The Deleuze Reader

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Edited
with an Introduction by
Constantin V. Boundas

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The editor of this volume wishes to dedicate it to Linda Carol Conway.

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Editor's Introduction

Constantin V. Boundas

Gilles Deleuze will be remembered as a philosopher, that is, as a creator of concepts. This has been his way of imposing a bit of order upon the menacing chaos. But he will also be remembered as a "stutterer," as someone who stutters as he speaks and writes, in his effort to make speech and, even more important, language, begin to stutter. Finally, he will be remembered as the thinker of "the outside." His moving references to those he reads and loves can easily be returned and attributed to him: "a little fresh air," "a gust of air," "a thinker of an outside." *Philosopher, stutterer, thinker of an outside.* How do these link?

Closed upon itself, and holding the lid down on its own discipline, philosophy has often mistaken vacuity and ineptness for wisdom and rigor and the foul odors of inbreeding for signs of intellectual and moral integrity. To open the lid, so that a gust of fresh air may come in from the outside, is not to waste time deciphering the signs of an upcoming end of philosophy. Although the problems of philosophy are problems of the outside, the outside is not a space for the preserve of disciplines *different from* philosophy; it is the space where philosophy begins to differ *in itself.*

In laboratories of research adjacent to the philosopher's, the scientist, the painter, the cinematographer experiment with their own materials.

Sometimes the porousness of the vessels' walls permits us to see that we have all been working with the same problems. But more often, an outside, which is the outside of all these laboratories and all these vessels, asserts itself and allows an unstable resonant "communication," which does not wipe out the differences or the discordance of the "regional" concerns. I will come back to this "absolute" outside later and stress again the role it plays in Deleuze's work. But a provisional characterization of it may already be possible. Deleuze does not mean to say that problems and issues outside the philosopher's laboratory are what cause the philosopher or her philosophy to develop as she or it does. Philosophy does not reflect or represent an outside that is merely relative to it. Rather, the philosopher creates concepts—nobody else can create concepts in her stead. But to create a powerful concept is to trace and to follow the line that makes the various regions communicate at the same time that these regions diverge and retain their differences. To trace such a line, say, between philosophy and music, is not to orchestrate a philosophical theme or to talk with philosophical expertise about the form and the content of a piece of music. It is to find a third term, in between the two, which would facilitate the "becoming-music" of philosophy and the "becoming-philosophy" of music.

It is this "becoming-x" that offers a possibility of explaining Deleuze's predilection for the stuttering philosopher. The concepts that Deleuze creates are the result of three interrelated imperatives that motivate and inform his philosophical experimentations with difference, repetition, and productive desire: to reverse Platonism without trading one structure of domination for another; to dismantle foundationalism without permitting the consensus of our Northwestern ethnicity to become the new foundation; and to deconstruct affirmatively, not for the sake of the Other-in-general, but rather for the sake of the "minoritarian" Other. But a moment's reflection shows that any creator of concepts who experiments with such operational rules in mind will be placing herself in a vulnerable position: her own concepts, along with the narratives within which they are embedded, will be problematic, both in the sense of problem-raising and in the sense of being essentially contestable and controversial. And problems and opposition will multiply because of the resistance of those who already occupy the regions and the territories that the philosopher-experimenter wishes to transform. It may be true that a powerful concept can be created only as regions begin to vibrate and to resonate together. It may also be true that vibrating and resonating occur along "nomadic" itineraries which cause those who travel to "become-other" than themselves. But sedentarism, being the law of the regions, along with its rules of identity, resemblance,

and analogy, create a formidable "majority," armed with the kind of moral uprightness which is ready to pounce at, and crush, the stutterer who dares them. Becoming or transformation here is possible only when the stuttering of the philosopher "hooks up" with the stuttering of the "majority" and begins to dissolve stubborn resistances and to clear up existing blockages (after all, every "majority" has a stuttering impediment of its own).

Philosopher, stutterer, thinker of an outside—but never marginal or parasitic. His philosophical apprenticeship and, later on, his career as a "public professor" have been in accordance with France's best and time-honored ways: *La Sorbonne, Professeur de Lycée, Professeur de l'Université en Provence,* researcher at the *Centre national des recherches scientifiques, Professeur de l'Université de Paris VIII,* first at Vincennes and, later on, at Saint Denis. But this rather orthodox French academic career—this molar, segmented line, as he would call it—never managed to conceal a certain taste for the outside, a desire for nomadic displacements, an openness to encounters which could cause the molar line to deviate and the rhizome to grow by the middle, or a kind of humor with which to displace the philosopher's old irony.

François Châtelet, for example, has retained, from his student days at Sorbonne, the memory of an oral presentation that Deleuze made on Malebranche's theory in a seminar led by a scholarly and meticulous historian of philosophy. Châtelet recalls how the erudite professor first paled, then got hold of himself, and finally expressed his respect and admiration as he sat listening to Deleuze's argument, backed by impeccable textual references and premised squarely on . . . the "principle of the irreducibility of Adam's rib."[1] As for Deleuze's own references to the postwar period in France, which coincides with his student days, they show the same early preference for the outside. He tells us how the new scholasticism that descended upon the Sorbonne after the liberation was made somewhat bearable thanks to the presence of Sartre. "Sartre was our Outside," he writes in his *Dialogues* with Claire Parnet. "He was really the breath of fresh air from the backyard. . . . Among all the Sorbonne's probabilities, it was his unique combination which gave us the strength to tolerate the new restoration of order."[2] In 1964 Deleuze will praise Sartre, private thinker and never public professor, for having introduced philosophy to new themes, for choosing a new style and for preferring a new, polemic and aggressive way of raising problems. In a way that speaks as much about himself as he does about Sartre, Deleuze goes on to remind us that, like every other private thinker, Sartre demonstrated how much thought needs a world with a grain of disorder in it, a bit of agitation and a dash of solitude. Stressing, with admiration, Sartre's opposition to all modes of representation and his love for speaking

in his own name, Deleuze, in 1964, hailed Sartre as his own teacher—a teacher of the outside.[3]

Historico-Philosophical Stutterings

Deleuze's love for the outside is also evident in his historico-philosophical work. Nobody can accuse him of not having labored hard and long in the fields of the history of philosophy before he came to write books in his own name. ("How can you think without having read Plato, Descartes, Kant and Heidegger, and so-and-so's book about them?" Deleuze mused with irony in *Dialogues.*)[4] His impressive monographs on Hume, Nietzsche, Bergson, Kant, Spinoza, and Leibniz, his discussions of Plato, the Stoics, and the Epicureans, betray his partiality for those fellow stutterers "who seemed to be part of the history of philosophy, but who escaped from it in one respect, or altogether."[5] His way of reading them is not a search for hidden signifieds. Rather, Deleuze tries to get hold of their texts "by the middle," refusing to follow them step after step according to the order of their argumentation or according to "the order of reasons." He forces arguments and reasons, he precipitates them toward their vanishing point, he accelerates and decelerates them the way that we accelerate or decelerate a liquid in an experimental vessel, until he gets hold of the machine that generates the problems and the questions—the stuttering—of the thinker.

Deleuze's thought cannot be contained within the problematics of the now fashionable textual allegory. The main thrust of his theoretical intervention is in the articulation of a theory of transformation and change or, as he likes to say, of a theory of *pure becoming* which, together with a language adequate to it, would be sufficiently strong to resist all identitarian pressures. It is this relentless effort to articulate a theory of transformation and change (and not the obsession with the diacritic nature of the linguistic sign) that motivates Deleuze to replace Being with difference, and linear time with a difference-making repetition.

It is precisely for the sake of a theory of transformation that Deleuze will reflect, throughout his work, on the nature of the event (see this volume, part II, essays 2 and 3), the structure of multiplicity (part II, essay 4), the requirements of individuation (part II, essay 5), the lure of the other (part II, essay 6), the ethics of the event (part II, essays 7 and 8), and the enabling and selecting force of repetition in the eternal return (part II, essays 9 and 10). To his theory of transformation, he will subordinate the results of his investigation of the agonistic relations between major and minor languages (part IV) and, later on, his elucidation of mobile nomadic differ-

ences, situated halfway between migrant and sedentary political strategies (part V).

Hume

Hume gives Deleuze a method, the method of *transcendental empiricism,* which allows him to dissolve the organic compounds of idealism and to reach for the anorganic subsoil of the atomic and the distinct. *Empiricism and Subjectivity: An Essay on Hume's Theory of Human Nature,* is among Deleuze's earlier writings.[6] True to his own reading "by the middle," Deleuze refuses to define empiricism on the basis of the postulate that the validity of ideas depends strictly on corresponding impressions of sensation or reflection. He rather believes that the principle of empiricism rests with Hume's doctrine of the externality of all relations: relations are always external to the terms they relate (even in the case of analytic relations). The principle of empiricism, therefore—Deleuze will argue—is a principle of differentiation and of difference: ideas are different because they are external to, and separable from one another; and they are separable, that is, external to one another, because they are different. It is easy to understand, therefore, why the question "how to relate or associate entities which are different" finds in Hume, and in Deleuze, an urgency that it never had before. Hume's associationism leads Deleuze, in the final analysis, to a theory of inclusive disjunctions and a theory of paratactic discourse, that is, to the triumph of the conjunction AND (*et*) over the predicative IS (*est*).

Spinoza

Deleuze wrote two books on Spinoza: *Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza*[7] and *Spinoza: Practical Philosophy.*[8] In them, he expressed his admiration for Spinoza's way of addressing the old problem of the One and the many. It was the Platonic paradigm that bequeathed us the problem embedded in the metaphor of participation, and that, in its effort to preserve the identity of the One, hardened the ontological difference between Being and becoming. Later on, the neoPlatonic shift of metaphors, from participation to emanation and gift, did little to decrease the cost of the moral and political choice involved. In either paradigm, a vertical axis of power relations was instituted, and whether the Despot was the self-identical Form or the One beyond Being and knowledge, the suitors had to rally around the center or face excommunication from the Republic of man or from the City of God.

But as Deleuze reads Spinoza, all this changes. To read Spinoza "by the middle" is to make the notion of expression the "vanishing point" of his

text. The One (which here is not a number) has the coherence of an open-ended differentiated whole, and expresses its essence by means of an infinity of attributes. Or again, the One expresses itself by means of an infinity of attributes in modes. The essence and the modes are the "explications" or "unfoldings" of all that which is "implicated" or enveloped inside the One. Deleuze suggests that we must learn to admire in this *implicatio/explicatio* the total absence of hierarchical powers and the freedom from vertical axes of descending grace. Being is univocal, equal to itself, and offers itself equally to all beings.

There is more, of course, in Spinoza's "minor" philosophy that attracts Deleuze's attention: there are bodies and affects specified in terms of their active and reactive forces; there is desire linked up with joy; there is opposition to representationalism, critique of negation, deconstruction of analogy and identity; there is opposition to teleological deferral, an entire phenomenology of joyful modes of life, and a discipline aimed at preventing sadness, loss of energy, and *ressentiment;* but, above all, there is *isonomia* among beings and compossible yet diverging lines inside the One, universal Being.

Bergson

Bergson is Deleuze's ally in his displacement of phenomenology and of the privilege that phenomenology assigns to natural perception. In *Bergsonism*,[9] *Difference and Repetition*,[10] and *Cinema 1: the Movement-Image*,[11] Deleuze argues that to be serious about the notion of the "worlding of the world," the mind must strive to sense a world behind appearances, a world in perpetual motion and change, without anchorage, without assignable points of reference, and without solid bodies or rigid lines. For empiricism to become transcendental, and for Spinozism to overcome the last vestiges of the One, the mind must transcend the *sensible* in the direction of the *sentiendum* (= that which ought to be sensed), in search of lines of (f)light traveling without resistance, an eye situated inside things, and consciousness understood as epiphenomenal opacity. What Deleuze admires in Bergson is his resolve to speak about the "originary" world of intensive magnitudes and forces—or, more accurately, about this originary world being in the process of "explicating" itself in extended surfaces.

Nietzsche

Bergson's theory of intensive time carries profound implications for memory and repetition. Memory as repetition of the past inside the interval of the

present presupposes the irreducible *écart* (interval) between past and present and foregrounds the "originary delay" upon which Derrida already fastened the dissemination of the *gramma*. And yet Deleuze is not convinced. Bergson's memory/repetition, without the time of the eternal return, would tend to immobilize past and present and to disempower the intuition of the irreducible multiplicity that, nevertheless, animates Bergson's texts. Isn't Plato's recollection, after all, a sufficient warning against putting our trust in *mnemosyne* and letting it chase after the shadow of the One?

As a result, Deleuze shifts his attention to Nietzsche's eternal return, and asks it to carry the weight of the move from *Being and Time* to *Difference and Repetition* (see this volume, part II, essays 9, 10 and 11). But for this move to be convincing, Deleuze must distinguish between the repetition/recycling of the tradition and the repetition which makes the difference. He pursues the project in *Nietzsche and Philosophy*[12] and *Nietzsche*.[13] Traditional repetition works with identical entities forming the extension of the same concept, with only their numerical difference to separate them from one another. Deleuze calls this difference a difference extrinsic to the concept.

The repetition that "makes the difference" is intensive, whereas the recycling repetitions of the present and the past are extensive. The concept is the shadow of the Idea-problem, because a concept has extension, that is, a range of particulars that instantiate it. But an Idea, being a structure, is an intensive magnitude whose nature changes as the Idea is divided or subdivided. The Idea-problem circulates in repetition and differentiates itself in concepts-solutions. But, as Deleuze has argued, no concept is ever adequate to the Idea, recycling repetitions can never exhaust or represent the nature of the difference that is intrinsic to the Idea. It is the Idea, with no intuition adequate to it, that generates problems and offers provisional solutions; the latter crystallize for a while around concepts and their extensions, only to be overthrown again by new intensities and new problems.

The conclusion that Deleuze draws from these examples, and from his reflection on Nietzsche's eternal return, is that to repeat is to behave in a certain way, but always in relation to something unique, without likeness or equivalence. Repetition, in Nietzsche's sense, is exception, transgression, difference. Like Kant's aesthetic Idea, repetition is a singular intuition, without a concept adequate to it. It was Nietzsche's privilege and fate to get a glimpse at this unique, transgressive, and a-centered center; he named it "will to power."

The will to power, as Nietzsche understands it, is not an intentional pursuit of power by forces deprived of it, but rather the expression of the kind of power that the force itself is. "Will *of* power," in the sense that power itself wills, is the correct reading of the will to power. The traditional, intentional

reading makes power the object of a representation, a wanting to acquire that which a force lacks, and therefore something incompatible with Nietzsche's theory of forces. According to Deleuze, it is a falsification of Nietzsche's views on the subject to expect values to come to light as a result of the struggle for recognition or the power-grabbing that such a representationalist reading of the will to power would necessitate.[14]

The Stoics

The articulation of a theory of pure becoming presupposes the overthrow of Platonism and the repudiation of the ethical choice that such difference supports. But a theory of pure becoming and transformation can only be a theory of paradoxes and of series-formation. "It is at the same moment that one becomes larger than one was and smaller than one becomes."[15] Predicative logic is not equipped to handle pure becoming. Deleuze needs a logic of the event, a sense-generating logic, and he sets out in earnest to give himself one in *The Logic of Sense.*

In this work, Deleuze discusses the Stoics extensively. With the Stoics, as Deleuze reads them, the overthrow of Platonism is undertaken seriously: philosophy thinks the event and gives itself the right tools for the discussion of change, transformation, and becoming. Since Zeno of Elea, philosophy had known that becoming cannot be thought of as a mere juxtaposition of immobile slices of extension and time. It was the Stoics, Deleuze argues, who made the first, correct move: to think of becoming is to think of the event (this volume, part II, essay 3).

Events are caused by bodies, but they are not states of affairs or Aristotelian accidents, which also affect substances or are caused by substances. Deleuze stresses the importance of the Stoic ontological difference traced between bodies, their qualities, mixtures, *and* "incorporeal events." Bodies and their mixtures are actual; they exist in the present, and they causally affect other bodies and bring about new mixtures. But bodies also cause events that are virtual and that, in turn, take toward bodies a kind of "quasi-causal efficacy." Events, as the Stoics and Deleuze understand them, elude the present: an event is never what is happening in the present, but always what has just happened or what is about to happen. It is best, Deleuze concludes, to denote them by means of infinitives: to green, to cut, to grow, to die. Without being subjective or objective, infinitives are determinate and specific and guarantee reversibility between future and past. And this is important for the designation of events, because the latter, by eluding the present, affirm simultaneously future and past, becoming thereby responsible for the passing of the present. Events, rather than denoting substances or

qualities, stand for forces, intensities, and actions. They do not preexist bodies; they rather inhere, insist, and subsist in them.

