deterritorialization—although he is also the one who does not move, who remains attached to the environment, desert, or steppe. But it is in concrete social fields, at specific moments, that the comparative movements of deterritorialization, the continuums of intensity and the combinations of flux that they form must be studied. We take some examples from around the eleventh century: the movement of flight of monetary masses; the great deterritorialization of peasant masses under the pressure of the latest invasions and the increased demands of the lords; the deterritorialization of the masses of the nobility, which takes forms as varied as the Crusades, settlement in towns, the new types of exploitation of the earth (renting or wage labor); the new forms of towns, whose installations become less and less territorial; the deterritorialization of the Church, with the dispossession of its lands, its "peace of God," its organization of Crusades; the deterritorialization of woman with chivalric love and then courtly love. The Crusades (including the Children's Crusade) may appear as a threshold of combination of all these movements. One might say in a certain sense that what is primary in a society are the lines, the movements of flight. For, far from being a flight from the social, far from being utopian or even ideological, these constitute the social field, trace out its gradation and its boundaries, the whole of its becoming. A Marxist can be quickly recognized when he says that a society contradicts itself, is defined by its contradictions, and in particular by its class contradictions. We would rather say that, in a society, everything flees and that a society is defined by its lines of flight which affect masses of all kinds (here again, "mass" is a molecular notion). A society, but also a collective assemblage, is defined first by its points of deterritorialization, its fluxes of deterritorialization. The great geographical adventures of history are lines of flight, that is; long expeditions on foot, on horseback or by boat: that of the Hebrews in the desert, that of Genseric the Vandal crossing the Mediterranean, that of the nomads across the steppe, the long march of the Chinese—it is always on a line of flight that we create, not, indeed, because we imagine that we are dreaming but, on the contrary, because we trace out the real on it, we compose there a plane of consistence. To flee, but in fleeing to seek a weapon.

This primacy of lines of flight must not be understood chronologically, or in the sense of an eternal generality. It is rather the fact and the right of the untimely: a time which is not pulsed, a haecceity like a wind which blows up, a midnight, a midday. For reterritorializations happen at the same time: monetary ones on new circuits; rural ones on new modes of exploitation; urban ones on new functions, etc. To the extent that an accumulation of all these reterritorializations takes place, a "class" then emerges which benefits particularly from it, capable of homogenizing it and overcoding all its seg-

ments. At the limit it would be necessary to distinguish the movements of masses of all kinds, with their respective coefficients of speed, and the stabilizations of classes, with their segments distributed in the reterritorialization of the whole—the same thing acting as mass and as class, but on two different lines which are entangled, with contours which do not coincide. One is then better able to understand why we sometimes say that there are at least three different lines, sometimes only two, sometimes only one which is very muddled. Sometimes three lines because the line of flight or rupture combines all the movements of deterritorialization, precipitates their quanta, tears from them the accelerated particles which come into contact with one another, carries them onto a plane of consistence or a mutating machine; and then a second, molecular line where the deterritorializations are merely relative, always compensated by reterritorializations which impose on them so many loops, detours, of equilibrium and stabilization; finally the molar line with clearly determined segments, where the reterritorializations accumulate to form a plane of organization and pass into an overcoding machine. Three lines, one of which would be like the nomadic line, another migrant and the third sedentary (the migrant is not at all the same as the nomadic). Or else there would be only two lines, because the molecular line would appear only to be oscillating between the two extremes, sometimes carried along by the combination of fluxes of deterritorialization, sometimes brought back to the accumulation of reterritorializations (the migrant sometimes allies with the nomad, sometimes is a mercenary or the federate of an empire: the Ostrogoths and Visigoths). Or else there is only one line, the primary line of flight, of border or frontier, which is relativized in the second line, which allows itself to be stopped or cut in the third. But even then it may be convenient to present THE line as being born from the explosion of the two others. Nothing is more complicated than the line or the lines—it is that which Melville speaks of, uniting the boats in their organized segmentarity, Captain Ahab in his animal-and-molecular-becoming, the white whale in its crazy flight. Let us go back to the regimes of signs about which we spoke earlier: how the line of flight is barred under a despotic regime, affected by a negative sign; how it finds in the Hebrews' regime a positive but relative value, cut up into successive processes. . . . These were two cases only, briefly outlined, and there are many others: each time it is the essential element of politics. Politics is active experimentation, since we do not know in advance which way a line is going to turn. Draw the line, says the accountant: but one can in fact draw it *anywhere*.

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# *Capitalism*

The subjectifications, conjunctions, and appropriations do not prevent the decoded flows from continuing to flow, and from ceaselessly engendering new flows that escape (we saw this, for example, at the level of a micropolitics of the Middle Ages). This is where there is an ambiguity in these apparatuses: they can only function with decoded flows, and yet they do not let them stream together; they perform topical conjunctions that stand as so many knots or recodings. This accounts for the historians' impression that capitalism "could have" developed beginning at a certain moment, in China, in Rome, in Byzantium, in the Middle Ages, that the conditions for it existed but were not effectuated or even capable of being effectuated. The situation is that the pressure of the flows draws capitalism in negative outline, but for it to be realized there must be a whole *integral of decoded flows,* a whole *generalized conjunction* that overspills and overturns the preceding apparatuses. And in fact when Marx sets about defining capitalism, he begins by invoking the advent of a single unqualified and global subjectivity, which capitalizes all of the processes of subjectification, "all activities without distinction": "productive activity in general," "the sole subjective essence of wealth. . . ." And this single subject now expresses itself in an object in general, no longer in this or that qualitative state: "Along with the abstract universality of wealth-creating activity we have now the universality of the ob-

ject defined as wealth, viz. the product in general, or labor in general, but as past, materialized labor."[1] Circulation constitutes capital as a subjectivity commensurate with society in its entirety. But this new social subjectivity can form only to the extent that the decoded flows overspill their conjunctions and attain a level of decoding that the State apparatuses are no longer able to reclaim: *on the one hand,* the flow of labor must no longer be determined as slavery or serfdom but must become naked and free labor; and *on the other hand,* wealth must no longer be determined as money dealing, merchant's or landed wealth, but must become pure homogeneous and independent capital. And doubtless, these two becomings at least (for other flows also converge) introduce many contingencies and many different factors on each of the lines. But it is their abstract conjunction in a single stroke that constitutes capitalism, providing a universal subject and object in general for one another. Capitalism forms when the flow of unqualified wealth encounters the flow of unqualified labor and conjugates with it.[2] This is what the preceding conjunctions, which were still topical or qualitative, had always inhibited (the two principal inhibitors were the feudal organization of the countryside and the corporative organization of the towns). This amounts to saying that capitalism forms with *a general axiomatic of decoded flows.* "Capital is a right, or, to be more precise, a relation of production that is manifested as a right, and as such it is independent of the concrete form that it cloaks at each moment of its productive function."[3] Private property no longer expresses the bond of personal dependence but the independence of a subject that now constitutes the sole bond. This makes for an important difference in the evolution of private property: private property in itself relates to rights, instead of the law relating it to the land, things, or people (this raises in particular the famous question of the elimination of ground rent in capitalism). *A new threshold of deterritorialization.* And when capital becomes an active right in this way, the entire historical figure of the law changes. The law ceases to be the overcoding of customs, as it was in the archaic empire; it is no longer a set of topics, as it was in the evolved States, the autonomous cities, and the feudal systems; it increasingly assumes the direct form and immediate characteristics of an axiomatic, as evidenced in our civil "code."[4]

When the flows reach this capitalist threshold of decoding and deterritorialization (naked labor, independent capital), it seems that there is no longer a need for a State, for distinct juridical and political domination, in order to ensure appropriation, which has become directly economic. The economy constitutes a worldwide axiomatic, a "universal cosmopolitan energy which overflows every restriction and bond,"[5] a mobile and convertible substance "such as the total value of annual production." Today we can de-

pict an enormous, so-called stateless, monetary mass that circulates through foreign exchange and across borders, eluding control by the States, forming a multinational ecumenical organization, constituting a de facto supranational power untouched by governmental decisions.[6] But whatever dimensions or quantities this may have assumed today, capitalism has from the beginning mobilized a force of deterritorialization infinitely surpassing the deterritorialization proper to the State. For since Paleolithic and Neolithic times, the State has been deterritorializing to the extent that it makes the earth an *object* of its higher unity, a forced aggregate of coexistence, instead of the free play of territories among themselves and with the lineages. But this is precisely the sense in which the State is termed "territorial." Capitalism, on the other hand, is not at all territorial, even in its beginnings: its power of deterritorialization consists in taking as its object, not the earth, but "materialized labor," the commodity. And private property is no longer ownership of the land or the soil, nor even of the means of production as such, but of convertible abstract rights.[7] That is why capitalism marks a mutation in worldwide or ecumenical organizations, which now take on a consistency of their own: the worldwide axiomatic, instead of resulting from heterogeneous social formations and their relations, for the most part distributes these formations, determines their relations, while organizing an international division of labor. From all these standpoints, it could be said that capitalism develops an economic order that could do without the State. And in fact capitalism is not short on war cries against the State, not only in the name of the market, but by virtue of its superior deterritorialization.

This however, is only one very partial aspect of capital. If it is true that we are not using the word *axiomatic* as a simple metaphor, we must review what distinguishes an axiomatic from all manner of codes, overcodings, and recordings: the axiomatic deals directly with purely functional elements and relations whose nature is not specified, and which are immediately realized in highly varied domains simultaneously; codes, on the other hand, are relative to those domains and express specific relations between qualified elements that cannot be subsumed by a higher formal unity (overcoding) except by transcendence and in an indirect fashion. The *immanent axiomatic* finds in the domains it moves through so many models, termed *models of realization.* It could similarly be said that capital as right, as a "qualitatively homogeneous and quantitatively commensurable element," is realized in sectors and means of production (or that "unified capital" is realized in "differentiated capital"). However, the different sectors are not alone in serving as models of realization—*the States* do too. Each of them groups together and combines several sectors, according to its resources, popula-

tion, wealth, industrial capacity, etc. Thus the States, in capitalism, are not canceled out but change form and take on a new meaning: models of realization for a worldwide axiomatic that exceeds them. But to exceed is not at all the same thing as doing without. We have already seen that capitalism proceeds by way of the State-form rather than the town-form; the basis for the fundamental mechanisms described by Marx (the colonial regime, the public debt, the modern tax system and indirect taxation, industrial protectionism, trade wars) may be laid in the towns, but the towns function as mechanisms of accumulation, acceleration, and concentration only to the extent they are appropriated by States. Recent events tend to confirm this principle from another angle. For example, NASA appeared ready to mobilize considerable capital for interplanetary exploration, as though capitalism were riding a vector taking it to the moon; but following the USSR, which conceived of extraterrestrial space as a belt that should circle the earth taken as the "object," the American government cut off funds for exploration and returned capital in this case to a more centered model. It is thus proper to State deterritorialization to moderate the superior deterritorialization of capital and to provide the latter with compensatory reterritorializations. More generally, this extreme example aside, we must take into account a "materialist" determination of the modern State or nation-state: a group of producers in which labor and capital circulate freely, in other words, in which the homogeneity and competition of capital is effectuated, in principle without external obstacles. In order to be effectuated, capitalism has always required there to be a new force and a new law of States, on the level of the flow of labor as on the level of the flow of independent capital.

So States are not at all transcendent paradigms of an overcoding but immanent models of realization for an axiomatic of decoded flows. Once again, our use of the word *axiomatic* is far from a metaphor; we find literally the same theoretical problems that are posed by the models in an axiomatic repeated in relation to the State. For models of realization, though varied, are supposed to be *isomorphic* with regard to the axiomatic they effectuate; however, this isomorphy, concrete variations considered, accommodates itself to the greatest of formal differences. Moreover, a single axiomatic seems capable of encompassing polymorphic models, not only when it is not yet "saturated," but with those models as integral elements of its saturation.[8] These "problems become singularly political when we think of modern States.

1. Are not all modern States isomorphic in relation to the capitalist axiomatic, to the point that the difference between democratic, totalitarian, liberal, and tyrannical States depends only on concrete vari-

ables, and on the worldwide distribution of those variables, which always undergo eventual readjustments? Even the so-called socialist States are isomorphic, to the extent that there is *only one world market*, the capitalist one.

2. Conversely, does not the world capitalist axiomatic tolerate a real polymorphy, or even a heteromorphy, of models, and for two reasons? On the one hand, capital as a general relation of production can very easily integrate concrete sectors or modes of production that are noncapitalist. But on the other hand, and this is the main point, the bureaucratic socialist States can themselves develop different modes of production that only conjugate with capitalism to form a set whose "power" exceeds that of the axiomatic itself (it will be necessary to try to determine the nature of this power, why we so often think of it in apocalyptic terms, what conflicts it spawns, what slim chances it leaves us. . .).

3. A typology of modern States is thus coupled with a metaeconomics: it would be inaccurate to treat all States as "interchangeable" (even isomorphy does not have that consequence), but it would be no less inaccurate to privilege a certain form of the State (forgetting that polymorphy establishes strict complementarities between the Western democracies and the colonial or neocolonial tyrannies that they install or support in other regions), or to equate the bureaucratic socialist States with the totalitarian capitalist States (neglecting the fact that the axiomatic can encompass a real heteromorphy from which the higher power of the aggregate derives, even if it is for the worse).

What is called a nation-state, in the most diverse forms, is precisely the State as a model of realization. And the birth of nations implies many artifices: Not only are they constituted in an active struggle against the imperial or evolved systems, the feudal systems, and the autonomous cities, but they crush their own "minorities," in other words, minoritarian phenomena that could be termed "nationalitarian," which work from within and if need be turn to the old codes to find a greater degree of freedom. The constituents of the nation are a land and a people: the "natal," which is not necessarily innate, and the "popular," which is not necessarily pregiven. The problem of the nation is aggravated in the two extreme cases of a land without a people and a people without a land. How can a people and a land be made, in other words, a nation—a refrain? The coldest and bloodiest means vie with upsurges of romanticism. The axiomatic is complex, and is not without passions. The natal or the land, as we have seen elsewhere, implies a certain deterritorialization of the territories (community land, imperial provinces, seigneurial domains, etc.), and the people, a decoding of the population. The nation is constituted on the basis of these flows and is inseparable from

the modern State that gives consistency to the corresponding land and people. It is the flow of naked labor that makes the people, just as it is the flow of capital that makes the land and its industrial base. In short, the nation is the very operation of a collective subjectification, to which the modern State corresponds as a process of subjection. It is in the form of the nation-state, with all its possible variations, that the State becomes the model of realization for the capitalist axiomatic. This is not at all to say that nations are appearances or ideological phenomena; on the contrary, they are the passional and living forms in which the qualitative homogeneity and the quantitative competition of abstract capital are first realized.

