# DELEUZE AND THE SCHIZOANALYSIS OF VISUAL ART

Edited by
Ian Buchanan
and Lorna Collins

BLOOMSBURY

Deleuze and the Schizoanalysis of Visual Art

Schizoanalytic Applications

Our goal with this series is to broaden the base of scholars interested in Deleuze and Guattari's work. But beyond that we want to change how their work is read. While their work is already widely known and used, its use tends not to be systematic, and this is both its strength and its weakness. It is a strength because it has enabled people to pick up their work from a wide variety of perspectives, but it is also a weakness because it makes it difficult to say with any clarity what exactly a 'Deleuzian-and-Guattarian' approach is. This has inhibited the uptake of Deleuze and Guattari's thinking in the more 'hard-headed' disciplines such as history, politics and even philosophy. Without this methodological core, Deleuze and Guattari studies risks being simply another intellectual fashion that will soon be superseded by newer figures. Our goal here is to create that methodological core and build a sustainable model of schizoanalysis that will attract new scholars to the field. In saying this, we also aim to be at the forefront of the field by starting a discussion about the nature of Deleuze and Guattari's methodology.

Editors: Ian Buchanan, David Savat and Marcelo Svirsky

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Deleuze and the Schizoanalysis of Cinema, edited by
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Deleuze and the Schizoanalysis of Visual Art

Edited by Ian Buchanan and Lorna Collins

Schizoanalytic Applications

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Contents

Notes on Contributors

Susan (Su) Ballard is a media art historian and curator from New Zealand. Her current research focuses on speculation, futures, networks, accidents, noise and machines in the art gallery. She edited *The Aotearoa Digital Arts Reader* in 2008 and in 2013 was appointed an editor of the *Fibreculture Journal.* In 2013 she curated *Among The Machines*, a major exhibition for the Dunedin Public Art Gallery. She is a senior lecturer in Art History and Contemporary Art at the University of Wollongong, Australia.

Ian Buchanan is Professor of Cultural Studies at the University of Wollongong. He is the author of the *Dictionary of Critical Theory* (OUP, 2010) and the founding editor of *Deleuze Studies*.

David Burrows is lecturer in Fine Art at Slade School of Fine Art, University College London. He is a writer and internationally exhibited artist based in London. Recent shows include *Night is also a Sun*, IMT Gallery, London 2012; *The Diagram: Black Board Series,* Banner Repeater, London/Torna Istanbul 2011; *Library of Babel/In and Out of Place,* Zabludowicz Collection, London 2010; *Waving from Afar*, Star Space, Shanghai, China 2009; *Little Monsters*, Artspace, Adelaide, Australia 2007; and *Popnosis*, Chungking Projects, Los Angeles, USA 2005. His essays have appeared in a number of journals, books, art magazines and catalogues (including in *Deleuze, Guattari and the Production of the New* and *Deleuze and Contemporary Art* as well as the journals *New Left Review* and *Angelaki*). He also works collaboratively, for example, with Simon O'Sullivan in the production of the 'Performance Fiction' *Plastique Fantastique*.

Lorna Collins is a painter, critic and arts educator based in Cambridge, where she completed her PhD as a Foundation Scholar in French Philosophy, at Jesus College. She was the founder and co-organizer/curator of the trans-disciplinary Making Sense colloquia, co-editor of a series of *Making Sense* books, and has a forthcoming monograph on *Making Sense: Art Practice and Transformative Therapeutics*, with Bloomsbury. Her (Deleuzian) philosophy is guided and informed by her provocative art practice.

Andrea Eckersley is a painter who lives and works in Melbourne, Australia. When she isn't chasing around two little boys, she is teaching at RMIT and finishing a PhD in Fine Arts (Painting) at Monash University. Primarily interested in the way the body interacts with abstract shapes, Andrea's work investigates the material aspects of painting with a particular focus on its surface. Andrea is also the art editor at the *Deleuze Studies* Journal.

jan jagodzinski is a professor in the Department of Secondary Education, University of Alberta in Edmonton, Alberta, Canada. He is the author of 11 books to date in media, visual art, visual art education and film.

Simon O'Sullivan is reader in Art Theory and Practice in the Department of Visual Cultures at Goldsmiths College, University of London. He has published two monographs with Palgrave, *Art Encounters Deleuze and Guattari: Thought Beyond Representation* (2005) and *On the Production of Subjectivity: Five Diagrams of the Finite–Infinite Relation* (2012), and is co-editor, with Stephen Zepke, of both *Deleuze, Guattari and the Production of the New* (Continuum, 2008) and *Deleuze and Contemporary Art* (Edinburgh University Press, 2010). He also makes art, with David Burrows, under the name *Plastique Fantastique*.

Plastique Fantastique is an artistic collaboration between David Burrows (lecturer in Fine Art, Slade), Simon O'Sullivan (reader in Art Theory and Practice, Goldsmiths) and others (the exact composition changes, depending on projects and circumstances). The practice can be understood as a 'mythopoetic fiction' that involves an investigation into the relations between aesthetics, politics, the sacred and popular culture, conducted through the production of objects (or 'shrines') and installations, performances, texts, and comics. The group was formed in 2004 and has performed and exhibited widely in the UK and abroad (including: ICA, London; Tate Britain, London; Royal Academy of Arts, London; 176 Zabludowicz Collection, London; ASC Gallery, London; Tatton Biennale; Wysing Art Centre, Cambridge; Grand Union, Birmingham; Summerhall, Edinburgh; Outpost, Norwich; Apex, Portsmouth; Aliceday Gallery, Brussels; and Pratt Manhattan Gallery, New York).

Anna Powell is reader in Film and English Studies at Manchester Metropolitan University. Her interests include film/philosophy, aesthetic affect, experimental film and video. Her books include *Deleuze and the Horror Film* and *Deleuze,*

Altered States and Film. She has published a wide range of articles and chapters on Deleuze, film and literature. Anna is the director of *A/V* webjournal and a member of the editorial board of *Deleuze Studies*.

Dr Jac Saorsa is a visual artist, writer, researcher and educator in art practice and philosophy. She is Director of The Broadway Drawing School in Cardiff, UK. Located primarily at the interface between visual art practice and the Medical Humanities, Jac's work embraces an eclectic mix of emotion and intellect, and is contextualized in a broad Deleuzean aesthetic. The intangible figure emerges from within tangible form through a creative process that is simultaneously constructive and deconstructive, and the intimate relation between theory and practice is a crucial and intrinsic factor.

Leon Tan (PhD) is an art and cultural historian, critic, artist and psychotherapist. He researches and publishes on contemporary art, public art, globalization, digital culture, social activism and mental health, and is a full member of the International Association of Art Critics. Tan also supervises postgraduate arts projects and maintains a small clinical practice.

Alexander Wilson's work straddles the boundary between aesthetic practice and philosophy. His forthcoming dissertation, prepared for UQAM in Montreal, Canada, investigates the relationship between aesthetics and emergence in nature, through the implicit links found in the science of complexity, computation, systems theory, chaos theory, contemporary cosmology, evolutionary aesthetics and process philosophy. He publishes on various connected topics, including the philosophies of Deleuze, Guattari, Simondon and Stiegler, as well as on speculative aesthetics. His art practice deals with related concepts in performances and installations that involve the synchronization of patterns of light and sound. As co-founder of Parabolik Guerilla Theatre, he has also directed several experimental multimedia works for the stage. As a musician and composer he is involved with the live-electronics trio K.A.N.T.N.A.G.A.N.O., among other electroacoustic and electronic projects. He occasionally teaches media arts and theory at Concordia University in Montreal.

Stephen Zepke is an independent researcher based in Vienna. He is the author of *Art as Abstract Machine, Ontology and Aesthetics in Deleuze and Guattari,* (Routledge, 2005) and *Sublime Art, Towards an Aesthetics of the Future* (Edinburgh University Press, forthcoming 2014), and the co-editor with Simon

O'Sullivan of *Deleuze, Guattari and the Production of the New* (Continuum, 2008) and *Deleuze and Contemporary Art* (Edinburgh University Press, 2010).

Ayelet Zohar is an artist, visual culture researcher (specializing in histories and theories of photography in Japan) and independent curator. Zohar completed her PhD research entitled *Strategies of Camouflage: Invisibility, Schizoanalysis and Multifocality in Contemporary Visual Arts* at the Slade School of Fine Art, UCL (2007). In her own art projects, research work and publications, Zohar explores the relations between photography and camouflage, visuality and imperceptibility. Zohar currently teaches at Tel Aviv University and Bezalel Academy of Art and Design in Jerusalem.

List of Illustrations

Chapter 11

Chapter 12

Introduction: Inventing Schizoanalysis

Ian Buchanan and Lorna Collins

What did Deleuze and Guattari actually say about art and artists? And what can one do with Deleuze and Guattari in relation to art and artists? The second question is conditioned by the first, but not determined by it. There is considerable scope for invention and reinvention in Deleuze and Guattari's thought. They never demanded slavish adherence. This book is not an exercise in trying to discern the masters' words more clearly so as to obey them more fully. But having said that, if we don't at least make the attempt to be precise in our understanding of what their arguments were, then it cannot be said that what we're doing is in any meaningful sense Deleuze-and-Guattarian. This is an old conundrum, but for us it takes on fresh urgency with this project because what we want to do is complete (or at least take further) what it is useful to see as an incomplete project, namely schizoanalysis.

Doubtless there will be critics who will say that this is to render their thought teleological in a way they would surely have objected to, so let us clarify what we mean by complete. We don't mean that we want to bring their work to some kind of conclusion. Rather, we mean simply that we want to treat their work as so many tools, as so much building material, whose purpose can only be fulfilled by trying to build something with it. And it remains incomplete to the extent that we have not and hopefully cannot exhaust its potential to tackle new problematics and engage new questions. It falls to us, then, to begin to consider just what schizoanalysis might be able to do, at least in the limited case of art and artists. To borrow one of Deleuze's own famous questions, we would say 'we still don't know what schizoanalysis can do'. The reason we don't know is because we've never asked the question properly; we haven't experimented enough to know where it can take us. The aim of this book is quite straightforward. We want to construct and experiment with a methodology for doing critical analysis based on Deleuze and Guattari's concept of schizoanalysis and apply it to art and artists.

Schizoanalysis is a theory of culture and society that pulls together and re-engineers three different theories: psychoanalysis, phenomenology and Marxism. It cannot, however, be conceived as a synthesis of psychoanalysis, phenomenology and Marxism. That would be to misunderstand the originality of Deleuze and Guattari's project. It is, rather, the product of a rethinking of the foundational problems of psychoanalysis, phenomenology and Marxism, which in each case centres on the meaning and function of desire. It is perhaps useful in this regard to think of schizoanalysis as the product of a coexistence of problems. As Deleuze and Guattari argue in *What is Philosophy?*, contrasting philosophical systems do not cancel each other out, they coexist like stars in the night sky, some shining brighter than others according to the nature of the times themselves. The aim of philosophy, then, is to construct new constellations according to the changing demands of the present (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 59). Putting it differently, one could say schizoanalysis arises at the point where the discourses of psychoanalysis, phenomenology and Marxism founder, namely on the rock of desire.

No reader of Deleuze and Guattari can be unaware of the importance of desire in their work, yet it seems few have fully grasped the originality of their conception of it. The general assumption is that desire is used in an ordinary sense to mean simply instinctual longing, but this is not at all the case.[1] Deleuze and Guattari categorically reject the idea that desire is an undifferentiated instinctual energy (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 215). Despite this, the assumption that desire is an instinctual energy is pervasive in the commentary on Deleuze and Guattari's work. This problem is compounded by Deleuze and Guattari's classification of desire as a flow, which makes it seem that it is structurally comparable to all other flows, such as the flows of capital, money, people and resources. This renders it undifferentiated at the level of both form and content, effectively turning it into a literally empty signifier. The poetic nature of Deleuze and Guattari's writing style is at least partly to blame for this misperception, in that it obscures the derivation of their concepts behind a bewildering screen of artistic, clinical, literary and philosophical 'voices', making it very difficult to see just how their formulations are constructed. One has only to compare the widely varying definitions of Deleuze and Guattari's concepts in the literature on their work to see how successful their writing style was and is at disguising the core elements of their thought. We take the view that Deleuze and Guattari's prodigious invention of concepts should be understood as an attempt to create a new set of coordinates for thinking that can and should be modified to suit new circumstances and new questions.

Many readers of Deleuze and Guattari think that the very idea of trying to extract a methodology from their work is a critical misunderstanding. By the same token, as is also clear from the literature condemning Deleuze and Guattari, particularly in the social sciences, it is precisely their perceived lack of a methodology that attracts the most complaints. For most readers, though, this isn't a problem; indeed, it isn't hard to find examples of commentators praising them for the absence of anything resembling a methodology or a model. The feeling seems to be that because there is no fixed methodology apparent in their work readers are given a free hand to do with it as they will. On top of that, their names are frequently cited as a licence to set aside the demand for methodology altogether.[2] Deleuze and Guattari seem to endorse all these positions, making it seem not merely counterintuitive but fundamentally wrong to take the contrary view and argue that there is in fact a methodology to be constructed out of their work. But they also endorse the contrary view that their work constitutes a strict methodology whose rules of application should be adhered to at all times. This is clear in the brief passage on pragmatics at the end of the chapter on the regime of signs in *A Thousand Plateaus* (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 146–8). But it is also reinforced throughout their work by countless injunctions not to do this and not to do that – most famously they say one should not ask what things mean, but only how they work (Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 109).

How then should we deal with this apparent inconsistency in Deleuze and Guattari's writing? This problem goes well beyond an inability to decide whether they allow that their work constitutes a methodology or not. Think of the way they seem to celebrate the schizo as the hero of desire on the one hand and then deny they're talking about real schizophrenics on the other hand. Similarly, look at the way they speak disparagingly of Freud yet retain many of his ideas. Then there is the highly ambiguous way they use source material – for example, they cite novels and memoirs as clinical material, or at least as evidence of mental processes that might be deemed pathological. Their use of anthropological, sociological and historical material is also highly problematic because in many cases it is not used in support of an anthropological, sociological or historical thesis, but is used rather as an analogy or framing device for a discussion about something else. More problematic still is their use of scientific material, which the authors themselves readily admit is not intended to be construed as in any way scientific in intent. 'Nowhere do we claim for our concepts the title of a science. We are no more familiar with scientificity than we are with ideology; all we know are assemblages' (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 22). In spite of this unequivocal statement, there is a persistent tendency in the secondary literature

on Deleuze and Guattari to do precisely the opposite and treat their concepts as science. How should the scientific material be treated? As philosophy, always as philosophy, which means it cannot be seen to support their thinking by somehow anchoring it in the unquestionably factual, as many readers appear to think.

There are a series of common themes that inform the analysis in the pages that follow. After setting a genealogical grounding to the relationship between art and schizoanalysis, the chapters move on to what is known as *Outsider art*, that is, raw art, or the art of the mad. Using examples of schizophrenic artists such as Antonin Artaud and Adolf Wölfli, several chapters discuss how art created as a result of and in reaction to psychotic illness provides a window into what might thought of as the therapeutic dimension of schizoanalysis in which art is considered as a new form of self-care. This is proposed through a genealogy of contemporary art practices, which mobilize and operate an affective schizo-analysis through the notion of the diagram, which is a conceptual tool used to consider how the works of these Outsider artists generate their affect.

Ian Buchanan's chapter, 'The "Clutter" Assemblage', challenges the pathological fantasies in the systematic order or disorder of contemporary psychoanalysts such as Adam Phillips. Here symptomology, diagnosis and cure – the clinical core of psychoanalysis – are related to artistic experimentation in the artist's cluttered or chaotic studio. Clutter forms an inchoate solution or end *in itself* in this space, where it inspires and results in the artist's work. This then moves a reductive psychoanalytical projection or introjection about Oedipus, to a schizoanalytic assemblage of purposive meaninglessness and meaningful purposelessness. Understanding clutter as an end in its own right, not repre-senting something else, enables Buchanan to introduce and lay a ground plan of art and schizoanalysis.

Stephen Zepke's chapter, 'Schizo-Revolutionary Art: Deleuze, Guattari and Communisation Theory' considers the proactive relation between the artist and a practice of schizoanalysis, where creativity is mobilized as the motor of resistance to capitalism. Deleuze and Guattari's revolutionary intentions for schizoanalysis are examined through Communisation Theory, which is a conception of communism that is concerned with a movement immanent to the world of capital, which then abolishes capitalist social relations. Zepke stretches Communisation Theory to the point where schizophrenia defines the prole-tariat, who can then revolt against capitalism. Meanwhile the artist sketches out a new genealogy of social space and fuels a revolution that that might operate an affective schizoanalysis. The motor of this (schizo) revolution is art practice.

Alexander Wilson's chapter leads the next section with 'Pragmatics of Raw Art (For the Post-Autonomy Paradigm)'. Wilson builds a schizoanalytic topology of art that moves away from the binary conceptions of high/low, inside/ outside, cultural/raw, civilized/primitive or real/unreal to pronounce a new, non-oppositional, post-autonomy paradigm. By identifying raw art in terms of semiotic modulations (a post-, counter-, or pre-signifying avant-garde), Wilson builds the argument that schizoanalysis provides a new pragmatic approach to aesthetic critique. This enables artists to utlize and activate heterogeneity and disorientation as revolutionary strategies for mechanizing creativity. This chapter then considers how one might think about the future of avant-garde movements, so that they might offer new forms of resistance against coercive regimes, from a critical, aesthetic and creative motor that is itself a form of schizoanalysis.

Anna Powell's 'Passional Bodies: The Interstitial force of Artaud's drawings' considers the drawings of Antonin Artaud, whose work is a crucial force in schizoanalysis. His drawings, along with his poetic commentaries on them, play a significant role in the wider anti-Oedipal, schizoanalytic project. Powell identifies three interlocking machines in his work: figures of the body, figures of the face and *gris-gris* or magical spells. All of Artaud's drawings renounce formal artistic rules and work in their own apertures to release powerful affects via the replaying and sublimation (or counter-actualization) of malediction. In relation to this, Powell connects Artaud's figures, portraits and self-portraits with Deleuze and Guattari's understanding of the schizo body, activating their disruptive, affective intentions for schizoanalysis.

In 'Art, Therapy and the Schizophrenic' Lorna Collins opens a discussion of the ethical and quasi-utopian intentions underpinning schizoanalysis. She argues that art-making can provide a schizoanalytic practice that builds a 'new earth' for the schizophrenic (and indeed for us all) because the creative process entails a machine of counter-actualization, which provides therapy and new ways of being. Collins uses Deleuze's moral philosophy in *The Logic of Sense* to build an ethical model of counter-actualization with an aesthetic motor. She then shows how different practices of art therapy offer a means to effect this counter-actualization. Art-making fuels a new way of living, outside of the clinic.

The third part of the book presents 'Art as an Abstract Machine'. Su Ballard opens this section. 'The Audience and the Art Machine: Janet Cardiff and George Bures Miller's *Opera for a Small Room*' provides a close examination of artworks that question the visual and social structures that sediment certain

cultural and political relationships for viewers and artworks. Ballard suggests these works are examples of a practice that moves significantly away from the concerns of modernism and its legacies. Instead, she argues, they demonstrate how our relations with art in the gallery are unnatural and accidental. This enquiry prompts a schizoanalytic comprehension of the aesthetic encounter, which concerns a new way of thinking about the subjectification, situated in the art gallery.

Following this, and changing direction slightly, is jan jagodzinski's '1780 and 1945: An Avant-Garde Without Authority, Addressing the Anthropocene'. He presents a playful conception of thinking about the cosmos through art. By introducing two concepts – the Anthropocene and an 'avant-garde without authority' – jagodzinski brings forward a sense of what Deleuze and Guattari call a 'new earth', which he interprets as an inhabited universe. In relation to climate change, the commodification of the earth's natural resources, the hegemony of the capitalist global economy and 'our current global schizo-phrenia', jagodzinski's understanding of schizoanalysis is ethical, and concerned with counter-actualization. He intends to outline and activate the force of art engaged in a 'dark' accelerated aesthetic (in relation to the world's demise), by an avant-garde that exists without authority and is bound by a pathos that is essential for our survival as a species.

This is followed by Israeli curator and artist Ayelet Zohar's 'Strategies of Camouflage: Depersonalization, Schizoanalysis and Contemporary Photography'. This chapter builds the practice of schizoanalysis through the notion of camouflage, as it is demonstrated and exposed in a selection of works by contemporary art photographers. Zohar demonstrates how the camouflage process activates schizoanalysis, since both camouflage and schizoanalysis mutually contribute to an understanding of the condition of the concealed and the unseen, as well as the presence of the shattered gaze (of the viewer) in the open-ended field of the aesthetic encounter. From this viewpoint, the chapter offers a schizoanalytic reassessment of the interrelation between the viewer, their gaze, and the artwork, by thinking about an aesthetic encounter as a strategy of camouflage.

The final part of the book mobilizes schizoanalysis through collaborative art practice. Andrea Eckersley's 'The Event of Painting' investigates the complex way intensity is generated in a painting at its surface. Schizoanalysis provides a useful conceptual toolkit for describing what a painting does and how it functions. In developing this toolkit, the chapter charts how a painting emerges in terms of events felt as a difference in intensity, thereby explicating how affect

emerges as a relation between the body of the painting and the body of the viewer. This chapter derives a molecular account of affect from schizoanalysis to indicate the ways that intensity is generated in paintings at, in or on its surfaces.

Jac Saorsa's 'In Response to the "Indiscreet Questioner"' is a self-reflexive exploration of Saorsa's own practice as a visual artist through an application of a schizoanalytic approach to creativity. Saorsa makes specific reference to her current artistic project, *Drawing Women's Cancer,* which explores the effect and the potential public impact of artworks that act as agents, or Deleuzian Bodies without Organs, between the scientific concept of disease and the existential experience of illness. Saorsa's working process is directly influenced by a continuing engagement with Deleuzian theory, where the aim is to not just interpret but to *use* the theory. The point of creating assemblages of theory and practice in this way is to provide the artist with a radical freedom of expression from an active application of schizoanalysis.

David Burrows and Simon O'Sullivan collaborate as performance artists *Plastique Fantastique*, alongside their continuing academic scholarship as Deleuzian theorists. This chapter, 'The Sinthome/Z Point Relation or Art as Non-Schizoanalysis', proceeds as a meta-reflection on – or metamodelling of – some of the experiments and strategies of their performative art practice. Burrows and O'Sullivan develop a method of thinking about art practice as a form of *non*-schizoanalysis (following Francois Laruelle's model non-philosophy). O'Sullivan and Burrows attach the prefix 'non' to activate a schizoanalytic practice that moves away from Guattari's clinical analytic framework, therapeutics, and the clinical and ecological responsibilities and problems raised by the therapeutic and socio-political contexts Guattari worked within. O'Sullivan and Burrows' understanding of art practice has no therapeutic applicability (they argue), while they repeatedly assert that their project concerns the *inversion* of clinical practice. Adapting Lacan they propose a concept of the 'Z-point'. This is a binding mechanism (comparable to the way the sinthome ties the knot of subjectivity), which produces a rupture in a situation or environment. The Z-point results in a new pattern, which has the function of an ethics of truth.

The final chapter is by psychoanalyst, critical theorist and artist Leon Tan: 'Art as Schizoanalysis: Creative Place-Making in South Asia'. Tan's chapter considers how public art functions as a kind of schizoanalysis in a given locale. Tan conceptualizes public art practices in South Asia in clinical and aesthetic terms. He engages with the work of Suely Rolnik to build a sense of schizoanalysis outside of the clinic. By examining the public art of Navjot Altaf, a pioneering figure in public art and collaborative practice in India, Tan demonstrates how

an aesthetics of collaboration can provide individuals and communities with new ways of being together and existing with solidarity and self-healing. Tan discusses how contemporary art in the public sphere can help to remediate collective trauma, presenting specific case studies in India that show where this has happened, and shows how communities cease to be powerless victims of external military or governmental forces, and become artists instead. This leads to the establishment of a financially self-sustaining arts organization and the invention of new assemblages, peoples and possible worlds.

Notes

1   Even such noted thinkers as Alain Badiou, Michel Foucault and Slavoj Žižek are guilty of this particular misapprehension.
2   This demand is, in our view, a category mistake. Freeing oneself from intellectual constraints is not the same thing, or at least not necessarily the same thing, as freeing oneself from any semblance of methodology. The one does not demand the other. It is perfectly possible to use research methodology in a flexible and experimental manner and thus retain intellectual responsiveness without having to sacrifice academic rigour altogether.

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Part One

Genealogy of Art and Schizoanalysis

The 'Clutter' Assemblage[1]

Ian Buchanan

Of the various definitions of schizoanalysis Deleuze and Guattari give, the most useful in my view is the one found in The Machinic Unconscious. Guattari defines schizoanalysis as a 'pragmatics of the unconscious', by which he means a mode of analysis whose purpose is to understand how the unconscious works (Guattari 2011: 27).

'Works' is meant in the most literal sense here – ultimately Deleuze and Guattari argue that the unconscious is a factory and not a theatre, which they claim is how Freud conceives it. They draw heavily on Marx's work on labour in the elaboration of their newly minted discourse of the machinic unconscious. But this discourse can be misleading because although Deleuze and Guattari frequently use the language of machines to describe the operations of the unconscious, their model isn't mechanics but pragmatics. The only time they make a direct comparison between the unconscious and actual machines is when they compare it to the absurd machines of the Dadaists, surrealists, and the infernal machines imagined by Buster Keaton and Rube Goldberg (Guattari 1995a: 135).[2] And on these occasions what is crucial is that these machines don't work.

