

An Apprenticeship in Philosophy

Gilles Deleuze

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Introduction

Hegel and the Foundations of Poststructuralism

Continental poststructuralism has problematized the foundations of philosophical and political thought. Perhaps dazzled by the impact of this theoretical rupture, diverse American authors have embraced this movement as the inauguration of a postphilosophical culture where philosophical claims and political judgments admit no justification and rest on no foundation. This problematic, however, settles too easily into a new opposition that obscures the real possibilities afforded by contemporary Continental theory. At the hands of both its supporters and its detractors, poststructuralism has been incorporated into a series of Anglo-American debates—between modernists and postmodernists, between communitarians and liberals—in such a way as to misdirect and blunt its force. The importance of poststructuralism cannot be captured by posing a new series of oppositions, but only by recognizing the nuances and alternatives it proposes within modernity, within the philosophical tradition, within the contemporary field of social practices. If we look closely at the historical development of poststructuralist thought, at the complex social and theoretical pressures it encountered and the tools it constructed to face them, we can recapture some of its critical and constructive powers. Poststructuralism, we find, is not oriented simply toward the negation of theoretical foundations, but rather toward the exploration of new grounds for philosophical and political inquiry; it is involved not simply in the rejection of the tradition of political and philosophical discourse, but more importantly in the

articulation and affirmation of alternative lineages that arise from within the tradition itself.

The roots of poststructuralism and its unifying basis lie, in large part, in a general opposition not to the philosophical tradition *tout court* but specifically to the Hegelian tradition. For the generation of Continental thinkers that came to maturity in the 1960s, Hegel was the figure of order and authority that served as the focus of antagonism. Deleuze speaks for his entire cohort: "What I detested above all was Hegelianism and the dialectic" ("Lettre à Michel Cressole" 110). In order to appreciate this antagonism, however, we must realize that, in the domain of Continental theory during this period, Hegel was ubiquitous. As a result of influential interpretations by theorists as diverse as Kojève, Gramsci, Sartre, and Bobbio, Hegel had come to dominate the theoretical horizon as the ineluctable centerpiece of philosophical speculation, social theory, and political practice. In 1968, it appeared to François Châtelet that every philosopher had to begin with Hegel: "[Hegel] determined a horizon, a language, a code that we are still at the very heart of today. Hegel, by this fact, is *our* Plato: the one who delimits—ideologically or scientifically, positively or negatively—the theoretical possibilities of theory" (*Hegel* 2). Any account of Continental poststructuralism must take this framework of generalized Hegelianism as its point of departure.

The first problem of poststructuralism, then, is how to evade a Hegelian foundation. In order to understand the extent of this problem, however, we have to recognize the serious restrictions facing such a project in the specific social and historical context. Châtelet argues, in curiously dialectical fashion, that the only viable project to counter Hegelianism is to make Hegel the negative foundation of philosophy. Those who neglect the initial step of addressing and actively rejecting Hegel, he claims, those who attempt simply to turn their backs on Hegel, run the risk of ending up as mere repetitions of the Hegelian problematic. "Certainly, there are many contemporary philosophical projects that ignore Hegelianism. . . . They are dealing with the false meaning of absolute beginnings, and, moreover, they deprive themselves of a good point of support. It is better—like Marx and Nietzsche—to begin with Hegel than to end up with him" (4). Hegelianism was such a powerful vortex that in attempting to ignore it one would inevitably be sucked in by its power. Only anti-Hegelianism provided the negative point of support necessary for a post-Hegelian or even a non-Hegelian project.

From this point of view, the early works of Gilles Deleuze are exemplary of the entire generation of poststructuralist thinkers. In his early investigations into the history of philosophy we can see an intense concentration of the generalized anti-Hegelianism of the time. Deleuze attempted to confront Hegel

and dialectical thought head-on, as Châtelet said one must, with a rigorous philosophical refutation; he engaged Hegelianism not in order to salvage its worthwhile elements, not to extract "the rational kernel from the mystical shell," but rather to articulate a total critique and a rejection of the negative dialectical framework so as to achieve a real autonomy, a theoretical separation from the entire Hegelian problematic. The philosophers that Deleuze selects as partisans in this struggle (Bergson, Nietzsche, and Spinoza) appear to allow him successive steps toward the realization of this project. Many recent critics of French poststructuralism, however, have charged that the poststructuralists did not understand Hegel and, with a facile anti-Hegelianism, missed the most powerful thrust of his thought.[1] Deleuze is the most important example to consider in this regard because he mounts the most focused and precise attack on Hegelianism. Nonetheless, perhaps since this cultural and philosophical paradigm was so tenacious, the attempted deracination from the Hegelian terrain is not immediately successful. We find that Deleuze often poses his project not only in the traditional language of Hegelianism but also in terms of typical Hegelian problems—the determination of being, the unity of the One and the Multiple, and so on. Paradoxically, in his effort to establish Hegel as a negative foundation for his thought, Deleuze may appear to be very Hegelian.

If Hegelianism is the first problem of poststructuralism, then, anti-Hegelianism quickly presents itself as the second. In many respects, Hegelianism is the most difficult of adversaries because it possesses such an extraordinary capacity to recuperate opposition. Many Anglo-American authors, seeking to discount the rupture of Continental poststructuralism, have rightly emphasized this dilemma. Judith Butler presents the challenge for anti-Hegelians in very clear terms: "References to a 'break' with Hegel are almost always impossible, if only because Hegel has made the very notion of 'breaking with' into the central tenet of his dialectic" (*Subjects of Desire* 184). It may seem, then, from this perspective, that to be anti-Hegelian, through a dialectical twist, becomes a position more Hegelian than ever; in effect, one might claim that the effort to be an "other" to Hegel can always be folded into an "other" within Hegel. There is in fact a growing literature that extends this line of argument, claiming that the work of contemporary anti-Hegelians consists merely in unconscious repetitions of Hegelian dramas without the power of the Hegelian subject and the rigor and clarity of the Hegelian logic.[2]

The problem of recuperation that faces the anti-Hegelian foundation of poststructuralism offers a second and more important explanation for our selection of Deleuze in this study. Although numerous authors have made important contributions to our critique of Hegel, Deleuze has gone the furthest in extricating himself from the problems of anti-Hegelianism and constructing

an alternative terrain for thought—no longer post-Hegelian but rather separate from the problem of Hegel. If our first reason for proposing Deleuze as an exemplary poststructuralist thinker was that he is representative of the antagonism to Hegelianism, our second is that he is anomalous in his extension of that project away from Hegel toward a separate, alternative terrain. There are two central elements of this passage that Deleuze develops in different registers and on different planes of thought: a nondialectical conception of negation and a constitutive theory of practice. We cannot understand these elements, I repeat, if we merely oppose them to Hegelian conceptions of negation and practice. We must recognize their nuances and pose them on an alternative plane. These two themes, then, negation and practice, understood with their new forms, comprise the foundation of the new terrain that poststructuralism has to offer for philosophical and political thought, a terrain for contemporary research.

Let us briefly examine the general outlines of these two central elements of Deleuze's project. The concept of negation that lies at the center of dialectical thought seems to pose the most serious challenge for any theory that claims to be anti- or post-Hegelian. "Nondialectical difference," Judith Butler writes, "despite its various forms, is the labor of the negative which has lost its 'magic' " (184). The nondialectical concept of negation that we find in Deleuze's total critique certainly contains none of the magical effect of the dialectic. The dialectical negation is always directed toward the miracle of resurrection: It is a negation "which supersedes in such a way as to preserve and maintain what is superseded, and consequently survives its own supersession" (*Phenomenology of Spirit* §188). Nondialectical negation is more simple and more absolute. With no faith in the beyond, in the eventual resurrection, negation becomes an extreme moment of nihilism: In Hegelian terms, it points to the death of the other. Hegel considers this pure death, "the absolute Lord," merely an abstract conception of negation; in the contemporary world, however, the absolute character of negation has become dreadfully concrete, and the magical resurrection implicit in the dialectical negation appears merely as superstition. Nondialectical negation is absolute not in the sense that everything present is negated but in that what is negated is attacked with full, unrestrained force. On the one hand, authors like Deleuze propose this nondialectical concept of negation not in the promotion of nihilism, but merely as the recognition of an element of our world. We can situate this theoretical position in relation to the field of "nuclear criticism," but not in the sense that nuclear weapons pose the threat of negation, not in the sense that they pose the universal fear of death: This is merely the "standing negation" of a Hegelian framework, preserving the given order. The negation of the bomb is nondialectical in its actuality, not in the planning

rooms of Washington but in the streets of Hiroshima, as an agent of total destruction. There is nothing positive in the nondialectical negation, no magical resurrection: It is pure. On the other hand, with an eye toward the philosophical tradition, we can locate this radical conception of negation in the methodological proposals of certain Scholastic authors such as Roger Bacon. The pure negation is the first moment of a precritical conception of critique: *pars destruens, pars construens*. The important characteristics are the purity and autonomy of the two critical moments. Negation clears the terrain for creation; it is a bipartite sequence that precludes any third, synthetic moment. Thus we can at least gesture toward solid grounds for this radical, nondialectical negation: It is as new as the destructive force of contemporary warfare and as old as the precritical skepticism of the Scholastics.

The radicality of negation forces Deleuze to engage questions of the lowest order, questions of the nature of being. Deleuze's total critique involves a destruction so absolute that it becomes necessary to question what makes reality possible. We should emphasize that, on one hand, the rejection of Hegelian ontology does not lead Deleuze to some form of deontological thought. Although he denies any preconstituted structure of being or any teleological order of existence, Deleuze still operates on the highest planes of ontological speculation. Once again, to reject Hegelian ontology is not to reject ontology *tout court*. Deleuze insists instead on alternatives within the ontological tradition. On the other hand, however, we should be careful from the outset to distinguish this from a Heideggerian return to ontology, most importantly because Deleuze will only accept "superficial" responses to the question "What makes being possible?" In other words, he limits us to a strictly immanent and materialist ontological discourse that refuses any deep or hidden foundation of being. There is nothing veiled or negative about Deleuze's being; it is fully expressed in the world. Being, in this sense, is superficial, positive, and full. Deleuze refuses any "intellectualist" account of being, any account that in any way subordinates being to thought, that poses thinking as the supreme form of being.[3] There are numerous contributions to this project of a materialist ontology throughout the history of philosophy—such as Spinoza, Marx, Nietzsche, and Lucretius—and we will refer to them in our discussion to provide illustrative points of reference. We will focus, however, on Deleuze's constitutive conception of practice as a foundation of ontology. The radical negation of the nondialectical *pars destruens* emphasizes that no preconstituted order is available to define the organization of being. Practice provides the terms for a material *pars construens*; practice is what makes the constitution of being possible. The investigation of the nature of power allows Deleuze to bring substance to the materialist discourse and

to raise the theory of practice to the level of ontology. The foundation of being, then, resides both on a corporeal and on a mental plane, in the complex dynamics of behavior, in the superficial interactions of bodies. This is not an Althusserian "theoretical practice," but rather a more practical conception of practice, autonomous of any "theoricist tendency," a "practical practice" that is oriented principally toward the ontological rather than the epistemological realm. The only nature available to ontological discourse is an absolutely artificial conception of nature, a hybrid nature, a nature produced in practice—further removed than a second nature, an *n*th nature. This approach to ontology is as new as the infinitely plastic universe of cyborgs and as old as the tradition of materialist philosophy. What will be important throughout our discussion is that the traditionally fundamental terms—such as necessity, reason, nature, and being—though shaken from their transcendental fixity, still serve as a foundation because they acquire a certain consistency and substance in our world. Being, now historicized and materialized, is delimited by the outer bounds of the contemporary imagination, of the contemporary field of practice.

I elaborate these conceptions of nondialectical negation and constitutive practice in Deleuze's work by reading the evolution of his thought, that is, by following the progression of critical questions that guide his investigations during successive periods. The evolution of Deleuze's thought unfolds as he directs his attention sequentially to a series of authors in the philosophical canon and poses them each a specific question. His work on Bergson offers a critique of negative ontology and proposes in its stead an absolutely positive movement of being that rests on an efficient and internal notion of causality. To the negative movement of determination, he opposes the positive movement of differentiation; to the dialectical unity of the One and the Multiple, he opposes the irreducible multiplicity of becoming. The question of the organization or the constitution of the world, however, of the being of becoming, pushes Deleuze to pose these ontological issues in ethical terms. Nietzsche allows him to transpose the results of ontological speculation to an ethical horizon, to the field of forces, of sense and value, where the positive movement of being becomes the affirmation of being. The thematic of power in Nietzsche provides the theoretical passage that links Bergsonian ontology to an ethics of active expression. Spinoza covers this same passage and extends it to practice. Just as Nietzsche poses the affirmation of speculation, Spinoza poses the affirmation of practice, or joy, at the center of ontology. Deleuze argues that Spinoza's is an ontological conception of practice; Spinoza conceives practice, that is, as constitutive of being. In the precritical world of Spinoza's practical philosophy, Deleuze's thought finally discovers a real autonomy from the Hegelian problematic.

One lesson to be learned from this philosophical project is to highlight the nuances that define an antagonism. Once we stop clouding the issue with crude oppositions and recognize instead the specificity of an antagonism, we can begin to bring out finer nuances in our terminology. For example, when I pose the question of the *foundations* of poststructuralist thought I mean to contest the claim that this thought is properly characterized as antifoundationalism. To pose the issue as an exclusive opposition is, in effect, to credit the enemy with too much force, with too much theoretical terrain. Poststructuralism does critique a certain notion of foundation, but only to affirm another notion that is more adequate to its ends. Against a transcendental foundation we find an immanent one; against a given, teleological foundation we find a material, open one.[4] A similar nuance must be made in our discussion of causality. When we look closely at Deleuze's critique of causality we find not only a powerful rejection of the final cause and the formal cause, but also an equally powerful affirmation of the efficient cause as central to his philosophical project. Deleuze's ontology draws on the tradition of causal arguments and develops notions of both being's "productivity" and its "producibility," that is, of its aptitudes to produce and to be produced. I will argue that efficient causality, in fact, provides a key to a coherent account of Deleuze's entire discourse on difference. The nuances in the use of "foundation" and "causality" are perhaps best summarized by the distinction between order and organization. By the order of being, of truth, or of society I intend the structure imposed as necessary and eternal from above, from outside the material scene of forces; I use organization, on the other hand, to designate the coordination and accumulation of accidental (in the philosophical sense, i.e., nonnecessary) encounters and developments from below, from within the immanent field of forces. In other words, I do not conceive of organization as a blueprint of development or as the projected vision of an avant-garde, but rather as an immanent creation or composition of a relationship of consistency and coordination. In this sense, organization, the composition of creative forces, is always an art.

Throughout this study we will encounter unresolved problems and propositions that are powerfully suggestive but perhaps not clearly and rigorously delimited. We do not look to Deleuze here, however, simply to find the solutions to contemporary theoretical problems. More important, we inquire into his thought in order to investigate the proposals of a new problematic for research after the poststructuralist rupture, to test our footing on a terrain where new grounds of philosophical and political thought are possible. What we ask of Deleuze, above all, is to teach us the contemporary possibilities of philosophy.

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Preliminary Remark

The Early Deleuze: Some Methodological Principles

In the Introduction to *Instincts et institutions*, a collection of texts edited by Deleuze in 1953, we see the general outlines of a philosophical and political project beginning to take shape as a theory of the institution. "Contrary to the theories of law that put the positive outside of the social (natural rights) and the social in the negative (contractual limitation), the theory of the institution puts the negative outside of the social (needs) in order to present society as essentially positive and inventive (original means of satisfaction)" (ix). This schematic presentation of a theory of the institution already gives us two fundamental elements of Deleuze's project: It designates the attack on "the negative" as a political task and it poses the central productive object of philosophy as the construction of a purely positive, inventive society. We can already recognize latent here a powerful notion of constitution and a suggestive glimpse of a radically democratic theory. Admittedly, though, at this early point Deleuze's use of "the negative" and "the positive" is rather vague and thus the proposition can only provide an initial intuition of a project. One could attempt to read Deleuze's book on Hume, *Empiricism and Subjectivity*, with its focus on association and belief, as an early attempt to address directly this politicophilosophical project.[1] However, the general development of Deleuze's thought does not immediately follow this line; it becomes clear that Deleuze requires an extensive ontological detour before arriving at this positive political project. There is not the space nor the terms for this constructive project without first conducting a broad destructive operation. Deleuze's early work thus

always takes the form of a critique: *pars destruens, pars construens.* Throughout this period, the cutting edge of Deleuze's thought is a persistent, implacable siege on Hegelianism, an attack on the negative. Even in his very first published article, "Du Christ à la bourgeoisie," published when he was only twenty-one years old, we can already recognize anti-Hegelianism as a driving force of his thought: What characterizes Hegel better, after all, than the strict continuity between Christianity and bourgeois thought? It is important to establish and clarify the terms of this antagonism from the outset in order to gain a clear perspective on the sense and trajectory of Deleuze's overall project. The various *mots d'ordre* heralded by Deleuze in this period—the destruction of the negative, the affirmation of the positive—lack their full power and significance when they are not firmly grounded in an antagonistic engagement of Hegel. As Deleuze himself asserts while reading Nietzsche, in order to gain an adequate understanding of a philosophical project one must recognize against whom its principal concepts are directed (*Nietzsche and Philosophy* 8, 162). This, then, constitutes our first methodological principle for reading Deleuze: *Recognize the object and the terms of the primary antagonism.*

Deleuze's detour, though, is not only an attack but also the establishment of new terrain: The early intuition of a positive political project is recast by means of the long passage that we will follow—from Bergson to Nietzsche and finally to Spinoza. Deleuze requires a positive ontology in order to establish a positive theory of ethics and social organization. This long passage through the history of Western philosophy forges a multifarious edifice on the highest planes of metaphysical meditation that supports and informs the entire breadth of Deleuze's work. One can certainly recognize, even in the early works, a desire to move away from philosophy, to depart from his training and branch out into other fields: biology, psychology, art, mathematics, politics, literature. Many read Deleuze's work as a rejection of Western philosophical thought and hence the proposition of a postphilosophical or postmodern discourse. Indeed, Deleuze himself provides numerous statements to substantiate such an interpretation.[2] However, when we look closely at his arguments, we find that not only is his thought saturated with the Western philosophical tradition, but even when his examples seem "unphilosophical" the coherence of his positions and the mode of explanation that supports them remain on the highest logical and ontological planes.[3] If, then, we are to read Deleuze's work as an attack or betrayal of elements of the Western metaphysical tradition, we have to understand this as an affirmation of other elements of that same tradition. In other words, we cannot read Deleuze's work as thought "outside" or "beyond" the philosophical tradition, or even as an effective line of flight from that block; rather we must see it as the affirmation of a (discontinu-

ous, but coherent) line of thought that has remained suppressed and dormant, but nonetheless deeply embedded within that same tradition. Deleuze does not announce the end of metaphysics, but on the contrary seeks to rediscover the most coherent and lucid plane of metaphysical thought.[4] If we wanted to insist on his rejection of a certain form of philosophical inquiry, we would have to pose the statement in paradoxical form and say (borrowing a phrase from Althusser) that Deleuze develops "a nonphilosophical theory of philosophy." In any case, if in the course of this study our references to the resonances between Deleuze's work and other positions in the philosophical tradition seem at times excessive, it is precisely to emphasize the properly philosophical nature of his thought. Here, then, we have our second methodological principle: *Read Deleuze philosophically*.

Deleuze's journey through the history of philosophy takes a peculiar form. Even though Deleuze's monographs serve as excellent introductions, they never provide a comprehensive summary of a philosopher's work; instead, Deleuze selects the specific aspects of a philosopher's thought that make a positive contribution to his own project at that point. As Nietzschean or as Spinozist, Deleuze does not accept all of Nietzsche or all of Spinoza. If a philosopher presents arguments with which Deleuze might find fault, he does not critique them but simply leaves them out of his discussion. Might it be said, then, that Deleuze is an unfaithful reader? Certainly not. If his readings are partial, they are nonetheless very rigorous and precise, with meticulous care and sensitivity to the selected topics; what Deleuze forfeits in comprehensiveness, he gains in intensity of focus. In effect, Deleuze's early works are "punctual interventions"—he makes surgical incisions in the corpus of the history of philosophy. This leads us to our third methodological principle: *Recognize Deleuze's selectivity*.

In each of the stages of this philosophical journey, Deleuze adds a specific point that builds and depends on the previous results. Each of Deleuze's philosophical monographs is directed toward a very specific question, and viewed as an ensemble the development of these philosophical questions reveals the evolution of Deleuze's thought. Often, Deleuze's explanations appear incomplete because he takes for granted and fails to repeat the results of his previous research. (For example, as we will see below, many of Deleuze's claims for Nietzsche's attack on the dialectic remain obscure unless we read into them a Bergsonian critique of a negative ontological movement.) Therefore, Deleuze's early work constructs an odd sort of history of philosophy in which the connecting links depend not on actual philosophical historiography but on the evolution of Deleuze's own thought. By evolution I do not mean to suggest a unilinear or teleological progression, but rather a sort of theoretical process of aggregation.