We distinguish *machinic enslavement* and *social subjection* as two separate concepts. There is enslavement when human beings themselves are constituent pieces of a machine that they compose among themselves and with other things (animals, tools), under the control and direction of a higher unity. But there is subjection when the higher unity constitutes the human being as a subject linked to a now exterior object, which can be an animal, a tool, or even a machine. The human being is no longer a component of the machine but a worker, a user. He or she is subjected *to* the machine and no longer enslaved *by* the machine. This is not to say that the second regime is more human. But the first regime does seem to have a special relation to the archaic imperial formation: human beings are not subjects but pieces of a machine that overcodes the aggregate (this has been called "generalized slavery," as opposed to the private slavery of antiquity, or feudal serfdom). We believe that Lewis Mumford is right in designating the archaic empires megamachines, and in pointing out that, once again, it is not a question of a metaphor: "If a machine can be defined more or less in accord with the classic definition of Reuleaux, as a combination of resistant parts, each specialized in function, operating under human control to transmit motion and to perform work, then the *human machine* was a real machine."[9] Of course, it was the modern State and capitalism that brought the triumph of machines, in particular of motorized machines (whereas the archaic State had simple machines at best); but what we are referring to now are *technical machines*, which are definable extrinsically. One is not enslaved by the technical machine but rather subjected to it. It would appear, then, that the modern State, through technological development, has substituted an increasingly powerful social subjection for machinic enslavement. Ancient slavery and feudal serfdom were already procedures of subjection. But the naked or "free" worker of capitalism takes subjection to its most radical expression, since the process of subjectification no longer even enter into partial conjunctions that interrupt the flow. In effect, capital acts as the point of subjectification that constitutes all human beings as subjects; but some, the

"capitalists," are subjects of enunciation that form the private subjectivity of capital, while the others, the "proletarians," are subjects of the statement, subjected to the technical machines in which constant capital is effectuated. The wage regime can therefore take the subjection of human beings to an unprecedented point, and exhibit a singular cruelty, yet still be justified in its humanist cry: No, human beings are not machines, we don't treat them like machines, we certainly don't confuse variable capital and constant capital. . . .

Capitalism arises as a worldwide enterprise of subjectification by constituting an axiomatic of decoded flows. Social subjection, as the correlate of subjectification, appears much more in the axiomatic's models of realization than in the axiomatic itself. It is within the framework of the nation-state, or of national subjectivities, that processes of subjectification and the corresponding subjections are manifested. The axiomatic itself, of which the States are models of realization, restores or reinvents, in new and now technical forms, an entire system of machinic enslavement. This is no way represents a return to the imperial machine since we are now in the immanence of an axiomatic, and not under the transcendence of a formal unity. But it is the reinvention of a machine of which human beings are constituent parts, instead of subjected workers or users. If motorized machines constituted the second age of the technical machine, cybernetic and informational machines form a third age that reconstructs a generalized regime of subjection: recurrent and reversible "humans-machines systems" replace the old nonrecurrent and nonreversible relations of subjection between the two elements; the relation between human and machine is based on internal, mutual communication, and no longer on usage or action.[10] In the organic composition of capital, variable capital defines a regime of subjection of the worker (human surplus value), the principal framework of which is the business or factory. But with automation comes a progressive increase in the proportion of constant capital; we then see a new kind of enslavement: at the same time the work regime changes, surplus value becomes machinic, and the framework expands to all of society. It could also be said that a small amount of subjectification took us away from machinic enslavement, but a large amount brings us back to it. Attention has recently been focused on the fact that modern power is not at all reducible to the classical alternative "repression or ideology" but implies processes of normalization, modulation, modeling, and information that bear on language, perception, desire, movement, etc., and which proceed by way of microassemblages. This aggregate includes both subjection and enslavement taken to extremes, as two simultaneous parts that constantly reinforce and nourish each other. For example, one is subjected to TV insofar as one uses and consumes it, in

the very particular situation of a subject of the statement that more or less mistakes itself for a subject of enunciation ("you, dear television viewers, who make TV what it is . . ."); the technical machine is the medium between two subjects. But one is enslaved by TV as a human machine insofar as the television viewers are no longer consumers or users, nor even subjects who supposedly "make" it, but intrinsic component pieces, "input" and "output," feedback or recurrences that are no longer connected to the machine in such a way as to produce or use it. In machinic enslavement, there is nothing but transformations and exchanges of information, some of which are mechanical, others human.[11] The term "subjection," of course, should not be confined to the national aspect, with enslavement seen as international or worldwide. For information technology is also the property of the States that set themselves up as humans-machines systems. But this is so precisely to the extent that the two aspects, the axiomatic and the models of realization, constantly cross over into each other and are themselves in communication. Social subjection proportions itself to the model of realization, just as machinic enslavement expands to meet the dimensions of the axiomatic that is effectuated in the model. We have the privilege of undergoing the two operations simultaneously, in relation to the same things and the same events. Rather than stages, subjection and enslavement constitute two coexistent poles.

We may return to the different forms of the State, from the standpoint of a universal history. We distinguish three major forms: (1) imperial archaic States, which are paradigms and constitute a machine of enslavement by overcoding already-coded flows (these States have little diversity, due to a certain formal immutability that applies to all of them); (2) extremely diverse States—evolved empires, autonomous cities, feudal systems, monarchies—which proceed instead by subjectification and subjection, and constitute qualified or topical conjunctions of decoded flows; (3) the modern nation-states, which take decoding even further and are models of realization for an axiomatic or a general conjugation of flows (these States combine social subjection and the new machinic enslavement, and their very diversity is a function of isomorphy, of the eventual heteromorphy or polymorphy of the models in relation to the axiomatic).

There are, of course, all kinds of external circumstances that mark profound breaks between these types of States, and above all submit the archaic empires to utter oblivion, a shrouding lifted only by archaeology. The empires disappeared suddenly, as though in an instantaneous catastrophe. As in the Dorian invasion, a war-machine looms up and bears down from without, killing memory. Yet things proceed quite differently on the inside, where all the States resonate together, appropriate armies for themselves,

and exhibit a unity of composition in spite of their differences in organization and development. It is evident that all decoded flows, of whatever kind, are prone to forming a war-machine directed against the State. But everything changes depending on whether these flows connect up with a war-machine or, on the contrary, enter into conjunctions or a general conjugation that appropriates them for the State. From this standpoint, the modern States have a kind of transspatiotemporal unity with the archaic State. The internal correlation between (1) and (2) appears most clearly in the fact that the fragmented forms of the Aegean world presuppose the great imperial form of the Orient and find in it a stock or agricultural surplus, which they consequently have no need to produce or accumulate for themselves. And to the extent that the States of the second age are nevertheless obliged to reconstitute a stock, if only because of external circumstances—what State can do without one?—in so doing they always reactivate an evolved imperial form. We find the revival of this form in the Greek, Roman, and feudal worlds: there is always an empire on the horizon, which for the subjective States plays the role of signifier and encompassing element. And the correlation between (2) and (3) is no less pronounced, for industrial revolutions are not wanting, and the difference between topical conjunctions and the great conjugation of decoded flows is so thin that one is left with the impression that capitalism was continually being born, disappearing and reviving at every crossroads of history. And the correlation between (3) and (1) is also a necessary one: the modern States of the third age do indeed restore the most absolute of empires, a new "megamachine," whatever the novelty or timeliness of its now immanent form; they do this by realizing an axiomatic that functions as much by machinic enslavement as by social subjection. Capitalism has reawakened the *Urstaat*, and given it new strength.[12]

Not only, as Hegel said, does every State imply "the essential moments of its existence as a State," but there is a unique moment, in the sense of a coupling of forces, and this moment of the State is capture, bond, knot, *nexum*, magical capture. Must we speak of a second pole, which would operate instead by pact and contract? Is this not instead that other force, with capture as the unique moment of coupling? For the two forces are the overcoding of coded flows, and the treatment of decoded flows. The contract is a juridical expression of the second aspect: it appears as the proceeding of subjectification, the outcome of which is subjection. And the contract must be pushed to the extreme; in other words, it is no longer concluded between two people but between self and self, within the same person—*Ich* = *Ich*—as subjected and sovereign. The extreme perversion of the contract, reinstating the purest of knots. The knot, bond, capture, thus travel a long history: first, the objective, imperial collective bond; then all of the forms of

subjective personal bonds; finally, the subject that binds itself, and in so doing renews the most magical operation, "a cosmopolitan, universal energy which overflows every restriction and bond so as to establish itself instead as the sole bond."[13] Even subjection is only a relay for the fundamental moment of the State, namely, civil capture or machinic enslavement. The State is assuredly not the locus of liberty, nor the agent of a forced servitude or war capture. Should we then speak of "voluntary servitude"? This is like the expression "magical capture": its only merit is to underline the apparent mystery. There is a machinic enslavement, about which it could be said in each case that it presupposes itself, that it appears as preaccomplished; this machinic enslavement is no more "voluntary" than it is "forced."

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# *The Three Aspects of Culture*

Culture means training and selection. Nietzsche calls the movement of culture the "morality of customs" (*D* 9);[1] this latter is inseparable from iron collars, from torture, from the atrocious means which are used to train man. But the genealogist's eye distinguishes two elements in this violent training (*BGE* 188)[2]: (1) That which is obeyed, in a people, race or class, is always historical, arbitrary, grotesque, stupid, and limited; this usually represents the worst *reactive* forces. (2) But in the fact that something, no matter what it is, is obeyed, appears a principle which goes beyond peoples, races, and classes. To obey the law because it is the law: the form of the law means that a certain *activity*, a certain active force, is exercised on man and is given the task of training him. *Even if they are historically inseparable* these two aspects must not be confused: on the one hand, the historical pressure of a State, a Church etc., on the individuals that it aims to assimilate; on the other hand, the activity of man as generic being, the activity of the human species as such. Hence Nietzsche's use of the words *primitive, prehistoric:* the morality of customs *precedes* universal history (*D* 18); culture is generic activity; "the labor performed by man upon himself during the greater part of the existence of the human race, his entire *prehistoric* labor . . . notwithstanding the severity, tyranny, stupidity and idiocy involved in it" (*GM* II 2, p. 59).[3] Every historical law is arbitrary, but what is not arbitrary, what is pre-

historic and generic, is the law of obeying laws. (Bergson will rediscover this thesis when he shows, in *Les Deux Sources,* that all habits are arbitrary but that the habit of taking on habits is natural.)

Prehistoric means generic. Culture is man's prehistoric activity. But what does this activity consist in? It is always a matter of giving man habits, of making him obey laws, of training him. Training man means forming him in such a way that he can act his reactive forces. The activity of culture is, in principle, exercised on reactive forces, it gives them habits and imposes models on them in order to make them suitable for being acted. Culture as such is exercised in many directions. It even attacks the reactive forces of the unconscious and the most subterranean digestive and intestinal forces (the diet and something analogous to what Freud will call the education of the sphincters—*EH* II "Why I am so Clever").[4] But its principal object is to reinforce consciousness. This consciousness which is defined by the fugitive character of excitations, this consciousness which is itself based on the faculty of forgetting must be given a consistency and a firmness which it does not have on its own. Culture endows consciousness with a new faculty which is apparently opposed to the faculty of forgetting: memory. But the memory with which we are concerned here is not the memory of traces. This original memory is no longer a function of the past, but a function of the future. It is not the memory of the sensibility but of the will. It is not the memory of traces but of words.[5] It is the faculty of promising, commitment to the future, memory of the future itself. Remembering the promise that has been made is not recalling that it was made at a particular past moment, but that one must hold to it at a future moment. This is precisely the selective object of culture: forming a man capable of promising and thus of making use of the future, a free and powerful man. Only such a man is active; he acts his reactions, everything in him is active or acted. The faculty of promising is the effect of culture as the activity of man on man; the man who can promise is the product of culture as species activity.

We understand why culture does not, in principle, recoil from any kind of violence: "perhaps indeed there was nothing more fearful and uncanny in the whole prehistory of man than mnemotechnics. . . . Man could never do without blood, torture and sacrifices when he felt the need to create a memory for himself" (*GM* II 3, p. 61). How many tortures are necessary in order to train reactive forces, to constrain them to be acted, before culture reaches its goal (the free, active, and powerful man). Culture has always used the following means: it made pain a medium of exchange, a currency, an equivalent; precisely the exact equivalent of a forgetting, of an inquiry caused a promise not kept (*GM* II 4). Culture, when related to this means, is called *justice;* the means itself is called *punishment.* "Inquiry caused = pain

undergone"—this is the equation of punishment that determines a relationship of man to man. This relationship between men is determined, following the equation, as a *relationship of a creditor and a debtor:* justice makes man *responsible for a debt.* The debtor-creditor relationship expresses the activity of culture during the process of training or formation. Corresponding to prehistoric activity this relationship itself is the relationship of man to man, "the most primitive of individuals" preceding even "the origins of any social organization."[6] It also serves as a model "for the crudest and most primitive social constitutions." Nietzsche sees the archetype of social organization in credit rather than exchange. The man who pays for the injury he causes by his pain, the man held responsible for a debt, the man treated as responsible for his reactive forces: these are the means used by culture to reach its goal. Nietzsche therefore offers us the following genetic lineage: (1) Culture as prehistoric or generic activity, an enterprise of training and selection; (2) The means used by this activity, the equation of punishment, the relationship of debt, the responsible man; (3) The product of this activity: the active man, free and powerful, the man who can promise.

## Culture Considered from the Posthistoric Point of View

We have posed the problem of bad conscience. The genetic lineage of culture does not seem to get us any nearer a solution. On the contrary: the most obvious conclusion is that neither bad conscience nor *ressentiment* intervene in the process of culture and justice. "The 'bad conscience,' this most uncanny and most interesting plant of all our earthly vegetation, did *not* grow on this soil" (*GM* II 14, p. 82). On the one hand, revenge and *ressentiment* are not the origin of justice. Moralists, even socialist ones, make justice derive from a reactive feeling, from deeply felt offense, a spirit of revenge or justiciary reaction. But such a derivation explains nothing; it would have to show how the pain of others can be a satisfaction of revenge, a reparation for revenge. We will never understand the cruel equation "injury caused = pain undergone" if a third term is not introduced—the pleasure which is felt in inflicting pain or in contemplating it.[7] But this third term, the external meaning of pain, has an origin which is completely different from revenge or reaction: it reflects an active standpoint, active forces, which are given the training of reactive forces as their task and for their pleasure. Justice is the generic activity that trains man's reactive forces, that makes them suitable for being acted and holds man responsible for this suitability itself. To justice we can oppose the way in which *ressentiment* and then bad conscience are formed: by the triumph of reactive forces, through their unsuitability for being acted, through their hatred for everything that is active, through their

resistance, through their fundamental injustice. Thus *ressentiment*, far from being at the origin of justice, is "the last sphere to be conquered by the spirit of justice. . . . The active, aggressive, arrogant man is still a hundred steps closer to justice than the reactive man."[8]

Just as *ressentiment* is not the origin of justice so bad conscience is not the product of punishment. However many meanings punishment can have there is always one meaning which it *does not have*. Punishment cannot awaken a feeling of guilt in the culprit.

> It is precisely among criminals and convicts that the sting of conscience is extremely rare; prisons and penitentiaries are *not* the kind of hotbed in which this species of gnawing worm is likely to flourish. . . . Generally speaking, punishment makes men hard and cold; it concentrates; it sharpens the feeling of alienation; it strengthens the power of resistance. If it happens that punishment destroys the vital energy and brings about a miserable prostration and self-abasement, such a result is certainly even less pleasant than the usual effects of punishment—characterized by dry and gloomy seriousness. If we consider those millenia *before* the history of man, we may unhesitantly assert that it was precisely through punishment that the development of the feeling of guilt was most powerfully *hindered*—at least in the victims upon whom the punitive force was vented. (*GM* II 14, pp. 81–82)

We can oppose point by point the state of culture in which man, at the cost of his pain, feels himself responsible for his reactive forces and the state of bad conscience where man, on the contrary, feels himself to blame for his active forces and experiences them as culpable. However we consider culture or justice we always see in them the exercise of a formative activity, the opposite of *ressentiment* and bad conscience.

