinct directed towards the meaning of art, which is *life?* Towards *a desideratum of life?* Art is the great stimulus to life: how could it be thought purposeless, aimless, *l'art pour l'art?*" (TI, "Expeditions of an Untimely Man," 24). The artist selects, and in selecting makes things more beautiful. The problem is that with the artist, Nietzsche writes, "this subtle power usually comes to an end where art ends and life begins" (GS, 299). Thus, the problem of "art" is the selection of forces that overcome the artist as human, for as Nietzsche argues, "man becomes the transfigurer of existence when he learns to transfigure himself" (WtP, 820).
41. These paintings, almost always produced in series, begin with the *Marilyn* paintings (started in the month of her suicide), and continue with series of Liz Taylor (painted while she was critically ill), Jackie Kennedy, Elvis, car crashes, food poisoning (*Tunafish Disaster*), suicides (most famously the young woman lying on a car after jumping to her death from the Empire State building) and the first series of *Electric Chair* works, among others.
42. Paul Patton, for example, finds this unlikely, writing: "To the extent that Warhol's work still plays with the idea of representation, it is not the most appropriate aesthetic correlate to Deleuze's non-representational conception of thought" ("Anti-Platonism and Art," in *Gilles Deleuze and the Theatre of Philosophy*, p. 155).
43. Gilles Deleuze, "Cold and Heat," *Photogenic Painting, Gerard Fromanger*, p. 65.
44. On the intricate repetitions of the various *Elvis* paintings, see Raiji Kuroda, "Collapsing/Collapsed Discourse on Warhol, Regarding Two *Elvis* Series," *Andy Warhol 1956–86: Mirror of His Time*.
45. It is well known that most of these works were actually executed by Warhol's assistant at this time, Gerard Malanga. More to the point is Warhol's own affirmation of this process as "like a Factory would do it." Gretchen Berg, "'Nothing to Loose," an interview with Andy Warhol." 1967, *Andy Warhol: A Factory*, unpaginated.
46. Andy Warhol, "Interview with Gene Swanson," *Art in Theory, 1900—1990, An Anthology of Changing Ideas*, p. 731, edited by C. Harrison and P. Wood, Oxford: Blackwell, 1992.
47. Interestingly enough, the exact number of the *Elvis* series is not known. See, Raiji Kuroda, "Collapsing/Collapsed Discourse on Warhol, Regarding Two *Elvis* Series," *Andy Warhol 1956–86: Mirror of His Time*.

48. A good example of this reading is Hal Foster, *The Return of the Real, The Avant-garde at the End of the Century.* Foster understands Warhol's simulacral series as a play of signifiers over an unsignifiable and traumatic Real.
49. As Warhol famously suggested: "If you want to know anything about Andy Warhol just look at the surface of my paintings and films and me, and there I am. There's nothing behind it." Gretchen Berg, "'Nothing to Loose,' an interview with Andy Warhol" (1967, *Andy Warhol. A Factory,* unpaginated).
50. Gretchen Berg, "'Nothing to Loose,' an interview with Andy Warhol."
51. See for example Thomas Crow's influential reading of these works as a humanist intervention by Warhol "in which the mass-produced image as the bearer of desires was exposed in its inadequacy by the reality of suffering and death." Deleuze, on the contrary, is arguing that mechanical repetition is entirely adequate to the eternal return as death. Thomas Crow, "Saturday Disasters: Trace and Reference in Early Warhol," *Reconstructing Modernism: Art in New York, Paris, and Montreal 1945–1964,* p. 318.
52. Although Elvis was obviously alive when the series bearing his name was created, the image itself is redolent with death. The film it advertises, *Flaming Star,* tells the story of a half Indian (Elvis) whose mother and father are killed in the course of conflict between Indians and whites. The title refers to the Indian belief that the "flaming star of death" is seen just before one dies, and in the film both Elvis and his mother utter the words: "I can see the flaming star of death." See Raiji Kuroda, "Collapsing/Collapsed Discourse on Warhol, Regarding Two *Elvis* Series," *Andy Warhol 1956–86: Mirror of His Time.* For a fascinating glimpse into the continued "life" of the simulacrum Elvis, after his "death," where "the shade of Elvis is now an anarchy of possibilities, a stain of freedom less clear, but no less suggestive than the man himself." see Griel Marcus, *Dead Elvis, A Chronicle of a Cultural Obsession,* p. xviii, New York: Doubleday, 1991.
53. Despite being published eighteen years later, Deleuze's description of Warhol's films in *Cinema 2* seems to echo *Difference and Repetition.* Deleuze discusses Warhol's films in terms of an "everyday theatricalization of the body," (C2, 192/249) or in the terms of *Difference and Repetition* "a veritable *theatre* of metamorphoses and permutations" (DR, 56/79). This does, perhaps, also suggest some continuities in Deleuze's approach in relation to our discussion here. Certainly, the appearance of Nietzsche in *Cinema 2,* in relation to cinema's "powers of the false" does echo many of the concerns of this chapter, and will be dealt with more fully in Chapter Three. It is interesting to note that while the term "simulacra" does fall out of Deleuze's vocabulary, he mentions the time-image's "*simulation*" in relation to cinema's power of the false, which carries a similar meaning (C2,148/194).
54. "[I]t is the masked," Deleuze writes, "the disguised or the costumed which turns out to be the truth of the uncovered" (DR, 24/37).

55. A "sign," Deleuze argues, expresses difference on one side, but on the other "tends to cancel it" (DR, 20/31). This two-sided aspect of the sign is developed by Deleuze, both in *Difference and Repetition* and in the article "How do we Recognise Structuralism?" in terms of "structure" and "structuralism." Deleuze argues that the differenciating element, which like death is what causes differences to repeat but is not itself given in the repetition, is the unimaginable element "object=*x*." This "object" "has no identity except in order to be displaced in relation to all places. As a result, for each order of structure the object=*x* is the empty or perforated site that permits this order to be articulated with the others, in a space that entails as many directions as orders. The orders of the structure do not communicate in a common site, but they all communicate through their empty place or respective object=*x*" (DR, 278/264). For Deleuze the meaning of structuralism and its series is found in this term without place animating any structure. This term is what lies "beneath" structuralism—namely nothing—because all structures are the repetition of the object=*x* in series. In this sense, a sense which has a good deal of historical precision, Pop art would be type of structuralism. But in *Anti-Oedipus,* Deleuze turns on structuralism and on one of its major figures, Jacques Lacan, and rejects both its negative ontology (as the expression of a real but *empty* place), its understanding of becoming in terms of serial structures, and its retention of a paradigm of signification.
56. Éric Alliez has explored this tension in Deleuze's work between that done before Guattari and that after—in terms of the concept of the BwO—in "The BwO Condition or, The Politics of Sensation," *Biographien des organlosen Körpers.*
57. This would also be one way to understand the move from Nietzsche to Spinoza as Deleuze's crucial philosophical reference. The question becomes less how to overcome man, than how man can become the God he *already is.* "A freeman thinks about nothing less than death," Spinoza writes, "and his knowledge is a meditation on life, not death" (*Ethics,* IV, p67).
58. "Cold and Heat," *Photogenic Painting, Gerhard Fromanger,* p. 65.

NOTE TO CHAPTER TWO

1. Benedict de Spinoza, *The Ethics,* in *A Spinoza Reader.* All references to this book now found in the text according to the standard form. For example, the above quote is Ethics, V, P24. That is, *The Ethics,* book V, proposition 24. Definitions (D), demonstrations (d), colloquiums (c), scholia (s), appendix (App.), Lemma (L), and Preface (Pref.) also appear as abbreviations after quotations cited in the text.
2. Félix Guattari, "I Am God Most Of The Time," *Chaosophy,* p.51.
3. Walt Whitman, "Starting from Paumanok," *Selected Poems,* p.4. Toronto: Dover, 1991.

4. The distinction between Substance, attributes and modes can be understood according to a scholastic distinction Spinoza sometimes employs. God expresses itself in itself as *natura naturans*, while expressing itself in its modes (produced within itself), as *natura naturata*. It is the attributes however, which articulate the absolute immanence of God's univocity, because the attributes as essence constitute the *natura naturans*, as well as being what is expressed by modes as *natura naturata*.
5. Gilles Deleuze, *Seminar Session On Scholasticism and Spinoza*, 14 January 1974. Deleuze is often vehement in his opinion of Hegel: "What I detested more than anything else was Hegelianism and the Dialectic." quoted by Brian Massumi, "Translators Introduction" (ATP, 517).
6. For a discussion of Hegel's reading of Spinoza in these terms, see, W. Montag, "Preface" to *The New Spinoza*. Also, Pierre Macherey, "The Problem of the Attributes," *The New Spinoza*, p.72–3. Alberto Toscano discusses "the compulsive ritual of exorcism which German philosophy had submitted itself to with regard to Spinozism." in "Fanaticism and Production: On Schelling's Philosophy of Indifference" in *Pli*, 8, 1999, p.47.
7. Gilles Deleuze, *Seminar Session On Scholasticism and Spinoza*, 14 January 1974.
8. Antonio Negri, in his important book *The Savage Anomaly* understands Spinoza's ontology in a similar way, writing: "There is no dialectic. Being is being, nonbeing is nothing. Nothing: phantasm, superstition, shadow. It is opposition. It is an obstacle of the constructive project" (p. 220). The mutual admiration of Negri and Deleuze, especially in relation to their respective work on Spinoza, is well known. Nevertheless differences and tensions between their readings exist, some of which will be the subject of further footnotes.
9. Plato's metaphysics were revived in a neo-Platonism which emerged in the middle of the third century, and which dominated the ancient world till the beginning of the sixth. Its most important figure was Plotinus, whose lectures and notes were edited by Porphyry, and appeared as the *Enneads*. This tradition passed into Christianity through numerous thinkers, the most important being St. Augustine. Augustine's book *City of God* codified in Christian terms the rejection of the body and the embrace of the spirit he found in neo-Platonic mysticism. For an account of Augustine's relation to neo-Platonism see John D. O'Meara, *Studies in Augustine and Eringena*.
10. Quoted in Phillip Goodchild, "Why is Philosophy so compromised with God?" *Deleuze and Religion*, p.165.
11. As Deleuze explains Plotinus, "the One does not come out of itself in order to produce Being, because if it came out of itself it would become Two, but Being comes out of the One. This is the very formula of the *emanative* cause." *Seminar on Spinoza*, 25 November 1980. Deleuze also gives a brief account of neo-Platonism in LS, 255/294. It would be over the question of Spinoza's immanent/emanative Substance that Negri and Deleuze would first part ways. Deleuze cannot allow for an emanative interpretation of Spinoza's Substance as this would lead to a pure expressionism, without the modal construction of Nature. Negri however, sees Spinoza's ontology as emanative, inasmuch as it remains within a pantheistic realm in which God is in Nature, but our mystical comprehension of God is limited to retracing his emanations. This implies a static divine rather than a God/Nature under construction, and is precisely what Deleuze seeks to avoid. "Spinozism," Negri writes, "resorted to mysticism, and through mysticism there re-emerged the old and always repeated pantheistic illusion of the immobility of being." *Time for Revolution*, p.214. Deleuze's reading of Spinoza's expressionism is directly oppossed to Negri's on this point. For Deleuze, expressionism would "free univocal Being from a state of indifference or neutrality, to make it the object of a pure affirmation, which is actually realized in an expressive pantheism or immanence" (EPS, 333/309).
12. Plotinus, quoted by Deleuze (EPS, 172/156).
13. The question of Deleuze-Spinoza's relation to Plotinus revolves around the relation of an emanative to an univocal ontology, and the structure of expressionism each involves. According to Deleuze, this relation is not always clear, for: "Expressive immanence is grafted onto the theme of emanation, which in part encourages it, and in part represses it" (EPS, 178/162, see also EPS, 171–2/155–6). Finally, however, Deleuze argues that emanation represses expressionism because it cannot do without a "minimal transcendence" (EPS, 180/163). Deleuze therefore distinguishes an emanative ontology/theology from a univocal and immanent one, and this is the distinction I will pursue in relation to Spinoza's "mysticism." As an interesting alternative account, Éric Alliez explores the confluences of Deleuze and Plotinus in *Capital Times: Tales from the Conquest of Time*, p.34–38.
14. Quoted in Jeremy R. Carrette, *Foucault and Religion, Spiritual Corporeality and Political Spirituality*, p.100. London: Routledge, 2000.
15. Quoted in Ray L. Hart, "God and Creature in the Eternity and Time of Nonbeing (or Nothing): Afterthinking Meister Eckhart," *The Otherness of God*, p.44. Eckhart's God is similar to Plotinus' One in this respect, that the One cannot be signified because it is "in truth beyond all statement" (*Enneads*, V, 5, 13). Quoted in Olivier Davies, "Thinking Difference, a comparative study of Gilles Deleuze, Plotinus and Meister Eckhart," *Deleuze and Religion*, p.77.
16. Michael Hardt has suggested a provocative atheist version of incarnation in these terms. "Incarnation," he writes, "is first of all a metaphysical thesis that the essence and the existence of being are one and the same. There is no ontological essence that resides beyond the world. None of being or God or Nature remains outside existence, but rather all is fully realized, fully expressed, without remainder, in the flesh." in "Exposure, Pasolini in the flesh," *A Shock to Thought, Expressionism after Deleuze and Guattari*, p.70. I shall return to this spiritual flesh in Chapter Six.

