Inspirations

Thinking about the conception of this project, I am drawn back to a very particular point in my graduate studies at the New School for Social Research, to a moment which has remained with me as the years have progressed and my philosophical journey has crystallised. That moment was during a lecture given by my professor, Claudia Baracchi, whom I had come to admire for her intellectual elegance, insight, and inspiration concerning Plato's *Ion*. Socrates is questioning Ion, the rhapsode, about the nature of his skill in interpreting poetry and, by extension, the source of the poet's gift – whether it be wisdom or inspiration. Socrates then presents an image of the nature of inspiration:

> It's a divine power that moves you, as a 'Magnetic' stone moves iron rings. (That's what Euripides called it; most people call it 'Heraclian'.) This stone not only pulls those rings, if they're iron, it also puts power in the rings, so that they in turn can do just what the stone does – pull other rings – so that there's sometimes a very long chain of iron pieces and rings hanging from one another. And the power in all of them depends on this stone. In the same way, the Muse makes some people inspired herself, and then through those who are inspired a chain of other enthusiasts is suspended.[1]

Inspiration extends from the divine through the poet to the listener herself, a vibratory chain that reaches to the very core of one's being. Thinking about certain melodies that had haunted me, or words that had moved me, this image seemed to ring true, as an image that encompassed more than just the poetic. I began to think of this as an image of my experience of philosophy. Of course, this dialogue is meant to separate the task of the poet and the philosopher. The poet's poeticising is no art, in the sense of *technē* as knowledge about the nature of that which is spoken, but an affective connection, a channelling of elusive and vertiginous elements and forces. Yet, even

maintaining that philosophy is about sober, rational discourse and knowledge, what is it that sets one on the path in the first place, to pick up with one philosopher over another? I experienced this vibratory force when I read Heidegger for the first time, and then, again, with Deleuze. I have never been able to give up either and have found myself constantly reading and thinking them together. I am inspired by both and these connections have very literally served to amplify my own voice, which has resulted in the work that is before you. This book began as a vague intuition – as I read Heidegger and Deleuze, I began to see subtle parallels, linkages that at first seemed subterranean and murky, but I became more and more convinced that the paths of these two monumental thinkers were in fact crossing.

Whether this was altogether conscious on Deleuze's part was not so much the issue for me. Of course, I have not been in the majority in this opinion. Few commentators have attempted to link the two in a positive or productive way, Miguel De Beistegui's *Truth and Genesis* being a notable exception.

I became a *bricoleur*, piecing together concepts and lines of thought, following Deleuze's twists of Heideggerian language, seeking out direct and indirect references to Heidegger in Deleuze's texts. One can find a few direct references to Heidegger, most notably in *Difference and Repetition*, where Deleuze offers a six point account of what he judges to be Heidegger's innovations, and, worth noting, expresses a healthy appreciation for his work. My intuition was that Deleuze reads Heidegger as a companion on a particular journey, but one who had just veered off the path too soon, or, as Deleuze says in *What is Philosophy?*, who got lost in the necessarily blinds paths of philosophising into the future (QP, 104/109). In any case, I became more and more convinced that Heidegger was of subterranean important for Deleuze's thought, and that their philosophical rings intersected – as was the ringing in my own ears. So, I attuned my reading of the two to this register. There are points of intersection that go beyond any explicit citation on the part of Deleuze: his privileging of ungrounding and the unthought that are clearly tied to a Heideggerian problematic; their mutual determination to theorise being as event; and the vestige of the generative and irreducible tension between earth and world in the movement of territorialisation and deterritorialisation. In many cases, the extension of this project relies on an imaginative projection on my part. Their mutual fascination with Paul Klee is largely unthematised in their own work, yet I see Klee as providing a unique window into their philosophical

worlds, especially in terms of what remains to be thought. I was delighted to discover a short essay on Alfred Jarry where Deleuze suggests that pataphysics opens the way for phenomenology (ID, 105/74) – and even more intrigued to find that Deleuze had once suggested that Jarry was 'the French poet who not only understood but also preceded Heidegger',[2] especially given that Jarry was known for a poetic form constructed as a mélange of languages and even slang. One can imagine my excitement to find that these two shared an intellectual friend, Kostos Axelos, who acted as interpreter and translator for Heidegger and was both a publisher for Deleuze and part of his intimate circle of friends for a time. Metaphorically, what I was discovering was a synaesthesia of the myriad Heideggerian and Deleuzian senses and affects. The final impetus for this project came when reading Deleuze's *What is Philosophy?*, where Deleuze directly addresses Heidegger's philosophical and political legacy, the gist of which is encapsulated in this line: 'He got the wrong

people, earth, and blood' (QP, 104/109). It is because of the intuitive engagement, which I have just outlined, that I came to these words perhaps differently than most. For those who read Deleuze as having already dismissed phenomenology and moved past Heidegger (of which there are many), these words are a straightforward indictment and dismissal of the German philosopher. But for me, there was something more. First of all, Deleuze goes on to suggest the features of a people-to-come, indicating that he supports the general task of theorising this relationship: 'It is the double-becoming that constitutes the people to come and the new earth. The philosopher must become nonphilosopher so that nonphilosophy becomes the earth and people of philosophy' (QP, 105/109). So, I thought, it must be a matter of understanding what Deleuze means by 'the wrong people, earth and blood'. Of course, the simple answer is that he is merely reiterating the numerous criticisms of Heidegger's involvement in National Socialism, but, as any reader of Heidegger is aware, these issues are not just ontic considerations, and Deleuze would surely have known this. It has been my claim that the wrong earth and wrong people concern ontology and the political as such. Further, given that Deleuze's considerations of a people-to-come are almost always articulated with respect to the potential of art, there is a direct parallel with Heidegger's triadic gathering of earth, art, and a people that animates Deleuze's work. It is this path that I have begun to trace in this book.