It is the nature of this not-working that will interest me here. As Guattari observes in a post-face he wrote for the second edition of Anti-Oedipus, Man Ray's collage 'dancer/danger' doesn't work inasmuch as its working parts, its cogs and wheels and so on, do not turn or intermesh with one another in a mechanical fashion, and it is precisely for that reason that it works as a piece of art (Guattari 1995a: 119–50). It works by creating a connection, but not an association – the distinction is important, indeed one could say the whole of schizoanalysis depends on it. Deleuze and Guattari stipulate that 'you will not have reached the ultimate and irreducible terms of the unconscious so long as you find or restore links between two elements' (Deleuze and Guattari 1983:

314). Man Ray's juxtaposition of the human dancer and the inhuman machine obeys this rule: it brings the two into a new kind of productive relation which Deleuze and Guattari would later call the assemblage, though in their first works they called it the desiring-machine, inasmuch as the relation it spawns is external to both of the original terms. It works precisely because it doesn't project a cyborg figure of a machinic dancer.

> What complicates everything is that there is indeed a necessity for desiring-production to be induced from representation, to be discovered through its lines of escape. But this is true in a way altogether different from what psychoanalysis believes it to be. The decoded flows of desire form the free energy (libido) of the desiring-machines (Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 314–15).

Desiring-machines are the working parts of the machinic unconscious – but they work by joining together elements that do not have pre-existing associations; it is their operation that the pragmatics of the unconscious is tasked to understand. If dreams are Freud's 'royal road' to the unconscious, then it is desiring-machines that provide Deleuze and Guattari with their sovereign superhighway to the machinic unconscious. If schizoanalysis is the discourse of the desiring-machine, then to understand schizoanalysis we must first of all understand the desiring-machine. To understand the desiring-machine we must go further back, as it were, because the desiring-machine is a product of a still more primary process, namely desiring-production.

Desiring-production is the process and means the psyche deploys in producing connections and links between thoughts, feelings, ideas, sensations, memories and so on that we call desiring-machines (assemblages). It only becomes visible to us in and through the machines it forms. While both these terms were abandoned by Deleuze and Guattari in subsequent writing on schizoanalysis, the thinking behind them remains germane throughout. This is by no means straightforward because Deleuze and Guattari cast their discussion of desiring-production in language drawn from Marx, which has the effect of making it seem as though they are talking about the production of physical things, which simply is not and cannot be the case. The truth of this can be seen by asking the very simple question: if desire produces, then what does it produce?

The answer isn't physical things. The correct answer is 'objects' – but 'objects' in the form of intuitions, to use Kant's term for the mind's initial attempts to grasp the world (both internal and external to the psyche). That is what desire produces, objects, not physical things. Kant, Deleuze and Guattari argue, was

one of the first to conceive of desire as production, but he botched things by failing to recognize that the object produced by desire is fully real. Deleuze and Guattari reject the idea that superstitions, hallucinations and fantasies belong to the alternate realm of 'psychic reality' as Kant would have it (Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 25). The schizophrenic has no awareness that the reality they are experiencing is not reality itself. They may be aware that they do not share the same reality as everyone else, but they see this as a failing in others rather than a flaw in themselves. If they see their long dead mother in the room with them they do not question whether this is possible or not; they aren't troubled by any such doubts. That is the essential difference between a delusion and a hallucination. What delusionals see is what *is*, quite literally.

If this Kantian turn by Deleuze and Guattari seems surprising, it is nevertheless confirmed by their critique of Lacan, who in their view makes essentially the same mistake as Kant in that he conceives desire as lacking a real object (for which fantasy acts as both compensation and substitute). Deleuze and Guattari describe Lacan's work as 'complex', which seems to be their code word for useful but flawed (they say the same thing about Badiou). On the one hand, they credit him with discovering desiring-machines in the form of the *objet petit a*, but on the other hand they accuse him of smothering them under the weight of the Big O (Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 310). As Žižek is fond of saying, in the Lacanian universe fantasy supports reality. This is because reality, as Lacan conceives it, is fundamentally deficient; it perpetually lacks a real object. If desire is conceived this way, as a support for reality, then, they argue, 'its very nature as a real entity depends upon an "essence of lack" that produces the fantasized object. Desire thus conceived of as production, though merely the production of fantasies, has been explained perfectly by psychoanalysis' (Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 25).

But that is not how desire works. If it was, it would mean that all desire does is produce imaginary doubles of reality, creating dreamed-of objects to complement real objects. This subordinates desire to the objects it supposedly lacks, or needs, thus reducing it to an essentially secondary role. This is precisely what Deleuze was arguing against when he said that the task of philosophy is to overturn Platonism. Nothing is changed by correlating desire with need as psychoanalysis tends to do. 'Desire is not bolstered by needs, but rather the contrary; needs are derived from desire: they are counterproducts within the real that desire produces. Lack is a countereffect of desire; it is deposited, distributed, vacuolized within a real that is natural and social' (Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 27). This rejection of Lacan confirms what might be termed the neo-Kantian reading of desire because it means that we cannot define desire

in a transitive fashion: any attempt to define desire as the desire *for* something immediately puts us back into the realm of lack. Productive desire cannot be the desire for something, it must produce something.

This brings us to the most important twist in Deleuze and Guattari's rethinking of desire: if desire is productive and what it produces is real, then desire must be actual and not virtual. Deleuze and Guattari are quite explicit on this point. Referring to the formation of symptoms, such as hallucinations, Deleuze and Guattari write: '*The actual factor is desiring-production*' (Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 129). To which they add the following important clarification: 'The term "actual" is not used because it designates what is most recent [which is its usual meaning in both French and German], and because it would be opposed to "former" or "infantile" [which is how it is used in Freud's texts]; it is used in terms of its difference with respect to "virtual"' (Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 129). I doubt there is a more important or consequential statement in the whole of Deleuze and Guattari's writings. Its importance becomes clear in the next sentence:

> And it is the Oedipus complex that is virtual, either inasmuch as it must be actualized in a neurotic formation as a derived effect of the actual factor, or inasmuch as it is dismembered and dissolved in a psychotic formation as the direct effect of this same factor (Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 129, emphasis in original).

This is a major reversal of how we are usually taught to think about the relationship between the actual and the virtual. To actualize the virtual, then, does not mean that something that was previously only notional or imaginary is thereby made concrete and real (an idea turned into a thing, for example); rather, it means that something that was sensual is made present to the mind in an active sense (it becomes an object). The actual is that which concerns the mind right now, where concern would mean an active form of attention which could be either conscious or unconscious (what we commonly refer to as 'preoccupation' would be an example of unconscious active attention). Freud's biggest mistake, Deleuze and Guattari claim, which demonstrates his failure to understand this point, was to think that the unconscious is constructed on the model of the Oedipus story, which would mean that the unconscious is merely a shadow theatre for the conscious and not a productive system in its own right. Freud thus mistook the virtual for the actual and vice versa. The problem of the actual and the virtual is central to the entire schizoanalytic project, but, as is obvious from the foregoing discussion, Deleuze and Guattari's conceptualization of this problematic does not follow any of the expected paths – it is not

used in either an ontological or metaphysical sense, but wholly in what must be called a psychological sense. And that must be borne in mind at all times if one is not to be led astray by Deleuze and Guattari's often perplexing rhetoric. Assembling, or synthesizing, which is the other word Deleuze and Guattari sometimes use, is then the basic operation performed by the unconscious, or indeed the mind as a whole. There are a number of sub-operations of assembling that Deleuze and Guattari consider (chief among these is the process of forming and unforming or deforming territories), but for present purposes it suffices it to say that assembling is what the mind does.

It is only when we turn to a consideration of actions – and not just the elaboration of thoughts and ideas – that we can see the full complexity of this claim because now it becomes clear that the usual distinction between actual and virtual must be reversed. The physical elements in a given assemblage are not necessarily 'actual' from the point of view of the construction of the assemblage, they are merely the props, and as we'll see in the case of Little Joey (Bettelheim's patient), they aren't even necessary. In this precise sense they should be considered virtual. The actual is rather the productive set of ideas – the complex as Freud called it – that holds the props together and gives the overall arrangement (a perhaps better translation of *agencement* than assemblage) its coherence and purpose; I use the term 'complex' here quite deliberately, too. In the glossary Guattari appended to *Molecular Revolution in Brazil*, he writes, 'In the schizoanalytic theory of the unconscious, assemblage is conceived as replacing the Freudian "complex"' (Guattari and Rolnik 2008: 463). This is an important clue to understanding the concept of the assemblage, which is all too often simply equated with the composition of a set of physical props. The actual is the beating heart of the assemblage, that which makes a particular arrangement of things necessary. As the 'Little Joey' case demonstrates it remains in place even when the things themselves are removed.

In the context of artistic production, this raises some very interesting questions about the relationship between the physical conditions in which the art is produced – e.g., the studio – and the final arrangement of the artistic object itself.

The well-known British psychoanalyst Adam Phillips engages this question directly, albeit using a very different critical language, in a short but intriguing essay entitled 'Clutter: A Case History'. He asks what clutter – e.g., a messy bedroom, an untidy studio, a disorganized desk, and so on – might mean, or rather 'do', for the person doing the cluttering. For Phillips, the questions 'what does clutter mean?' and 'what does clutter do?' are related, obviously, but also

distinct, and one senses that he shares Deleuze and Guattari's view, or at least intuits the substance of their argument, that one can only properly engage the second question by first of all renouncing the first, something he finds hard to do because psychoanalysis constantly pushes his thinking in that direction (Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 109).

Psychoanalysis, especially but not exclusively its British, empirical strain, is, Phillips observes, curiously ambivalent about disorder, or what he prefers to call clutter so as not automatically to pathologize it. Virtually all its 'categories of pathology' are, as Phillips puts it, 'fantasies of disorder', yet its critical language 'repudiates chaos' as its basic duty (Phillips 2000: 60). On the one hand, psychoanalysis is professionally fascinated by instances of disorder, it is constantly on the alert for slips of the tongue, tics, compulsions, anything that might be construed as betraying a second order of psychical activity; yet, on the other hand, it cannot accept that disorder really is what it appears to be, it must uncover the hidden pattern, the secret order that renders the slips of the tongue, the tics, the compulsions, and so on, legible. The irony of this, from a schizoanalytic point of view, is that these 'slips' are the only forms of desiring-production that psychoanalysis recognizes and it negates them (Deleuze and Parnet 1987: 77). What psychoanalysis cannot countenance is the idea that clutter might be meaningless and still purposive. The tension here between 'what does it mean?' and 'what does it do?' pushes contemporary psychoanalysts like Phillips in a similar direction to Deleuze and Guattari's work.

Phillips offers as his paradigmatic example of what might be termed purposive clutter (i.e. an assemblage), the case of a painter in his mid-30s who came to see him because he felt he was becoming 'mildly agoraphobic'. The artist couldn't be completely sure of his self-diagnosis because his vocation kept him indoors at an easel most of the time anyway; but, he was sufficiently anxious about venturing anywhere near parks or the countryside to compel him to seek treatment. However, it was not the thought of being able to go outside again in relative comfort that drove him to the analyst's door. His agoraphobia did not imprison him, or if it did it was not the confining nature of it that worried him. Not unfamiliar with psychoanalysis, he was more concerned with what his symptoms might mean. He wondered if his anxiety concealed an unconscious or perhaps preconscious desire not to see someone or something. Was it, in other words, a defence or perhaps a screen? Was he afraid of going outside in case he encountered someone or something that was in fact the real cause of his discomfort? Doubtless, as an artist he was also troubled by the potential impairment of his visual apparatus such a will to

blindness entails. How could he have confidence in the 'truth' of his art with that gnawing worm of self-doubt eating away at his sense of aesthetic integrity? Paradoxically, the prospect of treatment also caused him not a little anxiety too because he sensed there was an intimate and productive connection (i.e. the assemblage manifesting itself as a complex) between his symptoms and his art, as though his not-seeing one thing was the price he paid for acuity in other areas. Phillips also sensed a connection between art and symptoms, although not in quite the direct fashion the patient feared.

So worried was the patient about the connection between his symptoms and his art that he tells his analyst 'I will be in a mess if I come here with agoraphobia and you cure me of painting!' (Phillips 2000: 62) Phillips treats his patient's presenting symptoms as a potential entrée onto a new 'field of virtuality' (Guattari 1995b: 52). He doesn't immediately seize on agoraphobia as *the* problem, but waits for the patient to explain why he thinks it is a problem. This is of course standard procedure for psychoanalysis, which effects its 'cure' not by interpreting symptoms for the patient, but by teaching the patient how to interpret them. Its 'talking cure' label is well-deserved because it is precisely by talking, by self-analysing, that the patient attains their cure, albeit at the price of a perpetual auto-critique. For Deleuze and Guattari this is one of the more egregious aspects of psychoanalytic practice; in their view, the psychoanalyst's silences are more pernicious than their pronouncements. 'It is well known that although psychoanalysts have ceased to speak, they interpret even more, or better yet, fuel interpretation on the part of the subject, who jumps from one circle of hell to the next' (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 114). Phillips short-circuits the process by asking an exceedingly presumptive question about the connection between the agoraphobic symptoms and the patient's vocation. In doing so he exposes the clinician's own desire and more or less buries the patient's, or at least traps it within a problematic not of his own choosing. Agoraphobia is the patient's symptom, to be sure, but the connection between it and his artistic predicament is the analyst's. That it is the analyst not the analysand who desires the connection is apparent in Phillips' wordlessness at the moment the connection is made – 'I had so much to say that I couldn't think of anything to say' (Phillips 2000: 62). If one were, as Phillips puts it, 'a crude old-style Freudian', it would not be difficult to discern in his momentary aphasia evidence of cathexis (Phillips 2000: 67).

The patient's first response to the question of whether he saw any links himself between his symptoms and his art was to recollect seeing a photograph

of Francis Bacon's studio and being amazed at how cluttered it was. 'How could he find anything in all that mess?' (Phillips 2000: 62) The messiness of Bacon's South Kensington studio was legendary in the artist's own lifetime. It has become even more renowned since his death in 1992, when he bequeathed the studio, though not the building that contained it (which he didn't own), to the Hugh Lane Gallery in Dublin. In the face of a great furore Bacon's studio was relocated to Ireland, where a reconstruction of the surface layer of it can now be viewed through glass display windows. The full depth of the mess is stored separately in an archival area. A team of ten archaeologists were employed to excavate the 'site' and catalogue and photograph every single component of the mess. Some 7,500 individual items were unearthed, identified, labelled, recorded and entered into a database, the whole process taking some three years to complete. The archaeologists found all manner of detritus, such as empty paint containers, slashed canvases, shreds of corduroy used to texture images, clippings from magazines, and empty champagne bottles. In many places the rubbish is piled several feet high and even the walls are smeared thick with paint – apparently Bacon never used a palette to mix or test his colours, he simply used any available surface, including the walls. Bacon never took out the trash, either, but just dropped it at his feet and let it accumulate layer upon layer in a manner that can only have been deliberate.

In interviews Bacon described the mess as essential to his art and for this reason this studio (one of several he utilized in the course of his long career) has been preserved with the thought that it somehow provides an insight into the artist's process, if not the art itself. Not unaware of the importance of a good story, and always conscious of the need to build up his 'legend' as an artist whose work comes together by accident rather than design, through free-flowing experimentation rather than conscious purpose, Bacon himself was known to say that 'this mess is rather like my mind; it may be a good image of what goes on inside me' (Edemariam 2008). The notion that Bacon's art is 'accidental' is a constant refrain in his interviews with David Sylvester (2008). He claimed in effect that his studio was an outward expression (i.e. a projection in Klein's terms) of what was going on in his mind, thus raising the question (which countless art historians have asked with regard to artists throughout the ages) of whether it can also tell us something about his art. Putting this into the language of symptomatology, the question would be: is the studio the symptom of the art, or the art the symptom of the studio?

Bacon seems to have wanted us to think there was a direct connection between his work and his workspace. He told the poet and writer Anthony

Cronin an anecdote about his childhood that cannot but point us in this direction. When he was a young child, Bacon's parents used to leave him in the care of their maid, Jessie Lightfoot, who doubled as his nanny. The maid had a boyfriend who would visit when his parents were away and as can be imagined the two of them would try to spend some time alone, but being a demanding child the young Francis would constantly interrupt them, until – exasperated – the maid took to locking him in a broom cupboard. She would leave him there for several hours in complete darkness, impervious to his screams. ' "That cupboard", Bacon said years later, "was the making of me" ' (Edemariam 2008). It is tempting to see in this statement the biographical support for Deleuze's impression that the scream in Bacon is nothing other than the body trying to escape itself, but that would be to make neurosis the basis of his art, which Deleuze constantly cautions us against.

There are two other 'vital anecdotes' (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 72–3; Buchanan 2000: 55) that Bacon offers which reinforce the view that the cupboard was the making of him and thereby compel us to think further about the relation (or non-relation as the case may be) between neurosis and art. First, Bacon repeatedly said he couldn't paint anywhere else but his studio – the size of the room was important, and judging by the way he cluttered it up, it seems as if he constantly wanted it to become more not less claustrophobic, but the most interesting and surprising thing he says about the space is that its quality of light was right for him, despite it having only one very small skylight. Indeed, he found he couldn't paint while visiting family in South Africa because it was too bright there. It is as though his artistic eye – the 'actual' living, beating heart of his artistic assemblage – was formed in the Stygian gloom of the cupboard at the top of the stairs and could only function properly in the absence of strong light. Second, Bacon repeatedly said he couldn't live anywhere else but the one bedroom flat where his studio was located. Although he became very wealthy over the course of his career and did in fact own a more comfortable flat nearby, he found he couldn't bear it and remained in his tiny flat on Reece Mews in which the kitchen doubled as a bathroom and the living room doubled as the bedroom (Edemariam 2008; Peppiatt 2008: 227).

Evidently, in his life as in his art, Bacon quite literally never left the cupboard, even if he was 'out' of it in the more usual sense. Both his choice of working space and his choice of living space can easily be read as symptomatic of the neurosis brewed in the crucible of 'that cupboard'. Anyone with even the slightest acquaintance with psychoanalysis could see that being locked in a confined space knowing that the object of one's affection – it could have been

either the maid or her lover – is nearby making love to somebody else is a potent combination almost guaranteed to induce some kind of hysteria.

> There was a profound, possibly neurotic, contradiction in Bacon that made him long for another style of domestic living which, once achieved, was rejected. […] At one point he bought an impressive studio at Roland Gardens, a short walk away [from the Reece Mews studio and flat] on the other side of the Old Brompton Road. He went to considerable trouble to get it decorated and furnished to his liking and then found he could not even begin to work there. It was 'too grand', and he felt 'castrated' there because the immaculate splendour of the new space inhibited him from wiping brushes on the wall, letting paint drip and amassing the various documents and tools he liked to have scattered around on the floor (Peppiatt 2008: 311–12).

Chris Stephens, co-curator of the Tate Modern's 2008 major retrospective of Bacon, makes the interesting suggestion that the relationship between the contents of the studio and the work produced should be considered viral. Speaking of the 1500 photographs unearthed in the studio, Stephens says 'he didn't necessarily paint any of those – and yet he's sort of trying to get that *feeling*, that tension and apprehension, in his own images. There's a sense that just by owning images they somehow infected him' (Edemariam 2008). Again, what one sees here is an attempt to create some kind of homology between the state of the studio and the work produced there.

Returning to Phillips' case history, what really struck his patient was the apparent contradiction between Bacon's messy studio and the precision and clarity – i.e. unclutteredness – of his art. The photograph of the studio he shows Phillips induces a feeling of claustrophobia in both analyst and analysand, but somewhat surprisingly it is the sharpness of the artwork rather than the clutter of the studio that gives rise to this feeling. The clutter of the studio is somehow necessary for the production of such lucid images, either as a kind of relief from their starkness, or perhaps as their residue. The studio would in this latter regard be something like the work's midden mound, the product of an aesthetic abreaction displacing clutter from the canvas onto the floor and walls of the studio. It's as if to 'unclog' (a favourite word of Bacon's) the virtual space of the canvas Bacon had to 'clog' the actual space of his studio. Either way, it was concluded by Phillips and his patient that the disordered state of Bacon's studio was in no way incidental to the nature of the aesthetic production and that got both of them thinking about how space works in art.

The association the artist makes between his present predicament as mild agoraphobic and Bacon is soon explained. The explanation has more to do

with their respective art than their apparent neuroses. Both share an affinity for clutter as an aesthetic mechanism of defence, though in Phillips' patient's case the connection to his art is much less direct than it is in Bacon.

Bacon had been an important influence in his formative years as an artist precisely because he learned from reading an interview with Bacon a technique that enabled him to breakthrough the deadlock of his compulsive cluttering. Bacon described his practice of throwing paint at the canvas, rather than brushing it on, or using a palette knife, as a means of breaking free from the tiresome constraints of form. Deleuze renders his thinking thus: 'The painter's problem is not how to enter the canvas, since he is already there […], but how to get out of it, thereby getting out of cliché, getting out of probability […]' (Deleuze 2003: 96). Accidents and experiments are his way of freeing himself from the predictability of the image and the sterility of pure abstraction. In the eyes of Phillips' patient, Bacon's lucidity was achieved through a deliberate messiness in both his art and his working conditions, or what it might be useful now to call Bacon's 'clutter assemblage'. As Phillips puts it: 'Not only did this idea fit with a whole nexus of then adolescent intellectual passions – Gide's gratuitous acts, Breton's random writing, the chance and indeterminacy of John Cage's compositions; in other words, a passion for loop holes, for ways of abrogating self-control in the service of contingencies – but it also fitted in with one of his own techniques for the uncalculated, which I imagine was an adolescent reworking of a childhood game' (Phillips 2000: 65). Here, then, life and art finally connect, but not directly – as I will discuss in a moment – since we never find out how exactly the artist deployed the insight Bacon's technique afforded him, we only learn of the memory of a childhood game the analyst assumes it evoked.

The artist's childhood game was an invention of the patient's own and involved piling his clothes on the floor in a disordered jumble (rather than storing them in an orderly way in his wardrobe) and wearing whatever came to hand first regardless of whether it matched anything else he was wearing. New clothes were simply added to the heap, the resulting accumulation intensifying his interest in the tactic. The more chaotic his dress became somehow the more satisfying it was, as though only in absolute randomness was his freedom from having to choose actually to be found. If he looked ill-dressed that meant he couldn't have chosen his clothes, so he was fully free from the burden of that particular regime. His 'bohemian' parents were at first quite tolerant, but even they cracked and eventually insisted on at least some semblance of orderliness. This 'mess-dress' tactic, as he called it, saved him from the tedious and in its

own way troubling chore of having to decide what to wear each morning. It meant, as he tried to explain to his disconcerted mother, that he no longer had to think about what clothing he would put on. It was also an abrogation of all responsibility for he how looked, which left him impervious to criticism. Since his clothes found him and not the other way round, he did not have to concern himself with whether or not his ensemble was fashionable. Occasionally he found it disagreeable not to be able to find the clothing items he was looking for, but he felt this was more than compensated for by the 'way he could both discover things he didn't know he was looking for and, of course, that he would find himself wearing such apparently unusual combinations of clothes' (Phillips 2000: 66). He had stopped himself from being able to make cluttered choices and freed himself to embrace contingency not as an obstacle to be overcome but as a source of expression.

But for Phillips' patient, what worked in life did not work in art. This might seem surprising, but it reveals something essential about the assemblage – it is not a technique or method, it cannot simply be adapted to meet new circumstances, new problems. Each assemblage addresses and resolves its own singular problem. Moreover, despite appearances, and this point cannot be emphasized enough, assemblages are not found in or constituted by the physical arrangement of things, spaces or objects. They are constituted in particular kinds of relations; sometimes these relations require physical props as support, but the props are never in themselves essential. This is the key lesson to be drawn from Bettelheim (although it isn't one Bettelheim himself recognized). Cluttering up his bedroom worked for Phillips' patient in a singular way: it was the solution to nameless anxieties to do with dress; but when it came to his art clutter seemed to be the problem not the solution. Cluttering his room seemed to free his mind from the unknown anxieties that beset him, but it did not save him (as it apparently did Bacon) from cluttering the canvas. If for Bacon cluttering his physical surrounds was the price to be paid for unclogging his canvas, then the opposite was the case for Phillips' patient, who seemed (in his own mind) to carry the clutter of the physical space over to the virtual space of the canvas. The cluttered canvases he seemed inevitably to produce induced a great deal of anxiety and effectively paralysed him artistically. What he felt he needed was a tactic like Bacon's that could stop him from ruining – in his own eyes – his paintings. He needed a means of 'unclogging' his art.

Interestingly, Phillips does not read his patient's seemingly helpless cluttering of his art as entirely self-defeating. Underneath the self-defeat he detects an

undiscovered victory (an affirmative form of psychoanalysis' standard reversal into its opposite thesis). Phillips sees the clutter as the expression of an unconscious wish to sabotage the painting process, not to bring it to a halt so much as unconsciously to compel it to take another direction. Beneath the wish to sabotage, then, there is still another wish, which is to produce something new – the first wish is then interpreted as the means of fulfilling the latter, deeper and as it were truer wish. Phillips reasons that clutter 'may not be about the way we hide things from ourselves but the way we make ourselves look for things. It is, as it were, a self-imposed hide and seek' (Phillips 2000: 63). Phillips' clinical judgement is that clutter is a problem concealing a solution. What Bacon modelled for the artist, which only Phillips' intervention enabled him to see, was not how to unclutter his art, the goal his mess-dress had perhaps been aiming for; rather, it showed him how to clutter up the clutter and make clutter work for him and not against him.