Focusing on this progression highlights the movement in Deleuze's thought, and what emerges is the process of Deleuze's own philosophical education, his apprenticeship in philosophy. The lines of this educational journey help explain the counterhistorical development Bergson-Nietzsche-Spinoza that guides Deleuze from ontology to ethics and politics.[5] Hence, we can posit a final methodological principle: *Read Deleuze's thought as an evolution.*

When we look at Deleuze's early work from a historical perspective, as an evolution, the most striking fact is that he wrote his first book when he was rather young (he was twenty-eight years old in 1953 when *Empiricism and Subjectivity* appeared) and then waited eight years before publishing his next book. Eight years might not seem like a very long break for some authors, but for Deleuze, who after 1962 consistently published a book each year, eight years represents an enormous gap. "It's like a hole in my life, an eight-year hole. That is what I find interesting in lives, the holes they have, the lacunas, sometimes dramatic, sometimes not. . . . Perhaps it is in the holes that the movement takes place" ("Signes et événements" 18). This eight-year hole in Deleuze's intellectual life does in fact represent a period of movement, a dramatic reorientation of his philosophical approach. During this period, in effect, he shifts from the Hume-Bergson axis that characterizes his very early work to the Nietzsche-Spinoza identity that carries his work to its maturity. In order to read this hole in Deleuze's intellectual life, we must try to interpret what this reorientation can mean, what new possibilities it affords Deleuze, and how it characterizes the evolution of his thought.

This focus on the evolution of Deleuze's philosophical education best explains why I have chosen in the following study to deal exclusively with his early writings. In these works Deleuze develops a technical vocabulary and conceptual foundation that serve him through the entire trajectory of his career. The positions of the later works can appear obscure, even untenable, when we do not place them in the context of these early investigations. Indeed, some of the most spectacular innovations in what one might call his mature work—the major independent philosophical texts (*Différence et répétition* and *The Logic of Sense*), the collaborations with Félix Guattari, the cinema studies, and the latest works—are in large part reworkings of the cluster of problems developed in this formative period of intense and independent research. The profound originality of Deleuze's voice is perhaps due to the fact that during these years he was not following the same course as the majority of his generation.[6] This is the period of Deleuze's subterranean research—the period in which he forged new paths, outside of the limelight and commonplaces of public French cultural debates—that perhaps allowed him to surface with such a

profound impact later. If, in fact, as Michel Foucault suspected, this difference does come to mark our century, if our times do become Deleuzian, this early work, the subterranean Deleuze, will hold the key to the formative developments that made this new paradigm possible.

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Chapter 1

Bergsonian Ontology
The Positive Movement of Being

In the work of Henri Bergson, one might expect to find a psychology or a phenomenology of perception. It may seem strange at first, then, that what Deleuze finds principally is an ontology: an absolutely positive logic of being rooted in time. As we have noted, though, Deleuze does not move directly to the positive project but rather approaches first by means of a critical, aggressive moment: "What Bergson essentially reproaches his predecessors for. . . . " ("La conception de la différence chez Bergson" 79). Deleuze reads Bergson as a polemic against the dominant philosophical tradition, and the faults of his predecessors are found in their most concentrated form in Hegel's logic; Bergson critiques several philosophical arguments, but behind each of these Deleuze finds Hegel occupying an extreme, exaggerated position. Deleuze does not claim that a direct antagonism against Hegel is what primarily drives Bergson's thought, but his reading of Bergson continually retains the attack on Hegel as its own critical edge. In Deleuze's interpretation, Bergson does not challenge the central criteria for being inherited from the ontological tradition—simplicity, reality, perfection, unity, multiplicity, and so on—but rather he focuses on the ontological movement that is posed to address these criteria. "Difference" is the Bergsonian term that plays the central role in this discussion of ontological movement. We should be especially attentive at this point, because Deleuze's interpretation of Bergson (formulated as early as 1956) stands at the head of a long discourse on difference in French thought that constitutes a theoretical touchstone for poststructural-

ism. Here we find a particular and rigorous usage of the term. In Deleuze's reading, Bergson's difference does not principally refer to a quidditas or to a static contrast of qualities in real being; rather, difference marks the real dynamic of being—it is the movement that grounds being. Thus, Bergson's difference relates primarily to the temporal, not the spatial, dimension of being. The essential task that Deleuze sets for himself in the investigation of Bergson's concept of difference, then, is twofold. First, he must use Bergson's critique of the ontological tradition to reveal the weakness of Hegel's dialectic and its negative logic of being, as a false conception of difference. This attack is directed against two foundational moments of Hegel's logic: the determination of being and the dialectic of the One and the Multiple. Second, he must elaborate Bergson's positive movement of being in difference and show how this movement provides a viable alternative for ontology. It is precisely the aggressive moment against Hegelian logic that prepares the ground for the productive moment.

Deleuze's work on Bergson, however, presents a complication—and at the same time an opportunity—for studying the evolution of his thought because it is conducted in two distinct periods: one in the mid-1950s and another in the mid-1960s. The major result of the first period is an article titled "La conception de la différence chez Bergson," which was published in *Les études bergsoniennes* in 1956 but written at least two years earlier and presented to the "Association des amies de Bergson" in May 1954. This early article is very dense and contains the major points of Deleuze's reading of Bergson. Deleuze published two other Bergson texts in this period, but neither substantially modifies the early essay. The first is a chapter on Bergson for a collection edited by Merleau-Ponty, *Les philosophes célèbres* (1956), and the second is a selection of Bergson texts, *Mémoire et vie* (1957). The result of Deleuze's second period of Bergson study is *Bergsonism*, published in 1966. This short book takes up much of the argument presented in the early article but shows a change in focus and offers some very interesting additions to the original interpretation, additions that show the influence of Deleuze's intense Nietzsche period in the intervening years. These two phases of Bergson study, then, provide an excellent opportunity to read the orientation of Deleuze's early project, because they straddle not only the work on Nietzsche (1962) but also the long publication gap, the "eight-year hole" that, as Deleuze suggests, may be a site of considerable reorientation of the project.

1.1 Determination and Efficient Difference

Deleuze's early reading of Bergson is grounded on an attack against the negative process of determination. The specter that looms over this ques-

tion throughout Modern philosophy is Hegel's reading and critique of Spinoza. Hegel takes a phrase from one of Spinoza's letters and, turning it back against Spinoza, makes it a central maxim of his own logic: "Omnis determinatio est negatio" (*Science of Logic* 113).[1] This phrase describes for Hegel the process of determination and the state of determinateness. The *Logic* begins with pure being in its simple immediacy; but this simple being has no quality, no difference—it is empty and equivalent to its opposite, nothingness. It is necessary that being actively negate nothingness to mark its difference from it. Determinate being subsumes this opposition, and this difference between being and nothingness at its core defines the foundation of the real differences and qualities that constitute its reality. Negation defines this state of determinateness in two senses: It is a static *contrast* based on the finitude of qualities and a dynamic *conflict* based on the antagonism of differences (see Taylor 233-37). In the first sense, determinateness involves negation because qualities are limited and thus contrast, or passively negate, what is other than themselves (in the sense that red negates green, yellow, etc.). In the second sense, however, there is an active negation that animates determinateness, because determinate things are in a causal interaction with each other. The existence of something is the active negation of something else. Therefore, even the *state* of determinateness is essentially a negative *movement*. This insistence on a negative movement of determination is also the heart of Hegel's critique of Spinoza. Since Spinoza's being is absolutely positive, in other words since in Spinoza pure being does not actively negate nothingness and does not proceed through a negative movement, it lacks the fundamental difference that could define its real existence. In Hegel's eyes, Spinoza's ontology and any such positive, affirmative ontology must remain abstract and indifferent. "Reality as thus conceived [as perfection and affirmation] is assumed to survive when all negation has been thought away; but to do this is to do away with all determinateness" (*Science of Logic* 112). Negation cannot merely be passively "thought away," Hegel maintains, but must be actively engaged and really negated—this is the role of the process of determination. Consequently, finally, inevitably, because Spinoza's being is not held different from nothingness as its opposite, it dissolves into nothingness just as does Spinoza himself in Hegel's Romantic imagination: "The cause of his death was consumption, from which he had long been a sufferer; this was in harmony with his system of philosophy, according to which all particularity and individuality pass away in the one substance" (*Lectures on the History of Philosophy* 257). This polemic against Spinoza constitutes one of Hegel's strongest arguments for the ontological movement of negation: Being not determined through negation will remain indifferent and abstract, and finally, since it is not held different from its opposite, it will fade

into nothingness. Hegel insists that if we are to recognize difference, the real difference that characterizes the particularity and individuality of being, we must first recognize the negative movement of being; or else, we must disappear along with Spinoza in "acosmism," in the indifference of pure, positive ontology.

Deleuze's early reading of Bergson seems to accept the Hegelian formulation that the determination of being must be characterized by negation. Rather than challenging that formulation, Deleuze charges that the process of ontological determination itself undermines the real grounding of being; he claims that the difference constituted by the negative movement of determination is a false notion of difference. Hence, the process of determination both destroys the substantial nature of being and fails to grasp the concreteness and specificity of real being. Here, with the rejection of determination, we can recognize the anti-Hegelian approach of Deleuze's early work, his reaction to the dialectic of negation. In this process, however, Deleuze's critical method takes on an interesting form. He does not attack the dialectic directly, but rather he introduces a third philosophical position that he locates between Bergson and the dialectic. Deleuze engages this proximate enemy on the specific fault that marks its insufficiency, and then he proceeds to show that Hegel, the fundamental enemy, carries this fault to its extreme. In the Bergson studies, Deleuze engages Mechanicism and Platonism as the proximate enemies, and in the Nietzsche study he brings in Kant. The advantage of first addressing these proximate enemies is that they provide a common ground on which to work out the attack that can be subsequently extended to the dialectic. Indeed, as Deleuze's thought evolves we will see that he has continually greater difficulty in finding a common terrain for addressing the Hegelian position. More important, though, this method of triangulation shows us that even in this early work Deleuze has a problematic relation to opposition. It is clear that Deleuze is attacking the dialectic as the fundamental enemy, but this method affords him an oblique posture with regard to Hegel so that he does not have to stand in direct opposition.

Like Bergson, the Mechanicists try to theorize an empirical evolution of the differences of being, but in doing so Mechanicism destroys the substantial, necessary quality of being. Deleuze's Bergsonian challenge to Mechanicism takes the form of a curious proposition: In order for being to be necessary, it must be indeterminate. This discussion of ontological determination turns on an analysis of the nature of difference. The form of difference proposed by the process of determination, Deleuze argues, always remains external to being and therefore fails to provide it with an essential, necessary foundation. These are the terms Deleuze uses to critique the simple determination of Mechanicism: "Bergson shows that vital

difference is an *internal* difference. But also, that internal difference cannot be conceived as a simple *determination*: a determination can be accidental, at least it can only sustain its being through a cause, an end, or a chance [elle ne peut tenir son être que d'une cause, d'une fin ou d'un hasard], and it therefore implies a subsistent exteriority" ("La conception de la différence chez Bergson" 92). A Mechanistic determination of being, while it attempts to trace the evolution of reality, destroys the necessity of being. The external difference of determination is always reliant on an "other" (as cause, end, or chance) and thus it introduces an accidental quality into being; in other words, determination implies a mere subsistent exteriority, not a substantial interiority.

Right away, however, we have to find Deleuze's explanation puzzling. In effect, Deleuze has reversed the terms of the traditional ontological problematic here. He does not question how being can gain determinacy, how being can sustain its difference, but rather how difference "can sustain its being [peut tenir son être]." Deleuze gives difference a radically new role. Difference founds being; it provides being with its necessity, its substantiality. We cannot understand this argument for internal difference over external difference unless we recognize the ontologically fundamental role that difference is required to fill. I would suggest that we can best understand Deleuze's explanation through reference to Scholastic conceptions of the ontological centrality of causality and the productivity of being.[2] In many respects Deleuze reads Bergsonian ontology as a Scholasticism in which the discourse on causality is replaced with a discussion of difference.[3] We do not have to depart very far from the text to read the claim that determination "can only sustain its being through a cause, an end, or a chance" as an attack on three conceptions of causality that are inadequate for the foundation of being: (1) material—a purely physical cause that gives rise to an external effect; (2) final—a cause that refers to the end or goal in the production of its effect; (3) accidental—a cause that has a completely contingent relation to its effect. What is central in each case is that the cause remains external to its effect and therefore can only sustain the *possibility* of being. For being to be necessary, the fundamental ontological cause must be internal to its effect. This internal cause is the efficient cause that plays the central role in Scholastic ontological foundations. Furthermore, it is only the efficient cause, precisely because of its internal nature, that can sustain being as substance, as *causa sui*.[4] In the Bergsonian context, then, we might say that efficient difference is the difference that is the internal motor of being: It sustains being's necessity and real substantiality. Through this internal productive dynamic, the being of efficient difference is *causa sui*. The determination of Mechanicism cannot fill this role because it is constituted by an external, material causality. We should empha-

size here that Deleuze's argument is certainly not a critique of causality *tout court*, but rather a rejection of external conceptions of cause in favor of an internal, efficient notion.

After having laid out the terms of an attack on the external difference of determination with the critique of Mechanicism, Deleuze engages Plato, a second proximate enemy, to refine the attack. Deleuze recognizes that Plato shares with Bergson the project to construct a philosophy of difference ("La conception de la différence chez Bergson" 95), but what Deleuze challenges in Plato is the principle of finality. Once again, the critique is focused on the external nature of difference with the ontological criteria as measure. In Bergson difference is driven by an internal motor (which Bergson calls intuition), whereas in Plato this role is only filled by an external inspiration from the finality: The difference of the thing can only be accounted for by its destination, the Good (95). If we translate this into causal discourse, we can say that Plato tries to found being on the final cause. Although Bergson, like Plato, does conceive of the articulations of reality in terms of functions and ends, in Bergson there is no separation between difference and the thing, between cause and effect: "The thing and the corresponding end are in fact one and the same. . . . There is no longer any room to talk about an end: When difference has become the thing itself, there is no longer room to say that the thing receives its difference from an end" (96). Once again, the discussion of difference is perfectly consistent with a causal ontological argument: Bergson's efficient difference is contrasted to Plato's final difference. The key to the argument turns, as it did in the case of Mechanicism, on the need for difference to sustain a substantial nature, on its ontological centrality. Bergson presents difference as *causa sui*, supported by an internal dynamic, while Plato's difference is forced to rely on the external support of finality. Hence, Platonic difference is not capable of supporting being in its substantiality and necessity.

This explanation of the faults of Mechanicism and Platonism provides us with a means of understanding the Bergsonian distinction that Deleuze finds so important between "differences of nature" and "differences of degree." "What Bergson essentially reproaches his predecessors for is not having seen the real differences of nature. . . . Where there were differences of nature, they only recognized differences of degree" (79). At times it seems as if Deleuze and Bergson are using these terms to distinguish between qualitative and quantitative differences, but, especially given the sweeping claim about the originality of this conception in the history of philosophy, this interpretation proves inadequate. We gain a much clearer perspective if we refer, once again, to the tradition of Scholastic causal arguments: "Differences of nature" appear as those differences that imply ne-

cessity and substance, corresponding to the Scholastic *causae per se*; thus, "differences of degree" are those that imply accidents, *causae per accidens*.[5] "Thinking internal difference as such, as pure internal difference, arriving at a pure concept of difference, raising difference to the absolute—that is the sense of Bergson's effort" (90). While Mechanicism and Platonism do succeed in thinking difference, they only arrive at contingent differences (*per accidens*); Bergson's conception of internal difference leads us to recognize substantial differences (*per se*).

Hegelianism, however, is the fundamental target we find at the base of each of these critiques; Hegel is the one who takes the exteriority of difference to its extreme. "One can even, based on certain of Bergson's texts, foresee the objections that he would make to a dialectic of the Hegelian type, which he is much further from than that of Plato" (96). One might expect that with the critique of Platonic finality as an introduction Deleuze would mount an attack against the final cause and teleology in Hegel—in effect, he already has the weapons for such an attack at his disposal. Instead, he turns back to the process of determination and the basic negative movement of the dialectic, to the founding moment of Hegel's logic. "In Bergson . . . the thing differs with itself *first, immediately*. According to Hegel, the thing differs with itself because it differs first with all that it is not" (96). In Bergson, the thing immediately differs with itself; in other words, the difference of the thing is sustained through an internal, efficient production. The common fault of Mechanicism and Platonism is that they both conceive of difference as dependent on an external support; however, they each identify specific external supports (an external material thing in Mechanicism and a function or finality in Plato), and thus the exteriority of difference in each case is limited. Hegelian dialectics takes external difference to its extreme, to absolute exteriority, "all the way to contradiction." The dialectic presents the thing differing with an unlimited other, "with all that it is not"—this is absolute exteriority. In effect, if we ignore the question of historiography, Hegel appears to gather the faults of Mechanicism and Platonism and repeat them in their pure form by taking external difference to its extreme.

The Bergsonian critique is obvious when we focus on the causality implied by the dialectic. From the very first moments of *Science of Logic*—from pure being to nothingness to determinate being—the dialectic is constituted by a dynamic in which the cause is absolutely external to its effect: This is the essence of a dialectic of contradiction. The process of the mediation in the opposite necessarily depends on an external causality. As such, Hegel's logic of being is vulnerable to a Scholastic response: A conception of being founded on an external cause cannot sustain the necessity or substantiality of being because a cause external to its effect cannot be

necessary; the successive external mediations that found dialectical being cannot constitute *causae per se* but must rather be recognized as *causae per accidens*. Thus, because of the contingency of this external causal movement, the being of the dialectic is the extreme case of a "subsistent exteriority." The core of a Bergsonian attack on the Hegelian concept of dialectical mediation, then, is that it cannot sustain being as necessary and substantial.

Not only does the Hegelian dialectic, like Mechanicism and Platonism, introduce accident into being, but it also fails to grasp the concreteness and singularity of being: "Now, if the objection that Bergson could raise against Platonism was that it remained a conception of *difference that is still external*, the objection that he makes to a dialectic of contradictions is that it remains a conception of *difference that is only abstract*" (96-97). The logic of this further attack is not immediately clear. How does it follow that the difference of dialectical difference is abstract merely from the condition that its support is absolutely external? Deleuze backs up this claim by quoting Bergson on the logic of external perception: "It is hardly concrete reality on which one can take at the same time two opposing views, and subsume consequently the two antagonistic concepts. . . . This combination (of two contradictory concepts) cannot present either a diversity of degree or a variety of forms: It is or it is not" (96-97, cited from *La Pensée et le Mouvant* 198, 207). Once again, the argument is most clearly understood in terms of causality. First, Bergson claims that a dialectic of opposites remains a mere "combination" of two terms, not a synthesis, because the terms remain absolutely external to one another and thus cannot form a coherent, necessary causal chain. This charge is backed once again by the principle that an external cause cannot be necessary. Second, Bergson claims that the result of this combination of abstract concepts cannot produce something concrete and real. This claim is based on another fundamental principle of causality: An effect cannot contain more reality or perfection than its cause. The heart of a Bergsonian attack on the Hegelian concept of dialectical synthesis, then, is that its result must remain both contingent and abstract.

Up to this point we have considered Deleuze's Bergsonian attack on Hegel's negative ontological movement as it is presented in Deleuze's first phase of Bergson study, and mainly in the early article "La conception de la différence chez Bergson." Deleuze has attributed difference with an ontologically foundational role and then constructed a scale for evaluating various conceptions of difference based on their capacity to fulfill this role. We have found that, because of the ontological demands at its core, Deleuze's discussion on difference can be clearly understood if it is continually referred to a Scholastic discourse on causality. Bergson's internal

difference, appearing as an efficient causality, grasps differences of nature or differences that support substance in its necessity and reality; the external difference presented by the proximate enemies, Mechanicism and Platonism, is only capable of carrying differences of degree that cannot support being as necessary; finally, the Hegelian dialectic, with its absolutely external negative movement, can grasp neither differences of nature nor differences of degree—the being of the dialectic remains not only contingent but also abstract. "That which carries neither degrees nor nuances is an abstraction" (97).[6] The negative movement of dialectical determination, while purporting to establish the basis for real difference, actually ignores difference altogether. Deleuze has managed to turn Hegel's argument for determination completely upside down. Hegel proposes the negative movement of determination on the basis of the charge that Spinoza's positive movement remains abstract and indifferent; here, however, on the basis of classic ontological argumentation, Deleuze turns the charge of abstraction against Hegel and claims that dialectical determination ignores difference: "One has substituted for difference the game of determination" (96). The antagonistic project against Hegel is clearly the driving force of this argument. When Deleuze claims that "not only is vital difference not a determination, but it is rather the contrary—given the choice it would be indetermination itself" (92), it is very clear "against whom" these concepts are directed. Indeed, the acceptance of the term "indetermination" to describe Bergson's difference should be read principally as a refutation of the negative movement of the dialectic. We should note here that this early article is the only occasion on which Deleuze attacks the Hegelian dialectic directly, on its own terms, and perhaps for this reason it is his most powerful critique. Later, when Deleuze returns to attack the dialectic in the second Bergson phase of study, in his work on Nietzsche or in *Différence et répétition*, he always addresses an extrapolation or derivation of the dialectic.