A central chapter in the Stoic overthrow of Platonism—a chapter that Deleuze discusses extensively in *The Logic of Sense*—is the *ethics of the event.*[16] No longer do the Stoics attempt to articulate an ethical system on the basis of imitation of, and participation in, an ideal model. The ethical question is how individuals can be worthy of what is happening to them. Deleuze's reading of the Stoics, in the context of Spinoza (part II, essay 7) and Nietzsche (part II, essay 10) makes it clear that the quietist overtones of this ethical question are, in fact, deceptive. The ethics of the event is not the ethics of the accident. No one is suggesting that to acquiesce, without demurring, to whatever happens is the right thing to do. Moreover, events do not happen to a subject; they are presubjective and preindividual. Events decenter subjects—they are never responsible for the formation of the subject. To the extent that events are still future and always past, the ethics of the event presupposes a will that seeks in the state of affairs the eternal truth of events. Real *amor fati* is not in the acceptance of the actual state of affairs but in the "counteractualization" of the actual, so that the virtual event that inheres in it may be, for the first time, thought and willed.

To be worthy of what is happening to us, Deleuze concludes, means to will what is always both different and the same in each moment of our lives, to raise the banal and mundane into the remarkable and singular, the wound into a wound that heals, war against war, death against death. This is what it takes to will repetition as the task of freedom.

Leibniz

From his reading of Leibniz (*Le Pli. Leibniz et le baroque*;[17] *Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza*) Deleuze forges a powerful concept—the fold—and uses it extensively and as a fulcrum to make the questions of Leibniz resonate, but also to define the baroque as a style and as a period and to elaborate the theory of power and subjectivity that he shares with the late Foucault.

Leibniz's world resembles a building with two floors: on the upper floor, windowless monads, distinct from one another and without interaction, express the world, each one of them from a singular point of view. On the lower floor, organic and inorganic matter becomes subject to forces of the world that govern, and account for, its movement. The two floors communicate through the world, which is virtual, albeit actualized, in the monads and realized in matter. The world is *the fold* that separates the floors as it links them together. The concept of the fold and the power of the virtual link up with each other in Leibniz, and make him diverge sharply from the expres-

sionism of Spinoza where everything is subjected to an uninterrupted causal "explication." As for the centrality that the concept *fold* acquires in Deleuze's thought, its constant recurrence in his works, under different names and masks, establishes it beyond any doubt: it is the "somber precursor" of *Difference and Repetition*,[18] the "esoteric word" of *The Logic of Sense*,[19] the "outside" of *Foucault*,[20] the "line of death" of the *Dialogues*[21] and *A Thousand Plateaus*.[22] It is the entity or agent that holds diverging series together and makes possible a theory of inclusive disjunctions: Deleuze is fond of calling it "the differentiator of the differends."

Leibniz, of course, is not Deleuze; he remains the uncompromising theorist of convergence—not of divergence. But a more labyrinthine world than his, with an infinity of floors, can still be imagined—a world of incompossible strata. Of course, Leibniz thinks of his world of converging series as the best possible. But the reason this world is the best possible is no longer its optimal participation in the ideal model of the Good. The "best possible" presupposes and witnesses the erosion of Platonism. The world is the best possible as a result of a divine selection and play.[23] But then one more daring step is still possible: God can be "replaced by Baphomet, the 'prince of all modifications,' and himself modification of all modifications. . . . Rather than signifying that a certain number of predicates are excluded from a thing in virtue of the identity of the corresponding concept, the disjunction now signifies that each thing is opened up to the infinity of predicates through which it passes, on the condition that it lose its identity as concept and as self."[24] And Deleuze does take this step.

Kant

In 1963 Deleuze published a book on Kant, *Kant's Critical Philosophy: The Doctrine of the Faculties*,[25] whose brevity and clarity have proven to be deceptive. Very few noticed this important "minor" deconstructive reading of Kant. And yet the most fruitful way to receive Deleuze's *Difference and Repetition* is in its aspiration to be the critique of the *Critique of Pure Reason*. (I often wondered whether *Capitalism and Schizophrenia* is most profitably read as the critique of the *Critique of Practical Reason*—a critique clearly motivated by the *aporias* of Kant's third critique.)

Kant's love for all-rounded architectonic structures is well known: his theory of rationality based on the consensual harmony of all mental faculties and his attempt to coordinate cognitive praxiological and ludic interests belong here. Deleuze decides to pry open these structures by dislodging the cornerstone: the presumed harmony and cooperation among mental faculties. He states, before Lyotard made this point popular among us, that

for this cooperation to become possible, imagination must be assigned the task of training sensibility, memory, and understanding. Therefore, the lifting of the barriers that Kant placed between cognitive, practical, and aesthetic interests is what Deleuze will advocate, along with the coordination of the *aisthesis* (= sensation) of the first Critique and the *aisthesis* (= artistic, aesthetic sense) of the third.

We are now in a better position to advance a global characterization of Deleuze's theory of difference and repetition, the best source for which is his 1968 book bearing this very title. The *idée mère* of this theory is that fusion and fission are the external limits of all functioning assemblages, natural or man-made.[26] Despite the difference in degrees of contraction or dilation, the final result of fusion and fission is the same: the apparent numerical difference between the one (fusion) and the many (fission) disappears, since time, qualitative difference, and change no longer exist in either state. Assemblages, however, that are still in operational order avoid these absolute external limits through the preventive mechanism of a controlled repetition: they repeat the very conditions the extremes of which would have brought about their entropic *stasis* and death. Contraction *and* dilation constitute therefore the inclusive, disjunctive law of all systems. This does not mean, Deleuze will argue, that contraction and dilation are opposite forces in the service of homeostatic systems. Nor is dilation (extension) the founding stratum of systems. The world of extended things, in extended space and time, is the result of the dilation of intensive quanta of energy, captured in the process of slowing down and becoming cooler. And this process is "always already" reversible through new irruptions of intensity.

Now, to say that transformation, change, and motion implicate at least two differential, intensive forces or magnitudes is no longer surprising or new. But what is not so obvious is Deleuze's definition of an intensive magnitude in terms of incommensurability, inequality, and indivisibility. For, although intensive forces seem to be divisible into parts, the parts obtained through division differ *in nature* from one another. In an important sense, therefore, intensive forces are indivisible, because, unlike extended magnitudes, no one of their parts preexists the division or retains the nature that it used to have before its division.[27]

Thus, Deleuze concludes, the sufficient reason for transformation and becoming is the interaction of differential intensities, incommensurable with respect to each other, indivisible in themselves, but not at all for these reasons, indeterminate. Intensive forces are perfectly determinable and determinate in relation to each other. Distance, inequality, and difference are positive characteristics of the intensive manifold. Negation has no pri-

macy. Only in the process of its deployment, difference tends to cancel itself out in extension, and distance, to transform itself into length. But the cancellation of difference in extension and length does not make it any less the *sentiendum* of sensibility: difference/intensity is that which constitutes the sensible.

Without understanding, however, sensibility is blind, and understanding without sensibility is empty. This cornerstone of the Kantian idealism is due for a radical revision in the texts of Deleuze. The revision will attempt to establish the primacy of the Idea over the concept, with the understanding that, if this move succeeds, the traditional image of a recognitive and representative understanding will have to surrender its constitutive function to the differentiating role of the *cogitandum*—to that which ought to be thought.

Desire and Its Politics

Poised against the totalizing ambitions of the modern and the ineffectual celebration/lament of the postmodern, Deleuze orchestrated an untimely project for desire. The two volumes of *Capitalism and Schizophrenia*[28] and his *Dialogues*[29] are the repositories of this project. Rather than being a generator of phantasms, desire, according to Deleuze, produces connections and arrangements that are real in their function and revolutionary in their sprawling multiplicity. A process without *telos*, intensity without intention, desire (like the Aristotelian pleasure) has its "specific perfection" within itself at each moment of its duration. Desire is *energeia*—not *kinesis*. The fault of the modern and the postmodern alike is to have overlooked the energetic model of Aristotle, Spinoza, and Nietzsche and to have appropriated instead the kinetic and mimetic model of Plato (see part III, essay 16).

An energetic, constructivist, productive, and revolutionary model of desire such as Deleuze's is inevitably on a collision course with the psychoanalytic version of the unconscious and its subjection to Oedipus (part III, essay 12). Indeed, the twin volumes of *Capitalism and Schizophrenia* deploy a critique of psychoanalysis that is no longer a mere revisionism, like Marcuse's, Ricoeur's, or Habermas's.[30] Oedipus is no longer the phantasm that haunts the child; he is the paranoid obsession that torments the adult. The child must not expect her becoming-adult from her forced participation in the order of the father; the adult must build her becoming-child with the blocks of childhood she carries along with her. Deleuze (and coauthor Félix Guattari) denounce the Freudian Oedipus for having captured and confined desire. But the *Anti-Oedipus*, the first volume of *Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, published in 1972, is not exactly placated by the Lacanian recasting

of the Freudian drama either; nor does it conceal its opposition to the ominous transformation of psychoanalysis that the *École Freudienne* brought about.[31] When the signifier is substituted for the signified, Deleuze and Guattari argue, psychoanalysis turns its back to any experimental scientific aspiration that it might have entertained and opts for the invincibility of axiomatic systems. As a result of this shift, it articulates a daunting official language and places it at the service of the established order.

Instead of the Oedipus-dominated psychoanalysis, Deleuze and Guattari have been advocating schizoanalytic theory and practice.[32] Schizoanalysis takes psychoanalysis to task for insulating the libido and its investments against the flights of masses and the marauding of packs. It suggests that all desiring investments are social and have necessary relations to concrete historical conjunctures (see part III, essay 13). The unconscious, for Deleuze and Guattari, is a social and political space to conquer—not a prodigious memory to nurture and protect.

As for death, Deleuze and Guattari argue, it is the limit of extreme, opposite investments of desire, but the fact is that schizoanalysis and psychoanalysis do not invoke the same death. One does not need the postulate of a death drive to account for catatonic states. The "black hole" of the paranoid fusion, being the outcome of the collapse of desiring arrangements, has nothing in common with the active schizoid desire of becoming-Other, which shatters the "sphere of ownness" and ushers in the death of the subject.[33] They have nothing in common except the "body without organs," the unextended, zero-intensity body of Deleuze and Guattari's schizoanalysis. Neither an organism nor a "lived body," the body without organs is a series without organs, with indeterminate organs, or with temporary, transitory organs. Being the site of anarchy (its political function), of a Nirvana-like release from excitements and irritations (its schizoanalytic function), and the surface for the inscription of inclusive disjunctions (its ontological function), it appropriates organs in order to function, makes use of them, but also repudiates and takes its revenge upon them whenever it has enough of their aggression. It is clear that "body without organs" is a portmanteau word, the sign of an originary disjunction, the "somber precursor" that gives rise to two distinct series, organic and anorganic, and brings them together in a resonant association—nonsense generating sense.[34]

Deleuze and Guattari's political theory and strategy loathe models—models for *the* revolution—and work instead with "localized" principles of intelligibility, allowing concrete social conjunctures to be assessed in terms of their molar and molecular tendencies.[35] Once again, the ritornello of their minor deconstruction coordinates the manifesto of their radical plu-

ralism: fusion and fission are the absolute external limits of society. Centralizing hyperorganizations and political atomism are the two poles that tend toward, without ever reaching, the state of political immobility. They are the exclusive disjunctions of the body politic marking the paranoid and clinically schizophrenic poles of the social investment of desire.

But the emphasis on local principles of intelligibility does not always prevent Deleuze and Guattari from advancing bold hypotheses. Take, for example, their nomadology and the way it centers on the *Urstaat* hypothesis: the State, they argue, is not the result of a long and laborious evolution. It comes about, ready-made and all of a sudden, as the prototype of all sedentary arrangements.[36] The State always already exists, but it exists only in relation to an *outside* and cannot be conceived apart from this relation. The outside of the State are nomads and their constant struggle to fend off the sedentarism that the State threatens to impose upon them. But once again, this outside is not a relation of externality. Sedentaries and nomads are simultaneously present within the State. The State, with its appropriative powers, incorporates lines of flight that were not made for it. Once captured, these "alien to the State lines" may mobilize forces of transformation and change that cannot be overlooked by any political analyst and strategist.

In the nomads' capacity for transformation and flight, Deleuze and Guattari situate their difference from Foucault: "for him," they say, "a social field is run through by strategies; for us it flees from all its edges."[37] Indeed, this difference may well be the basis for the guarded optimism that permeates the following passage: "The choice is not between the State and its other—the nomad—. . . . We should dream no more about the disappearance of the State; we should rather choose . . . between blocking becomings or endowing ourselves with a war machine and making ourselves nomad"[38] (see part V, essay 25). In the last analysis, Deleuze and Guattari's wager on the nomads is due to their conviction that the outside is ultimately an irrecuperable and inexhaustible source of neg-entropic energy and capture-resisting subjectivity.

This point was recently made by one subtle reader of Deleuze, Monique Scheepers. According to her, the correct reception of Deleuze's politics depends on our ability to coordinate skillfully his political theory with his theory of subjectivity. In fact, as Scheepers goes on to argue, subjectivity, for Deleuze, is essentially a political dimension, to the extent that it folds and unfolds in an ever-renewed contact with the "outside"; thanks to this contact, subjectivity is able to resist standardization and harnessing.[39] When the traditional subject of interiority is bracketed, subjectivity is not lost. On the contrary, it is then that it reveals itself for the first time as a process and

as a special operation on the outside. But what is this "outside," and what is this special operation that merits the name "subjectivity"? Moreover, what is the political significance of subjectivity linked to this "outside"?

The outside is not another site, but rather an out-of-site that erodes and dissolves all other sites. Its logic, therefore, is like the logic of difference, provided that the latter is understood in its transcendental and not in its empirical dimension: instead of difference between x and y, we must now conceive the difference of x from itself. Like the structure of supplementarity whose logic it follows, the outside is never exhausted; every attempt to capture it generates an excess or a supplement that in turn feeds anew the flows of deterritorialization, and releases new lines of flight. As P. Levoyer and P. Encrenaz have recently argued, the outside is Deleuze-Leibniz's virtual that is always more than the actual; it is the virtual that haunts the actual and, as it haunts it, makes it flow and change.[40] A Heideggerian "*es gibt*" bestows upon forces the role of the subject *and* the object of forming and unforming processes. This same "*es gibt*" permits Deleuze to endorse Foucault's claim about the primacy of resistances: "There will always be a relation to oneself which resists codes and powers; the relation to oneself is even one of the origins of their points of resistance."[41] To the extent that the subject, for Deleuze, is the result of the folding of the outside, that is, of the bending of forces and making them relate to one another, the subject is the individual who, through practice and discipline, has become the site of a bent force, that is, the folded inside of an outside. Foucault's position could not have been any closer.

This move seals the priority and inexhaustibility of resistances, but, as far as I can see, it paints resistances as resistances to form and as objections to stratification. A politics of transgression can certainly find its place and justification here, but a differentiation between smart, progressive resistances and mere conservative, resentful, or even fascist oppositions cannot. Must we then conclude that the theoretical usefulness of the coordination between Deleuze's theory of subjectivity and his politics has run its course? I do not think so. The question is this: Once the Kantian categorical imperative is no longer available, how can the compossibility of diverging wills chart a passage between the politics of fusion and the politics of fission? Such questions invite us to take a more serious look at Deleuze's studies of Hume, Spinoza, and Nietzsche (this volume, part V, essay 28) and at the discussions of subjectivity and its politics found in them: *Hume*—subjectivity and politics as an artifice, that is, as the result and the agent of experimentation; *Spinoza*—subjectivity and politics as the artifice of desire that dissipates sad passions and restores the healing power of joyous affects; *Nietzsche*—subjectivity and politics as the bent and folded forces of the out-

side that create an inside already always deeper than any other kind of interiority.[42]

Minor Languages and Nomad Arts

Derrida's theory of the deconstructive efficacy of language and the practice that this theory entails are by now fairly well-known moves in our fin de siècle manic depression. But, on the other hand, Deleuze and Guattari's "minor deconstructive" approaches to language are more timidly invoked in the context of our local discussions, and the timidity begins to lose its initial innocence. The truth of the matter is that Deleuze (and Guattari) have written extensively on the subject: *Capitalism and Schizophrenia,*[43] *Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature,*[44] and *Superpositions,*[45] are the main sources.