Phillips thus altered the artist's perception of his own art such that clutter ceased to be the unwanted outcome or endpoint of his artistic endeavour, but the matter to hand, the substance or beginning of his work. 'His coming for psychoanalysis meant we could think about – in relation to his presenting symptom – what made this new kind of clutter work for him' (Phillips 2000: 70). But just what kind of work this newly conceived clutter was actually doing Phillips is evidently unable to say, save (echoing New Criticism's standard defence of difficult poetry) that by creating a stoppage in the artistic endeavour it forced the artist to be still more creative in order to retrieve it from the abyss. Phillips doesn't say whether he managed to diagnose, much less 'cure', his patient of his agoraphobia, but that was clearly never his point (hence Deleuze and Guattari's frequent complaint that the autocritique engendered by psychoanalysis is interminable – there is no way of bringing it to an end). 'It was the links between his present, apparently mild symptoms and the initial dilemmas my patient found himself in when he began painting as a fourteen-year-old boy that brought the analysis to life' (Phillips 2000: 63).

Phillips concludes that his patient was trying to construct something with his clutter, but is at a loss to say what it was. He can see readily enough that clutter is not merely a tic, a nervous habit with no conceivable purpose, but something purposive and even constructive. It is obvious to both him and, as it turns out, the patient that clutter is effective, or better yet, productive; it is a means to a perhaps ineffable but still strongly felt end. What Phillips demonstrates with admirable economy is that clutter can relieve one of the stress of having to decide what to wear, it can make clothes themselves take on that particular

burden; clutter can also relieve one of the starkness and anxiety of a blank canvas; by the same token, it can open an image up, get it out of its self-inflicted impasses. Beyond this point, however, Phillips's assiduously Freudian language reaches its own limit; his revealingly half-hearted foray into an Oedipal analysis of clutter (as a response to parental authority) betrays the extent to which his Freudian analytic apparatus is stretched past capacity.

Midway through his analysis, Phillips appears to lose his nerve because he ceases to describe clutter in constructive terms and falls back on the psychoanalytic standby of the reaction-formation. On the one hand, he wants to describe clutter as both the obstacle and the object of desire, which obviously presents no difficulty for psychoanalysis. But on the other hand, he also wants to describe clutter as being a kind of resource to action, and here psychoanalysis is much less sure of itself because the accidental can never be just that, accidental. Phillips senses that clutter functions as something like a reaction-formation, but if this were true it would simply be yet another instance of it functioning as both obstacle and object of desire. If clutter does function as a resource to action, then what exactly does it enable us to do? Here Phillips' answer is solidly constructivist, even if his avowed theoretical position is not: clutter enables the artist to create art by giving him a way out of the black holes his impetuous beginnings propel him into. It cannot then be said that clutter is either an obstacle to or object of desire because desire neither flows towards it nor indeed around it, but through it. It is, rather, a necessary arrangement made between the artist and the blank canvas.

Phillips cannot make this leap. At the fateful moment when his analysis might have broken free from psychoanalysis' eternal compulsion to exchange function for meaning, and substitute representation for production, he reintroduces the concept of lack and smothers function beneath the weight of childhood memory – he argues that the artist's clutter is not operative in itself, in its full positivity, but functions only as an obstacle to be overcome. In short, it is the proverbial nothing that gives rise to something. More to the point, Phillips betrays his own intuition – instead of a symptom that is meaningless but purposive he winds up with a symptom that is meaningful but purposeless. The clutter on the canvas is merely the repetition of the sartorial clutter the artist deliberately introduced into his daily routine, only now it is interiorized and rendered unconscious. It is as if psychoanalysis has only two ways of conceiving the relation between the interiority of desire and the outside world: introjection and projection – either everything we do as has an internal introjected counterpart in the psyche, or everything we do has an external projected counterpart of something that

takes place first of all in the psyche. In either case, the world thus described is a world of mirrors and doubles in which everything we see and act upon has always already taken place somewhere else. As a consequence, there is no real connection between the world outside and desire – neither can influence the other because they are both reduced to mirror images of each other (Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 28). So clutter is either the projection of an inner mental process (which Phillips thinks was the case for Bacon), or it is an introjection of an external set of circumstances (which Phillips thinks is the case for his patient).

Deleuze and Guattari's work cannot be understood in isolation from psycho-analysis – it is not merely a critique of psychoanalysis; it is, as they themselves say, a re-engineering of psychoanalysis. Deleuze and Guattari are quite explicit in saying they do not 'share the pessimism' that consists in thinking that psychoanalysis can only be remedied from the outside (or, what amounts to the same thing, flat-out rejected); they believe, rather, in the possibility of what they call an 'internal reversal' (Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 82). If one ignores Deleuze and Guattari's hyperbole and concentrates instead on the specifics of their critique of psychoanalysis, it is clear schizoanalysis is not so much a radical departure from psychoanalysis as the logical development of it in the face of precisely the kinds of diagnostic impasses the Phillips's case presents. I would go so far as to say schizoanalysis is, like psychoanalysis, a form of metapsychology, but whereas Freud mapped the landscape of neuroses, Deleuze and Guattari are cartographers of psychoses. In *Dialogues*, Deleuze states that he and Guattari have only two complaints against psychoanalysis: 'it breaks up all productions of desire and crushes all formations of utterances' (Deleuze and Parnet 1987: 77). 'Among the most grotesque passages in Freud are those on "fellatio": how the penis stands for the cow's udder, and the cow's udder for a mother's breast. A way of showing that fellatio is not a "true" desire, but means something else, conceals something else' (Deleuze and Parnet 1987: 77). This is how psycho-analysis crushes all formations of utterances, by always insisting that desire is unable to speak for itself, that it can only speak indirectly through signs, substitutes and symbols (i.e. via introjection and projection). These two complaints are borne out in Deleuze and Guattari's interrogation of three case histories by three different authors: 'Little Joey' (Bruno Bettelheim), 'Little Richard' (Melanie Klein) and 'Little Hans' (Sigmund Freud).

As we've seen already, 'Little Joey' is in many ways a paradigmatic figure for Deleuze and Guattari because his apparently pathological behaviour is so explicitly bound up with machines. A patient at the Sonia Shankman Orthogenic School in Chicago, which Bettelheim directed for several years,

Joey was classified as autistic, although his symptoms seem more consistent with schizophrenia. Joey thought of himself as a machine and he was only 'present', i.e. attentive and communicative, when his internal pistons and gears, or whatever else his mechanisms consisted of, were churning over. The rest of the time he was silent, virtually catatonic, hence the autistic label. His machines needed an energy source to function, so wherever he went he had to be 'plugged in'. Bettelheim describes Joey's routine as follows:

> Laying down an imaginary wire he connected himself with his source of electricity. Then he strung the wire from an imaginary outlet to the dining room table to insulate himself, then plugged himself in (He had tried to use real wire, but this we could not allow […]). The imaginary electrical connections he had to establish before he could eat, because only the current ran his ingestive apparatus. He performed this ritual with such skill that one had to look twice to be sure there was neither wire nor outlet nor plug (Bettelheim 1967: 235).

He had other machines too, such as his sleeping machine, which consisted of an elaborate array of aluminium foil, paper plates and plastic cups. Effectively, he had a different machine for each of the operations he was expected to perform in daily life – breathing, eating, sleeping, bathing, urinating and so on. These machines remained necessary and – as I've emphasized several times already – even continued to function when Bettelheim's staff removed the props. So while they were real machines, i.e. actual machines, they were not necessarily physical machines. Bettelheim was of the view that Joey's fascination with machinery 'ruled out any contact with reality', so his therapeutic strategy focused on weaning him off his machines (Bettelheim 1967: 243). But this never proved effective because while Joey was happy to give up the props, he never gave up on his machines.

Deleuze and Guattari are surprisingly soft in their criticism of Bettelheim, perhaps because in contrast to both Freud and Klein he is at least willing to entertain the idea that the machines are what Joey says they are and not substitutes for his parent's sexual organs.[3] Klein, for her part, as Deleuze and Guattari relate with unconcealed contempt, interpreted her patient Little Richard's interest in toy trains as symbolic of his penis, which in her view he wanted to drive into the tunnel, which was of course mummy (Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 45). Klein interpreted Richard's behaviour as regressive and saw all his actions in terms of a desire to return to the womb. In doing so she overcoded all his little machines, his trains and so on, and his statements, with a narrative framework that is nowhere to be found in anything she recorded her patient actually saying.

In 1977, Deleuze, along with students and friends (Félix Guattari, Claire Parnet and André Scala), conducted a seminar, later published as 'The Interpretation of Utterances', in which he made patent the degree to which analysts don't listen to their patients by placing in parallel the actual statements made by patients and the statements of what the analysts 'heard'. The disparity between the two sets of statements is quite striking (Deleuze 2006).

One of the test cases he uses is Klein's Richard and as one reads his statements freed from his analyst's overcoding it seems clear that he wasn't schizophrenic at all. Most likely he was traumatized by the fact that his father was away at war and that he himself had been evacuated from London to rural Scotland to escape the bombing. His dark and rather harrowing pictures of warplanes, submarines, explosions, but also maps and diagrams that look like so many escape plans would seem to bear this out. In any case, for our purposes here, Klein's analysis bears comparison with Phillips' because it centres on an arrangement of objects and assumes that this arrangement is neither accidental nor insignificant. In contrast to Klein, though, despite the obvious debt his work owes the theory of object relations she helped initiate, Phillips does not overcode his patient's clutter and try to give meaning to the specific objects. Rather he attempts to see the whole assemblage as being in some way functional, but is at a loss to explain exactly how this works. This is in effect what Deleuze and Guattari urge that Klein should have done and their work is taken up with explaining how this might be made to work both analytically and therapeutically. But at least Klein was able to see that there was an arrangement of objects that was important to her patient. Freud failed to appreciate that any such arrangement existed for Little Hans.

Whenever Hans spoke of horses all Freud heard was 'your father's penis' because his methodology prescribed that every object encountered must be representative or in some way symbolic of another object – invariably related to the parent's sexuality – that could not be mentioned in this particular context. Thus on this view of things Hans speaks of horses because he cannot, or, at any rate, does not know how to, speak of matters relating to human sexuality. In effect, this means that whenever Hans is speaking about horses he must in fact be speaking about something else. Likewise, when Freud's other famous case study the Wolfman speaks of wolves he must be speaking about something else. And because that something else is always presumed to be the Oedipal triangle of mummy–daddy–me, as Deleuze and Guattari put it, the horses and the wolves are never thought about for themselves. Freud never asks whether the horses or the wolves might be meaningful in their own right; he assumes that they were

just available images, suitable visual material for conveying symbolic meanings having nothing to do with either horses or wolves, except in their capacity to bring to mind parental sexuality. Deleuze and Guattari reject this view of things and in doing so create a new form of interpretive hermeneutic, one that focuses on the capacities of things (their affects in other words) in themselves, rather than their possible symbolic referent points. The horse doesn't stand for Hans's father; rather, it has certain affects that mesh with Hans's own to form what Deleuze and Guattari refer to as an assemblage.

> Little Hans's horse is not representative but affective. It is not a member of a species but an element or individual in a machinic assemblage: draft horse-omnibus-street. It is defined by a list of active and passive affects in the context of the individuated assemblage it is part of: having eyes blocked by blinders, having a bit and bridle, being proud, having a peepee-maker, pulling heavy loads, being whipped, falling, making a din with its legs, biting, etc. These affects circulate and are transformed within the assemblage: what a horse 'can do' (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 257).

In each of these three case studies, Deleuze and Guattari are critical of psycho-analysis for its inability to think or see the object except in terms of either introjection or projection – the train cannot but be daddy, likewise neither the horse nor the wolf cannot but be daddy. As ingenious as psycho-analysis is at making connections between images, there is also a clear predictability to its procedure that deadens the interest we might have in the connections it is able to make. If everything can be traced back to the Oedipal scenario in one form or another – whether as literal scene or abstract model – then as an interpretation of a symptom, or more impor-tantly of a text, it lacks subtlety and ultimately credibility. Deleuze and Guattari's rhetoric is at its most unbuttoned when they lampoon Freud for constantly bringing everything back to Oedipus, as though there were no other way of understanding the operations of the unconscious. Unlike Freud or Klein, Phillips does listen to his patients, quite attentively too it would seem, but he is nevertheless hampered by the requirements of the interpretative framework he has inherited from them. He tries to under-stand clutter for itself and not as a representative of something else, yet in the end he lacks the requisite vocabulary. Deleuze and Guattari offer new resources for the kinds of diagnostic and interpretive dilemmas Phillips encounters in this case that do not demand a constant return to Oedipus. Those resources are, to my mind at least, superior to those offered by Freud,

but as I've emphasized above, they can only be understood when read against a psychoanalytic background.

Notes

1 This is a revised version of a paper that was previously published in 2011 as 'The Clutter Assemblage' in *Drain: Journal of Contemporary Art and Culture*, 11, http://drainmag.com/power/ (accessed 1 February 2014).

2 This essay originally appeared as the appendix to the second edition of *Anti-Oedipus*. In the text Guattari actually refers to Julius Goldberg, but from the discussion that follows it is clear he meant Rube Goldberg.

3 For example, they say nothing at all about Bettelheim's now widely discredited theory of the genesis of autism, which he blames on mothers for not loving their children enough.

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Schizo-Revolutionary Art: Deleuze, Guattari and Communization Theory

Stephen Zepke

'insurrection is an art'. (Jacques Camatte 2011: 38)

'It is as a rupture with the reproduction of what we are that will necessarily form the horizon of our struggles' (Endnotes 2011: 31).

What is the 'art' of insurrection? It encompasses – for Deleuze and Guattari at least – a homemade atomic bomb and a delicate landscape painted with the soft, wet swish of Turner's brush (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 345, 1983: 132), which is to say it is not defined by the specifics of its material, its technique or its meaning, but by the nature of the act. The 'art' of insurrection is a mode of acting, of being in the world, a revolutionary style of life. But what is this? We can always point to something and say, 'It's that' – a bomb, a brush – but this says more about the 'that' than about the 'it'. In fact, 'it's that' perfectly captures the paradoxical ontology of the 'art' of insurrection, it is *at once* an actual moment in the world, and the way in which this moment transforms itself into something else. The 'art' of insurrection then, is a transformative action by which something overcomes its determining conditions, an 'art' at once political, philosophical and aesthetic. An 'art' at once in and of the world, and in the process of leaving it.

But all this remains typically vague, invoking a grand alliance between politics, philosophy and art through broad gestures loosely amenable to weapon, pen or brush – a kind of metaphorical allegiance between practices which barely goes beyond its evocation, its righteous self-evidence. This will never be good for anyone, because its fatuous and entirely general enthusiasms are precisely what the 'art' of insurrection is not. Insurrection is instead immediately singular and finite, it is something real, a thing – or better, a process. But this

'thing-process' is defined by its singular trajectory, making it undeterminable, immeasurable, infinitely open, aleatory and self-organizing. It exists in a world where, Deleuze and Guattari tell us, '*everything is possible...*' (1983: 328). In this sense an insurrectionary thing-process (Guattari calls it a 'schizoanalytic entity' (2013: 53)) can neither be described nor represented: 'The undecidable is the germ and locus par excellence of revolutionary decision' (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 522). The art of insurrection can only be enacted, and in doing so it constructs/discovers, as Deleuze and Guattari say, 'an *unknown country*' (1983: 318), 'the new world […] a world created in the process of its tendency, its coming undone, its deterritorialization' (1983: 322). This new world is that of 'the real in itself' (1983: 379), a reality that is always a 'work in progress' (1983: 318). This means that the specificity and particularity of this new world exists, but this being is becoming, it is always being constructed. This emergent new world exists within our everyday actuality, but only as a repressed and exploited dream that occasionally bursts through in insurrectionary explosions. These explosions are the schizo-real, and it is the schizoanalyst who creates them: 'The schizoanalyst is a mechanic', Deleuze and Guattari say, 'and schizoanalysis is solely functional' (1983: 322).[1] Schizoanalysis is the functional 'art' of making something – a class, a concept, a painting – escape from its 'self'. And our selves first of all, we must escape our limits. 'What does schizoanalysis ask? Nothing more than a little bit of a *relation to the outside*, a little real reality' (Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 334).

The 'art' of schizoanalysis can be concretely understood in political terms through Communization theory's view of revolution, and in aesthetic terms through a sublime theory of art. In fact we could understand these three terms as the ontological, political and aesthetic poles of a diagram of insurrection, a diagram this essay will attempt to sketch. This diagram is not an abstract idea but a practice. It begins from a method of immanent critique that reveals a system's a priori conditions of possibility (our inheritance of Kant's 'genius', according to Deleuze (1983: 91)), and then invents techniques by which these conditions are overcome and so discovers their 'principle of internal genesis' (our inheritance from Nietzsche, Deleuze will say (1983: 91)). All three poles of our diagram proceed in this manner, and together they constitute an outline of 'political art' in Deleuze and Guattari's sense, an art that is 'schizo-revolutionary'.

Why a schizoanalytic theory of political art? Because even the most cursory reading of *Anti-Oedipus* must conclude that schizoanalysis is a critique of capitalism by and through art.[2] Deleuze and Guattari map how the mechanisms of representation and Oedipus capture desire, and subject it to capitalist exploitation,

while giving overwhelmingly artistic examples (that are also models) of insurrectionary desire (Proust, Miller, Lawrence, Rimbaud, Ray, Kafka, Beckett, Butler, Burroughs, Nijinsky, Chaplin, Artaud, Lindner, Tintoretto, Lotto, Turner, Cage, Lautreamont, Celine, etc.). Indeed, as Guattari will later argue, schizoanalysis is an 'aesthetic paradigm' because the analyst works as an artist:

> This is art, this unnameable point, this point of non-sense that the artist works. In the domain of schizoanalysis it is the same aesthetic paradigm: how can one work a point that is not discursive, a point of subjectification that will be melancholic, chaotic, psychotic (Guattari 2011b: 47–8)?[3]

That schizoanalysis is an insurrectionary 'art' is an explicit assumption of Deleuze and Guattari's work; what remains to be seen is how this art manifests in directly political and artistic terms.

Capitalism and schizophrenia

The subtitle of both *Anti-Oedipus* and *A Thousand Plateaus* is 'Capitalism and Schizophrenia'. This subtitle does not offer us an opposition in the usual sense, because in fact capitalism is a form of schizophrenia. What then is schizophrenia? Schizophrenia is a mental illness in which the mediating forms of representation that enable the subject both to distinguish themselves from and to place themselves within the world have broken down (i.e. it is an absolute deterritorialization), meaning that life is experienced as an unmediated flow of sensation that exceeds and often terrorizes 'normal' subjectivity. Schizophrenia is obviously a terrible tragedy and painful suffering for those who experience it, but nevertheless Deleuze and Guattari adopt it both as their model for reality and as their technique for achieving it. As Guattari puts it:

> Schizoanalysis approaches all modalities of subjectivation in light of the world of the mode of being in the world of psychosis. Because nowhere more than here is the ordinary modelisation of everyday existence so denuded: […] with psychosis the world of standardised Dasein loses its consistency. Alterity, as such, becomes the primary question (1995: 63).

Obviously, then, schizoanalysis will develop techniques by which social and subjective 'normality' are overcome, and a new way of being is invented.[4] But what are these norms? These norms are capitalism.

Let's look more closely at *Anti-Oedipus* to get a better idea of the co-implication of schizophrenia and capitalism. 'At the heart of *Capital*', Deleuze and Guattari

write (1983: 225), referring both to the book and the economic system, a deterritorialized flow of labour meets a deterritorialized flow of capital capable of purchasing it. Each of these flows emerges from a decoding of the social structures that had previously contained it, and their relation (which is differential, a 'disjunctive synthesis') achieves a new regime of abstraction that concretizes an amount of abstract labour in a commodity (measured by money as the 'general equivalent'). This conjunction defines the social field particular to capitalism, on one side variable capital (labour power) and on the other constant capital (the power of machines). Surplus value flows from one side to the other, ensuring that the productive machine keeps expanding, but this also introduces one of the defining paradoxes of capitalism (Deleuze and Guattari call it an 'axiom' (1983: 511)), the declining rate of profit. In order to increase productive efficiency, more and more profit is invested into fixed capital (i.e. machines), but this means that the relative return on investment declines, even as the raw amount of return increases. As Marx explains in the third volume of *Capital*: 'The fall in the rate of profit thus expresses the falling ratio between surplus-value itself and the total capital advanced' (1991: 320). This tendency, Deleuze and Guattari argue, is the 'diagram' of capital:

> The tendency's only limit is internal, and it is continually going beyond it, but by displacing the limit – that is, by reconstituting it, by rediscovering it as an internal limit to be surpassed again by means of a displacement; thus the continuity of the capitalist process engenders itself in this break of a break that is always displaced, in this unity of the schiz and the flow (1983: 230).

The break of the break … the deterritorializing power of the schiz is reterritorialized in the constant development of the machinery of production, and the more rapidly this technological revolution moves, the more brutal its controls and repressions. But, and this is the crucial onto-political point for Deleuze and Guattari: 'In the expanded immanence of the system, the limit tends to reconstitute in its displacement the thing it tended to diminish in its primitive emplacement' (1983: 231). This means capitalism is permanently in crisis, needing the 'machinic surplus-value' it produces in order to maintain 'growth', but also having to control this force so as not to be destroyed by it. 'For capitalism', Deleuze and Guattari argue, 'it is a question of binding the schizophrenic charges and energies into a world axiomatic that always opposes the revolutionary potential of decoded flows with new interior limits' (1983: 246). This means channeling machinic surplus-value into greater exploitation of labour on one side, and increasing automation on the other. As we know,

within our contemporary cybernetic context these are complementary, and they can never stop. Greater automation and exploitation ('machinic enslavement') does not fix the declining rate of profit in monetary terms, but it introduces a new realm of decoding within the cybernetic body that succeeds in continually displacing the approaching limit. This is the emergence of deterritorialization as the necessary logic of the capitalist social system, and the means by which the entire social system is reterritorialized on this schizo force. This requires an 'extremely rigorous axiomatic that maintains the energy of the flows in a bound state on the body of capital as a socius that is deterritorialized' (1983: 246). As a result,

> the flows of code that are 'liberated' in science and technics by the capitalist régime engender a machinic surplus value that does not directly depend on science and technics themselves, but on capital – a surplus value that is added to human surplus value and that comes to correct the relative diminution of the latter, *both of them constituting the whole of the surplus value of flux that characterizes the system* (1983: 234).

The rise of neo-liberalism has intensified capitalism's foundational rhythm of schizophrenic deterritorializations and their biopolitical reterritorialization within increasingly cybernetic forms of subjectivity. This, the 'third age' of 'humans-machines systems', or 'machinic enslavement' (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 505–6), has thrust the realm of affect (now produced as a commodity) and thought (immaterial labour) to the forefront of political struggles. Schizoanalysis attempts to liberate thought and sensation from their cybernetic enslavement, through a 'machinics of existence whose object is not circumscribed within fixed extrinsic coordinates', but is instead directly compossible with 'Universes of alterity' (Guattari 1995: 64). This is not a rejection of cybernetic technology, but rather the necessity of inventing machinic interfaces that do not sacrifice schizophrenia on the alters of capitalist subjectivity and representation (i.e. profit). As a result, Guattari concludes: 'Just as the schizo has broken moorings with subjective individuation, the analysis of the Unconscious should be recentred on the non-human processes of subjectivation that I call machinic, but which are more than human – superhuman in a Nietzschean sense' (1995: 71–2). They are Nietzschean because the schizo has overcome its human conditions to enter the non-human flows of this expanded, 'machinic' life (2011a: 154). This is a sublime subjectivation, the emergence of an inhuman (non) subject whose activity (both material and immaterial) exceeds its economic determinations ('labour'), its subjective subjugation (whether as 'entrepreneur'

or 'indebted'), and its corporeal limitations (the organism), to reveal its transcendental condition of alterity, or becoming. Such activity, according to Guattari, embodies a process of self-othering that is 'the point of continual emergence of every form of creativity' (2013: 5). In schizoanalysis 'heterogeneity ceases to be something simply registered: it becomes productive of Effects. [...] It doesn't affirm its difference *against* the others but from its own interior, in an intensive mode of existential autonomization' (2013: 88, 165).

Guattari argues that machinic surplus-value is double sided, being used both to further our enslavement but also to provide a surplus to capital itself. This is a surplus to the representational and subjectivizing mechanisms of capital, a surplus of sensation (the surplus of the surplus, we might say) that defines the aesthetic paradigm, and gives art its power. As he writes:

> precisely because it intervenes on the most functional levels – sensorial, affective and practical – the capitalist machinic enslavement is liable to reverse its effects, and to lead to a new type of machinic surplus-value accurately described by Marx (expansion of alternatives for the human race, constant renewal of the horizon of desires and creativity) (1996: 220).

But given the immanence of machinic surplus-value and machinic enslavement within cybernetic capitalism, the question remains: how can we escape? In *Anti-Oedipus* 'lines of flight' emerge out of the 'creative' sectors of capitalist production that are most strongly controlled – the areas of science and art.[5] It is here that the greatest threat to the system emerges, a threat that is not so much an acceleration, as a phase-change that escapes capital's exploitation of the 'surplus value' that art and science release. For all types of art the schizoanalytic question is the same: whether art remains on the level of its capitalist conditions of possibility – its market, its meaning, its expressive modalities, etc. – or whether it can move beyond these limits.

To prevent this capital enforces a regime of 'anti-production' on the creativity of scientists and artists, 'as though they risked unleashing flows that would be dangerous for capitalist production and charged with a revolutionary potential, so long as these flows are not co-opted or absorbed by the laws of the market' (Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 245). Anti-production works through all the mechanisms that prevent or recoup creative excess, whether by refusing funding or support, or by rewards that monetize this excess. In this sense anti-production is not the opposite of production, but rather supports and develops it. As a result, the greater visibility, prosperity and integration enjoyed by the arts today does not mean they have more creative freedom. Just the opposite.