This impression is further reinforced if we consider the product of cultural activity: the free and active man, the man who can promise. Just as culture is the prehistoric element of man the product of culture is his posthistoric element.

> If we place ourselves at the end of this tremendous process, where the tree at last brings forth fruit, where society and the morality of customs at last reveal *what* they have simply been the means to: then we discover that the ripest fruit is the *sovereign individual*, like only to himself, liberated again from morality of customs, autonomous and supramoral (for "autonomous" and "moral" are mutually exclusive), in short, the man who has his own independent, protracted will and the *right to make promises*. (*GM* II 2, p. 59).

Nietzsche's point is that we must not confuse the product of culture with its means. Man's species activity constitutes him as responsible for his reactive forces: *responsibility-debt*. But this responsibility is only a means of training and selection: it progressively measures the suitability of reactive forces for being acted. The finished product of species activity is *not* the responsible man himself or the moral man, but the autonomous and supramoral man, that is to say, the one who actually acts his reactive forces and in whom all reactive forces are acted. He alone "is able to" promise, precisely because he is no longer responsible to any tribunal. The product of culture is not the man who obeys the law, but the sovereign and legislative individual who defines himself by power over himself, over destiny, over the law: the free, the light, the *irresponsible*. In Nietzsche the notion of responsibility, even in its higher form, has the limited value of a simple means: the autonomous individual is no longer responsible to justice for his reactive forces, he is its master, the sovereign, the legislator, the author, and the actor. It is he who speaks, he no longer has to *answer*. The only active sense of responsibility-debt is its disappearing in the movement by which man is liberated: the creditor is liberated because he participates in the right of the masters, the debtor liberates himself, even at the price of his flesh and his pain: both of them liberate themselves from the process which trained them (*GM* II 5, 13, 21). This is the general movement of culture: the means disappearing in the product. Responsibility as responsibility before the law, law as the law of justice, justice as the means of culture—all this disappears in the product of culture itself. The morality of customs, the spirit of the laws, produces the man emancipated from the law. This is why Nietzsche speaks of a self-destruction of justice.[9] Culture is man's species activity; but, since this activity is selective, it produces the individual as its final goal, where species is itself suppressed.

We have proceeded as if culture goes straight from prehistory to posthistory. We have seen it as a species activity which, through the long labor of prehistory, arrives at the individual as its posthistoric product. And indeed, this is its essence, in conformity to the superiority of active forces over reactive forces. But we have neglected an important point: the triumph, in fact, of inferior and reactive forces. We have neglected *history*. We must say of culture both that it disappeared long ago and that it has not yet begun. Species activity disappears into the night of the past as its product does into the night of the future. In history culture takes on a sense which is very different from its own essence, having been seized by strange forces of a completely different nature. Species activity in history is inseparable from a movement which perverts it and its product. Furthermore, history is this very perver-

sion, it is identical to the "degeneration of culture." Instead of species activity, history presents us with races, peoples, classes, Churches, and States. Onto species activity are grafted social organizations, associations, communities of a *reactive* character, parasites which cover it over and absorb it. By means of species activity—the movement of which they falsify—reactive forces form collectivities, what Nietzsche calls "herds" (*GM* III 18). Instead of justice and its process of self-destruction, history presents us with societies which have no wish to perish and which cannot imagine anything superior to their own laws. What State would listen to Zarathustra's advice: "Let yourself, therefore be overthrown" (*Z* II "Of Great Events")?[10] In history the law becomes confused with the content which determines it, reactive content which provides its ballast and prevents it from disappearing, unless this is to benefit other, even heavier and more stupid, contents. Instead of the sovereign individual as the product of culture, history presents us with its own product, the domesticated man in whom it finds the famous meaning of history: "the sublime abortion," "the gregarious animal, docile, sickly, mediocre being, the European today" (*BGE* 62; *GM* I 11). History presents all the violence of culture as the legitimate property of peoples, States, and Churches, as the manifestation of *their* force. And in fact, all the procedures of training are employed, but inside-out, twisted, inverted. A morality, a Church, a State are still enterprises of selection, theories of hierarchy. The most stupid laws, the most limited communities, still want to train man and make use of his reactive forces. But to make use of them for what? To carry out what training, what selection? Training procedures are used but in order to turn man into a gregarious, docile, and domesticated animal. Training procedures are used but in order to break the strong, to sort out the weak, the suffering or the slaves. Selection and hierarchy are put the wrong way round. Selection becomes the opposite of what is was from the standpoint of activity, it is now only a means of preserving, organising and propagating the reactive life (*GM* III 13–20; *BGE* 62).

History thus appears as the act by which reactive forces take possession of culture or divert its course in their favor. The triumph of reactive forces is not an accident in history but the principle and meaning of "universal history." This idea of a historical degeneration of culture occupies a prominent place in Nietzsche's work: it is an argument in Nietzsche's struggle against the philosophy of history and the dialectic. It is the source of Nietzsche's disappointment: culture begins "Greek" but becomes "German." . . . From the *Untimely Meditations* onward Nietzsche tries to explain how and why culture comes to serve reactive forces which pervert it.[11] More profoundly, Zarathustra develops an obscure symbol: the fire-dog (*Z* II "Of Great Events"). The fire-dog is the image of species activity, it expresses

man's relation to the earth. But, in fact, the earth has two sicknesses, man and the fire-dog itself. For man is domesticated man; species activity is deformed, unnatural activity which serves reactive forces, which becomes mixed up with the Church and the State: "'The church?' I answered, 'The church is a kind of State and indeed the most mendacious kind. But keep quiet, you hypocrite dog! You surely know your own kind best! Like you, the state is a hypocrite dog; like you, it likes to speak with smoke and bellowing—to make believe, like you, that it speaks out of the belly of things. For the state wants to be absolutely the most important beast on earth; and it is believed to be so, too!'" (*Z* II "Of Great Events," p. 154). Zarathustra appeals to another fire-dog, "This one really speaks from the heart of the earth." Is this still species activity? But, this time, species activity seized in the element of prehistory, to which man corresponds insofar as he is produced in the element of posthistory? This interpretation must be taken into consideration, even if it is insufficient. In the *Untimely Meditations* Nietzsche was already putting his trust in "the non-historical and supra-historical element of culture" (what he called the Greek sense of culture (*UM* II 10, 8).[12]

In fact there are a certain number of questions that we cannot yet answer. What is the status of this double element of culture? Is it real? Is it anything but one of Zarathustra's "visions"? Culture is inseparable from the history of the movement that perverts it and puts it at the service of reactive forces; but culture is also inseparable from history itself. The activity of culture, man's species activity: is this not a simple idea? If man is essentially (that is to say generically) a *reactive* being, how could he have, or even have had in prehistory, a species *activity*? How could an active man appear, even in a posthistory? If man is essentially reactive it seems that activity must concern a being different from man. If man, on the contrary, has a species activity, it seems that it can only be deformed in an accidental way. For the moment we can only list Nietzsche's theses, their precise significance must be considered later: man is essentially reactive; there is nevertheless a species activity of man, but one that is necessarily deformed, necessarily missing its goal, leading to the domesticated man; this activity must be taken up again on another plane, the plane on which it produces, but produces something other than man. . . .

It is, however, already possible to explain why species activity necessarily falls in history and turns to the advantage of reactive forces. If the schema of the *Untimely Meditations* is insufficient, Nietzsche's work presents other directions in which a solution can be found. The aim of the activity of culture is to train man, that is to say, to make reactive forces suitable for service, for being acted. But throughout the training this suitability for ser-

vice remains profoundly ambiguous. For at the same time it allows reactive forces to put themselves at the service of other reactive forces, to give these latter forces an appearance of activity, an appearance of justice, to form with them a fiction that gets the better of active forces. It will be recalled that, in *ressentiment*, certain reactive forces prevent other reactive forces from being acted. Bad conscience reaches the same end by almost opposite means: *in bad conscience some reactive forces make use of their suitability for being acted to give other reactive forces an appearance of acting.* There is no less fiction in this procedure than in the procedure of *ressentiment. In this way associations of reactive forces are formed under the cover of species activity.* These associations are grafted onto species activity and necessarily divert it from its real sense. Training provides reactive forces with a marvelous opportunity to go into partnership, to form a collective reaction usurping species activity.

# 29

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# *Toward Freedom*

The differences do not pass between the individual and the collective, for we see no duality between these two types of problem: there is no subject of enunciation, but every proper name is collective, every assemblage is already collective. Neither do the differences pass between the natural and the artificial since they both belong to the machine and interchange there. Nor between the spontaneous and the organized, since the only question is one of modes of organization. Nor between the segmentary and the centralized, since centralization is itself an organization which rests on a form of rigid segmentarity. The effective differences pass between the lines, even though they are all immanent to one another, all entangled in one another. This is why the question of schizoanalysis or pragmatics, micropolitics itself, never consists in interpreting, but merely in asking what are your lines, individual or group, and what are the dangers on each.

1. What are your rigid segments, your binary and overcoding machines? For even these are not given to you ready-made, we are not simply divided up by binary machines of class, sex, or age: there are others which we constantly shift, invent without realizing it. And what are the dangers if we blow up these segments too quickly? Wouldn't this kill the organism itself, the organism which possesses its own binary machines, even in its nerves and its brain?

2. What are your supple lines, what are your fluxes and thresholds? Which is your set of relative deterritorializations and correlative reterritorializations? And the distribution of black holes: which are the black holes of each one of us, where a beast lurks or a microfascism thrives?

3. What are your lines of flight, where the fluxes are combined, where the thresholds reach a point of adjacence and rupture? Are they still tolerable, or are they already caught up in a machine of destruction and self-destruction which would reconstitute a molar fascism? It may happen that an assemblage of desire and of enunciation is reduced to its most rigid lines, its devices of power. There are assemblages which have only these sorts of lines. But other dangers stalk each of them, more supple and viscous dangers, of which each of us alone is judge, as long as there is still time. The question "How is it that desire can desire its own repression?" does not give rise to real theoretical difficulty, but to many practical difficulties each time. There is desire as soon as there is a machine or "body without organs." But there are bodies without organs like hardened empty envelopes, because their organic components have been blown up too quickly and too violently, an "overdose." There are bodies without organs which are cancerous and fascist, in black holes or machines of abolition. How can desire outmaneuver all that by managing its plane of immanence and of consistence which each time runs up against these dangers?

There is no general prescription. We have done with all globalizing concepts. Even concepts are haecceities, events. What is interesting about concepts like desire, or machine, or assemblage is that they only have value in their variables, and in the maximum of variables which they allow. We are not for concepts as big as hollow teeth, THE law, THE master, THE rebel. We are not here to keep the tally of the dead and the victims of history, the martyrdom of the Gulags, and to draw the conclusion that "The revolution is impossible, but we thinkers must think the impossible since the impossible only exists through our thought!" It seems to us that there would never have been the tiniest Gulag if the victims had kept up the same discourse as those who weep over them today. The victims would have had to think and live in a quite different way to give substance to those who weep in their name, and who think in their name, and who give lessons in their name. It was their life force which impelled them, not their bitterness; their sobriety, not their ambition; their anorexia, not their huge appetites, as Zola would have said. We have set out to write a book of life, not of accounts, or of the tribunal even of the people or of pure thought. The question of a revolution has never been utopian spontaneity versus State organization. When we challenge the model of the State apparatus or of the party organization that

is modeled on the conquest of that apparatus, we do not, however, fall into the grotesque alternatives: either that of appealing to a state of nature, to a spontaneous dynamic, or that of becoming the self-styled lucid thinker of an impossible revolution, whose very impossibility is such a source of pleasure. The question has always been organizational, not at all ideological: is an organization possible which is not modelled on the apparatus of the State, even to prefigure the State to come? Perhaps a war-machine with its lines of flight? In order to oppose the war-machine to the State apparatus in every assemblage—even a musical or literary one—it would be necessary to evaluate the degree of proximity to this or that pole. But how would a war-machine, in any domain whatever, become modern, and how would it ward off its own fascist dangers, when confronted by the totalitarian dangers of the State, its own dangers of destruction in comparison with the conservation of the State? In a certain way it is very simple, this happens on its own and every day. The mistake would be to say: there is a globalizing State, the master of its plans and extending its traps; and then, a force of resistance which will adopt the form of the State even if it entails betraying us, or else which will fall into local spontaneous or partial struggles, even if it entails being suffocated and beaten every time. The most centralized State is not at all the master of its plans, it is also an experimenter, it performs injections, it is unable to look into the future: the economists of the State declare themselves incapable of predicting the increase in a monetary mass. American politics is forced to proceed by empirical injections, not at all by apodictic programs. What a sad and sham game is played by those who speak of a supremely cunning master, in order to present the image of themselves as rigorous, incorruptible, and "pessimist" thinkers. It is along the different lines of complex assemblages that the powers that be carry out their experiments, but along them also arise experimenters of another kind, thwarting predictions, tracing out active lines of flight, looking for the combination of these lines, increasing their speed or slowing it down, creating the plane of consistence fragment by fragment, with a war-machine which would weigh the dangers that it encountered at each step.

What characterizes our situation is both beyond and on this side of the State. *Beyond* national States, the development of a world market, the power of multinational companies, the outline of a "planetary" organization, the extension of capitalism to the whole social body, clearly forms a great abstract machine which overcodes the monetary, industrial, and technological fluxes. At the same time the means of exploitation, control, and surveillance become more and more subtle and diffuse, in a certain sense molecular (the workers of the rich countries necessarily take part in the plundering of the third world, men take part in the overexploitation of women, etc.). But the

abstract machine, with its dysfunctions, is no more infallible than the national States which are not able to regulate them on their own territory and from one territory to another. The State no longer has at its disposal the political, institutional, or even financial means which would enable it to fend off the social repercussions of the machine; it is doubtful whether it can eternally rely on the old forms like the police, armies, bureaucracies, even trade union bureaucracies, collective installations, schools, families. Enormous land slides are happening *on this side of* the state, following lines of gradient or of flight, affecting principally: (1) the marking out of territories; (2) the mechanisms of economic subjugation (new characteristics of unemployment, of inflation); (3) the basic regulatory frameworks (crisis of the school, of trade unions, of the army, of women . . .); (4) the nature of the demands which become qualitative as much as quantitative ("quality of life" rather than the "standard of living").

All this constitutes what can be called a *right to desire.* It is not surprising that all kinds of minority questions—linguistic, ethnic, regional, about sex, or youth—resurge not only as archaisms, but in up-to-date revolutionary forms which call once more into question in an entirely immanent manner both the global economy of the machine and the assemblages of national States. Instead of gambling on the eternal impossibility of the revolution and on the fascist return of a war-machine in general, why not think that *a new type of revolution is in the course of becoming possible,* and that all kinds of mutating, living machines conduct wars, are combined and trace out a plane of consistence which undermines the plane of organization of the world and the States? For, once again, the world and its States are no more masters of their plan than revolutionaries are condemned to the deformation of theirs. Everything is played in uncertain games, "front to front, back to back, back to front. . . ." The question of the future of the revolution is a bad question because, insofar as it is asked, there are so many people who do not *become* revolutionaries, and this is exactly why it is done, to impede the question of the revolutionary-becoming of people, at every level, in every place.