This book is a concrescence of these resounding reverberations

between the two thinkers. There are organisational elements within the book that seek to preserve the space of these encounters, zones of proximity which, as a nod to yet another level of affinity in their work, I have called plateaus – these interstices exist between some of the chapters and major sections of the book, revealing the emergence of a place (*milieu*) in between Heidegger and Deleuze that inaugurates new lines of thought (and flight).

> For the poet is a light and winged and holy thing, and there is no inven- tion in him until he becomes inspired and goes out of his mind.[3]

Between Heidegger and Deleuze, for whom philosophy and art are partners in the elucidation of being and becoming, we can think Socrates' words anew, as offering sustenance for the future of thought. Whether from the holy named by the poet or the violent otherness of the dark precursor, we need more inspiration in our philosophising. In order to reinvent philosophy (Heidegger's *anderen Anfang*; Deleuze's *recommencement*), we must heed the forces of non-philosophy (of art and externality) in order that our philosophical sense may become otherwise.

Contemplating the nature of my inspiration, its plural sources, and

the particular focus on the question of a people – which for Heidegger and Deleuze engages two levels of inquiry: not only who the 'we' includes but who 'we', as human beings, are – led me to question the presentation of my own discourse and to consider that thinking, which many consider a solitary pursuit, is, on multiple levels, always a communal event. Though Heidegger and Deleuze differ in their understanding of the status of history – as the inevitable unfolding of the destiny of being or as the outcome of contingent encounters which then serve as a non-linear backdrop that can potentially be animated for creative repetitions – each is acutely aware of the inflection of the present with the voices of the past. Thinking is, at least in part, an invocation of the accumulations and transformations of our past – the *we* of history, the *we* of past ideas, language and events. Philosophy has developed around this question of inheritance, in many ways thanks to Heidegger. Yet, if the discussion of inspiration reveals anything, it is also that thinking is more than this as well. François Zourabichvili maintains that Deleuze is both the closest and the farthest away from Heidegger with regard to this issue.[4] Both agree that thinking concerns a possibility rather than a capacity, and it is not a foregone conclusion that we have even begun to think, yet they differ with respect to the guarantee of this possibility: 'Whence

the metaphors of the gift are substituted for those of violence' (DR, 188n1/321n11). In one sense, I have outlined a process of selection, of figures and paths that are tangentially related to both figures, and the mere fact of selection introduces the element of randomness into the equation. Yet, inspiration also requires attention to the outside that has always already entered in.

Dramatising the fact that this project is wholly a collective enunciation, writing on Heidegger and Deleuze has been an imaginative process in which I am both a creator and simply a conduit for these generative spaces. This is a situation that Deleuze openly embraces and seeks to generate in his own writing – the writing between himself and others that he conceptualises as free indirect discourse (*discours indirect libre*), as a way of lending his voice to the other which results in being confounded with its inverse.[5] Deleuze quite literally displaces the image of the singularity of authorship, and, by proxy, thinking, by writing with Félix Guattari, but his previous method of writing also engages thinkers as more than mere objects of investigation, developing a discourse which, by borrowing the voice of the other, highlights the anonymity and plurality in thinking itself. It is, quite self-consciously, for all of these reasons that the material henceforth is presented in the voice of *we* rather than *I*.

Consequently, we have simultaneously opened up one of the animating paradoxes of the book: the question of who it is that we let in and how, a question which is both opened and foreclosed by a

necessary violation of the space of thinking. The question not only concerns our thinking, but very real decisions concerning politics, where it is linked with the problem of foundational violence with respect to nationhood, peoples and communities. Now, we seek to address the question of the 'we' beyond our own personal commitments, by linking this problematic to the multifaceted fabric of past and present negotiations surrounding the question of the 'we'.

In *The Postmodern Condition*, Lyotard presents the determination of the 'we' as the crucial political issue of our time, as it is connected to the consequent tyrannical solidification of certain types of knowledge and power. Specifically, discourses on the nature of a people serve as tools for the legitimisation of socio-political orders. Lyotard distinguishes modernity, as characteristic of any discourse that justifies itself with reference to a meta-discourse, from postmodernity, with its incredulity toward metanarratives and recognition that the utopian aspirations of high modernism are unrealisable.[6] In other words, the postmodern condition is characterised by a critical

awareness of how the language of origin and sameness legitimates power, oft-times eventuating real and horrific practices of exclu- sion and violence. Though it is uncontroversial to suggest that the majority of postmodern thinkers are attuned to issues of difference and otherness, our entrance into this conversation is specifically geared toward a compendium of thinkers who explicitly thematise forms of sociality that counter these paradigms by offering re-conceptualisations of community. This is a lineage that can be traced from George Bataille and includes Jean-Luc Nancy and Maurice Blanchot.[7] Generally, they seek to dispel the rhetoric of inclusion that surrounds 'community' and 'peoples', which has been used as political capital in global capitalist societies as well as communist regimes, and, likewise, has served as the underlying basis for utopian projects of restoring a lost social order or grand politics of solidarity. The suspicion and resistance toward the utopian projects of modernity rests upon the fact that these visions define the parameters of the perfect community from the outset; these parameters bound the community and set up a structure whereby the community is now merely a matter of production of the 'proper' elements and values, a matter of filling in an already determined ideal. Such grand utopian visions were always based on master narratives, and at best were revealed as a thinly veiled pretext for grasping power and control, at worst, when based on a narrative of national and racial purity, as leading to the dystopian reality of genocide.