As I will argue, contemporary artistic practice marks a particular low-point in creativity and insurrectionary spirit, not least because 'resistance' is now aggressively marketed as one of art's selling points. In this way, Deleuze and Guattari acerbically argue, capital doubles the flows of cultural production with a 'flow of *stupidity* that effects an absorption and a realization, and that ensures the integration of groups and individuals into the system' (1983: 236). This means that artistic production can be encouraged and increasingly exploited as long as it is always already subjected to capitalist axiomatics, and so merely reflects the 'stupidity' of its 'workers'. What is needed, as Maurizio Lazzarato points out, is a struggle that denounces stupidity in this sense, and so divides people and refuses the governing consensus (2012: 157–8).[6] This is true in the art world, as it is everywhere else. The question of course, is how are we to do it?

The practice of schizoanalysis begins with an immanent critique of existing conditions, by which something that escapes those conditions is produced. Deleuze and Guattari provide us with a clear picture of our conditions – capitalism – and their immanent mechanism of escape – schizophrenia. But because capitalism is itself 'schizophrenic', what escapes it is always a 'minority', not simply a numerical minority – although it often is this – but as well an ontological 'minority', a mode of being that does not obey the dominant conditions, and is insurgent. The 'minority' therefore marks a continuation of class politics, but in a form that is defined ontologically and aesthetically rather than economically or politically in their traditional senses.[7] 'Minor' politics is a particular action that escapes capital's axiomatics and then *might* proliferate into a larger movement. This is where it becomes possible to connect artistic practice to political action, because by creating experiences that escape our conditions of possibility art is able to contribute directly to the task of political transformation. Such 'minor' deterritorializations are anomalies, mutations, monsters, madness, everything that is condemned, controlled and marginalized within 'normal' life. As a result, Guattari deadpans: '*Important things never happen where we expect*' (2011a: 196). But this 'micro' dimension of politics is not detached from the 'whole', because both part and whole emerge according to the same ontological process (schizophrenia). In other words, the 'minor' always emerges within the midst of capital, as what within capital exceeds it. Thus, Guattari explains, 'there exists a sort of matter of unconscious deterritorialization, a matter of the possible, which constitutes the essence of politics, yet a transhuman, transsexual, transcosmic politics' (2011a: 167). This is a '*politics of desire "before" objects and subjects have been specified*' (2011a: 167), an 'ontological pragmatics' (2013: 35), or '*a diagrammatic politics*' that, Guattari thunders: 'can do nothing

but challenge every status of hegemony for linguistics, psychoanalysis, social psychology, and the entirety of the human, social, juridicial, economic sciences, etc.' (2011a: 174).

Communization theory

Good. We understand the ontological base of the insurrectionary 'art' of schizoanalysis, but we are yet to elaborate it in a concrete political or artistic sense. This is where Communization theory comes in, which suggests a schizo-analytic understanding of the proletariat.[8] In contemporary capitalism, where the proletariat is entirely subsumed by capital, the only possible response is for the proletariat to schizoanalyze itself, to escape or even negate its own function as a necessary part of capitalist processes of valuation and exploitation. Conveniently, Deleuze and Guattari suggest that their figure of the 'minority' and the process of 'minor' politics takes this path:

> The power of minority, of particularity, finds its figure or its universal consciousness in the proletariat. But as long as the working class defines itself by an acquired status, or even by a theoretically conquered State, it appears only as 'capital', a part of capital (variable capital), and does not leave the *plan(e) of capital*. […] On the other hand, it is by leaving the plan(e) of capital, and never ceasing to leave it, that a mass becomes increasingly revolutionary and destroys the dominant equilibrium of denumerable sets (1987: 521–2).[9]

This important passage clearly echoes Communization theory, which begins from the idea, as Jacques Camatte – one of the founding fathers of this theory – puts it: 'When the proletariat is broken, its immediate form of existence is the process of capital itself' (1995: 31). As a result, the only revolutionary action available to the working class is to become-minor and so overcome itself. Schizoanalysis will achieve this aim precisely to the extent that it is able to return us, as Deleuze and Guattari write, to 'the great nonappropriated, nonpos-sessed flow, *incommensurable with wages and profits*' (italics added, 1983: 372).

Communization theory therefore shares with Deleuze and Guattari a theory of revolution as immanent critique. In the words of the Endnotes collective, Communization is 'a conception of communism as neither an ideal or a programme, but a movement immanent to the world of capital, that which abolishes capitalist social relations on the basis of premises currently in existence' (2008: 18). The status of this immanent movement is, however, vigorously debated within Communization theory. On the one hand, there is

an 'ontological' theory of Communization (for our purposes represented by Jacques Camatte and Gilles Dauvé) that is broadly compatible with Deleuze and Guattari's position, while on the other is a 'dialectical' position (most forcefully articulated by the group *Théorie Communiste*) for whom any ontology of revolution transcends current existence, thereby diluting the power of negation. *Théorie Communiste* criticise any attribution of an essential or ontological form to revolutionary struggle, whether this is understood as an invariant revolutionary potential (Dauvé and Deleuze and Guattari[10]), or as an essential human desire for community (or *Gemeinwesen* as Camatte understands this term drawn from Marx's early work). 'The proletariat', *Théorie Communiste* write,

> does not have an a-classist or communitarian dimension: it has, in its contradiction with capital, the ability to abolish capital and class society and to produce community (the social immediacy of the individual). This is not a dimension that it carries within itself – neither as a nature that comes to it from its situation in the capitalist mode of production, nor as the finally discovered subject of the general tendency of history towards community. [...] Rather it is the actuality of its contradictory relation to capital in a historically specific mode of production' (2008a: 80. 83).

For *Théorie Communiste* contradiction is dialectical negation, and emerges from within the constitutive logic of capitalism itself. But in our current biopolitical situation – what they call the real domination of the proletariat by capital – this constitutive contradiction now lives within the body of the proletariat, and revolution through self-negation – or Communization – becomes possible: 'We are in contradiction with capital on the basis of what we are, that is to say of what capital is, and not from what we could be, a potential which would somehow already exist as suffering' (2008b: 198).[11] It is as if a certain 'schizophrenia' now defines the proletariat, whose contradiction to capital has emerged as the very logic of capital's development. By negating itself (i.e. negating the negation), then the proletariat can strike a revolutionary blow against capitalism, and in this blow communism comes into existence. *Théorie Communiste* therefore advocate a more traditional Marxist position (they specifically reject the reliance on early-Marx of their Communization opponents (2008b: 215)) based on Hegelian dialectics, but it is divested of any teleology, making communism the utterly specific moment of a revolutionary act. Thus commun*ism* becomes Communi*zation*, or as *Théorie Communiste* put it: 'It is this totality itself – this moving contradiction – which produces its own supersession in the revolutionary action of the proletariat against its own class-being, against

capital' (2008b: 215). While the rigorous immanence of revolution in *Théorie Communiste*'s position is appealing, it does restrict revolution to negating what is, rather than creating what is not. As a result, their rhetoric often takes the form of a kind of negative theology ('communization is not-that') that leaves all 'potential' futures necessarily opaque.[12]

Théorie Communiste's critical description of Dauvé's position therefore applies to Deleuze and Guattari up to a point:

> The history of class struggle is here always double: on the one hand the communist principle, the élan or revolutionary energy which animates the proletariat, a transcendent history, and on the other, the limited manifestation of this energy, an anecdotal history. Between these two aspects there exists a hierarchy. Transcendent history is 'real' history, and real history with all its limits is only the accidental form of the former, so much so that the former is constantly the judgment of the latter (2008a: 87–8).

The point where the description is not accurate is also the point that perhaps divides Dauvé and Camatte, and Deleuze and Guattari. For the latter, whether historical revolution or a minor schizoanalysis, 'on this level, everything is good' (Guattari, 2013: 3). Schizoanalysis certainly never 'fails' in the way that Dauvé describes the 'death' of insurrections, because it always goes as far as it can, and when it recedes another front, another struggle, another invention always fills the gap. This is the eternal 'potential' of a minor onto-politics, but its disadvantage – one felt especially strongly in relation to art – is that it struggles to connect to more widespread social movements. This is an important point we will return to, because in many ways it is a major motivation for contemporary art's turn towards discursively based practices, and their seemingly ubiquitous desire to turn 'art into life'.

Despite the similarities between Deleuze and Guattari and the 'ontological' stream of Communization theory, significant differences emerge in their conceptualization of the ontological excess. As we have seen, in Deleuze and Guattari schizo-revolutionary force is of necessity inhuman, inasmuch as the human, all too human is one of the most significant political conditions that schizoanalysis must overcome. In Camatte's work especially, almost the opposite seems to be the case. Camatte proposes *Gemeinwesen* as a kind of species-being that defines the human against capitalism, drawing the term (as well as a sketch of Communization theory itself) from a passage in Marx's *Economic and Philosophic Manuscript of 1844*. But Camatte's work proposes a series of radical breaks with normative conceptions of life that makes his affirmation of

the 'human' strangely useful for a specifically political understanding of schizo-analysis. Camatte is arguably most well-known for his rejection of organizations in all their forms, and first of all the groupuscules of the left. Communization theory really starts at home in this sense. Leftist organizations, Camatte argues, mimic the strategies of capitalist marketing, and so breaking with the representational organization of political groups, no matter how radical, is the only possible way of 'carrying the break with the political point of view to the depths of our individual consciousness. […] All political representation is a screen and therefore an obstacle to a fusion of forces' (1995: 20). The revolutionary parties of the proletariat are therefore the clearest evidence, Camatte writes, that: 'The counter-revolution triumphed in the guise of revolution' (2011: 45). The counter-revolution is nothing less than the capitalization of human beings (Camatte calls this 'anthropomorphization' (1975: 6)) that makes humans over in capital's image.[13] One of the most significant of these images is that of the proletarian, and especially the proletarian revolutionary, who is living proof that 'capital reconstructs the human being as a function of its process' (Camatte 1975: 6). It does so, Camatte claims, through cybernetic machines in which the mind is turned 'into a computer which can be programmed by the laws of capital' (1975: 6). In this way capital is able to make itself the logic of transformation and liberation that human beings desire: 'Since capital is indefinite it allows the human being to have access to a state beyond the finite in an infinite becoming or appropriation which is never realized, renewing at every instant the illusion of total blossoming' (Camatte 1975: 11). In this sense, and here Camatte uses very similar terms to Deleuze and Guattari, 'the movement toward unlimited generalization of desire is isomorphic to the indefinite movement of capital' (1975: 16). As a result, capitalism no longer depends on the production process, and so on humans, but rather humans have become 'produced' by capitalism through the mechanism of representation. 'We are only the activity of capital' (1995: 150), Camatte writes, 'the triumph of capital is the triumph of mediation and the loss of all immediateness for man, who cannot now experience what is immediate except through one of the mediations of capital' (1995: 193). Here, a new 'community of capital' emerges, along with an 'inhuman' humanity (2011: 12), by which an 'autonomized form of capital is interposed between the knowing human subject and reality; this form has absorbed all representations and schemes of knowledge: science, art, ideology. Man is completely divested' (2011: 103).[14] As a result, the revolution seeks to abolish the distance between the individual and community qua species being (*Gemeinwesen*), and to do so it must overcome the representation the proletariat gives of itself.

For Camatte, as for Deleuze and Guattari, revolution is not a question of raising consciousness, but of destroying repressive consciousness (2011: 34), destroying the way the proletariat embodies 'the community of capital' (1995: 183). Communization is not, therefore, a new mode of production, or even the appropriation of the existing mode of production, because revolutionaries 'will not gain mastery over production, but will create new relations among themselves which will determine an entirely different activity' (1975: 35–6). In this sense Camatte, like Deleuze and Guattari, sees creativity – qua schizo-analysis – as part of the revolution, because any revolution must 'unleash free creativity and unrestrained imagination in a movement of human becoming' (1995: 98). But it is precisely at this point that Deleuze and Guattari go further, because they understand that creativity must become synonymous with revolution itself.

Art

But what is the precise nature of this creativity? It is time, perhaps, to point to something and say, in the spirit of Communization theory, 'it's not that'. In a short essay on the Beaubourg museum of art in Paris written in 1977, Camatte provides an interesting critique of many aspects of contemporary artistic practices. He argues that contemporary art marks the realization of the 'end of art' proclaimed by Dada (also known as 'anti-art' or 'art into life', an ideology that regained importance in the art world in the late 60s, and that Peter Bürger consequently and famously called the 'neo-avant-garde'), because under the real domination of capital nothing, least of all subjective expression/represen-tation, is separate from capital. In contemporary capitalism art can truly be said to have moved into life because, Camatte says, prefiguring many recent debates surrounding art's complicity with 'cognitive capitalism': 'Capital's art is knowledge of capital. It's a way to achieve knowledge of the new world it has created, in which the sacred, nature, men and women exist only behind death masks' (1997: 54). More specifically, at the end of the 1960s art turns away from its modernist concern with the formal composition of the art work, and towards the creative process itself. Contemporary art's interest in the 'inner' creative process of artistic subjectivity imagined it to be the means by which 'art' could directly confront and challenge bourgeois 'life'. But despite all the good (and some not so good) intentions this had the opposite effect, and made the creative process available to capital to subsume and exploit.[15] Camatte writes:

> Everything must be understood through capital's image. Such is the Beaubourg's function, a carcinoma, a neoplasm that must divert the aesthetic flux into domination of the future. It will create roles to that end. […] The integration-realization of art by capital implies its integration of revolt. It will be absorbed (Camatte 1997: 55).

Echoing Deleuze and Guattari's account of deterritorialization's vital function within capitalism, Camatte argues that revolt is no longer possible when capitalism presents such an openness of possibilities (Camatte calls it 'credit', which must be repaid in recognizable forms, hence the rise of advertising and mass media in and as art), to the point where 'revolt' simply expresses the continual process of capital's own development.

Camatte's critique of the Beaubourg prefigures Deleuze and Guattari's later rejection of Conceptual art for its complicity with capitalism (1994: 198–9). Deleuze and Guattari emphasize how Conceptual art hands over the decision regarding whether or not something is art to the 'opinion' of the American everyman, and so subsumes aesthetic alterity in capitalist 'stupidity'. In this way the modern–postmodern break introduces a new understanding of artistic practice as a creative conceptual and discursive operation that is independent of medium, and even of 'art'. As a result, art becomes a form of information processing and communication, and its techniques feed on and into the wider emergence of immaterial labour and mass-media markets as the hegemonic mechanisms of social production. This would be the point at which contemporary art's interest in negating its own history by adopting 'non-art' compositional practices effectively subsumed its 'process' in the emerging mode of production (and especially those involved with new media). The mistake of contemporary practice in this sense was to imagine its political efficacy to lie in overcoming its autonomy from 'life', whereas in fact exactly the opposite was the case. As Guattari so passionately insists in *Chaosmosis*, art must operate within the world and in relation to social production, but only as a 'minority' sensation, one that affirms its ontological autonomy. For this reason, he continues, we must always celebrate 'the universe of art as such, precisely because it is always in danger of collapsing' (1995: 130).

Camatte's critique of the Beaubourg succinctly states how discursive and conceptual strategies subordinate contemporary art to capitalist conditions of possible experience, most importantly discursive functionality and the logical systems and processes of subjectivation that underpin it. But Deleuze and Guattari's insistence on art's production of sensation as a political practice takes us a step further, and leads us to a schizoanalytic aesthetic practice that finds its

model in Kant's concept of the sublime. In the dynamic sublime human condi-
tions of possibility are exceeded in a sensation of an infinite material force.
This experience evades the calculations of both the imagination and the under-
standing, as well as their supposed 'free play',[16] and so exceeds the conceptual
and empirical conditions of our experience. Sublime art qua schizoanalysis
therefore takes the sensation beyond its discursive and subjective rationality,
to leap into the transcendental schiz, a leap that does not reveal any Ideas of
reason (as it does in Kant), but is instead a psychotic 'reason' that is always in
the process of escaping itself.[17] Camatte's version of Communization theory also
affirms this point:

> Whatever is rational in relation to the established order can be absorbed and
> recuperated. If revolution operates on the same terrain as its adversary, it can
> always be halted. It cannot rise up; it is thwarted in its most passionate desire,
> which is to realize its own project and to accomplish it *on its own ground*
> (1995: 120).

Here Camatte approaches the schizoanalytic concept of a sublime humanity,
one whose capitalist subjectivities and forms of representation have turned
mad, and so turned truly creative. Here, he says, 'communism is not a mode of
production, but a new mode of being' (1995: 124).

Despite (or perhaps because of) the radicality of this rhetoric (which I in no
way wish to disavow), the sublime sensation must find a way to emerge from
within present forms of artistic expression. Maurizio Lazzarato puts it in an
appropriately mundane way:

> In the same way that capital must transform money (means of payment) into
> capital, the proletariat must transform the purchasing-power flow into a flow
> of autonomous and independent subjectivation, into a flow that interrupts the
> politics of capital, in other words, into a flow that is at once a refusal of and
> flight from the functions and subjections to which the proletariat is confined
> (2012: 85).

This would be art, even though Lazzarato doesn't call it that.

The upshot of all this is that today, in our time of the total subsumption of
labour, and as Anthony Iles and Marina Vishmidt put it: 'Art finds itself in a
new relation with contemporary forms of value production' (2011: 131). As we
have seen however, while Communization theory is strong in describing this
relation, it struggles to come up with a positive account of contemporary artistic
practices. Iles and Vishmidt are no exception to this. They are certainly right
when they claim: 'If art's emancipatory qualities are founded upon the tensions

between self-directed activity and productive labor then attempts to close the distance between them are of paramount importance' (2011: 135). But they are completely wrong when they repeat the tired litany of 'political art' movements, beginning with Constructivism, every one heading down the self-sacrificing road to Calvary along which art seems inevitably to move into life. In fact the schizoanalytic movement is in the opposite direction, towards the sublime and revolutionary sensation, and this is the way in which Iles and Vishmidt's conclusion must be understood:

> Not only do artworks pass through a moment which bypasses use value, and cannot be subsumed under exchange-value, they also connect with a form of activity which pressages non-objective values between subjects, activity which dismantles 'the subject as congealed technology' [Adorno]. Viewed thus communization would be a generalization of art and individuality *different* to that which we live through today (2011: 149).

That is all very good, but unfortunately Iles and Vishmidt's conclusion stops here, at exactly the point it gets interesting, at the shocking idea that perhaps the endlessly repeated orthodoxy 'that the dissolution of the borders between art and productive labor (or art and politics) heralds emancipation' (Iles and Vishmidt 2011: 150) *isn't right*. In fact, the so-called emancipation of art into life has turned out to be its diminishment (*anti*-art) and enslavement. We have therefore reached a point similar to that *Théorie Communiste* see in the dissolution of the worker's movement achieved by capitalism's restructuring of production; it is now time to begin a new cycle of struggles. We have reached the end of the trajectory of art-into-life, and its attempts to deny or subdue the sensation, and it is now time to go in the opposite direction, and transform life into art. Wherever art is produced – art defined as new and excessive sensation – an immanent outside to biopolitical controls emerges and a new community announces itself – the people to come as Deleuze and Guattari's calls them – a *Gemeinwesen* that is no longer organized around work or the commodity, or the proletariat's role in producing and/or destroying them. The aim then, would not be to make art relevant to the worker's struggle, but rather to grasp how it is art's alterity and irrelevance that already anticipates its role in the Communization movement.

The most immediate problem in such a schizoanalysis of contemporary artistic practices, is how to attack its post-conceptual reliance on language. As we have seen, art's embrace of the conceptual and discursive logics underpinning late-Capitalism have led to art's subsumption and instrumentalization. Deleuze

and Guattari continually make the point that desire and sensation exceed their representation in discursive linguistic forms: 'The unconscious', Guattari writes, 'is constituted by machinic propositions that no semiological or logico-scientific propositions can ever grasp in an exhaustive fashion' (2011a: 149). Such machinic propositions (or art works) operate according to what Guattari calls the 'invisible powers' of 'matters of expression', propositions that 'are unable to be circumscribed in well delimited substances from the point of view of explicit and spatio-temporal coordinates' (2011a: 150). These propositions are micropolitical in an ontological sense, because their materiality expresses, and so connects them to the living whole, to 'Nature', the 'plane of consistency', etc. This type of expressive connection (Deleuze will call it 'analogical expression' in his book on Bacon) is unthinkable within reductionist (i.e. digital (Deleuze 2003: 115)) discursive systems, whose logical operating systems tend, according to Guattari, to lose all expressive 'attachments to micro-social assemblages' (2011a: 151). Clearly this has significant repercussions for almost all aspects of contemporary practices, from the way they are organized around their conceptual content, to their reliance on the coherency of their funding applications, to the postmodern obsession with 'theory', and its latest instantiation in 'research-based practice'. Such work needs to be interrogated according to Guattari's schizoanalytic affirmation: 'Rather than remaining prisoner to the redundancy of signifying tracings, we will endeavor to fabricate a new map of competence and new asignifying diagrammatic coordinates' (2011a: 176).

There is unfortunately not the space to explore this schizoanalytic and 'asignifying diagram' of contemporary artistic practices, so we'll have to satisfy ourselves with an exemplary example. Guattari saw Duchamp's readymade (or artistic concept) as the emergence of the artistic concept (1995: 90; 2008: 328), but rather than positing it as the beginning of art's move away from sensation he suggests instead that it is 'a concept that creates sensations' (2011a: 43, see also 1995: 95). The readymade does this, he argues (drawing on Bakhtin), by deterritorializing its object to the point where it appears to us as a pure and empty existential excess, a 'being there' that immediately spins off on multiple affective trajectories that are entirely singular because they are entirely context dependent (as Duchamp said, viewing is a 'creative act').[18] This immediate interpretative proliferation is precisely the opening onto 'the aleatory at the heart of the enunciative' (2013: 180) that schizoanalysis seeks to produce. The readymade is no longer lauded for its rejection of painting, but for the way it creates sensations in a new way, through the conceptualization of itself as art. This would be the beginning of a contemporary schizoanalytic artistic practice located within

Capital's cybernetic circuits of control. It is not the rejection of the concept or of discursive logics, but their *poeticization*, their *infinitization*, their entry into a contemporary sublime. Similarly, an aesthetics of Communization does not involve a refusal of work, but rather, as Guattari puts it, 'a labor of heterogenesis' (2013: 185), a labour by which, Bifo sings, 'language can escape from the matrix and reinvent a social sphere of singular vibrations intermingling and projecting a new space for sharing, producing, and living' (2012: 148).

Bifo suggests a strategy that begins from within the standardized language and 'stupidity' (in Deleuze and Guattari's sense) of information that is embraced by contemporary artistic practices, but attempts to produce within them an insurrectionary excess, a 'poetic' sensation that escapes the circulation of discursive redundancies controlling our expression, imagination and subjectivity. As he writes, 'poetry may start the process of reactivating the emotional body, and therefore of reactivating social solidarity, starting from the reactivation of the desiring force of enunciation' (2012: 20). In this way 'poetry is the excess of sensuousness exploding into the circuitry of social communication' (2012: 21). In relation to contemporary artistic practices this statement does not even need to be taken literally, because it is not actual poetry that is required but a return to composing ourselves (it means our escapes) according to a 'logic of sensation', one in which affects multiply and lead towards a singular infinity of virtual possibility. As Nietzsche famously advised, we must become poets of our lives and in this way turn life into art. This, as Bifo rightly argues, is the way in which poetry (in its widest sense) might reconnect the social body and the general intellect. If the general intellect names the contemporary form of the alienated and enslaved proletariat, then 'poetry' could name the aesthetic practice of Communization theory, the way the brain-screen of contemporary digital culture could be re-sensitized, could be 'de-humanised', could be turned from work into art. This involves a different way of communicating and knowing, a 'knowing by affect' as Guattari calls it (2013: 180), 'the triggering of a line of discursivity that is itself non-discursive, instituting itself prior to the opposition discursivity/non-discursivity' (2013: 177).

Art joins Communization theory by offering an aesthetic power of invention that is autonomous and immanent, and whose insurrectionary productions produce a future beyond the simple reduction of art to its supposed opposite, politics. In fact, the relation of art and Communization theory seems to me doubly productive. On one side Communization theory provides a powerful political framework within which art's specific form of production finds its revolutionary potential. But on the other, art provides Communization theory

with a process that is on the one hand more down to earth than comical scenarios of self-organizing military victory, and on the other more concrete than righteous refusals to describe a revolutionary future. Certainly, art's production of sublime sensations is a micropolitical version of revolution, a profusion of militant productions whose singularity is uncontainable, but also potentially insignificant. Those, quite simply, are the stakes of schizoanalysis.

Notes

1　Schizoanalysis is in this sense 'completely oriented towards an *experimentation* in touch with the real. It will not "decipher" an already constituted, self-enclosed unconscious, *it will construct it*' (Guattari 2011a: 171–2).

2　This is even a criticism of the book Deleuze and Guattari anticipate; 'Those who have read this far will perhaps find many reasons for reproaching us: for believing too much in the pure potentialities of art; for denying or minimizing the role of classes and class struggle; for militating in favor of an irrationalism of desire; for identifying the revolutionary with the schizo' (1983: 378–9). Their response? To confirm the reasons for reproach, and in particular: 'that art and science have a revolutionary potential [...]; art and science cause increasingly decoded and deterritorialized flows to circulate in the socius, flows that are perceptible to everyone, which force the social axiomatic to grow ever more complicated, to become more saturated, to the point where the scientist and the artist may be determined to rejoin an objective revolutionary situation' (1983: 379).

3　The comparison of schizoanalysis to artistic practices is a common trope in Guattari's work, see, 2000: 40; 2013: 32, 36. For a more detailed account of Guattari's use of art as a model for schizoanalysis, see Zepke 2012; 2011a.