# *Notes*

## *Editor's Introduction*

1. François Châtelet, *Chronique des idées perdues* (Paris: Stock, 1977).

2. Gilles Deleuze and Claire Parnet, *Dialogues,* trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987), p. 12.

3. Gilles Deleuze, "Il a été mon maître," *Arts* (28 October–3 November 1964): 8–9.

4. Deleuze and Parnet, *Dialogues,* p. 13.

5. Ibid., pp. 14–15.

6. Gilles Deleuze, *Empiricism and Subjectivity. An Essay on Hume's Theory of Human Nature,* trans. with an introduction by Constantin V. Boundas (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991).

7. Gilles Deleuze, *Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza,* trans. Martin Joughin (New York: Zone Books, 1990).

8. Gilles Deleuze, *Spinoza: Practical Philosophy,* trans. Robert Hurley (San Francisco: City Lights, 1988).

9. Gilles Deleuze, *Bergsonism,* trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam (New York: Zone Books, 1988).

10. Gilles Deleuze, *Difference and repetition,* trans. Paul Patton (London: Athlone, Forthcoming).

11. Gilles Deleuze, *Cinema 1: The Movement-Image,* trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986).

12. Gilles Deleuze, *Nietzsche and Philosophy,* trans. Hugh Tomlinson (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983).

13. Gilles Deleuze, *Nietzsche* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1965).

14. See *Nietzsche and Philosophy,* pp. 47–49, 68–72; see also *Différence et répétition,* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France: 1968) pp. 96–168, 365–89, and "Conclusions sur la volonté de puissance et l'éternel retour," *Nietzsche: Cahiers de Royaumont* (Paris: Editions de Minuit, 1967), pp. 275–87. I have argued these points, in a more elaborate way, in "Minoritarian Deconstruction of the Rhetoric of Nihilism," in *Nietzsche and the Rhetoric of Nihilism: Essays on Interpretation, Language, and Politics,* ed. Tom Darby, Bela Egyed, and Ben Jones (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1989), pp. 81–92.

15. Gilles Deleuze, *The Logic of Sense,* trans. Mark Lester with Charles Stivale, ed. Constantin V. Boundas (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990), p. 1.

16. Ibid., pp. 148–53.

17. Gilles Deleuze, *Le Pli. Leibniz et le baroque* (Paris: Editions de Minuit, 1988); translation forthcoming from the University of Minnesota Press.

18. Deleuze, *Différence et répétition,* p. 136.

19. Deleuze, *The Logic of Sense,* pp. 42–47.

20. Gilles Deleuze, *Foucault,* trans. Sean Hand (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988), pp. 94–123.

21. Deleuze and Parnet, *Dialogues,* pp. 124ff.

22. Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia,* trans. Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987), pp. 195–200.

23. Bruno Paradis, "Leibniz: un monde unique et relatif," *Magazine Littéraire,* 257 (September 1988): 26.

24. Gilles Deleuze, "Klossowski or Bodies-Language," in *The Logic of Sense,* p. 296.

25. Gilles Deleuze, *Kant's Critical Philosophy: The Doctrine of the Faculties,* trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984). See also Gilles Deleuze, "L'Idée de genèse dans l'esthétique de Kant," *Revue d'Esthétique,* 16 (1963): 113–36.

26. This *idée mère* structures his discussion of intensity-extension, paranoia-schizophrenia, sense-nonsense, nomads-sedentaries, etc.

27. For Deleuze's theory of intensity, see *Différence et répétition,* pp. 286–335.

28. Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia,* trans. R. Hurley, M. Seem, and H. R. Lane (New York: Viking, 1977), passim; *A Thousand Plateaus,* passim.

29. Deleuze and Parnet, *Dialogues,* pp. 77–123.

30. See Herbert Marcuse, *Eros and Civilization: A Philosophical Inquiry into Freud* (Boston: Beacon, 1955); Paul Ricoeur, *Freud and Philosophy: An Essay on Interpretation,* trans. Denis Savage (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970); Jürgen Habermas, *Knowledge and Human Interests,* trans. Jeremy Shapiro (Boston: Beacon, 1971), chs. 10, 11, 12.

31. Deleuze and Guattari's approach to Lacan is guarded. They praise him for rendering schizophrenic the psychoanalytic field instead of Oedipalizing the psychotic field, but they are critical of Lacan's distinction between imaginary and symbolic, that is, between inclusive and exclusive disjunctions. See Deleuze and Parnet, *Dialogues,* pp. 81–89.

32. Schizoanalytic theory and practice are discussed at length in Deleuze and Guattari's *Anti-Oedipus,* pp. 325–457; see also Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *Politique et Psychanalyse* (Alençon: Des mots perdus, 1977).

33. Deleuze and Guattari's criticism of the "death drive" is developed in *Anti-Oedipus,* pp. 329–38.

34. For a detailed discussion of the body without organs, see "November 28, 1947: How Do You Make Yourself A Body Without Organs?" in *A Thousand Plateaus,* pp. 149–66.

35. Deleuze calls "molecular" the partial objects of desire between which there is a difference of nature, not only a difference of degree; the distinctions between them are qualitative, not merely quantitative—as it is with the molar objects. Partial objects are the molecular functions of the unconscious.

36. See "1227: Treatise on Nomadology—The War Machine" and "7000 B.C.: Apparatus of Capture," in *A Thousand Plateaus,* pp. 351–423, 424–73.

37. "Signes et événements," Raymond Bellour and François Ewald interview Gilles Deleuze, *Magazine Littéraire,* 257 (September 1988): 24.

38. François Ewald, "La schizo-analyse," *Magazine Littéraire,* 257 (September 1988): 53.

39. Monique Scheepers, "Subjektivität und Politik," *Lendemains,* 53 (1989): pp. 30–34.

40. P. Levôyer and P. Encrenaz, "Politique de Deleuze," *Lendemains,* 53 (1989): 38.

41. Deleuze, *Foucault,* p. 103.

42. See pp. 69–77; 245–52.

43. The expression *minor deconstruction* is not Deleuze's. François Laruelle uses it frequently in *Le déclin de l'écriture* (Paris: Aubier-Flammarion, 1977) and *Au-delà du principe de pouvoir* (Paris: Payot, 1978). For Deleuze's discussion of the issues that Laruelle labeled "minor deconstruction," see *A Thousand Plateaus,* pp. 3–25, 111–48.

44. Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986).

45. Gilles Deleuze and Carmelo Bene, *Superpositions* (Paris: Editions de Minuit, 1979).

46. See *A Thousand Plateaus,* pp. 75–85. *Order-word* and *password* translate the French *mot d'ordre* and *mot de passe.*

47. For an overview of the Russian formalists, see Tzvetan Todorov, *Théorie de la littérature* (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1965).

48. On the tensions between two models of science—the nomadic and the royal—see *A Thousand Plateaus,* pp. 361–74.

49. Deleuze, *Différence et répétition,* p. 251.

50. Gilles Deleuze, *Francis Bacon: Logique de la sensation*, 2 vols. (Paris: Editions de la Différence, 1987); translation forthcoming.

51. Cited by Deleuze in *A Thousand Plateaus*, p. 342.

52. Patrick Vauday, "Écrit à vue: Deleuze-Bacon," *Critique*, 38 (1982): 959.

53. Deleuze, *Francis Bacon*, 1: 27.

54. Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, pp. 310–50.

55. The term was coined by Ronald Bogue as the title of an essay published in *Substance*, 66 (1991). See Marcuse, *Eros and Civilization*, esp. part II. "It concerns alliance. If evolution includes any veritable becomings, it is in the domain of *symbioses* that bring into play beings of totally different scales and kingdoms." *A Thousand Plateaus*, p. 238.

56. On this distinction, see *A Thousand Plateaus*, pp. 43–45 and Deleuze's indebtedness to Hjelmslev.

57. Gilles Deleuze, *Cinema 2: Time-Image*, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Robert Galeta (London: Athlone, 1989).

58. Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *Qu'est-ce que la philosophie?* (Paris: Editions de Minuit, 1991).

59. Deleuze and Parnet, *Dialogues*, pp. 16, 17.

## *1. Rhizome Versus Trees*

1. Translator's note: U. Weinreich, W. Labov, and M. Herzog, "Empirical Foundations for a Theory of Language," in W. Lehmann and Y. Malkeiel, eds., *Directions for Historical Linguistics* (1968), p. 125; cited by Françoise Robert, "Aspects sociaux de changement dans une grammaire générative," *Languages*, 32 (December 1973): 90.

2. Bertil Malmberg, *New Trends in Linguistics*, trans. Edward Carners (Stockholm: Lund, 1964), pp. 65–67 (the example of the Castilian dialect).

3. Ernst Jünger, *Approches; drogues et ivresse* (Paris: Table Ronde, 1974), p. 304, sec. 218.

4. Rémy Chauvin, in *Entretiens sur la sexualité*, ed. Max Aron, Robert Courrier, and Etienne Wolff (Paris: Plon, 1969), p. 205.

5. On the work of R. E. Benveniste and G. J. Todaro, see Yves Christen, "Le rôle des virus dans l'évolution," *La Recherche*, 54 (March 1975): "After integration-extraction in a cell, viruses may, due to an error in excision, carry off fragments of their host's DNA and transmit them to new cells: this in fact is the basis for what we call "genetic engineering.' As a result, the genetic information of one organism may be transferred to another by means of viruses. We could even imagine an extreme case where this transfer of information would go from a more highly evolved species to one that is less evolved or was the progenitor of the more evolved species. This mechanism, then, would run in the opposite direction to evolution in the classical sense. If it turns out that this kind of transferral of information has played a major role, we would in certain cases have to *substitute reticular schemas (with communications between branches after they have become differentiated) for the bush or tree schemas currently used to represent evolution*" (p. 271).

6. François Jacob, *The Logic of Life*, trans. Betty E. Spillmann (New York: Pantheon, 1973), pp. 291–92, 311 (quote).

7. Carlos Castaneda, *The Teachings of Don Juan* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), p. 88.

8. Pierre Boulez, *Conversations with Célestine Deliège* (London: Eulenberg Books, 1976): "a seed which you plant in compost, and suddenly it begins to proliferate like a weed" (p. 15); and on musical proliferation: "a music that floats and in which the writing itself makes it impossible for the performer to keep in with a pulsed time" (p. 69 [translation modified]).

## *2. What Is Becoming?*

1. Plato, *Philebus*, 24d., trans. R. Hackforth; *Parmenides*, 154–55, trans. F. M. Cornforth; in E. Hamilton and H. Cairns, eds. *Plato: The Collected Dialogues* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961).

2. Plato, *Cratylus*, 437ff.

## *3. What Is an Event?*

1. Emile Bréhier, *La Theorie des incorporels dans l'ancien stoicisme* (Paris: Vrin, 1928), pp. 11–13.

2. On this example, see the commentary of Bréhier, p. 20.

3. On the distinction between real internal causes and external causes entering into limited relations of "confatality," see Cicero, *De Fato*, 9, 13, 15, and 16.

4. The Epicurean notion of the event is very similar to that of the Stoics: see Epicurus, *To Herodotus*, 39–40, 68–73, and Lucretius, *De Rerum Natura*, 1:449ff. As he analyzes the event, "the rape of Tyndareus' daughter," Lucretius contrasts *eventa* (servitude-liberty, poverty-wealth, war-peace) with *conjuncta* (real qualities which are inseparable from bodies). Events are not exactly incorporeal entities. They are presented nevertheless as not existing by themselves—impassible, pure results of the movements of matter, or actions and passions of bodies. It does not seem likely though that the Epicureans developed this theory of the event—perhaps because they bent it to the demands of a homogeneous causality and subsumed it under their own conception of the *simulacrum*.

5. On the account of Stoic categories, see Plotinus, 6:1.25. See also Bréhier, p. 43.

6. This description of the purse comprises some of Carroll's best writing: see *Sylvie and Bruno Concluded* (New York: Dover, 1988), ch. 7.

7. This discovery of the surface and this critique of depth represent a constant in modern literature. They inspire the work of Robbe-Grillet. In another form, we find them again in Klossowski, in the relation between Roberte's epidermis and her glove: see Klossowski's remarks to this effect in the postface to *Les Lois de l'hospitalité* (Paris: Gallimard, 1965), pp. 135, 344; see also Michel Tournier's *Friday*, trans. Norman Denny (New York: Pantheon Books, 1985, by arrangement with Doubleday), p. 67: "It is a strange prejudice which sets a higher value on depth than on breadth,

and which accepts 'superficial' as meaning not 'of wide extent' but 'of little depth, whereas 'deep,' on the other hand, signifies 'of great depth,' and not 'of small surface.' Yet it seems to me that a feeling such as love is better measured, if it can be measured at all, by the extent of its surface than by its degree of depth."

## *4. What Is a Multiplicity?*

1. For example, in the system of memory, the formation of a memory implies a diagonal that turns present $A$ into representation $A'$ in relation to the new present $B$,




and into $A''$ in relation to $C$, etc.: see Edmund Husserl, *The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness*, ed. Martin Heidegger, trans. James S. Churchill, intro. Calvin O. Schrag (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1964), pp. 48–50.

2. Friedrich Nietzsche, *Untimely Meditations*, trans. R.J. Hollingdale (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983), "On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life," sec. 1, pp. 63–64.

3. On all of these themes, see Pierre Boulez. (1) On how transversals always tend to escape horizontal and vertical coordinates of music, sometimes even drawing "virtual lines," see *Notes of an Apprenticeship*, ed. Paule Thevenin, trans. Robert Weinstock (New York: Knopf, 1968), pp. 231–32, 295–301, 382–83. (2) On the idea of the sound block or "block of duration," in relation to this transversal, see *Boulez on Music Today*, trans. Susan Bradshaw and Richard Bennett (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971), pp. 55–59. (3) On the distinction between points and blocks, "punctual sets," and "aggregative sets" with varying individuality, see "Sonate que me veux-tu?" *Médiations*, 7 (1964). The hatred of memory appears frequently in Boulez; see "Éloge de l'amnésie," *Musique en jeu*, 4 (1971), pp. 5–14, and "J'ai horreur du souvenir," in *Roger Desormière et son temps*, ed. Denise Mayer and Pierre Souvtchinsky (Monaco: Ed. du Rocher, 1966). Confining ourselves to contemporary examples, one finds analogous declarations in Stravinsky, Cage, and Berio. Of course, there is a musical memory that is tied to coordinates and is exercised in social settings (getting up, going to bed, beating a retreat). But the perception of a musical "phrase" appeals less to memory, even of the reminiscence type, than to an extension or contraction of perception of the encounter type. It should be studied how each musician sets in motion veritable *blocks of forgetting:* for example, what Jean Barraque calls "slices of forgetting" and "absent developments" in the work of Debussy; *Debussy* (Paris: Seuil, 1977), pp. 169–71. One can refer to a general study by Daniel Charles, "La musique et l'oubli," *Traverses*, 4 (1977), pp. 14–23.

4. Roland Barthes, "Rasch," in *The Responsibility of Forms*, trans. Richard Howard (New York: Hill and Wang, 1985), pp. 300–302, 308–9.