This direct antagonistic foundation, however, already raises a serious problem: The radical opposition to the dialectic appears to force us to read Bergsonian being as "indeterminate" in the Hegelian sense. We will find later, however, that Hegel's claims about the attributes of the state of determinate being—quality, finitude, and reality—are equally claimed by the being of Bergson's internal difference.[7] Deleuze feels the need to correct this false impression, warning us not to confuse Bergsonian "indetermination" with irrationality or abstraction: "When [Bergson] talks about determination he does not invite us to abandon reason, but to arrive at the true reason of the thing in the process of making itself, the philosophical reason that is not determination but difference" ("Bergson" 299). We will find, in fact, that Bergson's "indetermination" has little to do with Hegel's "deter-

mination," but rather it relates to an idea of the creativity and originality of real being: "*l'imprévisible*," the unforeseeable. Bergson's term is neither consistent with nor opposite to Hegel's. We will return to the specifics of Bergson's positive ontology; it is sufficient at this point to recognize the force and the initial consequences of the antagonistic foundation of Deleuze's argument.

1.2 Multiplicity in the Passage from Quality to Quantity

When Deleuze returns to Bergson in the mid-1960s to write *Bergsonism*, he takes up again many of his early arguments, but his polemical foundation changes slightly. The analysis still contains an attack against the negative movement of determination, but now the central critical focus is directed toward the problem of the One and the Multiple. This reorientation, however, does not by any means mark a departure from the earlier analysis, but simply a progression: We can imagine that Deleuze has merely continued in his reading of "The Doctrine of Being" in Hegel's *Science of Logic*, moving from chapter 2 on determinate being to chapter 3 on the construction of being-for-self through the dialectical relationship of the One and the Multiple. It is still the opposition to Hegel's ontological problematic that provides the dynamic for Deleuze's exposition of Bergson's position; it is as if Deleuze has merely descended one level deeper into Hegel's logic of being, with Bergson, his Virgil, close at his side.

It should come as no surprise, therefore, that when Deleuze approaches the problem of the One and the Multiple in *Bergsonism*, his critique of the dialectical solution is very similar to the earlier critique of the dialectical process of determination. "There are many theories in philosophy that combine the one and the multiple. They share the characteristic of claiming to reconstruct the real with general ideas" (*Bergsonism* 43-44). Deleuze provides us with two examples of this generalizing negative movement: "We are told that the Self is one (thesis) and it is multiple (antithesis), then it is the unity of the multiple (synthesis). Or else we are told that the One is already multiple, that Being passes into nonbeing and produces becoming" (44). Deleuze has three arguments ready in his arsenal from the earlier attack on determination. (1) Contradiction is a misreading of difference that can only be achieved by posing general, imprecise terms that are abstract from reality. Being in general, nonbeing in general, the One in general, the Multiple in general: These terms are too large, too abstract to grasp the specificity and singularity of reality; they are cut too big and hang loosely on reality, as Bergson says, "like baggy clothes" (44). (2) The negative movement of the dialectic violates the real relations of being. "Bergson criticizes the dialectic for being a *false movement*, that is,

a movement of the abstract concept, which goes from one opposite to the other only by means of imprecision" (44). As we found earlier, polemics about false and real movements of being have their foundation in causal ontological arguments: The dialectic of contradiction can only imply *causae per accidens*. (3) Finally, the dialectical synthesis cannot grasp the plane of reality by combining opposed abstract concepts:

> Of what use is a dialectic that believes itself to be reunited with the real when it compensates for the inadequacy of a concept that is too broad or too general by invoking the opposite concept, which is no less broad and general? The concrete will never be attained by combining the inadequacy of one concept with the inadequacy of its opposite. The singular will never be attained by correcting a generality with another generality. (44)

As we have noted, the principle that an effect cannot contain more reality than its cause denies the power of the dialectical synthesis to move from abstraction to reality, from generality to singularity.

We should pause for a moment, though, to evaluate Deleuze's characterization of the dialectic. "The Self is one (thesis) and it is multiple (antithesis), then it is the unity of the multiple (synthesis)"—certainly, Hegel's treatment of the One and the Multiple is much more complex than this. Is Deleuze merely setting up a straw man? A Hegelian could well object that Deleuze's characterization is presented in "inappropriate form" since it expresses the One and the Multiple as propositions: "This truth is to be grasped and expressed only as a becoming, as a process, a repulsion and attraction—not as being, which in a proposition has the character of a stable unity" (*Science of Logic* 172). This is certainly a valid charge against Deleuze's mock dialectic; we have seen elsewhere, however, that Deleuze's principal charge is not that the dialectic fails to recognize being in terms of a dynamic, a process, but that the movement of the dialectic is a false movement. Let us venture into the complexity of Hegel's argument, then, to gauge the validity of Deleuze's attack. For Hegel, the movement between the One and the Multiple represents a higher level of mediation than the movement of determination and constitutes a logical passage from the quality to the quantity of being. Determinate being, the result of the previous development, gives way to the abstract, posited unity of being-for-one. This One enters the quantitative domain through the dialectical process of repulsion and attraction, which is simultaneously internal and external in its complex movement of self-relation:

> The one as *infinitely self*-related—infinitely, as the posited negation of negation—is the mediation in which it repels from itself its own self as its absolute (that is, abstract) *otherness*, (the *many*), and in relating itself

> negatively to this its non-being, that is, in sublating it, it is only self-relation; and one is only this *becoming* in which it is no longer determined as having a *beginning*, that is, is no longer posited as an immediate, affirmative being, neither is it as result, as having restored itself as the one, that is, the one as equally *immediate* and excluding; the process which it is posits and contains it throughout only as sublated. (*Science of Logic* 177)

The infinitely self-related one, a posited indetermination, enters into relation with its abstract and multiple other, its nonbeing, and through the sublation of this opposition we get the becoming of the One, a realized ideality.

It is very easy to apply Deleuze's charges against the negative ontological movement to this passage. The initial movement of the One into its opposite, into its nonbeing, is completely external and can only imply an accidental relation. Furthermore, this movement between terms (Hegel calls them "absolute") claims to arrive at a determinate synthesis. "The one one . . . is the realized ideality, posited in the one; it is attraction through the mediation of repulsion, and it contains this mediation with itself as *its determination*" (174). The mere fact of abstract mediation results in a real determination. As we have seen, just as Deleuze charges that external mediation implies an accidental relation, he also refuses a dialectics of contradictions the power of real synthesis: The "combining" and "joining" of abstract terms cannot have a real, concrete result. To these two attacks we can add the charge that the very terms that Hegel uses are imprecise. For this argument, Deleuze invokes Plato and his metaphor of the good cook who takes care to make his cuts in the right place according to the articulations of reality (see *Bergsonism* 45 and "Bergson" 295). What Hegelian terminology lacks is close attention to the specificity and singularity of real being: Hegel appears as a careless dialectical butcher when compared to Plato's fine talents. To arrive at a singular conception of unity and multiplicity in real being we have to begin by asking, in Platonic fashion, Which being, which unity, which plurality? "What Bergson calls for—against the dialectic, against a general conception of opposites (the One and the Multiple)—is an acute perception of the 'what' and the 'how many' of what he calls the 'nuance' or the potential number" (*Bergsonism* 45).

What has Deleuze gained, then, in this second phase of Bergson study, by refocusing his attack from the problem of determination to that of the One and the Multiple, from the discussion of quality to the passage from quality to quantity? As always, Hegel is very clear about the stakes in the discussion. Describing the defects of the conception of one and many among the ancient atomists, who give precedence to multiplicity, he pro-

vides a suggestive analogy: "Physics with its molecules and particles suffers from the atom, this principle of extreme externality, which is thus utterly devoid of the Notion, just as much as does the theory of the State which starts from the particular will of individuals" (*Science of Logic* 167). The passage from quality to quantity reveals at the heart of an ontological problem, a political problem. The stakes are quite high. It is clear to Hegel that the relationship between the One and the Multiple is an (analogical) foundation for a theory of social organization, an ontological basis for politics. To attack the dialectical unity of the One and the Multiple, then, is to attack the primacy of the State in the formation of society, to insist on the real plurality of society. Here we begin to see traces of the movement that has taken place in Deleuze's "eight-year hole": The slight shift in focus in his attack on Hegelian logic, from chapter 2 to chapter 3 of "The Doctrine of Being," brings ontology into the sphere of politics.

What this new attack gives rise to specifically is a new conception of multiplicity. "The notion of multiplicity saves us from thinking in terms of 'One and Multiple' " (*Bergsonism* 43). This is where Deleuze manages to establish his preferred triangular configuration of enemies, because we find there are two types of multiplicities. The proximate enemies are G. B. R. Riemann and Albert Einstein; these thinkers are able to conceive of multiplicities, but merely of numerical, quantitative multiplicities that only succeed in grasping differences of degree (32-34). Bergson, in contrast, realizes a qualitative multiplicity founded on differences of nature. The first, the multiplicity of exteriority, is a multiplicity of "order"; Bergson's internal multiplicity is a multiplicity of "organization" (*Bergsonism* 38). The Hegelian dialectic, of course, occupies the third, extreme position, unable to think multiplicity at all because it recognizes neither differences of nature nor differences of degree. The configuration of proximate enemies, though, allows Deleuze's Bergson a detachment from the Hegelian terrain: "For Bergson it is not a question of opposing the Multiple to the One but, on the contrary, of distinguishing two types of multiplicity" (39). We will return to analyze this positive project of multiplicity below, but it is important now to recognize the clarity of the political framework of the project that has resulted from the critique: Deleuze has created a position to advocate a pluralism of organization against a pluralism of order. And this is far removed from Hegel's State philosophy of the unity of the One and the Multiple.

1.3 The Positive Emanation of Being

Let us turn now from the aggressive moment directed against the Hegelian dialectic to the positive alternative that Deleuze finds in Bergson. The

terms of the alternative are already given by the critique: Through a positive, internal movement, being must become qualified and concrete in its singularity and specificity. This issue of quality is common in both of Deleuze's periods of Bergson study, but since, as we noted, Deleuze's concerns move to the passage from quality to quantity in the second period, Bergson's alternative logic of being must also address the question of unity and multiplicity. We can begin to approach Bergson's position by trying to situate it in traditional ontological terms. In effect, we do find a conception of pure being in Bergson: The virtual is the simplicity of being, in itself, pure recollection (*le souvenir pur*). However, pure, virtual being is not abstract and indifferent, and neither does it enter into relation with what is other than itself—it is real and qualified through the internal process of differentiation: "Difference is not a determination but, in this essential relationship with life, a differentiation" ("La conception de la différence chez Bergson" 93). Being differs with itself immediately, internally. It does not look outside itself for an other or a force of mediation because its difference rises from its very core, from "the explosive internal force that life carries within itself" ("La conception de la différence chez Bergson" 93).[8] This *élan vital* that animates being, this vital process of differentiation, links the pure essence and the real existence of being: "Virtuality exists in such a way that it is realized in dissociating itself, that it is forced to dissociate itself in order to realize itself. Differention is the movement of a virtuality that is actualizng itself" (93). Bergson sets up, then, two concepts of being: Virtual being is pure, transcendental being in that it is infinite and simple; actualized being is real being in that it is different, qualified, and limited. We have already seen how Deleuze focuses on ontological movement as the locus of Bergson's originality. The central constructive task of Deleuze's reading of Bergson, then, is to elaborate the positive movement of being between the virtual and the actual that supports the necessity of being and affords being both sameness and difference, both unity and multiplicity.

This discussion of ontological movement relies on Bergson's claim of a fundamental difference between time and space, between duration and matter.[9] Space is only capable of containing differences of degree and thus presents merely a quantitative variation; time contains differences of nature and thus is the true medium of substance. "The division occurs between duration, which 'tends' for its part to take on or bear all the differences of nature (because it is endowed with the power of qualitatively varying with itself), and space, which never presents anything but differences of degree (since it is a quantitative homogeneity)" (*Bergsonism* 31, modified). Duration is the domain in which we can find the primary ontological movement because duration, which is composed of differences

of nature, is able to differ qualitatively with itself. Space, or matter, which contains only differences of degree, is the domain of modal movement because space cannot differ with itself, but rather repeats. "Everything that Bergson says always comes back to this: duration is *what differs with itself*. Matter, on the contrary, is what does not differ with itself, what repeats" ("La conception de la différence chez Bergson" 88). The ontological criterion assumed here is differing with self, internal difference. Once again, the discussion appears as a simple transposition of causal foundations of being: Substance that is cause of itself (*causa sui*) becomes substance that differs with itself. Indeed, Deleuze characterizes the distinction between duration and matter precisely in the traditional terms of a substance-mode relationship: "Duration is like a *natura naturans*, and matter a *natura naturata*" (*Bergsonism* 93, modified). Why is it, though, that duration can differ with itself and matter cannot? The explanation follows from our first observations about Bergson's difference. The discussion of difference in Bergson is not directed toward distinguishing a quidditas or a state; it is not oriented toward a *location* of essence, but rather toward the identification of an essential movement, a process, in time. In the second phase of Bergson study, Deleuze extends this distinction between duration and matter to the two distinct types of multiplicity: Space reveals a multiplicity of exteriority, a numerical multiplicity of quantitative differentiation, a multiplicity of order; pure duration presents an internal multiplicity, a heterogeneity of qualitative differentiation, a multiplicity of organization (*Bergsonism* 38). Furthermore, Deleuze argues not only that the domain of duration provides a more profound multiplicity than space, but also that it poses a more profound unity. The modal nature of space, in effect, does not afford it an inherent unity. To recognize the essential nature of being as a substantial unity, then, we have to think being in terms of time: "a single Time, one, universal, impersonal" (78).

Now that along with Bergson and Deleuze we have adopted an ontological perspective firmly grounded in duration, we still need to see how the virtual and the actual communicate. Bergson's discussion is very strong in analyzing the unfolding of the virtual in the actual—what Deleuze calls the process of differentiation or actualization. In this regard, Bergson is a philosopher of the emanation of being, and the Platonic resonances are very strong. This is precisely the context in which Deleuze notes the Platonic passage very dear to Bergson in which he compares the philosopher to the good cook, "who cuts according to the natural articulations" ("Bergson" 295). Recognizing the contour of being in the real differences of nature is the task of the philosopher, because the process of differentiation is the basic movement of life. *Elan vital* is presented in exactly these terms: "It is always a case of a virtuality in the process of being actualized, a sim-

plicity in the process of differentiating, a totality in the process of dividing: Proceeding 'by dissociation and division,' by 'dichotomy,' is the essence of life" (*Bergsonism* 94). Pure being—as virtuality, simplicity, totality—emanates or actualizes through a process of differentiation, a process that marks or cuts along the lines of the differences of nature. This is how differentiation addresses the ontological criteria of quality and quantity: Virtual being, as unity, unfolds and reveals its real multiple differences. However, we should be careful not to exaggerate the similarities to Platonism. There are at least two aspects that distinguish Deleuze's description of Bergsonian actualization from Platonic emanation. First, Deleuze claims that the actualization of "the virtual Whole" is not a degradation of being—it is not the limitation or copying of the ideal in the real—but instead Bergson's actualization is the positive production of the actuality and multiplicity of the world: "One only has to replace the actual terms in the movement that produces them, that is bring them back to the virtuality actualized in them, in order to see that differentiation is never a negation but a creation, and that difference is never negative but essentially positive and creative" (*Bergsonism* 103). Second, as we have seen, Deleuze argues that Bergson's ontological movement relies on an absolutely immanent, efficient production of being driven by "the explosive internal force that life carries within itself." There is no room for Platonic finalism as a force of order. In this context, then, we can understand Bergson's ontological movement as creative emanation of being free from the order of the Platonic Ideal (105-6).

However, as Deleuze makes very clear, if we are to understand Bergson's emanation of being correctly, we should not conceive it as a differentiation in space but an "actualization" in time. (Note that here the discussion relies heavily on the primary French meaning of *actuel* as "contemporary.") This is where Bergson's theory of memory comes into play. In the past Bergson finds pure being—"a recollection that is pure, virtual, impassive, inactive, *in itself*" (*Bergsonism* 71). The creative movement from the past unity to the present multiplicity is the process of actualization. Situating Bergson's emanation of being in time allows Deleuze to demonstrate the force of his terminology, which reveals the important difference between Bergson's and other conceptions of ontological movement. This discussion is presented through an enigmatic constellation of terms that constitutes a very complex argument. The general goal of this discussion is to offer an adequate critique of the notion of the possible. Deleuze asserts that it is essential that we conceive of the Bergsonian emanation of being, differentiation, as a relationship between the *virtual* and the *actual*, rather than as a relationship between the *possible* and the *real*.[10] After setting up these two couples (virtual-actual and possible-real),

Deleuze proceeds to note that the transcendental term of each couple relates positively to the immanent term of the opposite couple. The possible is never real, even though it may be actual; however, while the virtual may not be actual, it is nonetheless real. In other words, there are several contemporary (actual) possibilities of which some may be realized in the future; in contrast, virtualities are always real (in the past, in memory) and may become actualized in the present. Deleuze invokes Proust for a definition of the states of virtuality: "real without being actual, ideal without being abstract" (96). The essential point here is that the virtual is real and the possible is not: This is Deleuze's basis for asserting that the movement of being must be understood in terms of the virtual-actual relationship rather than the possible-real relationship. To understand this evaluation we need once again to refer to the causal arguments of Scholastic ontology. A fundamental principle of causality that we had occasion to invoke earlier is that an effect cannot have more reality than its cause. The ontological movement from the virtual to the actual is consistent with this principle since the virtual is just as real as the actual. The progression from the possible to the real, however, is clearly a violation of this principle and on this basis must be rejected as a model of ontological movement. We should note that, even though Deleuze makes no explicit reference to the Scholastics here, the mode of explanation and the very terms of the discussion are thoroughly Scholastic. Virtual is the Scholastic term to describe the ideal or transcendental; the virtual Scholastic God is not in any way abstract or possible, it is the *ens realissimum*, the most real being. Finally, actualization is the Scholastic means of describing the familiar Aristotelian passage from the virtual into act.[11] In this context, Bergson's usage becomes even more interesting: Bergson's "actualization" maintains the Aristotelian meaning and adds to it the temporal dimension suggested by the modern French usage. In Bergson, the passage from virtuality to act takes place only in duration.

What is at stake for Deleuze in this enigmatic group of terms—in rejecting the possible and advocating "actualization" over "realization"—is the very nature of the emanation of being and the principle that directs it. Deleuze elaborates this evaluation by adding a further constellation of terms. The process of realization is guided by two rules: resemblance and limitation. On the contrary, the process of actualization is guided by difference and creation. Deleuze explains that, from the first point of view, the real is thought to be in the image of (thus to *resemble*) the possible that it realizes—"it simply has existence or reality added to it, which is translated by saying that, from the point of view of the concept, there is no *difference* between the possible and the real" (*Bergsonism* 97, emphasis added). Furthermore, since all the possibilities cannot be realized,

since the realm of the possible is greater than the realm of the real, there must be a process of *limitation* that determines which possibilities will "pass" into reality. Thus, Deleuze finds a sort of preformism in the couple possibility-reality, in that all of reality is already given or determined in the possible; reality preexists itself in the "pseudo-actuality" of the possible and only emanates through a limitation guided by resemblances (98). Therefore, since there is no difference between the possible and the real (from the point of view of the concept), since the image of reality is already given in the possible, the passage of realization cannot be a creation.

On the contrary, in order for the virtual to become actual, it must *create* its own terms of actualization. "The reason for this is simple: While the real is the image and likeness of the possible that it realizes, the actual, on the other hand does *not* resemble the virtuality that it embodies" (*Bergsonism* 97). The *difference* between the virtual and the actual is what requires that the process of actualization be a *creation*. With no preformed order to dictate its form, the process of the actualization of being must be a creative evolution, an original production of the multiplicity of actual being through differentiation. We can partially understand this complex discussion as a critique of the movement of the formal cause (possible-real) and an affirmation of that of the efficient cause (virtual-actual). The stakes of the discussion appear more clearly, though, if we pose the issue in terms of the principle that determines the coherence of being, as a critique of *order* and an affirmation of *organization*. Earlier we cited a distinction that Deleuze makes between the "multiplicity of order" and the "multiplicity of organization" (38). The realization of the possible clearly gives rise to a multiplicity of order, a static multiplicity, because all of real being is pregiven or predetermined in the "pseudo-actuality" of the possible. The actualization of the virtual, on the other hand, presents a dynamic multiplicity in which the process of differentiation creates the original arrangement or coherence of actual being: This is the multiplicity of organization. The multiplicity of order is "determinate" in that it is preformed and static; the multiplicity of organization is "indeterminate" in that it is creative and original—organization is always unforeseeable.[12] Without the blueprint of order, the creative process of organization is always an art.