Minor deconstruction does not propose to determine majorities and minorities statistically. On the contrary, the dominant linguistic model that postulates that the intelligibility of minor languages depends on the epistemic priority of standard languages is in collusion with the political model for a homogeneous, centralized, and dominant language of power (see part IV, essays 17 and 18). Minor languages have their own internal homogeneity and consistency. In fact, as minor languages strive for recognition, they tend to become locally major. On the other hand, the more major a language becomes, the more it is evident that its innermost lines of flight transform it from within and deterritorialize it toward a minor position. It follows that "major" and "minor" languages or literatures enter into complex disjunctive syntheses that disallow the simplistic oppositional distribution of them into "high" and "low." It is preferable, therefore, to read "major" and "minor" as the qualifiers of two different tendencies or functions of every language. Major is the tendency toward standardization and fixed identity by means of homogenization, overcoding, and centralization: the *langue/parole* distinction, the pragmatic presuppositions of the dominant theory of the speech acts, the differentiation between ideal speech situation and distorted communication, the pre-predicative founding stratum of operating intentionality, are some of the many different strategies for the production of such an identity. "Minor," on the other hand, is not the mark of the quantitative or qualitative marginality of a dialect, but rather the index of transformative forces inherent in language and literature (semiotic, semantic, stylistic, pragmatic, etc.), and especially of the transformative forces that facilitate "transversal" alliances of equivalence. "Major" and "minor," in this sense, qualify different experiences of language, distribute in different ways the space of politics, and give rise to different linguistic theories. In the last analysis, it may be argued that they are anchored in different experiences of the body.

With Derridean deconstruction, minor deconstruction shares the initial premise that language is *anarchic*, provided, of course, that "anarchic" is heard in a very special way: it is not from the "lived" or the "sensed" that one reaches the "said," but rather one "said" always engenders another. Deconstructive minorities, in holding language to be "anarchic," intend indeed to denounce all attempts to fasten language onto referents whose identity is guaranteed by "good" and "common" sense, reliable hard science, required competences, or entrenched conventions. But at the same time they are uneasy with the defensive Derridean strategies that reproduce in the space of language the Freudian dream of an interminable analysis. If emancipation from the reproductive proliferation of the dominant signifier is to become possible, if deconstruction is to intervene, not for the sake of the Other-in-general, but rather for the sake of the Other for whom *la prise de la parole* is an urgent task, then the circulation of the signifier—whether atheist, parodic, performative or whether devout, somber, and assertive—must be circumscribed by a purposiveness without purpose, even if one is convinced that the final hour of the Other and of the pure emancipatory utterance will never come. Against, therefore, defensive strategies aimed at preventing the conservative foreclosure of language through anaphoric identities and against the endless relay of signifiers through metaphoric differences, Deleuze and Guattari opt for the stuttering intervention of the minoritarian.

Order-words and passwords, for Deleuze and Guattari, are the contractions and dilations of language.[46] Order-words and passwords, without being coextensive with imperatives or commands, are the staging orders of discourse, without which no utterance can function. Radicalizing the work of Austin, Searle, and Apel, Deleuze and Guattari show that order-words and passwords are regulatory and verdictive. They are the implicit presuppositions of discursive practices, distinct from presuppositions that become explicit when utterances are interpreted by other utterances, and also distinct from actions that are extrinsic to them. Without these regulatory presuppositions, the articulation of the semiotic, semantic, pragmatic, and procedural features of language-games would not account for "pragmatic contradictions" or for the materiality of language. Deleuze insists that order-words and passwords depend upon concrete political spaces. To argue, therefore, as is often done, that politics is external to language is to turn a blind eye to the way language functions. Not only vocabulary but also syntax and semantics are transformed as order-words change and shift.

Deleuze and Guattari know of course that order-words and passwords do not have the same function. Order-words attempt to fuse language and to eliminate the space or the interval between types in order to bring the flight of signifiers to an abrupt halt. Consequently, they are techno-political de-

vices that bring about conjunctive syntheses, exclusive disjunctions, hypotactic formations, and molar or subjugated groups. But at the other end of the linguistic continuum, the password "names the flight" and "speaks the things." The password functions as it breaks the blocks of identity, as it creates intervals, and as it makes language move (see part IV, essay 25). Its performativeness is reminiscent of the "estrangement-effect" that Russian formalists used to talk about.[47]

Order-words and passwords alike annex Being, and the annexation of Being is, in the Kantian project, the trace of politico-libidinal desires. But they do not annex Being in the same way. Order-words annex Being through identity-formation and subjection. Passwords annex Being through the repetition of differences. The fact is, though, that language is simultaneously crisscrossed by order-words and passwords without this fact disabling the evaluation of semiotic systems according to the preponderance of either order-words or passwords in them.

In *A Thousand Plateaus,* Deleuze and Guattari gave us a lengthy characterization of "nomad" (as opposed to "royal") sciences, and I find in this characterization a helpful access to the problematic of "nomad" arts as well.[48] Nomad arts mobilize material and forces instead of matter and form. Royal arts, being law oriented, strive to establish constants and, by means of an unchanging form, to discipline and control a supposedly reticent and unruly matter. Nomad arts, on the contrary, strive to put variables in a state of constant variation. The model for royal arts is hylomorphic, imposing form on secondary matter, that is, on matter that is already prepared to accept form. But in the case of nomad arts, matter is never prepared in advance, nor is it homogenized. It is rather "a vehicle of singularities which constitutes the form of the content. As for the expression, instead of being formal, it is inseparable from the pertinent characteristics, which constitute the matter of the expression."

In *Difference and Repetition,* Deleuze argued that the Idea-problem (or the *cogitandum*), in order to be grasped, requires a chain reaction of levels of intensity that must begin with sensible encounters.[49] Only the violence of the *sentiendum* would stand a chance of bringing about the resonance and the compossibility of all Ideas-problems. In 1981 Deleuze decided to face this violence seriously, choosing this time as his laboratory the paintings of the Irish artist Francis Bacon[50] (see part IV, essays 22 and 23). Struck by the powerful tensions that run through these paintings (tensions between figuration and defiguration; between disequilibrating, convulsive forces and an emerging balance; between motion and rest; contraction and expansion; destruction and creation) Deleuze concluded that their function is "to pro-

duce resemblances with non-resembling means." The violence of sensation tormenting Bacon's canvases trades off representation for the exploration of a world never before seen, yet strangely familiar and near. In his effort to escape the figurative and representative modes of narration and illustration and also the abstractness of pure form, Bacon aims at the liberation of the figure through iconic isolation. Through iconic isolation, that is, the neutralization of the background and the enclosure of figures in well-defined spaces, it prevents the figure from telling a story or from representing forms external to the canvas. Deleuze, faithful to his principle of transcendental empiricism, applauds the techniques of iconic isolation that turn figures into "matters of fact" and prevent their becoming situated inside a network of intelligible relations. Iconic isolation is the best training possible for those who look for an alternative to the phenomenology of natural perception in order to raise sensibility to its suprasensible destiny. It is also the best training possible for all those who, in Klee's happy phrase, want "not to render the visible, but to render visible."[51]

Instead of many sensations of different orders, Deleuze credits Bacon's painting with the ability to display different orders of one and the same sensation. Sensation, in his painting, is what happens between orders and levels. Indeed, Deleuze finds it more appropriate to talk of sensation and not of sensations, because sensations are extensive and contiguous, whereas sensation is intensive. Sensation is the figure, understood as the difference *of* the canvas.

None of this would be possible if sensation were to be thought of as a mere representation of the interaction of an eye and an object. But sensation is not the response to a form any more than Bacon's painting is a form-giving gesture. Sensation, contends Deleuze, is intimately related, not to forms but to forces, just as Bacon's painting aims at the capturing of force. And since a force must exert itself on a body for sensation to exist, force is the necessary condition of sensation, provided of course that sensation is not supposed to represent the force. It is "form . . . that subjugates force to a function, turns it against itself and transforms it into an energy of reproduction and conservation of forms."[52] Sensation, like force, brings things together in the very process of separating them. Now we understand what allows Deleuze to think of sensation in terms of different orders and levels: it is the fact that forces are intensities and therefore qualified as either high or low. Intensity permits us to talk about the multiplicity of sensation without having to appeal to many sensations. "Sensation," says Deleuze following Cézanne, "has one face turned toward the subject . . . and another, turned toward the object ('the fact,' the place, the event). Or rather, it does not have faces at all, it is both things at once; it is the being-in-the-world of the phe-

nomenologists: *I become* in sensation, and at the same time *something happens* because of it. In the last analysis, the same body gives it and receives it, and this body is both object and subject."[53]

Painting, to be sure, is not the only fine art. Deleuze and Guattari find in music additional confirmation for their nomadic choice (see part IV, 24). Indeed, *A Thousand Plateaus* devotes some very intriguing pages to music and to the place that music has within the cosmos:[54] an entire chapter on "rhizomusicosmology"[55] defends a nontraditional approach to music, connecting it with molecular becomings, studying it for the sake of its "ametrical rhythms of the incommensurable and the unequal," and gleaning from it a method of experimentation with "the floating time of haecceities."

It is not the expression or the content of a work of art that capture the attention of Deleuze and Guattari. It is the form of the expression and the form of the content,[56] the parallelism established between the two, and their resonant association. A brief look at Deleuze's impressive work on cinema—*Cinema 1: The Movement-Image* and *Cinema 2: The Time-Image*[57]—makes this very clear. In these two volumes, Deleuze invites Bergson, the philosopher, to the movies in order to show him that his dismissal of the "cinematographic illusion," that is, of the reconstitution of movement on the basis of immobile slices or cuts, was in fact all too hasty. Cinema today, argues Deleuze, successfully meets Bergson's challenge, because the age of the camera verifies the system of universal variation that Bergson tried to articulate. Moreover, the eye of the camera transcends human perception toward another perception, which is the genetic element of every possible perception.

As they sample a wide variety of films—from silent to experimental—Deleuze and Bergson stop to savor the new image of thought that the filmmaker, experimenting with her new material, has also begun to articulate: the need for a nonhuman eye, an eye between and inside things, that only montage can satisfy in its quest for the "originary" world; the organic arrangement of movement-images of the American cinema, with D. W. Griffith setting the parts in binary oppositions and, through alternating or parallel montage, making the image of one part succeed the image of another according to a certain rhythm; the oppositional montage of the Russian Eisenstein under the dialectical law of the one divided into two in order to form a higher unity; the mathematical sublime of the classic French cinema, interested primarily in the quantity of movement and in the metric relations that would allow its determination; the dynamic sublime of German expressionism, which substitutes light for movement and ushers in intensity as the tremendous force that annihilates organic being, strikes it

with terror, but also gives birth to a thinking faculty that makes us feel superior to the forces that annihilate us. The cinema is replete with movement-images, representing mobile "slices" of duration, with time-images, change-images, relation-images, action-images, and affect-images. There is framing and deframing (see part 4, essay 20), intervals operating with the force of intensive time (part 4, essay 21), spatial singularities and, above all, the Whole that is the Open—not the frame of all frames, but the unseen and the unrepresented that links frames together at the same time that it separates and differentiates them.

One word now about this *Reader:* it is the child of a frustration and the response to a challenge. Judging by recent publications and conferences, our Anglo-American discussions on "poststructuralism," "postmodernism," and "deconstruction" seem to be running out of steam. But the curious thing is that epitaphs and eulogies alike tend to bypass Gilles Deleuze, one of the most fertile minds of the last forty years. The name is mentioned—often with admiration—but Deleuze's texts are seldom used. This embarrassing silence is the source of the frustration from which this *Reader* was born.

Perhaps the silence is overdetermined. In the 1970s and 1980s the center of gravity of theoretical encounters of the "minor" kind shifted toward literary theory, feminist theory, and "dissident" sociology. But the space within which these encounters took place was already striated with exclusive disjunctions of North American vintage: pagan pluralism *or* hermeneutic pietas, phallogocentricism *or* being woman, positivist superficiality *or* genealogical investigations. On the other hand, the long and intimidating philosophical lineage of Deleuze's project, the long-standing reticence of the North American Freudo-Marxism even to entertain the suspicion that its war machine may have bred a "capture apparatus," the inoculation of our analysts with the Marcuse vaccine, and, last but not least, the fear of being identified with the "marginals" of the 1960s, have all contributed to the silence.

But to overlook Deleuze's theory of difference and repetition is to surrender the deconstructive space to the jejune logophobia of the epigoni: to refuse to name the Other on whose body power is inscribed in figures of cruelty, subjection, and forced reterritorialization is to silence the agent constantly mobilized in all deconstructive practices. To ignore Deleuze's theory of productive desire is to allow the Foucauldian emancipatory interest to fritter away in positivist investigations without ever revealing the "body without organs" that supports and sustains it. Finally, not to heed

minor languages and minor deconstructive practices is to think wishfully that catachresic transgressions suffice by themselves to produce the event of speech and the *prise de la parole.*

With the selections included in this *Reader,* I have tried to trace a diagram zigzagging from one concept of Deleuze's to another, without obliterating the outline of his own canvas. In order to counterbalance, as much as possible, the arborescent (orderly and organic) tendencies of the *Reader,* or, at least, in order to remind the reader of the precautions s/he must take as s/he goes through this collection, I chose as my prefatory text long excerpts from Deleuze and Guattari's "Rhizome," the well-known introduction to *A Thousand Plateaus* (see part I, essay 1). Rather than "book-trees" and the arborescent reading that helps them grow taller, Deleuze and Guattari prefer book-rhizomes, rhizomatic writing, and schizoanalytic reading. Rhizomes may be broken at any point of their growth, without being prevented from spreading through a multitude of alternate lines. Rhizomatic writing and reading are therefore preferable for turning a text into a problem and for tracing its active lines of transformation, stuttering, and flight, or for preventing its canonization. Lines of flight help transform a text and deconstruct the primacy of its signifiers or signifieds. This *Reader* grows around the textual lines of flight marked "intensity," "desire," "power," "becoming-minoritarian," and "becoming-nomad." It counts on these lines to bring the anthologized texts to their decline, and writing with its authorial responsibility, to its demise or, at least, face to face with the kind of alterity that would no longer circulate and exchange or inspire and enshrine meaning.

The choice of the "Rhizome" as the opening statement of this *Reader* is also governed by another consideration. In 1968, when nomadic desire took its affirmation to the streets, Deleuze met Guattari. From 1970 to 1980 they wrote and grew together, giving us samples of writing that are convincingly rhizomatic. After eleven years of separate growth, with the publication of *Qu'est-ce que la philosophie?*[58] with both their names on the jacket, their active cooperation has been renewed. This *Reader* includes many texts from the earlier period of the *écriture à deux* and makes any attempt to draw lines of demarcation between the rhizome "Deleuze" and the rhizome "Guattari" pointless. Here is how Deleuze talks about his work with Guattari:

> My encounter with Félix Guattari changed a lot of things. Félix already had a long history of political involvement and of psychiatric work. . . . In my earlier books, I tried to describe a certain exercise of thought; but describing it was not yet exercising thought in that way. . . . With Félix, all that became possible, even if we failed. We were only two, but what was

> important for us was less our working together than this strange fact of working between the two of us. And these "between-the-twos" referred back to other people, who were different on one side from on the other. The desert expanded, but in so doing became more populous.[59]

This *Reader* assumes a number of challenges: to bring to the center of our critical discussions Deleuze's philosophical references to the nomadic itinerary of Ideas, always already at war with the sedentary "image of thought"; to highlight texts that could prevent misreadings of rhizomatic desire from becoming canonic; to distinguish the minor deconstructive practices of Deleuze from the dominant "restrained" deconstruction of Derrida; to offer a sample of Deleuze's writings on nomad arts in search of the aesthetic Idea that has no intuition adequate to it; and to sketch the diagram of the political dilations and contractions of the body without organs. Whether accepting this challenge was a successful throw of the dice is not for me to say. Instead, it will be determined by the reader's desire to go beyond this volume, to the rhizome named "Deleuze," outside of the solarium that I, the editor, prepared for it. My only solace is that this selection was made as a labor of love and with the humiliating awareness that a *Reader* may not easily cast out its own arborescent tendencies.

Part One

Rhizome

1

Rhizome Versus Trees

A first type of book is the root-book. The tree is already the image of the world, or the root the image of the world-tree. This is the classical book, as noble, signifying, and subjective organic interiority (the strata of the book). The book imitates the world, as art imitates nature: by procedures specific to it that accomplish what nature cannot or can no longer do. The law of the book is the law of reflection, the One that becomes two. How could the law of the book reside in nature, when it is what presides over the very division between world and book, nature and art? One becomes two: whenever we encounter this formula, even stated strategically by Mao or understood in the most "dialectical" way possible, what we have before us is the most classical and well reflected, oldest, and weariest kind of thought. Nature doesn't work that way: in nature, roots are taproots with a more multiple, lateral, and circular system of ramification, rather than a dichotomous one. Thought lags behind nature. Even the book as a natural reality is a taproot, with its pivotal spine and surrounding leaves. But the book as a spiritual reality, the Tree or Root as an image, endlessly develops the law of the One that becomes two, then of the two that become four . . . Binary logic is the spiritual reality of the root-tree. Even a discipline as "advanced" as linguistics retains the root-tree as its fundamental image, and thus remains wedded to classical reflection (for example, Chomsky and his grammatical

trees, which begin at a point *S* and proceed by dichotomy). This is as much as to say that this system of thought has never reached an understanding of multiplicity: in order to arrive at two following a spiritual method it must assume a strong principal unity. On the side of the object, it is no doubt possible, following the natural method, to go directly from One to three, four, or five, but only if there is a strong principal unity available, that of the pivotal taproot supporting the secondary roots. That doesn't get us very far. The binary logic of dichotomy has simply been replaced by biunivocal relationships between successive circles. The pivotal taproot provides no better understanding of multiplicity than the dichotomous root. One operates in the object, the other in the subject. Binary logic and biunivocal relationships still dominate psychoanalysis (the tree of delusion in the Freudian interpretation of Schreber's case), linguistics, structuralism, and even information science.