5. There are many differences among painters, in all respects, but also a common movement: see Wassily Kandinsky, *Point and Line to Plane* in *Complete Writings on Art*, vol. 2, ed. Kenneth C. Lindsay and Peter Vergo (Boston: G. K. Hall, 1982), pp. 524–700, and Paul Klee, *On Modern Art*, trans. Paul Findlay, intro. Herbert Reed (London: Faber, 1966). The aim of statements like those of Mondrian on the exclusive value of the vertical and the horizontal is to show the conditions under which the vertical and horizontal are sufficient to create a transversal, which does not even have to be drawn; for example, coordinates of unequal thickness intersect inside the frame and extend outside the frame, opening a "dynamic axis" running transversally (see Michel Butor's comments in *Repertoire* [Paris: Minuit, 1960–61], vol. 3, "Le carre et son habitant"). One can also consult Michel Fried's article on Pollock's line, *Three American Painters* (Cambridge, Mass.: Fogg Art Museum, 1965), and Henry Miller's discussion of Nash's line, *On Turning Eighty* (London: Village Press, 1973).

## 5. *Individuation*

1. This is sometimes written "ecceity," deriving the word from *ecce*, "here is." This is an error, since Duns Scotus created the word and the concept from *haec*, "this thing." But it is a fruitful error because it suggests a mode of individuation that is distinct from that of a thing or a subject.

2. Michel Tournier, *Les Météores* (Paris: Gallimard, 1975), ch. 23, "L'âme déployé."

3. Translator's note: On *Aeon* versus *chronos*, Deleuze, *Logique du sense* (Paris: Minuit, 1969), especially series 23, pp. 190–97.

4. Pierre Boulez, *Conversations with Célestin Deliège* (London: Eulenberg Books, 1976), pp. 68–71: "It is not possible to introduce phenomena of tempo into music that has been calculated only electronically, in . . . lengths expressed in seconds or microseconds" (p. 70).

5. Ray Bradbury, *The Machineries of Joy* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1964), p. 53.

6. Translator's note: Virginia Wolff, *Mrs. Dalloway* (New York: Harcourt Brace and World, 1925), p. 11.

7. Gustave Guillaume has proposed a very interesting conception of the verb. He distinguishes between an interior time, enveloped in the "process," and an exterior time, pertaining to the distinction between epochs (*Epoques et niveaux temporels dans le systeme de la conjugaison française, Cahiers de linguistique structurale* [Universite de Laval, Quebec], 4 [1955]). It seems to us that these two poles correspond respectively to the infinitive-becoming, Aeon, and the present-being, Chronos. Each verb leans more or less in the direction of one pole or the other, not only according to its nature, but also according to the nuances of its modes and tenses, with the exception of "becoming" and "being," which correspond to both poles. Proust, in his study of

Flaubert's style, shows how the imperfect tense in Flaubert takes on the value of an infinitive-becoming: *Chroniques* (Paris: Gallimard, 1927), pp. 197–99.

8. On the problem of proper names (in what sense is the proper name outside the limits of classification and of another nature, and in what sense is it at the limit and still a part of classification?), see Alan Henderson Gardiner, *The Theory of Proper Names,* 2d ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1957), and Levi-Strauss, *The Savage Mind,* ch. 7 ("Time Regained"), pp. 217–44.

9. We have already encountered this problem of the indifference of psychoanalysis to the use of the indefinite article or pronoun among children; as early as Freud, but more especially in Melanie Klein (the children she analyzes, in particular, Little Richard, speak in terms of "a," "one," "people," but Klein exerts incredible pressure to turn them into personal and possessive family locutions). It seems to us that Laplanche and Pontalis are the only ones in psychoanalysis to have had any inkling that indefinites play a specific role; they protested against any overrapid interpretive reduction: see "Fantasme originaire," *Les temps modernes,* 215, April 1964, pp. 1861, 1868.

10. See the subjectivist or personalist conception of language in Emile Benveniste, *Problems in General Linguistics,* trans. Mary Elizabeth Meek (Coral Gables, Fla.: University of Miami Press, 1971), chs. 20 ("Subjectivity in Language," pp. 223–30) and 21 ("Analytical Philosophy and Language," pp. 231–38), especially pp. 220–21 and 225–26.

11. The essential texts of Maurice Blanchot serve to refute the theory of the "shifter" and of personology in linguistics. See *L'entretien infini* (Paris: Gallimard, 1969), pp. 556–67. And on the difference between the two propositions, "I am unfortunate" and "he is unfortunate," or between "I die" and "one dies," see *La part du feu* (Paris: Gallimard, 1949), pp. 29–30, and *The Space of Literature,* trans. Ann Smock (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1982), pp. 90, 122, 126. Blanchot demonstrates that in all of these cases the indefinite has nothing to do with "the banality of daily life," which on the contrary would be on the side of the personal pronoun.

12. Translator's note: These quotes, the first from Nietzsche, the second from Kafka, are quoted more fully in ch. 12 of *A Thousand Plateaus,* "1227: Treatise on Nomadology," p. 353.

13. For example, see François Cheng, *Chinese Poetic Writing,* trans. Donald A. Riggs and Jerome P. Seaton (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982), especially his analysis of what he calls "the passive procedures," pp. 23–42.

## 6. *A Theory of the Other*

1. Michel Tournier, *Vendredi ou les limbes du Pacifique* (Paris: Gallimard, 1967). English translation, *Friday,* trans. Norman Denny (New York: Pantheon Books, 1985, by arrangement), pp. 186–87.

2. Tournier's conception clearly contains Leibnizian echoes (the monad as expression of the world); it also contains Sartrean echoes. Sartre's theory in *Being and Nothingness* is the first great theory of the Other, because it transcends the alternative: is the Other an object (even if it is a particular object inside the perceptual

field), or rather a subject (even if it is another subject for another perceptual field)? Sartre is here the precursor of structuralism, for he is the first to have considered the Other as a real structure or a specificity irreducible to the object and the subject. But, since he defined this structure by means of the "look," he fell back into the categories of object and subject, making of the Other the one who constitutes me as an object when he looks at me, even if this means that the Other would himself become an object when I, in turn, look at him. It seems that the structure-Other precedes the look; the latter, rather, marks the moment at which *someone* happens to fill the structure. The look brings about only the effectuation or the actualization of a structure which must nonetheless be independently defined.

3. Tournier, *Friday* pp. 94–96.
4. Ibid., p. 204.
5. Ibid., p. 205.
6. Ibid., p. 115–16.
7. Ibid., p. 67.
8. Ibid., p. 180.
9. Ibid., pp. 211–12.
10. Ibid., p. 113.
11. See the collection *Le Désir et la perversion* (Paris: Seuil, 1967). Guy Rosolato's article, "Étude des perversions sexuelles a partir du fétishisme," contains some very interesting, though too brief, remarks on "sexual difference" and "the double" (pp. 25–26). Jean Clavreul's article, "Le couple pervers," shows that neither the victim nor the accomplice takes the place of an Other; (on "desubjectivization," see p. 110, and on the distinction between the cause and the object of desire, see the same author's "Remarques sur la question de la realité dans les perversions," *La Psychanalyse,* 8, pp. 29off.). It seems that these studies, founded on Lacan's structuralism and on his analysis of the *Verleugnung,* are in the course of development.
12. In Sade there is the ever-present theme of molecular combination.

## 7. *Ethics Without Morality*

1. Benedict de Spinoza, *The Ethics and Selected Letters,* trans. Samuel Shirley, ed. with introduction by Seymour Feldman (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1982). *Ethics,* III, 2, schol.
2. *Ethics,* III, 2, schol. (and II, 13, schol.).
3. Even the mind has a very large number of parts: cf. *Ethics,* II, 15.
4. *Ethics,* II, 28, 29.
5. *Ethics,* I, appendix.
6. *Ethics,* III, 2, schol.
7. *Ethics,* III, 9, schol.
8. *Ethics,* III, definition of Desire ("in order to involve the cause of this consciousness in my definition. . .").
9. *Spinoza: The Political Works,* ed. A. G. Wernham (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1958). Spinoza, *Theological-Political Treatise,* ch. 4. And *Letter XIX,* to Blyenbergh, *The Ethics and Selected Letters.*

10. Friedrich Nietzsche, *On the Genealogy of Morals*, ed. with commentary by Walter Kaufmann (New York: Random House, 1967) first essay, sec. 17.

11. Cf. the text on suicide, *Ethics*, IV, 20, schol.

12. *Theological-Political Treatise*, ch. 4.

13. Cf. Spinoza's denunciation of "satire": *Political Treatise*, *Spinoza: The Political Works*, ed. A. G. Wernham, ch. I, sec. 1, and *Ethics*, III, preface.

14. *Theological-Political Treatise*, preface.

15. *Ethics*, IV, appendix, ch. 13.

16. *Ethics*, I, appendix.

17. *Ethics*, III.

18. *Ethics*, IV, 47, schol.

19. *Political Treatise*, ch. 10, sec. 8.

20. On the two sorts of passion, cf. *Ethics*, III, general definition of the affects.

21. This was a common procedure that consisted in concealing the boldest or least orthodox arguments in appendices or notes (Bayle's dictionary is a later example). Spinoza renewed the procedure with his systematic method of scholia, which refer to each other and are themselves connected to the prefaces and appendices, thus forming a second subterranean *Ethics*.

## *8. Ethics and the Event*

1. With respect to Joe Bousquet's work, which is in its entirety a meditation on the wound, the event, and language, see two essential articles in *Cahiers du Sud*, 303 (1950): René Nelli, "Joe Bousquet et son double;" and Ferdinand Alquié, "Joe Bousquet et la morale du language."

2. See Joe Bousquet, *Les capitales* (Paris: Le Cercle du Livre, 1955), p. 103.

3. Maurice Blanchot, *L'Espace littéraire* (Paris: Gallimard, 1955), p. 160.

4. Essay by Claude Roy on Ginsbert, *Nouvel Observateur*, 1968.

5. See Blanchot, *L'Espace*, p. 155: "This attempt to elevate death to itself, to bring about the coincidence of the point at which it disappears in itself and that at which I disappear outside of myself, is not a simple internal affair, but implies an immense responsibility with regard to things and is possible only through their mediation."

## *9. The Selective Test*

1. In the preceding comparison, we are referring to some of the best-known texts of Nietzsche and Kierkegaard. In the case of Kierkegaard, these include *Fear and Trembling* and *Repetition*, ed. and trans. H. V. and E. H. Hong, published as two volumes in one (Princeton University Press, 1983); the very important note in *The Concept of Anxiety*, trans. R. Thomte, ed. H. V. and E. H. Hong (Princeton University Press, 1980); and passages from the *Journals and Papers*, ed. H. V. and E. H. Hong (Indiana University Press, 1967–78). On the critique of memory, cf. *Philosophical Fragments* or *A Fragment of Philosophy*, rev. trans. H. V. Hong (Princeton University

Press, 1962), and *Stages on Life's Way: Studies by Various Persons,* ed. and trans. H. V. and E. H. Hong (Princeton University Press, 1988).

In the case of Nietzsche, see *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* (especially part II, "Of Redemption"; and the two main passages in part III, "Of the Vision and the Riddle" and "The Convalescent," one concerning Zarathustra ill, talking to his demon, and the other concerning Zarathustra convalescent, conversing with his animals), trans. R. J. Hollingdale (Penguin, 1961); but also the Notes of 1881–1882 (in which Nietzsche explicitly opposes "his" hypothesis to the cyclical hypothesis and criticizes all notions of resemblance, equilibrium, and identity. Cf. *La Volonté de Puissance,* trans. Bianquis (Paris: Gallimard, S.d.), pp. 295–301). Finally, for Péguy, see essentially *Clio* (Paris: Gallimard, 1931) and *Le mystère de la charité de Jeanne d'Arc* (Paris, Gallimard, 1955/ New York, Pantheon Books, 1943).

2. See Kierkegaard, *Fear and Trembling* (*Crainte et Tremblement,* trans. Tisseau, (Paris: Aubier, 1984), pp. 52–67) on the nature of the real movement which is not mediation but "repetition" and which stands opposed to the abstract logical, false movement described by Hegel. See the remarks from the *Journal* published as an appendix to *La Répétition,* trans. and ed. Tisseau. One also finds in Péguy a profound critique of "logical movement": Péguy denounces this as a conservative, accumulative, and capitalistic pseudomovement. See *Clio,* pp. 45 et seq. This is close to the Kierkegaardian critique.

3. See Nietzsche, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra,* part III, "Of Old and New Law-Tables," sec. 4: "But only a buffoon thinks: 'Man can also be jumped over.'"

## *10. Eternal Recurrence*

1. Friedrich Nietzsche, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra,* trans. by R. J. Hollingdale (New York: Penguin Books, 1961); hereafter *Z.*

2. Friedrich Nietzsche, *La volonté de puissance,* trans. by G. Bianquis (Paris: Gallimard, 1935); hereafter *VP.* Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Will to Power,* trans. by Walter Kaufmann and R. J. Hollingdale (New York: Random House, 1968); hereafter *WP.*

3. *Z* III, "Of the Virtue That Makes Small," p. 191; *Z* II, "Of the Compassionate," p. 113: "But worst of all are petty thoughts. Truly, better even to have done wickedly than to have thought pettily! To be sure, you will say: 'Delight in petty wickedness spares us many a great evil deed.' But here one should not wish to be spared."

4. Friedrich Nietzsche, *On the Genealogy of Morals,* trans. by Walter Kaufmann (New York: Random House, 1967).

5. Friedrich Nietzsche, *Ecce Homo,* trans. by W. Kaufmann (New York: Random House, 1967); hereafter *EH.*

## *11. Man and Overman*

1. M. Serres, *Le système de Leibniz* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1982), pp. 648–57.

2. See *The Order of Things*, trans. A. Sheridan (New York: Pantheon 1970), chs. 4, 5, 6; hereafter *OT*.

3. *Les Mots et les choses* (Paris: Gallimard, 1966), p. 243 (hereafter *MC*), (*OT*, pp. 320–31). Daudin's exemplary study, *Les classes zoologiques et l'idée de série animale* (Paris: Éditions des Archives contemporaraines, 1983), had shown how classification in the classical age developed according to series.

4. *Naissance de la clinique* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1963), pp. 119, 138 (*The Birth of the Clinic*, trans. A. Sheridan (New York: Pantheon, 1973), pp. 118, 136).

5. This theme has found its fullest expression in J. Vuillemin's book *L'héritage kantien et la révolution copernicienne* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1954).

6. In *OT* Foucault constantly recalls the necessity of recognizing two stages, but these are not always defined in the same way: either, in a narrow sense, they are things which first receive a particular historicity, and then man appropriates this historicity for himself in the second stage (*MC*, pp. 380–81 [*OT*, pp. 370–71]); or else, in a larger sense, it is "the configurations" which change first, followed by their "mode of being" (*MC*, p. 233 [*OT*, p. 221]).

7. *MC*, p. 268 (*OT*, p. 258).

8. See Etienne Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire, *Principes de phillosophie zoologique* (Paris: Pichon et Didiet, 1830), which contains the polemic with Cuvier on folding.

9. On the great "break" brought about by Cuvier, whereby Lamarck still belongs to classical natural history while Cuvier makes possible a history of the living creature that will manifest itself in Darwin, see *MC*, pp. 287–89 (*OT*, pp. 174–76) and *MC*, p. 307 (*OT*, p. 294): "evolutionism is a biological theory, of which the condition of possibility was a biology without evolution—that of Cuvier."

10. *MC*, p. 291 (*OT*, p. 278). We feel that this text, which deals with nineteenth-century biology, has much wider implications and expresses a fundamental aspect of Foucault's thought.

11. This is the point emphasized by P. Klossowski in his *Nietzsche et le cercle vicieux* (Paris: Mercure de France, 1978).