4　In *Anti-Oedipus* Deleuze and Guattari argue for a 'politics of psychiatry' (i.e. an antipsychiatry) where 'madness would no longer exist as madness […] because it would receive the support of all the other flows, including science and art' (1983: 321). This would be the contrary to today's situation where madness is deprived of all support, and must 'testify all alone for deterritorialisation as a universal process' (1983: 321). It means, in other words, that madness should no longer be considered the exception, *but the rule ...*

5　This is a quite different proposition to Deleuze and Guattari's rather controversial, and more well-known statement:

> Which is the revolutionary path? To go still further, that is, in the movement of the market, of decoding and deterritorialization? For perhaps the flows are not yet deterritorialized enough, not decoded enough, from the viewpoint of a theory and a practice of a highly schizophrenic character. Not to withdraw

from the process, but to go further, to 'accelerate the process', as Nietzsche put it: in this matter, the truth is that we haven't seen anything yet (1983: 239–40).

Although my own affirmation of sublime art as a technique of 'Communization' is entirely consistent with Deleuze and Guattari's claim that 'one can never go far enough in the direction of deterritorialization', it nevertheless rejects their suggestion that this can be achieved through an acceleration of capitalism. Nevertheless, because of the co-implication of digital technology and capital, 'accelerationism' has appealed to those who see technology as the road to liberation. Nick Land, for example, has offered the highly influential interpretation that 'market immanentization' means the obliteration of class opposition in the pure deterritorializing force of the 'free market'. According to Land,

> what appears to humanity as the history of capitalism is an invasion
> from the future by an artificial intelligent space that must assemble itself
> entirely from its enemies' resources. Digitocommodification is the index
> of a cyberpositively escalating techno-virus, of the planetary technocapital
> singularity: a self-organizing insidious traumatism, virtually guiding the
> entire biological desiring-complex towards post-carbon replicator usurpation
> (1993: 479).

While there is much to recommend Land's work, imagining *Bladerunner*'s replicants as cyberpunk insurgents of the future seems a little far-fetched. In hindsight, the way cyberpunk imagined a 'liftoff' of cybernetic technology as liberated machinic desire seems naïve, and its intoxicated celebration of a subversive cyber-future was often indistinguishable from a celebration of a liberated free-market (a point made by Fredric Jameson in his great book on science-fiction (2005: 190)).

6   Guattari puts it a bit more technically: 'the schizoanalytic objective will consist in disengaging the nature of the crystallizations of power which function around a dominant transformational component' (2011a: 178).

7   As Deleuze and Guattari put it in *Anti-Oedipus*:

> The opposition is between the class and those who are outside the class.
> Between the servants of the machine, and those who sabotage it or its cogs and
> wheels. Between the social machine's regime and that of the desiring machines.
> Between the relative interior limits and the absolute exterior limit. If you will:
> between the capitalists and the schizos in their basic intimacy at the level of
> decoding, in their basic antagonism at the level of the axiomatic (1983: 255).

8   In making a link between Deleuze and Guattari and Communization theory I am following in the wake of Nicholas Thoburn's wonderful book *Deleuze, Marx and Politics* (2003), which convincingly places Deleuze and Guattari's work within the

broader ultra-left political tradition, and in direct contact with Communization theory.

9   Deleuze and Guattari already said something very similar in *Anti-Oedipus*: 'It is a question of knowing how a revolutionary potential is realized, in its very relationship with the exploited masses or the "weakest links" of a given system. Do these masses or these links act in their own place, within the order of causes and aims that promote a new socius, or are they on the contrary the place and the agent of a sudden and unexpected irruption, an irruption of desire that breaks with causes and aims and overturns the socius, revealing its other side?' (1983: 377).

10 Deleuze has most clearly articulated this onto-political position in terms of 'vitalism': 'When power becomes bio-power resistance becomes the power of life, a vital power that cannot be confined within species, environment or the paths of a particular diagram. Is not the force that comes from outside a certain idea of Life, a certain vitalism?' (1988: 92–3).

11 While *Théorie Communiste* and Deleuze and Guattari share the idea that 'local [proletarian or minor] struggles directly target national and international axioms, at the precise point of their insertion in the field of immanence' (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 512), they differ over the term 'potential', which clearly remains too ontological for *Théorie Communiste*. Deleuze and Guattari's ontological optimism is always accompanied by a political pessimism, meaning that although schizophrenia is inherent to capital, its revolutionary power remains merely a 'potential'. As they rather plaintively ask, 'how can we count on art and science except as potentialities, since their actuality is easily controlled by the formations of sovereignty?' (1983: 376).

12 Leon de Mattis, for example, writes:

> We don't know, we cannot know, and therefore we do not seek to concretely describe, what communism will be like. We only know how it will be in the negative, through the abolition of capitalist social forms. Communism is a world without money, without value, without the state, without social classes, without domination and without hierarchy – which requires the overcoming of the old forms of domination integrated in the very functioning of capitalism (2011: 27).

As a result of this strictly negative approach Alberto Toscano has pointedly accused Communization theory of being a revolution that is both 'now and never', and 'renders certain contemporary debates on communism more formal than strategic' (2011: 88). As he quite rightly suggests, 'the salutary emphasis on communism as the real movement of the destruction of value as a social form risks trading off theoretical coherence and purity for practical irrelevance' (2011: 92).

13 Deleuze and Guattari echo Camatte on this point when they write; 'capital acts as the point of subjection that constitutes all human beings as subjects; but some, the "capitalists", are subjects of enunciation that form the private subjectivity of capital, while the others, the "proletarians", are subject of the statement, subjected to the technical machines in which constant capital is effected' (1987: 505).

14 As Camatte puts it elsewhere: 'By simply having interiorized the social base on which it is built, capital has become autonomous, from which point it is then able to make its escape' (1995: 97). This 'escape' constitutes what Camatte calls *The Wandering of Humanity*.

15 The most influential account of this process has been Boltanski and Chiapello's *The New Spirit of Capitalism* (2005), which famously argues that the 'aesthetic' revolution of 1968, and its demands for a less mediated and more creative life have been subsumed in the recent radical restructuring of capitalist management. This has led to a change in workers' subjectivation that draws heavily on 'artistic practice' as its model. Focusing specifically on the sphere of art, Alexander Alberro convincingly shows how on the one hand many of the most directly 'political' strategies of the Conceptual artists were eagerly consumed or copied by the burgeoning class of marketing and advertising executives that formed the bulk of its collectors, and on the other how these artists and their dealers themselves borrowed extensively from the marketing strategies of their clients (Alberro 2003).

16 Guattari will specifically say that schizoanalysis seeks to avoid the 'Kantian opposition of sensibility and understanding' (2013: 187). The sublime not only avoids it, it overcomes it.

17 I have elaborated this admittedly rather opaque claim in Zepke 2011b.

18 For more on Guattari and the readymade see Zepke 2008 and 2011a.

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Part Two

Raw Data for Schizoanalysis: Outsider Art

Pragmatics of Raw Art
(For the Post-Autonomy Paradigm)

Alexander Wilson

In the past several decades, art has seen the dissolution of the old avant-garde critical grid. Gone are the days of absolutes and manifestos. The most varied styles have been absorbed into the postmodern pastiche, outsider artworks have been traded for large sums on the fine-art market, and a contemporary zeitgeist marked by a general relativization of aesthetic values has emerged, exploding into a plethora of parallel discourses on art. Perhaps there is no longer such a thing (if there ever was) as Culture with a capital C, which Dubuffet so vehemently opposed in his championing of 'art brut'. The concepts of raw art and outsider art were typical of a time when oppositional politics still infused artistic and academic discourses. But modernity seems to have 'grown out' of its adolescence, so to speak: out of politics of opposition and absolutes. This theme is examined at length in Johanna Drucker's *Sweet Dreams*, where the critic argues that the art of today is 'complicit' with its many outsides, so much so that it no longer has a clearly defined inside; it is now so open that it is no longer strictly contained (Drucker 2006). Her point is that art criticism has not yet found an appropriate way to respond and engage with this new non-oppositional, post-autonomy, post-'enclosure' (Deleuze 1992) topology of art.

The binary oppositions have vanished, disarming the familiar modernist and avant-garde critical distinctions between high/low, inside/outside, cultural/raw, civilized/primitive, real/unreal. As a result, the styles, methods and subjects typical of outsider art, once considered an exciting revelation by the avant-garde, have been absorbed into the mainstream, indexed, and categorized. The germ of this great relativization of values can be traced to pop art, the essential traits of which were championed again in the cynical cultural motifs of the turn of the millennium: the cult of guilty pleasures, of kitsch, of blasé cultural identities,

and overtly self-conscious celebrations of 'bad taste' and risqué moral stances. The question artists are faced with is what to make of this new, non-oppositional paradigm, which attitudes to adopt, and how to engage with aesthetics in an age of networked identities, distributed complicities and disciplinary ambiguities. The pages of Drucker's *Sweet Dreams* overflow with examples of one way to grow out of oppositional stances: artists can resign themselves to a cynical complicity and indifference with regard to capitalism and its levelling of values, championing a mundane variety of personal preferences and desires.

Of course, it is neither desirable nor possible to return to the oppositional dynamics and binary divisions of yesterday, now that we have crossed this paradigmatic threshold. But the schizoanalytic stance may offer us another view of the emerging paradigm. It affords different tools of interpretation and suggests ways artists may grow out of modernity's adolescence without hyposta-sizing distinctions between inside and outside, or between culture and its raw or primitive origins, while nevertheless not conflating the dissolution of boundaries and hierarchies with a possible end to territoriality and control, or promoting a resignation of thought to the apparent aporia of the reversibility of distinctions. The schizoanalytic or pragmatic approach to aesthetics reveals the folds within the folds, acknowledging the nuances and singularities that multiply within superficial distinctions that, on each stratum, resist reduction and totalization. For this reason, schizoanalysis can not only help critics and theorists find new ways of interpreting the works of artists, but perhaps more importantly, provide artists (and non-artists) with lines of escape from aesthetic cul-de-sacs. From a schizoanalytic point of view, each artwork, each artist, each artistic movement, each aesthetic or style is regarded as developing through 'mixed semiotics', which are trans-individual networks of partial objects, affective flows and prehensive events on the social stratum. Deleuze and Guattari's machinic mapping of the processes at play within the semiotic mixtures that inevitably constrain the field of aesthetics (affect, percept, sensation) suggests methods for diagramming the variety of regimes that order and organize artistic movements and styles, allowing us to trace the continuous transformations between them and uncover the potential they enfold, perhaps suggesting new hybrid logics, new aesthetic solutions to heterogeneous affective tensions.

One way of beginning to grasp the relevance of schizoanalysis for art practice in today's post-autonomy paradigm, is to start from a somewhat privileged point in history: the point at which the art world itself became most infatuated with one of its 'outsides' as it recognized its complicity with the schizophrenic mind. This is the point where the avant-garde machine, then led by the surrealists,

began testing the waters of insanity, of primitivism, of asocial behaviour, and found itself at the limit of autonomy, cracked open, allowing a deeper survey of the machines at work in the mixed semiotics that resulted in the concepts of 'outsider art' and 'raw art'.

Autonomy and the signifying regime

There already were copious lines connecting madness with creative genius, and many examples of mad artists and writers, from Blake to Van Gogh, from Hölderlin to Nietzsche, who gave substance to the idea that these two extremes of human behaviour are somehow linked. But the romantic cult of melancholia, which cherished despair and psychological disturbance, did not gain its clinical meaning until the alienists truly began mingling with the alienated and observing their creative behaviours. Though there were precursors, like Marcel Reja, it was only after Morgenthaler's *Ein Geisteskranker als Künstler* (1921), which showcased the work of Adolf Wölfli, and Prinzhorn's *Bildnerei der Geisteskranken* (1922), that the avant-garde machine began its reterritorialization of the mad and the visionary. The dream of capturing the artistic event in its raw, primal, living form, untainted by cultural refinements, hence became a structuring motif in the avant-garde machine. Dada had wanted to shatter art's autonomy, to dismantle its transcendental signifiers, making them immanent and interactive: rationality had led only to war and genocide, so Dada responded by unleashing the infinite power of the irrational, the illogical, the absurd and spontaneous. But the issue of autonomy was not laid to rest with the historical avant-garde: autonomy now had become a central problem. This carried forward into the each successive incarnation of the avant-garde, no longer as a bourgeois appreciation of *l'art pour l'art*, but as a constantly renewed critical question of how art was to disentangle itself from the institutions of modernity. The avant-garde's renewed notion of autonomy was one of paranoid territoriality, rather than complacency with bourgeois institutions.

One of the Cologne Dadaists, Max Ernst, is responsible for introducing Prinzhorn's book to the surrealists through Paul Éluard. Under the influence of André Breton, who was captivated by the Freudian psychoanalytic doctrine, surrealism was turning from the purely irrational to the more subjectively-slanted forces of the subconscious, which expressed themselves between the cracks of intentionality, in dreams, slips of the tongue and in automatic, unconscious gestures. Breton's initial fascination with the automatic art of visionary

artists and poets, who seemed to produce works mediumistically, by channelling subconscious drives and impulses, inspired his passionate simulation of these works and his championing of their methods. But as we will see, his status as an intellectual conflicted with this appeal to the irrational and the automatic: there was a certain threshold he was not prepared to cross. With each reincarnation henceforth, from the situationists to Fluxus, the avant-garde machine found ways to revive its quest for the unmediated creative event, and so continued to entertain certain affinities with raw and outsider art.

It is important, however, to disentangle the two notions. Though the terms 'outsider art' and 'raw art' are often used as synonyms, they nevertheless respectively reflect two very different semiotic regimes described in Deleuze's *A Thousand Plateaus*. The notion of 'outsider' is spatially organized and articulated on a distinction between the state of a given marked inside (see Spencer-Brown 1979) – be it a historical tradition, an institution, a culture – and its unmarked, or negatively marked outside (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 169). This is the typical first-level ordering of the abstract pure semiotic Deleuze and Guattari call the 'signifying regime'. In this regime, the emphasis is on capture (selection and rejection). The selection combines a continual deterritorialization of the signifier, with an incessant reterritorialization of the signified. In the centre, the face of the despot recaptures the changing interpretations of the priests, who simultaneously eject various alienated scapegoats, whom they cast away along lines of flight that have been marked 'negative'. The spatial distinction is thus prone to dialectical reversals, it is constantly inverting the inside and outside, yet continually reaffirming the structure of the sign: the signified remains the centre of significance, a paranoid, despotic face. The mixed semiotic of the avant-garde contains a strong element of such a logic of reversal: at times it imagines that the outside retains a certain ineffable purity relative to the inside (primitivism, the cult of madness); at other times it imagines that true creativity can only be found in a new centre that must be aggressively defended (the manifesto). Both of these trends signal the typical circuits of the signifying regime.

The priests form a concentric ring around the face of the despot, reinterpreting the meaning of the signified, pulling it in different directions towards various connotations, offering a constantly renewed disposition to a face that nevertheless retains its essential characteristic: being at the centre. We can see this process at work in the surrealists' own reinterpretation of automatism. Though the surrealists admired the art of the alienated, mad, and of paranormal clairvoyants or mediumistic artists, they were forced to halt and fold back towards the centre, once they had reached a certain limit. André Breton's

about-face, with regard to the significance of automatism – which he came to equate with natural or 'uncritical' processes, as uncritical as the nests birds build (Breton 1965: 298) – is exemplary of surrealism's facial reterritorialization of aesthetics. Breton, in fact, is more than a priestly figure, he is the 'pope' of surrealism (Breton et al. 1924), for he incessantly reterritorializes the collective by establishing strict criteria for membership, with the correlative affiliations and alliances he imposes on the one side, and the dramatic excommunications of its dissident members on the other, who, like scapegoats, are timely sacrifices that replenish the authority of the system while negating its lines of flight. In *The Automatic Message*, Breton's about-face reveals itself as a blatant reification of intentional subjectivity in the face of the total automatic depersonalization of the visionary artist:

> … contrairement à ce que se propose le spiritisme : dissocier la personnalité psychologique du médium, le surréalisme ne propose rien de moins que d'unifier cette personnalité (Breton 1933: 61).

In effect, though automatism is used by Breton to deterritorialize the established high-art ideals of the time, the signifying regime constrains him to fold back at the limit, for he judges the visionary artist's radical automatism, which he deems passive, mechanical and depersonalized, as being in excess of surrealism's protected signified: the autonomy of the critical unified ego. He hypostasizes the need for a reunification of the automatic upon the signified, so as to limit its deterritorializing potential. The surrealist about-face is the warning cry of the Oedipal superego, as Deleuze and Guattari argue:

> There will always be a Breton against Artaud, a Goethe against Lenz, a Schiller against Holderlin, in order to superegoize literature and tell us: Careful, go no further! (Deleuze and Guattari 1977: 134)

Indeed, the about-face is also confirmed by another surrealist 'priest', Salvador Dali, who performed the same U-turn from the edge of the desert, back towards the centralizing despotic face. Referring freely to Lacan, Dali insists that art's 'general irrationality' must be tempered by 'critical activity' (Dali 1933: 65–7). In other words, a centralizing subjective unification must take place in order to harness and channel the unwieldy powers of the automatic and irrational. In claiming this, Dali also aligned himself with the paranoiac-despotic regime of faciality. We see how the surrealist incarnation of the avant-garde fascination with its estranged other, reterritorializes on the face of autonomy, sending the pharmakos, the visionary or mad man, back into the desert, outside the city walls. For Dali, like Breton, only the surrealist – who simulates the work of the

mad, but who is not himself insane – is worthy of praise, for only he captures the automatic within intentionality.[1]

In today's post-autonomy paradigm, a similar pattern of centralization and reversal can still be detected in the typical struggles of the professional artist. For, in the pursuit of 'authenticity', insider artists, that is, artists who are trained and actively seeking professional opportunities, often also seek lines of flight from the business of their career, from the various pressures of the profession that condemn them to compete for recognition. They also need to foster and harness unmediated relationships with their practice and with the materials and tools it engages. This causes them to continually deterritorialize and reinterpret their practice and its signifiers, putting everything in question, while simultaneously reterritorializing on their public image – the face – in order not to lose their competitive edge (lose face). Artists also strive or even struggle to find ways out of the indexed, striated, grammatized, quantified and decoded cultural territories they must navigate:

> The painter does not paint on an empty canvas, and neither does the writer write on a blank page; but the page or canvas is already so covered with pre-existing, re-established clichés that it is first necessary to erase, to clean, to flatten, even to shred, so as to let in a breath of air from the chaos that brings us the vision (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 204).

Hence the outsider at times becomes the object of the insider's envy. The outsider's alienation from society, at least from the insider's point of view, will seem inextricable from the 'chaos that brings us the vision' whenever madness is interpreted as a flight (an escape), rather than a confinement (an isolation), a deterritorialization rather than a reterritorialization. Echoing this reversal of perspective, John Hughling Jackson argued that confinement to the asylum itself provoked the creative impulse, which he thought explained the explosion of mentally ill artists in isolation. They were not alienated because they were artists, he argued: they were artists because they were alienated (Danchin 2006: 17). The outside becomes the inside in the signifying regime's logic of reversal. It is well known that artists often replenish their inspiration by exiles and hermitage, and indeed there are many examples of professional artists who began creating more 'original' works once they had been committed to an asylum (Thévoz 1999: 71). Adolf Wölfli started his artistic process only years into his confinement: if he had never been admitted, the world would never have known his work. The asylum is thus not merely an outside but – at least with regard to the practice of art – can potentially become a new locus, a new

inside, because *l'artiste interné* can establish within it a new resonant centre around which can be reconstituted the paranoid semiotic. There is an element of this in the fact that Adolf Wölfli – somewhat of a poster-child for art brut – always began his works from the periphery, first drawing a bounding frame that immediately captured the empty space inside, in order then to populate it with 'all sorts of clocks, turbines, dynamos, celestial machines, house-machines, and so on' (Deleuze and Guattari 1977: 15). One is tempted, with Deleuze and Guattari, to relate this feature of his practice to the very structure that allowed for his artistic process: closure and confinement, in the asylum as within the perimeter of the drawing, may be a kind of prehensive strategy, permitting the initial capture of an affective event, which can then be delivered to transformations, twists and explanations.

While the insider tries to dig him- or herself out of the clichés of the inside (of culture) and finds him- or herself immediately chasing after new centres of signification, the outsider begins by capturing the inside and deterritorializing the centre. In both cases, the spatial logic of inside and outside are continually reversed, as they are in the typical reversal of the observer and the observed in second-order systems theory (Von Foerster, Spencer-Brown, Luhmann).[2] Regardless of where one begins, outside or inside, the structure of this semiotic remains: the central face, with concentric rings propagating around it, the first of which puts into play a constant deterritorialization and reterritorialization of the signified, the inside, and a second concentric ring, tracing the periphery, which blocks lines of flight and demarcates a negatively marked outside. The distinction between 'insider art' and 'outsider art' does not depend on any constant property of either, for their roles relentlessly exchange in the reversal mechanisms of the signifying regime.

But things are somewhat different in today's post-autonomy, post-disciplinary paradigm, where the artist can no longer distinguish between clearly bounded, enclosed territories. As Deleuze explains in *Postscript on the Societies of Control*, the previous paradigm of discipline and enclosure, which afforded the avant-garde's distinction of inside and outside, has given way to a paradigm of control and universal modulation (Deleuze 1992). Territories have become porous and amorphous. 'Dividuals' are free to roam wherever their passwords and access codes will lead them, and the landscape accessible to them is constantly shifting, as the topology of the network is modulated, as the distributions of affective potential are controlled by the contemporary molar organizations epitomized in the structures of global media, finance, pharmaceutical, agricultural and military hegemonies. The notion of inside

and outside no longer seems to be relevant, now that the territorial cascades, shifts and reversals have revealed themselves explicitly, freed from state-level constraints in advanced capitalism. If the boundaries of the avant-garde fell prey to constant reversals, the post-enclosure paradigm falls prey to constant system-wide topological breaks. This has disarmed the artist's romantic appreciation for the creative works of the outsider, for no one is clearly outside: no one is clearly even one, for each dividual is shared among various shifting territories.

> Even art has left the spaces of enclosure in order to enter into the open circuits of the bank (Deleuze 1992: 6).

Originality and the post-signifying regime

The identification of the raw state with the origin allowed early psychology to liken schizophrenia to a regression to childlike behavioural patterns. Childhood may be assumed to retain a raw potentiality, still undetermined and untamed, that is successively lost with each stage of learning or enculturation. It is from this point of view that one of the precursors of art brut, Cesare Lombroso, the Italian criminologist, connected artistic genius with madness (in what he called 'psychiatric art') by means of the notion of 'degeneration' (Danchin 2006: 15). To Lombroso, a Darwinist, genius was merely a form of hereditary madness. But on a deeper level, his linking of madness and creative genius with regression on a genealogical or genetic timeline, is characteristic of the second distinctive semiotic that compelled the avant-garde's fascination with the insane, the one that they unfortunately also shared with the monstrous Nazi notion of Entartete 'Kunst'.

Unlike the reversible distinction of inside/outside, the notion of rawness aligns itself with a different axis of distinctions, one that describes a linear series of irreversible thresholds. The raw is understood as the absent origin of a process of refinement. And as such, the notion of raw art is more closely related to the post-signifying regime than to the signifying regime; it is closer to the passional subject than the paranoid despot. In fact it is an act of flight from the despotic centre: it has a genealogically organized semiotic, characterized by a straight line that flees the origin on a path of absolute deterritorialization, or rather of indefinite postponement of reterritorialization. The origin replaces the centre, which provokes a considerably different organizational pattern. Dubuffet, who of course coined the term 'art brut', himself drew distinctions between cultural art and raw art from a temporal or sequential point of view,

and saw art as creation in its intrinsic process, while regarding culture as its past: art = future, culture = past. As Dubuffet retorts in an interview:

> Art is creation in process, and culture is creation done, already done, creation of the past.[3]

Rather than ordering elements in concentric circles about a centre, as was the case with outsider art, the concept of raw art orders its elements temporally or sequentially in a segmented series. We see this by considering how the notion of raw art identifies the unattainable ideal of *l'état brut* – the original state of un-refinement – with the lost origin of its line of flight. By unravelling the spiral, the now positively marked line of flight betrays the god, betrays the origin and takes off on its own, becoming its own scapegoat. But though the process is now free to indefinitely postpone reterritorialization and thus perpetually deterritorialize, the subjective line remains fixed in the gaze of the origin, no matter how far it may flee. Though it is released from the centre's principle of reterritorialization, the straight line remains forever tethered to its source, as a transcendent, unattainable ideal: the lost origin. It is as though the origin or 'point of subjectification', like a narcissistic wound, initiates an autonomous, autopoietic process, which solipsistically cuts off the passional line from all exteriority, thus capturing the earth within its monomaniacal or monotheistic reduction (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 127).

Clearly, the avant-garde's mixed semiotic was also constrained by this second regime, which works in each case to rewrite histories to align them with a singular subjectifying event. It is in this sense that the concept of 'raw art' applies its passional effect on the artist of the avant-garde. It is from the singular point of departure of the passional line that the artist now considers the raw state as prior-to and thus more original and authentic than the civilized, cultured or refined state. Culture betrays its raw origin much like the prophet betrays his god. Deleuze and Guattari offer the founding history of Judaism as an example of a post-signifying regime. Instead of functioning by deceit, it functions by betrayal: a continual betrayal of the central signified. A continual betrayal of god, and by god, sends the prophet (who replaces the priest of the signifying regime) down an autonomous line of flight, an escape from despotic Egypt into the smooth desert, indefinitely postponing a reterritorialization, committing to a potentially eternal Diaspora. The post-signifying regime is fatalistic and invents the notion of time as a subjective experience (the future as a betrayal of the past, or time as a being-toward-death). Once on this path, the artist betrays the origin with every segment of

the line. With each betrayal, one is subjected to fate, to determinations and actualizations that simultaneously exhaust one's creative potential. Each is a selection, a purification, a refinement that guides the passional line of flight irreversibly from the raw mixed state to the refined pure state of the finished work or accomplished career. In this regime, madness and artistic genius resonate together as regressions upon the line, as degenerations to the raw, un-individuated origin, which now appears as intrinsically creative by virtue of it being as of yet still potential, undetermined, un-actualized, preindividual, where all possible lines of becoming meet at the limit, becoming indiscernible: creativity as regression. Where the signifying regime offers a paranoid logic of continual reversal, the post-signifying regime offers a subjective logic of fatal irreversibility or destiny.