The radicle-system, or fascicular root, is the second figure of the book, to which our modernity pays willing allegiance. This time, the principal root has aborted, or its tip has been destroyed; an immediate, indefinite multiplicity of secondary roots grafts onto it and undergoes a flourishing development. This time, natural reality is what aborts the principal root, but the root's unity subsists, as past or yet to come, as possible. We must ask if reflexive, spiritual reality does not compensate for this state of things by demanding an even more comprehensive secret unity, or a more extensive totality. Take William Burroughs's cut-up method: the folding of one text onto another, which constitutes multiple and even adventitious roots (like a cutting), implies a supplementary dimension to that of the texts under consideration. In this supplementary dimension of folding, unity continues its spiritual labor. That is why the most resolutely fragmented work can also be presented as the Total Work or Magnum Opus. Most modern methods for making series proliferate or a multiplicity grow are perfectly valid in one direction, for example, a linear direction, whereas a unity of totalization asserts itself even more firmly in another, circular or cyclic, dimension. Whenever a multiplicity is taken up in a structure, its growth is offset by a reduction in its laws of combination. The abortionists of unity are indeed angel makers, *doctores angelici*, because they affirm a properly angelic and superior unity. Joyce's words, accurately described as having "multiple roots," shatter the linear unity of the word, even of language, only to posit a cyclic unity of the sentence, text, or knowledge. Nietzsche's aphorisms shatter the linear unity of knowledge, only to invoke the cyclic unity of the eternal return, present as the nonknown in thought. This is as much as to say that the fascicular system does not really break with dualism, with the complementarity between a subject and an object, a natural reality and a spiritual reality:

unity is consistently thwarted and obstructed in the object, while a new type of unity triumphs in the subject. The world has lost its pivot; the subject can no longer even dichotomize, but accedes to a higher unity, of ambivalence or overdetermination, in an always supplementary dimension to that of its object. The world has become chaos, but the book remains the image of the world: radicle-chaosmos rather than root-cosmos. A strange mystification: a book all the more total for being fragmented. At any rate, what a vapid idea, the book as the image of the world. In truth, it is not enough to say, "Long live the multiple," difficult as it is to raise that cry. No typographical, lexical, or even syntactical cleverness is enough to make it heard. The multiple *must be made,* not by always adding a higher dimension, but rather in the simplest of ways, by dint of sobriety, with the number of dimensions one already has available—always $n - 1$ (the only way the one belongs to the multiple: always subtracted). Subtract the unique from the multiplicity to be constituted; write at $n - 1$ dimensions. A system of this kind could be called a rhizome. A rhizome as subterranean stem is absolutely different from roots and radicles. Bulbs and tubers are rhizomes. Plants with roots or radicles may be rhizomorphic in other respects altogether: the question is whether plant life in its specificity is not entirely rhizomatic. Even some animals are, in their pack form. Rats are rhizomes. Burrows are too, in all of their functions of shelter, supply, movement, evasion, and breakout. The rhizome itself assumes very diverse forms, from ramified surface extension in all directions to concretion into bulbs and tubers. When rats swarm over each other. The rhizome includes the best and the worst: potato and couchgrass, or the weed. Animal and plant, couchgrass is crabgrass. We get the distinct feeling that we will convince no one unless we enumerate certain approximate characteristics of the rhizome.

1 and 2. Principles of connection and heterogeneity: any point of a rhizome can be connected to anything other, and must be. This is very different from the tree or root, which plots a point, fixes an order. The linguistic tree on the Chomsky model still begins at a point *S* and proceeds by dichotomy. On the contrary, not every trait in a rhizome is necessarily linked to a linguistic feature: semiotic chains of every nature are connected to very diverse modes of coding (biological, political, economic, etc.) that bring into play not only different regimes of signs but also states of things of differing status. *Collective assemblages of enunciation* function directly within *machinic assemblages;* it is not impossible to make a radical break between regimes of signs and their objects. Even when linguistics claims to confine itself to what is explicit and to make no presuppositions about language, it is still in the sphere of a discourse implying

particular modes of assemblage and types of social power. Chomsky's grammaticality, the categorical *S* symbol that dominates every sentence, is more fundamentally a marker of power than a syntactic marker: you will construct grammatically correct sentences, you will divide each statement into a noun phrase and a verb phrase (first dichotomy. . .). Our criticism of these linguistic models is not that they are too abstract but, on the contrary, that they are not abstract enough, that they do not reach the *abstract machine* that connects a language to the semantic and pragmatic contents of statements, to collective assemblages of enunciation, to a whole micropolitics of the social field. A rhizome ceaselessly establishes connections between semiotic chains, organizations of power, and circumstances relative to the arts, sciences, and social struggles. A semiotic chain is like a tuber agglomerating very diverse acts, not only linguistic, but also perceptive, mimetic, gestural, and cognitive: there is no language in itself, nor are there any linguistic universals, only a throng of dialects, patois, slangs, and specialized languages. There is no ideal speaker-listener, any more than there is a homogeneous linguistic community. Language is, in Weinreich's words, "an essentially heterogeneous reality."[1] There is no mother tongue, only a power takeover by a dominant language within a political multiplicity. Language stabilizes around a parish, a bishopric, a capital. It forms a bulb. It evolves by subterranean stems and flows, along river valleys or train tracks; it spreads like a patch of oil.[2] It is always possible to break a language down into internal structural elements, an undertaking not fundamentally different from a search for roots. There is always something genealogical about a tree. It is not a method for the people. A method of the rhizome type, on the contrary, can analyze language only by decentering it onto other dimensions and other registers. A language is never closed upon itself, except as a function of impotence.

3. Principle of multiplicity: it is only when the multiple is effectively treated as a substantive, "multiplicity," that it ceases to have any relation to the One as subject or object, natural or spiritual reality, image and world. Multiplicities are rhizomatic, and expose arborescent pseudomultiplicities for what they are. There is no unity to serve as a pivot in the object, or to divide in the subject. There is not even the unity to abort in the object or "return" in the subject. A multiplicity has neither subject nor object, only determinations, magnitudes, and dimensions that cannot increase in number without the multiplicity changing in nature (the laws of combination therefore increase in number as the multiplicity grows). Puppet strings, as a rhizome or multiplicity, are tied not to the supposed will of an artist or puppeteer but to a multiplicity of nerve fi-

bers, which form another puppet in other dimensions connected to the first: "Call the strings or rods that move the puppet the weave. It might be objected that *its multiplicity* resides in the person of the actor, who projects it into the text. Granted; but the actor's nerve fibers in turn form a weave. And they fall through the gray matter, the grid, into the undifferentiated. . . . The interplay approximates the pure activity of weavers attributed in myth to the Fates or Norns."[3] An assemblage is precisely this increase in the dimensions of a multiplicity that necessarily changes in nature as it expands its connections. There are no points or positions in a rhizome, such as those found in a structure, tree, or root. There are only lines. When Glenn Gould speeds up the performance of a piece, he is not just displaying virtuosity, he is transforming the musical points into lines, he is making the whole piece proliferate. The number is no longer a universal concept measuring elements according to their emplacement in a given dimension, but has itself become a multiplicity that varies according to the dimensions considered (the primacy of the domain over a complex of numbers attached to that domain). We do not have units [*unités*] of measure, only multiplicities or varieties of measurement. The notion of unity [*unité*] appears only when there is a power takeover in the multiplicity by the signifier or a corresponding subjectification proceeding: This is the case for a pivot-unity forming the basis for a set of biunivocal relationships between objective elements or points, or for the One that divides following the law of a binary logic of differentiation in the subject. Unity always operates in an empty dimension supplementary to that of the system considered (overcoding). The point is that a rhizome or multiplicity never allows itself to be overcoded, never has available a supplementary dimension over and above its number of lines, that is, over and above the multiplicity of numbers attached to those lines. All multiplicities are flat, in the sense that they fill or occupy all of their dimensions: we will therefore speak of a *plane of consistency* of multiplicities, even though the dimensions of this "plane" increase with the number of connections that are made on it. Multiplicities are defined by the outside: by the abstract line, the line of flight or deterritorialization according to which they change in nature and connect with other multiplicities. The plane of consistency (grid) is the outside of all multiplicities. The line of flight marks: the reality of a finite number of dimensions that the multiplicity effectively fills; the impossibility of a supplementary dimension, unless the multiplicity is transformed by the line of flight; the possibility and necessity of flattening all of the multiplicities on a single plane of consistency or exteriority, regardless of their number of dimensions. The ideal for a book would be to lay everything out on a

plane of exteriority of this kind, on a single page, the same sheet: lived events, historical determinations, concepts, individuals, groups, social formations. Kleist invented a writing of this type, a broken chain of affects and variable speeds, with accelerations and transformations, always in a relation with the outside. Open rings. His texts, therefore, are opposed in every way to the classical or romantic book constituted by the interiority of a substance or subject. The war machine–book against the State apparatus–book. *Flat multiplicities of n dimensions* are asignifying and asubjective. They are designated by indefinite articles, or rather by partitives (*some* couchgrass, *some* of a rhizome. . .).

4. Principle of asignifying rupture: against the oversignifying breaks separating structures or cutting across a single structure. A rhizome may be broken, shattered at a given spot, but it will start up again on one of its old lines, or on new lines. You can never get rid of ants because they form an animal rhizome that can rebound time and again after most of it has been destroyed. Every rhizome contains lines of segmentarity according to which it is stratified, territorialized, organized, signified, attributed, etc., as well as lines of deterritorialization down which it constantly flees. There is a rupture in the rhizome whenever segmentary lines explode into a line of flight, but the line of flight is part of the rhizome. These lines always tie back to one another. That is why one can never posit a dualism or a dichotomy, even in the rudimentary form of the good and the bad. You may make a rupture, draw a line of flight, yet there is still a danger that you will reencounter organizations that restratify everything, formations that restore power to a signifier, attributions that reconstitute a subject—anything you like, from Oedipal resurgences to fascist concretions. Groups and individuals contain microfascisms just waiting to crystallize. Yes, couchgrass is also a rhizome. Good and bad are only the products of an active and temporary selection, which must be renewed.

How could movements of deterritorialization and processes of reterritorialization not be relative, always connected, caught up in one another? The orchid deterritorializes by forming an image, a tracing of a wasp; but the wasp reterritorializes on that image. The wasp is nevertheless deterritorialized, becoming a piece in the orchid's reproductive apparatus. But it reterritorializes the orchid by transporting its pollen. Wasp and orchid, as heterogeneous elements, form a rhizome. It could be said that the orchid imitates the wasp, reproducing its image in a signifying fashion (mimesis, mimicry, lure, etc.). But this is true only on the level of the strata—a parallelism between two strata such that a plant organization on one imitates an animal organization on the other. At the same time, something else entirely is going on: not imitation at all but a

capture of code, surplus value of code, an increase in valence, a veritable becoming, a becoming-wasp of the orchid and a becoming-orchid of the wasp. Each of these becomings brings about the deterritorialization of one term and the reterritorialization of the other; the two becomings interlink and form relays in a circulation of intensities pushing the deterritorialization ever further. There is neither imitation nor resemblance, only an exploding of two heterogeneous series on the line of flight composed by a common rhizome that can no longer be attributed to or subjugated by anything signifying. Rémy Chauvin expresses it well: "the *aparallel evolution* of two beings that have absolutely nothing to do with each other."[4] More generally, evolutionary schemas may be forced to abandon the old model of the tree and descent. Under certain conditions, a virus can connect to germ cells and transmit itself as the cellular gene of a complex species; moreover, it can take flight, move into the cells of an entirely different species, but not without bringing with it "genetic information" from the first host (for example, Benveniste and Todaro's current research on a type *C* virus, with its double connection to baboon DNA and the DNA of certain kinds of domestic cats). Evolutionary schemas would no longer follow models of arborescent descent going from the least to the most differentiated, but instead a rhizome operating immediately in the heterogeneous and jumping from one already differentiated line to another.[5] Once again, there is *aparallel evolution*, of the baboon and the cat; it is obvious that they are not models or copies of each other (a becoming-baboon in the cat does not mean that the cat "plays" baboon). We form a rhizome with our viruses, or rather our viruses cause us to form a rhizome with other animals. As François Jacob says, transfers of genetic material by viruses or through other procedures, fusions of cells originating in different species, have results analogous to those of "the abominable couplings dear to antiquity and the Middle Ages."[6] Transversal communications between different lines scramble the genealogical trees. Always look for the molecular, or even submolecular, particle with which we are allied. We evolve and die more from our polymorphous and rhizomatic flus than from hereditary diseases, or diseases that have their own line of descent. The rhizome is an antigenealogy.

The same applies to the book and the world: contrary to a deeply rooted belief, the book is not an image of the world. It forms a rhizome with the world, there is an aparallel evolution of the book and the world; the book assures the deterritorialization of the world, but the world effects a reterritorialization of the book, which in turn deterritorializes itself in the world (if it is capable, if it can). Mimicry is a very bad concept, since it relies on binary logic to describe phenomena of an entirely

different nature. The crocodile does not reproduce a tree trunk, any more than the chameleon reproduces the colors of its surroundings. The Pink Panther imitates nothing, it reproduces nothing, it paints the world its color, pink on pink; this is its becoming-world, carried out in such a way that it becomes imperceptible itself, asignifying, makes its rupture, its own line of flight, follows its "aparallel evolution" through to the end. The wisdom of the plants: even when they have roots, there is always an outside where they form a rhizome with something else—with the wind, an animal, human beings (and there is also an aspect under which animals themselves form rhizomes, as do people, etc.). "Drunkenness as a triumphant irruption of the plant in us." Always follow the rhizome by rupture; lengthen, prolong, and relay the line of flight; make it vary, until you have produced the most abstract and tortuous of lines of *n* dimensions and broken directions. Conjugate deterritorialized flows. Follow the plants: you start by delimiting a first line consisting of circles of convergence around successive singularities; then you see whether inside that line new circles of convergence establish themselves, with new points located outside the limits and in other directions. Write, form a rhizome, increase your territory by deterritorialization, extend the line of flight to the point where it becomes an abstract machine covering the entire plane of consistency. "Go first to your old plant and watch carefully the watercourse made by the rain. By now the rain must have carried the seeds far away. Watch the crevices made by the runoff, and from them determine the direction of the flow. Then find the plant that is growing at the farthest point from your plant. All the devil's weed plants that are growing in between are yours. Later . . . you can extend the size of your territory by following the watercourse from each point along the way."[7] Music has always sent out lines of flight, like so many "transformational multiplicities," even overturning the very codes that structure or arborify it; that is why musical form, right down to its ruptures and proliferations, is comparable to a weed, a rhizome.[8]

5 and 6. Principle of cartography and decalcomania: a rhizome is not amenable to any structural or generative model. It is a stranger to any idea of genetic axis or deep structure. A genetic axis is like an objective pivotal unity upon which successive stages are organized; a deep structure is more like a base sequence that can be broken down into immediate constituents, while the unity of the product passes into another, transformational and subjective, dimensions. This does not constitute a departure from the representative model of the tree, or root—pivotal taproot or fascicles (for example, Chomsky's "tree" is associated with a base sequence and represents the process of its own generation in terms

of binary logic). A variation on the oldest form of thought. It is our view that genetic axis and profound structure are above all infinitely reproducible principles of *tracing*. All of tree logic is a logic of tracing and reproduction. In linguistics as in psychoanalysis, its object is an unconscious that is itself representative, crystallized into codified complexes, laid out along a genetic axis and distributed within a syntagmatic structure. Its goal is to describe a de facto state, to maintain balance in intersubjective relations, or to explore an unconscious that is already there from the start, lurking in the dark recesses of memory and language. It consists of tracing, on the basis of an overcoding structure or supporting axis, something that comes ready-made. The tree articulates and hierarchizes tracings; tracings are like the leaves of a tree.

The rhizome is altogether different, a *map and not a tracing*. Make a map, not a tracing. The orchid does not reproduce the tracing of the wasp; it forms a map with the wasp, in a rhizome. What distinguishes the map from the tracing is that it is entirely oriented toward an experimentation in contact with the real. The map does not reproduce an unconscious closed in upon itself; it constructs the unconscious. It fosters connections between fields, the removal of blockages on bodies without organs, the maximum opening of bodies without organs onto a plane of consistency. It is itself a part of the rhizome. The map is open and connectable in all of its dimensions; it is detachable, reversible, susceptible to constant modification. It can be torn, reversed, adapted to any kind of mounting, reworked by an individual, group, or social formation. It can be drawn on a wall, conceived of as a work of art, constructed as a political action or as a meditation. Perhaps one of the most important characteristics of the rhizome is that it always has multiple entryways; in this sense, the burrow is an animal rhizome, and sometimes maintains a clear distinction between the line of flight as passageway and storage or living strata (cf. the muskrat). A map has multiple entryways, as opposed to the tracing, which always comes back "to the same." The map has to do with performance, whereas the tracing always involves an alleged "competence." . . .