17. Gilles Deleuze, *Seminar Session on Spinoza*, 24 January 1978.
18. Fernando Pessoa, "The Keeper of Sheep," *The Poems of Fernando Pessoa*, p. 20. Translated and edited by E. Honig and S. Brown, San Fransisco: City Light Books, 1998. For Deleuze and Guattari on Pessoa's work see WP, 167/158. For a short account of Pessoa's relation to Deleuze and Guattari see Brian Massumi, "Deleuze and Guattari and the Philosophy of Expression," *Canadian Review of Comparative Literature*, p. 756–7.
19. For the story of Spinoza's relationship to the Jewish church, and the significance of his background as a Marrano Jew, see Yirmiyahu Yovel, *Spinoza and Other Heretics vol.2 The Adventures of Immanence*.
20. Gilles Deleuze, *Seminar Session on Spinoza*, 25 November 1980.
21. Negri, while acknowledging that atheism is the creative moment in Spinoza, nevertheless warns that it does not avoid "in a definitive manner" that point in the Judeo-Christian tradition where all experience is brought back to unity. "To expropriate God of its creativity is not decisive," he argues, "if we allow creativity to be defined still by the unity of the creative project. By doing so we make the divinity worldly but do not eliminate it." Spinoza's atheism would in this way remain within the Christian tradition in retaining "the ultimate defining characteristic of the religious concept of creativity." *Insurgencies, Constituent Power and the Modern State*, p. 308. This would not seem a problem for Deleuze, who does not claim Spinoza's creative atheism is not religious, but that creativity as such is the atheism proper to religion. Similarly, creativity does not remain unified in God, on Deleuze's account, because God's unity exists only in the necessary multiplicity of its creative movements. In terms of Negri's political concept of constituent power, the creativity of Spinoza's multitude is restricted by its retention of an ideal unity in and as God. For Deleuze however, and as we shall see, this is not a restriction because God's ideal unity is nothing but the immanence of God in the multiplicity of modes. In other words, it is not a question of unity but of immanence. It is God's immanence that is articulated through creativity, understood as the genetic process in which God is constructed (becoming), as it is expressed (being). The creative project would be *both* unified and multiple on this account.
22. Gilles Deleuze, *Seminar Session on Spinoza*, 25 November, 1980. Deleuze and Guattari will extend this idea to philosophy, writing that: "Perhaps Christianity does not produce concepts except through its atheism" (WP, 92/88).
23. Art as creation therefore defines both Nietzsche and Spinoza's atheism, just as it defines their mysticism. I did not develop an argument for Nietzsche's atheistic mysticism in the previous chapter, although I believe it lies implicit in much that I wrote there. It seems to me that the critical expression/ construction of will to power, and the power of the false it implies and embodies in the simulacra, involves an atheistic mysticism which culminates in, and finds its proper name as, art. As Nietzsche wrote, this is: "An art so divine, so infernally divine. . . ." (*The Antichrist*, 61). Of course, this common project of Nietzsche and Spinoza is marked by highly divergent means, and it hardly needs pointing out that Nietzsche's atheism will involve the death of God, while Spinoza's involves his true understanding, as what we already are.

24. Deleuze's formulation of Spinoza's immanent and expressive God, or Deity, finds explicit echoes in Alfred North Whitehead's "process" philosophy. For an interesting comparison of Deleuze and Whitehead framed in terms of the emanative/immanent relation I have already discussed, see Arnaud Villani, "Deleuze et Whitehead," in *Revue de Metaphysique et de Morale*, No.2, 1996. For Deleuze on Whitehead see TF, 76–82/103–12.
25. In *A Thousand Plateaus* Deleuze and Guattari offer a similar reading of Spinoza, this time through the intercession of Antonin Artaud. They argue that the BwO is an unformed matter with an "intensity = 0" (ATP, 153/189) and thus conforms to the "qualitative identity of the absolute" (EPS, 197/180) Deleuze finds in Spinoza's Substance. The BwO is modified in quantitative individuations measured as intensities, and expressed in actual bodies and ideas (we will see that Deleuze reads Spinoza in precisely these terms). This implies a single plane of immanence, the BwO, as a univocal being which is continually becoming in its intensive individuations. "The body without organs," Deleuze and Guattari write, "is the immanent substance, in the most Spinozist sense of the word; and the partial objects are like its ultimate attributes" (AO, 327/390). The BwO therefore seems to specifically reply to Deleuze's initial objection about Spinoza's ontology, inasmuch as it, "effectively goes beyond any opposition between the one and the multiple. [. . .] There is a continuum of all the attributes or genus's of intensity under a single substance, and a continuum of the intensities of a certain genus under a single type or attribute. A continuum of all substances in intensity and of all intensities in substance. The uninterrupted continuum of the BwO. BwO, immanence, immanent limit"(ATP, 154/191).
26. Gilles Deleuze, *Negotiations, 1972–1990*. This "identity" is elaborated in Deleuze's discussions of Nietzsche and Spinoza's shared devaluation of consciousness and morality, and their shared atheism. See SPP, chapter 2, NP, 39/44–5, and in Deleuze's discussion of the affect as an immanent evaluation in C2, 141/184–5.
27. Thomas Bernhard, *Extinction*, p. 188, translated by D. McLintock, London: Penguin, 1996.
28. Artaud and Spinoza seem on the face of it an unlikely combination, but for Deleuze they both reconstruct the body outside of God's judgement. "The *judgement of God*," Deleuze and Guattari write, "the system of the judgement of God, the theological system, is precisely the operation of He who makes an organism, an organisation of organs called the organism, because He cannot bear the BwO" (ATP, 158–9/196–7). Artaud's BwO is Spinoza's God/Nature, Spinoza's *Ethics* being, they say, "the great book of the BwO"

(ATP, 153/190). The ethical question for both is the same, "How Do You Make Yourself A Body Without Organs?" We will pick up this question again in Chapter Six.

29. This Spinozian body of affect is developed by Deleuze and Guattari in *A Thousand Plateaus*. "A body," they write, "is not defined by the form that determines it nor as a determinate substance or subject nor by the organs it possesses or the functions it fulfils. On the plane of consistency, *a body is defined only by a longitude and a latitude:* in other words the sum total of the material elements belonging to it under given relations of movement and rest, speed and slowness (longitude); the sum total of the intensive affects it is capable of at a given power or degree of potential (latitude). Nothing but affects and local movements, differential speeds. The credit goes to Spinoza for calling attention to these two dimensions of the Body, and for having defined the plane of Nature as pure longitude and latitude. Latitude and longitude are the two elements of a cartography" (ATP, 260–1/318). Bodies are material flows distinguished by their movement and speed, and to which corresponds a degree of power that determines bodies' power to act. The body is always in movement, not just in material and intense transformations, but also on a plane which is itself alive with the vital movements of nonorganic life. Longitude and latitude give us a cartography to understand the becoming of affect, and the essential affectual capacities available to a given material assemblage. This capacity or power gives a "mode of individuation" (ATP, 261/318) very different from a person, subject, thing or substance. Deleuze and Guattari call this mode of individuation a "haecceity," which "consists entirely of relations of movement and rest between molecules or particles, capacities to affect and be affected" (ATP, 261/318).
30. Deleuze argues that an idea's formal reality, its reality as an idea in itself is "the thing the idea is or the degree of reality or perfection it possesses in itself, [and] is its intrinsic character." In other words this is its essence and expresses God. Gilles Deleuze, *Seminar Session of Spinoza*, 24 January 1978.
31. Gilles Deleuze, *Session on Spinoza*, 13 January 1981.
32. Gilles Deleuze, *Seminar Session of Spinoza*, 24 January 1978.
33. Gilles Deleuze and Claire Parnet, *Dialogues*, p.11. (*Dialogues*, p.18)
34. See Gilles Deleuze, *Seminar Session of Spinoza*, 24 January 1978.
35. Spinoza's attack on representation implied by his concept of univocity is also a direct attack upon orthodox theological models. These assumed 1) an equivocal model of being, where God is unrepresentable and yet more real than his earthly representations, and so assumes a different sort of being, or 2) an analogical model where God's being is different from ours, but is understood through a process of analogy, for example God being to man as man is to an art. Theologies of equivocity and analogy both require representation as their theoretical mechanism, although analogy became the orthodox Christian position, as formulated by Thomas Aquinas, because it assured a common measure and hence a comprehensibility to the otherness of God. In being anti-representational a Spinozian theory of art will break with these orthodox theologies, to become atheist in the terms we have already discussed.
36. For Deleuze's account of the role of analogy in representation, see DR, 137–8/179–80.
37. Gilles Deleuze, *Session on Spinoza*, 13 January 1981.
38. Gilles Deleuze, *Session on Spinoza*, 13 January 1981. "The opposition of expressions and signs is one of the fundamental principles of Spinozism" (EPS, 181–2/165).
39. Gilles Deleuze, *Seminar Session On Scholasticism and Spinoza*, 14 January 1974, italics added.
40. Pierre Macherey, "The Problem of the Attributes," *The New Spinoza*, p.89.
41. Gilles Deleuze, *Seminar on Spinoza*, 13 January 1981.
42. Antonio Negri regards this final moment of Spinoza's *Ethics* as the point where his "asceticism" imposes on univocity a separation of the divine from life that denies a total immanence of being and becoming. Spinoza's asceticism, Negri argues, "forms an image of beatitude that, in separating itself from the production of desire touches upon the notion of beatitude without appropriating it" (*Time for Revolution*, p.187). This argument takes us back to Deleuze's "correction" of Spinoza through Nietzsche in *Difference and Repetition*. Indeed, one could imagine the difference between Deleuze and Negri on this point in the same terms as the difference between *Difference and Repetition* and Deleuze's later work. Accordingly, Negri's appeal to the "void" in *Time for Revolution* as being that with which being confronts itself in its processes of becoming echoes Deleuze's use of "death" and the "object=x" in *Difference and Repetition* as the genetic element in the repetition of difference. As we have seen, however, Deleuze abandons these terms in turning Spinoza away from the problem of the separation of Substance from the modes, and towards the entirely productive plane of immanence where the construction of Substance is immanent with its expression. Obviously a full discussion of the relation of Negri's work to Deleuze's, and visa versa, is outside the scope of this book. For a first approach to this question however, see Kenneth Surin, "Reinventing a Physiology of Collective Liberation," Going 'beyond Marx' in the Marxism(s) of Negri, Guattari, and Deleuze." *Rethinking Marxism*, 7 (1994).
43. There is of course, a strong tradition of love-mysticism which constitutes a transversal line finding religious, philosophical and literary expression. To gesture at Spinoza's connection to it is all that can be done here, although it would be a fascinating line for further research. For example, Hadewijch of Antwerp writes of the feminine and loving God: "If they love her (love) with the vigour of love, they will soon be one with love in love" (Hadewijch of Antwerp, *Strophic Poems*) To continue this gesture forward, it also speaks in Henry Miller's words: "Everything stands in a certain way in a certain place,

as our minds stands in relation to God. The world, in its visible, tangible Substance, is a map of our love. Not God but life is love. Love, love, love" (Henry Miller, *The Tropic of Capricorn*, p.222–3, London: BCA, 1982). Love is also the culminating state of vital mysticism for Bergson, which he counterposed to the religion of the church. He writes of the mystic that, "the love which consumes him is no longer simply the love of man for God, it is the love of God for all men. Through God, in the strength of God, he loves all mankind with divine love" (Henri Bergson, *The Two Sources of Religion and Morality*, p.199). Finally, we might add Deleuze himself to this abstract line of love mysticism, who in the third kind of knowledge finds, "the love of a God who is himself joyful, who loves himself and loves us with the same love by which we love him" (EPS, 309/288).

44. Michael Hardt, *Gilles Deleuze: An Apprenticeship in Philosophy*, p.108.

NOTES TO CHAPTER THREE

1. Henri Bergson, *Matter and Memory*, references to this book now found in the text following the abbreviation "MM."
2. The philosophical implications of this universal variation are, at least as Deleuze explains them, by now familiar to us: "What in effect is duration?" Deleuze asks, "Everything that Bergson says about duration always comes back to this: *duration is what differs from itself.*" "Bergson's conception of difference," *The New Bergson*, p. 48. ("La conception de la différence chez Bergson," *L'île Déserte et Autres Textes 1953–1974*, p. 51)
3. Deleuze's ontological valorisation of cinema, while being entirely Bergsonian, runs contra to Bergson's own theory of the "cinematographical mechanism." Bergson argued that cinematic images operate in the same way as conscious perception. Consciousness, he claimed, converts the movement of duration into a "series of snapshots," and throws them on a screen "so that they replace each other very rapidly" (*Creative Evolution*, p. 305, all references to this book now found in the text following the abbreviation "CE"). As an example of natural perception Bergson thought the cinema could only give an image of movement which was a fast succession of frozen attitudes. "Whether we would think becoming, or express it, or even perceive it," Bergson argues, "we hardly do anything else than set going a kind of cinematograph inside us. We may therefore sum up what we have been saying in the conclusion that the *mechanism of our ordinary knowledge is of a cinematographical kind*" (CE, 306). Deleuze reverses Bergson's view, arguing that movement belongs to cinema's image directly, not added from "above" as the general conditions of natural perception. Cinema, according to Deleuze, "immediately gives us a movement-image. It does give us a section, but a section which is mobile, not an immobile section + abstract movement" (C1, 2/11). Deleuze finds Bergson's ontology so thoroughly cinematic that he claims: "Even in his critique of the cinema Bergson was in agreement with it" (C1, 58/85). This rather odd statement is justified, Deleuze argues, by the fact that Bergson's critique is premised on his philosophy of the movement-image found "in the brilliant first chapter of *Matter and Memory*" (C1, 58/85). Deleuze insists on *Matter and Memory* as an initial affirmation of cinema counteracting Bergson's later rejection of it. Deleuze's insistence on the early Bergson is both an implicit critique of Bergson's retreat from the possibility of perceiving duration and his re-emphasis of a stable perceptual mechanism in *Creative Evolution*. For a discussion of Bergson's relation to cinema see Paul Douglas, "Bergson and Cinema: Friends or Foes?," *The New Bergson*. On the Deleuze-Bergson relation in the cinema books see, Gregory Flaxman, "Cinema Year Zero," *The Brain is the Screen, Deleuze and the Philosophy of Cinema*.
4. The reference is, of course, to Guy Debord's *Society of the Spectacle*. (Translated by D. Nicholson-Smith, New York: Zone Books, 1995). Debord also proposes an aesthetic of temporal contestation: "The point is to take effective possession of the community of dialogue, and the playful relationship to time, which the works of the poets and artists have heretofore merely *represented*" (section 187). Like Deleuze, Debord affirms the political necessity of re-inserting art into the everyday, placing creation back into the midst of life. Debord however, understands this reinsertion through the operation of the Hegelian dialectic. "Culture," he writes, "is the locus of the search for lost unity. In the course of this search culture as a separate sphere is obliged to negate itself" (section 180). For Deleuze, as we shall see, the separation of art and life has always been produced through false assumptions. In Bergson Deleuze finds an ontology of cinema capable of affirming its coexistence with life itself.
5. The phrase is Bergon's (CE, 319).
6. Zeno's paradoxes show how our rational concept of movement is inadequate because it conflates duration and extention, which are in fact different in kind (See B, 22/12). Bergson discusses Zeno's paradoxes in CE, 308–313.
7. "*Intuition* is the method of Bergsonism" (B, 13/1), Deleuze argues, and is the conceptual method adequate to time because it presupposes duration, "it consists in thinking in terms of duration" (B, 31/22). Deleuze develops the methodology of intuition at length in *Bergsonism*.
8. Gilles Deleuze, "Bergson's conception of difference," *The New Bergson*, p. 46. ("La conception de la différence chez Bergson," *L'île Déserte et Autres Textes 1953–1974*, p. 49)
9. The ontological status of this open "whole" of duration is another of the stakes in Alain Badiou's dispute with Deleuze. Deleuze explicitly distinguishes the "whole" from sets, writing: "The whole and the 'wholes' must not be confused with *sets*. Sets are closed, and everything which is closed is artificially closed. [. . .] The whole is not a closed set, but on the contrary that