12. As we have seen, it is Bichat who breaks with the classical conception of death, as being a decisive indivisible instant (Marraux's formula, taken up again by Sartre, whereby death is that which "transforms life into a destiny," still belongs to the classical conception). Bichat's three great innovations are to have seen death as being coextensive with life, to have made it the global result of partial deaths, and above all to have taken "violent death" rather than "natural death" as the model (or the reasons for this last point, see *Recherches physiologiques sur la vie et la mort* [Paris Fortin, Masson et Cie., ca. 1800], pp. 116–19). Bichat's book is the first act of a modern conception of death.

13. See *MC*, p. 291 (*OT*, p. 278).

14. See "What Is an Author?" in *Language, Counter-Memory, Practice*, ed. D. F. Bouchard (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977), pp. 136–39.

15. *MC*, pp. 397–98 (*OT*, pp. 385–87).

16. See *MC*, pp. 309, 313, 316–18, 395–97 (*OT*, pp. 296, 300, 305–6, 384–85), or

the characteristics of modern literature as being "the experience of death . . . , unthinkable thought . . . , repetition . . . , finitude."

17. On the reasons given by Foucault for this special situation in language, see *MC,* pp. 306–7 (*OT,* pp. 293–94) and *MC,* pp. 315–16 (*OT,* pp. 304–5).

18. *MC,* p. 395 (*OT,* p. 383). Rimbaud's letter not only invokes language or literature, but the two other aspects: the future man is in charge not only of the new language, but also of animals and whatever is unformed (in the "Letter to Paul Demeny" [Paris: Pleiade, 1972], p. 255).

## *12. Psychoanalysis and Desire*

1. E. A. Bennett, *Ce que Jung a vraiment dit* (Paris: Gérard, 1973), p. 80.

2. Translators' note: in English in the original.

3. Serge Leclaire, *Démasquer le réel* (Paris: Seuil, 1971), p. 35.

4. Cf. the famous case of President Schreber and the verdict which grants him his rights. (Translators' note: the reference is to Freud's essay, "Psychoanalytic Notes on an Autobiographical Account of a Case of Paranoia [Dementia Paranoides]," in vol. 9 of the Pelican Freud Library, *Case Histories II* [Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1979]).

5. Cf. Robert Castel, *Le Psychoanalysme* (Paris: François Maspero, 1973).

6. Cf. a curious text of J. A. Miller in *Ornicar,* 1.

7. Jacques Donzelot, in *The Policing of Families,* trans. R. Hurley (London: Hutchinson, 1980), shows that psychoanalysis has evolved from the private relationship and that it perhaps entered the "social" sector very much earlier than has been thought.

## *13. Delirium: World-Historical, Not Familial*

1. R. D. Laing, *The Politics of Experience* (New York: Ballantine, 1967), pp. 154–55.

2. On the interplay of races and intensities in the theater of cruelty, see Antonin Artaud, *Oeuvres complètes* (Paris: Gallimard), vols. 4 and 5: for example, the project of "La conquête du Mexique," vol. 4, p. 151; and the role of intensive vibrations and rotations in "Les Cenci," vol. 5, pp. 46ff. (Translators' note: for the English text of the latter, see Antonin Artaud, *The Cenci,* trans. Simon Watson Taylor [New York: Grove Press, 1970], pp. vii ff.)

3. Arthur Rimbaud, *Une saison en enfer* (Paris: Flammarion, 1989).

4. Nietzsche, letter to Jakob Burckhardt, 5 January 1889, in *Selected Letters of Friedrich Nietzsche,* trans. Christopher Middleton (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969), p. 347.

5. Jacques Besse, "Le danseur," in *La grande paque* (Paris: Editions Belfond, 1969). The whole first part of this book describes the schizo's stroll in the city; the second part, "Légendes folles," progresses to the hallucinations or deliriums of historical episodes.

6. Wilhelm Reich, *The Function of the Orgasm,* trans. Vincent R. Carfagno (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1973), p. 70. For a critique of autism, see Roger Gentis, *Les murs de l'asile* (Paris: Maspero, 1970), pp. 41ff.

7. Maurice Garçon, *Louis XVII ou la fausse énigme* (Paris: Hachette, 1968), p. 177.

## *14. Becoming-Animal*

1. René Schérer and Guy Hocquenghem, *Co-ire, Recherche,* 22 (1976), pp. 76–82: see their critique of Bettelheim's thesis, which considers the becomings-animal of the child merely an autistic symbolism that expresses the anxiety of the parents more than any reality of the child. See Bruno Bettelheim, *The Empty Fortress* (New York: Free Press, 1967).

2. Philippe Vagi, "Les philosophes du fantastique," *Libération,* 31 March 1977. For the preceding cases, what we must arrive at is an understanding of certain so-called neurotic behaviors as a function of becomings-animal, instead of relegating becomings-animal to a psychoanalytic interpretation of behaviors. We saw this in relation to masochism (and Lolito explains that the origin of his feats lies in certain masochistic experiences, a fine text by Christian Maurel conjugates a becoming-monkey and a becoming-horse in a masochistic pairing). Anorexia would also have to be understood from the point of view of becoming-animal.

3. See *Newsweek,* 16 May 1977, p. 57.

4. See Dolfi Trost, *Visible et invisible* (Paris: Arcanes 1953) and *Librement mécanique* (Paris: Minotaure 1955): "She was simultaneously, in her sensible reality and in the ideal prolongation of her lines, like the projection of a human group yet to come."

## *15. The Signs of Madness: Proust*

1. Marcel Proust, "Within a Budding Grove," in *Remembrance of Things Past,* 3 vols. trans. C. K. Scott Moncrieff, Terence Kilmartin, and Andres Mayor (New York: Vintage Books, 1982), vol. 1, p. 568.

2. Marcel Proust, "Time Regained," in *Remembrance of Things Past,* vol. 3, pp. 832–33.

3. Marcel Proust, "The Captive," in *Remembrance of Things Past,* vol. 3, pp. 203-4.

4. Marcel Proust, "The Fugitive," in *Remembrance of Things Past,* vol. 3, p. 613.

5. Proust, "Within a Budding Grove," p. 579.

6. Marcel Proust, "The Guermantes Way," in *Remembrance of Things Past,* vol. 2, p. 298.

7. Charlus' three speeches are: "Within a Budding Grove," pp. 578–80; "The Guermantes Way," pp. 294–306; and "The Guermantes Way," pp. 574–86.

8. Proust, "The Guermantes Way," p. 577.

9. An elementary combination is defined in terms of the encounter of one masculine *or* feminine part of an individual with a masculine *or* feminine part of another. Thus, we may have: the masculine part of a man and the feminine part of a woman; but also the masculine part of a woman and the feminine part of a man; the mas-

culine part of a man and the feminine part of another man; the masculine part of a man and the masculine part of another man. . . .

10. Proust, "The Captive," pp. 202–3.

11. On the distinction between main characters and narrator in *Remembrance*, see Gerard Genette, *Figures III* (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1972), pp. 259f. Genette introduces to this distinction many corrections.

12. Marcel Proust, "Cities of the Plain," in *Remembrance of Things Past*, vol. 2, p. 976.

## *16. What is Desire*

1. Cf. the article of Roland Barthes on Schumann, "Rasch," in *Language, cours, société: Pour Emile Benveniste*, ed. J. Kristeva, J.-C. Milnes, N. Ruwet (Paris: Seuil, 1975), pp. 218ff.

2. Translator's note: the original is, literally, "Oh, I could tell you, mummy," a line from a French nursery rhyme.

3. René Nellie, in *L'Erotique des Troubadours* (Tours, 1963), gives a good analysis of this plane of immanence of courtly love, in the way it challenges the interruptions that pleasure would like to introduce into it. In a quite different assemblage, similar utterances and techniques are to be found in Taoism for the construction of a plane of immanence of desire (cf., R. Van Gulik, *Sexual Life in Ancient China* [Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1961], and the commentaries of J.-F. Lyotard, *Économie Libidinale* [Paris: Minuit, 1974]).

4. D. H. Lawrence, *Eros et les chiens* (Paris: Bourgois, 1970), p. 290.

5. Ray Bradbury, *The Machineries of Joy* pp. 38–39.

## *17. Language: Major and Minor*

1. On the expansion and diffusion of states of language, in the "patch of oil" mode or the "paratrooper" mode, see Bertil Malmberg, *New Trends in Linguistics*, trans. Edward Carners (Stockholm: Lund, 1964), ch. 3 (which uses N. Lindqvist's important studies on dialect). What are needed now are comparative studies of how homogenizations and centralizations of given major languages take place. In this respect, the linguistic history of French is not at all the same as that of English; neither is their relation to writing as a form of homogenization the same. For French, the centralized language par excellence, one may refer to the analysis of Michel de Certeau, Dominique Julia, and Jacques Revel, *Une politique de la langue* (Paris: Gallimard, 1975). The analysis covers a very brief period at the end of the eighteenth century, focusing on Abbot Gregory, and notes two distinct periods: one in which the central language opposed the rural dialects, just as the town opposed the countryside, and the capital the provinces; and another in which it opposed "feudal idioms," as well as the language of the émigrés, just as the nation opposes everything that is foreign to it, an enemy to it: "It is also obvious that the rejection of the dialects resulted from a technical inability to grasp stable laws in regional speech patterns" (pp. 160ff.).

2. See Michel Lalonde, *Change,* 30 (March 1977), pp. 100–122, where the poem, "Speak White," quoted in text, appears, along with a manifesto on the Quebecois language ("La deffense et illustration de la langue quebecqoyse").

3. On the complex situation of Afrikaans, see Breyten Breytenbach's fine book, *Feu Froid* (Paris: Bourgeois, 1976); G. M. Lory's study (pp. 101–107) elucidates Breytenbach's project, the violence of his poetic treatment of the language, and his will to be a "bastard, with a bastard language."

4. On the double aspect of minor language, poverty-ellipsis, and overload-variation, one may refer to a certain number of exemplary studies: Klauss Wagenbach's study of the German of Prague at the beginning of the twentieth century, *Franz Kafka: Eine Biographie seiner Jugend* (Bern: Francke, 1958); Pasolini's study demonstrating that Italian was not constructed on the basis of a new standard or mean, but exploded in two simultaneous directions, "upward and downward," in other words, toward simplified material and expressive exaggeration (*L'expérience hérétique: Langue et cinema* (Paris: Payot, 1976), pp. 46–47); and J. L. Dillard's study bringing out the double tendency of Black English on the one hand to omit, lose, disencumber, and on the other to overload, to develop "fancy talk" (*Black English* [New York: Random House, 1972]). As Dillard notes, there is no inferiority to the standard language; instead there is a correlation between two movements that necessarily escape from the standard level of language. Still on the topic of Black English, LeRoi Jones shows the extent to which the two conjoined directions approximate language to music (*Blues People* [New York: William Morrow, 1963], pp. 30–31 and all of ch. 3). On a more general level, one will recall Pierre Boulez's analysis of a double movement in music, dissolution of form, and dynamic overload or proliferation: *Conversations with Célestin Deliège* (London: Eulenberg Books, 1976), pp. 20–22.

5. Yann Moulier, preface to Mario Tronti, *Ouvriers et capital* (Paris: Bourgois, 1977), p. 6.

6. Pasolini, *L'expérience hérétique,* p. 62.

7. See the "Strategy Collective" manifesto on the Quebecois language in *Change,* 30 (March 1977); it denounces the "myth of subversive language," which implies that simply being in a minority is enough to make one a revolutionary: "this mechanist equation derives from a populist conception of language. . . . Speaking the language of the working class is not what links an individual to the positions of that class. . . . The argument that Joual has a subversive, countercultural force is entirely idealistic" (p. 188).

## *18. Minor Literature: Kafka*

1. See letter to Brod in Franz Kafka, *Letters to Friends, Family and Editors,* trans. Richard and Clair Winston (New York: Schocken Books, 1977), June 1921, p. 289, and commentaries in Wagenbach, *Franz Kafka, Années de jeunesse* (Paris: Mercure: 1967), p. 84.

2. Kafka, *Diaries,* trans. Martin Greenberg (New York: Schocken Books, 1949), 29 December 1911, p. 194.

3. Ibid., p. 193: "Literature is less a concern of literary history, than of the people."

4. See "Wedding Preparations in the Country," in Kafka, *Complete Stories* (New York: Schocken Books, 1971): "And so long as you say 'one' instead of 'I,' there's nothing in it" (p. 53). And the two subjects appear several pages later: "I don't even need to go to the country myself, it isn't necessary. I'll send my clothed body," while the narrator stays in bed like a bug or a beetle (p. 55). No doubt, this is one of the origins of Gregor's becoming-beetle in "The Metamorphosis" (in the same way, Kafka will give up going to meet Felice and will prefer to stay in bed). But in "The Metamorphosis," the animal takes on all the value of a true becoming and no longer has any of the stagnancy of a subject of enunciation.

5. See Michel Ragon, *Historie de la littérature prolétarienne en France* (Paris: Albin Michel, 1974) on the difficulty of criteria and on the need to use a concept of a "secondary zone literature."

6. Kafka, *Diaries,* 25 December 1911, p. 193: "A small nation's memory is not smaller than the memory of a large one and so can digest the existing material more thoroughly."

7. See the excellent chapter "Prague at the Turn of the Century," in Wagenbach, *Franz Kafka,* on the situation of the German language in Czechoslovakia and on the Prague school.

8. The theme of teeth is constant in Kafka. A grandfather-butcher; a streetwise education at the butcher-shop; Felice's jaws; the refusal to eat meat except when he sleeps with Felice in Marienbad. See Michel Cournot's article, "Toi que as de si grandes dents," *Nouvel Observateur,* 17 April 1972. This is one of the most beautiful texts on Kafka. One can find a similar opposition between eating and speaking in Lewis Carroll, and a comparable escape into nonsense.

9. Franz Kafka, *The Trial,* trans. Willa and Edwin Muir (New York: Schocken Books, 1956); "He noticed that they were talking to him, but he could not make out what they were saying, he heard nothing but the din that filled the whole place, through which a shrill unchanging note like that of a siren seemed to sing."

10. Kafka, *Diaries* 20 August 1911, pp. 61–62.

11. Kafka, *Diaries:* "Without gaining a sense, the phrase 'end of the month' held a terrible secret for me" especially since it was repeated every month—Kafka himself suggests that if this expression remained shorn of sense, this was due to laziness and "weakened curiosity." A negative explication invoking lack or powerlessness, as taken by Wagenbach. It is well known that Kafka makes this sort of negative suggestion to present or to hide the objects of his passion.

12. Kafka, *Letters to Milena* trans. Philip Boehm (New York: Schocken, 1990), p. 58. On Kafka's fascination with proper names, beginning with those that he invented, see Kafka, *Diaries,* 11 February 1913 (apropos of the names in *The Verdict*).

13. Kafka commentators are at their worst in their interpretations in this respect when they regulate everything through metaphors: thus, Marthe Robert reminds us that the Jews are *like* dogs or, to take another example, that "since the artist is treated as someone starving to death Kafka makes him into a hunger artist; or since he is treated as a parasite, Kafka makes him into an enormous insect" (*Oeuvres com-*

*plètes,* Circle du livre precieux, vol. 5, p. 311). It seems to us that this is a simplistic conception of the literary machine—Robbe-Grillet has insisted on the destruction of all metaphors in Kafka.