We have shown that Deleuze presents the Bergsonian actualization of being as a dynamic and original emanation, as a creative evolution free from the ordering restraints of both Platonic finalism (final cause) and the realization of the possible (formal cause). However, this formulation begs the important question, which has been inherent in the discussion all along: Free from any determined order or preformism, what constitutes the creative mechanism in Bergsonian being that is capable of continually forming a new, original being, a new plane of composition? What is the

basis of Bergsonian organization? This is precisely the point on which one could mount a Hegelian counteroffensive. If we return to Hegel's critique of Spinoza we can recognize a pressure that also applies to Bergson's position. Hegel finally characterizes Spinoza's positive movement of being as an unrecuperative emanationism:

> In the oriental conception of *emanation* the absolute is the light which illumines itself. Only it not only illumines itself but also *emanates*. Its emanations are *distancings* from its undimmed clarity; the successive productions are less perfect than the preceding ones from which they arise. The process of emanation is taken only as a *happening*, the becoming only as a progressive loss. Thus being increasingly obscures itself and night, the negative, is the final term of the series, which does not return to the primal light. (*Science of Logic* 538-39)

Clearly, it is true that Bergson's movement, like that of Spinoza, does lack the "reflection-into-self" that Hegel identifies as the missing element here. However, as we have seen, Bergson insists that "successive productions" are not "less perfect"; the movement is not a "progressive loss," but rather, the differentiation constituted by *élan vital* is a creative process that produces new equally perfect articulations. Bergson might very well respond in Spinozian fashion that actuality is perfection. However, the Hegelian attack serves as a pressure to back up this Bergsonian claim with an immanent creative mechanism. Hegel recognizes that a positive ontological movement can account for the becoming of being (as emanation), but, he asks, How can it account for the being of becoming? Furthermore, Hegel's analogy between physics and politics returns as a serious political challenge. Along with the ancient atomists, Deleuze and Bergson refuse the preformism of the multiplicity in the unity; they refuse the order of the State, and insist instead on the originality and freedom of the multiplicity of organization. From a Hegelian perspective, this is just as mad as trying to base a State on the individual wills of its citizens. The attack on order (the order of finalism, of the possible, of the dialectic) creates both the space for and the need for an organizational dynamic: the organization of the actual, the organization of the multiplicity. Responding to this is the final task posed in Deleuze's reading of Bergson.

1.4 The Being of Becoming and the Oganization of the Actual

The question of creative organization poses a serious problem, and, finally, this is the point on which Bergson's thought seems to prove insufficient for Deleuze. The need for actual organization obviously becomes much more important as Deleuze moves to his second phase of Bergson study, as he

shifts focus from the issue of quality to the passage between quality and quantity. In our analysis up to this point we have seen that Bergson is very effective in describing the emanative movement from a unity to a multiplicity, the process of differentiation or actualization. But now we discover a need for a complementary organizational movement in the opposite direction, from a multiplicity to a unity. Unfortunately, this organizational movement is nearly absent in Bergson's thought. There are, nonetheless, several points at which Deleuze's reading suggests that we might find an answer to this need in Bergson. Deleuze seems to suggest that there is a convergent movement of the actual: "The real is not only that which is cut out [*se découpe*] according to natural articulations or differences of nature; it is also that which intersects again [*se recoupe*] along paths converging toward the same ideal or virtual point" (*Bergsonism* 29). What exactly is this process of *recoupement* or intersection that relates the actual multiplicity to a virtual unity? Deleuze does not treat this point extensively. It seems, however, that in order to make sense of this passage we cannot read *recoupement* as a creative process that organizes a new virtual point of unity, but rather merely as a process that traces the lines of the natural articulations back to the original point of departure. *Recoupement* is a Bergsonian way of expressing the Scholastic principle that being is univocal; we can verify that being is always and everywhere said in the same way, that is, because all of reality can be traced back along convergent paths to one unique virtual point. This theory of univocity opposes a theory of the analogy of being. What is important for us here is that while univocity implies a general equality and commonality of being, it does so only on the virtual plane.[13] What we are in need of, however, is a means of communication between the two planes. This passage suggests, and indeed we often find in Bergson's work, that the unity only appears on the plane of the virtual. What Deleuze's argument demands at this point, on the contrary, is a mechanism for the organization of the actual multiplicity.

We find another example of the communication between the virtual and the actual in Bergson's two movements of memory: the "recollection-memory" that dilates or enlarges in an inclusive movement toward the past and the "contraction-memory" that concentrates toward the future as a process of particularization (*Bergsonism* 52). In other words, looking backward we see the universal (recollection-memory) and looking forward we see the individual (contraction-memory). What would be necessary for the creative organization of the actual, on the contrary, would be an enlarging, inclusive movement oriented toward the future capable of producing a new unity. However, Bergson is insistent on the temporal directions of the movements. The unity of the virtual resides only in the past and we can never really move backward toward that point: "We do not move from the

present to the past, from perception to recollection, but from the past to the present, from recollection to perception" (63). In these terms, the organization of the actual would have to be a movement from perception to a new "recollection" that would be a future memory (a sort of *futur antérieur* or future perfect in the grammatical sense) as a common point of real organization.

Deleuze does his best to address seriously the question of organization and socialization in the final pages of *Bergsonism* (106-12). In many of his major works (in his studies of both Nietzsche and Spinoza, for example), Deleuze presents in the final pages his densest and most elusive argument that points the way toward future research. In this final section of *Bergsonism*, Deleuze tries to explain the human capacity for creativity, the capability to take control of the process of differentiation or actualization and to go beyond the "plane" or "plan" of nature: "Man is capable of burning the plans, of going beyond both his own plan and his own condition, in order finally to express naturing Nature [*natura naturans*]" (107). The explanation of this human freedom and creativity, though, is not immediately obvious. Certainly, society is formed on the basis of human intelligence, but Deleuze notes that there is not a direct movement between intelligence and society. Instead, society is more directly a result of "irrational factors." Deleuze identifies "virtual instinct" and "the fable-making function" (*la fonction fabulatrice*) as the forces that lead to the creation of obligations and of gods. These forces, however, cannot account for the human powers of creativity.[14]

For solution, we have to go back to analyze the gap that exists between human intelligence and socialization. "What is it that appears in the interval between intelligence and society . . . ? We cannot reply: It is intuition" (109). The intuition is that same "explosive internal force that life carries within itself" that we noted earlier as the positive dynamic of being. Here, however, this notion is filled out more clearly. More precisely, Deleuze adds soon after, what fills this gap between intelligence and sociability is the origin of intuition, which is creative emotion (110). This original production of sociability through creative emotion leads us back to Bergson's plane of unity in memory, but this time it is a new memory. "And what is this creative emotion, if not precisely a cosmic Memory, that actualizes all the levels at the same time, that liberates man from the plan or the level to which he belongs, in order to make him a creator, adequate to the whole movement of creation?" (111, modified). With the cosmic Memory, Deleuze has arrived at a mystical Bergsonian sociability that is available to the "privileged souls" (111) and that is capable of tracing the design of an open society, a society of creators. The incarnation of the cosmic Memory "leaps from one soul to another, 'every now and then,' crossing closed

deserts" (111). What we have here sounds distinctly like a weak echo of the voice of Zarathustra on the mountaintops: creative pathos, productive emotion, a community of active creators who go beyond the plane of nature and human beings. However, suggestive as this brief explanation of a Bergsonian social theory might be, it remains in this final section obscure and undeveloped. Furthermore, the rest of Deleuze's work on Bergson does not serve to support this theory. In effect, we have to refer to Deleuze's Nietzsche to give these claims real coherence and a solid grounding.[15]

This final section of *Bergsonism* is the most notable positive argument in the second phase of Bergson study that does not appear in the first, and it perfectly corresponds to the shift from the problematic of quality to that of the passage from quality to quantity that we noted in the attack on Hegel. This twofold shift between the two Bergson studies shows clearly one aspect of the movement that takes place in Deleuze's "eight-year hole"; in effect, Deleuze feels the pressure to bring the ontological to the social and the ethical. In *Bergsonism* Deleuze succeeds in addressing this pressure to an extent. More important, however, this reorientation announces the need for and the advent of Nietzsche in Deleuze's thought. Nietzsche gives Deleuze the means to explore the real being of becoming and the positive organization of the actual multiplicity. Furthermore, by shifting the terrain from the plane of logic to that of values, Nietzsche allows Deleuze to translate the positive ontology he has developed through the study of Bergson toward a positive ethics.

Remark: Deleuze and Interpretation

Before turning to Nietzsche, let us take a moment to consider two critiques of Deleuze's reading of Bergson that will help us clarify the characteristics of Deleuze's interpretative strategy. At the outset of our essay, we noted that the peculiarities of Deleuze's work require that we keep a series of methodological principles in mind. One aspect that makes Deleuze's work so unusual is that he brings to each of his philosophical studies a very specific question that focuses and defines his vision. In the case of the Bergson studies, we have found that Deleuze is principally concerned with developing an adequate critique of the negative ontological movement of the dialectic and elaborating an alternative logic of the positive, creative movement of being. The selection involved in Deleuze's narrow focus is what seems to confuse some of his readers and to irritate others. The critiques of Gillian Rose ("The New Bergsonism") and Madeleine Barthélemy-Madaule ("Lire Bergson") offer us two examples of this problem. In these

critiques we can discern two methods of reading Deleuze that lead to interpretative difficulties: First, by failing to recognize Deleuze's selectivity, these authors conflate Deleuze's positions with those of the philosophers he addresses, and second, by ignoring the evolution of Deleuze's thought, they confuse the different projects that guide his various works. In addition, the diversity of perspective between these two critics will serve to illustrate the slippage that results from the gap between the Anglophone and the French traditions of Bergson interpretation.

Throughout "The New Bergsonism" (chapter 6 of *Dialectic of Nihilism*), Rose reads Bergson's work and Deleuze's interpretation as if they constituted a perfect continuum. She concludes her brief discussion of *Bergsonism* with an ambiguous attribution that illustrates this confusion very clearly: "On Deleuze's reading Bergson produces a *Naturphilosophie* which culminates at the point when *élan vital* 'becomes conscious of itself' in the memory of 'man' " (Rose 101). To back this claim she cites the final page of *Bergsonism* (112 in the English edition), which supports the second half of her sentence in part but does not support the first half at all. Not only does Deleuze not mention *Naturphilosophie* in this passage, but he has spent the previous pages (106-12) arguing that Bergson shows how we can go beyond the plan of nature and create a new human nature, beyond the human condition. Here Deleuze is drawing principally on Bergson's late work *Les deux sources de la morale et de la religion* (1932). Rose derives the idea of *Naturphilosophie* not from Deleuze but from Bergson's earliest work, *Essai sur les données immédiates de la conscience* (1889), which she reads as consistent with the work of Comte (Rose 98). (Therefore, to add to the confusion, we have a completely ahistorical reading of Bergson that fails to distinguish between his early and late works.) The central point here, though, is not that Bergson's thought does or does not constitute a *Naturphilosophie*; rather, it is that this aspect does not form a part of Deleuze's project, that this is not what Deleuze takes from Bergson.

We find a similar problem of interpretation in the essay by Madeleine Barthélemy-Madaule, a French Bergson specialist, and it is interesting that in her reading it is precisely these same pages of *Bergsonism* that create the greatest irritation. Her reaction, however, comes from a very different perspective from that of Rose, since she is grounded in the French spiritual reading of Bergson rather than the Anglo-Saxon positivist reading. Barthélemy-Madaule's primary objection is that Deleuze tries to read *Les deux sources* as a Nietzschean and antihumanist text when in fact it demonstrates the profoundly religious character of Bergson's thought: "The process of 'going beyond the human condition,' which is in effect the vocation of philosophy for Bergson, cannot be formulated in terms of the 'inhuman' or the 'superhuman.' . . . In any case, the principal conclusion

that we take from this interpretation is that Bergson is not Nietzsche" ("Lire Bergson" 86, 120). Barthélemy-Madaule is a very careful reader of Bergson and, to a certain extent, one has to accept her criticism. Bergson is indeed not Nietzsche. For our purposes, Deleuze's (perhaps strained and unsuccessful) effort to bring the two together in these pages indicates the important effect that the period of Nietzsche study has had on his thought and the need to move beyond the Bergsonian framework. The main issue at stake in the conflict with Barthélemy-Madaule, however, is how one interprets a philosopher. Barthélemy-Madaule is reacting primarily against Deleuze's principle of selection: "Interpreting a doctrine supposes that one has accounted for all the terms of the ensemble. Now it does not seem to me that this is the case here. I would contest Mr. Deleuze's use of *Bergsonism* as the title of his study" (120). The first type of problem in reading Deleuze, then, which we find in both Rose and Barthélemy-Madaule, results from a failure to recognize or accept Deleuze's selectivity and, thus, from a confusion both of his use of sources and of his relationship to the philosopher he studies.

The second type of problem results from a misreading of Deleuze's projects, from a failure to recognize Deleuze's evolution. This problem arises primarily in Rose's critique. It is certainly strange that when Rose seeks to engage Deleuze's work in relation to her general theme about juridicism and poststructuralism she would choose to read *Bergsonism*—any of his other studies in the history of philosophy (on Kant, Hume, Nietzsche, or Spinoza) would have been more adequate to her task. As we have seen, Deleuze's investigation of Bergson is focused primarily on ontological issues, and, although it flirts with the question of ethics, it gives no solid grounds for a discussion of law. With this in mind, then, it should come as no surprise that Rose has difficulty writing directly about Deleuze's Bergson. In fact, she dedicates less than two of the twenty-one pages to *Bergsonism* (99-100); these are prefaced by a reading of Bergson's *Essai sur les données immédiates de la conscience* in relation to Comte and positivism and followed by a reading of sections of Deleuze's *Différence et répétition*, combined with small additions from Nietzsche and Duns Scotus. Rose repeatedly refers to the intent of Deleuze's new Bergsonism as the attempt to found an "ontological injustice" (99, 104, 108). She substantiates this claim with a quote from a section of *Différence et répétition* in which Deleuze is discussing the univocity of being in Duns Scotus, Nietzsche, and Spinoza: "Univocal Being is both nomadic distribution and crowned anarchy" (quoted by Rose 99, Deleuze 55). The problem here is quite simple: In the cited passage, Deleuze is dealing neither with Bergson nor with justice. I have argued that in Deleuze's treatment of Bergson we can find the suggestion of a concept of univocal being, but that does not

mean that we can transfer the Duns Scotus-Spinoza-Nietzsche nexus directly to Bergson: This is a simple methodological issue. More important, though, this passage reveals the inadequacy of Rose's entire argument. It is absurd to read the statement that univocal being is "crowned anarchy" as a directly political statement, or even as a statement about justice. Such a claim attempts to collapse a complex development from ontology to politics and to assume that such a development admits only one solution. (This is apparently how Rose can come to the point of attributing Scotus's ethics to Deleuze [107]—with the belief, one must assume, that there can only be one ethics that corresponds to a univocal conception of being.) At the very most, univocity gives us an intuition of politics through its implication of an ontological equality and participation; this equality is what "crowns" the anarchy of being in Deleuze's account (*Différence et répétition* 55). I would maintain, however, that in order to bring this intuition to a veritable conception of justice in Deleuze's thought, to move in effect from ontology to politics, we need to pass through at least two more important phases. First, we must look at the conception of efficient power (force internal to its manifestation) developed in the study of Nietzsche, because this founds an attack on law and juridicism.[16] Second, we must turn to the study of Spinoza for its investigation of common notions, of socially constitutive practice and of right, so that Deleuze can elaborate a positive alternative to law. *Jus* versus *lex*: This a much more adequate formulation of Deleuze's position against legalism and juridicism.

Chapter 2

Nietzschean Ethics
From Efficient Power to an Ethics of Affirmation

In order to appreciate Deleuze's work on Nietzsche we have to situate it in the context of the development of Deleuze's own project. *Nietzsche and Philosophy* is the concrete result of the "eight-year hole" in Deleuze's intellectual life, the longest gap in his prolific career. According to Deleuze, though, such a gap is not indicative of inactivity; on the contrary, "perhaps it is in the holes that the movement takes place" ("Signes et événements" 18). The work on Nietzsche, then, will perhaps give us a key to reading the movement that animates Deleuze's early work. This study of Nietzsche is the intervention that gives rise to the important differences between the two phases of Bergson study that we discussed in chapter 1. We can summarize this reorientation by saying that Bergson's positive, logical dynamism has entered a new horizon, a field of forces, where all the logical issues are posed now in terms of sense and value. On this new terrain, all kinds of new figures immediately spring up. Most important, the heart of the Bergsonian logical discussion is transformed into an analysis of the nature of power. The analysis of power provides the basis for the fundamental passage in Deleuze's study of Nietzsche: from the ontological foundation of power to the ethical creation of being. Finally, we should refer the study of Nietzsche not only back to the previous work on Bergson, but also forward to the subsequent study of Spinoza. We will find that Deleuze's construction of an ethical horizon within the framework of Nietzsche's thought brings to light the questions that make possible (or indeed necessary) his subsequent investigation of Spinozian practice.

2.1 The Paradox of Enemies

In the study of Nietzsche, as in that of Bergson, Deleuze's analysis is driven by an antagonism toward Hegel. Here, however, Deleuze's strategy of triangulation that we discussed earlier (Section 1.1) becomes more complicated and more ambiguous. Although *Nietzsche and Philosophy* contains some of Deleuze's harshest rhetoric against Hegel, the polemical focus is already moving away from Hegel in important ways. As in the Bergson studies, Deleuze brings in other antagonists who are closer to Nietzsche's position and who share some of his concerns in order to maintain the vast distance from Hegel; Deleuze refuses to descend and struggle on Hegel's own terrain. Once again, we find that Hegel inherits the faults of the proximate antagonists and takes them to their extreme, as a sort of negative raising to the *n*th power.

The ambiguities in Deleuze's position, however, are all those related to his developing conceptions of antagonism and opposition. Deleuze gives seemingly contradictory indications about the best way to choose and relate to one's enemy. In several passages, we find that Deleuze views the fundamental antagonism toward Hegel as an urgent and central element of his reading of Nietzsche: "We will misunderstand the whole of Nietzsche's work if we do not see 'against whom' its principal concepts are directed. Hegelian themes are present in this work as the enemy against which it fights" (162). "Anti-Hegelianism runs through Nietzsche's work as its cutting edge" (8). And finally, Nietzsche's philosophy forms "an absolute anti-dialectics" (195). In these passages the need for a direct confrontation with Hegel is very clear. In other passages, however, Deleuze tries to displace the relationship to Hegel, to destroy its binary character with the same type of triangular configuration we found in the Bergson studies:

> Nietzsche's relation to Kant is like Marx's to Hegel: Nietzsche stands critique on its feet, just as Marx does with the dialectic. . . . the dialectic comes from the original Kantian form of the critique. There would have been no need to put the dialectic back on its feet, nor "to do" any form of dialectics if critique itself had not been standing on its head from the start. (89)

In this passage it seems that Hegel is not of real concern to Nietzsche; the dialectic constitutes a false problem. Instead, Nietzsche addresses Kant as his proximate enemy. These two stances form a paradox: Is Nietzsche's primary antagonism with Kant, the proximate enemy, or with Hegel, the ultimate enemy? Deleuze has to navigate between Scylla and Charybdis. Posing Nietzsche as the ultimate anti-Hegel presents a real danger; Nietzsche

appears in the position of negation, of reaction, of *ressentiment*. And furthermore, absolute opposition seems (in a Hegelian framework) to imply the initiation of a new dialectical process. However, if we try instead to focus only on a proximate enemy (such as Kant) and do not recognize anti-Hegelianism as the fundamental driving force, "we will misunderstand the whole of Nietzsche's work" (162).

We can get a preliminary idea of Deleuze's treatment of this problem of enemies by looking at his reading of *The Birth of Tragedy*. Deleuze finds that this early text presents a "semi-dialectical" argument based on the Dionysus/Apollo antithesis (13). Deleuze gives an elegant explanation of this problem in terms of an evolution of Nietzsche's thought that resolves the antinomic couple in two directions: on one hand, toward a more profound opposition (Dionysus/Socrates or, later, Dionysus/Christ) and, on the other hand, toward a complementarity (Dionysus/Ariadne) (14). In the second couple, that of complementarity, the enemy has completely disappeared and the relationship is one of mutual affirmation; this couple is productive, but cannot suffice on its own because it does not provide Nietzsche a weapon with which to attack his enemies. The first couple does constitute a weapon, but in a problematical fashion. According to Deleuze, Nietzsche first shifts from Apollo to Socrates as the real enemy of Dionysus, but this proves insufficient because "Socrates is too Greek, a little too Apollonian at the outset because of his clarity, a little too Dionysian in the end" (14). When Socrates proves to be merely a proximate enemy, Nietzsche discovers the fundamental enemy in Christ. Here, however, with the Antichrist and the opposition and negation it implies, we seem to run the risk of initiating a new dialectic. Deleuze claims that this is not the case: "The opposition of Dionysus or Zarathustra to Christ is not a dialectical opposition, but opposition to the dialectic itself" (17). What exactly is this nondialectical negation, and what marks its difference from dialectical negation? We do not have the means to give the answer yet, but the question itself sets the tone and the task for Deleuze's reading. The answer will have to be found in Nietzsche's total critique; it must constitute an absolutely destructive negation that spares nothing from its force and recuperates nothing from its enemy; it must be an absolute aggression that offers no pardons, takes no prisoners, pillages no goods; it must mark the death of the enemy, with no resurrection. This is the radical, nondialectical negation that Deleuze's reading of Nietzsche must develop.