by virtue of which the set is never absolutely closed, never completely sheltered, that which keeps it open by the finest thread which attaches it to the rest of the universe" (C1, 10/21). Following his quotation of the latter part of the above passage Badiou succinctly presents one of his major objections to Deleuze. For him there is a problem with "this providential marking as to the theory of the two—the virtual and the actual—parts of the object: it sorely puts univocity to the test, by directly assigning the chance of thought to a discernible *division* of its objects. It would seem that it is not very easy to definitively abandon the presuppositions of the dialectic" (*Deleuze: The Clamour of Being*, p. 85). Badiou sees the Deleuzian whole (duration) as transcending the actual, and as with his reading of Deleuze's simulacra, as reinstating a type of Platonism. This is precisely, as I hope to show, what Deleuze attempts to avoid in his reading of Bergson. Badiou, in contrast to Deleuze, understands the multiple (duration in Deleuze's Bergsonian terms) as a multiplicity of actual or closed sets whose becoming is generated not by their opening onto each other in the "open" universe of duration, but by opening onto the void. The creative properties of the event are therefore generated by the disjunctive and genetic power of the void's radical exteriority. For Badiou, "immanence excluded the All and the only possible end point of the multiple, which is always the multiple of multiples (and never the multiple of Ones), was the multiple of nothing: the empty set" (*Deleuze: The Clamour of Being*, p. 46). Finally, Badiou presents his opposition to Deleuze as, "for me, multiplicities 'were' sets, for him, they 'were not'" (*Deleuze: The Clamour of Being*, p. 48) Badiou elaborates his argument with Deleuze over the ontology of set theory in, "Gilles Deleuze: The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque," *Gilles Deleuze and the Theatre of Philosophy*, and in 'One, Multiple, Multiplicities,' *Theoretical Writings*.

10. This is a phrase of Deleuze's, "The Brain is the Screen: an interview with Gilles Deleuze," *The Brain is the Screen, Deleuze and the Philosophy of Cinema*, p. 366.
11. Or as Bergson has it: "Our sun radiates heat and light beyond the farthest planet. And, on the other hand, it moves in a certain fixed direction, drawing with it the planets and their satellites. The thread attaching it to the rest of the universe is doubtless very tenuous. Nevertheless it is along this thread that is transmitted down to the smallest particle of the world in which we live the duration immanent to the whole of the universe"(CE, 11).
12. Against realism and idealism, Bergson argues, "it is a mistake to reduce matter to the perception which we have of it, a mistake also to make of it a thing able to produce in us perceptions, but in itself is of another nature than they. Matter, in our view, is an aggregate of 'images.' And by 'image' we mean a certain existence which is more than that which the idealist calls a *representation*, but less than that which the realist calls a *thing*—an existence placed halfway between the 'thing' and the 'representation.' This conception of matter is simply that of common sense. [. . .] For common sense, then, the object exists in itself, and, on the other hand, the object is, in itself, pictorial, as we perceive it: image it is, but a self-existing image" (MM, 9–10). Further on, Bergson argues that perceptions of things-images in the eye are "vibrations of light." This means, "there is no essential difference" between "light and movements" (MM, 41).

13. This ontological movement is also found in images produced by other art forms. Indeed, Deleuze argues, around the same time as cinema's birth the other arts, "even painting, were abandoning figures and poses to release values which were not posed, not measured, and which related movement to the any-instant-whatever" (C1, 6–7/16). Painting explored the movement of matter through its experimentations with color, especially the work of Robert Delauney which drew on contemporary scientific theories of color as a radiant energy. This energetic-materialist theory of color rejected painting's representational function for an exploration of the vibrations produced by the simultaneous contrast of colors. Building on the scientific work done by Eugene Chevreuil, Delauney, Deleuze writes, discovered the different movements of sun and moon light, "one constituting a circular, continuous movement of complementary colors, the other a faster and uneven movement of jarring, iridescent colors, the two together making up and projecting an eternal mirage on to the earth" (C2, 11/20, see also 282–3/20). Delauney then, like cinema, constructs images in which light is movement. This has implications for painting similar to those Deleuze finds for cinema. Color is stripped of any representational function (as Godard so famously stated, "it's not blood it's red") and revalues the action of the eye, which now constructs a material vibratory thread enveloping brain and world. (Delauney explicitly claims this for his work in "On the Construction of Reality in Pure Painting" *Art in Theory 1900–1990, An Anthology of Changing Ideas.*) Guillaume Appollinaire explains the materialist aesthetics of Delauney rather well, writing in 1913: "Color is saturated with energy and its outmost points are prolonged in space. Here it is the medium which is the reality. Color no longer depends on the three known dimensions; it is color which creates them" (*The Cubist Painters: Aesthetic Meditations*, p. 45., translated by L. Abel, New York: Wittenborn Schultz Inc., 1945). In its materialism Delauney's painting shares an ontological ground with cinema, and his exploration of simultaneous contrasts was influential, Deleuze claims, on the pre-war French school of film-makers, which "owes much to Delauney's colorism" (C1 ,45/72). As do the films of Jacques Rivette (C2, 11/20). Painting and cinema therefore both develop a movement-image, each in their own medium. This shared ontology nevertheless admits, and indeed requires, distinctions between the arts according to their modalities of expression—cinema at this time was not concerned with color for example. As a result, each art form will require a taxonomy specific to it. This is entirely consistent with Deleuze's Bergsonian

understanding of duration as a multiplicity, which is neither indivisible nor immeasurable, but whose division implies a change in nature, each division in turn implying a change in the metrical principle of its measure (B, 40/31–2, and ATP, 483/604).

14. For Bergson, perception "limits itself to the objects which actually influence our organs and prepare our movements" (MM, 179).
15. As we shall see, Deleuze uses this initial "strength" of Peirce, while also pointing out the ways in which Peirce himself departs from it. Indeed, Deleuze says: "Peirce can sometimes find himself as much a linguist as the semiologists" (C2, 31/46). In fact, Deleuze will argue that Peirce finally makes of the sign something linguistic, because no "material that cannot be reduced to an utterance survives, and hence [Peirce] reintroduces a subordination of semiotics to a language system" (C2, 31/46). As a result, Deleuze (and Guattari) will, as they say, "borrow his terms, even while changing their connotations" (ATP, 531/177).
16. Charles S. Peirce, *76 Definitions of the Sign*, 5 (Collected Papers 7–356).
17. Charles S. Peirce, *76 Definitions of the Sign*, 16 (MS-599).
18. Charles S. Peirce, *76 Definitions of the Sign*, 4 (MS-380).
19. Peirce describes it as "a state of mind in which something is present, without compulsion and without reason; it is called *Feeling*." "What is a Sign?," *The Essential Peirce, Selected Philosophical Writings, Vol. 2 (1893–1913)*, p. 4.
20. Charles S. Peirce, "What is a Sign?," *The Essential Peirce, Selected Philosophical Writings, Vol. 2 (1893–1913)*, p. 5.
21. Deleuze extends Peirce's model in applying it to the cinema, by adding transitional images moving from affection to action (the impulse-image) and from action to relation (the reflection-image). Thus Deleuze identifies six types of images, each of which are organised in an opposition reflecting the two sides of the sensory-motor interval, but which also have a generic aspect reflecting their genesis in the "ground zero" of the perception image. The six types of visible movement images and their compositional and genetic signs are listed by Deleuze "in partial conformity with Pierce" (C1, 142/198), as the Perception-image (Dicisign, Reume, Gramme), Affection-image (Icon of power, Icon of quality, Qualisign), the Impulse-image (Fetish, Idol, Symptom), Action-image SAS (Synsign, Binomial, Imprint), and ASA (Index of lack, Index of equivocity, Vector), Reflection-image (Figures of attraction, Figures of inversion, Discursive sign), Relation-image (Mark, Demark, Symbol) (See also C2, 32/48). The nature of this "partial conformity" can be seen in comparing the distinctions of Deleuze's schema with those Peirce makes in "Sundry Logical Conceptions," and "Nomenclature and Divisions of Triadic Relations," *The Essential Peirce, Selected Philosophical Writings, Vol. 2 (1893–1913)*.
22. Deleuze is here referring to his earlier discussion of the relation of the "open whole" of duration as plane of consistency to the artificial closure of sets (see note 9). We will see in what ways classical cinema was able to open its montaged sets, and reattach a thread connecting them to the universe.

23. Both techniques appear in *Man with a Movie Camera*.
24. Jonathan Bellor has developed Deleuze's reading of Vertov in interesting ways, especially his suggestion that Vertov's material consciousness is a cinematic answer to the soviet problem of 'self-conscious democracy' (p. 165). "Dziga Vertov and the Film of Money," *Boundary 2*, 26.3, 1999.
25. This is an echo of Peirce, who describes it as a "Feeling." Charles S. Peirce, "What Is a Sign?" *The Essential Peirce, Selected Philosophical Writings, Vol. 2 (1893–1913)*, p. 4.
26. Charles S. Peirce, "Sundry Logical Conceptions," *The Essential Peirce, Selected Philosophical Writings, Vol. 2 (1893–1913)*, p. 268–9.
27. We should note here a change in Deleuze's terminology. In relation to Spinoza, and in *A Thousand Plateaus*, as we have seen, "affection" (*affectio*) is a state of the body as it is affected by another body, and an "affect" (*affectus*) is the passage from one state to another as this indicates the increase or decrease of a bodies power. In the Cinema books "affection" and "affect" are known as "perception-image" and "affection-image," while "affect" refers to qualities or powers extracted from affections and treated as pure, autonomous, "possibles."
28. Charles S. Peirce, "What Is a Sign?," *The Essential Peirce, Selected Philosophical Writings, Vol. 2 (1893–1913)*, p. 5.
29. Once again Deleuze focuses on montage as the creative mechanism of Dreyer's affectual film. Dreyer, Deleuze notes, avoids the shot-reverse shot constructions which tend to establish subjective relations, in favour of the "virtual conjunction" of "flowing close-ups" (C1, 107/152). This enables him to focus on the intensive affects of the face as the real "subjects" of the film.
30. The reasons for this breakdown, Deleuze argues, were "the war and its consequences, the unsteadiness of the 'American Dream' in all its aspects, the new consciousness of minorities, the rise and inflation of images both in the external world and in people's minds, the influence on the cinema of the new modes of narrative with which literature had experimented, the crises of Hollywood and its old genres. . . ." (C1, 206/278). We may wonder at the telegraphic nature of this sentence, which contains almost the entirety of Deleuze's historical contextualisation of cinema's production of time-images. But Deleuze's purpose is not to provide a historical reading of the time-image, but a symptomatic one. Deleuze, in other words, is not so much interested in showing how the world affects cinema, but to show how cinema remakes the world.
31. As Michael Goddard has pointed out, "while mysticism is not referred to explicitly by Deleuze in his works on cinema, the centrality of the crystalline regime, and its operation of opening to a direct image of time and of the virtual, is a parallel process to the mystical metamorphosis of subjectivity identified by Bergson." "The scattering of time crystals: Deleuze, mysticism, and cinema," *Deleuze and Religion*, p. 62.