Let us summarize the principal characteristics of a rhizome: unlike trees or their roots, the rhizome connects any point to any other point, and its traits are not necessarily linked to traits of the same nature; it brings into play very different regimes of signs, and even nonsign states. The rhizome is reducible neither to the One nor the multiple. It is not the One that becomes Two or even directly three, four, five, etc. It is not a multiple derived from the One, or to which One is added ($n + 1$). It is composed not of units but of

dimensions, or rather directions in motion. It has neither beginning nor end, but always a middle [*milieu*] from which it grows and which it overspills. It constitutes linear multiplicities with n dimensions having neither subject nor object, which can be laid out on a plane of consistency, and from which the One is always subtracted ($n - 1$). When a multiplicity of this kind changes dimensions, it necessarily changes in nature as well, undergoes a metamorphosis. Unlike a structure, which is defined by a set of points and positions, with binary relations between the points and biunivocal relationships between the positions, the rhizome is made only of lines: lines of segmentarity and stratification as its dimensions, and the line of flight or deterritorialization as the maximum dimension after which the multiplicity undergoes metamorphosis, changes in nature. These lines, or lineaments, should not be confused with lineages of the arborescent type, which are merely localizable linkages between points and positions. Unlike the tree, the rhizome is not the object of reproduction: neither external reproduction as image-tree nor internal reproduction as tree-structure. The rhizome is an antigenealogy. It is a short-term memory, or antimemory. The rhizome operates by variation, expansion, conquest, capture, offshoots. Unlike the graphic arts, drawing, or photography, unlike tracings, the rhizome pertains to a map that must be produced, constructed, a map that is always detachable, connectable, reversible, modifiable, and has multiple entryways and exits and its own lines of flight. It is tracings that must be put on the map, not the opposite. In contrast to centered (even polycentric) systems with hierarchical modes of communication and preestablished paths, the rhizome is an acentered, nonhierarchical, nonsignifying system without a General and without an organizing memory or central automaton, defined solely by a circulation of states. What is at question in the rhizome is a relation to sexuality—but also to the animal, the vegetal, the world, politics, the book, things natural and artificial—that is totally different from the arborescent relation: all manner of "becomings."

Part Two

Difference and Repetition

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What Is Becoming?

Alice and *Through the Looking-Glass* involve a category of very special things: events, pure events. When I say "Alice becomes larger," I mean that she becomes larger than she was. By the same token, however, she becomes smaller than she is now. Certainly, she is not bigger and smaller at the same time. She is larger now; she was smaller before. But it is at the same moment that one becomes larger than one was and smaller than one becomes. This is the simultaneity of a becoming whose characteristic is to elude the present. Insofar as it eludes the present, becoming does not tolerate the separation or the distinction of before and after, or of past and future. It pertains to the essence of becoming to move and to pull in both directions at once: Alice does not grow without shrinking, and vice versa. Good sense affirms that in all things there is a determinable sense or direction [*sens*]; but paradox is the affirmation of both senses or directions at the same time.

Plato invites us to distinguish between two dimensions: (1) that of limited and measured things, of fixed qualities, permanent or temporary which always presuppose pauses and rests, the fixing of presents, and the assignation of subjects (for example, a particular subject having a particular largeness or a particular smallness at a particular moment); and (2) a pure becoming without measure, a veritable becoming-mad, which never rests. It moves in both directions at once. It always eludes the present, causing fu-

ture and past, more and less, too much and not enough to coincide in the simultaneity of a rebellious matter. "'Hotter' never stops where it is but is always going a point further, and the same applies to 'colder,' where as definite quality is something that has stopped going on and is fixed"; ". . . the younger becoming older than the older, the older becoming younger than the younger—but they can never finally become so; if they did they would no longer be becoming, but would be so."[1]

We recognize this Platonic dualism. It is not at all the dualism of the intelligible and the sensible, of Idea and matter, or of Ideas and bodies. It is a more profound and secret dualism hidden in sensible and material bodies themselves. It is a subterranean dualism between that which receives the action of the Idea and that which eludes this action. It is not the distinction between the Model and the copy, but rather between copies and simulacra. Pure becoming, the unlimited, is the matter of the simulacrum insofar as it eludes the action of the Idea and insofar as it contests *both* model *and* copy at once. Limited things lie beneath the Ideas; but even beneath things, is there not still this mad element which subsists and occurs on the other side of the order that Ideas impose and things receive? Sometimes Plato wonders whether this pure becoming might not have a very peculiar relation to language. This seems to be one of the principal meanings of the *Cratylus*. Could this relation be, perhaps, essential to language, as in the case of a "flow" of speech, or a wild discourse which would incessantly slide over its referent, without ever stopping? Or might there not be two languages and two sorts of "names," one designating the pauses and rests which receive the action of the Idea, the other expressing the movements or rebel becomings?[2] Or further still, is it not possible that there are two distinct dimensions internal to language in general—one always concealed by the other, yet continuously coming to the aid of, or subsisting under, the other?

The paradox of this pure becoming, with its capacity to elude the present, is the paradox of infinite identity (the infinite identity of both directions or senses at the same time—of future and past, of the day before and the day after, of more and less, of too much and not enough, of active and passive, and of cause and effect). It is language which fixes the limits (the moment, for example, at which the excess begins), but it is language as well which transcends the limits and restores them to the infinite equivalence of an unlimited becoming ("A red-hot poker will burn you if you hold it too long; and . . . if you cut your finger *very* deeply with a knife, it usually bleeds"). Hence the reversals which constitute Alice's adventures: the reversal of becoming larger and becoming smaller—"which way, which way?" asks Alice, sensing that it is always in both directions at the same time, so that for once she stays the same, through an optical illusion; the

reversal of the day before and the day after, the present always being eluded—"jam tomorrow and jam yesterday—but never jam *to-day*"; the reversal of more and less: five nights are five times hotter than a single one, "but they must be five times as cold for the same reason"; the reversal of active and passive: "do cats eat bats?" is as good as "do bats eat cats?"; the reversal of cause and effect: to be punished before having committed a fault, to cry before having pricked oneself, to serve before having divided up the servings.

All these reversals as they appear in infinite identity have one consequence: the contesting of Alice's personal identity and the loss of her proper name. The loss of the proper name is the adventure which is repeated throughout all Alice's adventures. For the proper or singular name is guaranteed by the permanence of *savoir*. The latter is embodied in general names designating pauses and rests, in substantives and adjectives, with which the proper name maintains a constant connection. Thus the personal self requires God and the world in general. But when substantives and adjectives begin to dissolve, when the names of pause and rest are carried away by the verbs of pure becoming and slide into the language of events, all identity disappears from the self, the world, and God. This is the test of *savoir* and recitation which strips Alice of her identity. In it words may go awry, being obliquely swept away by the verbs. It is as if events enjoyed an irreality which is communicated through language to the *savoir* and to persons. For personal uncertainty is not a doubt foreign to what is happening, but rather an objective structure of the event itself, insofar as it moves in two directions at once, and insofar as it fragments the subject following this double direction. Paradox is initially that which destroys good sense as the only direction, but it is also that which destroys common sense as the assignation of fixed identities.

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What Is an Event?

The Stoics also distinguish between two kinds of things. First, there are bodies with their tensions, physical qualities, actions and passions, and the corresponding "states of affairs." These states of affairs, actions and passions, are determined by the mixtures of bodies. At the limit, there is a unity of all bodies in virtue of a primordial Fire into which they become absorbed and from which they develop according to their respective tensions. The only time of bodies and states of affairs is the present. For the living present is the temporal extension which accompanies the act, expresses and measures the action of the agent and the passion of the patient. But to the degree that there is a unity of bodies among themselves, to the degree that there is a unity of active and passive principles, a cosmic present embraces the entire universe: only bodies exist in space, and only the present exists in time. There are no causes *and* effects among bodies. Rather, all bodies are causes—causes in relation to each other and for each other. In the scope of the cosmic present, the unity is called Destiny.

Second, all bodies are causes in relation to each other, and causes for each other—but causes of what? They are causes of certain things of an entirely different nature. These *effects* are not bodies, but, properly speaking, "incorporeal" entities. They are not physical qualities and properties, but rather logical or dialectical attributes. They are not things or facts, but events. We

can not say that they exist, but rather that they subsist or insist (having this minimum of being which is appropriate to that which is not a thing, a nonexisting entity). They are not substantives or adjectives but verbs. They are neither agents nor patients, but results of actions and passions. They are "impassive" entities—impassive results. They are not living presents, but infinities: the unlimited Aeon, the becoming which divides itself infinitely in past and future and always eludes the present. Thus time must be grasped twice, in two complementary though mutually exclusive fashions. First, it must be grasped entirely as the living present in bodies which act and are acted upon. Second, it must be grasped entirely as an entity infinitely divisible into past and future, and into the incorporeal effects which result from bodies, their actions and their passions. Only the present exists in time and gathers together or absorbs the past and future. But only the past and future insist in time and divide each present infinitely. These are not three successive dimensions, but two simultaneous readings of time.

In his fine reconstruction of Stoic thought, Emile Bréhier says:

> When the scalpel cuts through the flesh, the first body produces upon the second not a new property but a new attribute, that of being cut. The *attribute* does not designate any real *quality* . . . , it is, to the contrary, always expressed by the verb, which means that it is not a being, but a way of being. . . . This way of being finds itself somehow at the limit, at the surface of being, the nature of which it is not able to change: it is, in fact, neither active nor passive, for passivity would presuppose a corporeal nature which undergoes an action. It is purely and simply a result, or an effect which is not to be classified among beings. . . . [The Stoics distinguished] radically two planes of being, something that no one had done before them: on the one hand, real and profound being, force; on the other, the plane of facts, which frolic on the surface of being, and constitute an endless multiplicity of incorporeal beings.[1]

Yet, what is more intimate or essential to bodies than events such as growing, becoming smaller, or being cut? What do the Stoics mean when they contrast the thickness of bodies with these incorporeal events which would play only on the surface, like a mist over the prairie (even less than a mist, since a mist is after all a body)? Mixtures are in bodies, and in the depth of bodies: a body penetrates another and coexists with it in all of its parts, like a drop of wine in the ocean, or fire in iron. One body withdraws from another, like liquid from a vase. Mixtures in general determine the quantitative and qualitative states of affairs: the dimensions of an ensemble—the red of iron, the green of a tree. But what we mean by "to grow," "to diminish," "to become red," "to become green," "to cut," and

"to be cut," etc., is something entirely different. These are no longer states of affairs—mixtures deep inside bodies—but incorporeal events at the surface which are the results of these mixtures. The tree "greens." . . .[2] The genius of a philosophy must first be measured by the new distribution which it imposes on beings and concepts. The Stoics are in the process of tracing out and of forming a frontier where there had not been one before. In this sense they displace all reflection.

They are in the process of bringing about, first, an entirely new cleavage of the causal relation. They dismember this relation, even at the risk of recreating a unity on each side. They refer causes to causes and place a bond of causes between them (destiny). They refer effects to effects and pose certain bonds of effects between them. But these two operations are not accomplished in the same manner. Incorporeal effects are never themselves causes in relation to each other; rather, they are only "quasi-causes" following laws which perhaps express in each case the relative unity or mixture of bodies on which they depend for their real causes. Thus freedom is preserved in two complementary manners: once in the interiority of destiny as a connection between causes, and once more in the exteriority of events as a bond of effects. For this reason the Stoics can oppose destiny and necessity.[3] The Epicureans formulated another cleavage of causality, which also grounds freedom. They conserve the homogeneity of cause and effect, but cut up causality according to atomic series whose respective independence is guaranteed by the *clinamen*—no longer destiny without necessity, but causality without destiny.[4] In either case, one begins by splitting the causal relation, instead of distinguishing types of causality as Aristotle had done and Kant would do. And this split always refers us back to language, either to the existence of a *declension* of causes or, as we shall see, to the existence of a *conjugation* of effects.

This new dualism of bodies or states of affairs and effects or incorporeal events entails an upheaval in philosophy. In Aristotle, for example, all categories are said of Being; and difference is present in Being, between substance as the primary sense and the other categories which are related to it as accidents. For the Stoics, on the other hand, states of affairs, quantities, and qualities are no less beings (or bodies) than substance is; they are a part of substance, and in this sense they are contrasted with an *extra-Being* which constitutes the incorporeal as a nonexisting entity. The highest term therefore is not Being, but *Something (aliquid)*, insofar as it subsumes being and nonbeing, existence and inherence.[5] Moreover, the Stoics are the first to reverse Platonism and to bring about a radical inversion. For if bodies with their states, qualities, and quantities, assume all the characteristics of substance and cause, conversely, the characteristics of the Idea are relegated to

the other side, that is to this impassive extra-Being which is sterile, inefficacious, and on the surface of things: *the ideational or the incorporeal can no longer be anything other than an "effect."*

These consequences are extremely important. In Plato, an obscure debate was raging in the depth of things, in the depth of the earth, between that which undergoes the action of the Idea and that which eludes this action (copies and simulacra). An echo of this debate resonates when Socrates asks: is there an Idea of everything, even of hair, dirt, and mud—or rather is there something which always and obstinately escapes the Idea? In Plato, however, this something is never sufficiently hidden, driven back, pushed deeply into the depth of the body, or drowned in the ocean. *Everything now returns to the surface.* This is the result of the Stoic operation: the unlimited returns. Becoming-mad, becoming unlimited is no longer a ground which rumbles. It climbs to the surface of things and becomes impassive. It is no longer a question of simulacra which elude the ground and insinuate themselves everywhere, but rather a question of effects which manifest themselves and act in their place. These are effects in the causal sense, but also sonorous, optical, or linguistic "effects"—and even less, or much more, since they are no longer corporeal entities, but rather form the entire Idea. What was eluding the Idea climbed up to the surface, that is, the incorporeal limit, and represents now all possible *ideality,* the latter being stripped of its causal and spiritual efficacy. The Stoics discovered surface effects. Simulacra cease to be subterranean rebels and make the most of their effects (that is, what might be called "phantasms," independently of the Stoic terminology). The most concealed becomes the most manifest. All the old paradoxes of becoming must again take shape in a new youthfulness—transmutation.

Becoming unlimited comes to be the ideational and incorporeal event, with all of its characteristic reversals between future and past, active and passive, cause and effect, more and less, too much and not enough, already and not yet. The infinitely divisible event is always *both at once.* It is eternally that which has just happened and that which is about to happen, but never that which is happening (to cut too deeply and not enough). The event, being itself impassive, allows the active and the passive to be interchanged more easily, since it is *neither the one nor the other,* but rather their common result (to cut—to be cut). Concerning the cause and the effect, events, *being always only effects,* are better able to form among themselves functions of quasi-causes or relations of quasi-causality which are always reversible (the wound and the scar).

The Stoics are amateurs and inventors of paradoxes. It is necessary to reread the astonishing portrait of Chrysippus given in several pages written by Diogenes Laertius. Perhaps the Stoics used the paradox in a completely

new manner—both as an instrument for the analysis of language and as a means of synthesizing events. *Dialectics* is precisely this science of incorporeal events as they are expressed in propositions, and of the connections between events as they are expressed in relations between propositions. Dialectics is, indeed, the art of *conjugation* (see the *confatalia* or series of events which depend on one another). But it is the task of language both to establish limits and to go beyond them. Therefore language includes terms which do not cease to displace their extension and which make possible a reversal of the connection in a given series (thus too much and not enough, few and many). The event is coextensive with becoming, and becoming is itself coextensive with language; the paradox is thus essentially a "sorites," that is, a series of interrogative propositions which, following becoming, proceed through successive additions and retrenchments. Everything happens at the boundary between things and propositions. Chrysippus taught: "If you say something, it passes through your lips; so, if you say 'chariot,' a chariot passes through your lips." Here is a use of paradox the only equivalents of which are to be found in Zen Buddhism, on one hand, and in English or American *nonsense*, on the other. In one case, that which is most profound is the immediate, in the other, the immediate is found in language. Paradox appears as a dismissal of depth, a display of events at the surface, and a deployment of language along this limit. Humor is the art of the surface, which is opposed to the old irony, the art of depths and heights. The Sophists and Cynics had already made humor a philosophical weapon against Socratic irony; but with the Stoics, humor found its dialectics, its dialectical principle or its natural place and its pure philosophical concept.