2.2 The Transcendental Method and the Partial Critique

Kant's enormous contribution to philosophy is to conceive of an immanent critique that is both total and positive. Kant, however, fails to carry out this

project, and thus Nietzsche's role, according to Deleuze, is to correct Kant's errors and salvage the project (89). The principal fault of the Kantian critique is that of transcendental philosophy itself. In other words, Kant's discovery of a domain beyond the sensible is the creation of a region outside the bounds of the critique that effectively functions as a refuge against critical forces, as a limitation on critical powers. A total critique, on the contrary, requires a materialistic, monistic perspective in which the entire unified horizon is open and vulnerable to the critique's destabilizing inquiry. Therefore, it is the transcendental method itself that requires (or allows) that the critique remain partial. With the ideal values safely protected in the suprasensible, the Kantian critique can proceed to treat claims to truth and morality without endangering truth and morality themselves. Kant effectively grants immunity to the established values of the ruling order and "thus total critique turns into a politics of compromise" (89). Kant's critical reason functions to reinforce the established values and make us obedient to them: "When we stop obeying God, the State, our parents, reason appears and persuades us to continue being docile" (92). The very positing of the transcendental plane and the consequent partiality of the critique, then, is what allows Kantianism to be conservative. Under the cloak of disinterest, Kant appears as a passive State functionary, a traditional intellectual in Gramscian terms, legitimating the values of the ruling powers and protecting them from critical forces. Finally, Kant's critique is too polite, restrained by the "humble recognition of the rights of the criticised" (89). Kant is too genteel, too well mannered, too timid to question seriously the fundamental established values. In contrast, the total critique recognizes no restraints, no limits on its power, and is therefore necessarily insurrectional; a total critique must be an all-out attack on the established values and the ruling powers they support. Critique is always violence—this is not the real issue. The issue is the extent of, and the limits on, the reign of critique's destructive force.

The Kantian critique not only fails to be total, but it also fails to be positive; in effect, the failure to be total obstructs the possibility of being positive. The negative, destructive moment of the critique (*pars destruens*) that draws the total horizon into question and destabilizes previously existing powers must clear the terrain to allow the productive moment (*pars construens*) to release or create new powers—destruction opens the way for creation. Therefore, Kant's double failure is really one. This conclusion follows directly from Nietzsche's focus on values: "One of the principal motifs of Nietzsche's work is that Kant had not carried out a true critique because he was not able to pose the problem of critique in terms of values" (1). The partiality of the first destructive moment of the critique allows the essential established values to endure and therefore fails to clear the ground necessary for the value-creating,

constructive power. The "active instance" (89) that the Kantian critique lacks is precisely that which truly legislates: To legislate is not to legitimate order and preserve values, but precisely the opposite, to create new values (91). This critique of values forces us to consider the question of interest and perspective. Since we can accept no transcendental standpoint external to the plane of forces that determines and legitimates absolute knowledge and universal values, we must locate the perspective on the immanent plane and identify the interests it serves. Therefore, the only possible principle of a total critique is perspectivism (90).

This attack on Kant's transcendental method, invoking perspectivism, goes hand in hand with the Nietzschean attack on Platonic idealism. Deleuze approaches this issue by considering "the form of the question" that animates philosophical inquiry. The central question for Platonic inquiry, Deleuze claims, is "Qu'est-ce que?": "What is beauty, what is justice, etc?" (76). Nietzsche, though, wants to change the central question to "Qui?": "Who is beautiful?," or rather, "Which one is beautiful?" Once again, the focus of the attack is the transcendental method. "Qu'est-ce que?" is the transcendental question par excellence that seeks an ideal that stands above, as a suprasensible principle ordering the various material instantiations. "Qui?" is a materialist question that looks to the movement of real forces from a specific perspective. In effect, the two questions point to different worlds for their answers. Deleuze will later call the materialist question "the method of dramatization" and insist that it is the primary form of inquiry throughout the history of philosophy (except perhaps in the work of Hegel).[1] The method of dramatization, then, is an elaboration of perspectivism as part of a critique of interest and value: "It is not enough to pose the abstract question 'what is truth?' (*qu'est-ce que le vrai*)"; rather we must ask "who wants truth (*qui veut le vrai*), when and where, how and how much?" ("La méthode de dramatisation" 95). The object of the attack in the question "Qu'est-ce que?" is the transcendental space that it implies, and that provides a sanctuary for established values from the destructive power of inquiry and critique. This transcendental space immune from the critique is the locus of order. We can certainly detect a Bergsonian inspiration in this argument. The question "Qu'est-ce que?" remains abstract because it implies two errors: (1) It seeks essence in a static quidditas rather than in a dynamic of movement (and thus can only reveal differences of degree, not differences of nature); and (2) it assumes either a formal or a final cause (the form of justice and truth, of the Just and the True) as the ordering principle of reality. The question "Qui?" that brings us to the terrain of will and value asks for an immanent dynamic of being, an internal, efficient force of differentiation.

Remark: Deleuze's Selection of the "Impersonal" Nietzsche

We must be careful with the question "Qui?", however, because in Deleuze's Nietzsche the answer it seeks will never be found in an individual or collective subject, but rather in a presubjective force or will. The difficulties presented for the English translation of this passage serve to highlight the problem: Hugh Tomlinson notes that "who" cannot function as a translation of "qui" because it directs inquiry toward a person; therefore, at Deleuze's suggestion he translates "qui" as "which one" (207, note 3). Deleuze tries to explain this nuance further in his preface to the English translation: "Here we must rid ourselves of all 'personalist' references. The one that . . . does not refer to an individual, to a person, but rather to an event, that is, to the forces in their various relationships in a proposition or a phenomenon, and the genetic relationship that determines these forces (power)" (xi). This insistence on the impersonal nature of the question "Qui?" casts a different light on Deleuze's charge that the question "Qu'est-ce que?" is abstract. The impersonal "Qui?" is not more concrete because it locates specific subjects or agents, but because it operates on the materialist terrain of an efficient causality.

It is often a strain to read Nietzsche without adopting personalist references. Not only is there a long tradition of reading Nietzsche in this way, but also it would not be difficult to cite several passages in which we cannot help but read Nietzsche "personally." Here we have a very clear example of Deleuze's selectivity. In effect, Deleuze brings a Bergsonian approach to Nietzsche so as to read him in logical terms, that is, as a logic of the will and value that animates the field of presubjective forces. Whenever we ask the question "Qui?" we are going to look to a certain will to power for the response (cf. 53). Deleuze's research moves from a Bergsonian logic of being to a Nietzschean logic of the will. It is clear, then, how Deleuze's selection fits in with the scope of his project. The "impersonal" interpretative strategy can also be seen as a political selection. In fact, Deleuze's reading has made such a profound impression on Nietzsche studies partly because it succeeds in making so much of Nietzsche's thought while avoiding or effectively diffusing the force of arguments about Nietzsche's individualism and reactionary politics, nearly all of which are centered around a "personalist" interpretation and selection. I will argue, however, that although this selection may be necessary for Deleuze, it is effectively this "impersonal" aspect that marks the limit of Deleuze's development of ethical and political veins in Nietzsche.

2.3 Slave Logic and Efficient Power

Thus far we have considered Deleuze's Nietzschean attacks on the proximate enemies, Kant and Plato. The direct Nietzschean attack on Hegel, the fundamental enemy, appears first in Bergsonian form. As in the works on Bergson, Deleuze's initial charge against the dialectic is once again that it is driven by a negative movement that cannot arrive at a concrete, singular conception of being. Contradiction and opposition can only give abstract results (157) and can only lead to an abstract determination of being, blind to its subtle nuances, to its singularity: "The being of Hegelian logic is merely 'thought' being, pure and empty, that affirms itself by passing into its own opposite. But this being was never different from its opposite, it never had to pass into what it already was. Hegelian being is pure and simple nothingness" (183). The core of this attack is that Hegelian being is abstract, not really different from its opposite. Deleuze, however, provides no substantial foundation for these claims here, and therefore they can sound rather hollow unless we read Bergson's critique of determination into them. We have seen that Bergson argues that difference is only conceived as opposition through an abstraction from real differences, by an imprecise view of reality; real difference does not go "all the way" to opposition. Moreover, the movement implied by this Hegelian being "passing into its opposite" is a completely external, and thus false, movement that can never move closer to a real, concrete affirmation. Hence, Hegelian ontological movement remains abstract and accidental. In effect, Deleuze's Nietzsche takes this Bergsonian analysis of the abstract character of the negative ontological movement of determination for granted.

Once we recognize that Bergsonian arguments are functioning as the foundation for this discussion, then, it should be no surprise that Deleuze finds a Bergsonian alternative in Nietzsche: "For the speculative element of negation, opposition or contradiction, Nietzsche substitutes the practical element of *difference*" (9). This is very reminiscent of Bergson, except that we can note that the terms of the conflict have become more concrete—now the "speculative element" is contrasted with the "practical element." In fact, the advent of Nietzsche in Deleuze's thought transforms the Bergsonian theoretical scene with a very important contribution. We no longer have purely logical categories (external vs. internal difference, and negative vs. positive ontological movement), but now the logic is presented in terms of volition and value (negation vs. affirmation, and interiority vs. exteriority). This shift to the horizon of forces marks the tendency in Deleuze's thought that we noted earlier in the second phase of Bergson study. The transposition to the terrain of values marks the beginning of our trajectory from ontology to ethics and politics.

The complexity of this new terrain and the importance of Nietzsche's transformation become evident as Deleuze treats Nietzsche's polemic against slave logic and thereby develops a new attack on the Hegelian dialectic: "Nietzsche presents the dialectic as the speculation of the pleb, as the way of thinking of the slave: the abstract thought of contradiction then prevails over the concrete feeling of positive difference" (10). On this new terrain we have dramatic personae representing the two philosophical methods: the slave of abstract speculation versus the master of concrete pathos and practice. We are entering a very difficult passage, though, and should be careful to recognize from the outset the specific focus and polemical content of Deleuze's argument. Clearly, Deleuze is reading *On the Genealogy of Morals* as a harsh attack against Hegel—but against which Hegel? Since we are dealing with the master and the slave, it seems obvious that Deleuze's target is the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, or perhaps Kojève's popularized version of it. However, if we posit this as the focus, Deleuze's attack seems somewhat misdirected. In a very careful and intelligent study of *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, Jean Wahl notes the shortcomings of this attack: "Isn't there in the *Phenomenology of Spirit* something more profound that is able to resist the Nietzschean critique?" (364). Wahl is undoubtedly correct in noting that Deleuze's Nietzsche does not directly confront Hegel's central focus in the *Phenomenology*; but this should indicate to us that perhaps we have misinterpreted the primary target. Here we need to refine the first methodological principle we presented in the "Preliminary Remark": It is necessary not only to recognize "against whom" the polemic is directed, but against which specific argument.

We gain a more adequate view of the Nietzschean attack presented here if we read it as a continuation of the polemic against Hegel's *Science of Logic*. In effect, Deleuze has taken the logical attack developed in Bergson and added the question of will—"Who wills a negative ontological movement?" This is the method of dramatization: In Bergson, Deleuze asks the Platonic question "What is the negative logic of being?"; but now, with Nietzsche, he can make the discussion more concrete by dramatizing the investigation in terms of will. We should be careful to keep in mind, though, that the question "Qui?" does not find its answer in an individual, a group, or even a social class; rather, "Qui?" leads us to identify a kind of force, or a specific quality of will. In this dramatization, then, the slave is the persona who plays the will to a negative movement. Nietzsche presents the slave syllogism as the false attempt to arrive at self-affirmation. Once again, even though we are dealing with the question of self-affirmation, the discussion has nothing to do with the subject of consciousness, but rather deals strictly with a logic of valuation dramatized in terms of two personae. The slave plays the negative logic of valuation: "You are evil; therefore I am

good." The master's syllogism is the inverse: "I am good; therefore you are evil" (119). Deleuze brilliantly brings this back to the question of logical movement by focusing on the different function of "therefore" in the two cases. In the master's syllogism, the first clause is independent and thus carries the essential, positive statement; "therefore" merely introduces a negative correlate. Master logic appears in Deleuze's description as a sort of efficient causality of valuation—the effect is completely internal to the cause and comes forth through a logical emanation. "Therefore" marks the necessity of an internal movement. In the slave's syllogism, however, "therefore" plays a completely different role; it attempts to reverse the negative first clause to arrive at a positive conclusion. Slave logic tries to operate a completely external movement by using the logical operator "therefore" to relate the two opposite clauses. If we try to pose this logic in causal terms, we find that the slave's "therefore" can only mark a *causa per accidens*. Furthermore, the slave's second clause cannot be a real affirmation because the effect ("I am good") cannot contain more perfection or reality than its cause ("You are evil"). "This is the strange syllogism of the slave: he needs two negations in order to produce an appearance of affirmation" (121). Deleuze is clearly drawing on the Bergsonian logical charges against the negative movement of the dialectic. The affirmation of the slave, like the determination of the dialectic, is a false movement that merely produces a "subsistent exteriority."

While this first Nietzschean attack on slave logic is looking back to Bergson for its foundation (since now will and force have come into play), Deleuze is also able to develop a further, and more powerful, accusation, which looks forward to Spinoza. Negation takes on a different form in the field of forces: The second negation of the slave syllogism (contained in "therefore") is a purely logical negation, whereas the first negation ("You are evil") is a negative *evaluation*. Deleuze explains that the negative value given to the other from the slave perspective is not attributed simply because the other is strong, but because the other does not restrain that strength. This is where Deleuze locates the primary slave paralogism: The initial evaluative negation is based on "the fiction of a force separated from what it can do" (123). The slave logic negates the force of the strong not by opposing it with another force, but by the "fiction" of dividing it into two parts. This fictitious division creates the space for the imputation of evil: It is not evil to be strong, but it is evil to carry that strength into action. The slave's evaluative negation is based on a false conception of the nature of power. The slave maintains that power is a capacity, exterior or transcendent to the field of forces, that can be manifest in action or not. This separation of power into two parts allows for the creation of a "fictitious" causal relationship: "The manifestation is turned into an effect that is re-

ferred to the force as if it were a distinct and separated cause" (123). The slave sets up a relationship in which force appears as merely a formal cause—force represents a *possible* manifestation.[2] Nietzsche's master, however, insists that power exists only *en acte* and cannot be separated from its manifestation: "Concrete force is that which goes to its ultimate consequences, to the limit of power or desire" (53). The master conceives an internal, necessary relationship between a force and its manifestation.

What is the reasoning behind Deleuze's claim here? By what logic is slave power merely a "fiction," and master power more real or concrete? Obviously, this cannot be read as simply an empirical observation because Nietzsche would be the first to say that slave power is very real, and, indeed, it is the more prevalent conception in history, to such an extent that "the strong always have to be defended against the weak" (58). To understand this argument, we have to bring it back once again to the ontological plane.[3] As we noted earlier, in Scholastic ontologies the essence of being is its "productivity" and its "producibility," or, in Spinozian terms, power is the essence of being (*Ethics* IP34). Therefore, the slave conception is a "fiction" precisely because it introduces an accidental quality into the power of being by setting up an external causal relation. The master logic provides a more substantial conception of power by posing the effect, the manifestation internal to the cause, that is, internal to being. This evaluation follows from a materialist conception of being, and William Ockham, one of the strictest materialists in the Western tradition, expresses the point clearly:

> The distinction between potential existence [*ens in potentia*] and actual existence [*ens in actu*] . . . does not mean that something that is not in the universe, but can exist in the universe, is truly a being, or that something else that is in the universe is also a being. Rather, when Aristotle divides "being" into potentiality and actuality . . . he has in mind that the name "being" is predicated of some thing by means of the verb "is," in a proposition that merely states a fact concerning a thing and is not equivalent to a proposition containing the mode of possibility. . . . Hence, Aristotle declares in the same place that "being is divisible into potential and actual, as knowledge and rest are"; but nothing is knowing or resting unless it is actually knowing or resting. (*Philosophical Writings* 92)

Ockham's insight leads us directly to the nucleus of Deleuze's Nietzschean distinction between master power and slave power. To say that "the name 'being' is predicated of some thing by means of the verb 'is' " is to say that the power of being is necessarily, efficiently linked to its manifestation, that the force of being is inseparable from "what it can do." The slave's conception of power is a "fiction" because it fails to recognize the real sub-

stantial nature of being, and tries to maintain a separation between the potential and the actual through a notion of possibility. Slave power is real and certainly does exist, but it cannot exist as a real expression of substance. The master conception of power reveals being in its actual productivity; in other words, it expresses the essence of being as the actual and efficient (not merely possible or formal) power of being. Framing the discussion in these terms, we can see that Nietzsche's argument has to do not with the quantity of power, but with its quality. "What Nietzsche calls weak or slavish is not the least strong but that which, whatever its strength, is separated from what it can do" (61). The entire discussion of power has little to do with strength or capacity, but with the relation between essence and manifestation, between power and what it can do. What Nietzsche contributes to this discourse on power is an evaluation—he judges the power internal to its manifestation as noble.[4]

This analysis of the nature of power is already very suggestive of an ethics. Deleuze brings out the ethical and political implications of the two types of power with an interesting comparison between Nietzsche and Callicles:

> Callicles strives to distinguish nature and law. Everything that separates a force from what it can do he calls law. Law, in this sense, expresses the triumph of the weak over the strong. Nietzsche adds: the triumph of reaction over action. Indeed, everything that separates a force is reactive as is the state of a force separated from what it can do. Every force that goes to the limit of its power is, on the contrary, active. It is not a law that every force goes to the limit, it is even the opposite of a law. (58-59)

This passage presents a terrain that is very close to that of Spinoza's political writings. First Spinoza affirms that power = virtue = right, and then he opposes *jus* to *lex*. This formulation serves Spinoza as an extension of his ethics and as the foundation for a viable, democratic politics. However, at this point in our reading of Deleuze's Nietzsche, we do not yet have the practical, constructive elements necessary to elaborate this ethical and political terrain. We have a substantial theory of power that can serve as an attack on juridicism (based on the conception of power it implies), but we do yet not have any positive alternative to complement this attack. To fill out this alternative we will have to wait until we can elaborate a conception of ethical practice. For the moment, then, we can only read the Nietzschean analysis of power as suggestive of a future ethics and politics.

We have made great progress in fleshing out the logic and value of Nietzsche's distinction between master power and slave power. However, it is clear that Hegel's master and slave do not tread directly on this same terrain. Hegel's slave is interested in consciousness and independence; he

is too preoccupied with his death, and too busy thinking about his work, to pose the question of value.[5] Evidently, the preceding discussion has not been dealing with the *Phenomenology*. Deleuze directs the Nietzschean attack not against Hegel's master and slave, but against an extrapolation from Hegel's *Science of Logic*. We no longer ask the question "What is the dialectical logic of being?" but "Who wills this logic?" This is the line of reasoning that leads us to master and slave valuation and to the two conceptions of power. Thus, Deleuze conducts a second-order critique of Hegel that builds on Bergsonian logic and looks forward to Spinozian politics. We should note that Deleuze's tactics for attacking Hegel have changed somewhat. Even if the rhetoric has intensified, the polemic no longer applies directly to Hegel's argument; it addresses a derivation from Hegel, an implication of his dialectic. This new tactic affords Deleuze a greater autonomy from Hegelian terminology, and, in effect, it transports the dialectic to Deleuze's terrain (in this case, of sense and value) so that he can carry out the combat there.

Remark: The Resurgence of Negativity

A parenthesis about Steven Houlgate's response to Deleuze's charges against slave logic in *Hegel, Nietzsche and the Criticism of Metaphysics* can help us frame the importance of the arguments we have presented. Houlgate's project is to defend Hegel against the recent charges wielded by the French Nietzscheans (Deleuze in particular) and, like a good Hegelian, to go back on the offensive, demonstrating that not only is Hegel invulnerable to Nietzschean critiques, but he actually completes the Nietzschean project better than Nietzsche himself did. He makes two central counterattacks against Deleuze's Nietzscheanism: (1) It fails to appreciate that Hegel's negative logic is required for determination, and (2) its conception of self does not meet the requirements to achieve genuine interiority. Given our reading of the evolution of Deleuze's work and the development of his project, it should be clear that these two points are well off the mark. Houlgate explains:

> Hegel's dialectic is not in fact based upon an initial *external* negation of the specific differences between things, and does not therefore constitute a flight into an abstract world of fictional concepts as Deleuze asserts. . . . According to Hegel's *Science of Logic*, a thing must be *in itself* the negation of something else . . . if it is to have any determinate characteristics . . . at all. The notion of something real or specific that is not negatively determined, or mediated, is precisely what dialectical philosophy shows up to be an impossibility. However, Deleuze fails to see Hegel's point. (7)

"Omnis determinatio est negatio." Houlgate reminds us that if we want determination, we must have negation. Deleuze has shown us in his studies on Bergson that he agrees with this point—but Deleuze is not the one who wants determination. We have seen that the negative movement of determination that founds Hegelian being is, by definition, a completely external movement. Further, when we considered this movement in a causal framework, we found that this external foundation is abstract, that it cannot adequately support being as substance, as *causa sui*. We must admit that Deleuze does not repeat this argument in *Nietzsche and Philosophy*; as we have said, he takes the Bergsonian point for granted and builds on it. However, we have come back to this argument so many times now that it can only appear comical when Houlgate claims that, like Nietzsche, Deleuze does not have an adequate familiarity with Hegel the logician, *doctor subtilis*: "What are the consequences of Deleuze's failure to appreciate Hegel's somewhat rarefied point of logic?" (8). Jean Wahl is much closer to the mark when he claims that Deleuze at times falls into rhetorical exaggerations by giving in to his unbridled hatred for Hegel.[6]

Houlgate's second charge shows a similar confusion of Deleuze's project. He reads Deleuze's Nietzschean critique as if it remained a reformist endeavor, content to criticize Hegel's means, not his ends. Thus, just as Houlgate assumes that Deleuze is striving for determination, which implies negation, so too he assumes as another goal the interiority of self-consciousness, which likewise proves to require negation: "Deleuze thus rules out the possibility that true, concrete selfhood is to be understood in terms of the negation of, or mediation by, the other" (7). And further: "In contrast to Hegel, Deleuze does not believe that genuine self-consciousness requires consciousness of the other's recognition of oneself" (8). Houlgate is assuming that Deleuze's project is to refine or complete Hegel's argument; Deleuze, on the contrary, wants to have nothing to do with self-consciousness and the self it gives rise to (cf. *Nietzsche and Philosophy* 39, 41-42, 80). Along with Nietzsche, he views it as a sickness, a *ressentiment* caused by the reflection of a force back into itself. What Deleuze is searching for, instead, is a productive exteriority that is based on affirmation (36). We can see this point clearly if we keep in mind the implications of Nietzsche's two types of power. Finally, Houlgate shows us one reason why Deleuze might choose not to address directly the master and slave of Hegel's *Phenomenology*: The entire terrain is oriented toward promoting the sickness of interiority and self-consciousness.