32. Henri Bergson, *The Two Sources of Morality and Religion*, p. 201.
33. Henri Bergson, *The Two Sources of Morality and Religion*, p. 188. This creative life is what Bergson calls in *Creative Evolution* life's "intention." "This intention," Bergson argues, "is just what the artist tries to regain, in placing himself back with the object by a kind of sympathy, in breaking down, by an effort of intuition, the barrier that space puts up between him and his model. It is true that this aesthetic intuition, like external perception, only attains the individual. But we can conceive an inquiry turned in the same direction as art, which would take life *in general* for its object."
34. Henri Bergson, *The Two Sources of Morality and Religion*, p. 217.
35. Henri Matisse, *Matisse on Art*, p. 217. J. Flam ed., Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995. For Matisse's Bergsonian approach to painting see, "Notes of a Painter" (1908) in the same volume.
36. This introduces a theme which often appears in Deleuze's discussions of art, a new tactility of the image. This tactile image marks the transition from an "optical," or sensory-motor regime of signs, to "haptic" signs, from the abstraction of representation to the reality of sensation. As we have seen, this materialism is a necessary part of Deleuze's aesthetics. Deleuze takes the distinction of optic and haptic from the art historian Alois Riegl, and we will return to it in chapters 4 and 6. The haptic "flesh" of the time-image is briefly explored in *Cinema 2* in terms Deleuze also employs in other contexts, "it is the tactile which can constitute a pure sensory image," he writes, "on condition that the hand relinquishes its prehensile and motor functions to content itself with a pure touching. [. . .] The hand then, takes on a role in the image which goes infinitely beyond the sensory-motor demands of the action, which takes the place of the face itself for the purpose of the affects, and which in the area of perception, becomes the mode of construction of a space which is adequate to the decisions of spirit. [. . .] The hand doubles its prehensile function (of object) by a connective function (of space); but, from that moment, it is the whole eye which doubles its optical function by a specifically 'grabbing' [*haptique*] one, if we follow Riegl's formula for indicating a touching which is specific to the gaze" (C2, 12–13/22). The haptic, in other words, defines a space of sensation in which the sensory-motor distinction does not operate, and the question is not so much that of perception by the eye, but of a construction of space by the hand, a "touching" in which subject and object merge. This question will be taken up and discussed at length in Chapter Six.
37. Here Deleuze closely follows the work of Andre Bazin, whose name appears in the first sentence of *Cinema 2*. Deleuze takes from Bazin what he describes as the "fundamental requirement of formal aesthetic criteria" in order to define the ontological break in cinema initiated by Italian neo-realism (although Bazin understands this in phenomenological rather than Bergsonian terms). Deleuze follows these criteria and expands them beyond a strict definition of neo-realism to later Italian directors, and further to European cinema after the war, in defining an aesthetics of time-images.
38. It is at this point that Deleuze refers to Bergson's famous "cone" diagram (MM, 162). There Bergson writes of the "double current" which goes from actual image to the 'thousand individual images' which are its virtual equivalent in memory, and which are 'always ready to *crystallize* into uttered words" (MM, 162, italics added). For Deleuze's more detailed discussion of this diagram see B, 57–62/53–7.
39. "Perhaps," Deleuze suggests, "when we read a book, watch a show, or look at a painting, and especially when we are ourselves the author, an analogous process can be triggered [. . . to] extract non-chronological time. [. . .] it is possible for the work of art to succeed in inventing these paradoxical hypnotic and hallucinatory sheets whose property is to be at once a past and always to come" (C2, 123/161–2).
40. We see here that although Deleuze abandons the concept of the "simulacra," its disappearance is only nominal, and it is still in operation in *Cinema 2* as cinema's "power of the false."
41. Deleuze conflates direct cinema with *cinema verite* at this point, discussing them, or at least their representative directors Don Pennebaker and Jean Rouch separately, but arguing they both achieve a cinematic constructivism in which distinctions between truth and falsity are dissolved in the process of constructing images, to the point of including the construction of the film itself. Construction becomes the "subject" of the film. For a more traditional reading, which attempts to make a rigorous distinction between "direct" cinema and *cinema verite*, see Bill Nichols, *Representing Reality, Issues and Concepts in Documentary*, p. 32–75, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1991.
42. The proof of this is that the least convincing scene of *Hier Strauss* (at least as far as its "reality" is concerned) is that in which we find Strauss at home, reading the paper, the static nature of both action and camera ironically re-establishing our exteriority at exactly the moment when the "true" Strauss supposedly emerges.
43. Deleuze suggests this when he writes, "the power of the false cannot be separated from an irreducible multiplicity" (C2, 133/174).
44. This formulation comes from Éric Alliez, who has suggested that Deleuze finds in the Cinema books, a "*Bergsonism beyond Bergson* [. . .] a Bergsonism projected beyond the caesura between the metaphysical intuition of life and the philosophy of the concept, cleansed of any spiritualism of presence." "Midday, Midnight: The Emergence of Cine-Thinking," *The Brain is a Screen: Gilles Deleuze and the Philosophy of Cinema*, p. 295 and 297. Deleuze himself suggests such a projection of Bergson when he claims his "return to Bergson" is "a renewal or an extension of his project today" (B, 115, afterword to the English translation).

45. I have developed Deleuze's figure of the "spiritual automaton" in relation to Artaud and the films of Carl Theodor Dreyer in "Believing in the BwO: Artaud-Deleuze-Dreyer," *Biographien des organlosen Körpers*, edited by E. Samsanow and E. Alliez, Vienna: Turia+Kant, 2003.
46. At one point she explains that her doctor told her she must love her husband, her son, her job or her dog, but not husband-son-job-dog. To anticipate the next chapter, Giuliano's schizophrenia is a form of visionary mysticism.
47. Quoted in Peter Bondanella, *Italian Cinema, From Neorealism to the Present*, p. 219, London and New York: Continuum, 2002.
48. Gilles Deleuze, *Negotiations 1972–1990*, p. 145.
49. Quoted in Bondanello, *Italian Cinema*, p. 220.
50. Gilles Deleuze, 'Bergson's conception of difference,' *The New Bergson*, p. 48. ('La conception de la différence chez Bergson,' *L'île Déserte et Autres Textes 1953–1974*, p. 51)

NOTES TO CHAPTER FOUR

1. The first part of the title comes from DR, 293/375. The epitaph is from John Dewey, *Art as Experience*, p. 82.
2. For a good account of Deleuze and Guattari's theory of the content-expression relation, see Brian Massumi, *A User's Guide to Capitalism and Schizophrenia, Deviations from Deleuze and Guattari*, chapter 2 "Force."
3. Brian Massumi leaves both terms untranslated in *A Thousand Plateaus*.
4. As Guattari puts it: "The signifying machine was based on the system of representation." "The Place of the Signifier in the Institution," *The Guattari Reader*, p. 151.
5. Deleuze and Guattari write that Hjelmslev was "the only linguist to have actually broken with the signifier and signified" (ATP, 523/85). Guattari in particular has worked extensively on Hjelmslev. See, Félix Guattari, "Semiological Subjection, Semiotic Enslavement," and "The Place of the Signifier in the Institution," *The Guattari Reader*.
6. Deleuze and Guattari draw heavily on the work of Michel Foucault in their account of abstract machines and their diagrammatic operation. Foucault, they say, showed the way for a diagrammatic analysis of history, inasmuch as he gave a "machinic" understanding of power that encompassed both its "minitiarized mechanisms, or molecular focuses" (ATP, 537/265), and their composition in "assemblages of power, or micropowers" (ATP, 531/175). These actual assemblages were singularities of an abstract 'diagram' or "a 'biopolitics of population' as an abstract machine" (ATP, 531/175). Although Deleuze and Guattari give a favourable account of Foucault's method they also point out their differences from it by emphasising the way the diagram functions to create a new reality. Foucault's analysis, in assuming the priority of power relegates creative forces to reactions to power, and so makes creation relative to the power of the strata. "Our only points of disagreement with Foucault are the following," they write, "(1) to us the assemblages seem fundamentally to be assemblages not of power but of desire (desire is always assembled), and power seems to be a stratified dimension of the assemblage; (2) the diagram and abstract machine have lines of flight that are primary, which are not phenomena of resistance or counterattack in an assemblage, but cutting edges of creation and deterritorialisation" (ATP, 531/176). This is, in fact, a fundamental re-orientation of the Foucauldian model, one which assumes the power of absolute deterritorialisation as immanent to every relative deterritorialisation, and therefore makes creation "prior to" power, and operating as its condition. As Deleuze writes elsewhere, "desire is but one with a given assemblage, a co-functioning" ("Désir et Plaisar," *Deux Régimes de Fous, textes et entretiens 1975–1995*, p. 114). Furthermore, absolute deterritorialisation is present in the strata as the revolutionary practice which acts as the condition of their possible operation. See also, Gilles Deleuze, "Sur les principaux concepts de Michel Foucault," *Deux Régimes de Fous, textes et entretiens 1975–1995*, and Gilles Deleuze, *Foucault*.
7. Deleuze and Guattari give a diagram of pragmatics in which its processual creation of destratifying signs appears as a circle with four stages. It begins with an analysis of regimes of signs in terms of their expressive forms, and the content they determine. The second stage is the analysis of how regimes of signs transform (de- and re-territorialise) each other. The third "diagrammatic" component extracts particles-signs from the regimes by constructing "abstract-real machines" which absolutely deterritorialise the strata. The final "machinic" component returns us to the actual world, in order to show how it appears through, and is conditioned by, the destratifying break pragmatics has instituted. "To show," Deleuze and Guattari write, "how abstract machines are effectuated in concrete assemblages" (ATP, 146/182). This final stage, while appearing to return us to the circles starting point, has in fact fractured it by constructing a new reality. Pragmatics, or schizoanalysis is this critical process of eternal return. Deleuze and Guattari provide a useful diagram, ATP, 146/182.
8. In line with this suggestion, Deleuze and Guattari claim that "artisan" is a better term than "artist" for the schizoanalyst of art. The artisan, they write, "is determined in such a way as to follow a flow of matter, a *machinic phylum*" (ATP, 409/509), in freeing "a life proper to matter, a vital state of matter as such, a material vitalism that doubtless exists everywhere but is ordinarily hidden or covered, rendered unrecognisable" (ATP, 411/512). Guattari directly opposes this "cosmic artisan" (ATP, 345/426) to the "schizo-analyst technician." "There could never be a schizo-analyst technician," he says, "this would be a contradiction in terms. If schizo-analysis must exist, it is because it already exists everywhere; and not just among schizophrenics, but in the schizes, the lines of escape, the processual ruptures

which are facilitated by a cartographic auto-orientation. Its goal? One could say that it doesn't have any, because it is not so much the end that matters but the "middle" itself." "Institutional Schizo-Analysis," *Soft Subversions*, p. 276. For an account of Deleuze's "stark blend" of materialism and vitalism, see John Mullarky, "Deleuze and Materialism: One or Several Matters?," *South Atlantic Quarterly*, 96, 3, 1997.

9. In this regard, "schizoanalysis" is a war machine against psychoanalysis. As Guattari writes: "The Lacanian Signifier homogenises the various semiotics, it loses the multi-dimensional character of many of them. Its fundamental linearity, inherited from Saussurian structuralism, does not allow it to apprehend the pathic, non discursive, autopoietic character of the partial nuclei of enunciation" (Chaos, 72/103).
10. For an extended account of Deleuze and Guattari's understanding of these paintings by Turner see, James Williams, "Deleuze on J. M. W. Turner, Catastrophism in philosophy?" *Deleuze and Philosophy: The Difference Engineer.*
11. Deleuze and Guattari have received a lot of criticism over their supposed glamorisation of a tragic psychic condition, and have vigorously defended their use of the term "schizophrenia" against this charge. Both Deleuze and Guattari repeatedly emphasise the difference between schizophrenia as a clinical condition, and schizoanalysis or "schizophrenization" as an "ethical-aesthetic paradigm." As Deleuze writes: "It is not a question of opposing to the dogmatic image of thought another image borrowed, for example, from schizophrenia, but rather of remembering that schizophrenia is not only a human fact but also a possibility for thought—one, moreover, which can only be revealed as such through the abolition of that image" (DR, 148/192). The relationship between schizophrenia as a clinical condition and as a critical practice is more complex in Guattari's work. He was involved in the institution of La Borde that attempted to treat schizophrenia along anti-psychiatry lines. This involved experimenting with the distinctions between a clinical schizophrenic and a schizoanalytic health worker in order to elaborate a "schizo" unconscious emerging beyond institutional distinctions of doctor and patient. So although Guattari states: "Schizoanalysis obviously does not consist in miming schizophrenia" (Chaos, 68/98), he nevertheless accepts that schizophrenia as a clinical condition is the ground of an effective schizoanalysis. "The complexions of the psychotic real," he writes, "in their clinical emergence constitute a privileged exploratory path for other ontological modes of production in that they disclose aspects of excess and limit experiences. [. . .] Here a sense of being-in-itself is established before any discursive scheme, uniquely positioned across an intensive continuum whose discursive traits are not perceptible by an apparatus of representation but by a pathic, existential absorption, a pre-egoic, pre-identificatory agglomeration" (Chaos, 79/111). For Guattari schizophrenia can, in certain specific ways, be seen as exemplary of an ethical-aesthetics of expression: "Just as the schizo has broken moorings with subjective individuation, the analysis of the Unconscious should be recentred on the non-human processes of subjectivation that I call machinic, but which are more than human—superhuman in a Nietzschean sense' (Chaos, 71–2/102–3). This privileging of schizophrenia is however, significantly qualified: "The problem of schizophrenization as a cure consists in this," Deleuze and Guattari write, "how can schizophrenia be disengaged as *a power of humanity and of Nature* without a schizophrenic thereby being produced?" "La synthese disjonctive," *L'Arc* 43. For Guattari on La Borde see "La Borde: A Clinic Unlike Any Other," *Chaosophy.*

12. Henry Miller, *Tropic of Cancer*, p. 250, London: BCA, 1982.
13. For a detailed explanation of painting's face-landscape problem, see Ronald Bogue, *Deleuze on Music, Painting, and the Arts*, chapter four.
14. For a fascinating account of some of the more surprising results—ithyphallic Christ Childs, ithyphallic crucified Christs, masturbating Christs, and more, see Leo Steinberg, *The Sexuality of Christ in Renaissance Art and in Modern Oblivion*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996.
15. Gilles Deleuze, *The Nature of Flows*, seminar 14th December 1971.
16. Steinberg's major argument in *The Sexuality of Christ in Renaissance Art and in Modern Oblivion* is that no matter how bizarre we might find paintings of the Christ child with an erection, for example, these were accepted by the church as valid theological statements of Christ's incarnation. Deleuze however, wants to make a more radical claim, arguing that it is the church that supplies "nothing but the conditions of his [the artist's] radical emancipation." Gilles Deleuze, *Seminar Session on Spinoza*, 25th November 1980.
17. In fact, as well as the extensive decoration of the church being Byzantine in style, much of its material wealth, including the four horses on its roof, and the enamels of the *Pala d'Oro*, the altarpiece of San Marco, were brought directly from Constantinople after its sack and looting by the Crusaders in 1204.
18. In central Italy, as we shall see, the introduction of classical approaches to drawing and modelling appeared in the early fourteenth century with Giotto and Cimabue.
19. Peter Hills notes: "Such interchange between obscurity and brilliance became [. . .] vital to the colouring of sixteenth-century Venetian painting." *Venetian Colour: Marble, Mosaic Painting and Glass 1250—1550*, p. 47.
20. In his description of the eleventh century church in the monastery of Hosious Loukas, M. Chadzdakis writes, "the high mosaics with their gold grounds shine: *such light, such beauty illumines the church.* The light, element of victory and triumph, permanent symbol of Christ in ecclesiastical phraseology, dominates throughout, clarifies all the forms and in its diurnal course, vivifies the flowing surfaces and transmutes the material into precious spiritual substance." *Byzantine Monuments in Attica and Boeotia*, p. 12–3.