Though elements of this regime's influence are still identifiable in today's art world, the landscape has drastically changed. The notion of 'originality' has lost much of its relevance in an artistic paradigm that functions less by eventful cuts and breaks – as it did with the avant-garde – than by the indefinite postponement of the event, typical of societies of control (Deleuze 1992: 5). To a certain extent this is analogous to how the post-signifying regime postpones reterritorialization upon the despotic centre. But in contrast to the post-signifying regime, today's paradigm is no longer tethered to a founding event. The narcissistic passion and subjective perspective of the paradigm of originality is no longer relevant for the 'dividual' artist, who navigates parallel temporalities and heterogeneous series that are irreducible to a singular linear progression from raw to refined. Additionally, in today's world of digital information and access, the notion of originality has been further disarmed, for it simply doesn't apply to anything in the digital realm, where a copy is indistinguishable from its original. The prophet's betrayal of the origin now seems impossible, and with it, the line of passional deterritorialization.

Dubuffet and the counter-signifying regime

Throughout his life, Jean Dubuffet rebelled against intellectualism and academism and defended the spontaneous, unassuming innocence of unedu-cated behaviour. He eventually came to associate intellectualism with the dry, hot south. He critiqued the Mediterranean, Greco-Roman influences of academics, who worked under the sign of the hot, dry, abstract Idea. He elevates Céline to the likes of a Nordic god, a symbol of the cold, wet north, and

the unassuming values of uneducated working men, with whom he wants to associate himself (Dieudonné and Jakobi 2007).

To escape the despotic regime of Parisian culture, Dubuffet flees several times to the desert. At first the Sahara affords him the isolation and exoticism he desires, which he believes will help foster a more authentic relationship to his painting practice, and perhaps rid him of cultural systems and clichés. As we saw earlier, this signals Dubuffet is now still moved by the passional, post-signifying regime. He has betrayed the value system of high-art, having already started to collect and display the work of raw artists alongside insiders. He has allied himself with culture's scapegoat, effectively taking its place to become his own scapegoat. He has broken off from the face and suddenly the landscape offers itself as a vast, open, smooth space: the desert.

But upon his second voyage to the Sahara, the desert already reveals its inhospitable nature: it is too hot to paint, too dusty, the accommodations are inadequate for his partner Lili, the locals are trying to profit from him at every chance. His admiration for the vastness, the emptiness, the rawness of the landscape transforms into resentment for the local culture, the heat, and the superficial nature of the human relations he entertains there. Like the surreal-ists, he too now has to fold back at the limit, for his northern temperament now associates the desert, not with freedom from the strictures of the Parisian cultural elite, but with the abstract rational thought he takes it to be a symbol for. This is perhaps the moment of Dubuffet's own U-turn. But though it may at first look as if he has shifted back to the signifying regime, his is a reversal that differs from the typically surrealist about-face. We might better call Dubuffet's recoil an 'about-hand', more closely aligned with the counter-signifying regime of the nomadic war machine than with the sedentary despotic regime. The nomadic war machine functions 'less by segmentarity then by arithmetic and enumer-ation' (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 131), and as such, Dubuffet is strategic and calculated in each of his moves. He is a businessman: he has a natural knack for the wine trade and keeps returning to it after having abandoned his stake in the family fortune. He effortlessly sets up direct connections with producers in Algiers, and opens up new avenues of distribution in occupied Paris, quickly reimbursing his pre-war debts. He behaves in much the same way in his management of the Collection de l'art brut: strategic, cunning and calculated. Indeed, he is neither a subjective post-signifying Judaic nomad, nor a primitive pre-signifying hunter nomad, but rather more of an animal-herding, tool-making, counter-signifying nomad. Dubuffet's about-hand remains a folding back of the line of flight, but instead of reterritorializing on the face and

language, it reterritorializes on the hand and tool, on connections and inter-faces between different territories, on new trade routes and modes of transport and communication. This is typical of a semiotic that begins in the desert and on the steppes, not in Paris or New York. The concept of art brut is thus also afforded by the counter-signifying regime, perhaps as much as signifying and post-signifying regimes.

> In this counter-signifying regime, the imperial despotic line of flight is replaced by a line of abolition that turns back against the great empires, cuts across them and destroys them, or else conquers them and integrates with them to form a mixed semiotic (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 118).

The nomad leaves the smooth desert and invades the cities, plugging his war machine wherever he deems it convenient, entirely disregarding the despotic regime's hierarchized and stratified signifying space. A barbarian invasion creates new connections while severing others, mixing the semiotic. Dubuffet, the rebel artist, is involved in his own reterritorializing strategy, but it is a war-like nomadic reterritorialization. He is not idealistic; he is resourceful and at times even opportunistic. His fascination with the deterritorializing agents of raw art give way to a reterritorializing scheme: he uses the post-war absence of the surrealists to his advantage and attempts to occupy the territory of raw art in the social field (Dieudonné and Jakobi 2007: 152). Art brut will henceforth be his territory; he will have become its champion, given it a name and a value.[4] The technologically advanced nomad, who invades an empire, partly disowns his nomadic origins in doing so. In a letter to Jacques Berne, like a war nomad infatuated with his sedentary other, he agonizes about the inhospitality of the desert, and aligns himself not with the city, for he still opposes its elitist culture, but rather with the war nomads of the steppes and with the Aryan culture that occupies the north in his north–south, hand–face axis (Dieudonné and Jakobi 2007: 227).

It is clear that the counter-signifying regime will today find it difficult to plug into, dissect or reintegrate the contemporary age's new forms of imperialism, which, as we will see, are no longer marked by the single-point attractor of the central signifier, but rather defined by dynamic equilibria, and limit cycles, which sometimes even integrate chaos for themselves (strange attractors), and which provoke continuous semiotic shifts and cascades. However, an opening may now exist for a new kind of 'barbarian', one that could use the internal cybernetic rhythms of the society of control against itself, sabotaging its mechanism, making it go out of step with itself.

Wölfli and the pre-signifying regime

> Once he has begun a description or a drawing, he carries it through as if he were obeying a mechanical law (Morgenthaler 1992: 23).

Adolf Wölfli never, or very rarely, edited his works once he had begun. His drawings emerged 'full-grown from his spirit', but not because he had planned them out beforehand. Rather, though he related how 'taxing it is to try not to forget anything' (Morgenthaler 1992: 23), he didn't know what would come out of him until his pencil met the paper. Once a mark was made it was there for good, and began interacting with the other devices already on the paper, producing a hybrid, poly-vocal logic, a plural semiotic, a primitive coding machine.

His writings and drawings feature scenes from the travels of his majestic persona, the Emperor Rudolf I of St-Adolf-Wood, or simply St Adolf, the ruler of the universe. He describes great flights across star fields, cities, oceans, forests, peaks and abysses, each more grand or vast than imaginable, each indexed to as many adjectives of magnitude as his limited vocabulary will allow: supreeme elegance, gigantic majesty, and myriad unfathomable numbers. The consistent doubling of consonants and vowels in his descriptions (Eearth, Sstars) seem to multiply the intensities of their pronunciation, and inscribe fixed points of articulation in the text's field of variation. His incessant oscillation between the very highest peaks and the lowest abysses, between glorious lives and shameful deaths, between himself as the emperor of the universe and himself as an interned paedophile, reflect the typical rhythm one can identify both in his prose and in the swirls, series, repetitions, and vacillations of his pictures.

It is difficult not to think of his work's incessant recasting of real events from his personal history, the grandiose mutations of his memories in his fantasy, including his crimes as a sexual predator, as strategies of emancipation from the painful determination of his fate. Throughout his fantasy, he manically re-diagrams his own painful memories into dense circuits of flight, creating routes of escape from each point in his lifeline. Each event connects to trans-cendent ladders and stairways that carry him away from determination. Each event brings a thickening of the plot, where simultaneous timelines reveal themselves: he is an adult groping a child while he is also a child beaten by his mother. Sublime expanses of landscape and indexed weights, distances, sizes, monetary values, compound interest, and other quantities, each described in minute detail, lend the characters of his epic a universal and eternal authority,

while simultaneously discharging the fateful overtones of his memories, releasing their subjective determination to a chaotic ocean of contingency.

Following through with his initial framing and capture of the paper's surface within the contour, he manipulates the shape of each element he draws in order to fit it into the whole, as if the whole absorbed and organized the parts, like organs attaching themselves to an empty body. This is perhaps the precise reason why his drawing is always begun from the periphery: the boundary first instantiates the whole as an emptiness, the white wall of a face. It is perhaps this feature of his work that most directly expresses his relationship to destiny. Not only is the picture captured in the bounding frame, Wölfli's entire life is captured by his tragic destiny of confinement. In Wölfli's case, the multiplication of the holes upon the wall, propagating by binarisations and symmetries, evokes the idea that destiny captures the will, that fate captures intent. His art directly addresses the face of the despot in its initial gesture. But it is important to stress that in Wölfli's work the face is only a provisional phase, a point of departure that is immediately disfigured, warped and deterritorialized. For he doesn't stop there: he begins with the figure of capture only to transform it into a figure of release and escape. Immediately Wölfli's drawings are swept up in sublime deterritorializations evoking escapes to the desert, surveys of the sea, flights to interstellar space, and free-falls into unimaginably deep chasms, each a strategy for postponing the determination of his life. Now instead of propagating black holes and eyes, Wölfli's pictures multiply the outlines: they appear to vibrate and recede into the depths beyond the paper, as if each line was the occasion of a catastrophic topological rupture, where the image breaks off from the despotic centre and is carried off into a parallel universe, a perpendicular dimension.

This systematic dismantling of hierarchical orderings and subjective sequences is the work of the pre-signifying semiotic, which, more than any other regime, affords Wölfli's particular practice. Though Deleuze and Guattari relate this regime to primitive cultures, it is important not to mistake it for a naïve 'primitivism', or interpret it in terms of a regression. If we were to do so, we would be reading the pre-signifying regime through the lens of the post-signifying regime, which as we have seen, offers the point of view from which the primitive may be understood as previous to the civilized, or the oral tradition as previous to the written: only the post-signifying regime organizes according to a line of perpetual betrayal of the origin. Rather, in order to understand the pre-signifying regime we should think of it as an abstract semiotic that anticipates the signifying regime for itself. It does not rely on a post hoc, post-signifying interpretation. It anticipates the decoding of the territory and

the establishment of centres of signification, and fiercely fends them off with its internal anti-hierarchical mechanisms. As such the pre-signifying regime relates directly to Pierre Clastres's argument that primitive cultures have in-built mechanisms that ward off capture by the state apparatus, and that they engage in a perpetual and deliberate dismantling of centralized power, of decodings and deterritorializations that would otherwise lead to hierarchical power relations (as they do in despotic culture).

> Only one structural, cataclysmic upheaval is capable of transforming primitive society, destroying it in the process: the mutation that causes to rise up within that society, or from outside it, the thing whose very absence defines primitive society, hierarchical authority, the power relation, the subjugation of men, in a word, the State (Clastres 1987: 202).

Clastres' argument is echoed in Deleuze and Guattari's description of the pre-signifying semiotic:

> It should not be thought that a semiotic of this kind functions by ignorance, repression, or foreclosure of the signifier. On the contrary, it is animated by a keen presentiment of what is to come. It does not need to understand it to fight against it. It is wholly destined by its very segmentarity and poly-vocality to avert the already-present threat: universalizing abstraction, erection of the signifier, circularity of statements, and their correlates, the State apparatus, the instatement of the despot, the priestly caste, the scape-goat, etc. (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 118)

The pre-signifying regime is thus related to the primary social machine, where the initial primitive codings and territorializations of the earth are inscribed. The primitive social machine is that which is in immediate contact with the flows of the earth: flows of water, vegetation, animal herds, ions, faeces, sperm and menstrual fluids. All the flows are directly intercepted and coded by the stateless social machine. In this unmediated proximity with the earth, the primitive social machine samples its flows, unlinks its chains and redistributes the parts (1977: 112). But importantly, the territoriality of this primitive semiotic is not privatized or reduced to the face, the hand, or to subjective passion. No signified is abstracted from the mixture. Forms of content freely circulate in reciprocity with a plurality of forms of expression. This 'prevents any power takeover by the signifier and preserves expressive forms particular to content'. (1987: 117) The very method of operation of the pre-signifying regime emphasizes plurality and polyvocality. The One is singled out as a threat and dealt with accordingly: avoided or eliminated. Organs and functions,

though inscribed into flows, are not attached to bodies or 'privatized'; names can only be used once and then must be consumed (cannibalism), because the pre-signifying regime does not separate the content from the expression: there is no abstract form of expression, only a singular expression for each singular content. This is because the sign has not yet emerged: the coding itself occurs on another plane, previous to the sign, and in fact is engaged in a constant warding off of the emergence of the sign.

Hence, though Wölfli's art may have some elements of the signifying regime and the post-signifying regime, the major engine at work here is pre-signifying. Though he may begin each individual drawing with an apparatus of capture, the contoured white wall of faciality is populated with eyes and then immediately folded and skewed to allow the wall to spin off to the infinite horizon of the maritime or desert landscape. The works are constantly drowned in great catastrophes and cataclysms, which eliminate hierarchies and empires: he falls back to the ground from his celestial throne. This reading of his work is consistent with its incessant enumeration: nothing comes in ones, everything is multiple and infinitely subdivided.

The pre-signifying semiotic may be still operative in today's paradigm, but its influence has waned considerably. For if it anticipates the state, with its hierarchical organization and bounded territorialities, it is now unclear how this regime could maintain its operation without clearly defined orderings to identify and ward off. This may suggest the days of the mad artistic genius are somewhat behind us, for if other outsiders once shared Wölfli's pre-signifying affordances, today the operative efficacy of this regime has been diminished: the major threat today is no longer that of hierarchy and striated territoriality, but rather one of levelling, homogenization and control. But an important lesson can nonetheless be learned from this regime's mode of operation: the pre-signifying realm is not a formless magma or a random chaotic variation: it is a specific semiotic regime, with its own operative logic and strategy. It is not merely a 'lack' of order; it is order of another kind. The primitive does not lack civilization, it actively and continually works to eliminate civilization's characteristic hierarchizations, power takeovers, and repressions. It is imperative to underline this now, given that the post-autonomy paradigm seems to have dissolved the grid of distinctions claimed by the avant-garde. It shows us how what we are left with – in the wake of this great levelling of aesthetic values – is not a fatalistic lack of ordering principles, but rather a multiplicity of more subtle and complex semiotic textures and timbres, irreducible to structural clichés (binaries, hierarchies, arborescent orderings),

but which nevertheless come with their own more nuanced sets of constraints and affordances.

Contemporary pragmatics and the future of the avant-garde

Different situations in history will inevitably call different semiotic regimes into play. But it is unclear which abstract regime, if any, takes precedence over the others in today's post-autonomy, post-enclosure paradigm. Hence, though the signifying regime may still be privately active in an artist's search for escape from competitive professional pressures, it has for the most part been dissolved along with the traditional boundaries between high and low, inside and out, and is no longer operative on its own. Nor is today's paradigm characterized by that which led to a fascination for the raw origin, namely the post-signifying regime, for in an epoch of 'real-time' digital media, with the temporal disorientation and rampant anachronism they afford, today linear historical series have lost much of their claim on sensation (Stiegler 1998). Even the most cunning counter-signifying nomad will today find it hard to cut across the apparatus of art as ostentation, where art-fair billionaires invest in a disappearing sliver of time, increasingly instantaneous and infinitesimally contemporary (Smith 2009: 117–38). And if the pre-signifying regime perhaps still speaks most to today's paradigm, it nevertheless falls short of accounting for today's seemingly non-hierarchichal, non-dialectical aesthetic field. For though they are no longer individually 'enclosed' and may seem to have become semiotically mixed, the cybernetic topologies of contemporary 'societies of control' remain extensions of the history of sedentarization, of grammatization, of the progressive capture and indexation of thought and affect on the social stratum. As Deleuze noted, it is the nature of societies of control that they never stabilize on one regime or another. Rather, they modulate them, shifting variably through different organizational paradigms and territorial regimes (Deleuze 1992). As Guattari imagined, we are only free to roam wherever our passwords will allow, free to think, free to feel that to which we are granted access. It is this access from point to point which changes as the topology is modulated, reformalizing social expressions as a function of fluctuating global variables. Hence contemporary cybernetic societies also involve a modulation of forms of expression. This fact underlines the significance of the historical shift Deleuze was recognizing in his postscript to Foucault's analysis of the disciplinary society. Cultures

hitherto tended to tease out their own abstract paradigms of interpretation to capture and organize social expressions according to specific semiotic regimes: the tribal was pre-signifying, the despotic was signifying, the 'barbarian' was counter-signifying, the monotheistic was post-signifying. Already the modern state and the Christian regime were oscillating mixtures of signifying and post-signifying elements (Deleuze and Guattai 1987: 125, 128). But if today's world seems difficult to define according to specific abstracted regimes, if all regimes seem to fit variably into their own provisional and local niches, it is because the post-enclosure paradigm has reterritorialized upon the diagrammatic itself, upon the abstract machine itself, making it operative in a global modulation of semiotic topologies.

Thus it is no surprise that many artists (and non-artists) have become disillusioned with creative practice, no longer finding within it a clear logic of engagement, or have opted to continue in a disinterested, cynical manner. I began by suggesting that schizoanalysis could carve out alternatives to the contemporary artistic zeitgeist of cynical complicity with the redundant signifiers of advanced capitalism. Art finds its consistency, much like madness, in the challenges of becoming: it is geared towards loosening the constraints of the age, the molar organizations of affect, percept and sensation, whatever they may be (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 187). It inherently seeks ways beyond the reductive critical grid into the complex machinic assemblages that have been at work from the onset, in effect producing the critical grid itself. But what will art do now, in the age of access, where the primary organizing principle is that of the modulation and control of shifting critical grids? Perhaps this is where schizoanalysis finds its greatest relevance with regard to aesthetics today: not only does it suggest much-needed new pragmatic approaches to aesthetic critique, capable of responding freely to incessant semiotic modulations, it also potentially arms artists with a timely claim to heterogeneity and disorientation as a strategic advantage, as a mechanism for creativity, rather than an aporetic signal for resignation. If there are to be avant-garde movements in the future, they may very well depend on the aesthetic application of a 'transformational pragmatics', affording the agility, elasticity, and athleticism required to act in an age of imperceptibly rapid shifts in the semiotic landscape. We can now only ask about the future of avant-garde movements, exactly what Deleuze asked regarding labour unions: 'tied to the whole of their history of struggle against the disciplines or within the spaces of enclosure, will they be able to adapt themselves or will they give way to new forms of resistance against societies of control' (Deleuze 1992: 7)?

Notes

1   For an excellent exposition on this surrealist *about-face* (volte-face), see: *L'art du ruisseau,* in Thévoz, M. (1999). *Art brut, psychose et médiumnité* (2e éd.). Editions de La Différence.

2   Indeed it is tempting to link the typical orderings of second-order systems theory with the structure of Deleuze and Guattari's conceptualization of the signifying regime.

3   www.youtube.com/watch?v=v0HvEJnyRJo (accessed 1 February 2014).

4   Ironically, it is remarkable that perhaps the closest Dubuffet ever got to creating a 'true' work of outsider or raw art was when he collaborated with Asger Jorn in an uneducated attempt to make sounds. For *Musique Phénoménale,* a series of recordings from 1960–1, the two painters decided to experiment with found instruments, invented instruments, noises, textures and a tape recorder, without any knowledge or even any prior interest in the academic history of music and with the *musique concrète* of their time. What allowed them to create these sounds with the innocence, spontaneity and freedom of the raw artists Dubuffet admired was not their ignorance itself, but rather their experiment's absence of centralizing signifiers and any need to betray an origin, as well as its freedom from any desire for a new origin or signifier.

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Passional Bodies: The Interstitial Force of Artaud's Drawings

Anna Powell

'These lines are what one might call interstitial lines/ Interstitial they are, as if being held in suspense within the movement that they accompany' (Rowell: 1996: 62).

How to write 'about' the interstitial force of Artaud's drawings? To trace the oscillations of passional affect and critical concept? To transcribe delirium into the sentences and paragraphs of an argument? The encounter with their materiality disrupts analysis as rational thought is pushed to its limits by the shocking event of these images.[1] For Deleuze and Guattari, Artaud's work, 'embracing all that flows and counterflows', will indeed appear 'difficult' to intellectual approaches (1984: 370–1). On the interstitial plane of these drawings, stretched between affect and thought, I feel a new and disturbing sense of what schizoanalysis might demand as a method of thinking through this intense encounter with Artaud as art's ability to stretch the limits of thought by affective encounter offers fresh insight into Deleuze and Guattari's concepts.

Artaud's drawings map a plane of consistency made up of part-objects, matter *in potentia*. Their glossolalic use of language, between sound and significance, is also interstitial. 'The *bouillabaiss*e of forms in the Tower of Babel/*La bouillabaisse de formes dans le tour de Babel*' (1946a; Figure 4.1) despite – or perhaps because of – its figural ambiguities, demonstrates the predominant elements of Artaud's graphic work in small form. It features bodies without organs (BwOs), figures of the face and *gris-gris* or magical spells. Although Deleuze and Guattari's BwOs do not need manifest components at all, Artaud's work offers us affective figures that we can use to think the concept. Here, BwOs mix human and non-human elements and blur the boundaries between them.

They include a conglomerate of semi-abstract forms that lean diagonally across the composition: broken tubes or pillars containing cubes or boxes in metallic blues and reds. A pink human leg stretches out, attached to a dismembered buttock, while some of metal bars adopt an upright humanoid shape. Clock faces clustered at top left show one dial reversed and some are stuck at half past three. Hands and numbers stretch out and break loose in this assemblage of fragmented time.

Figure 4.1 *La bouillabaisse de formes dans le tour de Babel/The bouillabaisse of forms in the Tower of Babel* (1946) © ADAGP, Paris and DACS, London 2013.

Artaud's portraits attack the *tabula rasa* of representation by making 'the human face/is an empty force, a/field of death' (Rowell 1996: 94). Here, a nascent faciality struggles to materialize, as a human arm protrudes from a kind of grey tuber with rudimentary facial features of three dots, with loops for ears. This entity pushes itself from a box using the larger figure as leverage. At bottom left another coffin-like case has jagged terminals. Emerging from this is a pink face, with red splotches for cheeks, dots for eyes, two spike noses and one ear. The drawing slides away from representation towards abstraction as signification sinks into the plane of consistency.

Among the mixed objects at bottom left are a chimney or tube punched with holes and boxes pierced by metal pegs. They recall African *Nkonde* magical figurines hammered with nails to 'send' the force of their spell and mark Artaud's magical intent to use his work as spells to send occult forces abroad. He elucidates his project as 'the lifting of malediction, a bodily vituperation against the constraints of spatial form, perspective, measure, balance, dimensions' (Grossmann 2008: 50). The delirious impact of the drawings and their melting of preconceptions are fuelled by a deliberate rejection of 'art' as institutional concept. They repudiate the formal constraints of artistic conventions and work in their interstices to release powerful affects. Lacking obvious aesthetic style and thematic content, they act against signification as 'drawings/which mean nothing/and represent/absolutely nothing' (Grossmann 2008: 34). Artaud's anti-art is intended to 'create, as it were, above the paper/a kind of counter-figure that would be an/ongoing protest against the exigencies of spatial form, or perspective, of measure, of equilibrium, /of dimension' (Grossmann 2008: 42).[2] In his exhibition catalogue Artaud the anti-artist explains: 'I've deliberately broken with art, style or skill in the drawings that one will see here. I mean there'll be trouble for those who consider them works of art, works of aesthetic simulation of reality' (Hirschman 1963: 233). To work with them, then, I must be wary of mapping familiar templates of 'meaning' over them.

Yet, despite the experimental form of the drawings, Artaud presents them as documents to be 'read' in order to 'understand what's *inside*' (Kendall 2011, emphasis in the original). This 'reading' is not, however, that of scholarly analysis and critique; indeed, he sets out to subvert this. Jacques Derrida's deconstructive analysis cites Artaud's art-attack against arid intellectual critique, '*by a stroke/anti-logical/anti-philosophic/anti-intellectual/anti-dialectic/of the tongue/ by stubbing with my black pencil/and that's all*' (Derrida and Thévenin 1991: 73,

emphasis in the original). The drawings are not intended as finished products, as 'not one properly speaking is a work, all are sketches' (Hirschman 1963: 233), thus further challenging attempts at textual analysis. As Stuart Kendall contends, they demand direct participation via 'bodily response to the material forces of the images, sounds, and ideas of the art' (Kendall 2011). A 'reading' must itself be interstitial, for it is 'in the interstices the emotion that generated the drawing appears' (Kendall 2011). By the 'inside' of the drawings, then, Artaud means that the viewer 'must superadd [*surajouter*] this primal emotion subordinated by nature on pain of becoming no more than an incompetent illiterate' (Kendall 2011).