2.4 Slave Labor and the Insurrectional Critique

Is it true, as Jean Wahl claims, that there is something richer and more pro-

found in Hegel's analysis of the master-slave dialectic that escapes the Nietzschean critique? Or, on the contrary, has Deleuze already provided us with the weapons for an adequate Nietzschean attack? Let us try to test Deleuze's Nietzschean challenge by bringing it onto Hegel's own terrain. Hegel's slave does not reason, "The master is evil; therefore I am good"; instead, we can pose Hegel's slave syllogism as "I fear death and I am constrained to work; therefore I am an independent self-consciousness." The logic of this syllogism takes two routes—one implicit path in relation to the master, and one explicit path in relation to the object of the slave's labor—which are linked together as a progression to describe the education of the slave.

The implicit path is founded on the slave's confrontation with death, "the absolute Lord." In this encounter, the slave undergoes the negation of everything that is solid and stable in its being: "But this pure universal movement, the absolute melting-away of everything stable, is the simple, essential nature of self-consciousness, absolute negativity, *pure being-for-self* which is *implicit* in this consciousness" (*Phenomenology* §194). On a first consideration, the implicit process seems to develop the following logic: The initial self-consciousness of the slave, a simple being-for-self, is negated in death and then resurrected as an affirmation of life and as a pure being-for-self. However, we cannot understand the logic of this passage unless we note that this "melting-away of everything stable" is not, properly speaking, an absolute or total negation, because it preserves the "essential nature" of the consciousness under siege. The death of the slave would not serve Hegel's purposes: He wants to destroy all that is inessential in the slave, but to stop at the threshold of essence. This partial aggression, this restraint of the destructive force of dialectical negation is what allows for conservation—it is a negation "which supersedes in such a way as to preserve and maintain what is superseded" (§188).

Now, assuming we do accept that it is the opposition (albeit partial) with death that affirms the life of the slave, we can already venture a Bergsonian response to this implicit process. If the difference that animates life is its opposition to death, that is, if the difference of life is absolutely external, then life appears as merely unsubstantial, as a result of chance or hazard, a "subsistent exteriority." Furthermore, when we pose death in general as a contradiction of life in general, we are dealing in terms too imprecise and too abstract to arrive at the singularity and concreteness of the difference that defines real life and subjectivity. In effect, we are dressing life in baggy clothes. Life and death in their abstract opposition are indifferent. Therefore, the affirmation of life that the slave attains "in principle" through the confrontation with death can only be abstract and hollow.

Hegel, however, immediately follows with a response to this challenge: "This moment of pure being-for-self is also *explicit* for the bondsman, for in the lord it exists for him as his *object*. Furthermore, his consciousness is not this dissolution of everything stable merely in principle; in his service he *actually* brings this about" (§194). Here the slave no longer faces "the absolute Lord," abstract death, but he confronts a particular master and is forced to work. This explicit negation takes two forms that are linked together in a progressive movement: a formal negation in the slave's relation to the master, and an actual negation in the slave's relation to his labor. In the master, the slave is confronted by an independent self-consciousness that negates him. However, the slave cannot gain recognition from the master, and thus this form of opposition can only give him "the beginning of wisdom." The second explicit relationship reveals the slave's essential nature, allowing him to become "conscious of what he truly is" (§195). The slave comes out of himself by engaging the thing as object of his labor; he loses or negates himself and finds himself in the thing; finally, he retrieves the essential nature of himself through his negation or transformation of the thing. Through his forced labor, then, the slave negates a specific other (the aspect of himself that has gone out of himself) through working or transforming it, just as the master negates the object of his desire in consuming it. The primary difference between these two negations (master desire and slave labor) lies in the fact that the object of the master's desire appears as a dependent, transitory other, and therefore can provide only fleeting satisfaction; the object of the slave's labor, however, resists his negation, and thus appears as permanent and independent: "Work . . . is desire held in check, fleetingness staved off" (§195). Master desire, like death, is too thorough in its negation for Hegel's purposes: It is the total destruction of the other and the end of the relationship. Work, however, like the near-death Hegel posits in fear, is a "dialectical" or partial negation that allows the "essential nature" of the other to survive and thus perpetuates the relationship. We can understand this entire complex process, from the initial implicit relationship to the final explicit relationship, as the progressive education of the slave. The first moment, the slave's confrontation with death, dissolves the fixity of his life and focuses his attention on the universal (Charles Taylor, *Hegel* 155). This educational fear prepares the slave for his work. Thus prepared, the slave is able, in the second, explicit moment of labor, to achieve his true self-realization: He becomes "conscious of what he truly is."

We should take a moment here to clarify the terms of our reading of this passage. There is a great deal of slippage and ambiguity regarding the level of abstraction and the register of Hegel's argument, which leave it open to a variety of interpretations. It is not clear exactly where we should look to

locate the master and the slave—in real individuals? in social classes? in the logical movement of Spirit? What is unclear is the nature of the contents we should attribute to the agents of the drama. Should we read the master-slave dialectic in personalist terms, or rather as an impersonal, logical drama of being? A Hegelian might immediately object to the form of these questions, insisting that Hegel's analysis spans the different registers and effectively unites them in the movement of historical being. Spirit, which is always embodied, is simultaneously the individual subject, the sociohistorical subject, and the essence of being; thus, Hegel's argument slips comfortably between personal and impersonal references, and between microcosm and macrocosm. On this basis, many interpreters invoke a personalist reading to pose the master-slave relation as the affirmation of a liberal ethics of mutual respect that spans both the personal and formal registers: "Men seek and need the recognition of their fellows" (Taylor 152).[7] However, when we refer back to the argument, it is clear that the personalist hypothesis provides certain difficulties for a consistent reading of the text. The master term presents difficulties because, in effect, it can only successfully fit into a personalized mold for brief sections of the analysis. In the implicit half of the passage, the master moves to the extreme extension of its role: "The absolute Lord" is death. This should already indicate to us that the master cannot be read in personal terms. Later in the text, however, the slave discovers his other in the object of his labor, and through his interaction with this object the slave gains the necessary self-recognition. If we read this section as the human need to gain acknowledgment from another human, how could the slave possibly find satisfaction through his relation to the object of his labor? The working slave gains a reflected image of himself from the thing, but never gains acknowledgment from a human or personal other. Indeed, we can only maintain the coherence of the passage if we attribute no personal contents to the master role and read it as an impersonal, logical role or as an objective other. The question remains, however, whether we should read the slave's drama in personal or impersonal terms, as a development of a personal, human consciousness (individual or collective) in an objective world, or as a purely logical development. Let us explore these two possibilities in turn.

If we read the text from a strictly logical perspective, the master-slave drama illustrates the conflict between two forms of negation. The master negation is the villain of the drama because it totally destroys its object and ends the relationship (the master, in its desire/consumption, brings on the death of the other); in contrast, the slave negation is the hero because it operates a partial destruction and perpetuates its object (the slave in its labor). Master negation does not hold back its powers but attacks with full force, while slave negation is the model of restraint: "desire held in check,

fleetingness staved off." This is where Deleuze's Nietzsche can finally enter the discussion. Master negation is simply destructive force carried through to its logical conclusion, a force inseparable from its manifestation. Slave negation is force "held in check," that is, restrained from full expression. This is the "fiction" at the essence of slave power. Nietzsche recognizes that this slave negation is the reflective moment of self-consciousness, the interiorization of force: "Whatever the reason that an active force is falsified, deprived of its conditions of operation and separated from what it can do, *it is turned back inside, turned back against itself*" (*Nietzsche and Philosophy* 127-28). This is perfectly coherent with the Hegelian argument. The essence of the slave that emerges victoriously from the dialectic is the universal essence of being: pure self-consciousness. Interiority is the essence of Hegelian being. Here we can see Hegel and Nietzsche on the same terrain, marching in precisely opposite directions. Both seek to locate essence in the movement of being, but Hegel discovers a force reflected back into itself (self-consciousness or interiority), and Nietzsche proposes a force that emerges unhaltingly outside itself (the will to power or exteriority). The discussion comes back once again to the nature of power. If, in both cases, the essence of being is power, they are two radically different conceptions of power. Our terms are clumsy, but the distinction is clear: On one side, there is power separated from what it can do, Hegelian reflection, Ockham's *ens in potentia*, or Spinoza's *potestas*; on the other side, there is power internal to its manifestation, Ockham's *ens in actu* and Spinoza's *potentia*. We have seen that a modified Scholastic argument is available to Deleuze to defend the "efficient" conception of power in logical terms. Here, however, Deleuze follows Nietzsche's argument and shows a series of negative practical effects that are consequent on this slave victory of interiority, such as pain, guilt, and sin (*Nietzsche and Philosophy* 128-31). Once again we can see why Deleuze might choose not to address Hegel's master-slave dialectic directly, because the entire discussion is directed toward self-consciousness, toward interiority, a condition antithetical to joy and affirmation.

Furthermore, in these same logical terms and in a perfectly coherent fashion, the "education" of the slave reveals a critical method of partial negations. The first moment of the critique is the slave's close confrontation with, or fear of, death; this moment is the *pars destruens*, but it is a limited *pars destruens* since the "essential nature" of the slave is spared. This confrontation purports to free the slave from the fixity of its previously stable conditions and allows it to operate the second moment of the critique, the *pars construens*, through the slave's labor. This second moment, however, is not properly a *pars construens*. It is not really productive, but rather revelatory; the slave is not created or substantially transformed in this second

moment, but rather "becomes conscious of what he truly is" (195). Charles Taylor's term for this moment of labor—a "standing negation"—is adequate because it shows that there is really no progression here. Posed in these logical terms, then, we can finally make good on Deleuze's claim cited earlier that it is precisely the errors of the Kantian critique that lead to the Hegelian dialectic Like the Kantian critique, the dialectical critique described by the education of the slave is neither total nor positive. The partiality of its destructive moment spares precisely what takes the place of creation in the productive moment, the "essential nature" of the slave. However, while Kant "seems to have confused the positivity of critique with a humble recognition of the rights of the criticised" (*Nietzsche and Philosophy* 89), this Hegelian slave critique has made the criticized into the hero of the drama. The triumph of this dialectical critique is that the essential nature of the slave survives and is revealed in pure form in a stable configuration of partial, "standing" negations. Only the master's active negation, the unrestrained attack, the death of the adversary can lead to a total critique, and therefore to the opportunity for a positive, original creation: "Destruction as the active destruction of the man who wants to perish and to be overcome announces the creator" (178). The differences between the two types of power, then, are directly related to the two types of critique. Nietzsche's master power, in which force is internal to its manifestation, knows no restraint and thus operates a total critique; when power is separated from what it can do, on the other hand, the *pars destruens* that initiates the critique can only be partial.

All of this we have discovered by reading Hegel's argument as if the slave were an impersonal force playing out a logical position. However, if we are to emphasize the educational journey of the slave as the development of a particular self-consciousness, as Hegel does, it seems that we have to fill the slave with some general personal contents. What exactly is the "essential nature" of the slave that survives the onslaught of critical forces and emerges victorious from the development? Hegel would have us believe that the slave essence is content-less as pure self-consciousness, and that this essence is not particular to the slave, but is the very essence of being. The coherence of Hegel's argument, however, relies on the differential *relationship* between the slave and its master. The movement that defines and reveals essence cannot develop with any actor, but is dependent on a specific position in the relationship. We see, of course, that the master does not embody this movement. Since the logic of the drama turns on the slave's position in the relationship, the essence of the slave has to involve his servitude.[8] The first moment of the critique (the fear of death, the relation to the master) makes the slave more intent on its activity, and the second moment (work) is its pure expression. It is precisely slave labor

that survives and is purified through the critical education. The text makes clear, however, that the work of the slave cannot be considered as creative energy or productive force; on the contrary, the slave's work is fundamentally his role in a "standing" relationship.

The tradition of Marxist thought has known all too many interpretations that (directly or indirectly) exalt this Hegelian proposition: The worker occupies an exalted position because his or her work expresses human essence. Thus, the history of the workers' struggle becomes an educational drama that assaults, "melting away," the inessential character of the worker in order to affirm the essential nature of work. The worker is liberated inasmuch as work is affirmed as his or her essence. This is the Stakhanovite "dignity" of the worker. Marx will have no part of this: Leave it to the bosses to sing the praises of work. What is at issue here is not the description of the worker's existence in a relationship, but the proposition that this role constitutes the *essence* of the worker. Marx makes a perfectly analogous argument in relation to the State: "Hegel is not to be blamed because he describes the existence of the Modern State such as it is, but because he passes off what it is as the *essence of the State*" ("Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right" 63). This is where we can see Deleuze's Nietzsche and Marx very close to one another, in an unrestrained attack on the essence of established values. They both conceive of real essence not as work, but as a force: power, the will to power, living labor, creation.[9] But in order to liberate that force, to provide the room for the *pars construens*, the constructive, transformative force, they must both conduct a radical, total critique, an unlimited *pars destruens*, attacking the essence of the established values. If the worker is to reach a point of genuine affirmation, of self-valorization, the attack has to be directed at the "essence," at the values that define the worker as such—against servitude, against work.[10] In this context, Nietzsche appears in the position of Marxist workerism: "In order to struggle against capital, the working class must struggle against itself inasmuch as it is capital. . . . Workers' struggle against work, struggle of the worker against himself inasmuch as worker" (Tronti 260). The worker attacking work, attacking himself inasmuch as worker, is a beautiful means of understanding Nietzsche's "man who wants to perish and to be overcome." In attacking himself, he is attacking the relationship that has been posed as his essence—only after this "essence" is destroyed can he truly be able to create. A Hegelian partial critique is at best a reformism, preserving the essence of what it attacks—it "supersedes in such a way as to preserve and maintain what is superseded" (*Phenomenology* §188). A total critique is necessarily an insurrectional critique. And only that unrestrained destruction of established "essence" can allow for genuine cre-

ation. Deleuze's Nietzsche appears as a prophet of what Lenin calls "the art of insurrection."[11]

Remark: The Will to Workers' Power and the Social Synthesis

Is *Nietzsche and Philosophy* an untimely hymn to the workers of '68? Through Deleuze's reading, we have found a surprisingly strong confluence between Nietzsche and Marx (and even Lenin) in terms of the power, the radicality, and the creativity of the practical critique. However, we are not prepared here to confront the Nietzsche-Marx question in all its complexity. In this "Remark," I wish only to touch on the question, somewhat indirectly, by considering Deleuze's Nietzschean arguments in terms of Nanni Balestrini's *Vogliamo tutto* (We want everything), a simple, beautiful Italian novel that recounts the story of a worker at the FIAT plant in the late 1960s and his involvement in the formation of the political movement *Potere operaio* (Workers' Power).[12] What interests me initially in this comparison is the radical attack on the established notion of essence as a precondition for change and creation. In Nietzschean terms, Deleuze often expresses this as the attack on "man" or as a moment in the effort to go beyond man, to create new terms and values of human existence (*Nietzsche and Philosophy* 64-65; also *Foucault* 131-41). This is the same notion expressed by the workers' "refusal of work," an attack against their established essence so as to be able to create new terms of existence. Note that the workers' refusal is not only a refusal *to* work but a refusal *of* work, that is, a refusal of a specific existing relation of production. In other words, the workers' attack on work, their violent *pars destruens*, is directed precisely at their own essence.

In the first section of *Vogliamo tutto*, the protagonist cannot yet pose his desires in such political terms; nonetheless, what he hates most of all is precisely what defines his social existence and what is presented to him as his essence. Thus, he cannot understand why anyone would want to celebrate work on May Day: "What a joke to celebrate labor day. . . . I never understood why work ought to be celebrated" (74). Workers who accept the established value of work appear to him as closed, blocked from what they can do, and it is precisely this acceptance of the established values as essence that makes them dangerous: "Thick people obtuse without the least bit of imagination dangerous. Not fascists just obtuse. Those in the PCI [Italian Communist Party] were bread and work. I was a '*qualunquista*' [nonideological, value-less] at least I was recuperable. But they completely accepted work and for them work was everything" (85-86). Those who accept "bread and work" as their essence as workers are unable to imagine, unable to create. The danger they present is that of a forced stasis, a dead-

ening of creative powers, and a perpetuation of the established essence. In this context, a "*qualunquista*" is already in a better position. The lack of values, of beliefs, provides a space on which imagination and creation can act. From this position, from the recognition of his antagonism toward work as a relation of production, the protagonist begins a progressively more political attack on work itself. Thus far, we are still on the terrain of Deleuze's Nietzsche, with the total critique of established values. Here we have a developed example of the worker attacking work, and therefore attacking himself inasmuch as worker—a beautiful instance of Nietzsche's "man who wants to perish," the active and liberatory destruction that must be distinguished from the passivity of the "last man," the PCIista who completely accepts work (cf. *Nietzsche and Philosophy* 174).

The protagonist of *Vogliamo tutto*, however, only gains the real power to carry out this destructive project when he begins to recognize his commonality with the other workers. The voice of the narrative takes on a continually broader scope, shifting from first person singular to first person plural as the mass of workers begin to recognize what they can do and what they can become: "All the stuff all the wealth we produce is ours. . . . We want everything. All the wealth all the power and no work" (128). The expansion of the collective expression is matched by an expansion of the will. It is precisely the wealth of the collectivity that provides the basis for the violent radicality of critique: "What began to come up was the desire to struggle not because the work not because the boss were bad but because they exist. What began to come out was the demand to want power, in short" (128). The recognition of collective desires goes hand in hand with the development and expansion of collective practice. The workers' strikes build to the point where they spill outside of the factory as demonstrations in the streets and violent conflict involving large parts of the city. Finally, this collective destructive expression, this moment of intense violence, opens the possibility for the subsequent joy and creation: "But now the thing that moved them more than anger was joy. The joy of being finally strong. Of discovering that these demands that this struggle were the demands of everyone that it was the struggle of everyone" (171). This is the climax of the novel, the point where the struggle transforms from a *pars destruens* driven by hatred for the bosses and work to a *pars construens* of workers' joy in feeling their power. In this focal point, the struggle is converted from negation to affirmation. This is the hour of "midnight," Nietzsche's transmutation (*Nietzsche and Philosophy* 171-75). The workers' attack on their essence as workers arrives at a moment when they are able to "go beyond," to discover a terrain of creation and joy beyond the "worker."

I would like to emphasize two elements of this workers' transmutation. The first is that the entire critical movement is necessarily tied to a broadening movement of the collectivity. The workers' recognition of their commonality and their expression in collective action take the form of a spatial or social *synthesis*, composing an expansive and coherent body of desire: As the body of workers expands, their will and power grow. The synthesis involved in the workers' collectivity is an eternal return of the will not in time but in space, the return of the will laterally throughout the mass of workers. It would be a poor formulation to say that the workers are powerful because they come together—this would imply a calculation of individual sacrifice for achieving extrinsic collective goods. Rather, the workers' power and their joy lie precisely in the fact that they will and act together. The workers form a powerful assemblage. The second element I would like to emphasize is that the transmutation comes about through the *practice* of the workers. Precisely when the workers "actualize" their critique, when they pass into action in the factory and in the streets, they achieve the constructive moment of joy and creation. The "actualization" of the workers is a practice of joy. These two elements give us the terms for the remainder of our study of Deleuze's Nietzsche: How does Nietzsche conceive a real synthesis of forces, and how do these forces manifest themselves in terms of practice?

2.5 The Being of Becoming: The Ethical Synthesis of the Efficient Will

When Deleuze approaches the question of a Nietzschean synthesis, he comes back once again to the affirmation of multiplicity and the attack on the dialectic. "Hegel wanted to ridicule pluralism" (*Nietzsche and Philosophy* 4): The dialectic of the One and the Multiple sets up a false image of multiplicity that is easily recuperable in the unity of the One. We have treated this charge at some length in the second phase of Bergson study (Section 1.3). As we have seen, the most potent Bergsonian attack against the dialectic in this regard is the construction of a veritable multiplicity, of differences of nature. We find this same attack in Deleuze's Nietzsche: "Pluralism sometimes appears to be dialectical—but it is its most ferocious enemy, its only profound enemy" (8). Pluralism or multiplicity is so dangerous for the dialectic precisely because it is irreducible to unity. Through the analysis of Bergson's work, Deleuze brings out the irreducibility and eminence of multiplicity in clear, logical terms; but, as we have seen, in this context Deleuze only succeeds in posing the complementary moment of the organization of the Multiple in very weak terms. Indeed, it seems that the irreducibility of the multiplicity prohibits any idea of organization. We have argued that the failure to provide an adequate notion of organization

is what makes Deleuze's Bergson most vulnerable to a Hegelian counterattack. This is where Nietzsche provides Deleuze with an enormous advance.