21. For the Plotinian aspects of Byzantine art see Éric Alliez, *Capital Times: Tales from the Conquest of Time*, pp. 57–64. For a detailed account of Deleuze's understanding of Byzantine art, and especially the importance of the work of Henri Maldiney in this regard, see Ronald Bogue, *Deleuze on Music, Painting and the Arts*, p. 143–4.
22. Vasari notes that drawing is the necessary first stage in the painting process. "The idea which the artist has in his mind must be translated into what the eyes can see, and only then, with the assistance of his eyes, can the artist form a sound judgement concerning the interventions he has conceived." *Lives of the Artists, Volume 1*, p. 443–4.
23. Light and shadow nevertheless retained their ideal value despite the greater naturalism afforded by Alberti's value system, because shadow and light were created only by mixing black or white with the local color. This gave, as Leonardo put it, a "true" shadow.
24. Vasari writes of Giorgione, "he fell so deeply in love with the beauties of nature that he would represent in his works only what he copied directly from life." *Lives of the Artists, Volume 1*, p. 272.
25. Marcia Hall, *Color and Meaning, Practice and Theory in Renaissance Painting*, p. 71.
26. This process has been made visible by the twentieth century techniques of the x-radiograph and the infrared reflectograph, which allow us to see the reworkings of the painting lying beneath its surface. The most radical example in Giorgione's work is the replacement in *La Tempesta* of a bathing woman by the young man in the lower left corner of the picture.
27. Marcia Hall, *Color and Meaning, Practice and Theory in Renaissance Painting*, p. 210.
28. Titian's assistant and well-known painter in his own right, Palma Giovane, captures the drama of this process. Giovane wrote of Titian's method: "He blocked in his pictures with a mass of colors that served as the ground . . . upon which he would then build. I myself have seen such under painting, vigorously applied with a loaded brush of pure red ochre, which would serve as the middle ground, then with a stroke of white lead, with the same brush then dipped in red, black or yellow, he created the light and dark areas that give the effect of relief. And in this way with four strokes of the brush he was able to suggest a magnificent form." Quoted in Emmachia Gustina Ruscelli, *An Examination of late Venetian Painting Techniques.*
29. A fine example of all these aspects of Titian's late style is *The Death of Actaeon* (1565–76, National Gallery, London). For a discussion of the techniques used in this work see Jill Dunkerton, "Titian's Painting Techniques," in *Titian*, p. 59.
30. Deleuze favoured this kind of art historical symptomotogy of functions and also draws on the haptic-optic tensor of Alois Riegl, and Wilhelm Worringer's organic-abstract.

31. Deleuze points out their importance for him, FB, 190/119. Deleuze also draws on Wölfflin's *Renaissance and Baroque* in TF.
32. Heinrich Wölfflin, *Principles of Art History*, p. 19.
33. Heinrich Wölfflin, *Principles of Art History*, p. 19.20.
34. Heinrich Wölfflin, *Principles of Art History*, p. 21.
35. Vasari notes how Titian's last works "are executed with bold, sweeping strokes, and in patches of colour," that "makes pictures seem alive." *Lives of the Artists, Volume 1*, p. 458. This development has an obvious echo in Deleuze's discussion of Bacon's "patches," which we shall turn to in Chapter Six.
36. Marcia Hall, *Color and Meaning, Practice and Theory in Renaissance Painting*, p. 233.
37. Heinrich Wölfflin, *Principles of Art History*, p. 196.
38. Heinrich Wölfflin, *Principles of Art History*, p. 52.
39. Consistent with our earlier discussion of the relation of the plane and the strata in relative and absolute deterritorialisation, "smooth space is constantly being translated, transversed into a striated space; striated space is constantly being reversed, returned to a smooth space" (ATP, 474/593). Deleuze and Guattari's descriptive topology tends to lay out these poles in their pure state, but this is only in order to operate a symptomatology (a schizo-analysis) that returns striated spaces to smoothness. That is, in striated space we see things in terms of objects and their representations, in terms of cause and effect, in terms finally, of an *a priori* space and time that condition these relations. In smooth space however, perception changes, and becomes "based on symptoms and evaluations rather than measures and properties" (ATP, 479/598). Smooth space is a space of evalutative connection whereas striated space imposes distinctions and limits. Nevertheless, Deleuze and Guattari suggest that the extension of a striated representational space gives smooth space a milieu of propagation and renewal, without which its consistency might remain unexpressed. Striated space here becomes "a mask without which it [smooth space] could neither breathe nor find a general form of expression" (ATP, 486/607). And indeed, more than just a life support, striated space offers a "richness and necessity of translations, which include as many opportunities for openings as risks of closure or stoppage" (ATP, 486/607). In other words, striated space is where relative deterritorialisations occur, and it is only through these that a destratified smooth space will appear. The necessity of affirmative evaluation however, remains, and although the abstract line requires striated space in which to operate, "It is less easy," Deleuze and Guattari note, "to evaluate the creative potentialities of striated space and how it can simultaneously emerge from the smooth and give everything a whole new impetus" (ATP, 494/616). Striated space is never in itself creative, and is always attempting to restratify things in its various "apparatus of capture." Only when the abstract line draws or "abstracts" a vital mat-

ter from its representational signs is an absolutely deterritorialised smooth space created, and an artwork appears which is truly "abstract."

40. Although it seems that Pollock did view his paintings on the wall, before lowering them again for reworking. See Timothy J. Clark, "Jackson Pollock's Abstraction," *Reconstructing Modernism: Art in New York, Paris and Montreal 1945—1964.*
41. Clement Greenberg, "Abstract, Representational, and so forth," *Art and Culture, Critical Essays*, p. 228.
42. Deleuze and Guattari take the concept of the "haptic" from Alois Riegl's *Late Roman Art Industry*, p. 32–3.
43. This concept of the "will to art" [*Kunstwollen*] also comes from Riegl. Riegl regarded art works as symptoms of a historical people's experience of space, time and matter. "The character of this volition [*Wollen*]," Riegl wrote, "is always determined by what may be termed the conception of the world [*Weltanschauung*] at a given time" (*Late Roman Art Industry*, p. 231). Art expresses the "artistic will" of a culture, its abstract machine, and could only be interpreted by disregarding the more obvious representational or symbolic intentions of the work, and by suspending judgements of value. "The mission of our discipline," Riegl thought, "is not simply to find the things in the art of the past that appeal to modern taste, but to delve into the artistic volition [*Kunstwollen*] behind works of art and to discover why they are the way they are, and why they could not have been otherwise" (*The Group Portraiture of Holland*, p.63). *Kunstwollen* is therefore a symptommatological taxonomic tool, and shorn of its ethnographic pretensions provides a way in which a rigorous analysis of formal qualities could move beyond the art object and towards its ontological mechanisms. See also, Alois Riegl, "The Place of the Vapheio Cups in the History of Art," in *The Vienna School Reader, Politics and Art Historical Method in the 1930s*, p. 35.
44. The phrase is from the founder of the *Einfühlung* tradition of German aesthetics, Theodor Lipps, and that Worringer quotes in *Abstraction and Empathy, A Contribution to the Psychology of Style*, p. 14. (References now found in the text following the abbreviation 'AE') Lipps argued that art expressed its inner and psychological conditions, conditions that were not simply confined to the subjective interiority of the artist, but were shared with the viewer of the work as well. Art, according to Lipps, expressed emotional or physiological truths that we recognize by finding them in ourselves, through empathy. Aesthetics thereby becomes the study of art's ontological conditions, as they are found in the viewers "empathy" or "participation" in the work. What is significant about this approach is that it did not understand empathy as determined by subjective factors in the viewer, but by a transcendental vital energy that Lipps believed was that of organic life. On Lipps see Moshe Barusch, *Theories of Art 3, From Impressionism to Kandinsky*, p. 111–12.

45. Wilhelm Worringer, *Form in Gothic*, p. 21. References to this book now found in the text following the abbreviation "FG."
46. Deleuze and Guattari criticise Worringer for this crystallisation of the abstract line into 'the most rectilinear forms possible' (ATP, 496/619). Worringer believed these forms appear in the earliest art forms and so are the source of art. Deleuze and Guattari part ways with Worringer on this point, writing, "we do not understand the aesthetic motivation of the abstract line in the same way, or its identity with the beginning of art" (ATP, 496/620). Deleuze and Guattari also reject Worringer's rather negative understanding of abstraction as the product of anxiety, in which fear is the impulse for erecting monuments to "the eternity of an In-Itself." I shall return to some of these points in connection to Francis Bacon's use of Egyptian art, in Chapter Six.
47. We have already heard the echo in *Cinema 1:* "How can we rid ourselves of ourselves, and demolish ourselves?" (C1, 66/97).
48. "Where the abstract line is the exponent of the will to form," Worringer writes, "art is transcendental, is conditioned by the need for deliverance" (FG, 67).
49. This is a significant reinterpretation of Riegl's terms. For Riegl the haptic was associated with tactile sensation, the optic with visual sensation. Consistent with his assumption of an organic sensibility Riegl saw thought as subsequent to either experience.
50. Greenberg writes: "Because flatness was the only condition painting shared with no other art, Modernist painting oriented itself to flatness as it did to nothing else." "Modernist Painting," *The Collected Essays and Criticism, Vol. 1, Perceptions and Judgements 1939–44*, p. 87. I shall examine the immanent critical process by which Greenberg defines modernist art in the next chapter.
51. Clement Greenberg, "Towards a New Laocoon," *The Collected Essays and Criticism, Vol. 1, Perceptions and Judgements 1939–44*, p. 30.
52. Clement Greenberg, "Abstract, Representational, and so forth," *Art and Culture, Critical Essays*, p. 136–7.
53. Clement Greenberg, "The Case for Abstract Art," *The Collected Essays and Criticism, Volume 4 Modernism with a Vengeance*, p. 81.
54. Clement Greenberg, "Byzantine Parallels," *Art and Culture*, p. 167–8.
55. Clement Greenberg, "Byzantine Parallels," *Art and Culture*, p. 169.
56. Clement Greenberg, "Byzantine Parallels," *Art and Culture*, p. 169.
57. Clement Greenberg, quoted in John Rajchman, *Constructions*, p. 69. In chapter 4 of this book, Rajchman offers a critical view of Deleuze and Guattari's use of Pollock.
58. Clement Greenberg, "Byzantine Parallels," *Art and Culture*, p. 170.
59. Clement Greenberg, "The Case for Abstract Art," *The Collected Essays and Criticism, Volume 4 Modernism with a Vengeance*, p. 81.

60. Strangely enough, Greenberg also calls Pollock a "Gothic painter" ("The Present Prospects of American Painting and Sculpture," *The Collected Essays and Criticism, Volume 2, Arrogant Purpose, 1945–49*, p. 166) but, as Deleuze points out, "without seeming to give this term the full meaning it assumes in Worringer's analysis" (FB, 186/101).
61. Michael Fried, "Morris Louis," *Art and Objecthood, Essays and Reviews*, p. 106.
62. Michael Fried, "Three American Painters: Kenneth Noland, Jules Olitski, Frank Stella," *Art and Objecthood, Essays and Reviews*, p. 223.
63. Michael Fried, "Three American Painters: Kenneth Noland, Jules Olitski, Frank Stella," *Art and Objecthood, Essays and Reviews*, p. 223.
64. Michael Fried, "Three American Painters: Kenneth Noland, Jules Olitski, Frank Stella," *Art and Objecthood, Essays and Reviews*, p. 224–5.
65. Deleuze has elsewhere described the "American critics" definition of Abstract Expressionism as "the creation of a purely optical space" as "curious," and finally, in relation to his own work, as "a quarrel over words, an ambiguity of words" (FB, 106–7/99). This seems a very generous evaluation by Deleuze, and one that obscures the significant differences in their positions. Indeed, Deleuze puts it more bluntly in a subsequent passage when he writes: "By liberating a space that is (wrongly) claimed to be purely optical, the abstract expressionists in fact did nothing other than to make visible an exclusively manual space" (FB, 107/100).
66. As Timothy J. Clark notes, Fried's argument (and this applies equally well to Greenberg) only works when the viewer is an ideal distance from the work, at which the "surface volatizes." "At five feet away," he very practically points out, "it simply doesn't work." "Jackson Pollock's Abstraction," *Reconstructing Modernism: Art in New York, Paris, and Montreal 1945–1964*, p. 236.
67. For a criticism of Greenberg in these terms see Rosalind Krauss, *The Optical Unconscious*, p. 307–8.
68. The phrase comes from John Welchman's description of Pollock's work in *Modernism Relocated: Towards a cultural studies of visual modernity*, p. 45.
69. Michael Fried, "Three American Painters: Kenneth Noland, Jules Olitski, Frank Stella," *Art and Objecthood, Essays and Reviews*, p. 224.
70. Quoted in Irving Sandler, "Abstract Expressionism," *American Art in the Twentieth Century*, p. 78. Edited by C. M. Joachimides and N. Rosanthal, Munich: Prestal-Verlag, 1993.
71. John Welchman, *Modernism Relocated: Towards a cultural studies of visual modernity*, p. 226, italics added.
72. Pollock quoted in Nancy Jachec, *The Philosophy and Politics of Abstract Expressionism 1940–1960*, p. 83. This book gives a fascinating account of Pollock and Greenberg's development in terms of the intellectual context of post-War America. Of particular interest is their relation to the rise of Existentialism, and its role in redefining Socialism as a politics of individual intervention within historical processes, unrelated to class interests or agency.

NOTES TO CHAPTER FIVE

1. Walt Whitman, "Song of Myself," 26, *Leaves of Grass*, lines 598–610, M. Cowley ed., London: Penguin, 1959.
2. This term is left untranslated in the English translations of Guattari's work. It must be noted that this is the same word Deleuze and Guattari use in *A Thousand Plateaus*, and that we discussed in Chapter Four. Although this term is descriptive, and in itself does not carry any pejorative or positive sense, last chapter we saw its negative connotations developed, whereas in this one Guattari's use of the term takes on an affirmative sense.
3. Félix Guattari, "Subjectivities: For Better and for Worse," *The Guattari Reader*, p. 198. Clearly this statement prefigures the task of *Chaosmosis*, where it is repeated: "My perspective involves shifting the human and social sciences from scientific paradigms towards ethico-aesthetic paradigms" (Chaos, 10/24).
4. Félix Guattari "Institutional Schizo-Analysis," *Soft Subversions*, p. 271.
5. For Guattari the unconscious is what cannot be expressed in terms of the subject, and is what subjectivity represses. But the unconscious is nonetheless active, and is never figured as a lack. The unconscious is the virtual dimension of affect which fractalises the subject in processes of subjectivation. "[I]t is not necessary to oppose the basic logic of latent contents, to that of repression." Guattari writes, "It is possible to use a model in which the unconscious is open to the future and able to integrate any heterogeneous, semiotic components which may interfere. Then, meaningful distortions no longer arise from an interpretation of underlying contents. Instead they become part of a machinic set-up entirely on the text's surface. Rather than be mutilated by symbolic castration, recurring incomplete goals act instead as autonomous purveyors of subjectivation. The rupture, the breach of meaning, is nothing else than the manifestation of subjectivation in its earliest stages. It is the necessary adequate fractalisation which enables something to appear where the access before was blocked. It is the deterritorialising opening." "The Refrain of Being and Meaning: Analysis of a Dream," *Soft Subversions*, p. 233. ("Les ritournelles de l'Être et du Sens," *Cartographies Schizoanalytiques*, p. 235)
6. Deleuze and Guattari explain this fractal ontology in *A Thousand Plateaus:* "Fractals are aggregates whose number of dimensions is fractional rather than whole, or else whole and with continual variation in direction (ATP, 486/607). Subjectivation operates on this model, creating a "directional space" which "doesn't have a dimension higher than that which moves through it or is inscribed on it" (ATP, 488/609).