So what did Artaud intend the long-term effect of his graphics to be? He believed that 'no matter how deep we dig into the mind, we find at bottom of every emotion, even an intellectual one, an affective sensation of a nervous order' (Sontag 1976a: 150). He offered his viewers both general and specific guidance to using his drawings as catalytic portals for 'the opening/of our consciousness/towards possibility/beyond measure' (Barber 2004: 14). We need to leave off ascertaining spatial qualities to experience durational intensity. To engineer this paradigm shift, he advises a repeated viewing that 'remains then not in space but in time, at that point of the space of time where a breath from behind the heart holds on to existence and suspends it' (Barber 2004: 78). Letting their affective force pull us away from familiar ground, we slide between mind and body, flesh and spirit, feeling and thought as we enter the turbulence of the interstitial.

The concept of the interstitial was borrowed from set theory to develop Deleuze and Guattari's fundamental 'METHOD of between […] the method of AND "then this then that"' (1989: 174). In *The Time Image* Deleuze exemplifies this by Godard's cinematic editing, in which the cut is the interstice as '*it is irrational, and does not form part of either set, one of which has no more of an end than the other has a beginning*' (1989: 175, emphasis in the original). The interstice is a fissure 'between two actions, between two affections, between two perceptions, between two visual images, between two sound images, between the sound and the visual: make the indiscernible, that is, the frontier, visible' (1989: 175). By means of this 'radical calling into question of the image' (1989: 175), 'the interval is set free, the interstice becomes irreducible and stands on its own' (1989: 266). Deleuze associates its cinematic use with 'the power of the outside' and the direct presentation of time (1989: 175).

Artaud explains that his own intentions are 'concretely signified' through 'interstitial […] lines and points' that stimulate the viewer's own passional

response (Scheer 2000: 62). 'Death and the Man/*Le mort et l'homme*' (1946c) offers a diagram of the interstitial operations of thought between various planes. In this sketch, a skeletal stick-figure is suspended between the poles of life and death. To prevent his body from taking off in the air like a released balloon, he anchors himself to two cubes. His hands are enlarged, splayed and reddened as he clings to life. Here the body is drawn 'as interstitial, as negatively infinite, intervening between two finite, closed boxes' (Scheer 2000: 70). This unnerving cartoon is not a psychoanalytic ego clinging onto subjective interiority, but a dramatization of schizoanalytical operations in motion between the planes.

In Artaud's drawings, bodies are eviscerated to reveal part-objects as raw interstitial forces neither inside nor out, as 'there is no inside, no spirit, no outside or consciousness, nothing but the body' (Beaumelle 1996: 59). These part-objects are in a condition of latency intended to '*work in concert* with each other so that with the colours, the shadows, and their emphases the whole would become valid and singular' (Beaumelle 1996: 57). These 'improbable bodies' invite a schizo encounter with the viewer's embodied mind. Deleuze and Guattari deploy Artaud's 'convulsive' life to express and develop the possibilities of schizoanalysis and as an exemplification of its methodology. They stress the 'schizorevolutionary' potential of his oeuvre, its silencing of signification and formal structure by the 'decoded and deterritorialized flows' of passional energy.

Artaud uses the adjective 'passional' (*passionelle*) in his writings on art and describes portrait artists working 'in the crucible of a passional palpitation never wearied' (Rowell 1996: 94). As a noun, a passional is a devotional book 'of the sufferings of saints and martyrs, for reading on their feast days', a meaning apposite to both to Artaud's role as countercultural 'saint' and his physical and psychic suffering (OED). The passional is one of the four regimes of signs in *A Thousand Plateaus* (Deleuze and Guattari 1988: 9). Deleuze and Guattari refer to 'the passional semiotic of subjectification' in the negative sense of passive self-absorption (1988: 150) and warn against the dangers of 'absolute deterritorialisation expressed in the black hole of consciousness and passion' (1988: 147). Deleuze's usage of the term draws substantially on Spinoza's *Ethics* (2008). For Spinoza, the passions are sad affects that, in reducing the ability to act, deplete joyful energy. He aligns them with a passivity, a lack that stymies thought, 'all appetites or desires are only passions, in so far as they spring from inadequate ideas' (2008: 122).

On the other hand, Deleuze and Guattari's awareness of passional duality incorporates more positive usages such as those of D. H. Lawrence. In

Women in Love, Ursula's sexual encounter with Rupert establishes 'a rich new circuit, a new current of passional electric energy, between the two of them' (2005: 424). Lawrence's assertion that the value of the novel as a literary form lies in the flow and recoil of sympathy states that 'it is in the passional secret places of life, above all, that the tide of sensitive awareness needs to ebb and flow, cleansing and refreshing' (*Lady Chatterley's Lover*, 2008: 63). For Deleuze, passional affects have the dual potential to 'release joys, vectoral signs of the augmentation of power and ward off sadnesses, signs of diminution' ('Spinoza and The Three Ethics', 1997: 27). He considers the birth of concepts to be a 'passional struggle, an inexpiable affective combat one risks dying from, in which signs confront signs, and affects clash with affects in order that a little joy might be saved' (1997: 27). Given that 'assemblages are passional, they are compositions of desire', the regime's positive or negative tendencies depend on the nature of desire in a BwO and thus lines of flight can change direction (Deleuze and Guattari 1988: 440). I will consider Deleuze and Guattari's concept of the BwO in more detail to help elucidate its application to Artaud.

BwOs/Bodies

> 'On November 28, 1947, Artaud declares war on the organs' (Deleuze and Guattari 1988: 71).

Ian Buchanan notes the conceptual shifts of the BwO across Deleuze's work as it 'evolved constantly and considerably (to the point of eventually being declared a non-concept' (Buchanan, in press). Deleuze and Guattari align it to unconscious forces operating as 'the field of immanence of desire, the plane of consistency specific to desire (with desire defined as a process of production without reference) to any external agency, whether it be a lack that hollows it out or a pleasure that fills it' (1988: 170–1). In their model, 'a Plateau is a piece of immanence. Every BwO is made up of Plateaus. Every BwO is itself a plateau in communication with other plateaus on the plane of consistency. The BwO is a component of passage' (1988: 171). The BwO works to dismantle the strata of signification, subjectification and stasis by its 'disarticulation (or *n* articulations) as the property of the plane of consistency, experimentation as the operation on that plane (no signifier, never interpret!), and nomadism as the movement (keep moving, even in place, never stop moving, motionless voyage, desubjectification' (1988: 176). It is, then, a force operant at the opposite pole to the stratification it undermines.

Deleuze and Guattari identify three types of BwOs: cancerous, empty and full. The cancerous BwO is fascistic, perpetually replicating its own homogeneous 'cells'. The empty BwO is passive and schizophrenically open to all flows. The full BwO 'without its being the cancerous BwO of a fascist inside us, or the empty BwO of a drug addict, paranoiac or hypochondriac' is the ideal (1988: 181). They warn against confusing these three bodies when 'the strata spawn their own BwOs, totalitarian and fascist, terrifying caricature of the plane of consistency' (1988: 181). The healthy BwO, productively open to experimentation, must be critically distinguished from its 'doubles: empty, vitreous bodies, cancerous bodies, totalitarian and fascist' (1988: 183). As experimental machine, it must be made 'ready to be plugged in to other collective machines' (1988: 179) in order to 'connect, conjugate, continue' (1988: 178).

For Buchanan, Artaud's overall influence on the conception of the BwO is over-emphasized. He argues that the 'negative' Artaudian BwO of *Anti-Oedipus*, with 'no pappamummy' is 'an agency of repulsion and anti-production', an unconscious refusal (Buchanan, in press). By *A Thousand Plateaus*, written a decade later, however, the BwO becomes 'a multi-dimensional concept with both "negative" and "affirmative" capabilities as well as the capacity to be influenced by subjective agency' (Buchanan). Buchanan indicates that Freud and Klein 'are at least as important points of reference as Artaud' (Buchanan). He points out that the BwO makes an 'essentially defensive response to internal stimuli, produced by the unconscious system of generalised desire itself' (Buchanan). The BwO's psychic structure actually arises, then, in response to these stimuli, which render it 'structurally necessary' for maintaining balancing operations (Buchanan). It thus 'erects a membrane where Freud thought no barrier was possible (between the so-called "primary processes" and the unconscious)' to absorb psychic shocks, but unlike the Freudian censor, this 'operates in the midst of desire […] recoding it and passing judgement on it' (Buchanan).

In *A Thousand Plateaus*, additionally, 'all BwOs pay homage to Spinoza' (1988: 170). Deleuze and Guattari draw on Spinoza's concept of univocity to read the 'crowned anarchy' in Artaud's play *Heligobale* and travelogue *Les Tarahumaras*. They contend that 'Heligobale is Spinoza, and Heligobale is Spinoza revived. And the Tarahumaras are experimentation, peyote' (1988: 175). Their reading emphasizes Artaud's awareness of the unity of the multiple on the plane of consistency for 'Spinoza, Heligobale and experimentation have the same formula: anarchy and unity are one and the same thing, not the unity

of the One, but a much stronger unity [they] express the multiplicity of fusion, fusionability as infinite zero, the plane of consistency' (1988: 175). Deleuze and Guattari note 'the difficulty of reaching this world of crowned Anarchy if you go no further than the organs […] and if you stay locked in the organism, or into a strata that blocks the flows and anchors us in this, our world' (1988: 175).

Deleuze and Guattari cite Artaud's poem, 'The body is the body. Alone it stands. And in no need of organs. Organism it never is. Organisms are the enemy of the body' (1988: 170). By their use of the term 'organism', they intend the *organization* of the BwO's potential by an adjacent psychic 'stratum', by 'a phenomenon of accumulation, coagulation, and sedimentation that, in order to extract useful labour from the BwO, imposes upon it forms, functions, borders, dominant and hierarchised organisations, organised transcendencies' (1988: 176). Thus, they contend that 'every coupling of machines, every production of a machine, every sound of a machine running, becomes unbearable to the body without organs. Beneath its organs it senses there are larvae and loathsome worms, and a God at work messing it all up or strangling it by organising it' (1984: 9).

According to Buchanan, Artaud, 'besieged' by unconscious demands, like an excess of internal organs 'longs for the peace of the unproductive state of an organless body'. And yet, this remains elusive, as the ongoing struggle of his art attests. The BwO is 'precisely a defence mechanism against the ambivalence of objects/machines', with their pathological modality, which is characterized by what I will term the irruption of immanence' (Buchanan) of the primary processes and the 'corresponding loss of transcendence' (*Anti-Oedipus*: 1984: 5). Chaos and disorder reign if the desiring-machines become autonomous from the necessary constraints of the organism (Buchanan). The BwO thus operates a series of resistances against machinic primary processes in order to 'drown them out', presenting its 'smooth, slippery, opaque, taut surface as a barrier' (Buchanan). Against 'linked, connected, and interrupted flows, it sets up a counterflow of amorphous, undifferentiated fluid' demonstrable in Artaud's poetry that opposes phonetic systems by uttering 'only gasps and cries that are sheer unarticulated blocks of sound' (1984: 9). Thus the BwO becomes machinic itself as it repels the primary process machines by magical prophylaxis.

Buchanan warns us against the deceptively poetic 'charm' of Deleuze and Guattari's evocation of an immanence that is only 'liberating for the schizophrenic, who finds the pressure of staying within the confines of

the transcendentally organised body and universe impossible to sustain' (Buchanan). Though schizophrenics, addicts and masochists might appear to be romanticized by Deleuze and Guattari, Buchanan reminds us that the irruption of immanence is 'pathological – it is a schizophrenic effect signalling the onset of psychosis' and thus 'schizoanalysis is the attempt to understand this illness for itself and map its structure'. Deleuze and Guattari contend that 'dismantling the organism has never meant killing yourself, but rather opening the body to connections that presuppose an entire assemblage, circuits, conjunctions, levels and thresholds, passages and distributions of intensity, and tensions and deterritorializations measured with the craft of a surveyor' and dismantling experience as substantial as Artaud's (1988: 177).

I use pharmacoanalysis to explore Artaud's visionary account of the empty BwO elsewhere (Powell 2007: 58). During the Tarahumara rite of *Tutuguri*, he experiences the dissolution of his organs while 'personal consciousness has expanded in this process of internal separation and distribution' (1976d: 24). The experimental 'drugs assemblage' as a method of schizoanalysis in *A Thousand Plateaus* was developed from the earlier study, 'Porcelain and Volcano' (1990a), where Deleuze asserts that the 'cracks' of drug addiction and madness can be expressed 'safely', and beneficially, on the virtual plane of art. Productive delirium thus prevents the actualization in the depths that 'characterises the victim or the true patient' by engineering its creative diversion ('Porcelain and Volcano': 157). By becoming instead 'the mime of what *effectively occurs*', art offers us a virtual double in a 'counter-actual-isation which limits, moves and transfigures it' ('Porcelain and Volcano': 161). This valorization of pharmacoanalysis is clearly marked by the work of Artaud among others (Micheaux, Castaneda). Yet, despite the significant extensions, revisions and cautions of the BwO, schizoanalysis remains shot through by Artaud's schizo workings of the BwO across different expressive media. As Buchanan acknowledges, 'for Deleuze and Guattari the very idea that schizophrenia could be thought of as having a structure derives from Artaud'.

Artaud's graphic BwOs range from amorphous blotches to recognizable portraits. The paper itself, as interstitial between artist and viewer, is a further BwO as a pierced and penetrated 'subjectile'. In Adrian Gargett's account, Artaud's drawings disintegrate the surface of body/page by graphic aggression, 'grinding it with crayons into the surface of the paper as a substance to be collapsed and then reformulated from zero' whilst its 'inner space was

extracted and exploded with great velocity into the world' (Gargett: 26). These aggressive pencil lines and loops scribble out sections of the figures drawn beneath. In his poem '*Les figures sur la page inerte*', Artaud says he will 'plumb, carve, scrape, file, seam together and sunder, hack, slash to ribbons' to open up the force of his pictures (Rowell 1996: 42). As Deleuze suggests, in its general breakdown of surfaces (1990a) Artaud's work performs a kind of autopsy, as he was himself aware (1947b: 78). For Adrian Gargett, these figures are dismembered as 'sections of metal, insects, child-like female faces, internal organs, spilled out in painful dispersal across the scorched surface of the paper' (2001: 1). The viewer thus encounters a virtual event of evisceration both affective and psychic. In 'Porcelain and Volcano', aesthetic 'identification with a distance' distinguishes the truth of the event from its corporeal actualization (Deleuze: 161). The distancing devices of art 'give the crack the chance of flying over its own incorporeal surface area, without stopping at the bursting within each body' ('Porcelain and Volcano': 161). The aesthetics of affect thus offer 'the chance to go further than we could have believed possible' ('Porcelain and Volcano': 161). If the pure event is 'imprisoned forever in its actualisation', art 'liberates it, always for other times' ('Porcelain and Volcano': 161).

The BwO of these incisive drawings slides between the planes of subjectivization and consistency, oscillating between judgement and immanence (Deleuze and Guattari 1988: 180). It 'swings between two poles, the surfaces of stratification into which it is recoiled, on which it submits to judgement, and the plane of consistency in which it unfurls and opens to experimentation' (1988: 176). In Artaud's drawings, for Gargett, the 'vectors through which the body escapes are all provisional organs, loci of sensations on the body without organs' (Gargett 2001: 1). Yet, images of corporeal dismemberment and organic dissipation must retain sufficient stratification to have enabled their becoming-figural in the first place. This alternation of freedom and recoil produces 'a perpetual and violent combat between the plane of consistency, which frees the BwO, cutting across and dismantling all of the strata, and the surfaces of stratification that block it or make it recoil' (Deleuze and Guattari 1988: 159). Artaud's drawings cross and re-cross this interstitial combat zone, marking it and mapping it in graphite.

The totalitarian system that Artaud calls the 'Judgment of God' (1976d) seeks to organize and stratify the BwO as it 'uproots it from its immanence and makes it an organism, a signification, a subject' (Deleuze and Guattari 1988: 159). To repel this Judgement Artaud's BwO must (in the earlier terminology

of *Anti-Oedipus*) become 'full' as 'the unproductive, the sterile, the unengendered, the unconsumable. Antonin Artaud discovered this one day, finding himself with no shape or form whatsoever, right there where he was at that moment' (Deleuze and Guattari 1988). By *A Thousand Plateaus*, however, the pole of consistency, where un-differentiation threatens interstitial survival, almost destroys Artaud by 'too-violent destratification' as 'automata stop dead and set free the unorganized mass they once served to articulate' (Deleuze and Guattari 1988).

'Being and its foetuses/*L'être et ses foetus*' (1945) is one of Artaud's most destratified schizzes. An over-full BwO, the crowded paper undermines formal signification by a proliferation of wheels, suns, breasts, penises, tubes and tuberheads. Most of these are pencilled outlines, with a few details picked out in blue crayon: bones; eyes; wheels; squared circles and a pale sun emitting one blue ray. Three splayed figures are a knot of vaginas and bones. In an Hieronymus Bosch-like composite of lovers, the lower figure kisses the rectum of the one above. A cellular foetus sprouts spikes. Figures are violently conjoined, penetrated by teeth or thorns, and partly formed faces with breasts float out from the upper corners.

Artaud integrates written language into his drawings and his skill in *transcribing* glossolalia, usually an oral performance of pure sound, is highly distinctive. This liminal script straddles words and sounds to shatter linguistic signification by a counter-spell. In this case, the faintly lettered script sprawls across the page as an anti-title. Their alliterative non-sense forms a tectonic plate that slides beneath the plane of images and further undermines signification as the picture moves intensively on the spot. As Stephen Barber suggests, the body thus becomes 'immediate and dense' as the disarticulation and abjection of language lead to its transformation (2004: 18). Such linguistic torsions enhance the function of magical forces unleashed by the marks on the paper. The glossolalic incantation, 'Foto fote a keko a klis/poto klis, ake klis/da poto. Poto klis, aka klis, da poto', emerges from below to undermine the differentiation of the figures and smooth out the overall consistency of the drawing's planes.

Fragmented images and words work in unison to make this BwO an (anti-Oedipal) resistance-machine against the organic, so that 'in order to resist linked, connected, and interrupted flows, it sets up a counterflow of amorphous, undifferentiated fluid. In order to resist using words composed of articulated phonetic units, it utters only gasps and cries that are sheer unarticulated blocks of sound' (Deleuze and Guattari 1884). The matter of the drawing

is itself in foetal formation, the becoming of being. In *A Thousand Plateaus*, Deleuze and Guattari evoke a multiplicity of part-objects to make the BwO a desubjectified 'collectivity (assembling elements, things, plants, animals, tools, people, powers, and fragments of all these' (1984: 179). Artaud's drawing, with its multiple 'flows of intensity', helps us to think 'matter where no gods go; principles as forces, essences, substances, elements, remissions, productions; manners of being or modalities as produced intensities, vibrations, breaths, Numbers' (1984: 179).

As Deleuze and Guattari suggest, Artaud's creative process does not excise organs *per se*, indeed, dismembered, they multiply and permeate his work with their affects, but rather he jettisons any organization of them (1988: 16). In his drawings 'forms become contingent, organs are no longer anything more than intensities that are produced, flows, thresholds and gradients' (1988: 164). The organs have been freed from belonging to an organized body by the indefinite article as a 'conductor of desire' that expresses 'the pure determination of intensity, intensive difference' (1988: 164). There is neither a lost unity nor complete indifferentiation, but rather 'a distribution of intensive principles of organs' (1988: 165). These images reveal the plane of consistency as traversed with vectors of force and flows of affect in which no single element predominates to stratify meaning. In the later drawings, however, the human face comes to express a more specialized locus of interstitiality. Deleuze and Guattari's use of the face as a diagrammatic component of desire animated by 'intensive movements' is also a crucial tool in schizoanalysis (1988: 171). Their concept of faciality is linked to Artaud's work in which 'faciality loses its substantial function of support from signifying semiologies' (Guattari 2011: 324).

The Face

'The human face is an empty force, a field of death' (Rowell 1996: 94).

Artaud aimed to make the face as the most 'authentic' and 'heavily coded zone' of the body, express 'the body of sensation, as opposed to simple representation' (Gargett 2001: 1). For Guattari, the face (like the refrain) has 'specialized in "misconstruing" the other components, either by short-circuiting their rhizomatic connections, or by recentralizing them around black hole effects, by echoing them in relation to one another' (2011: 156). Artaud's 'portraits' with their 'hard bones/concentrated eyes' seek to 'obliterate the body's weaknesses

and return it to a vivid manifestation of turbulent movement and experiential existence' and thus to 'challenge and reformulate the visual experience' (Gargett 2001: 26).

After electroshock treatment, Artaud began to produce recognizable portraits and self-portraits as well as signing his work. 'Blue Head/*La Tête bleue*' (1946d; Figure 4.2) initially appears to be more formally accessible

Figure 4.2 *La Tête bleue/Blue Head* (1946) © ADAGP, Paris and DACS, London 2013.

than his other works. Yet the clarity of its outline is undermined by a multi-plicity of jagged scribbles, holes that scab the surface of the skin and infest the long, drooping curl of the hair. As well sores, the face is punctured by larger orifices: a cavernous, screaming mouth; gaping nostrils and mismatched eyes (one pupil dilated, the other shrunk to a pinprick). The drawing performs a kind of literalization of Deleuze's figure of the schizophrenic sieve. In this extended metaphor, he characterizes the three 'primary dimensions' of the schizophrenic body as 'body-sieve, fragmented body and dissociated body' (Deleuze 1990b). The 'body-sieve' is 'punctured by an infinite number of little holes' so that 'the entire body is no longer anything but depth' (1990: 87). Furthermore, 'everything is a mixture of bodies, and inside the body, inter-locking and penetration' and thus, 'as there is no surface, the inside and the outside, the container and the contained, no longer have a precise limit; they plunge into a universal depth' (1990: 87). The binary divide of inside and out that propels fantasy is no longer operant, as 'every event is realised, albeit in an hallucinatory form' (1990: 87). Artaud's schizo images break though the limits of the surface they have 'split open' (1990: 86). Their multiple holes or portals render the surface redundant so that terror and beauty flow through without restraint.

The distortions of the face, head and neck suggest a body *in extremis*, but death is denied here by potent affect which, rather, makes this image, with its positive and negative currents, a live force-field of 'electric matter' (Grossmann 2008: 23). The head melts into imperceptibility as the burnt and blackened texture of the left side spreads across the cheek. For Agnes Beaumelle, the drawings generate a new perception of the body and mind 'as a stripped, live, *field,* open, crossed by circuits, passages, fluxes, connections, resonances, forces of death and life, and, finally, of multiple becomings' (1996: 60). Through its holes; zigzag cables and red and blue current-markers, this interstitial sieve lets the force of anguish stream through in both directions.

An assemblage of names aligns Artaud with his closest women friends, 'Artaud/Yvonne/Anie/Catherine/Cécile/Elah/'. The glossolalic proclamation, 'Ana/or/paru/or/paru/petolo/or/papa/rulu/Ir/pera/ir/perti/cili/cur/pito/o/ta/fiole/ira' may be a kind of 'binding spell' to cement his relationships with them. Yet, any such biographical reading is undercut by the formal fluidity and unnerving affect of the drawing, which remains fully operational in '[t]earing the conscious away from the subject in order to make it an exploration, tearing the unconscious away from significance and interpretation in order to make it

a veritable production' (Deleuze and Guattari 1988: 160). Its material impact thus undermines the arborescence tendencies of biographical identities and narratives.

'Untitled/*Sans titre*' (1948) is an heterogeneous interstitial machine in which the deterritorialized subject becomes multiple as a facial assemblage. This sea of deterritorialized faces ranges from recognizable portraits to rudimentary squiggles. Artaud's drawing works to 'dismantle the face and facializations, to become imperceptible, to become clandestine' (Deleuze and Guattari, 1984). This facial assemblage evokes the effects of the plane of consistency, between materialization and transcendence. Its tectonic plates shift and slide, impelling the melt-out of faces into a diagonal fault-line, thus rendering text partly illegible. Subjective boundaries are stretched and torn in a field of becoming, an unrolling passional map that refuses to fix the face. Its multiplicity includes facial components overcome by other objects, forms and words. At the bottom of the drawing lurk rudimentary parts of the faciality machine – an eye, a molecule or a forming foetus. A blot becomes an unformed head with nascent part-object-features combining mouth, vagina and trap. A soldier's face is reduced to a featureless shrunken head, or even a rudimentary eye. Protruding from the chin of a female face is a small satyr-like figure, with horns and a beard. One head has pegs or terminals jammed into it. Eyeless sockets are punctured by sharp wires that send currents into a mesh of limbs. Lips are drawn back in a rictus to reveal sharp pointed teeth. The features of one face are blurred and gouged into a becoming-owl.

Deleuzian thinking about faciality draws on the 'unextended' affection-image in Henri Bergson's work via which intensive images enter virtual conjunctions unlimited by spatio-temporal co-ordinates (Deleuze and Guattari, 1984). Power-qualities 'in themselves' are expressed by faces (or their equivalent) and embody the cinematic affection-image, epitomizing its 'motor effort on an immobilised receptive plate' (1984: 13). For Deleuze and Guattari, the intensive deterritorial-ization machines of experimental art first learn to 'know' the face, then use that knowledge to dismantle it so as to deterritorialize others. For them, 'dismantling the face is the same as breaking through the wall of the signifier and getting out of the black hole of subjectivity' and schizoanalysis demands that we learn to 'know' faces as 'black holes' of subjective consciousness and 'white walls' for the projection of signification (1984: 13). Artaud's 'portraits' offer a potent visualization of such facial demolition through the knowledge of black graphite on white paper.