In the name of establishing a new politics, a counter-politics, these thinkers engage with the problem of undoing social homogeneity, avoiding both fascism and communism, as well as a kind of philosophical totalitarianism stemming from longstanding ontological

commitments to the unity of being, the correspondence of being and the human, and the privileging of origin. These political ontologies rely on the underlying distinction between politics (*le politique*), which indicates the conventional, pre-established definitions of political institutions and aims, and the political (*la politique*), which attempts to think the place of the political and the various ways in which communities, or peoples, are established. The ontological turn in political theory is to a large extent indebted to Heidegger, who makes the distinction the foundation of his thinking of the *polis*,[8] an inheritance that is complicated because these thinkers are themselves critical of Heidegger, their work explicitly defined as post-Heideggerian.[9] It is into this discourse that we wish to insert our discussion of Heidegger and Deleuze, and, in what will be a

common refrain for this book, we begin in the middle – in this case, in the middle of a debate that has only mythological beginnings and conceivably no end. Given the existential condition of sociality, the question of who we are and how we identify with others is unavoidable, and the persistence of the question is fundamentally philosophical. Though the debate between grand political ideologies may have been dissolved, the resolution of politics in the triumph of democracy and individualism obfuscates one of the primary issues of politics itself – the 'who' of politics, how to think the 'we'.

Communities and Peoples: The Origins of the Question and the Question of Origins

The assumption of commonality or belonging as the basis of community is generally accepted as a logical outgrowth of the concept. Even contemporary accounts that consider the largesse and virtuality of communities, such as Anderson's 'imagined communities',[10] rely on such notions to provide the consistency and reason for drawing boundaries around peoples. Identification on the basis of commonality and belonging form part of our historical consciousness, often tied to the more primordial notion of autochthony, the view of peoples tied together through common birth or origin. Animating the cultural imagination, autochthony secures itself through myths of origin. For example, in the *Menexenus*, Plato advocates an autochthonous vision of the 'good birth' (*Eugeneia*). True inhabitants are descended from those born from the same earth, a situation that confers the Athenian privilege of citizenship, and those born from immigrants who are fated to always be outsiders, or Metics. The language of autochthony undergoes multiple transmutations through the tradition, especially under the aegis of Romanticist nostalgia for the return to lost origins, a classic nineteenth-century problem. Heidegger, though a recipient of the German Romanticist tradition,

does not fully accept the romanticist nostalgia for lost origin; he seeks to make of the people a philosophical issue, reading the possibility of becoming a people through his plans to reform philosophy and overcome metaphysics. Moreover, the employment of the language of autochthony in the service of conceptions of nationalism and peoplehood in twentieth-century politics reveals the inherent problems with beginning from such an exclusive demarcation of inclusion, a situation that complicates and renders quite precarious Heidegger's philosophical attempts to define a people.

the invention of a people

Inevitably, the philosophical question of what it means to be a people was exacerbated by the tumultuous events of the twentieth century, the clash of burgeoning nations and ideologies, the onslaught of modernity, the rise of the technological age, and, ultimately, the aftermath of the unthinkable events of the Second World War. The turn to political issues, largely those of culpability and responsibility, is an identifying mark of post-war philosophical thinking, marking an event envisaged as philosophy interrupted in the breach of the real. George Bataille, Maurice Blanchot and Jean-Luc Nancy, all of whom tacitly take the postmodern critique of meta-narrative as their starting point and are thus engaged in a kind of political ontology, address the problem through a reconsideration of notions of community and by examining the underlying presuppositions that inform consideration of group identification. The fascist insistence on homogeneity, national socialist obsession with purity, communist galvanisation of the proletariat, and capitalist hegemony all bear the marks of assumptions concerning solidarity, identity, and belonging that become the focus of explicit philosophical critique by these thinkers.

As the catalyst for future exchanges between Jean-Luc Nancy and Maurice Blanchot, George Bataille's fixation on the problem of community marks the proliferation of multiple exchanges concerning the pitfalls of totalisation and the paradoxical problem of conceiving community beyond commonality.[11] Throughout his life, Bataille made multiple attempts to conceive alternative communities that would be resistant to the homogenising forces of society. He was critical of traditional views of the community as something to be produced or completed, and he devised conceptual apparatuses to dismantle or break apart the enclosure of such understandings. Bataille's reasons for contesting the characteristics of homogeneity and totality were based on several factors: first, such views, enshrined in community, actually work against the possibility of communal life and communication between people. This is because the nature of human finitude, rather than delimiting the individual, opens the individual to its lack of totality and the excessiveness of existence. This excessiveness is also an insufficiency in that it always suggests a remainder and

incompleteness, hence the priority of heterogeneity over homogeneity. Bataille developed several concepts to counteract the unifying priorities of homogeneity and totality which seek to control and limit the excessiveness of being, many of which become central to Nancy and Blanchot's reworkings of the issue of community as well. Chief

among these were the notions of expenditure, inoperativity (*désoeuvrement*), and the unavowable (*inavouable*).