"The game has two moments that are those of the dicethrow—the dice that is thrown and the dice that falls back" (25). The two moments of the dicethrow constitute the basic elements of Nietzsche's alternative to the dialectic of the One and the Multiple. The first moment of the game is the easier to understand. The throw of the dice is the affirmation of chance and multiplicity precisely because it is the refusal of control: Just as we saw in the Bergson studies, this is not the multiplicity of order; there is nothing preformed in the possibility of this moment—it is the indeterminate, the unforeseeable. This is Bergson's creative evolution (or emanation) of being, and in Nietzschean terms this is the becoming of being: pure multiplicity. The moment that the dice fall back, however, is more obscure and more complex: "The dice that are thrown once are the affirmation of *chance*, the combination that they form on falling is the affirmation of *necessity*. Necessity is affirmed of chance in exactly the same sense that being is affirmed of becoming and unity is affirmed of multiplicity" (26). The falling back of the dice is not merely a confirmation of the necessity of the given, of multiple reality; this would merely be a determinism, and it would risk negating rather than affirming the first moment of the game. Instead, the falling back of the dice is a moment of the organization of unity—it is not the passive revelation, but the active creation of being. To understand this, we have to relate the dicethrow metaphor to the eternal return:

> The dice that fall back necessarily affirm the number or the destiny that brings the dice back. . . . The eternal return is the second moment, the result of the dicethrow, the affirmation of necessity, the number that *brings together all the parts of chance*. But it is also the return of the first moment, the repetition of the dicethrow, the reproduction and reaffirmation of chance itself. (27-28, emphasis mine)

The dicethrow metaphor is admittedly somewhat strained at this point, but we must recognize the second moment as a moment of organization that constructs unity, that constitutes being by bringing together "all the parts of chance" created in the first moment—not according to any preformed order, but in an original organization. The return of the dice is an affirmation of the dicethrow in that it constitutes the original elements of chance in a coherent whole. Not only does the first moment (of multiplicity and becoming) imply the second moment (of unity and being), but this second moment is also the return of the first: The two moments imply one another

as a perpetual series of shattering and gathering, as a centrifugal moment and a centripetal moment, as emanation and constitution.

What is the logic of the synthesis or constitution of being in the eternal return? We can no longer pose this question on a purely logical plane; Nietzsche has transformed the terrain, so that we can only consider such ontological questions in terms of force and value:

> The synthesis is one of forces, of their difference and their reproduction; the eternal return is the synthesis that has as its principle the will to power. We should not be surprised by the word "will"; *which one* apart from the will is capable of serving as the principle of a synthesis of forces by determining the relation of force with forces? (50)

We have seen from the outset that the will is the dynamic that moves and animates the horizon of force and value: The logic of the synthesis, then, is the logic of the will. The will to power is the principle of the synthesis that marks the being of becoming, the unity of the multiplicity and the necessity of chance. How, though, does the will provide a foundation for being? We are not so far from the Scholastic horizon that we earlier drew on so heavily. In effect, the will to power is the principle of the eternal return in that it plays the role of a primary cause, defining the necessity and substantiality of being. Nietzsche's terrain, however, quickly transforms this logical/ontological point into an ethics. The eternal return of the will is an ethics inasmuch as it is a "selective ontology" (72).[13] It is selective because not every will returns: Negation comes only once; only affirmation returns. The eternal return is the selection of the affirmative will as being. Being is not given in Nietzsche; being must be willed. In this sense, ethics comes before ontology in Nietzsche. The ethical will is the will that returns; the ethical will is the will that wills being. This is the sense in which the eternal return is a temporal synthesis of forces: It demands that the will to power wills unity in time. Deleuze formulates the ethical selection of the eternal return as a practical rule for the will: "Whatever you will, will it in such a way that you also will its eternal return" (68). We should note here, however, that when we read Deleuze's rule of the eternal return, we must be careful not to emphasize the word "also." This "also" can be very misleading because the eternal return is not separate from the will, but internal to it. "How does the eternal return perform the selection here? It is the *thought* of the eternal return that selects. It makes willing something whole" (69). The ethical will is whole, internal to its return: "Always do what you will" (*Nietzsche and Philosophy* 69, quoted from *Thus Spake Zarathustra* 191). The principle of the eternal return as being is the efficient will as an ethical will.

We can now trace a beautiful trajectory of this fundamental idea of efficiency and internality: from the logical centrality of efficient difference (the difference internal to the thing), to the ontological centrality of efficient power (the force internal to its manifestation), and now to the ethical centrality of the efficient will, the principle of the eternal return. A Scholastic logic runs through this series as the guiding thread, providing it a materialist, metaphysical foundation: The internal nature of the cause to its effect is what supports the necessity, substantiality, singularity, and univocity of being. This is how we can understand the eternal return of the efficient will as the ethical pillar of a Nietzschean philosophy of being. We asked ourselves earlier, in our analysis of Deleuze's work on Bergson (Section 1.3) how a philosophy of "indetermination" can also be a philosophy of being, how we can have both becoming and being. Here we have a Nietzschean answer. The dicethrow (the moment of becoming, of indetermination) is followed by dice falling back (the selection of being), which in turn leads to a new dicethrow. The ontological selection does not negate the indetermination of the dicethrow, but enhances it, affirms it, just as the eternal return is an affirmation of the will.

Finally, pure being is attained in Nietzsche as an achieved state, a finality, and it is presented in the persona of Ariadne. The love of Ariadne for Dionysus is the affirmation of the eternal return; it is a double affirmation, the raising of the being of becoming to its highest power. Dionysus is the god of affirmation, but it takes Ariadne to affirm affirmation itself: "Eternal affirmation of being, eternally I am your affirmation" (187, quoted from *Dionysian Dithyrambs*). Dionysus's affirmation marks the being of becoming; therefore, since Ariadne takes Dionysus for the object of her affirmation, she marks the pure affirmation of being. Ariadne's affirmation is a double affirmation ("the 'yes' that responds to 'yes' " ["Mystère d'Ariane" 15]), or, more properly, it is a spiraling, infinite affirmation—affirmation raised to the *n*th power. Ariadne's creation of pure being is an ethical act, an act of love.

2.6 The Total Critique as the Foundation of Being

On this ethical terrain of the efficient, affirmative will, Deleuze reproposes the drama of the total critique, one last time, now in terms of valuation—as "transmutation." Deleuze presents the critique this time through a combination of refurbished Kantian and Scholastic terms. In effect, transmutation moves from Kantianism to Scholasticism in that it moves from a critique of knowledge to a foundation of being.[14] Here, also, we find Deleuze's final attack on the Hegelian dialectic, albeit in distant, indirect form. As we have

already seen, the standpoint of the critique, free from its transcendental instance, is the will to power. Now the antagonistic moment, the *pars destruens* of the critique, is played by nihilism. Deleuze explains that nihilism is the *ratio cognoscendi* of the will to power: "What we in fact *know* of the will to power is suffering and torture" (173, emphasis mine). Deleuze has explained at great length that nihilism, as a project of interiority and consciousness, is full of pain and suffering; however, this same nihilism is what reveals "all the values known or knowable up to the present" (172). We gain knowledge of ourselves and our present through the suffering of the negative will to power. As Kant has taught us, though, there is a beyond to this knowledge: "We 'think' the will to power in a form distinct from that in which we know it. (Thus the *thought* of the eternal return goes beyond all the laws of our *knowledge*.)" (172-73). Nihilism itself is what takes us beyond interiority, beyond suffering: The power of the negative in this critique does not operate a Hegelian "standing negation"; instead, this "completed" nihilism is an *active* will to nothingness—"self-destruction, active destruction" (174). Completed nihilism is self-destruction in two senses: Completion means that nihilism defeats itself so that the final act of the negative will to power is to extinguish itself; also, the completion of nihilism is the end of "man" as a constructed interiority—it is the suicide of the "last man."

At the limit of this destruction, at midnight, the focal point, there is a transformation, a conversion from knowledge to creation, from savage negation to absolute affirmation, from painful interiority to joyful exteriority: "The legislator takes the place of the 'scholar,' *creation takes the place of knowledge itself* and affirmation takes the place of all negations" (173). Affirmation, the *pars construens* of the will to power, is "the unknown joy, the unknown happiness, the unknown God" (173) that is beyond the *ratio cognoscendi*. With the active completion of nihilism and the transmutation to affirmation and creation, we are finally finished with negativity, interiority, and consciousness as such. Exteriority is the condition for the grounding of being: The *ratio essendi* of the will to power, Deleuze explains, is affirmation. These terms allow Deleuze to reformulate a statement of Zarathustra as an ontological ethics: "I love the one who makes use of nihilism as the *ratio cognoscendi* of the will to power, but who finds in the will to power a *ratio essendi* in which man is overcome and therefore nihilism is defeated" (174). Being is primary over knowledge. Like Ariadne, Zarathustra loves being, the creation and affirmation of being. Exteriority, affirmation, the efficient will to power: This is the *ratio* that supports being, and this is what Zarathustra loves.

Remark: The End of Deleuze's Anti-Hegelianism

We noted at the outset of this chapter that one of the central goals in Deleuze's study of Nietzsche is to flesh out an alternative to dialectical opposition that would be an "opposition to the dialectic itself" (17). It is precisely the dialectic's ability to recuperate opposition that is often used to critique contemporary anti-Hegelians such as Deleuze. Judith Butler forcefully poses the question of an opposition to Hegelianism in *Subjects of Desire*: "What constitutes the latest stage of post-Hegelianism as a stage definitively beyond the dialectic? Are these positions still haunted by the dialectic, even as they claim to be in utter opposition to it? What is the nature of this 'opposition,' and is it perchance a form that Hegel himself has prefigured?" (176). Butler answers these questions in strictly Hegelian fashion: "References to a 'break' with Hegel are almost always impossible, if only because Hegel has made the very notion of 'breaking with' into the central tenet of the dialectic" (183-84). From this perspective, opposition itself is essentially dialectical, and hence "opposition to the dialectic itself" can only mean a reinforcement or repetition of the dialectic. In other words, any effort to be an "other" to Hegelianism can be effectively recuperated as an "other" within Hegelianism.

Through our reading of Deleuze's Nietzsche we have explored two points that could constitute adequate responses to Butler's proposition. Deleuze's elaboration of the total critique provides us a direct response by showing that there are two different types of opposition. Dialectical opposition is a restrained, partial attack that seeks to "preserve and maintain" its enemy; it is a sort of low-intensity warfare that can be prolonged indefinitely in a "standing negation." In effect, the dialectic pillages and reforms the essence of its predecessor through a partial critique. Therefore, the "breaking with" that is a central tenet of the dialect can only be a partial rupture, preserving the continuity that characterizes the prefix "post." Nondialectical opposition, however, is that which operates a complete rupture with its opponent through an unrestrained, savage attack. The result of this profound opposition is a separation that prohibits the recuperation of relations. It would be a mistake, then, to call this Nietzschean position "post-Hegelian," as if it built on, reformed, or completed Hegelianism. Deleuze's claim is that the Nietzschean total critique is a "post-Kantian" position—it corrects the Kantian errors to realize the goals of Kant's own original project. Kant's critique allows established values to persist on the transcendental plane as essence. This exception is a result of Kant's incompleteness, and this is the fundamental error that Nietzsche corrects. In Hegel's dialectical critique, however, the established values that are posed as essence are presented as the central protagonist of the critical drama. It

is impossible to conceive of the Nietzschean total critique and its unrestrained *pars destruens* as a reform of this position—it can only appear as a profound rupture. At this point, we can clearly see the need for Deleuze's care in positioning the relation to proximate and fundamental enemies. Deleuze's Nietzsche can appear as "post-Kantian" but only "anti-Hegelian": The difference is between reform and rupture. Posed in historiographic terms, Butler's Hegelian claim is that there are only continuous lines in the history of philosophy, reformed to a greater or lesser extent as differences of degree. Deleuze, on the contrary, insists that the history of philosophy contains real discontinuities, veritable differences of nature, and that discontinuity is the only way of posing the Hegel-Nietzsche relationship: "There is no possible compromise between Hegel and Nietzsche" (195).

Deleuze offers us, however, a second response. As we have proceeded through the evolution of Deleuze's thought we have seen the terrain on which he can address Hegelianism constantly shrinking, and we have seen that his attacks on the dialectic have become more and more indirect. The Bergsonian attack on the One and the Multiple, and the Nietzschean attack on the master-slave relation, are carried out on planes completely removed from Hegel's discourse. Deleuze's strategy of developing a total opposition to the dialectic is accompanied by another strategy: to move away from the dialectic, to forget the dialectic. We have arrived at the end of Deleuze's anti-Hegelianism. Even though rhetoric against the dialectic will reappear, in the opening of *Différence et répétition*, for example, it is only to repeat the arguments developed in these early studies, not to develop new ones. The development of a total opposition to the dialectic seems to have been an intellectual cure for Deleuze: It has exorcised Hegel and created an autonomous plane for thought, one that is no longer anti-Hegelian, but that, quite simply, has forgotten the dialectic.

2.7 Pathos and Joy: Toward a Practice of Affirmative Being

A philosophy of joy is necessarily a philosophy of practice. Throughout Deleuze's reading of Nietzsche we have the impression that practice plays a central role, but the terms never come out clearly. It is very clear, on the other hand, what Deleuze's Nietzsche is not: It is not an investigation of consciousness; it is not only a reformation of the understanding or an emendation of the intellect; in short, it is not the construction of an interiority, but a creation of exteriority through the power of affirmation. The exteriority of thought and of the will, however, is not yet an adequate characterization, because Nietzschean affirmation is also corporeal. We have one last passage to make in our reading of Deleuze's Nietzsche: from will to appetite and desire, from exteriority to practice.

Deleuze's elaboration of Nietzschean exteriority rediscovers a Spinozian proposition: "Will to power is manifested as a power to be affected [pouvoir d'être affecté]" (62, modified).[15] Spinoza conceives a positive relation between a body's power to be affected and its power to effect (see Section 3.7): "The more ways a body could be affected the more force it had" (62). Two aspects of this Spinozian conception interest Deleuze in the context of Nietzsche's work. First, this power to be affected never deals with a possibility, but it is always actualized in relations with other bodies. Second, this power defines the receptivity of a body not as a passivity, but as "an *affectivity*, a sensibility, a sensation" (62). What this notion affords Deleuze is a means of posing inner experience as a mode of corporeal exteriority. The receptivity of a body is closely tied to its active external expression: Affectivity is an attribute of the body's power. In Nietzsche, as in Spinoza, then, pathos does not involve a body "suffering" passions; on the contrary, pathos involves the affects that mark the activity of the body, the creation that is joy.

To arrive at a practical conception of joy, however, this rich sense of the power of the affectivity of bodies must be accompanied by an elaboration of the activity of bodies in practice. The very last section of *Nietzsche and Philosophy* approaches this problem:

> Nietzsche's practical teaching is that difference is happy; that multiplicity, becoming and chance are adequate objects of joy by themselves and that only joy returns. . . . Not since Lucretius has the critical enterprise that characterizes philosophy been taken so far (with the exception of Spinoza). Lucretius exposes the trouble of the soul and those who need it to establish their power—Spinoza exposes sorrow, all the causes of sorrow and all those who found their power at the heart of this sorrow—Nietzsche exposes *ressentiment*, bad conscience and the power of the negative that serves as their principle. (190)

This history of practical philosophies of joy (Lucretius, Spinoza, Nietzsche) is very suggestive. However, in Deleuze's Nietzsche there are two elements that block the development of a practical struggle against the sad passions: elements that direct us forward to the study of Spinoza. First, Deleuze's "impersonal" reading of Nietzsche blocks the development of a theory of practice because it limits our conception of agents to the interplay of forces. We have noted that when Deleuze asks the question "Qui?" he avoids all "personalist" references, and looks rather to a specific will to power. At this point, however, we need to look not only to the will, but also to the appetite and desire.[16] The attributes of a practical agent must be "personalist" in some sense—for a theory of practice we do not need an individualist theory, but we do need a corporeal and desiring agent.

Spinoza is exemplary in this regard when he defines the agent of practice, the "Individual," as a body or group of bodies recognized for its common movement, its common behavior, its common desire (*Ethics* IIP13Def). A corporeal agent such as Spinoza's can lead a struggle against the sad passions and discover a practice of joy. Second, Deleuze's study of Nietzsche fails to arrive at a theory of practice because it does not arrive at a conception of a spatial or social synthesis. The Nietzschean synthesis, the eternal return, is a temporal synthesis that projects the will to power in time. Spinoza will show us, however, that a practice of joy takes place on the plane of sociality: Spinoza's common notions, for example, provide the terms for an expansive collectivity, for the creation of society, and thus constitute a powerful weapon against the sad passions. This final section of *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, then, is already looking forward to the next passage in Deleuze's evolution: from Nietzschean affirmation to Spinozian practice.

Chapter 3

Spinozian Practice
Affirmation and Joy

One can recognize immediately that Deleuze's reading of Spinoza has a different quality than his treatment of other philosophers. There is a certain modesty and caution before Spinoza that we do not find elsewhere. We should keep in mind, of course, that Deleuze presented *Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza* as the historical portion of his doctoral thesis, but this fact can only provide a partial explanation for the change in tone. As we have seen, Deleuze often presents his investigations in the history of philosophy in the form of extreme simplicity, as the elaboration of a single idea: ontological positivity for Bergson, ethical affirmation for Nietzsche. These studies take the form of clean-cut jewels. They pose the essential idea from which an entire philosophical doctrine follows. In comparison, Deleuze's work on Spinoza is very ragged; it is spilling over with underdeveloped insights and unresolved problems. Precisely for this reason it is a more open work, and at the same time a work that is less accessible to a general public.[1] *Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza* appears as a set of working notes that do not present a completed interpretation, but rather propose a series of interpretative strategies in the process of development. Therefore, the theoretical passages that we will follow here are necessarily complex, and often elliptical:

> It was on Spinoza that I worked the most seriously according to the norms of the history of philosophy—but it was Spinoza more than any other that gave me the feeling of a gust of air that pushes you on the back

> each time you read him, a witch's broomstick that he mounts you atop. We have not yet begun to understand Spinoza, and I myself no more than others. (*Dialogues* 15)

Spinoza remains an enigma.

Our task is to discern how the reading of Spinoza contributes to the development and evolution of Deleuze's project. Let us go back to our initial methodological principles. We presented as a hypothesis at the outset, and we have confirmed in our first two chapters, that there is an evolution in Deleuze's early thought. His historical monographs approach the work of the individual philosophers according to the demands of his own intellectual project. With Bergson, Deleuze develops an ontology. With Nietzsche, he sets that ontology in motion to constitute an ethics. With Spinoza, we will take a further step in this evolution, toward politics, building a new wing onto the structure of a Bergsonian ontology and a Nietzschean ethics. A particular and important aspect of Deleuze's evolution is that it does not involve exchanging one theoretical perspective for another, but rather it is a process of accumulation and constitution. In other words, each step, each new terrain of investigation, is a construction that never abandons or negates, but rather reproposes the terms of its predecessor. Deleuze carries his baggage with him. Nietzschean ethics is Bergsonian ontology transported to the field of value; Spinozian politics is Bergsonian ontology and Nietzschean ethics transported to the field of practice. Ontology inheres in ethics, which in turn inheres in politics. Spinoza's politics is an ontological politics in that, through a rich analysis of power and a conceptual elaboration of practice, the principles that animate being are the very same principles that animate an ethics and a practical constitution of political organization.

In the study of Spinoza, however, Deleuze does not immediately proceed beyond his previous results; rather, he takes a few steps back in order to prepare the leap ahead. In effect, in Deleuze's reading of Spinoza we can find a summary of the entire evolution. In the first half of his study, corresponding roughly to his reading of the first two books of the *Ethics*, we find a reelaboration of the terrain that he treated in his study of Bergson (the plenitude of being, the positivity of difference, the problem of emanation, etc.); in the second half of Deleuze's reading, treating the final books of the *Ethics*, we find a reworking and extension of the Nietzschean terrain (the affirmation of being, the ethics of power and activity, etc.). Bergson and Nietzsche breathe life into Spinoza, standing as his primary predecessors: In Deleuze's inverted history of philosophy, Spinoza seems to be able to look back and see that he too is not alone on the mountaintops.[2]

Our focus on this Deleuzian evolution allows us to recognize another thesis that is important in the context of Spinoza studies. Throughout *Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza*, we can see that Deleuze treats the Spinozian system as two distinct moments, as two perspectives of thought, one speculative and another practical. This distinction between speculation and practice, which remains implicit in Deleuze's work, is both a theoretical claim and an interpretative strategy. In other words, although Deleuze does not highlight this distinction, we can see that it clearly constitutes a challenge to the traditional commentaries on Spinozian thought. For example, Ferdinand Alquié, one of the most acute readers, maintains that, unlike Descartes, Spinoza is not a "philosopher of method" who starts from the human point of view to build toward a divine perspective, but rather a "philosopher of system" setting out directly from the point of view of God: The *Ethics* is principally a systematic, rather than a methodological, text (*Nature et vérité* 34). Deleuze, however, presents the *Ethics* as a double text that proceeds from both of the perspectives identified by Alquié: The first moment of the *Ethics*, speculative and analytic, proceeds in the centrifugal direction from God to the thing in order to discover and express the principles that animate the system of being; the second moment of the *Ethics*, practical and synthetic, moves in the centripetal direction from the thing to God by forging an ethical method and a political line of conduct. The two moments are fundamentally linked: The moment of research, the *Forschung*, prepares the terrain for the moment of presentation and practice, the *Darstellung*. The two moments cover the same terrain of being, but from different perspectives. One of the important consequences of recognizing these two moments of Spinoza's thought, as we will see, is that there are substantial nuances in Spinoza's major concepts (universal, absolute, adequate, necessary, rational, etc.) when one considers them from one perspective or the other. In reading Deleuze's previous works, we have insisted at length on the importance of his critical procedure: *pars destruens, pars construens*. Here we are presented with a similar procedure, but the moment of opposition, of antagonism, of destruction, has changed. We still find a Deleuzian opposition in *Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza* (to Descartes, to Leibniz, to the Scholastics, etc.), but this opposition no longer plays a foundational role. Rather than a destructive moment followed by a constructive moment, Deleuze's Spinoza presents a speculative, logical investigation followed by a practical, ethical constitution: *Forschung* followed by *Darstellung*. The two moments, then, speculation and practice, are fundamentally linked, but they remain autonomous and distinct—each with its own method and animating spirit. "The sense of joy appears as the properly ethical sense; it is to practice what affirmation itself is to speculation. . . . A philosophy of pure affirmation, the *Ethics*

is also a philosophy of the joy corresponding to such affirmation" (*Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza* 272, modified). The affirmation of speculation and the joy of practice are the two threads that weave together to form the general design of the *Ethics*.