7. Brian Massumi, "Chaos in the 'Total Field' of Vision," *Hyperplastik, Kunst und Konzept der Wahrnehmung in Zeiten der mental imagery*, p. 255.
8. The affect is an "autopoietic" machine in precisely the sense the biologists Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela first proposed the term: "the product of their operation is their own organisation." Quoted in Félix Guattari, *The Three Ecologies*, p. 102. As Maturana and Varela write, "an autopoietic machine continually generates and specifies its own organization through its operation as a system of production of its own components, and does this in an endless turnover of components under conditions of continuous perturbations and compensation of perturbation. [. . .] [A]utopoietic machines are unities whose organization is defined by a particular network of processes (relations) of production of components, the autopoietic network." Quoted in *The Three Ecologies*, p. 100. Guattari qualifies his use of Maturana and Varela's term however, inasmuch as they limit it to the unitary individuations of "living" or organic bodies. Against this limitation Guattari argues: "Autopoiesis deserves to be rethought in terms of evolutionary, collective entities, which maintain diverse types of relations to alterity, rather than being implacably closed in on themselves. [. . .] Thus we will view autopoiesis from the perspective of the ontogenesis and phylogenesis proper to a mecanosphere superposed on the biosphere" (Chaos, 39–40/62) This means that art can be understood as autopoietic, as Guattari specifically suggests (Chaos, 93/130). For an account of Maturana and Varela's relation to Deleuze and Guattari, see Ronald Bogue, "Art and Territory," *A Deleuzian Century? The South Atlantic Quarterly*, Summer 1997, Vol.96, No.3.
9. This is another site of Guattari's break with Lacan. "Not only is I an other," he writes, "but it is a multitude of modalities of alterity. Here we are no longer floating in the Signifier, the Subject and the big other in general" (Chaos, 96/134).
10. Guattari describes the autogenetic properties of chaos as follows: "The chaotic nothing spins and unwinds complexity, puts it in relation with itself and what is other to it, with what alters it. This actualisation of difference carries out an aggregate selection into which limits, constants and states of things can graft themselves" (Chaos, 114–115/159).
11. Joyce writes, "every person, place and thing in the chaosmos of Alle anyway connected with the gobblydumped turkety was moving and changing every part of the time." James Joyce, *Finnegans Wake*, p. 118, London: Penguin, 1992.
12. Samual Butler, *Erewhon*, p. 219, London: Penguin, 1986. The machinic world of Erewhon, Deleuze and Guattari suggest, is not just a no-where, but simultaneously a now-here (WP, 100/96), meaning its utopian topos of virtual creativity does not transcend our world but continually infuses it with an immanent and revolutionary alterity.
13. Félix Guattari, "So What," *Chaosophy*, p. 18.

14. Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, "Balance-Sheet Program for Desiring Machines," *Chaosophy*, p. 120–1.
15. Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, "Balance-Sheet Program for Desiring Machines," *Chaosophy*, p. 128.
16. Gilles Deleuze, "Cold and Heat," *Photogenic Painting, Gerard Fromanger*, p. 64.
17. Gilles Deleuze, "On Gilbert Simondon," *Desert Islands and Other Texts 1953–1974*, p. 86. ("Gilbert Simondon, L'individu et sa genèse physico-biologique," *L'île desérte et autres textes 1953–1974*, p. 120)
18. Gilles Deleuze, *Seminar Session at Vincennes*, 27 February 1979.
19. Simondon argues that individuation is the result of the non-identity of being with itself. Being attempts to solve its non-identity through individuation, but this can never eradicate its constitutive difference, which keeps any individuation open and in progress (the power of repetition in Deleuze's terms). This inherent non-identity of being takes the form of a problem Simondon argues, a problem which is autopoietic inasmuch as it is that "by which the incompatibility within the unresolved system becomes an organising dimension in its resolution. "The Genesis of the Individual," *Incorporations*, p. 311. See also, Gilles Deleuze, "On Gilbert Simondon," *Desert Islands and Other Texts 1953–1974*. ("Gilbert Simondon, L'individu et san genèse physico-biologique," *L'île Déserte et Autres Textes 1953–1974*)
20. Georges Simondon, "The Genesis of the Individual," *Incorporations*, p. 311. For an account of Deleuze's use of Simondon see Ronald Bogue, *Deleuze and Guattari*, p. 61ff and Brian Massumi, "The Autonomy of the Affect," *Deleuze: A Critical Reader*, p. 227ff. Similarly, Guattari opposes a process of "automodelization" to that involving pre-existing models in "Institutional Schizo-Analysis," *Soft Subversions*, p. 268–9.
21. Félix Guattari, "Institutional Schizo-Analysis," *Soft Subversions*, p. 276.
22. Félix Guattari, "Subjectivities: For Better and for Worse," *The Guattari Reader*, p. 200.
23. The essay this quotation comes from, "The Exhausted" is not found in the French edition of *Critique et Clinique*. Deleuze's essay, 'L'Épuisè' appears in Samuel Beckett, *Quad*, Paris: Minuit, 1992. The quotations come from p. 72.
24. Gilles Deleuze, "L'Épuisè," in Samuel Beckett, *Quad*, p. 72.
25. Félix Guattari, "Subjectivities: For Better and for Worse," *The Guattari Reader*, p. 198–201.
26. Félix Guattari, "Subjectivities: For Better and for Worse," *The Guattari Reader*, p. 196.
27. This reading of Duchamp has been exhaustively developed by Thierry de Duve. De Duve argues that the readymade was Duchamp's ironic response to painting's contemporaneous re-foundation on pure color as the expression of an eternal language of abstraction. This was Kandinsky's argument in

Concerning the Spiritual in Art, one Duchamp was familiar with after his stay in Munich in 1912. The readymade is, on de Duve's account, the re-foundation of art on an act of pure nomination as an attack on the spiritual claims made by Kandinsky for modern abstract art. De Duve's Duchamp is the post-modern hero, the anti-painter. De Duve makes much of Duchamp claiming the tube of paint as the first readymade, and argues that in so doing Duchamp "switched from one regulative idea to another by giving that of his colleagues, the early abstractionists, an additional reflexive twist which turned it into a referent for his own idea. Their regulative idea was the specifically pictorial; his was *about* the specifically pictorial. Theirs was geared to establish their craft's name, *Malerei;* his was a philosophy *about that name*, a kind of pictorial nominalism" *Kant After Duchamp*, p. 165.

28. Duchamp's well-known statement is: "There is no art. Instead of choosing something which you like, or something which you dislike, you choose something that has no visual interest for the artist. In other words to arrive at a state of indifference towards this object; at that moment, it becomes a ready made." Quoted in J. Gough-Cooper and J. Caumont, *Marcel Duchamp*, unpaginated.
29. Félix Guattari, "Subjectivities: For Better and for Worse," *The Guattari Reader*, p. 198.
30. Alliez has developed this critique as part of his wider projection of an alternative direction to (post) modernism, a trajectory of "vital abstraction" that finds its most important exponent in the painter Henri Matisse. I attended Alliez's seminar, "On the Eye-Brain of Modernity" at the Akademie der bildenden Künste Wien, 2002–3, where he presented these arguments in detail. My account is heavily indebted to the work he developed there.
31. Éric Alliez points this out in "Rewriting Postmodernity (Notes)," unpublished translation by C. Penwarden and A. Toscano of an article which originally appeared in *Trésors publics 20 ans de création dans les Fonds régionaux d'art contemporain*, Paris: Flammarian, 2003.He also quotes another of Duchamp's interviews with Sweeney (1946) where he claims: "This is the direction that art must take: intellectual expression rather than animal expression."
32. Deleuze and Guattari's assumption of a productive chaos as the privileged ontological state has been criticised by Antonio Negri and Michael Hardt in their book *Empire* (Cambridge (Mass.): Harvard University Press, 2000). Given their attempt to reinvigorate a politics of the left in terms they take from Deleuze and Guattari, this criticism is important. Deleuze and Guattari, they write, "focus our attention clearly on the ontological substance of social production. Machines produce. The constant functioning of social machines in their various apparatuses and assemblages produces the world along with the subjects and objects that constitute it. Deleuze and Guattari, however, seem to be able to conceive positively only the tendencies

toward continuous movement and absolute flows, and thus in their thought too, the creative elements and the radical ontology of the production of the social remain insubstantial and impotent. Deleuze and Guattari discover the productivity of social reproduction (creative production, production of values, social relations, affects, becomings), but manage to articulate it only superficially and ephemerally, as a chaotic, indeterminate horizon marked by the ungraspable event" (p. 28). First, given the extensive development by Deleuze and Guattari of the "negative" pole of productivity in strata, faces, apparatus' of capture, etc., this criticism seems at least a little hasty. Second, it seems strange, and not a little strategic, that Hardt and Negri should call "superficial" one of the most important theoretical underpinnings of their own project (which they presumably correct and complete). Third, the indeterminable and ungraspable event has a specific philosophical meaning in Deleuze and Guattari which is only superficially reduced to their common meanings. The most chaosmic event may be "ungraspable," but it is, as we have seen, nevertheless entirely immanent to the actuality that expresses it. It is ironic that Hardt and Negri should criticise Deleuze and Guattari in this way when their own book seems to rest on just such an ungraspable event, the coming to power of the multitude. "The only event," Hardt and Negri tell us, "that we are awaiting is the construction, or rather the insurgence, of a powerful organisation. We do not have any models to offer for this event. Only the multitude through its practical experimentation will offer the models and determine when and how the possible becomes real" (p. 411). As almost the last words of their book, and as the culmination of their implied promises of a determinate and graspable production of the multiple, this is more than a little disappointing. Here, it seems as if Hardt and Negri finally accept Deleuze and Guattari's supposed commitment to an ontological revolution necessarily unknown, but nevertheless embodied, in Deleuze and Guattari's words, by a "people yet to come." This specific sense of Deleuze and Guattari's indeterminate and ungraspable event, which operates as the immanent ontological power unravelling stable structures, seems in fact very close to Hardt and Negri's own use of the term "multitude." "The deterritorialising power of the multitude," they write, "is the productive force that sustains Empire and at the same time the force that calls for and makes necessary its destruction" (p. 61). The multitude acts as the political expression of an ontological and affirmative matter/force which is forever over-coded by Empire, but which forever escapes it. As with Deleuze and Guattari's aesthetic paradigm, Negri and Hardt are also attempting an ontology of the social which would seek to express its most libratory immanent forces of creation. Their criticism of Deleuze and Guattari seems therefore, at best ungenerous, and at worst misleading, especially in relation to their own project.

33. "That which is or returns has no prior constituted identity: things are reduced to the differences which fragment them, and to all the differences

which are implicated in it and through which they pass" (DR, 67/92). As a result: "The same is said of that which differs and remains different" (DR, 126/165). In this sense Deleuze and Guattari propose a rigorously Nietzschean readymade, a simulacrum or image without resemblance, which "attains the status of a sign in the coherence of eternal return" (DR, 67/93).