Implicit in Bataille's philosophic stance is the idea that there are other possible forms of life; that submitting to social norms and the dominant social order limits our ability to become and transform ourselves and our communities. Bataille experimented with community on three different occasions, with the 'secret' society *Acéphale*, the political group *Contre-Attaque*, and the *Collège de Sociologie*. Bataille's occupation was never merely theoretical, but always situated, an urgent response to the imminent horizon.[12] Bataille responds to the milieu of war and destruction within which he is inextricably bound as witness and participant, as well as the homogenising social forces seeking to shore up these ruptures. With the onset and progression of war, Bataille, evincing a general sense of abandonment,[13] proposes the necessity of thinking 'the community of those who have no community'.[14] This community operates beyond death, confronting finitude in terms of the ecstatic desire for the other. He associates the political disasters of war and decimation with the repression of expenditure and the violent inner passions necessary for maintaining the illusion of homogeneity and social order. Bataille seeks to release the violent inner passions, focusing on the visceral, the erotic, and the relation of society to the primeval. At the heart of his vision is the contestation of the desire for homogeneity. Such a contestation is possible through the experience of the insufficiency of existence. Insufficiency is the realisation of the dispossession of self, the fracture of totality which opens onto an outside and secures the possibility of the impossible community, a community of heterogeneity. Interestingly, though Deleuze initially advocates Bataille's zeal for erotic excess, he eventually comes to criticise Bataille, calling him the French pope of sad passions,[15] while nonetheless remaining passionately possessed by the thought of the outside.

Bataille's commitment to erotic excess does achieve a sense of communion as infinitely deferred and incomplete, but one that may be considered romanticised, intellectualised, and withdrawn from the political. The community of lovers, Bataille's paradigm, cannot be extended because of its ultimate singularity; Bataille even calls the world of lovers the oblivion of the world.[16] In *The Inoperative Community* (1983), Jean-Luc Nancy, focusing on Bataille's notion of inoperativity, develops a conception of community recalcitrant to the economy of production, seeking to reconcile Bataille's commitments

with political being. For Nancy the inoperativity of community

preserves the essence of infinite communication, the always 'to come' communication of the absent. Nancy develops an account of community that preserves the space necessary for communication through the marriage of the singularity of being and the clinamen, as the tendency of singular being to be inclined outside itself: 'There has to be an inclination or an inclining from one toward the other, of one by the other, or from one to the other.'[17] The singularity of being, '*a* body, *a* voice, *a* death', is derived from its exposure to these external relations; this singularity evades the absolute and resists the fusion that renders community a species of the absolute, or immanence, while its inclination always puts the being in question or puts the being of the question to others. Community is a perpetual, interminable negotiation of singularity and inclination.

Maurice Blanchot, who wrote *The Unavowable Community* in response to Nancy's 1983 article, emphasises the resistance of communicability inherent to Bataille's conception and focuses on instances of impossibility implied in the idea of the unavowable, as what cannot be affirmed or assimiliated. There is always a remainder, or excess, that cannot be assimilated by the social order and an element of transgressiveness within it that necessarily undoes this order.[18] From consideration of unavowability, Blanchot develops a notion of contestation at the heart of the relation between beings. Beings find their own being, as immanent completeness, contested by their encounters, thus opening the space for ex-istence: 'an existence shattered through and through, composing itself only as it decomposes itself constantly, violently and silently'.[19] In each case, what is crucial is the avoidance of immanence, the idea of completion or wholeness of the community. This will to essence/immanence makes community a work of death which utterly rejects movement, otherness and communication,[20] for which Nazism, and the horrors of the concentration camps, serve as the primary example as well as the logical conclusion of this metaphysics of the absolute.

Though often hailed as the product of post-Heideggerian thinkers, much of this work is indebted to the Heideggerian move toward human existence as primordially *mitdasein*, being-with-others. Such is Nancy's view that *Dasein* is always related to and with-others, wherein the individual is 'merely the residue of the experience of the dissolution of community'.[21] Conceiving of human existence as fundamentally *mit-sein*, rather than essentially individual and objectively present, allows us to understand human existence in its connectivity rather than through what separates individuals who will then

comprise some sort of after-the-fact aggregate. It is a philosophical issue for Heidegger because it is a matter of transformative thinking and fundamental ontology; these are what will lead to human beings acceding to their essence. Each of these thinkers tries to rethink the we outside of homogeneity and self-identity, while insisting on the ontological primacy of the we, in a truly Heideggerian vein. Ironically, it is also on Heidegger that much of the debate and criticism falls, as his own emphasis on *Volk*, even as a *future* people, comes under fire from this post-war perspective. Criticisms abound: *Mit-sein* as ontological condition falls to the ontic consideration of *the* (German) people; though Heidegger posits *mit-sein*, he does not fully flesh it out (Nancy's view); or Derrida's criticism that Heidegger's philosophy ultimately does not break from the metaphysical privilege of unity, as his predilection for gathering and belonging reveal. In fact, preoccupation with community can be read as an attempt to move away from the conceptually and politically laden *Volk* favoured by Heidegger.

We maintain that Deleuze continues this line of thinking (of being-with), and can be situated within this tradition of attempting to rethink the boundaries of community in the post-war climate. By situating Deleuze in this lineage, we are engaging the debate about the a-political nature of his work and arguing against those who would claim that it has no political efficacy on the grounds of its naive or irresponsible exaltation of creation and desire for its own sake, and that Deleuze is not concerned about real social conditions.[22] On the contrary, Deleuze's political ontology emerges from a refusal to break with (to seek transcendence from) the real conditions of deterritorialised flows of capital and consumption that threaten to close in upon us, eradicating our ability to think otherwise. His micropolitics hinges on the possibility of the 'minor', of formations that elude national boundaries, state hierarchy and identity, racial or otherwise, yet which operate from within, immanent to the system under scrutiny. Significantly, Deleuze maintains Heidegger's language of a 'people' rather than eschewing such language in favour of talk of 'community', which thinkers such as Nancy self-consciously adopt in order to avoid the negative associations with *völkisch* thinking. The question is why?