Lewis Carroll carries out this operation, inaugurated by the Stoics, or rather, he takes it up again. In all his works, Carroll examines the difference between events, things, and states of affairs. But the entire first half of *Alice* still seeks the secret of events and of the becoming unlimited which they imply, in the depths of the earth, in dug out shafts and holes which plunge beneath, and in the mixture of bodies which interpenetrate and coexist. As one advances in the story, however, the digging and hiding gives way to a lateral sliding from right to left and left to right. The animals below ground become secondary, giving way to *card figures* which have no thickness. One could say that the old depth having been spread out became width. The becoming unlimited is maintained entirely within this inverted width. "Depth" is no longer a complement. Only animals are deep, and they are not the noblest for that; the noblest are the flat animals. Events are like crystals, they become and grow only out of the edges, or on the edge. This is, indeed, the first secret of the stammerer or of the left-handed person: no longer to sink, but to slide the whole length in such a way that the old depth

no longer exists at all, having been reduced to the opposite side of the surface. By sliding, one passes to the other side, since the other side is nothing but the opposite direction. If there is nothing to see behind the curtain, it is because everything is visible, or rather all possible science is along the length of the curtain. It suffices to follow it far enough, precisely enough, and superficially enough, in order to reverse sides and to make the right side become the left or vice versa. It is not therefore a question of *the adventures* of Alice, but of Alice's *adventure:* her climb to the surface, her disavowal of false depth and her discovery that everything happens at the border. This is why Carroll abandons the original title of the book: *Alice's Adventures Underground.*

This is the case—even more so—in *Through the Looking-Glass.* Here events, differing radically from things, are no longer sought in the depths, but at the surface, in the faint incorporeal mist which escapes from bodies, a film without volume which envelops them, a mirror which reflects them, a chessboard on which they are organized according to plan. Alice is no longer able to make her way through to the depths. Instead, she releases her incorporeal double. *It is by following the border, by skirting the surface, that one passes from bodies to the incorporeal.* Paul Valéry had a profound idea: what is most deep is the skin. This is a Stoic discovery, which presupposes a great deal of wisdom and entails an entire ethic. It is the discovery of the little girl, who grows and diminishes only from the edges—a surface which reddens and becomes green. She knows that the more the events traverse the entire, depthless extension, the more they affect bodies which they cut and bruise. Later, the adults are snapped up by the ground, fall again, and, being too deep, they no longer understand. Why do the same Stoic examples continue to inspire Lewis Carroll?—the tree greens, the scalpel cuts, the battle will or will not take place. . . . It is in front of the trees that Alice loses her name. It is a tree which Humpty Dumpty addresses without looking at Alice. Recitations announce battles, and everywhere there are injuries and cuts. But are these examples? Or rather, is it the case that every event is of this type—forest, battle, and wound—all the more profound since *it* occurs at the surface? The more it skirts bodies, the more incorporeal it is. History teaches us that sound roads have no foundation, and geography that only a thin layer of the earth is fertile.

This rediscovery of the Stoic sage is not reserved to the little girl. Indeed, it is true that Lewis Carroll detests boys in general. They have too much depth, and false depth at that, false wisdom, and animality. The male baby in *Alice* is transformed into a pig. As a general rule, only little girls understand Stoicism; they have the sense of the event and release an incorporeal double. But it happens sometimes that a little boy is a stutterer and left-handed, and thus conquers sense as the double sense or direction of the sur-

face. Carroll's hatred of boys is not attributable to a deep ambivalence, but rather to a superficial inversion, a properly Carrollian concept. In *Sylvie and Bruno,* it is the little boy who has the inventive role, learning his lessons in all manners, inside-out, outside-in, above and below, but never "in depth." This important novel pushes to the extreme the evolution which had begun in *Alice,* and which continued in *Through the Looking-Glass.* The admirable conclusion of the first part is to the glory of the East, from which comes all that is good, "the substance of things hoped for, and the existence of things not seen."[5] Here even the barometer neither rises nor falls, but goes lengthwise, sideways, and gives a horizontal weather. A stretching machine even lengthens songs. And Fortunatus' purse, presented as a Möbius strip, is made of handkerchiefs sewn *in the wrong way,* in such a manner that its outer surface is continuous with its inner surface: it envelops the entire world, and makes that which is inside be on the outside and vice versa.[6] In *Sylvie and Bruno,* the technique of passing from reality to dream, and from bodies to the incorporeal, is multiplied, completely renewed, and carried out to perfection. It is, however, still by skirting the surface, or the border, that one passes to the other side, by virtue of the strip. The continuity between reverse and right side replaces all the levels of depth; and the surface effects in one and the same Event, which would hold for all events, bring to language becoming and its paradoxes.[7] As Carroll says in an article entitled "The Dynamics of a Parti-cle": "Plain Superficiality is the character of a speech. . . ."

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What Is a Multiplicity?

Let us summarize the principal characteristics of a punctual system: (1) Systems of this kind comprise two base lines, horizontal and vertical: they serve as coordinates for assigning points. (2) The horizontal line can be superposed vertically and the vertical line can be moved horizontally, in such a way that new points are produced or reproduced, under conditions of horizontal frequency and vertical resonance. (3) From one point to another, a line can (or cannot) be drawn, but if it can it takes the form of a localizable connection; diagonals thus play the role of connectors between points of different levels or moments, instituting in their turn frequencies and resonances on the basis of these points of variable horizon or verticon, contiguous or distant.[1] These systems are arborescent, mnemonic, molar, structural: they are systems of territorialization or reterritorialization. The line and the diagonal remain totally subordinated to the point because they serve as coordinates for a point or as localizable connections for two points, running from one point to another.

Opposed to the punctual system are linear, or rather multilinear, systems. Free the line, free the diagonal: every musician or painter has this intention. One elaborates a punctual system or a didactic representation, but with the aim of making it snap, of sending a tremor through it. A punctual system is most interesting when there is a musician, painter, writer,

philosopher to oppose it, who even fabricates it in order to oppose it, like a springboard to jump from. History is made only by those who oppose history (not by those who insert themselves into it, or even reshape it). This is not done for provocation but happens because the punctual system they found ready-made, or themselves invented, must have allowed this operation: free the line and the diagonal, draw the line instead of plotting a point, produce an imperceptible diagonal instead of clinging to an even elaborated or reformed vertical or horizontal. When this is done it always goes down in history but never comes from it. History may try to break its ties to memory; it may make the schemas of memory more elaborate, superpose and shift coordinates, emphasize connections, or deepen breaks. The dividing line, however, is not there. The dividing line passes not between history and memory but between punctual "history-memory" systems and diagonal or multilinear assemblages, which are in no way eternal: they have to do with becoming; they are a bit of becoming in the pure state; they are transhistorical. There is no act of creation that is not transhistorical and does not come up from behind or proceed by way of a liberated line. Nietzsche opposes history not to the eternal but to the subhistorical or superhistorical: the Untimely, which is another name for haecceity, becoming, the innocence of becoming (in other words, forgetting as opposed to memory, geography as opposed to history, the map as opposed to the tracing, the rhizome as opposed to arborescence). "The unhistorical is like an atmosphere within which alone life can germinate and with the destruction of which it must vanish. . . . What deed would man be capable of if he had not first entered into that vaporous region of the unhistorical?"[2] Creations are like mutant abstract lines that have detached themselves from the task of representing a world, precisely because they assemble a new type of reality that history can only recontain or relocate in punctual systems.

When Boulez casts himself in the role of historian of music, he does so in order to show how a great musician, in a very different manner in each case, invents a kind of diagonal running between the harmonic vertical and the melodic horizon. And in each case it is a different diagonal, a different technique, a creation. Moving along this transversal line, which is really a line of deterritorialization, there is a *sound block* that no longer has a point of origin, since it is always and already in the middle of the line; and no longer has horizontal and vertical coordinates, since it creates its own coordinates; and no longer forms a localizable connection from one point to another, since it is in "nonpulsed time": a deterritorialized rhythmic block that has abandoned points, coordinates, and measure, like a drunken boat that melds with the line or draws a plane of consistency. Speeds and slownesses inject

themselves into musical form, sometimes impelling it to proliferation, linear microproliferations, and sometimes to extinction, sonorous abolition, involution, or both at once. The musician is in the best position to say: "I hate the faculty of memory, I hate memories." And that is because he or she affirms the power of becoming. The Viennese school is exemplary of this kind of diagonal, this kind of line-block. But it can equally be said that the Viennese school found a new system of territorialization, of points, verticals, and horizontals that position it in history. Another attempt, another creative act, came after it. The important thing is that all musicians have always proceeded in this way: drawing their own diagonal, however fragile, outside points, outside coordinates and localizable connections, in order to float a sound block down a created, liberated line, in order to unleash in space this mobile and mutant sound bloc,, a haecceity (for example, chromaticism, aggregates, and complex notes, but already the resources and possibilities of polyphony, etc.).[3] Some have spoken of "oblique vectors" with respect to the organ. The diagonal is often composed of extremely complex lines and spaces of sound. Is that the secret of a little phrase or a rhythmic block? Undoubtedly, the point now assumes a new and essential creative function. It is no longer simply a question of an inevitable destiny reconstituting a punctual system; on the contrary, it is now the point that is subordinated to the line, the point now marks the proliferation of the line, or its sudden deviation, its acceleration, its slowdown, its furor or agony. Mozart's "microblocks." The block may even be reduced to a point, as though to a single note (point-block): Berg's B in *Wozzeck*, Schumann's A. Homage to Schumann, the madness of Schumann: the cello wanders across the grid of the orchestration, drawing its diagonal, along which the deterritorialized sound block moves; or an extremely sober kind of refrain is "treated" by a very elaborate melodic line and polyphonic architecture.

In a multilinear system, everything happens at once: the line breaks free of the point as origin; the diagonal breaks free of the vertical and the horizontal as coordinates; and the transversal breaks free of the diagonal as a localizable connection between two points. In short, a block-line passes amid [*au milieu des*] sounds and propels itself by its own nonlocalizable middle [*milieu*]. The sound block is the *intermezzo.* It is a body without organs, an antimemory pervading musical organization, and is all the more sonorous:

> The Schumannian body does not stay in place. . . . The intermezzo [is] consubstantial with the entire Schumannian oeuvre. . . . At the limit, there are only intermezzi. . . . The Schumannian body knows only bifur-

> cations; it does not construct itself, it keeps diverging according to an accumulation of interludes. . . . Schumannian beating is panic, but it is also coded . . . and it is because the panic of the blows apparently keeps within the limits of a docile language that it is ordinarily not perceived. . . . Let us imagine for tonality two contradictory (and yet concomitant) statuses. On the one hand . . . a screen, a language intended to articulate the body . . . according to a known organization. . . . On the other hand, contradictorily . . . tonality becomes the ready servant of the beats within another level it claims to domesticate.[4]

Does the same thing, strictly the same thing, apply to painting? In effect, the point does not make the line; the line sweeps away the deterritorialized point, carries it off under its outside influence; the line does not go from one point to another, but runs *between points* in a different direction that renders them indiscernible. The line has become the diagonal, which has broken free from the vertical and the horizontal. But the diagonal has already become the transversal, the semidiagonal or free straight line, the broken or angular line, or the curve—always in the midst of themselves. Between the white vertical and the black horizontal lie Klee's gray, Kandinsky's red, Monet's purple; each forms a block of color. This line is without origin, since it always begins off the painting, which only holds it by the middle; it is without coordinates, because it melds with a plane of consistency upon which it floats and that it creates; it is without localizable connection, because it has lost not only its representative function but any function of outlining a form of any kind—by this token, the line has become abstract, truly abstract and mutant, a visual block; and under these conditions the point assumes creative functions again, as a color-point or line-point.[5] The line is between points, in their midst, and no longer goes from one point to another. It does not outline a shape. "He did not paint things, he painted between things." There is no falser problem in painting than depth and, in particular, perspective. For perspective is only a historical manner of *occupying* diagonals or transversals, lines of flight [*lignes de fuite:* here, the lines in a painting moving toward the vanishing point, or *point de fuite*—Trans.], in other words, of reterritorializing the moving visual block. We use the word "occupy" in the sense of "giving an occupation to," fixing a memory and a code, assigning a function. But the lines of flight, the transversals, are suitable for many other functions besides this molar function. Lines of flight as perspective lines, far from being made to represent depth, themselves invent the possibility of such a representation, which occupies them only for an instant, at a given moment. Perspective, and even depth, are the reterritorialization of lines of flight, which alone created painting by carrying it

farther. What is called central perspective in particular plunged the multiplicity of escapes and the dynamism of lines into a punctual black hole. Conversely, it is true that problems of perspective triggered a whole profusion of creative lines, a mass release of visual blocks, at the very moment they claimed to have gained mastery over them. Is painting, in each of its acts of creation, engaged in a becoming as intense as that of music?

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Individuation

There is a mode of individuation very different from that of a person, subject, thing, or substance. We reserve the name ***haecceity*** for it.[1] A season, a winter, a summer, an hour, a date have a perfect individuality lacking nothing, even though this individuality is different from that of a thing or a subject. They are haecceities in the sense that they consist entirely of relations of movement and rest between molecules or particles, capacities to affect and be affected. When demonology expounds upon the diabolical art of local movements and transports of affect, it also notes the importance of rain, hail, wind, pestilential air, or air polluted by noxious particles, favorable conditions for these transports. Tales must contain haecceities that are not simply emplacements, but concrete individuations that have a status of their own and direct the metamorphosis of things and subjects. Among types of civilizations, the Orient has many more individuations by haecceity than by subjectivity or substantiality: the haiku, for example, must include indicators as so many floating lines constituting a complex individual. In Charlotte Brontë, everything is in terms of *wind,* things, people, faces, loves, words. Lorca's "five in the evening," when love falls and fascism rises. That awful five in the evening! We say, "What a story!" "What heat!" "What a life!" to designate a very singular individuation. The hours of the day in Lawrence, in Faulkner. A degree of heat, an intensity of white, are

perfect individualities; and a degree of heat can combine in latitude with another degree to form a new individual, as in a body that is cold here and hot there depending on its longitude. Norwegian omelette. A degree of heat can combine with an intensity of white, as in certain white skies of a hot summer. This is in no way an individuality of the instant, as opposed to the individuality of permanences or durations. A tear-off calendar has just as much time as a perpetual calendar, although the time in question is not the same. There are animals that live no longer than a day or an hour; conversely, a group of years can be as long as the most durable subject or object. We can conceive of an abstract time that is equal for haecceities and for subjects or things. Between the extreme slownesses and vertiginous speeds of geology and astronomy, Michel Tournier places meteorology, where meteors live at our pace: "A cloud forms in the sky like an image in my brain, the wind blows like I breathe, a rainbow spans the horizon for as long as my heart needs to reconcile itself to life, the summer passes like vacation drifts by." But is it by chance that in Tournier's novel this certitude can come only to a twin hero who is deformed and desubjectified, and has acquired a certain ubiquity?[2] Even when times are abstractly equal, the individuation of a life is not the same as the individuation of the subject that leads it or serves as its support. It is not the same Plane: in the first case, it is the plane of consistency or of composition of haecceities, which knows only speeds and affects; and in the second case, it is the altogether different plane of forms, substances, and subjects. And it is not in the same time, the same temporality. *Aeon:* the indefinite time of the event, the floating line that knows only speeds and continually divides that which transpires into an already-there that is at the same time not-yet-here, a simultaneous too-late and too-early, a something that is both going to happen and has just happened. *Chronos:* the time of measure that situates things and persons, develops a form, and determines a subject.[3] Boulez distinguishes tempo and nontempo in music: the "pulsed time" of a formal and functional music based on values versus the "nonpulsed time" of a floating music, both floating *and* machinic, which has nothing but speeds or differences in dynamic.[4] In short, the difference is not at all between the ephemeral and the durable, nor even between the regular and the irregular, but between two modes of individuation, two modes of temporality.