34. Gilles Deleuze, "On Nietzsche and the Image of Thought," *Desert Islands and Other Texts 1953–1974*, p. 138. ("Sur Nietzsche et l'image de la pensée," *L'île desérte et autres textes, 1953–1974*, p. 191)
35. Marcel Duchamp, quoted in Calvin Tomkins, *Duchamp, A Biography*, p. 159.
36. Félix Guattari and Antonio Negri, "Communist Propositions," *The Guattari Reader*, p. 255.
37. Fernando Pessoa, "The Keeper of Sheep," in *Selected Poems*, p. 81. Translated by J. Griffen, London: Penguin, 1974.
38. Nietzsche, *The Gay Science*, 367. Nietzsche discusses the painter Mirabeau's creative ability of forgetting in *On the Genealogy of Morals*, I, 10.
39. This is possibly the most direct statement of the vitalist and materialist 'permanent revolution' of the aesthetic paradigm. It is one they repeat: "Deformations destined to harness a great force are already present in the small-form refrain or rondo [. . .] the cosmic force was already present in the material, the great refrain in the little refrain, the great manoeuvre in the little manoeuvre" (ATP, 350/432).
40. Nevertheless, a number of commentators have claimed that Deleuze and Guattari are Romantics. Dana Polan for example, while pointing out that Deleuze "avoids a full romantic mythology of expressiveness," nevertheless calls Deleuze's book on Francis Bacon "quasi-romantic," and as such part of "the larger romantic project of Deleuze: to go beyond the surface fixities of a culture and find those forces, those energies, those fluxes, those sensations that specific sociohistorical inscriptions have blocked and reified into social etiquettes and stultifying patterns of representation" ("Francis Bacon, The logic of sensation," *Gilles Deleuze and the Theater of Philosophy*, p. 230). The problem here is not Polan's description of Deleuze's project, but its description as romantic. I hope the reasons for this will be obvious in what follows. In a more 'archaeological' mode John Sellers (in "The Point of View of the Cosmos: Deleuze, Romanticism, Stoicism" in *Pli* 8, 1999) argues that German Romanticism is a "central" influence on Deleuze and Guattari in its project of "following nature" (p. 1). Sellers traces connections from Deleuze and Guattari to Friedrich Schlegel's concepts of a "direct mediator," and a divine immanence as the "unity in multiplicity and multiplicity in unity" (p. 10). Although these connections are no doubt active in Deleuze and Guattari's work, Sellers strangely ignores their discussion of Romanticism in *A Thousand Plateaus*, and chooses to instead find evidence for the connections between Schlegel and Deleuze and Guattari in their shared interest in the Stoics. Once again the problem is not the connections Sellers draws per se, but the lack of their critical assessment in light of what Deleuze and Guattari themselves write about Romanticism.
41. Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A68/B93.
42. Gilled Deleuze, *Third Lesson on Kant*, 28 March 1978.
43. Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Judgment*, ss. 26.
44. Gilled Deleuze, *Third Lesson on Kant*, 28 March 1978.
45. Kant writes: "The sublime may be described in this way: It is an object (of nature) the representation of which determines the mind to regard the elevation of nature beyond our reach as equivalent to the presentation of ideas" Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Judgment*, General Remarks upon the Exposition of Aesthetic Reflexive Judgments. Deleuze's reading of this movement can be found in *Kant's Critical Philosophy: The Doctrine of the Faculties*, p. 51–2.
46. Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Judgment*, General Remarks upon the the Exposition of Aesthetic Reflexive Judgments.
47. Gilles Deleuze, "The Idea of Genesis in Kant's Esthetics," *Desert Islands and Other Texts 1953–1974*, p. 62. ('L'idée de genèse dans l'esthétique de Kant,' *L'île Déserte et autres textes 1953–1974*, p. 88)
48. Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Judgment*, ss. 28.
49. Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Judgment*, ss. 28.
50. Gilled Deleuze, *Fourth Lesson on Kant*, 4 April 1978.
51. Deleuze specifically makes this point (C2, 18/29).
52. Gilles Deleuze, "The Idea of Genesis in Kant's Esthetics," *Desert Islands and Other Texts 1953–1974*, p. 62. ("L'idée de genèse dans l'esthétique de Kant," *L'île Déserte et autres textes 1953–1974*, p. 88)
53. Gilles Deluze, *Fourth Lesson on Kant*, 4 April 1978.
54. Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Judgment*, ss. 28 and General Remarks.
55. As Deleuze and Guattari describe Romanticism: "It is certain that the Earth as an intense point in depth or in projection, as *ratio essendi*, is always in disjunction with the territory: and the territory as the condition of "knowledge," *ratio cognoscendi*, is always in disjunction with the earth" (ATP, 339/418).
56. Gustav Mahler, "Ich bin der Welt abhanden gekommen," *Ruckert Lieder*. Death is a recurring Romantic motif, and was often used as a description of the artist's journey from individual to universal consciousness.
57. Clement Greenberg, "Modernist Art," *The Collected Essays and Criticism, Volume 4, Modernism with a Vengeance*, p. 85.
58. Clement Greenberg, "Modernist Art," *The Collected Essays and Criticism, Volume 4, Modernism with a Vengeance*, p. 86. Greenberg writes: "The essence of Modernism lies, as I see it, in the use of characteristic methods of a discipline to criticise the discipline itself, not in order to subvert it but in order to entrench it more firmly in its area of competence" (p. 85).

59. Clement Greenberg, "'American-Type' Painting," *Art and Culture, Critical Essays*, p. 208.
60. Clement Greenberg, "Modernist Art," *The Collected Essays and Criticism, Volume 4, Modernism with a Vengeance*, p. 85.
61. Clement Greenberg, "Towards a Newer Laocoon," *The Collected Essays and Criticism, Volume 4, Modernism with a Vengeance*, p. 23.
62. Clement Greenberg, "Towards a Newer Laocoon," *The Collected Essays and Criticism, Volume 4, Modernism with a Vengeance*, p. 30.
63. Clement Greenberg, "Towards a Newer Laocoon," *The Collected Essays and Criticism, Volume 4, Modernism with a Vengeance*, p. 29. "The picture," Greenberg writes, "exhausts itself in the visual sensation it produces" p. 34.
64. That Greenberg regarded art after such abstraction as a decline is the most obvious symptom of his modernist teleology. See, Thierry de Duve, *Kant after Duchamp*, p. 216–248.
65. How, in other words, does art make these forces visible? Deleuze and Guattari often quote Paul Klee in this regard, particularly the line: "Art does not reproduce the visible; rather it makes visible." Paul Klee, *Creative Credo*, 1. Deleuze and Guattari's use of Klee as the spokesman for Modernism is ironic, considering the usual association of his work and thought (not least his own) with Romanticism. (See, Robert Rosenblum, "Other Romantic currents: Klee and Ernst," in *Major European Art Movements, 1900–1945*) But Klee's formulations that have been taken as Romantic are also open to Deleuze and Guattari's concept of Modernism. For example, Klee writes: "There, where the power-house of all time and space—call it brain or heart of creation—activates every function; who is the artist who would not dwell there?" (*On Modern Art*, p. 49). Obviously, space and time are not *a priori* categories, but elements of a creation that makes this there a here, and implies a brain and a creative chaosmos which are immanent to each other *in the production of art*. This reading is supported by Klee's rejection of what he calls the "*crass emotional phase of Romanticism*," in favour of a "cool Romanticism," a "new Romanticism" which rejects the heroic solitude of the romantic artist in order to "embrace the life force itself," at "the source of creation" (*On Modern Art*, p. 49). Such an art would be, in Klee's words, "a Romanticism which *is one* with the universe" (*On Modern Art*, p. 43) and would find its definitively modern statement in the words Klee placed on his own tombstone: "I cannot be grasped in immanence." Finally, and importantly for Deleuze and Guattari, Klee will abandon romantic feelings of longing and disjunction, in realising that a "modern Romanticism" calls for the creation of a people to come (*On Modern Art*, p. 55).
66. This materialism would be the ground of Guattari's objections to post-modernism; that it fails to open itself to cosmic forces, to molecularise and deterritorialise itself sufficiently, and thereby accepts a romantic disjunction of discursive systems and what grounds them. That is, it is not materialist enough. As a result, there is no true resistance in post-modernism because there is no true creation. "The virtual ethical and aesthetic abdication of postmodern thought," Guattari writes, "leaves a kind of black stain upon history." "Postmodernism and Ethical Abdication," *The Guattari Reader*, p. 116. The postmodern project of "deconstructing" cliché and opinion would not be the same as its absolute deterritorialisation, precisely because the first operation involves a supplemental dimension of irony and the second does not (Derridean differance cannot, I believe, be equated to Deleuzian difference, as they do not share the same ontological grounds). Deleuze and Guattari re-vitalise modernism rather than suggest a post-modernism, because they far prefer modernism's ontological ambition to post-modernism's epistemological pessimism. As Deleuze writes, paraphrasing D. H. Lawrence on painting, "the rage against clichés does not lead to much if it is content only to parody them; maltreated, mutilated, destroyed, a cliché is not slow to be reborn from its ashes" (C1, 211/284).
67. This is Deleuze and Guattari's version of the "death of the artist," and is extended by Deleuze's suggestion that the art work is a gravestone: "Art is defined as an impersonal process in which the work is composed somewhat like a *cairn*, with stones carried in by different voyages and beings in becoming" (ECC, 66/87).
68. In this sense, Modernism marks the point where "Art and philosophy converge," inasmuch as both, on Deleuze and Guattari's account, emerge at a point at which, "the constitution of an earth and a people that are lacking [are] the correlate of creation" (WP, 108/104). This is not to deny their very different materialities—concept and sensation—but to understand their common ontology, and their shared process of chaosmic construction/expression. Deleuze suggests, and here perhaps expresses his agreement with Guattari's privileging of art, that philosophy begins with sensation, inasmuch as 'the path that leads to that which is to be thought, begins with sensibility. [. . .] The privilege of sensibility as origin appears only in the fact that, in an encounter, what forces sensation and that which can only be sensed are one and the same thing" (DR, 144–5/188).
69. Walt Whitman, "Song of Myself," *Leaves of Grass*, lines 226, 505, and 136.
70. Deleuze and Guattari's terms of percept and affect involve a terminological reconfiguration in relation to the work of Spinoza, from where the term "affect" comes. As Deleuze and Guattari explain, what is here called "perception" and "affection" are what Spinoza had previously called "affection" and "affectus" (WP, 154/145–6), and what Deleuze and Guattari had in ATP called "affection" and "affect".
71. See B, 28–9/19–20 for a discussion of the percept in similar terms.
72. Deleuze and Guattari's association of Cubism with the plane of composition is perhaps even more ironic than their exploration of Klee's anti-Romanticism, and must be treated as a metaphor. Despite the Cubist's interest in Bergson and

Nietzsche, the well known Cubist "call to order" is an idealism rather than an empiricism, an attempt at 'objectivity' framed in the Kantian terms of a transcendental subject. For an art historical account of the Cubist interest in Bergson and Nietzsche see, Mark Antliff, *Inventing Bergson, Cultural Politics and the Parisian Avant-Garde*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993. Especially chapter 2 "*Du Cubisme* between Bergson and Nietzsche."

73 Gilles Deleuze, *Negotiations 1972–1990*, p. 146–7.

74. Gilles Deleuze, *Proust and Signs*, p. 97. (*Proust et les signes*, p. 54)

75. Gilles Deleuze, *Proust and Signs*, p. 98. (*Proust et les signes*, p. 56)

76. Some of Deleuze and Guattari's most beautiful passages evoke this creative mystical immanence: "The Cosmos is an abstract machine, and each world is an assemblage effectuating it. If one reduces oneself to one or several abstract lines that will prolong itself in and conjugate with others, producing immediately, directly *a* world in which it is *the* world that becomes, then one becomes-everybody/everything" (ATP, 280/343).

77. Virginia Woolf, *Mrs. Dalloway*, p. 154–55, London: Penguin, 1996.

78. Gilles Deleuze, "L'Épuisè," in Samuel Beckett, *Quad*, Minuit, Paris, 1992. p. 77.

79. Gilles Deleuze, "Having an Idea in Cinema," *Deleuze and Guattari New Mappings in Politics, Philosophy and Culture*, p. 18. (Qu'este-ce que L'acte de création, *Deux Régimes de Fous, Textes et Entretiens 1975–1995*, p. 300)

80. This is a favourite set of images Deleuze often uses. In relation to Nietzsche: "There are dimensions here, times and places, glacial or torrid zones never moderated, the entire exotic geography which characterises a mode of thought as well as a style of life" (LS, 128/153). "It is up to us to go to extreme places, to extreme times, where the highest and the deepest truths live and rise up. The places of thought are the tropical zones frequented by the tropical man, not temperate zones or the moral, methodical or moderate man" (NP, 110/126). And in relation to German expressionist cinema: "It is the hour when it is no longer possible to distinguish between sunrise and sunset, air and water, water and earth, in the great mixture of a marsh or of a tempest" (C1, 14/26).

NOTES TO CHAPTER SIX

1. Deleuze and Guattari write: "An abstract machine is not physical or corporeal, any more than it is semiotic; it is diagrammatic" (ATP, 147/176).

2. "The privilege of sensibility as origin," Deleuze writes, "appears in the fact that, in an encounter, what forces sensation and that which can only be sensed are one and the same thing." (DR, 144–5/188) Sensation marks the immanence of ontological and aesthetic dimensions, and is what must be thought, in painting as in philosophy.

3. This date refers to the appearance of a diagram or abstract machine. In ATP each plateau carries such a date, for example on November 28 1947 Antonin Artaud announces the Body without Organs (BwO). As we shall see, this is an important date for Deleuze's account of Bacon's diagram.

4. For a brief account of Riegl's concept of *Kunstwollen* see Chapter Four, note 43.

5. The chapter this quotation comes from, "Machinic heterogenesis" gives a good account of the machinic history Deleuze is employing in relation to Bacon's diagram. "It is at the intersection of heterogeneous machinic Universes, of different dimensions and with unfamiliar ontological textures, radical innovations and once forgotten, then reactivated, ancestral machinic lines, that the movement of history singularises itself" (Chaos, 41/63).

6. The diagram is "present," Deleuze and Guattari write, "in a different way in every assemblage, passing from one to the other, opening one onto the other, outside any fixed order or determined sequence" (ATP, 347/428).

7. For an interesting account of Bacon's "diagrammatic" use of Velázquez and Ingres see, Norman Bryson, "Bacon's Dialogues with the Past," in *Francis Bacon and the Tradition of Art*.

8. Deleuze writes: "Painting invents entirely different types of blocks. These are neither blocks of concepts nor blocks of movements/durations, but blocks of line/colors." Gilles Deleuze, "Having an Idea in Cinema," *Deleuze and Guattari New Mappings in Politics, Philosophy and Culture*, p. 15. ("Qu"est-ce que l"acte de création?," *Deux Régimes de Fous, textes et entretiens 1975–1995*, p. 293)

9. David Sylvester, *Interviews with Francis Bacon*, p. 16–7.

10. "Paintings eternal object is this:" Deleuze and Guattari write, "to paint forces" (WP, 182/172).

11. Spiritual or "geometric" abstraction, Deleuze argues produces a purely optical space without tactile connections, within which the "spiritual" (transcendent) values of the abstract forms signify according to a still classical model of representation. In "spiritual" abstraction color and form are understood in an entirely symbolic way, as representing higher truths (for example, Kandinsky's understanding of color in *On the Spiritual in Art*, or Malevich's understanding of form in Suprematism). Abstract expressionism is the other pole, and produces a catastrophe enveloping the entire canvas. Abstract Expressionism, Deleuze writes, "grounds itself in a scrambling" (FB, 117/111). Here, optical space disappears in favour of a manual line that produces a sensation that is "irremediably confused" (FB, 109/102). Deleuze's critique of "spiritual" abstraction and abstract expressionism, it must be noted, is specific to Deleuze's evaluation of Bacon's practice, and will not prevent Deleuze from affirming both diagrams elsewhere (he affirms both Pollock and minimalism as expressions of the Baroque fold (TF, 27/38, 160/168), and gives a positive evaluation of Mondrian (WP, 183/173). We

have already seen Deleuze and Guattari's affirmation of Pollock in ATP. The point is that different diagrams answer different questions, as Deleuze explains: "The important question is: Why did Bacon not become involved in either of the two preceding paths. The severity of his reactions, rather than claiming to pass judgement, simply indicate what was not right for him, and explains why Bacon personally took neither of these paths" (FB, 109/101–2). As a result, Bacon's "middle way" between geometric abstraction and abstract expressionism "is called a "middle" way only from a very external point of view" (FB, 118/111).