Granted, these thinkers of community are responding to the failure of communism, and of major ideologies in general, more directly than to the Heideggerian problematic, but this critique was prefigured by a prescient Heidegger, who presented the concern topologically, in terms of a Europe caught between the two pincers of American

capitalism and Bolshevism. Since the outgrowth of these two possibilities was the result of technological thinking predicated on a certain trajectory of philosophy and metaphysics, Heidegger looked forward to a recommencement (and alternative political formula) initiated out of philosophy. To be sure, Heidegger saw Germany, philosophically, as the centre of Europe. Thus, from this centre, thought needed to be reborn with a politics to follow. Becoming a people/political entity meant something like becoming historical, which meant, as well, becoming philosophical. All of this is laid out topologically in terms of returning to the earth, *autochthony*.

Here, there are some grounds for comparison. Deleuze revives the image of the pincers, in reference to a double articulation that composes the earth;[23] he also returns to philosophical topology, or geophilosophy. With regard to Heidegger's topology, Deleuze conducts the geological equivalent of Nietzsche's *Genealogy of Morals*,[24] de-centring the German origin, revealing the layers of the earth and its shifting surface as the non-teleo-historical beginnings of multiple conceptual personae. Of course, Deleuze's critique extends well beyond Heidegger, offering a model (in geophilosophy) that represents an alternative to the canonised trajectory of philosophy, the grand narrative and the kind of immanence to which Nancy et al. are opposed. We argue that Deleuze is reluctant to leave Heidegger behind because he recognises that the impasse for thinking requires a particular ontological dispensation, i.e. the issue of a people is essentially connected to the reformulation of immanence, the earth, through an engagement with the essence of art.

This is the hypothesis with which we approach Deleuze's statement that 'Heidegger got the wrong people, the wrong earth, the wrong blood.' In other words, Deleuze's particular understanding and contribution to the political question of the 'we', to which one must attach the language of 'a people-to-come', resides in his particular connection to Heidegger. Given that thinking, poeticising and the coming of a people are clearly united for Heidegger,[25] and that the same can be claimed for Deleuze,[26] such an analysis requires an examination of the convergence of the ontological, the political and the aesthetic (as the components of a people-to-come) within their respective works.

The fact that Deleuze directly critiques Heidegger's problematic linkage of a people and its earth in *What is Philosophy?* complicates matters, necessitating a thorough examination of these interactions. Which leads almost immediately to a rejoinder: what would be the

right conception of a people, earth, or even blood? This is the paradox: in determining the *right* people, one immediately engages with the critique of foundational violence which has self-consciously become part of the postmodern condition. To replace one vision of a people

with another does nothing to address the problematic assumptions involved in carving out a grand narrative that serves to legitimate and concretise certain ways of being at the expense of others. Deleuze is well aware of this difficulty. His philosophy is predicated on the critique of representation and the privilege of identity and sameness, which is reinforced by his ontological commitment to becoming and difference in itself. In the final analysis, Deleuze's vision of a people-to-come provides a solution to this impasse. His emphasis on minor literature and the fluidity of the concept is employed to produce diagrams of a people that resists totalisation, homogeneity and concretisation. Thus, it will be argued that Deleuze's thought is both an avowal and displacement of Heidegger, in the sense that he both extends and radicalises Heideggerian themes such as event, difference, a people, and the aesthetic dimension of life.

Topologically, the space of their interaction is marked by a productive tension, not unlike the Heideggerian *Riss* out of which the *Gestalt* arises. We will investigate what Deleuze's taking up of this Heideggerian language might mean, and how his own philosophical commitments influence or transform it. We examine how it is possible to speak of the relation between thinking, art and a people, a relation which Heidegger's work sets up, beyond the Heideggerian purview while remaining tied to the idea of the essential connections between the three that Heidegger's work reveals. Through the critical evaluation of their respective positions, we will show how Heidegger's concept of a people is insufficiently open to difference, contingency and the future (the Event), and that Deleuze's people-to-come corresponds to a radical reworking of what it means to be human, demanding incessant redefinition and openness toward future unknowns in order to engender new forms of *mit-sein*, which differ from other attempts in the emphasis they give to immanence and an existence that precedes a concern for the particularly human.

Displacements

Heidegger and Deleuze's proximity inheres within the milieu of their specific divergences. Both are concerned with overcoming Platonism and the metaphysics of presence, and both interpret Nietzsche's

reversal of Platonism as a benchmark in this process, though they interpret this moment quite differently – this will be the focus of Part I. Heidegger refuses the overcoming that Nietzsche offers, while Deleuze interprets Nietzsche's eternal return and doctrine of will to power as a crucial and effective overturning of Platonism that points to an entirely new ontological position. In contrast, Heidegger places Nietzsche at the end of metaphysics, which allows him to use Nietzsche's insights as a stepping off point for positing the overcom-

ing of metaphysics.[27]

Heidegger's critique of aesthetics runs parallel to this analysis. Just as the lack of a name for Being allows for the recognition of Western philosophy as the naming of Being and for moving beyond to question the essence of Being itself, so too the fleeing of the gods, as in Nietzsche's abolishing of the supersensuous, is a prerequisite for beginning an inquiry into the essence of art. For Heidegger, the purpose of art must be reset, its greatness restored from the ashes of aesthetics. Heidegger believes that the aestheticisation of art is art's demise. Overcoming aesthetics, for Heidegger, demands an overcoming of art based in sensation or feeling, the final stage of aesthetics which Nietzsche's philosophy represents.

Deleuze rejects Heidegger's interpretation, instead crediting Nietzsche with anticipating an entirely novel ontological system based on immanence, difference, and the power of the simulacrum or, as Deleuze will later call it, the power of the false. Deleuze does not refer to the subjective feelings of individuals as the basis for a logic of sensation, but always to the pre-individual, thus ridding his aesthetics of the spectre of subjectivisation indicative of what Heidegger describes as the history of aesthetics.