14. See, for example, the letter to Pollak in Kafka, *Letters,* 4 February 1902, pp. 1–2.

15. See H. Vidal Sephiha, "Introduction a l'étude de l'intensif," in *Langages,* 18 (June 1970), pp. 104–20. We take the term *tensor* from J.-F.. Lyotard who uses it to indicate the connection of intensity and libido.

16. Sephiha, "Introduction," p. 107: "We can imagine that any phrase conveying a negative notion of pain, evil, fear, violence can cast off the notion in order to retain no more than its limit-value—that is, its intensive value"; for example, the German word *sehr,* which comes from the Middle High German word, *Ser* meaning "painful."

17. Wagenbach, *Franz Kafka,* pp. 78–88 (especially pp. 78, 81, 88).

18. Kafka, *Diaries,* 15 December 1910, p. 33.

19. Henri Gobard, "De la vehicularité de la langue anglaise," *Langues modernes* (January 1972), and *L'Alienation linguistique: analyse tetraglossique* (Paris: Flammarion, 1976).

20. Michel Foucault insists on the importance of the distribution between what can be said in a language at a certain moment and what cannot be said (even if it can be *done*). Georges Devereux (cited by H. Gobard) analyzes the case of the young Mohave Indians who speak about sexuality with great ease in their vernacular language, but who are incapable of doing so in that vehicular language that English constitutes for them; and this is so not only because the English instructor exercises a repressive function, but also because there is a problem of languages (see *Essais d'ethnopsychiatrie générale* [Paris: Gallimard, 1970], pp. 125–26).

21. On the Prague circle and its role in linguistics, see *Change,* 3 (1969), and 10 (1972). It is true that the Prague circle was only formed in 1925. But in 1920, Jakobson came to Prague where there was already a Czech movement directed by Mathesius and connected with Anton Marty who had taught in the German university system. From 1902 to 1905, Kafka followed the courses given by Marty, a disciple of Brentano, and participated in Brentanoist meetings.

22. On Kafka's connections to Lowy and Yiddish theater, see Brod, *Franz Kafka,* pp. 110–16, and Wagenbach, *Franz Kafka,* pp. 163–67. In this mime theater, there must have been many bent heads and straightened heads.

23. Franz Kafka, "An Introductory Talk on the Yiddish Language," in Franz Kafka, *Dearest Father,* trans. Ernst Kaiser and Eithne Wilkins (New York: Schocken Books, 1954), pp. 381–86.

24. A magazine editor will declare that Kafka's prose has "the air of the cleanliness of a child who takes care of himself" (see Wagenbach, *Franz Kafka,* p. 82).

25. "The Great Swimmer" is undoubtedly one of the most Beckett-like of Kafka's texts: "I have to well admit that I am in my own country and that, in spite of all my efforts, I don't understand a word of the language you are speaking."

## *19. Nomad Art: Space*

1. The principal texts are Alois Riegl, *Die Spatrömische Kunstindustrie* (Vienna: Staatdruckerei, 1927); Wilhelm Worringer, *Abstraction and Empathy: A Contribution to the Psychology of Style*, trans. Michel Bullock (New York: International Universities Press, 1963); Henri Maldiney, *Regard, parole, espace* (Lausanne: L'Age d'homme, 1973), especially "L'art et le pouvoir du fond," and Maldiney's discussion of Cézanne.

2. All of these points already relate to Riemannian space, with its essential relation to "monads" (as opposed to the unitary subject of Euclidean space see Gilles Châtelet, "Sur une petite phrase de Riemann," *Analytiques*, 3 (May 1979). Although the "monads" are no longer thought to be closed upon themselves, and are postulated to entertain direct, step-by-step local relations, the purely monadological point of view proves inadequate and should be superseded by a "nomadology" (the ideality of striated space versus the realism of smooth space).

3. See Edmund Carpenter's description in *Eskimo* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1964) of ice space, and of the igloo: "There is no middle distance, no perspective, no outline, nothing the eye can cling to except thousands of smokey plumes of snow . . . a land without bottom or edge . . . a labyrinth alive with the movements of crowded people. No flat static walls arrest the ear or eye . . . and the eye can glance through here, past there" (no pagination).

4. These two aspects, the encompassing element and the center, figure in Jean-Pierre Vernant's analysis of space in Anaximander, in *Mythe et pensée chez les Grecs* (Paris: Maspero, 1971–74), vol. 1, part III. From another perspective, the entire history of the desert concerns the possibility of its becoming the encompassing element, and also of being repelled, rejected by the center, as though in an inversion of movement. In a phenomenology of religion like that of Van der Leeuw, the *nomos* itself does indeed appear as the encompassing-limit or ground, and also as that which is repelled, excluded, in a centrifugal movement.

5. Whatever interactions there may be, the "art of the steppes" had a specificity that was communicated to the migrating Germans; in spite of his many reservations about nomad culture, Rene Grousset makes this point in *The Empire of the Steppes*, trans. Naomi Walford (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1970), pp. 11–25. He notes the irreducibility of Scythian art to Assyrian art, Sarmatian art to Persian art, and Hunnic art to Chinese art. He even points out that the art of the steppes influenced more than it borrowed (see in particular the question of Ordos art and its relations to China).

6. On this question of light and color, in particular in Byzantine art, see Henri Maldiney, *Regard, parole, espace*, pp. 203ff., 239ff.

7. The correlation, "haptic-close-abstract," was already suggested by Riegl. But it was Worringer who developed the theme of the abstract line. Although he conceives of it essentially in its Egyptian form, he describes a second form in which the abstract assumes an intense life and an expressionist value, all the while remaining inorganic; see *Abstraction and Empathy*, ch. 5, and especially *Form in Gothic* (London: Putnam's and Sons, 1927), pp. 38–55.

8. André Leroi-Gourhan, *Le geste et la parole* (Paris: Albin Michel, 1964–1965), 2 vols. *Technique et langage*, 1: 263ff.; *La mémoire et les rythmes*, 2: 219f. ("Rhythmic marks are anterior to explicit figures"). Worringer's position is very ambiguous; thinking that prehistoric art is fundamentally figurative, he excludes it from art, on the same grounds as he excludes the "scribblings of a child" (*Abstraction and Empathy*, pp. 51–55). Then he advances the hypothesis that the cave dwellers were the "ultimate result" of a series he says began with the abstract (p. 130). But would not such a hypothesis force Worringer to revise his conception of the abstract, and to cease identifying it with Egyptian geometricism?

9. Worringer establishes an opposition between the power of repetition, which is mechanical, multiplying, and without fixed orientation, and the force of symmetry, which is organic, additive, oriented, and centered. He sees this as the fundamental difference between Gothic ornamentation and Greek or classical ornamentation; see *Form in Gothic*, pp. 53–55 ("The Ceaseless Melody of the Northern Line"). In a fine book, *Esthétiques d'Orient et d'Occident* (Paris: E. Leroux, 1937), Laura Morgenstern develops a particular example, distinguishing the "symmetrical antithetism" of Sassanid Persian art from the "disjointed antithetism" of the art of the proto-Iranian nomads (Sarmatians). Many authors, however, have stressed the centered and symmetrical motifs in barbarian or nomad art. Worringer anticipated this objection: "Instead of the regular and invariably geometrical star or rosette or similar restful forms, in the North we find the revolving wheel, the turbine or the so-called sun wheel, all designs which express violent movement. Moreover, the movement is peripheral and not radial" (*Form in Gothic*, p. 54). The history of technology confirms the importance of the turbine in the life of the nomads. In another, bio-aesthetic, context, Gabriel Tarde opposes repetition as indefinite potential (*puissance*) to symmetry as limitation. With symmetry, life constituted an organism for itself, taking a star-shaped or reflected, infolded form (the radiata and mollusks). It is true that in doing so it unleashed another type of repetition, external reproduction; see *L'opposition universelle* (Paris: Alcan, 1897).

10. Translator's note: Worringer, *Abstraction and Empathy*, p. 33.

11. Translator's note: Worringer, *Abstraction and Empathy*, p. 42.

12. On all these points, see Georges Charriere's very intuitive book, *Scythian Art* (New York: Alpine Fine Arts Collection, 1979), which includes a great number of reproductions. It is doubtless René Grousset who has most effectively emphasized "slowness" as a dramatic pole of nomad art; see *The Empire of the Steppes*, pp. 13–14.

13. Dora Vallier, in her preface to the French translation of *Abstraction and Empathy* (*Abstraction et Einfuhlung* [Paris: Klincksieck, 1978]), is right to note Worringer and Kandinsky's independence from one another, and the differences between the problems they were addressing. However, she maintains that there is still convergence and resonance between them. In a sense, all art is abstract, with the figurative springing from certain types of abstraction. But in another sense, since there are very different types of lines (Egyptian-geometrical, Greek-organic, Gothic-vital, etc.), the question then becomes one of determining which line remains abstract, or realizes abstraction as such. It is doubtful that it is the geometrical line, since it still draws a figure, even though an abstract and nonrepresentative one. Rather, the ab-

stract line is that defined by Michael Fried in relation to certain works by Pollock: multidirectional, with neither inside nor outside, form nor background, delimiting nothing, describing no contour, passing between spots or points, filling a smooth space, stirring up a close-lying haptic visual matter that "both invites the act of seeing on the part of the spectator yet gives his eye nowhere the rest once and for all" (*Three American Painters* [Cambridge, Mass.: Fogg Art Museum, 1965], p. 14). In Kandinsky himself, abstraction is realized not so much by geometrical structures as by lines of march or transit that seem to recall Mongolian nomadic motifs.

## *20. Cinema and Space: The Frame*

1. See P. Pasolini, *L'Expérience hérétique,* pp. 263–265.

2. Noël Burch, *Praxis du cinéma,* p. 86: on the black or white screen, when it no longer simply serves as "punctuation" but takes on a "structural value."

3. Claude Ollier, "Souvenirs 'écran,'" in *Cahiers du Cinéma,* p. 88. It is this which Pasolini analyzed as "obsessive framing" in Antonioni (*L'Expérience hérétique,* p. 148).

4. Dominique Villain, in an unpublished work which includes interviews with cameramen (*cadreurs*), analyzes these two conceptions of framing: *Le Cadrage cinématographique.*

5. Lotte Eisner, *L'Écran démoniaque* (Paris: Ramsay, 1985), p. 124. Translated as *The Haunted Screen* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969).

6. Cf. Bouvier and Leutrat, "Nosferatu," in *Cahiers du cinéma,* pp. 75–76.

7. Jean Mitry, *Esthétique et psychologie du cinéma* (Paris: Editions Universitaires, 1990), vol. 2, pp. 78–79.

8. Pascal Bonitzer, "Décadrage," in *Cahiers du cinéma,* 284 (January 1978).

9. R. Bresson, *Notes on Cinematography,* trans. Jonathan Griffin (New York: Urizen 1977), p. 28: "A sound must never come to the help of an image, nor an image to the help of a sound. . . . Image and sound must not support each other, but must work each in turn through *a sort of relay.*"

10. The most systematic study of the out-of-field was made by Noël Burch, precisely in relation to Renoir's *Nana* (*Une Praxis du cinéma,* (Paris: Gallimard, 1986), pp. 30–51). And it is from this point of view that Jean Narboni contrasts Hitchcock and Renoir (*Hitchcock,* "Visages d'Hitchcock," p. 37). But, as Narboni recalls, the cinematographic frame is always a mask in Bazin's sense: this is because Hitchcock's closed framing also has its out-of-field, although in a completely different way from Renoir (not a "space which is continuous and homogeneous with that of the screen" but an "off-space" "which is discontinuous and heterogeneous to that of the screen," which defines virtualities).

11. Bergson developed all these points in *Creative Evolution,* trans. Arthur Mitchell (New York: Holt, 1911), Ch. 1. On the "tenuous thread," cf. p. 11.

12. Bonitzer objects to Burch's view that there is no "becoming-field of the out-of-field" and that the out-of-field remains imaginary, even when it is actualized by the effect of a continuity shot: something always remains out-of-field, and according to Bonitzer it is the camera itself, which can appear on its own account, but by introducing a new duality into the image (*Le regard et la voix,* p. 17). These remarks of

Bonitzer seem to us to be solidly based. But we believe that there is an internal duality in the out-of-field itself which does not merely relate to the working implement.

13. Dreyer, quoted by Maurice Drouzy, *Carl Th. Dreyer né Nilsson Essai de psychocritique* (Paris: Cerf, 1982), p. 353.

## *21. Cinema and Time*

1. Paul Rozenberg sees in this the essence of English romanticism. See his *Le romantisme anglais* (Paris: Larousse).

2. J.M.G. LeClezio, "The Extra-Terrestrial," in "Fellini," *L'Arc*, 45, p. 28.

3. On Marxist criticism on the evolution of neo-realism and its characters, cf. *Le néo-réalisme, Études cinématographiques*, p. 102. And on Marxist criticism in Japan, especially against Ozu, cf. Noël Burch, *Une Praxis du cinéma*, p. 283. It must be emphasized that in France the new wave, in its visionary aspect, was deeply understood by Sadoul.

4. Cf. *Jean-Luc Godard par Jean-Luc Godard*, p. 392.

5. Marc Chevrie analyzes Jean-Pierre Leaud's playing as "medium" in terms close to Blanchot's (*Cahiers du cinéma*, 351 (September 1983): 31–33).

6. Criticism of metaphor is equally present in the new wave with Godard and in the new novel with Robbe-Grillet (*Pour un nouveau roman*). It is true that, more recently, Godard has taken inspiration from a metaphorical form, for instance, in the case of *Passion:* "The knights are metaphors for the bosses" (*Le Monde*, 27 May 1982), but, as we shall see, this form draws on a genetic and chronological analysis of the image, much more than on a synthesis or comparison of images.

7. D. H. Lawrence wrote an important piece in support of the image and against clichés in relation to Cézanne. He shows how parody is not a solution; and neither is the pure optical image, with its voids and disconnections. According to him, it is in the still lifes that Cézanne wins his battle gainst chichés, rather than in the portraits and landscapes ("Introduction to These Paintings," *Phoenix*, ed. D. McDonald (London: Heinemann, 1936). We have seen how the same remarks applied to Ozu.

8. "Lectosign" refers to the Greek *lekton* or Latin *dictum*, which indicates what is expressed in a proposition independent of the relationship of this to its object. Similarly for the image when it is captured intrinsically, independent of its relationship with a supposedly external object.

9. Text of Antonioni's quoted by Pierre Leprohon, *Antonioni* (Paris: Seghers), p. 103: "Now that we have today eliminated the problem of the bicycle (I am using a metaphor, try to understand beyond my words), it is important to see what there is in the spirit and heart of this man whose bicycle has been stolen, how he has adapted, what has stayed with him out of all his past experiences of the war, the post-war and everything that has happened in our country." (See also the text on Eros sick, pp. 104–6.)

10. Noël Burch is one of the first critics to have shown that the cinematographic image ought to be read no less than seen and heard; and this in connection with Ozu

(*Pour un observateur lointain* (Paris: Gallimard, 1982), p. 175). But already in *Praxis du cinema* Burch showed how *Story of a Love Affair* inaugurated a new relation between story and action, and gave the camera an "autonomy," rather like that of a reading, pp. 112–18; on the "continuity grasped through discrepancy," see p. 47.