12. We recall from Chapter Four that this is the aspect of Worringer's account of Egyptian art Deleuze and Guattari criticize.
13. Deleuze takes the term "Figure" from Jean-Francois Lyotard's book *Discours, Figure*. Lyotard is primarily concerned with Freud's topological construction of the unconscious in which surface elements of a narrative appear as figurative transformations of an invisible system of unconscious relations. Lyotard argues that the unconscious production of conscious meaning does not occur through a process of interpretation—that is through the signifier—and this is the "importance" of the book for Deleuze ("Remarks (on Jean-Francois Lyotard)," *Desert Islands and Other Texts 1953–1974*, p. 214). (*L'île Déserte et Autres Textes, textes et entretiens 1953–1974*, p. 299) Instead, meaning emerges through an invisible "matrix" that exists outside of any laws of representation and discourse. For Lyotard the visible is structured by this invisible and unconscious matrix which becomes visible in the Figure, or "figural," *as* the deformation of figurative representations. The matrix, according to Lyotard, "resides in a space that is beyond the intelligible, [and] is in radical rupture with the rules of opposition; we can already see that this property of unconscious space, which is also that of the libidinal body, is to have many places in one place, and to block together what is logically incompatible. This is the secret of the figural: the transgression of the constitutive intervals of discourse and the transgression of the constitutive distances of representation" (Lyotard quoted in Yve-Alain Bois and Rosalind E. Krauss, *Formless A User's Guide*, p. 106–7). Deleuze, while adopting the deformative aspect of Lyotard's Figure, and acknowledging the "extreme importance" of his book (AO, 243/289) discards its psychoanalytic focus. This is because although Lyotard identifies the "figure-matrix" with desire, correctly in Deleuze and Guattari's opinion, he limits desire, and indeed "castrates" it (AO, 244/290) by bringing it back "toward the shores he has so recently left behind" in reducing the Figure to "transgressions" which remain secondary to what they deform (AO, 244/290). For an account of Deleuze's relation to Lyotard, see Ronald Bogue, *Deleuze on Music, Painting and the Arts*, p. 113–16.

14. In *A Thousand Plateaus* Deleuze and Guattari argue that the face finds its becoming-animal in a head-body. The head-body is composed of "*faciality traits*," which "elude the organisation of the face" (ATP, 171/209).
15. That is, it considers painting as an ontological practice. See Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible* (references now found in the text following the abbreviation "VI"), and his essays "Eye and Mind," and "Cézanne's Doubt," in *The Merleau-Ponty Aesthetics Reader: Philosophy and Painting* (references to "Eye and Mind" are now found in the text following the abbreviation "EM").
16. Apart from Merleau-Ponty's work, Deleuze also draws on and discusses other phenomenological accounts of Cézanne, especially Erwin Straus, *The Primary World of the Senses*, and Henri Maldiney, *Regard, Parole, Espace*. For an account of Deleuze"s relationship to Straus and Maldiney see, Ronald Bogue, *Deleuze on Music, Painting and the Arts*, p. 116–121 (for Straus), and p. 139–145 (on Maldiney). For other accounts of Deleuze's relation to phenomenology see, Daniel W. Smith, "Deleuze's Theory of Sensation: Overcoming the Kantian Duality," in *Deleuze: A Critical Reader*, and Judy Purdom, "Mondrian and the destruction of space," in *Hyperplastik, Kunst und Konzepte der Wahrnehmung in Zeiten der mental imagery*.
17. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, "Cézanne's Doubt," *The Merleau-Ponty Aesthetics Reader: Philosophy and Painting*, p. 68.
18. As Merleau-Ponty writes, "it is not I who sees, not he who sees, because an anonymous visibility inhabits both of us, a vision in general, in virtue of that primordial property that belongs to the flesh, being here and now, of radiating everywhere and forever, being an individual, of being also a dimension and a universal" (VI, 142).
19. Merleau-Ponty's "pathic" flesh is clearly distinguished from Deleuze's "haptic" one in terms of this topology of absence. If we recall Merleau-Ponty's pathic topology of "the outside of its inside and the inside of its outside" (VI, 144), we can contrast this directly with Deleuze's haptic topology of a plane of composition which "is not internal to the self, but neither does it come from an external self or a non-self. Rather it is like the absolute Outside that knows no Selves because interior and exterior are equally a part of the immanent in which they have fused" (ATP, 156/194).
20. This is inevitable, Deleuze writes, for "A consciousness is nothing without a synthesis of unification, but there is no synthesis of unification without the form of the I, or the point of view of the Self" (LS, 102/124).
21. "The question of whether flesh is adequate to art," Deleuze and Guattari write, "can be put in this way: can it support percept and affect, can it constitute the being of sensation, or must it not itself be supported and pass into other powers of life?" (WP, 178/169).
22. Interestingly, Cézanne is more of a stopping place for Deleuze's recapitulation of Bacon, than for Bacon himself. As Bacon said of Cézanne: "I'm not

sure what place he has in the history of painting. I can see that he has been important, but I must admit I'm not madly enthusiastic about him, as many people are." Michael Archimbaus, *Francis Bacon. In Conversation with Michael Archimbaud*, p. 42.

23. Éric Alliez, "Some Remarks on Color in Contemporary Philosophy," unpaginated unpublished paper, given at the conference *Chroma Drama. Widerstand der Farbe*. the Akademie der bildenden Künste Wien, 2000. Alliez develops this idea here in some detail, writing, "Deleuze reverses the order in perceptions supposed in Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology of art and instead of the painter following the birth of the thing in its actualisation—a move from the virtual to the actual—has the painter dissolve the thing and move from the actual to the virtual. To the consistent material virtual discovered by the old Cézanne; to the matter and movement of paint as expressions of colors-constructions."
24. This independent light illuminating things obviously recalls our discussion of phenomenology. The separation of light from color introduces an optical space and implies a discrete eye to see it. We can understand Cézanne's relation to the Impressionists in this way, for although the Impressionists succeeded in dissolving form, this dissolution was achieved in light, Deleuze and Guattari argue, and depended on an "optical mixture of colors" in an autonomous eye (WP, 165/155). Cézanne said "Monet is but an eye," and this is no doubt a very Deleuzian criticism. Indeed, Deleuze expands on Cézanne's "lesson against the impressionists," writing that a sensation is not achieved through "the 'free' or disembodied play of light and color (impressions)." Rather, sensation emerges in the construction of colored planes, solid bodies of color that do not melt into the air. "Color," Deleuze writes, "is in the body, sensation is in the body, and not in the air" (FB, 35/40). The Impressionists then, not Cézanne, were the real painters of phenomenology.
25. For Goethe: "Two pure original principles in contrast are the foundation of the whole." *Theory of Colours*, 707. Goethe offers a whole range of terms to describe the differential relations of yellow and blue (*Theory of Colours*, 696) many of which describe the relations of forces—Repulsion/Attraction, Action/Negation. Deleuze generally sticks to hot and cold. See also Deleuze's discussion of the painter Gérard Fromanger in these terms, in "Cold and Heat," *Photogenic Painting, Gerhard Fromanger*.
26. Deleuze gives the example of the color "green: yellow and blue can surely be perceived but if their perception vanishes by dint of progressive diminution, they enter into a differential relation (db/dy) that determines green. And nothing impedes either yellow or blue, each on its own account, from being already determined by the differential relation of two colors that we cannot detect" (TF, 88/117).
27. Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, *Theory of Colours*, 805.

28. The forces of the earth (forces of folding, thermal and magnetic forces, forces of germination) emerge in Cézanne's paintings according to an abstract geometry. This abstract geometry, common to the mountains and to Cézanne's paintings, is what Deleuze and Guattari call "traits of content," with colors being their "traits of expression" (ATP, 141/176). The forces of the earth emerge in inseparable traits of content and expression, in Cézanne's paintings as in Nature, they form sensations (particle-signs).
29. Sensation, Deleuze says, is "irreducibly synthetic," because it is its nature "to envelop a constitutive difference of level" (FB, 37/41–2). Vision, in other words, is the differential calculus of Nature and gives an analogical expression of the becoming of its forces.
30. Here we are not far from Spinoza's formula for beatitude, a percept in which I think or experience God/Nature as God/Nature thinks itself.
31. Quoted in Éric Alliez, "Hallucinating Cézanne," p.185, in *Hyperplastik, Kunst und Konzepte der Wahrnehmung in Zeiten der mental imagery*.
32. Where Bacon remains Cézannean, Deleuze writes, "is in the extreme elaboration of painting as analogical language" (FB, 120/113).
33. "In Van Gogh, Gauguin, or today, Bacon," Deleuze and Guattari write, "we see the immediate tension between flesh and the area of plain, uniform color surging forth, between the flows of broken tones [*tons rompus*] and the infinite band of a pure, homogeneous, vivid and saturated colour" (WP, 181/171). More specifically, "Van Gogh and Gauguin, sprinkle the area of plain, uniform color with little bunches of flowers so as to turn it into wallpaper on which the face stands out in broken tones" (WP, 182/173). This is a device Gauguin frequently employs (*Sleeping Child*, 1884, Josefowitz collection, *Self portrait: "Les Miserables,"* 1888, Vincent van Gogh Foundation, Amsterdam, *La Belle Angele*, 1889. Musée d'Orsay, Paris). In Van Gogh the "wallpaper" tends not so much to the floral as to a swirling pattern (*Self-portrait*, 1889, Musée d'Orsay, Paris). Bacon also took other things from Gauguin and Van Gogh. The broken tones of Bacon's figures are much closer to Van Gogh's "malerisch" technique, while the flat colored grounds and the use of an armature to frame the figures is closer to Gauguin. In this latter respect Deleuze argues that Bacon shares a "cloissonism" with Gauguin which, for both, "recovers a function that is derived from the halos of premodern painting" (FB, 152/142). There is also a danger Bacon's "malerisch" period shares with the early Gauguin, that of a "blending" in the broken tones darkening the painting (FB, 143/134).
34. There are, for example, only "obvious" differences between Bacon and Cézanne, Cézanne paints landscapes and still-life's, Bacon does not, Cézanne paints Nature, Bacon interiors. But these differences are united, Deleuze argues, in their shared project, to "*paint the sensation*" (FB, 35/40).
35. This would be the only point at which my account of Deleuze's reading of Bacon differs from the otherwise immaculate description Ronald Bogue

gives in *Deleuze on Music, Painting, and the Arts*. "Sensation," Bogue argues, "registers directly on the nerves without passing through the brain" (p. 158). As we shall see this is perhaps simply a "quarrel over words."

36. Quoted in Éric Alliez, "Hallucinating Cézanne," p. 144. I have also taken the concept of the eye-brain which follows from Éric Alliez, who developed it in his seminar *On the Eye-Brain of Modernity*, at the Akademie der bildenden Künste Wien, 1999–2003. See Éric Alliez and Jean-Clet Martin, *L'Oeil-cerveau. De la peinture moderne*, Paris: Seuil, 2005.
37. "According to phenomenology," Deleuze and Guattari write, "thought depends on mans relations with the world—with which the brain is necessarily in agreement because it is drawn from these relations, as excitations are drawn from the world and reactions from man, including their uncertainties and failures. "Man thinks, not the brain"; but this ascent of phenomenology beyond the brain towards a Being in the world, through a double criticism of mechanism and dynamism, hardly gets us out of the sphere of opinions. It leads us only to an *Urdoxa* posited as an original opinion, or meaning of meanings" (WP, 209–10/197).
38. For Deleuze's account of the *spatium* as the intensive differenciation of spatio-temporal dynamisms particular to the Body without Organs, see DR, 251/323.
39. John Milton, *Paradise Lost*, book 1, line 124, in *The Complete English Poems*, p. 161, edited by G. Campbell, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1992.
40. Antonin Artaud, "To Have Done with the Judgement of God," *Selected Writings*, p. 571.
41. Antonin Artaud, "To Have Done with the Judgement of God," *Selected Writings*, p. 565.
42. The first quotation is Antonin Artaud, "Situation of the Flesh," *Selected Writings*, p. 111. The second is an unreferenced quotation of Artaud by Deleuze (C2, 165/215).
43. Antonin Artaud, "Situation of the Flesh," *Selected Writings*, p. 111.
44. Deleuze argues: "[Artaud] says that the cinema is a matter of neuro-physiological vibrations, and that the image must produce a shock, a nerve-wave which gives rise to thought, "for thought is a matron who has not always existed." Thought has no other reason to function than its own birth, secret and profound" (C2, 165/215).
45. Antonin Artaud, "Situation of the Flesh," *Selected Writings*, p. 110.
46. Antonin Artaud, final letter to Paule Thevenin, February 24 1948, *Selected Writings*, p. 585.
47. This is the theatre of what Deleuze calls dramatisation. A theatre both Artaud's and Bacon's, in which "It is intensity which is immediately expressed in the basic spatio-temporal dynamisms and which determines the 'indistinct' differential relation in a distinct quality and a distinguished extensity" (DR, 245/316). Deleuze calls this process "individuation," and in relation to Bacon we could say it is the act of painting. "Individuation," he writes, "is the act by which intensity determines differential relations to become actualised, along the lines of differenciation and within the qualities and extensities it creates" (DR, 246/317).
48. Deleuze and Guattari discuss the "rhythmic character" in ATP, 318/391. Deleuze's discussion of the three different rhythms comes from the composer Olivier Messiaen.
49. It often appears as such, for example, in *Anti-Oedipus* Deleuze and Guattari write: "It must not be thought that the intensities themselves are in opposition to one another, arriving at a state of balance around a neutral state. On the contrary, they are all positive in relation to the zero intensity that designates the full body without organs. And they undergo relative rises or falls depending on the complex relationship between them and the variations in the relative strength of attraction and repulsion as determining factors" (AO, 19/25). Further down the page they mention Kant's theory of intensive quantity. Deleuze also discusses Kant's theory of intensity in DR, 231/298. The references in ATP have already been given.

NOTES TO THE CONCLUSION

1. Thomas Pynchon, *Vineland*, p. 266–7, London: Minerva, 1990.
2. Gilles Deleuze, *Negotiations 1972–1990*, p. 145.
3. Gilles Deleuze, "Immanence: A Life," *Pure Immanence: Essays on A Life*, p. 27.
4. Félix Guattari, "Institutional Schizo-Analysis," *Soft Subversions*, p. 276.

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