Heidegger and Deleuze's positions on Nietzsche will serve merely as a backdrop for our main concerns. In other words, we refrain from any critical evaluation of their respective interpretations of Nietzsche, but rather treat this moment as a productive space of convergence from which to draw insights as to why the two thinkers are committed to certain ontological positions and to explain how their philosophies concerning the function of the artwork differ. The difference between Heidegger and Deleuze's interpretations of the eternal return is extremely salient in that it both reveals an inheritance of the question of Nietzsche's Overman as his vision and directive for a future humanity and offers a touchstone for explaining their differing positions on the subject of 'going beyond', both socially and philosophically.

Introduction

We illustrate the displacement of Heidegger by Deleuze by comparing a similar structure within their thinking: the figures of the ordered and the unordered, as a productive tension expressed through works of art. Each are characterised as movements, whether as the sway between the unconcealed and the concealed or as the constant movement of deformation and reformation in the infinite process of becoming. Their philosophies are momentarily aligned on this point: Being is not static, it is a movement, an Event.[28] As thinkers of the event, both Heidegger and Deleuze are invested in presenting the conditions under which something new arises and in presenting a form of thinking adequate to these conditions. We must then ask the question of how a transformation in thinking is,

or relates to, a transformation of what it means to be human and to become a people. As has been suggested, for both philosophers, artworks provide the possibility of a leap into new modes of life. The irreducible jointure of art and ontology will be the focus of Part II.

For Heidegger, the poem, because of its inherent connection to the richness of language, allows us to reclaim our ability to listen to language and its essential connection to Being. His emphasis on language and remembrance, rooted in a particular land and linked to a particular poet, reflects his commitment to the pre-orientation or destiny of a people and marks a decisive difference from how Deleuze will conceive a people. Deleuze will emphasise the importance of 'minor discourses' – those discourses within a language that are less visible or that go undetected – which brings him very close to Heidegger's thought of retrieving what has been silent within language. Yet language is only one aspect of discourse for Deleuze. He holds that different modes of art such as painting, writing, music, etc., must be taken as singularities that express different things according to their different modes of presentation, material conditions and constellation of problems. The heterogeneity of expressive materials and the a-signifying quality of the artwork are central to its being, allowing Deleuze to connect the human practice of art to counterparts in the natural world.

For Heidegger, we have not yet begun to think, and the task that lies before us is one of remembrance. Through the self-refusing earth, the very essence of Being/Truth is revealed. Acknowledging this concealment opens up a clearing and leads to another relationship to earth and world, another beginning in terms of moving past the presuppositions of metaphysics and *technē* as the dominant experience of Western thought. Radicalising the Heideggerian claim, Deleuze

holds that it is what *cannot* be thought, the nonsense within sense, which must be thought.

The question is how we are to accomplish this task: what is it to think the unthought or the nonthinking within thought? Here again Heidegger and Deleuze share a similar problem: how to get beyond a certain type of thinking that occludes that which they would have us think. For Deleuze, we must think the conditions of thinking, and these conditions begin with the being of the sensible, the plane of immanence, which remains an informal element out of which our representations are formed. The move toward the deterritorialised must be understood in terms of an earth tending toward the cosmic,[29] a plane of forces, speeds, intensities and potentialities. Recognition of a deterritorialised plenum ungrounding the earth allows for new and transformative alliances between bodies and the earth that would have been hitherto unthinkable. Thinking is to enter into the process of becoming which occurs by virtue of this molecular level. A general

power of works of art is to elevate the moment of ungrounding, or deterritorialisation, thus making visible invisible forces and drawing us toward the plane of immanence.[30]

According to Heidegger, the work is also the means by which a people instantiates itself. The decision of a people to be defined by the work is an instance of its being transposed into its endowment and taking hold of the possibilities that remain latent within it. Since, for Heidegger, art is tied to a particular world and a particular people, he contends that modernity is an artless age: there is no 'people' for the art, or art itself has ceased to be related to or arise out of a people. One must ask the question of if it is possible to speak of 'a people' in the wake of the demise of what Heidegger refers to as great art. For a moment, let us suppose that the essential structure of the relation between a work of art and a people-to-come remains viable. Either we can agree with Heidegger that our time is 'artless' or, remaining within Heidegger's formula, we can ask out of what 'soil' modern art grew? In other words, where are and who are the people and the endowment to which modernity is entitled? This line of questioning may prompt us to re-conceive the notion of a people entirely, and Deleuze offers us just such a re-conceptualisation.

The unthought revealed through the work of art that each philosopher describes has its counterpart in a kind of people. Hence, the final displacement that we address pertains to a people-to-come, the focus of Part III of the book. Instead of conceiving a people as tied to or arising out of a particular location, nation-state, or cultural

heritage, Deleuze speaks not of 'a people' but of 'several people, an infinity of peoples, who remain to be united' (CII, 220) and invented. He introduces the notion of a missing people. For Deleuze, a people is never preordained or inscribed by national boundaries. Deleuze's criticism of origin can be seen as an explicit criticism of Heidegger's notion of a people. Even origin as beginning will not be a radical enough departure in so far as it maintains a connection to the past that precludes the possibility of the radically new. Deleuze develops the notion of milieu, which we connect to the amorphous pack, centreless and perpetually in transformation, to replace the former notion. He also connects historicity with the domination of a par- ticular state apparatus, directly confronting Heidegger's thinking in this criticism, and arguing that there is an arbitrariness involved in every worldview that reflects the general character of the movement of thought and the movement of Being as Becoming. A people is, and must always be, to come. This is the impossible possibility that corresponds to thinking as becoming and creation as opposed to will to truth (QP, 55/54). If Heidegger's people becomes as marked by its being transposed into the truth of its endowment, into its proper place, Deleuze's people becomes by way of the power of the false, by

having no place. Thus, Deleuze rejoins our compendium of thinkers of the non-community, the 'beyond-we', and this inquiry rejoins a contemporary and unresolved debate concerning Deleuze's place in the political.[31] Given this context, we must ask, *what is the difference that Deleuze's difference makes?*