Continually in Deleuze's reading of the *Ethics*, we can feel the tendency to move from the first moment to the second, from speculation to practice, from affirmation to joy. The catalyst that allows Deleuze to make this passage is the Spinozian analysis of power. In the ontological domain, the investigation of the structure of power occupies a privileged position, because the essence of being is its productive causal dynamic. *Causa sui* is the essential pillar that supports being, in that being is defined in its power to exist and produce. All discussions of power, productivity, and causality in Deleuze, as in Spinoza, refer us back to this ontological foundation. The analysis of power, though, is not only an element that brings us back to first principles, it is also the passage that allows the discussion to forge ahead onto new terrain. In the study of Nietzsche, we found that by recognizing the distinction within power between the active and the reactive, we were able to transform the ontological discussion into an ethics. In this study of Spinoza, the same passage through power gains a richer and more extensive function. Here we find an entire system of distinctions within power: between spontaneity and affectivity, between actions and passions, between joy and sadness. This analysis sets the terms for a real conversion within the continuity of the theoretical framework. The investigation of power constitutes the end of speculation and the beginning of practice: It arrives at the hour of midnight, as a Nietzschean transmutation. Power is the crucial link, the point of passage from speculation to practice. The elaboration of this passage will form the pivot of our study. Just as the *Theses on Feuerbach* and *The German Ideology* are said to constitute a "break" in Marx's thought, so too the analysis of power functions as a point of conversion in Spinoza: It is the moment in which we stop striving to think the world, and begin to create it.

Speculation

3.1 Substance and the Real Distinction: Singularity

The opening of the *Ethics* is remarkable. It is precisely these initial passages that have inspired so many readers, in amazement and irritation, in admiration and damnation, to declare that the *Ethics* is an impossible, incomprehensible text—how can one possibly embark on a project starting from the idea of God, from the absolute? This remarkable opening, however, does not appear as problematic to Deleuze. On the contrary,

he seems to be perfectly at ease with Spinoza's initial step: Along with Merleau-Ponty, he sees seventeenth-century thought generally as "an innocent way of setting out in one's thinking from the infinite" (*Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza* 28, modified). Starting with the infinite is not impossible, but rather quite natural, for Deleuze. We should be careful, though, not to misread this innocence—infinite does not mean indefinite; the infinite substance is not indeterminate. This is the challenge that provides an initial key to Deleuze's analysis and that, according to Deleuze, orients and dominates the first book of the *Ethics*: What kind of distinction is there in the infinite, in the absolutely infinite nature of God? We should note immediately a Bergsonian resonance in this problematic. The connections between Bergsonism and Spinozism are well known, and, although we find no direct references in the text, we can be certain that Deleuze is sensitive to the common features of the two philosophies.[3] However, Deleuze brings the two doctrines together in an unusual and complex way. In effect, Deleuze uses the opening of the *Ethics* as a rereading of Bergson: He presents the proofs of the existence of God and the singularity of substance as an extended meditation on the positive nature of difference and the real foundation of being.

To approach the question of distinctions in Spinoza, of course, we must assume Descartes's position as a point of departure. Deleuze notes the three distinctions of being in Cartesian philosophy: (1) a real distinction between two substances, (2) a modal distinction between a substance and a mode that it implies, and (3) a conceptual distinction (*distinction de raison*) between a substance and an attribute (29). The first error in this system of distinctions, from a Spinozian point of view, is the proposition of number in the definition of substance. By affirming the existence of two substances, Descartes presents the real distinction as a numerical distinction. According to Deleuze, Spinoza challenges this Cartesian idea from two angles in the opening of the *Ethics*: First, he argues that a numerical distinction is never real (*Ethics* IP1-P8), and then that a real distinction is never numerical (P9-P11).[4] In other words, while traditional interpretations have generally identified Spinoza's substance with the number one or with infinity, Deleuze insists that substance is completely removed from the realm of number. Spinoza's first demonstration, that a numerical distinction is never real, rests on the definition of the internal causality of substance (P6C). Number cannot have a substantial nature, because number involves a limitation and thus requires an external cause: "Whatever is of such a nature that there can be many individuals of that nature must . . . have an external cause to exist" (P8S2). From the definition of substance (D3) we know that it cannot involve an external cause. A numerical distinction, then, cannot pertain to substance; or, in other words, a numerical

distinction cannot be a real distinction. Starting with P9, however, Spinoza proceeds to the inverse argument, which is really the more fundamental one: Having shown that each attribute corresponds to the same substance (i.e., the numerical distinction is not real), he proceeds to demonstrate that substance envelops all the attributes (i.e., the real distinction is not numerical). This second proof consists of two parts. Spinoza proposes first that the more reality a thing has, the more attributes it must have (P9), and second, he proposes that the more attributes a thing has, the more existence it has (P11S). The two points essentially cover the same ground, and serve together to make the definition of God (D6) a real definition: An absolutely infinite being (God, *ens realissimum*) consists of an absolute infinity of attributes. God is both unique and absolute. It would be absurd to maintain at this point that we are dealing with a numerical domain in which the two endpoints, one and infinity, are united. Spinoza's substance is posed outside of number; the real distinction is not numerical.

Why, though, does this complex logical development of the real distinction appear as fundamental to Deleuze? We should be aware that Spinoza does not use the term "real distinction" when he discusses substance, even though he is certain to be familiar with its usage in Cartesian and Scholastic philosophy. Deleuze introduces this term because it serves to highlight the fundamental relation between being and difference. This strained and tendentious usage of the "real distinction" should draw our attention to Deleuze's original conception of difference. Descartes's real distinction is relational (there is a distinction between x and y); or, more explicitly, it proposes a concept of difference that is entirely founded on negation (x is different from y). Spinoza's challenge is to eliminate the relational, or negative, aspect of the real distinction. Rather than pose the real distinction as a "distinction between" or a "difference from," Spinoza wants to identify the real distinction in itself (there is a distinction in x; or rather, x is different).[5] Once again, we have to be sensitive to the Bergsonian resonances here: "Dissociated from any numerical distinction, real distinction is carried into the absolute. It becomes capable of expressing the difference in being and consequently it brings about the restructuring of other distinctions" (*Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza* 39, modified). This statement bears a striking resemblance to a passage in Deleuze's early essay on Bergson: "Thinking internal difference as such, as pure internal difference, arriving at a pure concept of difference, raising difference to the absolute—that is the sense of Bergson's effort" ("La conception de la différence chez Bergson" 90). What we find in common here is the ontological grounding of difference and the central role of difference in the foundation of being. In both Bergson and Spinoza, the essential characteristic of difference is, on one side, its internal causality, and, on the other, its immersion in the

absolute. As I have insisted at length, Deleuze's reading of Bergsonian difference depends heavily on a conception of a being that is productive, of an internal and efficient causal dynamic that can be traced back to the materialist tradition and to the Scholastics. This conception takes on its full import in Spinoza: "Spinoza's ontology is dominated by the notions of a *cause of itself, in itself* and *through itself*" (*Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza* 162). This internal causal dynamic is what animates the real distinction of being. This is the absolutely positive difference that both supports being in itself and provides the basis for all the differences that characterize real being. To this extent, there is a positive correspondence between Bergson's difference of nature and Spinoza's real distinction: "*Non opposita sed diversa* is the formula of a new logic. Real distinction appeared to open up a new conception of the negative, free from opposition and privation" (*Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza* 60). In both cases, a special conception of difference takes the place of opposition: It is a difference that is completely positive, that refers neither to an external cause nor to external mediation—pure difference, difference in itself, difference raised to the absolute.

We should dwell a moment on this point, because its sense is not immediately evident. What can be meant by a distinction that is not numerical? In other words, how can something be different when it is absolutely infinite and indivisible? What is a difference that involves no other? How can we conceive of the absolute without negation? The enormous difficulties posed by these questions point to the ambitious task of the opening of the *Ethics*: "Spinoza needed all the resources of an original conceptual frame to bring out the power and the actuality of positive infinity" (*Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza* 28). Here we are confronted with the Spinozian principle of the singularity of being. As a first approximation, we could say that singularity is the union of monism with the absolute positivity of pantheism: The unique substance directly infuses and animates the entire world. The problem with this definition is that it leaves open an idealistic interpretation of substance, and allows for a confusion between the infinite and the indefinite. In other words, from an idealist perspective, absolute substance might be read as an indetermination, and pantheism might be read as acosmism. Deleuze's reading, however, closes off this possibility. Being is singular not only in that it is unique and absolutely infinite, but, more important, in that it is *remarkable*. This is the impossible opening of the *Ethics*. Singular being as substance is not "distinct from" or "different from" any thing outside itself; if it were, we would have to conceive it partly through another thing, and thus it would not be substance. And yet, being is not indifferent. Here we can begin to appreciate the radicality of Spinoza's definition of substance: "By substance I under-

stand what is in itself and is conceived through itself, i.e., that whose concept does not require the concept of another thing, from which it must be formed" (D3). The distinction of being rises from within. *Causa sui* means that being is both infinite and definite: Being is remarkable. The first task of the real distinction, then, is to define being as singular, to recognize its difference without reference to, or dependence on, any other thing. The real nonnumerical distinction defines the singularity of being, in that being is absolutely infinite and indivisible at the same time that it is distinct and determinate. Singularity, in Deleuze, has nothing to do with individuality or particularity. It is, rather, the correlate of efficient causality and internal difference: The singular is remarkable because it is different in itself.

3.2 Expressive Attributes and the Formal Distinction: Univocity

At this point, it seems that we can identify Deleuze's reading of Bergsonian virtuality with that of Spinozian substance in that both propose singular conceptions of being animated by an absolutely positive and internal difference.[6] Once we propose this common terrain of the singularity of being, however, Spinoza's conception of the attributes rises up as a real departure and as a profound contribution. We have established thus far that the real distinction is not a numerical distinction, or, in Bergsonian terms, that a difference of nature is not a difference of degree; now, with Spinoza's theory of the attributes, Deleuze will extend this argument beyond Bergson to show that the real distinction is also a formal distinction. Through the investigation of the formal distinction of the attributes, Deleuze arrives at a second Spinozian principle of ontology: the principle of the univocity of being. In order to grasp the univocity of being, we have to begin with an investigation of its vocality, its expressivity. The Spinozian attributes, on Deleuze's reading, are the expressions of being. Traditionally, the problem of the attributes of God is closely tied to that of divine names. Spinoza transforms this tradition by giving the attribute the active role in divine expression: "The attribute is no longer attributed, but is in some sense 'attributive.' Each attribute expresses an essence, and attributes it to substance" (45). The issue of divine names becomes a problematic of divine expression.

Deleuze sets up a simple progression of theological paradigms to situate Spinoza's theory of expressive attributes. Negative theologies in general affirm that God is the cause of the world, but deny that the essence of the world is the essence of God. In other words, although the world is a divine expression, the divine essence always surpasses or transcends the essence of its expression: "What conceals also expresses, but what ex-

presses still conceals" (53). Thus, God as essence or substance can only be defined negatively, as an eminent, transcendent, and concealed source of expression. The God of negative theology is expressive, but with a certain essential reserve. Positive theologies, on the contrary, affirm God as both cause and essence of the world. However, among these theories there are important distinctions in the way that they affirm God's positivity. Deleuze finds it most important to distinguish expressive theologies from analogical theologies. In the Thomistic tradition, for example, the qualities attributed to God imply an analogical relation between God and the creatures of the world. This conception both elevates God to an eminent position and renders the expression of being equivocal. God and the creatures are different in form, and thus cannot be said in the same sense, but analogy is employed precisely to bridge this gap. Analogy proposes to reconcile the essential identity and the formal difference between God and things. Spinoza's theory of the attribute reverses this formula: "Attributes are forms common to God, whose essence they constitute, and to modes or creatures which imply them essentially" (47). Spinoza's attribute, in contrast to theories of analogy, proposes a commonality of form and a distinction of essences: "Spinoza's method is neither abstract nor analogical. It is a formal method based on community" (48). This Spinozian distinction of essence, though, should not be referred back to a negative theological conception. Through the attributes (the expressions), substance (the expressing agent) is absolutely immanent in the world of modes (the expressed). The distinction between the essence of the expressing agent and the essence of the expressed does not deny the immanence of the one in the other. The divine is absolutely expressed; nothing is hidden; there is neither reserve nor excess. Spinoza's conception of the singularity of being shows clearly his opposition to this negative theological paradigm: Immanence is opposed to eminence; pantheism is opposed to transcendence. Spinoza's God is fully expressed in the world, without reserve. Spinozian monism opposes all dualism, both negative and analogical. The central element that allows for this absolute expression is the commonality of forms contained in the attribute.

The distinction between expression and analogy becomes clearer when Deleuze distinguishes attributes from properties. "Properties are not properly speaking attributes, precisely because they are not *expressive*" (50). The properties of God (omnipotence, omniscience, perfection, etc.) do not express anything of the nature of God: Properties are mute. They appear to us as signs, as revelations, as commandments. Properties are notions impressed on us that cannot make us understand anything about nature, because they do not present us with a common form. Deleuze distinguishes, therefore, between two senses of "the word of God": one

that refers to the attribute as expression, and another that refers to the property as sign: "*A sign always attaches to a property*; it always signifies a commandment; and it grounds our obedience. *Expression always relates to an attribute*; it expresses an essence, that is, a nature in the infinitive; it makes it known to us" (57). Once again, the expression of the attributes can only take place through the common forms of being. This conception can be seen from two sides: On one hand, by means of the attributes, God is absolutely *immanent* (fully expressed) in the world of the modes; and on the other hand, through the common forms of the attributes, the modes *participate* fully in divine substance. Immanence and participation are the two sides of the expression of the attributes. It is this participation that distinguishes between the understanding given by the expressive attributes and the obedience imposed by the analogous properties. A system of signs tells us nothing about being; the mute signs and the commandments of semiology close off ontology. Only expression can open up our knowledge of being.[7]

Thus far, we have critiqued negative theology and analogical positive theology on the basis of the expression of the attributes through the common forms of being. To an extent, the conception of common forms is implied by the real distinction: The singularity of being requires the absolute immanence of the divine in the world, because if God were not absolutely immanent, we would need to distinguish between two substances. Absolute immanence, however, is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for univocity. The attributes are not only characterized by an internal common form (that follows from immanence), but also by an external plurality. In other words, in order to pursue this theory of an expressive positive theology, the formal commonality embodied in each infinite attribute has to be complemented by the formal distinction among the different attributes. The divine essence is not only expressed in one attribute, but in an infinite number of *formally distinct* attributes. To fill out this positive theological framework, then, Deleuze traces Spinoza's theory of the attributes back to Duns Scotus:[8] "It was without doubt Scotus who pursued farther than any other the enterprise of a positive theology. He denounces at once the negative eminence of the Neoplatonists and the pseudoaffirmation of the Thomists" (63). The positive theology of Duns Scotus is characterized by the theory of the formal distinction. This concept provides a logical mechanism whereby he can maintain both the differences among the attributes and the commonality within each attribute: The attributes are formally distinct and ontologically identical. "There are here as it were two orders, that of formal reason and that of being, with the plurality in one perfectly according with the simplicity of the other" (64). The positive expression of the formally distinct attributes constitutes, for Spinoza as for Duns Scotus,

a conception of the univocity of being. *Univocity means precisely that being is expressed always and everywhere in the same voice*; in other words, the attributes each express being in a different form but in the same sense. Therefore, univocity implies a formal difference between attributes, but a real and absolute ontological commonality among the attributes.

Deleuze is careful to point out, however, that Spinoza's theory of univocal being well surpasses that of Duns Scotus, thanks to the Spinozian conception of the expressivity of the attributes. In Duns Scotus, what are called attributes—justice, goodness, wisdom, and so on—are really merely properties. In the final analysis, Duns Scotus remains too much of a theologian, and thus he cannot abandon a certain eminence of the divine: "For his theological, that is to say 'creationist,' perspective forced him to conceive univocal Being as a *neutralized, indifferent* concept" (67). In Duns Scotus, God the creator is not the cause of all things *in the same sense* that it is the cause of itself. Since univocal being in Duns Scotus is not absolutely singular, it remains somewhat indifferent, somewhat inexpressive. Spinoza's real distinction, though, elevates univocity to the level of affirmation. In the Spinozian attribute, the expression of being is the affirmation of being: "Attributes are affirmations; but affirmation, in its essence is always formal, actual, univocal: therein lies its expressivity. Spinoza's philosophy is a philosophy of pure affirmation. Affirmation is the speculative principle on which hangs the whole of the *Ethics*" (60). In the Spinozian context, Deleuze gives affirmation an original and precise definition: It is a speculative principle based on the absolute singularity and univocity of being, or, in other words, on the full expressivity of being. And here, once again, we can recognize a typical Bergsonian appreciation of Spinoza: "Spinoza allows us to put a finger on what is heroic in speculation" (*Ecrits et paroles* 587). Affirmation constitutes the pinnacle, the heroic moment of a pure, speculative philosophy.

Remark: Ontological Speculation

Let us pause for a moment and consider carefully the ground we have covered. In effect, Deleuze has read the first two great steps of the Spinozian system, the elaborations of substance and the attributes, as an alternative logic of speculation—not in opposition to, but completely autonomous from, the Hegelian progression. This conceptual autonomy demonstrates not only how Spinoza represents a turning point in the evolution of Deleuze's work, but also how Deleuze's interpretation constitutes a revolution for Spinoza studies, which had been long dominated in Continental philosophy by a Hegelian reading. In reading Deleuze's study of Nietzsche, we argued that Deleuze was disengaging his own thought from the dialec-

tical terrain through the theory of the total critique. In Spinoza, this process is complete. However, even though there is no mention of Hegel in the entire text, we can easily construct a comparison with Hegelian ontology in order to demonstrate the important conceptual autonomy marked by Deleuze's Spinozian foundation. Hegel's own interpretation and critique of Spinozian ontology, in fact, serve to highlight the differences of Deleuze's work; from a Hegelian perspective, we will be able to recognize the radical departure constituted by Deleuze's reading of the singularity of substance and the univocity of the attributes in Spinoza.

The crux of the issue here is the Hegelian conception of determination. Hegel claims not only that Spinozian substance is indeterminate, but that all determinations are dissolved in the absolute (*Science of Logic* 536). According to Hegel, the unique and absolute being of Spinozism cannot provide a basis for determination or difference because it involves no other or limitation. Determinate being must negate and subsume its other within itself in order to attain quality and reality. The Spinozian conception of singularity is a logical impossibility. The definition of being as singular is precisely what irritates Hegel most, and it is the point that he refuses to recognize: Spinozism, he claims, is an acosmism. Singularity is, in fact, a real threat to Hegel because it constitutes the refusal of the speculative foundation of dialectics. In this context we can understand clearly the theoretical demands that could drive Hegel to give this final judgement of Spinoza: "The cause of his death was consumption, from which he had long been a sufferer; this was in harmony with his system of philosophy, according to which all particularity and individuality pass away in the one substance" (*Lectures on the History of Philosophy* 257). When determination is denied, so too Spinoza the philosopher dissolves into nothingness.

Deleuze's reading of the real distinction stands in sharp contrast (but not opposition!) to this interpretation. As we have argued, the real distinction presents being as different in itself. Singular being is not different from anything outside being, and neither is it indifferent or abstract: It is simply remarkable. It would be false, then, to set up an opposition between singular being and determinate being. Singularity is and is not determination. In other words, Spinoza's being, the unique substance, is determinate in the sense that it is qualified, that it is different. However, it is not determinate in the sense of being limited. This is where Deleuze's discussion of number comes into play. If substance were to be limited (or to have number) it would have to involve an external cause. Substance, on the contrary, is absolutely infinite, it is cause of itself. *Causa sui* cannot be read in any ideal sense: Being is the material and efficient cause of itself, and this continual act of self-production brings with it all the real determinations of the world. "Omnis determinatio est negatio"? Clearly, there is no