We must avoid an oversimplified conciliation, as though there were on the one hand formed subjects, of the thing or person type, and on the other hand spatiotemporal coordinates of the haecceity type. For you will yield nothing to haecceities unless you realize that that is what you are, and that you are nothing but that. When the face becomes a haecceity: "It seemed a curious mixture that simply made do with time, weather and these peo-

ple."[5] You are longitude and latitude, a set of speeds and slownesses between unformed particles, a set of nonsubjectified affects. You have the individuality of a day, a season, a year, a *life* (regardless of its duration)—a climate, a wind, a fog, a swarm, a pack (regardless of its regularity). Or at least you can have it, you can reach it. A cloud of locusts carried in by the wind at five in the evening; a vampire who goes out at night, a werewolf at full moon. It should not be thought that a haecceity consists simply of a decor or backdrop that situates subjects, or of appendages that hold things and people to the ground. It is the entire assemblage in its individuated aggregate that is a haecceity; it is this assemblage that is defined by a longitude and a latitude, by speeds and affects, independently of forms and subjects, which belong to another plane. It is the wolf itself, and the horse, and the child, that cease to be subjects to become events, in assemblages that are inseparable from an hour, a season, an atmosphere, an air, a life. The street enters into composition with the horse, just as the dying rat enters into composition with the air, and the beast and the full moon enter into composition with each other. At most, we may distinguish assemblage haecceities (a body considered only as longitude and latitude) and interassemblage haecceities, which also mark the potentialities of becoming within each assemblage (the milieu of intersection of the longitudes and latitudes). But the two are strictly inseparable. Climate, wind, season, hour are not of another nature than the things, animals, or people that populate them, follow them, sleep and awaken within them. This should be read without a pause: the animal-stalks-at-five-o'clock. The becoming-evening, becoming-night of an animal, blood nuptials. Five o'clock is this animal! This animal is this place! "The thin dog is running in the road, this dog is the road," cries Virginia Woolf. That is how we need to feel. Spatiotemporal relations, determinations, are not predicates of the thing but dimensions of multiplicities. The street is as much a part of the omnibus-horse assemblage as the Hans assemblage the becoming-horse of which it initiates. We are all five o'clock in the evening, or another hour, or rather two hours simultaneously, the optimal and the pessimal, noon-midnight, but distributed in a variable fashion. The plane of consistency contains only haecceities, along intersecting lines. Forms and subjects are not of that world. Virginia Woolf's walk through the crowd, among the taxis. Taking a walk is a haecceity; never again will Mrs. Dalloway say to herself, "I am this, I am that, he is this, he is that." And "She felt very young; at the same time unspeakably aged. She sliced like a knife through everything; at the same time was outside, looking on. . . . She always had the feeling that it was very, very dangerous to live even one day."[6] Haecceity, fog, glare. A haecceity has neither beginning nor end, origin nor destination; it is always in the middle. It is not made of points, only of lines. It is a rhizome.

And it is not the same language, at least not the same usage of language. For if the plane of consistency only has haecceities for content, it also has its own particular semiotic to serve as expression. A plane of content and a plane of expression. This semiotic is composed above all of proper names, verbs in the infinitive and indefinite articles or pronouns. *Indefinite article* + *proper name* + *infinitive verb* constitutes the basic chain of expression, correlative to the least formalized contents, from the standpoint of a semiotic that has freed itself from both formal significances and personal subjectifications. In the first place, the verb in the infinitive is in no way indeterminate with respect to time; it expresses the floating, nonpulsed time proper to Aeon, in other words, the time of the pure event or of becoming, which articulates relative speeds and slownesses independently of the chronometric or chronological values that time assumes in the other modes. There is good reason to oppose the infinitive as mode and tense of becoming to all of the other modes and tenses, which pertain to Chronos since they form pulsations or values of being (the verb "to be" is precisely the only one that has no infinitive, or rather the infinitive of which is only an indeterminate, empty expression, taken abstractly to designate the sum total of definite modes and tenses).[7] Second, the proper name is no way the indicator of a subject; thus it seems useless to ask whether its operation resembles the nomination of a species, according to whether the subject is considered to be of another nature than that of the Form under which it is classified, or only the ultimate act of that Form, the limit of classification.[8] The proper name does not indicate a subject; nor does a noun take on the value of a proper name as a function of a form or a species. The proper name fundamentally designates something that is of the order of the event, of becoming or of the haecceity. It is the military men and meteorologists who hold the secret of proper names, when they give them to a strategic operation or a hurricane. The proper name is not the subject of a tense but the agent of an infinitive. It marks a longitude and a latitude. If Tick, Wolf, Horse, etc., are true proper names, they are so not by virtue of the specific and generic denominators that characterize them but of the speeds that compose them and the affects that fill them; it is by virtue of the event they are in themselves and in the assemblages—the becoming-horse of Little Hans, the becoming-wolf of the Were [which etymologically means "man"—Trans.], the becoming-tick of the Stoic (other proper names).

Third, the indefinite article and the indefinite pronoun are no more indeterminate than the infinitive. Or rather they are lacking a determination only insofar as they are applied to a form that is itself indeterminate, or to a determinable subject. On the other hand, they lack nothing when they introduce haecceities, events, the individuation of which does not pass into a form and is not effected by a subject. The indefinite then has maximum de-

termination: once upon a time; a child is being beaten; a horse is falling . . . Here, the elements in play find their individuation in the assemblage of which they are a part, independent of the form of their concept and the subjectivity of their person. We have remarked several times the extent to which children use the indefinite not as something indeterminate but, on the contrary, as an individuating function within a collectivity. That is why we are dumbfounded by the efforts of psychoanalysis, which desperately wants there to be something definite hidden behind the indefinite, a possessive, a person. When the child says "*a* belly," "*a* horse," "how do *people* grow up?" "*someone* is beating *a* child," the psychoanalyst hears "my belly," "the father," "will I grow up to be like daddy?" The psychoanalyst asks: who is being beaten, and by whom?[9] Even linguistics is not immune from the same prejudice, inasmuch as it is inseparable from a personology; according to linguistics, in addition to the indefinite article and the pronoun, the third-person pronoun also lacks the determination of subjectivity that is proper to the first two persons and is supposedly the necessary condition for all enunciation.[10]

We believe on the contrary that the third-person indefinite, HE, THEY, implies no indetermination from this point of view; it ties the statement to a collective assemblage, as its necessary condition, rather than to a subject of the enunciation. Blanchot is correct in saying that ONE and HE—*one* is dying, *he* is unhappy—in no way take the place of a subject, but instead do away with any subject in favor of an assemblage of the haecceity type that carries or brings out the event insofar as it is unformed and incapable of being effectuated by persons ("something happens to them that they can only get a grip on again by letting go of their ability to say I").[11] The HE does not represent a subject but rather makes a diagram of an assemblage. It does not overcode statements, it does not transcend them as do the first two persons: on the contrary, it prevents them from falling under the tyranny of subjective or signifying constellations, under the regime of empty redundancies. The contents of the chains of expression it articulates are those that can be assembled for a maximum number of occurrences and becomings. "They arrive like fate . . . where do they come from, how have they pushed this far?"[12] He or one, indefinite article, proper name, infinitive verb: A HANS TO BECOME HORSE, A PACK NAMED WOLF TO LOOK AT HE, ONE TO DIE, WASP TO MEET ORCHID, THEY ARRIVE HUNS. Classified ads, telegraphic machines on the plane of consistency (once again, we are reminded of the procedures of Chinese poetry and the rules for translation suggested by the best commentators).[13]

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A Theory of the Other

By comparing the primary effects of the Other's presence and those of his absence, we are in a position to say what the Other is. The error of philosophical theories is to reduce the Other sometimes to a particular object, and sometimes to another subject. (Even a conception like Sartre's, in *Being and Nothingness,* was satisfied with the union of the two determinations, making of the Other an object of my gaze, even if he in turn gazes at me and transforms me into an object.) But the Other is neither an object in the field of my perception nor a subject who perceives me: the Other is initially a structure of the perceptual field, without which the entire field could not function as it does. That this structure may be actualized by real characters, by variable subjects—me for you and you for me—does not prevent its preexistence, as the condition of organization in general, to the terms which actualize it in each organized perceptual field—yours and mine. Thus the *a priori Other,* as the absolute structure, establishes the relativity of others as terms actualizing the structure within each field. But what is this structure? It is the structure of the possible. A frightened countenance is the expression of a frightening possible world, or of something frightening in the world—something I do not yet see. Let it be understood that the possible is not here an abstract category designating something which does not exist: the expressed possible world certainly exists, but it does not exist (actually)

outside of that which expresses it. The terrified countenance bears no resemblance to the terrifying thing. It implicates it, it envelops it as something else, in a kind of torsion which situates what is expressed in the expressing. When I, in turn, and for my part, grasp the reality of what the Other was expressing, I do nothing but explicate the Other, as I develop and realize the corresponding possible world. It is true that the Other already bestows a certain reality on the possibilities which he encompasses—especially by speaking. The Other is the existence of the encompassed possible. Language is the reality of the possible as such. The self is the development and the explication of what is possible, the process of its realization in the actual. Proust says of the perceived Albertine that she encompasses or expresses the beach and the breaking of the waves: "If she had seen me, what could I have represented for her? At the heart of what universe was she perceiving me?" Love and jealousy will be the attempt to develop and to unfold this possible world named "Albertine." In short, the Other, as structure, is *the expression of a possible world:* it is the expressed, grasped as not yet existing outside of that which expresses it.

> Each of these men was a *possible* world, having its own coherence, its values, its sources of attraction and repulsion, its center of gravity. And with all the differences between them, each of these possible worlds at that moment shared a vision, casual and superficial, of the island of Speranza, which caused them to act in common, and which incidentally contained a shipwrecked man called Robinson and his half-caste servant. For the present this picture occupied their minds, but for each of them it was purely temporary, destined very soon to be returned to the limbo from which it had been briefly plucked by the accident of the *Whitebird's* getting off course. And each of these possible worlds naively proclaimed itself the reality. That was what other people were: the possible obstinately passing for the real.[1]

And we can go even further in our understanding of the effects of the presence of Others. Modern psychology has elaborated a rich series of categories to account for the functioning of the perceptual field and the variations of the object within this field: form-background; depth-length; theme-potentiality; profiles-unity of the object; fringe-center; text-context; thetic-nonthetic; transitive states–substantive parts; etc. But the corresponding philosophical problem is perhaps not very well raised: one asks whether these categories belong to the perceptual field itself being immanent to it (monism), or whether they refer to subjective syntheses operating on the subject matter of perception (dualism). It would be wrong to take exception to the dualist interpretation on the pretext that perception does

not occur through a judgmental intellectual synthesis; one can certainly conceive of passive sensible syntheses of an entirely different sort operating on this material (in this sense, Husserl never renounced a certain dualism). Even so, we doubt that dualism is correctly defined as long as it is established between the matter of the perceptual field and the prereflective syntheses of the ego. The true dualism lies elsewhere; it lies between the effects of the "structure-Other" of the perceptual field and the effects of its absence (what perception would be were there no Others). We must understand that the Other is not one structure among others in the field of perception (in the sense, for example, that one would recognize in it a difference of nature from objects). *It is the structure which conditions the entire field* and its functioning, by rendering possible the constitution and application of the preceding categories. It is not the ego but the Other as structure which renders perception possible. Thus, the authors who interpret dualism poorly are also the authors who cannot extricate themselves from the alternative according to which the Other would be either a particular object in the field or another subject of the field. In defining the Other, together with Tournier, as the expression of a possible world, we make of it, on the contrary, the a priori principle of the organization of every perceptual field in accordance with the categories; we make of it the structure which allows this functioning as the "categorization" of this field. Real dualism then appears with the absence of the Other. . . .

Let us return to the effects of the presence of Others, such as they follow from the definition "Other = an expression of a possible world." The fundamental effect is the distinction of my consciousness and its object. This distinction is in fact the result of the structure-Other. Filling the world with possibilities, backgrounds, fringes, and transitions; inscribing the possibility of a frightening world when I am not yet afraid, or, on the contrary, the possibility of a reassuring world when I am really frightened by the world; encompassing in different respects the world which presents itself before me developed otherwise; constituting inside the world so many blisters which contain so many possible worlds—this is the Other.[2] Henceforth, the Other causes my consciousness to tip necessarily into an "I was," into a past which no longer coincides with the object. Before the appearance of the Other, there was, for example, a reassuring world from which my consciousness could not be distinguished. The Other then makes its appearance, expressing the possibility of a frightening world which cannot be developed without the one preceding it passing away. For my part, I am nothing other than my past objects, and my self is made up of a past world, the passing away of which was brought about precisely by the Other. If the Other is a possible world, I am a past world. The mistake of theories of

knowledge is that they postulate the contemporaneity of subject and object, whereas one is constituted only through the annihilation of the other.

> Then suddenly there is a click. The subject breaks away from the object, divesting it of a part of its color and substance. There is a rift in the scheme of things, and a whole range of objects crumbles in becoming *me*, each object transferring its quality to an appropriate subject. The light becomes the eye and as such no longer exists: it is simply the stimulation of the retina. The smell becomes the nostril—and the world declares itself odorless. The song of the wind in the trees is disavowed: it was nothing but a quivering of the timpani. . . . The subject is the disqualified object. My eye is the corpse of light and color. My nose is all that remains of odors when their unreality has been demonstrated. My hand refutes the thing it holds. Thus the problem of awareness is born of anachronism. It implies the simultaneous existence of the subject with the object, whose mysterious relationship to himself he seeks to define. But subject and object cannot exist apart from one another since they are one and the same thing, at first integrated into the real world and then cast out by it.[3]

The Other thus assures the distinction of consciousness and its object as a temporal distinction. The first effect of its presence concerned space and the distribution of categories; but the second effect, which is perhaps the more profound, concerns time and the distribution of its dimensions—what comes before and what comes after in time. How could there still be a past when the Other no longer functions?

In the Other's absence, consciousness and its object are one. There is no longer any possibility of error, not only because the Other is no longer there to be the tribunal of all reality—to debate, falsify, or verify that which I think I see; but also because, lacking in its structure, it allows consciousness to cling to, and to coincide with, the object in an eternal present. "And it is as though, in consequence, my days had rearranged themselves. No longer do they jostle on each other's heels. Each stands separate and upright, proudly affirming its own worth. And since they are no longer to be distinguished as the stages of a plan in process of execution, they so resemble each other as to be superimposed in my memory, so that I seem to be ceaselessly reliving the same day."[4] Consciousness ceases to be a light cast upon objects in order to become a pure phosphorescence of things in themselves. . . .

Consciousness has become not only a phosphorescence internal to things but a fire in their heads, a light over each one, and a "soaring *I*." In this light, *something else* appears, an ethereal double of each thing. "I seemed to glimpse *another island*. . . . Now I have been transported to that other Speranza, I live perpetually in a moment of innocence."[5] It is this extraordinary

birth of the erect double that the novel excels in describing. But what exactly is the difference between the thing such as it appears in the presence of Others and the double which tends to detach itself in their absence? The Other presides over the organization of the world into objects and over the transitive relations of these objects. These objects exist only through the possibilities with which Others filled up the world; each one was closed onto itself, or opened onto other objects, only in relation to possible worlds expressed by Others. In short, it is the Other who has imprisoned the elements within the limits of bodies and, further still, within the limits of the earth. For the earth itself is but a great body which retains the elements; it is earth only to the extent that it is peopled by Others. The Other fabricates bodies out of the elements and objects out of bodies, just as it fabricates its own countenance out of the worlds it expresses. Thus, the liberated double, when the Other collapses, is not a replica of things. It is, on the contrary, the new upright image in which the elements are released and renewed, having become celestial and forming a thousand capricious elemental figures. . . .

In short, the Other, as it encompasses the possible worlds, prevents the doubles from standing erect. The Other is the grand leveler, and consequently the destructuration of the Other is not a disorganization of the world, but an upright organization as opposed to the recumbent organization; it is the new uprightness, and the detachment of an image which is vertical at last and without thickness; it is the detachment of a pure element which at last is liberated. . . .

When we desire Others, are not our desires brought to bear upon this expressed small possible world which the Other wrongly envelops, instead of allowing it to float and fly above the world, developed onto a glorious double? And when we observe a butterfly pillaging a flower that exactly resembles the abdomen of the female of the species and then leaving the flower carrying on its head two horns of pollen, we are tempted to conclude that bodies are but detours to the attainment of images, and that sexuality reaches its goal much better and much more promptly to the extent that it economizes this detour and addresses itself directly to images and to the elements freed from bodies.[6] . . .

Neurosis and psychosis—this is the adventure of depth. The structure-Other organizes and pacifies depth. It renders it livable. This is why the agitations of this structure imply a disorder, a disturbance of depth, as an aggressive return of the bottomless abyss that can no longer be conjured away. Everything has lost its sense, everything becomes *simulacrum and vestige*—even the object of work, the loved one, the world in itself or the self in the world . . . ; that is, unless there be some sort of salvation for Robinson; unless he invents a new dimension or a third sense for the expression

"loss of Others"; unless the absence of the Other and the dissolution of its structure do not simply disorganize the world but, on the contrary, open up a possibility of salvation. Robinson must return to the surface and discover surfaces. The pure surface is perhaps what Others were hiding from us. It is perhaps at the surface, like a mist, that an unknown image of things is detached and, from the earth, a new surface energy without possible others. For the sky does not at all signify a height which would merely be the inverse image of depth. In opposition to the deep earth, air and sky describe a pure surface, and the surveying of the field of this surface. The solipsist sky has no depth: "It is a strange prejudice which sets a higher value on depth than on breadth, and which accepts 'superficial' as meaning not 'of wide extent' but 'of little depth,' whereas 'deep,' on the other hand, signifies 'of great depth' and not 'of small surface.' Yet it seems to me that a feeling such as love is better measured, if it can be measured at all, by the extent of its surface than by its degree of depth."[7] It is at the surface that doubles and ethereal images first rise up; then the pure and free elements arise in the celestial surveying of the field. The generalized erection is the erection of surfaces, their rectification—the disappearance of the Others. At the surface of the isle and the overarching sky, simulacra ascend and become *phantasms.* Doubles without resemblance and elements without constraint—these are the two aspects of the phantasm. This restructuring of the world is Robinson's great health—the conquest of the great health, or the third sense of the "loss of Others." . . .