Like Deleuze, these thinkers are concerned with re-opening being-with as a question and creating a space for new conceptions of community to arise, rather than giving concrete and norma- tive descriptions of what they should be. Remaining within this open space is itself a kind of formidable and tenacious activity, a form of resistance – to the present, to repetition of the past, and to philosophies of totality. Breaking this homogeneity is imagined through a variety of models and images, each evoking a sense of escape or ecstasis – whether Bataille's erotism and death, Nancy's exposures via the fragility of the nude and the openness of literature, or Blanchot's shattering of lover against lover. The common thread between these thinkers of community beyond community is the disavowal of immanence, as a false desire for totalisation aimed at essence, the violent eradication of otherness, and the closure of the political;[32] it is always a matter of 'getting out', to the Outside (*le Dehors*). Deleuze enters this discussion as one similarly committed

to dismantling the forms of thought that mask difference for the sake of sameness, homogeneity, and representation. The difference resides first in Deleuze's understanding of pure immanence, as a positive term rather than a prong of a dichotomous relation of inclusion and exclusion. While still invoking a concept of the Outside, Deleuze differs from these thinkers in that he operates from the inside – in the fissures and the cracks. Pure immanence, rather than the immanence of self or community, is univocal, necessitating that the Outside is within; our lives are a variety of complications and implications of a radical immanence.

With regard to the systematicity of the book itself, we do not approach either thinker from a linear or chronological perspective. In both cases our work begins in the middle, a mark of the particular problematic with which we are dealing. The guiding thread running through our narrative is how each negotiates a recommencement of thinking with respect to art and ontology, in order to illuminate a new formation of the political.

Notes

1. Plato, 'Ion', in *Complete Works*, ed. John M. Cooper and D.S. Hutchinson (New York: Hackett, 1997), 533d-e, p. 941.
2. François Dosse, *Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari: Intersecting Lives*, trans. Deborah Glassman (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011), pp. 95–6.

3. Plato, 'Ion', 534b, p. 942.
4. François Zourabichvili, *Deleuze: Une philosophie de l'événement* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1994), p. 24.
5. Ibid., p. 6.
6. Jean-François Lyotard, *The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge*, trans. Geoff Bennington and Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984). See pp. 27–37.
7. There is a substantial body of literature devoted to the postmodern discourse on community. See, for example: Jean-Pol Maldou, 'The Law, the Heart: Blanchot and the Question of Community', *Yale French Studies* 93 (1998), pp. 60–5; Marie-Claire Ropars-Wuilleumier, 'On *Unworking*: the Image in Writing According to Blanchot,' in *Maurice Blanchot: The Demand of Writing* (New York: Routledge, 1996), pp. 138–53; Michael Strysick, 'The End of Community and the Politics of Grammar', *Cultural Critique* 36 (1997), pp. 195–215; Ginette Michaud, '*In media res*: Interceptions of the Work of Art and the Political in Jean-Luc Nancy', *SubStance* 34:1 (2005), pp. 104–28; Ana

Luszcynska, 'The Opposite of the Concentration Camp: Nancy's Vision of Community', *The New Centennial Review* 5:3 (2005), pp. 167–205; Irving Goh, 'The Question of Community in Deleuze and Guattari (I): Anti-Community', *symploke* 14:1–2 (2006), pp. 216–31; Karim Benammar, 'Absence of Community', in *Who is this 'We'? Absence of Community* (Montréal: Black Rose Books,1994), pp. 31–43.

8. See Heidegger, *Parmenides* (GA 54, Winter Semester 1942/43).
9. See Oliver Marchart, *Post-foundational Political Thought* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2007).
10. Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and the Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, 2006).
11. For a compilation of articles chronicling the exchange opened up through Bataille's problematic, see Andrew Mitchell and Jason Kemp Winfree, eds, *The Obsessions of George Bataille: Community and Communication* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2009).
12. 'What would be at stake is a confrontation of the *situated* character of Bataille's interventions in and on community in the 1930s (urgency of the struggle against fascism, disengagement of Nietzsche from Nazi ideology, proximity to the "'non-conformist'" tendency which will later not be foreign to collaboration, hostility to the union of the left, tensions between the "'mystical'" interests of Bataille and the sociology of Caillois, Leiris . . .), a confrontation of this historical embeddedness with the withdrawal from immediacy and from (en)closure which is a distinctive trait of Bataille's thought.' See Patrick ffrench, 'Friendship, Asymmetry, Sacrifice: Bataille and Blanchot', *Parrhesia* 3 (2007), pp. 32–42 (n2).
13. Georges Bataille's *Le coupable* (*Guilty*) was written between September 1939 and the summer of 1943.
14. See the epigraph to Blanchot's *La Communauté Inavouable* (Paris: Editions de Minuit, 1983); translated as *The Unavowable Community*, trans. Pierre Joris (New York: Station Hill Press, 1988).