## *22. Painting and Sensation*

1. Henri Maldiney, *Regard parole espace* (Lausanne: Éditions l'Age d'Homme, 1973), p. 136. Phenomenologists like Maldiney and Merleau-Ponty see Cézanne as the painter par excellence. They analyze, in fact, sensation or rather "sensing," not only in terms of relating sensible qualities to an identifiable object (figurative movement), but also from the point of view of each quality constituting a field which stands by itself without ceasing to interfere with the other's ("pathetic" moment). Hegel's phenomenology short-circuits this aspect of sensation, which, nonetheless, is the basis of every possible aesthetics. See Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1962), pp. 207–42; Maldiney, *Regard parole espace*, 124–208.

2. D. H. Lawrence, "Introduction to These Paintings," in *Phoenix*, pp. 551–84.

3. *Francis Bacon. Interviewed by David Sylvester* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1975), p. 18.

4. Ibid., p. 63.

5. Ibid., p. 65.

6. All these themes are constantly present in *Francis Bacon. Interviewed by David Sylvester.*

7. Ibid., p. 58.

8. Ibid., pp. 83–84.

9. Ibid., p. 58 ("coagulation of non-representational marks").

10. Ibid., pp. 76–81 (see also p. 47: "I have never tried to be horrific").

11. Ibid., p. 43. Bacon seems to rebel against psychoanalytic suggestions; Sylvester, in another context, tells him that "the Pope is *il Papa*"; Bacon answers politely: "Well, I certainly have never thought of it in that way" (p. 71). For a more elaborate, psychoanalytic interpretation of Bacon's paintings, see Didier Anjeu, *Le Corps de L'Autre* (Paris: Gallimard), pp. 333–40.

12. *Francis Bacon. Interviewed by David Sylvester*, pp. 75–76, 108.

13. On sensation and rhythm, systole and diastole (and on Cézanne's pages on them, see *Regard Parole Espace*, pp. 147–172.

14. *Francis Bacon. Interviewed by David Sylvester*, p. 74.

## *23. The Diagram*

1. This is very important text of Bacon taken from *Francis Bacon. Interviewed by David Sylvester*, p. 56. "FB: Well, very often the involuntary marks are much more deeply suggestive than others, and those are the moments when you feel that anything can happen. DS: You feel it while you're making those marks: FB: No, the marks are made, and you survey the thing like you would a sort of graph. And you

see within this graph the possibilities of all types of fact being planted. This is a difficult thing; I'm expressing it badly. But you see, for instance, if you think of a portrait, you maybe at one time have put the mouth somewhere, but you suddenly see through this graph that the mouth could go right across the face. And in a way you would love to be able in a portrait to make a Sahara of the appearance—to make it so like, yet seeming to have the distances of the Sahara." In another passage, Bacon explains that, when he makes a portrait, he often looks at photographs which have nothing to do with the model—for example, a photograph of a rhinoceros for the texture of the skin (ibid., p. 32).

2. Ibid., p. 90.

3. On the possibility that involuntary marks offer nothing and spoil the painting, leading it "into a kind of marshland, see ibid, 90.

4. See ibid., p. 56: "And you see within this graph the possibilities of all types of fact." Wittgenstein invoked a diagrammatic form in order to express the "possibilities of fact" in logic.

5. Ibid., p. 56.

6. Henri Maldiney compares, in this respect, Cézanne and Klee. See *Regard parole espace*, pp. 149–51.

7. This tendency to eliminate the manual has always been present in painting, in the sense that we say about a certain work that "we no longer feel the hand." Focillon analyzes this tendency—"ascetic frugality"—which reaches its apex in abstract painting. See *Vie des Formes, suivi de l'Éloge de la Main* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1934), 5th ed., pp. 118–19. But, as Focillon says, the hand feels itself all the same. In order to distinguish a real from a false Mondrian, Georg Schmidt used to appeal to the intersection of the two black sides of a square, or to the disposition of the layers of color along right angles (see *Mondrian,* Réunion des Musées Nationaux, p. 148).

8. See Elie Faure's famous text on Velasquez, *Histoire de l'Art. L'Art Moderne 1* (Paris: Gallimard, 1988), pp. 167–77.

9. On these new blind spaces, see Christian Bonnefoi's analyses on Ryman in Christian Bonnefoi's "A propos de la destruction de l'entité de surface," *Macula,* 3–4 (1978): 163–66. For Yves-Alain Bois' analyses of Bonnefoi see Yves-Alain Bois, "Le futur antérieur," *Macula,* 5–6 (1979): 229–33.

10. Clement Greenberg (*Art and Culture: Critical Essays* [Boston: Beacon Press, 1961]) and Michael Fried ("Trois Peintres Américains," in *Peindre: Revue d'Esthétique* [Paris: Union Générale d'Editions]) have been the first to analyze the spaces of Pollock, Morris Louis, Newman, Noland, etc., and to define them in terms of "strict opticality." Undoubtedly, the question for these critics was how to break away from the extraaesthetic criteria that Harold Rosenberg had invoked, as he baptized action painting. They reminded us that Pollock's words—although "modern"—are, first and foremost, tableaus, and as such answerable to formal criteria. The question, though, is to find out whether opticality is the right criterion for these works. It seems that Fried entertains doubts but that he abandons them too quickly (see pp. 283–87). The term *action painting* can be aesthetically correct.

11. Greenberg has noted very forcefully the importance of this abandonment of the easel, especially in Pollock. He emphasizes, in this context, the "Gothic" theme,

without giving it, though, the full meaning that the term can assume with respect to Worringer's analyses (one of Pollock's paintings is called *Gothic*); it seems that Greenberg sees no alternative other than that between "painting with easel" and "mural painting" (it seems to us that this would rather apply to the case of Mondrian). See in *Macula*, 2, "Jackson Pollock's File."

12. Bacon often criticizes abstraction for staying "at only one level" and for spoiling the "tension" (*Francis Bacon. Interviewed by David Sylvester*, p. 60). About Marcel Duchamp, Bacon says that he admires him more for his attitude and less for his painting; in fact, his painting strikes Bacon as symbolics or "shorthand figuration" (ibid., p. 105).

13. Ibid., p. 94: "I hate that kind of sloppy sort of Central European painting; it's one of the reasons I don't really like abstract expressionism"; see also p. 61: "I think Michaux is a very, very intelligent and conscious man. . . . And I think that he has made the best tachist or free marks that have been made. I think he is much better in that way, in making marks, than Jackson Pollock."

14. See Gregory Bateson, "Why Do Things have Outlines?" in *Steps to an Ecology of Mind* (San Francisco: Chandez, 1972), pp. 27–32. What used to make Blake mad, incensed, or furious, was for people to think of him as mad; but it was also because of "some artists who paint as if things did not have contours." He used to call them "the slobbering school."

15. *Francis Bacon. Interviewed by David Sylvester*, p. 94: "You would never end a painting by suddenly throwing something at it. Or would you?—Oh yes. In that recent triptych, on the shoulder of the figure being sick into the basin, there's like a whip of white paint that goes like that. Well, I did that at the very last moment, and I simply left it."

## *24. Music and Ritornello*

1. See Fernand Deligny, "Voix et voir," *Recherches*, 8 (April 1975), on the way in which, among autistic children, a "line of drift" deviates from the customary path and begins to "vibrate," "toss about," "yaw."

2. Paul Klee, *On Modern Art*, trans. Paul Findlay, intro. Herbert Reed (London: Faber, 1966), p. 43 (translation modified to agree with the French version cited by the authors). See Henri Maldiney's comments in *Regarde parole espace* (Lausanne: L'Age d'homme, 1973), pp. 149–51.

3. On the musical nome, the ethos, and the ground or land, notably in polyphony, see Joseph Samson in *Historie de la musique*, ed. Roland Manuel (Paris: Gallimard, 1977), vol. 2, pp. 1168–72. One may also refer to the role in Arab music of the "maqam," which is both a modal type and a melodic formula; see Simon Jargy, *La musique arabe* (Paris: PUF, 1971), pp. 55ff.

## *26. On the Line*

1. Heinrich von Kleist, *Uber das Marionettentheater: Aufsätze und Anekdoten* (Frankfurt a.M.: Ingel, 1980).

2. F. Scott Fitzgerald, *The Crack-Up, with Other Pieces and Stories* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1965).

3. S. Kierkegaard, *Fear and Trembling,* trans. Walter Lowrie (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968). This also shows the way in which Kierkegaard, in relation to movement, sketches a series of scripts that already belong to the cinema.

4. Fernand Deligny, "Cahiers de l'immuable," *Recherches* 18 (Paris: Recherches, 1975).

5. Pierrette Fleutiaux, *Histoire du gouffre et de la lunette* (Paris: Julliard, 1976).

## *27. Capitalism*

1. Karl Marx, "Introduction to the Critique of Political Economy," in *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy,* trans. N. I. Stone (Chicago: Charles H. Kerr, 1904), p. 298 (translation modified).

2. On the historical independence of the two series, and their "encounter," see Etienne Balibar in Althusser and Balibar, *Lire le Capital,* vol. 2 (Paris: Maspero, 1968), pp. 286–89.

3. See Arghiri Emmanuel, *Unequal Exchange: A Study of the Imperialism of Trade* (New York: Monthly Review Books, 1972), pp. 13–14, and the following passage he cites from Paul Sweezy, *The Theory of Capitalist Development* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1942), p. 338: "'Capital' is not simply another name for means of production; it is means of production reduced to a qualitatively homogeneous and quantitatively measurable fund of value" (whence the equalization of profit). In his analysis of the primitive accumulation of capital, Maurice Dobb (*Studies in the Development of Capitalism,* rev. ed. [New York: International Publishers, 1964], pp. 177–86) effectively demonstrates that primitive accumulation bears not on the means of production but on "rights or titles to wealth" (p. 177; modified to agree with the French translation cited by the authors), which, depending on the circumstances, are convertible into means of production.

4. See the distinction certain jurists make between Roman, "topical," law, and modern, "axiomatic," law of the civil-code type. We may define certain fundamental ways in which the French Civil Code is closer to an axiomatic than to a code: (1) the predominance of the enunciative form over the imperative and over affective formulas (damnation, exhortation, admonishment, etc.); (2) the code's pretension that it forms a complete and saturated rational system; (3) but at the same time the relative independence of the propositions, which permit axioms to be added. On these aspects, see Jean Ray, *Essai sur la structure logique du code civil français* (Paris: Alcan, 1926). It has been established that the systematization of Roman law took place very late, in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.

5. Translator's note: Marx, *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844,* ed. and intro. Dirk J. Struik, trans. Martin Mulligan (New York: International Publishers, 1964), p. 129.

6. See Jean Saint-Geours, *Pouvoir et finance* (Paris: Fayard, 1979). Saint-Geours is one of the best analysts of the monetary system, as well as of "private-public" mixes in the modern economy.

7. On the tendency toward the elimination of ground rent in capitalism, see Samir Amin and Kostas Vergopoulos, *La question paysanne et le capitalisme* (Paris: Éditions Anthropos, 1974). Amin analyzes the reasons why ground rent and rent of mines keep or assume a present-day meaning in the peripheral regions, although in different ways; see *The Law of Value and Historical Materialism,* trans. Brian Pearce (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1978), chs. 4 and 6.

8. Introductory books on the axiomatic method emphasize a certain number of problems. For example, see Robert Blanché's fine book, *L'axiomatique* (Paris: PUF, 1959) (abridged and translated by G. B. Keene as *Axiomatics* [New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1962]). There is first of all the question of the respective independence of the axioms, and whether or not the system is saturated, or "strongly complete" (secs. 14 and 15). Second, there is the question of "models of realization," their heterogeneity, but also their isomorphy in relation to the axiomatic system (sec. 12). Then there is the possibility of a polymorphy of models, not only in a nonsaturated system, but even in a saturated axiomatic (secs. 12, 15, and 26). Then, once again, there is the question of the "undecidable propositions" an axiomatic confronts (sec. 20). Finally, there is the question of "power," by which nondemonstrable infinite sets exceed the axiomatic (sec. 26 and "the power of the continuum"). The comparison of politics to an axiomatic is based on all of these aspects.

9. Lewis Mumford, "The First Megamachine," *Diogenes,* 55 (July–September 1966), p. 3 (translation modified to agree with the French translation cited by the authors).

10. Ergonomics distinguishes between "human-machine" systems (or work posts) and "humans-machines" systems (communicational aggregates composed of human and nonhuman elements). But this is not only a difference of degree; the second point of view is not a generalization of the first: "The notion of information loses its anthropocentric aspect," and the problems are not of adaptation but of the choice of a human or nonhuman element depending on the case. See Maurice de Montmollin, *Les systèmes hommes-machines* (Paris: PUF, 1967). The issue is no longer to adapt, even under violence, but to localize: where is your place? Even handicaps can be made useful, instead of being corrected or compensated for. A deaf-mute can be an essential part of a "humans-machines" communicational system.

11. One of the basic themes of science fiction is to show how machinic enslavement combines with processes of subjection, but exceeds and differs from them, performing a qualitative leap. Take Ray Bradbury: television not as an instrument located at the center of the house, but as forming the walls of the house.

12. See Lewis Mumford, *The Pentagon of Power,* vol. 2 of *The Myth of the Machines* (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1970), pp. 236–360 (a comparison of the "old megamachine" and the modern one; despite writing, the old megamachine notably suffered from difficulties in "communication").

13. Marx, *Manuscripts of 1844,* p. 129.

## *28. The Three Aspects of Culture*

1. Friedrich Nietzsche, *Daybreak,* trans. by R. J. Hollingdale (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982); hereafter *D.*

2. Friedrich Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil,* trans. R. J. Hollingdale (New York: Penguin, 1973); hereafter *BGE.*

3. Friedrich Nietzsche, *On the Genealogy of Morals,* trans. by Walter Kaufmann and R. J. Hollingdale (New York: Random House, 1967); hereafter *GM.*

4. Friedrich Nietzsche, *Ecce Homo,* trans by Walter Kaufmann (New York: Random House, 1967).

5. *GM* II 1: On this point the resemblance between Freud and Nietzsche is confirmed. Freud attributes verbal traces to the preconscious, these are distinct from the mnemonic traces peculiar to the unconscious system. This distinction permits him to reply to the question "How to render repressed elements (pre-)conscious?" The reply is: "By restoring these intermediary preconscious elements which are verbal memories." Nietzsche's question would be stated in this way: how is it possible to "act" reactive forces?

6. *GM* II 8, p. 70: It was in the debtor-creditor relationship "that one person first encountered another person, that one person first *measured himself* against another."

7. *GM* II 6, pp. 65–66: "Whoever clumsily interposes the concept of 'revenge' does not enhance his insight into the matter but further veils and darkens it (for revenge merely leads us back to the same problem: 'how can making suffer constitute a compensation?')." This is what is lacking in the majority of theories: showing from what point of view "making suffer" gives pleasure.

8. *GM* II 11, p. 75: "The law represents on earth . . . the struggle against the reactive feelings, the war conducted against them on the part of the active and aggressive powers."

9. *GM* II 10, p. 73: Justice "ends, as does every good thing on earth, by *overcoming itself.*"

10. Friedrich Nietzsche, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra,* trans. by R. J. Hollingdale (New York: Penguin Books, 1961); hereafter *Z.*

11. Friedrich Nietzsche, "Schopenhauer as Educator," trans. by James W. Hillesheim and Malcolm R. Simpson (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1965), chap. 6—Nietzsche explains the diverting of culture by invoking the "three egoisms," the egoism of *acquirers,* the egoism of the *State,* the egoism of *science.*

12. Friedrich Nietzsche, *Untimely Meditations,* trans. by R. J. Hollingdale (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983).

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# *Index*