What is essential, however, is that Friday does not function at all like a rediscovered Other. It is too late for that, the structure has disappeared. Sometimes he functions as a bizarre object, sometimes as a strange accomplice. Robinson treats him sometimes as a slave and tries to integrate him into the economic order of the island—that is, as a poor simulacrum—and sometimes as the keeper of a new secret which threatens that order—that is, as a mysterious phantasm. Sometimes he treats him almost like an object or an animal, sometimes as if Friday were a "beyond" with respect to himself, a "beyond" Friday, his own double or image. Sometimes he treats him as if he were falling short of the Other, sometimes as if he were transcending the Other. The difference is essential. For the Other, in its normal functioning, expresses a possible world. But this possible world exists in our world and, if it is not developed or realized without changing the quality of our world, it is at least developed in accordance with laws which constitute the order of the real in general and the succession of time. But Friday functions in an entirely different way—he indicates *another,* supposedly true world, an irreducible double which alone is genuine, and in this other world, a double of the Other who no longer is and cannot be. Not an Other, but something

wholly other (*un tout-autre*) than the Other; not a replica, but a double: one who reveals pure elements and dissolves objects, bodies, and the earth. "It seemed, indeed, that (Friday) belonged to an entirely different realm, wholly opposed to his master's order of earth and husbandry, on which he could have only a disruptive effect if anyone tried to imprison him within it."[8] It is for this reason that he is not even an object of desire for Robinson. Though Robinson embraces his knees and looks into his eyes, it is only in order to grasp the luminous double which now barely retains the free elements which have escaped from his body. "As to my sexuality, I may note that at no time has Friday inspired me with any sodomite desire. For one thing, he came too late, when my sexuality had already become elemental and was directed toward Speranza. . . . It was not a matter of turning me back to human loves but, while leaving me still an elemental, of causing me to change my element."[9] The Other *pulls down [rabat]:* it draws the elements into the earth, the earth into bodies, and bodies into objects. But Friday innocently makes objects and bodies stand up again. He carries the earth into the sky. He frees the elements. But to straighten up or to rectify is also to shorten. The Other is a strange detour—it brings my desires down to objects, and my love to worlds. Sexuality is linked to generation only in a detour which first channels the difference of sexes through the Other. It is initially in the Other and through the Other that the difference of the sexes is founded. To establish the world without Others, to lift the world up (as Friday does, or rather as Robinson perceives that Friday does) is to avoid the detour. It is to separate desire from its *object,* from its detour through the body, in order to relate it to a pure *cause:* the elements. ". . . So also has perished the framework of institutions and myths that permits desire to become *embodied,* in the twofold sense of the word—that is to say, to assume a positive form and to expend itself in the body of a woman."[10] . . .

Everything here is fictitious (*romanesque*), including theory, which merges with a necessary fiction—namely, a certain theory of the Other. First, we must attach a great importance to the notion of the Other as structure: not at all a particular "form" inside a perceptual field (distinct from the form "object" or the form "animal"), but rather a system which conditions the functioning of the entire perceptual field in general. We must therefore distinguish the *a priori Other,* which designates this structure, and the *concrete Other,* which designates real terms actualizing the structure in concrete fields. If this *concrete Other* is always someone—I for you and you for me—that is, in each perceptual field the subject of another field—the a priori Other, on the other hand, is no one since structure is transcendent with respect to the terms which actualize it. How then is it to be defined? The expressiveness which defines the structure-Other is constituted by the catego-

ry of the possible. The a priori Other is the *existence* of the possible in general, insofar as the possible exists only as expressed—that is, in something expressing it which does not resemble what is expressed (a torsion of the expressed in that which expresses it). When Kierkegaard's hero demands "the possible, the possible or I shall suffocate," when James longs for the "oxygen of possibility," they are only invoking the a priori Other. We have tried to show in this sense how the Other conditions the entire perceptual field, the application to this field of the categories of the perceived object and the dimensions of the perceiving subject, and finally, the distribution of concrete Others in each field. In fact, perceptual laws affecting the constitution of objects (form-background, etc.), the temporal determination of the subject, and the successive development of worlds, seemed to us to depend on the possible as the structure-Other. Even desire, whether it be desire for the object or desire for Others, depends on this structure. I desire an object only as expressed by the Other in the mode of the possible; I desire in the Other only the possible worlds the Other expresses. The Other appears as that which organizes elements into earth, and earth into bodies, bodies into objects, and which regulates and measures object, perception, and desire all at once. . . .

A world without Others. Tournier assumes that Robinson, through much suffering, discovers and conquers a great health, to the extent that things end up being organized in a manner quite different than their organization in the presence of the Others. They liberate an image without resemblance, or their own double which is normally repressed. This double in turn liberates pure elements which are ordinarily held prisoner. The world is not disturbed by the absence of the Other; on the contrary, it is the glorious double of the world which is found to be hidden by its presence. This is Robinson's discovery: the discovery of the surface, of the elemental beyond, of the "otherwise-Other" [*de l'Autre qu'autrui*]. Why then do we have the impression that this great health is perverse, and that this "rectification" of the world and of desire is also a deviation and a perversion? Robinson exhibits no perverse behavior. But every study or every novel of perversion strives to manifest the existence of a "perverse structure" as the principle from which perverse behavior eventually proceeds. In this sense, the perverse structure may be specified as that which is opposed to the structure-Other and takes its place. And just as concrete Others are actual and variable terms actualizing this structure-Other, the pervert's behaviors, always presupposing a fundamental absence of the Others, are but variable terms actualizing the perverse structure.

Why does the pervert have the tendency to imagine himself as a radiant angel, an angel of helium and fire? Why does he have—against the *earth*,

fertilization, and the objects of desire—the kind of hatred which is already found systematized in Sade? Tournier's novel does not intend to explain—it shows. In this manner, it rejoins, by very different ways, recent psychoanalytic studies which may renew the status of the concept of perversion and disentangle it from the moralizing uncertainty in which it was maintained by the combined forces of psychiatry and the law. Lacan and his school insist profoundly on the necessity of understanding perverse behavior on the basis of a *structure,* and of defining this structure which conditions behavior. They also insist on the manner in which desire undergoes a sort of *displacement* in this structure, and the manner by which the *cause* of desire is thus detached from the *object;* on the way in which the *difference of sexes* is disavowed by the pervert, in the interest of an androgynous world of *doubles;* on the annulment of the Other inside perversion, on the position of a "beyond the Other" [*un au-delà de l'Autre*] or of an "otherwise Other" [*un Autre qu'autrui*], as if the Other disengaged in the eyes of the pervert his own *metaphor;* finally, they insist on perverse "desubjectivation"—for it is certain that neither the victim nor the accomplice function as Others.[11] For example, it is not because he has a need or a desire to make the Other suffer that the sadist strips him of his quality of being an Other. The converse is rather the case: it is because he is lacking the structure-Other and lives within a completely different structure, as a condition for his living world, that he apprehends Others sometimes as victims and sometimes as accomplices, but in neither case does he apprehend them as Others. On the contrary, he always apprehends them as "otherwise Others" [*Autres qu'autrui*]. It is striking to see in Sade's work to what extent victims and accomplices, with their necessary reversibility, are not at all grasped as Others. Rather, they are grasped sometimes as detestable bodies and sometimes as doubles, or allied elements (certainly not as doubles of the hero, but as their own doubles, always outside of their bodies in the pursuit of atomic elements).[12]

The fundamental misinterpretation of perversion, based on a hasty phenomenology of perverse behavior and on certain legal exigencies, consists in bringing perversion to bear upon certain offenses committed against Others. Everything persuades us, from the point of view of behavior, that perversion is nothing without the presence of the Other: voyeurism, exhibitionism, etc. But from the point of view of the structure, the contrary must be asserted: it is because the structure-Other is missing, and is replaced by a completely different structure, that the real "Others" are no longer able to play the role of terms actualizing the lost primary structure. Real "Others" can only play now, in the second structure, the role of bodies-victims (in the very particular sense that the pervert attributes to bodies), or the role of accomplices-doubles, and accomplices-elements (again, in the very partic-

ular sense of the pervert). The world of the pervert is a world without Others, and thus a world without the possible. The Other is that which renders possible. The perverse world is a world in which the category of the necessary has completely replaced that of the possible. This is a strange Spinozism from which "oxygen" is lacking, to the benefit of a more elementary energy and a more rarefied air (Sky-Necessity). All perversion is an "Othercide," and an "altrucide," and therefore a murder of the possible. But altrucide is not committed through perverse behavior, it is presupposed in the perverse structure. This does not keep the pervert from being a pervert, not constitutionally, but at the end of an adventure which surely has passed through neurosis and brushed up against psychosis. This is what Tournier suggests in this extraordinary novel: we must imagine Robinson as perverse; the only Robinsonade possible is perversion itself.

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Ethics Without Morality

No philosopher was ever more worthy, but neither was any philosopher more maligned and hated. To grasp the reason for this it is not enough to recall the great theoretical thesis of Spinozism: a single substance having an infinity of attributes, *Deus sive Natura,* all "creatures" being only modes of these attributes or modifications of this substance. It is not enough to show how pantheism and atheism are combined in this thesis, which denies the existence of a moral, transcendent, creator God. We must start rather from the practical theses that made Spinozism an object of scandal. These theses imply a triple denunciation: of "consciousness," of "values," and of "sad passions." These are the three major resemblances with Nietzsche. And already in Spinoza's lifetime, they are the reasons for his being accused of *materialism, immoralism,* and *atheism.*

I. A Devaluation of Consciousness (in Favor of Thought): Spinoza the Materialist

Spinoza offers philosophers a new model: the body. He proposes to establish the body as a model: "We do not know what the body can do." This declaration of ignorance is a provocation. We speak of consciousness and its decrees, of the will and its effects, of the thousand ways of moving the body, of dominating the body and the passions—but *we do not even know what a body*

can do.[1] Lacking this knowledge, we engage in idle talk. As Nietzsche will say, we stand amazed before consciousness, but "the truly surprising thing is rather the body."

Yet, one of the most famous theoretical theses of Spinoza is known by the name of *parallelism;* it does not consist merely in denying any real causality between the mind and the body, it disallows any primacy of the one over the other. If Spinoza rejects any superiority of the mind over the body, this is not in order to establish a superiority of the body over the mind, which would be no more intelligible than the converse. The practical significance of parallelism is manifested in the reversal of the traditional principle on which morality was founded as an enterprise of domination of the passions by consciousness. It was said that when the body acted, the mind was acted upon, and the mind did not act without the body being acted upon in turn (the rule of the inverse relation, cf. Descartes, *The Passions of the Soul,* articles 1 and 2). According to the *Ethics,* on the contrary, what is an action in the mind is necessarily an action in the body as well, and what is a passion in the body is necessarily a passion in the mind.[2] There is no primacy of one series over the other.

What does Spinoza mean when he invites us to take the body as a model? It is a matter of showing that the body surpasses the knowledge that we have of it, *and that thought likewise surpasses the consciousness that we have of it.* There are no fewer things in the mind that exceed our consciousness than there are things in the body that exceed our knowledge. So it is by one and the same movement that we shall manage, if possible, to capture the power of the body beyond the given conditions of our knowledge, and to capture the power of the mind beyond the given conditions of our consciousness. One seeks to acquire a knowledge of the powers of the body in order to discover, *in a parallel fashion,* the powers of the mind that elude consciousness, and thus to be able to *compare* the powers. In short, the model of the body, according to Spinoza, does not imply any devaluation of thought in relation to extension, but much more important, a devaluation of consciousness in relation to thought: a discovery of the unconscious, of an *unconscious of thought* just as profound as *the unknown of the body.*

The fact is that consciousness is by nature the locus of an illusion. Its nature is such that it registers effects, but it knows nothing of causes. The order of causes is defined by this: each body in extension, each idea or each mind in thought are constituted by the characteristic relations that subsume the parts of that body, the parts of that idea. When a body "encounters" another body, or an idea another idea, it happens that the two relations sometimes combine to form a more powerful whole, and sometimes one decomposes the other, destroying the cohesion of its parts. And this is what is prodigious in the body and the mind alike, these sets of living parts

that enter into composition with and decompose one another according to complex laws.[3] The order of causes is therefore an order of composition and decomposition of relations, which infinitely affects all of nature. But as conscious beings, we never apprehend anything but the *effects* of these compositions and decompositions: we experience *joy* when a body encounters ours and enters into composition with it, and *sadness* when, on the contrary, a body or an idea threaten our own coherence. We are in a condition such that we only take in "what happens" to our body, "what happens" to our mind, that is, the effect of a body on our body, the effect of an idea on our idea. But this is only our body in its own relation, and our mind in its own relation, and the other bodies and other minds or ideas in their respective relations, and the rules according to which all these relations compound with and decompose one another; we know nothing of all this in the given order of our knowledge and our consciousness. In short, the conditions under which we know things and are conscious of ourselves condemn us *to have only inadequate ideas,* ideas that are confused and mutilated, effects separated from their real causes.[4] That is why it is scarcely possible to think that little children are happy, or that the first man was perfect: ignorant of causes and natures, reduced to the consciousness of events, condemned to undergo effects, they are slaves of everything, anxious and unhappy, in proportion to their imperfection. (No one has been more forceful than Spinoza in opposing the theological tradition of a perfect and happy Adam.)

How does consciousness calm its anguish? How can Adam imagine himself happy and perfect? Through the operation of a triple illusion. Since it only takes in effects, consciousness will satisfy its ignorance by reversing the order of things, by taking effects for causes (*the illusion of final causes*): it will construe the effect of a body on our body as the final cause of its own actions. In this way it will take itself for the first cause, and will invoke its power over the body (*the illusion of free decrees*). And where consciousness can no longer imagine itself to be the first cause, nor the organizer of ends, it invokes a God endowed with understanding and volition, operating by means of final causes or free decrees in order to prepare for man a world commensurate with His glory and His punishments (*the theological illusion*).[5] Nor does it suffice to say that consciousness deludes itself: consciousness is inseparable from the triple illusion that *constitutes* it, the illusion of finality, the illusion of freedom, and the theological illusion. Consciousness is only a dream with one's eyes open: "The infant believes he freely wants the milk; the angry child that he freely wants vengeance; and the timid, flight. So the drunk believes that it is from a free decision of the mind that he speaks the things he later, when sober, wishes he had not said."[6]

It is still necessary for consciousness itself to have a cause. Spinoza sometimes defines desire as "appetite together with consciousness of the ap-

petite." But he specifies that this is only a nominal definition of desire, and that consciousness adds nothing to appetite ("we neither strive for, nor will, neither want, nor desire anything because we judge it to be good; on the contrary, we judge something to be good because we strive for it, will it, want it, and desire it").[7] We need, then, to arrive at a real definition of desire, one that at the same time shows the "cause" by which consciousness is hollowed out, as it were, in the appetitive process. Now, the appetite is nothing else but the effort by which each thing strives to persevere in its being, each body in extension, each mind or each idea in thought (*conatus*). But because this effort prompts us to act differently according to the objects encountered, we should say that it is, at every moment, determined by the affections that come from the objects. *These determinative affections are necessarily the cause of the consciousness of the conatus.*[8] And since the affections are not separable from a movement by which they cause us to go to a greater or lesser perfection (joy and sadness), depending on whether the thing encountered enters into composition with us, or on the contrary tends to decompose us, consciousness appears as the continual awareness of this passage from greater to lesser, or from lesser to greater, as a witness of the variations and determinations of the *conatus* functioning in relation to other bodies or other ideas. The object that agrees with my nature determines me to form a superior totality that includes us, the object and myself. The object that does not agree with me jeopardizes my cohesion, and tends to divide me into subsets, which, in the extreme case, enter into relations that are incompatible with my constitutive relation (*death*). Consciousness is the passage, or rather the awareness of the passage from these less potent totalities to more potent ones, and vice versa. It is purely transitive. But it is not a property of the Whole or of any specific whole; it has only an informational value, and what is more, the information is necessarily confused and distorted. Here again, Nietzsche is strictly Spinozan when he writes: "The greater activity is unconscious; consciousness usually only appears when a whole wants to subordinate itself to a superior whole. It is primarily the consciousness of this superior whole, of reality external to the ego. Consciousness is born in relation to a being of which we could be a function; it is the means by which we incorporate into that being."

II. A Devaluation of All Values, and of Good and Evil in Particular (in Favor of "Good" and "Bad"): Spinoza the Immoralist

"Thou shalt not eat of the fruit . . . ": the anxious, ignorant Adam understands these words as the expression of a prohibition. And yet, what do they