15. According to Deleuze, Bataille's characterisation of the erotic in terms of transgression reintroduces the moral imperative. See 'On the Superiority of American Literature', in *Dialogues*.
16. Blanchot, *The Unavowable Community*, p. 34.
17. Jean-Luc Nancy, *The Inoperative Community* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1991), p. 3.
18. Bataille theorises the relation of taboo and transgression in *L'Erotisme* (Paris: Les Éditions de Minuit, 1957). Taboos are necessary for a community brought into being through or by work to curb the natural violent tendencies that interfere with this common goal. Eroticism, death and sensuality are all instances that reveal this violence, and are thus labelled transgressive. The irony is that transgression is used to

curb these tendencies through either ordered release or through the social disapproval of the transgression even as it is being acted on. Bataille advocates unemployed negativity, which is to say a different sort of transgressiveness that cannot be assimilated by the social order, thus made part of the 'work'.

19. Blanchot, *The Unavowable Community*, p. 6.
20. Nancy, *The Inoperative Community*, p. 12.
21. Ibid., p. 3.
22. See, for instance, Peter Hallward, *Out of this World: Deleuze and the Philosophy of Creation* (London: Verso, 2006), as well as Erin Gilson's review of Hallward in *Continental Philosophy Review* 42 (2009), pp. 429–34, and Alain Badiou's criticism of Deleuzian's who naively celebrate everything as event, surprise and creation in *Deleuze: The Clamor of Being* (Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press, 2000). Irving Goh, while acknowledging that Deleuze is not known for attempting a theory of community, claims that this theme silently animates Deleuze's work. See his 'The Question Of Community in Deleuze and Guattari (I): Anti-Community'.
23. See MP, Ch. 3, beginning with the image of the double-pincered lobster (God).
24. Deleuze's partial titling of chapter 3 of *A Thousand Plateaus* as 'The Geology of Morals' is a clear nod to the excavating process that Nietzsche conducts with regard to morality in *Genealogy of Morals*; the insinuation is that Deleuze is conducting the same sort of critique with regard to an ontology of the earth. Once this becomes clear, it is difficult not to place the critique in proximity to Heidegger, the thinker of the earth.
25. In 'What are Poets for?' Heidegger places the poet and the thinker on the same path, that of reaching into the abyss of the oblivion of Being in order that mortals may come into their own essence. The thinker must ask the question of being in order to recognise the oblivion of being, and the poet must trace the tracks of the fugitive gods, name the sacred, and give direction in this time of need. Couple this with Heidegger's clear linkage of the work of art with the becoming historical of a people in 'The Origin of the Work of Art' (henceforward *Origin*), and there is little room to contest this conjunction.
26. Deleuze establishes a distinction between philosophy and art in *What*

is Philosophy?, yet the body of his work suggests a special affinity between philosophy and the arts: 'they share the same shadow' (QP, 206/218); they 'forewarn of the advent of a people' (QP, 105/110), which echoes the sense of preparation for a future people that arises in the final version of *Origin*.

27. Nietzsche's philosophy does not overcome metaphysics because, though he reverses the priority of the supersensuous and the sensuous, he is still

working with the same concept of truth as correctness and adequation. Heidegger's twist free of metaphysics involves a fundamental change in the understanding of truth, as *aletheia* or unconcealedness. It is Heidegger who truly overcomes Platonism and restores the essence of art as related to the essence of truth.

28. Deleuze credits Heidegger with identifying the generative capacity of positive, unmediated difference: 'this difference is not "between" in the ordinary sense . . . it is the Fold, *Zwiefalt*. It is constitutive of Being and of the manner in which Being constitutes being, in the double movement of the "clearing" and "veiling"' (DR, 90/65).
29. At the beginning of Chapter 4 we investigate how Deleuze's use of the cosmic is related to Kostas Axelos' idea of 'planetary thought', which is a direct confrontation with Heidegger's theorising of the separation of world and being and represents a cosmological vision of the unfolding of being, one that transcends the human. Though planetary thinking is also a key concept for Heidegger, his vision of widening the scope of thinking beyond Western metaphysics, even if more inclusive, remains bound to the 'world' as defined by the human. This concept is re-envisioned by Kostas as the larger milieu of unfolding out of which the world (of technology) happens; thus the planetary becomes the vantage from which the Heideggerian is overcome. See Deleuze's 'How Jarry's Pataphysics Opened the Way for Phenomenology' and 'The Fissures of Anaxagoras and the Local Fires of Heraclitus', both in ID. See also Christian Kerslake, *Immanence and the Vertigo of Philosophy: From Kant to Deleuze* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh Press, 2009) for more on this relationship.
30. The artwork is a negotiation of chaos and form that comes to stand in itself, where 'standing' depicts the greatest amount of openness onto the plane of immanence, the infinite, bridled by the most minimal amount of form that it can sustain. The artwork, as characterised by this tension, opens up new degrees of movement, making possible immense amounts of complexity that in its ever-renewing singularity constitutes a provocation to thinking. In this way, art reveals the conditions of the real.
31. See, for instance, Phillip Mengue's *Deleuze et la question de la démocratie* (Paris: L'Harmattan, 2003) and Paul Patton's response in 'Deleuze and Democracy', *Contemporary Political Theory* 4 (2005), pp. 400–13.
32. Nancy specifically refers to 'immanentism' as the desire for a closed community producing its essence and as completely present or identical with itself (Jean Luc Nancy, *Being Singular Plural*, trans. Robert Richardson and Anne O'Byrne (Stanford: Stanford University Press,

2000)). The critique of immanentism can be understood as the desire to move beyond hypostatic ways of understanding community, a concept

which involves three senses: community as substance, community as shared identity, and community as supra-individual. See Gregory Bird, 'Community Beyond Hypostasis: Nancy Responds to Blanchot,' *Angelaki* 13.1 (2008), pp. 3–26.