For Deleuze, the desubjectified face attains a trans-personal quality in cinema as though 'it had torn it away from the co-ordinates from which it was abstracted' and it then acts 'like a short circuit of the near and far' to assemble disparate elements (1986: 104). Faciality reins in ambient non-facial elements to increase its own affect. All components interact intensively among themselves or extensively with other elements. Thus defamiliarized, the intensive face epitomizes the 'unextended' affection-image and produces '*asignifying faciality traits*, figures of expression which allow us, beyond trans-sexuality, to access a trans-subjectivity' to interrogate the nature of identity (Guattari 2011: 326). Like the cinematic close-up, Artaud's drawings magnify facial qualities and modalities, moving them even further from recognizable templates of signification (Deleuze 1986: 103). Stephen Barber asserts that for Artaud the human face carries '"a kind of perpetual death" from which the artist can "save it/by giving it back its authentic features"' (Barber 2004: 75). The mobile passional face of art thus seeks to counter the death imposed by arboresent control and stasis. For Deleuze and Guattari, 'dismantling the face is also a politics, involving real becoming, an entire becoming-clandestine' (1988: 188). Artaud's radical anatomies thus offer liberation from signification, enabling us 'to escape the face, to dismantle the face and facialisations, to become imperceptible' (1988: 171).

As well as dismantling, or cancelling, the content of his drawings, refusing their completion, Artaud's 'working over' them by overlay and partial erasure also effects a magical evocation, a 'working' by which a spell is 'sent' out. Artaud explains 'the figures that I thereby made/Were spells-which, after so meticulously/Having drawn them, I put a match to' (1947: 42). This gesture of destruction is also part of the anti-art agenda that repudiates the ossifying of 'works of art' by judging, archiving and curating them for posterity. They are, rather, meant to go out into the world to affect recipients, as acts of magical intent.

Spells

'especially magical/magical first/and foremost' (Artaud 1996: 32).

Many of Artaud's drawings are marked with magic details to send out affective force as a prophylactic against psychic 'incubi and succubi' (1947a: 42). Artaud prepared a collection of his spells for publication, but this did not appear in his lifetime (Grossmann 2008). These semi-figurative and highly tactile pictograms

are difficult to describe as they appear in mixed-media letters sent to particular recipients, the whole letter forming part of the conjuration. In 'Spell for Leon Fouks' (1939c) the paper is covered by purple crosses and stars as well as infinity signs. There is a large burn hole in the centre and four smaller holes on the left. The 'Spell for Sonia Mossé' (1939a) is marked with purple and yellows stars, crosses and burn holes, with further blurs caused by folding the letter. The 'Spell for Roger Blin' (1939b) is burned, smeared with blood and scored with sharp pencil. The 'Spell for Hitler' (1939d) features overlaid crosses and stars covered with burn marks.

The untitled 'Spell 9' is a pictogram that tends towards abstraction (Grossmann 2008: 53). Infinity symbols and glyphs borrowed from the occult systems of gnosticism and alchemy proliferate. Dark patches engulf the symbols in a field of force. Multivalent figures melt out representational identity. The same figure could be an arrangement of crosses, swastikas or the roof of a church. Zeros might be rudimentary eyes. A tiny skull-face is surrounded by a halo-like circuit of infinity symbols. This image is a roughly drawn amalgam of Artaud and the crucified Jesus with crown of thorns. The entity at the top of the drawing suggests a practice sketch or double for a more detailed figure joined to it by an explosion of force from a central point. The magical crosses exceed the limits imposed by symbolic meaning. Like the other spells, this diagonal composition is only one component of an intensive movement extending beyond the edges of the paper.

Elsewhere I have linked Deleuze's concept of 'sorcery' with Carlos Castaneda's *brujo* Don Juan and Artaud's rituals (Powell, 2007). Both literary sources advocate the magical use of hallucinogens to access psychic alterity. Don Juan's mescalin stops the disciple's internal dialogue by flooding his mind with information so as to prepare it for new modes of perception (Powell 2007, 57). When engaging with these forces, humans are no longer focused on a single subjectivity, but experience themselves as more complex: 'luminous beings' as a 'cluster' or multiplicity of fibres (Castaneda 1976: 225). For Deleuze and Guattari Don Juan's teachings, like Artaud's work, evoke a pre-subjective autonomy and the genesis of a radical mode of operations prior to imposed structures of signification. Seeking to alleviate his opium addiction by participation in a sacred tribal ritual, Artaud visited the *Tarahumara* in 1936. His account of *Ciguri*'s sacred '*plane*', which is 'the very mystery of all poetry', inaccessible to normal consciousness, perhaps marks Deleuze and Guattari's own use of the terms 'plane' and 'stratum' (1976d: 38–9). Artaud contrasts this with the more limited level on which mundane awareness operates. In the *Tutuguri* ritual, he seeks a

magical aid to autopoesis by a kind of metaphysical homeopathy. Castaneda's sorcerer also describes a kind of autopoiesis that, according to Deleuze and Guattari, can 'combat the mechanisms of interpretation and instil in the disciple a presignifying semiotic, or even an asignifying diagram' (1988: 138). They present these accounts as an inspiration for new becomings, to help Westerners 'find your own places, territorialities, deterritorialisations, regime, line of flight! Semioticise yourself instead of rooting around in your prefab childhood and Western semiology!' (1988: 138).

Don Juan's existential cartography depends on the dynamic interaction of two forces: *tonal* and *nagual*. The *tonal* is the 'organiser of the world', while the *nagual* is 'nonordinary reality', the sorcerers' field of operations (Castaneda 120 in 1988: 162). In Deleuze and Guattari's interpretation, the *tonal* is subjective signification, while the *nagual* is 'the same everything, but under such conditions that the body – without – organs has replaced the organism and experimentation has replaced all interpretation' (1988: 162). Subjectivity is thus transformed into 'flows of intensity, their fluids, their fibres, their continuums and conjunctions of affects, the wind, fine segmentation, microperceptions' in the dynamic flux of material forces (1988: 162). The destratified *nagual* enables becomings, intensities and the moving forces via which magic operates. Yet, its dynamic chaos might irrevocably annihilate the subject, destroying not enhancing agency. For Deleuze and Guattari, 'a *nagual* that erupts, that destroys the tonal, a body – without – organs that shatters all strata, turns immediately into a body of nothingness, pure self-destruction' with death as its outcome (1988: 162). Their ideal is interstitial, to move freely between planes as particular operations demand.

Echoing Artaud, Deleuze maintains that 'the hieroglyph is everywhere; its double symbol is the accident of the encounter and the necessity of thought: "fortuitous and inevitable"' (2000: 102). In a hieroglyph, 'the essences are at once the thing to be translated and the translation itself, the sign and the meaning' (2000: 102). The hieroglyphic function is explained by Jay Murphy, as 'an ideogram where the thing, the notion or idea of the thing, and the term for it are "a whole wedded by the mark of the 'character'"' (Murphy 2013: 7). The hieroglyph cannot be encapsulated by discursive logic, that poses another more primal logic of its own' (Murphy 2013: 2). Evelyne Grossmann explains that Artaud's magic offers him 'an awesomely effective form of communication. It is no doubt the only way to heal that "painful split" between things and words, between ideas and signs, the gulf between culture and life' (Grossmann 2008: ix).

Artaud explains his own magical intent as a kind of exorcism against established powers of repression, systematizing and stagnation. For him, 'the goal of all these drawn and colored/figures was to exorcise the curse, to vituperate/bodily against the exigencies of spatial form,/of perspective, of measure, of equilibrium,/of dimension and/Via this vituperative act of/ protest, to condemn the psychic world' (Rowell 1996: 42). His aim is thus 'especially magical/magical first/and foremost' to enable the force of his intent to become embodied (Rowell: 1996: 32). The spells are neither representative nor psychological, but are rather 'the circumscribed/figuration/on paper/of an élan/that took place/and produced/magnetically and magically its/effects/' (Rowell: 1996: 34) as materializations 'of a magical/gesture/ which I executed/in true space/with the breath of my/lungs/and my hands,/ with my head/and 2 feet/with my trunk and my arteries etc.' (Rowell: 1996: 35). His chosen symbols do not endorse the originary mystical systems that he had studied, such as the 'Great Work' of Alchemy or the Kabbalah, but have become, rather, 'natural' tools 'for we/are no longer in chemistry/but in/nature/and I firmly believe/that/nature/shall speak' (Rowell: 1996: 37). Murphy contends that the BwO was conceived between Artaud's more traditional occult activities, such as the experience of 'double and triple worlds

Figure 4.3 *La Projection du Véritable Corps/The Projection of the True Body* (1946–1947) © ADAGP, Paris and DACS, London 2013.

in the Tarahumara rites' and his later 'refutation of all mystical systems' such as the "hieroglyphics and secret keyboard"' of *The Theatre and its Double* (1938) (Murphy 2013: 6). Yet, despite Artaud's stated disavowal of occult systems, his magical intent is undiminished across his work and some traditional pictograms and symbols clearly remain in use later, though in a pared-down form (Murphy 2013: 6) as he invents a new, more modernist form of magic.

Conclusion: The projection of the true body

I leave this exploration of Artaud's schizo drawings with what remains for me the most vividly potent image of his BwO, 'The Projection of the True Body/ *La projection du véritable corps*' (1946–1947; Figure 4.3). Superficially, his post-electroshock pictures appear more formally confident and conventional, more 'finished' and less like diagrams, than his earlier work. The central figure of this balanced composition in contrasting orange and blue is a double, two 'bodies' of Artaud. On the left, in martyr-like posture, is a recognizable portrait of him with oversized head. He stands erect despite being shot repeatedly by a hideous firing squad with shrunken heads. Their rifles fire jets of yellow flame though his chest. The second soldier in the line shoots him again after the failure of the first to kill him. The double is an ambivalent figure in Artaud's work, which 'threatened to kill him, but it could also serve to resurrect his life' (Gargett 2001: 6). The figure on the right recalls a Tarahumara shaman with a skeletal face or ritual mask. A body of power with stocky build and solid legs, he radiates blue and scarlet rays from his solar plexus. His is the passional 'dancing BwO' that both counters and sustains Artaud's suffering, shackled body. In contrast to the shaman's sturdy dancing legs, Artaud's shattered knees radiate jagged rays of black and scarlet. The vigour of the shaman's dance is expressed by the densely layered graphite and the jagged composition. His head shoots out blue, black, yellow and red rays like flames, a visual rhyme to the guns' explosions. The shaman's fierce glare contrasts with the contemplative calm of the victimized Artaud. Two asymmetrical lassos couple the figures together. They are further linked by an anomalous amalgam of steam engine, car and bicycle, faintly outlined at the top of the drawing, This inhuman desiring-machine is pulled in opposite directions by tiny figures. Prominent glossolalic script marks the top of the drawing, with 'lanabul, zabul, keniston, zabul, zabul, kanavicton' 'nizam, taber, kambush', a transcription of a sonorous invocation to intensify the spell.

According to Deleuze and Guattari, Artaud's thought operates in a schizoid way, 'on the basis of a *central breakdown,* that it lives solely by its own incapacity to take on form, bringing into relief only traits of expression in a material, developing peripherally, in a pure milieu of exteriority, as a function of singularities impossible to universalize, of circumstances impossible to interiorize' (1988: 42). For Artaud, to think, to send out the BwO towards the as-yet-unthought, is to suffer a necessary agony, as 'the real pain is to feel one's thought shift within oneself' and to become aware of the hole at the heart of thought that the mind might fall into (Sontag 1976c: 84). The inherent nature of the mind is a crack or fissure out of which pour 'images that we cannot think; images beyond our experience' (Frampton 2006: 67). Yet this very elusiveness generates the possibility of new thought and action. Rather than being a shortcoming, powerlessness is thus an integral hiatus and 'we should make our way of thinking from it, without claiming it to be restoring an all-powerful thought. We should rather make us of this powerlessness to believe in life, and to discover the identity of thought and life' (Deleuze 1989: 170).

As a vital link between brain and world, Deleuze posits an interstitial 'spiritual automaton' that forms 'a limit, a membrane which puts an outside and an inside in contact, makes them present to each other, confronts them, or makes them clash' (1989: 206). If the apparent distinction between internal psychic and external material forces is terrifyingly undermined (as in Stanley Kubrick's film *The Shining*, 1980), Deleuze asks 'how can we decide what comes from the inside and what comes from the outside, the extra-sensory perceptions, or hallucinatory projections?' (1989: 206). The membrane is thus a vital interstice between thought and matter, world and mind. As both 'agent and victim' of thought, Artaud's 'spiritual automaton' has become a 'dismantled, paralysed, petrified, frozen instance' (Deleuze 1989: 166) that must 'confront thought as higher "problem"' or 'enter into relation with the undeterminable, the unreferable' (1989: 167). For Deleuze, Artaud's singular problem was the search for the ever-elusive concept, the 'being of thought which is always to come' (1989: 167).

Despite the chaotic turbulence of Artaud's work, the interstice offers a kind of psychic 'no-man's land' between planes that enables expression of the passional flux and maintains the consistency of his anti-art projects. It is here, in this psychic space, that thought about his work becomes possible. In multiplicity, Deleuze tells us, 'what counts are not the terms or the elements' but, rather, 'the between, a set of relations. A line does not go from one point to another,

but passes between the points, ceaselessly bifurcating and diverging' (Deleuze and Parnet 2007: viii). Becomings thus 'take place "between" poles they are in-betweens that pass only and always along the middle without origin or destination' (Deleuze and Guattari 1988: 378). The schizoanalytical works of Deleuze and Guattari operate 'in-between' philosophy and art, concept and affect, whether by stretching the poles apart or bringing them closer together. Artaud's experimental works themselves are diagrams of the interstice; being both signposts into delirium and prophylactics against annihilation. Their 'improbable bodies', connected to other responsive BwOs, can release collective schizo forces. Artaud's drawings thus offer a passional encounter across the middle plane, a 'small plot of new land' that demands our own becoming-interstitial (1988: 160).

Notes

1   Copies of Artaud's drawings can be viewed on the Pompidou Centre website. I am grateful to Guillaume Fau and Anne Limonnier for enabling me to view a selection of original drawings in the Centre's Paris archive in February 2013.
2   *L'art en Guerre 1938–1947*, exhibition at La Musée de l'art Moderne Paris, October 2012–February 2013. A selection of Artaud's drawings were featured in the 'anti-artists' section of the exhibition.

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—(1939c) 'Spell for Leon Fouks', May 1939, wax crayon on burned paper, 8¼" × 5¼": 9.21 × 13.5 cm, private collection.
—(1939d) 'Spell for Hitler', *c.* Sep. 1939, wax crayon on burned paper, 8¼" × 5¼": 21 × 13. 5 cm, private collection.
—(1945) 'Being and its foetuses/*L'être et ses foetus*', *c.* Jan. 1945, graphite and wax crayon, 25¼" × 19⅝": 64 × 50 cm, private collection.
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Art, Therapy and the Schizophrenic

Lorna Collins

Deleuze and Guattari's project of schizoanalysis in *Anti-Oedipus* proceeds in search of 'the new earth', or a new understanding of subjectivity and desire (Deleuze and Guattari 2004b: 417). In their conclusion, they say that this search will provide 'a place of healing' (Deleuze and Guattari 2004b: 417). From this backdrop, I will ask how we can use their thinking to provide therapy for the clinical cases that they utilize throughout their combined and separate œuvres, and to source an ameliorative and ethical sensibility for all of us. To do this, I turn to *The Logic of Sense*, where Deleuze brings forward what James Williams calls a 'moral philosophy' (Williams 2008: 135–74). I will consider how Deleuze's morality implies an art practice when it involves the process of *counter-actualization*, whereby the tortured individual is encouraged to replay the event of their wounding in a way that provides catharsis and the counter-actualizing of pain.

The question then comes down to *how* one can replay events in order to provide a process of counter-actualization and relief from suffering for the clinical cases utilized by Deleuze and Guattari, and for us all. I will discuss the therapeutic and restorative effects of art-making as they are demonstrated through an example of the application of art therapy, the genre of Art Brut, and from Guattari's own schizoanalytic practice. In these cases art provides individuals with a method of making sense of the world, and their condition, whilst offering some form of relief. This provides an ethics that consists of counter-actualization and a place of healing, thus fulfilling the intentions of Deleuze and Guattari's project of schizoanalysis.

At the start it is important to define what I mean by 'counter-actualization'. Counter-actualization is a concept Deleuze uses, particularly in *The Logic of Sense*, and with Guattari in *Anti-Oedipus*, to indicate a way of replaying the accident to connect it with the energy and potential of its impersonal event,

which then provides differentiation. It means the possibility of living a situation in a way that might provide relief from its inherent misery. This is not a matter of restoring or regaining a previous sense of being, nor does it indicate a teleological amelioration according to a standard of progress. Rather than focusing on a pseudo 'cure', condescending those for whom existence is fundamentally different, it does not assume that the normopathic genre is the best and only point of departure for a full life. By contrast, the relief provided by counter-actualization offers replenishment, nourishment and new ways of being.

By offering a 'place of healing' as the conclusion of *Anti-Oedipus*, Deleuze and Guattari imply an ethics to their schizoanalytic project. As Mark Seem argues, *Anti-Oedipus* 'develops an approach that is decidedly *diagnostic* […] and profoundly *healing* as well' (Deleuze and Guattari 2004b: xix). They are not looking for a *cure* for the schizophrenic, but a cure from the system that causes and detains this illness: 'the schizophrenization that must cure us of the cure' (Deleuze and Guattari 2004b: 76). They argue that the desiring-machines activated by the schizophrenic process, once separated and liberated from the illness, operate as lines of escape from the system of psychoanalysis. The implications of schizoanalysis, from this point of view, as Foucault says, intend to 'break the holds of power and institute research into a new collective subjectivity and a revolutionary healing of mankind' (Deleuze and Guattari 2004b: xxiii). Foucault accordingly calls this work a 'book of ethics' (Deleuze and Guattari 2004b: xv).

The question is, how can we activate this ethics and source the place of healing and new earth called for by *Anti-Oedipus*? To take this further I turn to Deleuze's moral philosophy, as laid out in his *The Logic of Sense*. In this work Deleuze again uses the schizophrenic, and other disorders, but what is different is the way in which his moral philosophy draws upon aesthetics, when he calls upon art in the process of counter-actualization, using case studies of particular artists to define his moral principles.

Deleuze's moral philosophy

In *The Logic of Sense* Deleuze presents his reasons for using amoral motifs throughout his œuvre, and he also brings forward practical principles of a moral philosophy. This is particularly interesting because it involves the counter-actualization of the wound and the sublimation of pain.

Deleuze engages with schizophrenic discourse in *The Logic of Sense* because he wishes to utilize the way that the schizophrenic's language brings forward a

dual or paradoxical sense of sense and nonsense, at the edges or on the surface of sense-making. Deleuze uses the words of Artaud, such as 'Ratara ratara ratara Atara tatara rana Otara otara katara…', and the nonsensical words of Lewis Carroll, like 'Pimpanicaille', because he is trying to free up set meanings for words and open up their signification to a multitude of interpretations (Deleuze 2004: 96, 102). Deleuze reads from the schizophrenic's language a sense where words become 'suitcases' for a multitude of paradoxical meanings, each one determined on or during the event of their utterance. Deleuze then uses the multiple layers of reality that define the schizophrenic's psychosis to open similarly heterogeneous and spontaneous possibilities for making sense. This sense is embodied, and located at the edge or on the surface of things and propositions. In this case his use of the schizophrenic offers a multiplicity that redefines the subject as a continually changing process of individuation. Deleuze is using the schizophrenic to undo the subject and reorientate thought.

But in *The Logic of Sense* Deleuze presents a different perspective that, as James Williams argues, offers us practical principles for a moral philosophy (Williams 2008: 135–74). Deleuze describes why he uses the amoral in his philosophy by showing how his repeated turn to the motifs of sadism, perversion and illnesses like schizophrenia can be sourced from the Stoics' use of similar amoral motifs like incest or cannibalism. Seeing how the Stoics used amoral motifs helps us to understand why Deleuze's philosophy takes the direction that it does.

In the eighteenth series in *The Logic of Sense* Deleuze argues that entertaining maladies, or engaging with mania, depression or psychological problems, is a properly philosophical exercise. He says that we shouldn't equate philosophy with an illness, but 'there are properly philosophical diseases' (Deleuze 2004: 145). He then describes how mania 'guided' Plato, and says that the death of Socrates is something like a depressive suicide. Deleuze goes on to discuss how the Stoics used activities, such as masturbation, cannibalism or incest, and engaged with all sorts of decadence, alongside their thinking, in order to pose difficult and new philosophical questions:

> On one hand, the philosopher eats with great gluttony, he stuffs himself; he masturbates in public […] he does not condemn incest with the mother, the sister or the daughter; he tolerates cannibalism and anthropophagy – but, in fact, he is also supremely sober and chaste. On the other hand, he keeps quiet when people ask him questions or gives them a blow with his staff. […] Yet he also holds a new discourse, a new logos animated with paradox and philosophical values and significations which are new. (Deleuze 2004: 147–8)

These words seem to represent Deleuze's efforts to legitimize the controversy raised by his own philosophy's use of psychological problems. This is the way that Deleuze is defining what philosophy actually is – as he says at the end of the eighteenth series, 'What are we to call this new philosophical operation […]? Perhaps we can call it "perversion"' (Deleuze 2004: 151). It seems a contentious proposition to equate philosophy with perversion, but the reason Deleuze is making this claim, and using the Stoic philosophy is, he says, because it brings *the body* into play with thinking. Involving the body in this way then connects with the desiring-machine and BwO at play in schizoanalysis. Deleuze says that the Stoic philosophy, by engaging with amoral motifs, opens up 'the discovery of passions-bodies and of the infernal mixtures which they organise or submit to: burning poisons and paedophagous banquets' (Deleuze 2004: 149). The point of this is to reorientate all thinking. Deleuze wants to define philosophy by perversion as part of his overriding efforts to make a new kind of philosophy, which uproots Platonic Idealism, dialectical contradiction, hierarchy, striation, causality, transcendence, signification and metaphysics:

> This is a reorientation of all thought and of what it means to think: *there is no longer depth of height.* The Cynical and Stoic sneers against Plato are many. It is always a matter of unseating the Ideas, of showing that the incorporeal is not high above (*en hauteur*), but is rather at the surface, that it is not the highest cause but the superficial effect par excellence, and that it is not Essence but event (Deleuze 2004: 148).

In Deleuze the amoral motifs of incest or cannibalism engage with the 'passions-bodies', which then reorientates thought away from Platonic Idealism or dialectical contradiction, by engaging with the flesh and forces of the body, which opens out a plane of immanence for the BwO (Deleuze 2004: 149). From the start, he says, the pre-Socratics make 'philosophical schizophrenia par excellence' because with it, Deleuze argues, they situate and activate thought in the body (Deleuze 2004: 147). The question is, to what extent can we think with the body without (potentially) damaging it?

Deleuze does anticipate such dubiousness from the reader. He questions the Stoics' use of amoral motifs, which raises the same questions for his own philosophy: 'How could the world of mixtures not be that of a black depth wherein everything is permitted?' (Deleuze 2004: 148). The Stoics paint a picture of 'a world of terror and cruelty, of incest and anthropophagy', Deleuze says, and the reason why this works is because it opens a new mode of thinking *at the surface of things* (Deleuze 2004: 150). There is another paradoxical part to these activities, beyond

their perversity, which comes from a different and non-causal understanding of time. The surface lays out a theatre for a paradoxical intertwining of sense, which provides an interface for expressions and their representation – propositions, bodies, and events in their immanent arousal. Here there is no hierarchy, depth or cause; just a flat surface for the body and its reorientating of thought:

> […] there is of course another story, namely, the story of that which, from the Heraclitean world, is able to climb to the surface and receive an entirely new status. This is the event in its difference in nature from causes-bodies, the Aion in its difference in nature from the devouring Chronos. […] The Cynics and the Stoic establish themselves and wrap themselves up with the surface, the curtain, the carpet, and the mantle. The double sense of the surface, the continuity of the reverse and the right sides, replace height and depth (Deleuze 2004: 149–50).

Deleuze gives us particular examples of moral problems: Nietzsche and Artaud's madness, Fitzgerald and Lowry's alcoholism, or Bousquet's wound, because he wants to provide a moral philosophy that is based from charting a series of singularities as events which, when considered as particular examples across a broad scan of society, demonstrate turning points that define the real (Deleuze 2004: 169–72, 176–83). He argues that we must consider and replay the events of suffering in order to source a process of counter-actualizing for what is amoral or damaging, whilst retaining the engagement with the process of the event and the emphasis on the body. In other words, to create his moral philosophy Deleuze presents case studies of singularities that mark a series of actual turning points. This develops a diagrammatic of intense relations and particular phenomena within society, which then charts how they set a pattern to constitute and divine new events.

James Williams argues that in Deleuze there will always be moral problems; moral philosophy is then about '*charting series of actual turning points*' when things are changing, the social, political, individual and singular turning points, and connecting diagrams of intense relations and particular phenomena within society (Williams 2008: 141, original emphasis). From this process it is possible to draw a chart that sees how moral problems constitute and divine *new* events, connected through the event that runs through all of them.

The point is to *actualize* the disruptive, corporeal *dynamic* that can be accessed through perverse or damaging behaviours, whilst simultaneously *counter-actualizing* their perverse or damaging *accident*:

> […] the crack is nothing if it does not compromise the body, but it does not cease being and having a value when it intertwines its line with the other line,

inside the body. We cannot foresee, we must take risks and endure the longest possible time, we must not lose sight of grand health. The eternal truth of the event is grasped only if the event is also inscribed in the flesh (Deleuze 2004: 182).

Deleuze talks about how, in this way, the actor *actualizes* the event:

The actor thus actualises the event [...] Or rather, the actor redoubles this cosmic, or physical actualisation, in his own way, which is singularly superficial – but because of it more distinct, trenchant and pure. Thus, the actor delimits the original, disengages from it an abstract line, and keeps from the event only its contour and its splendour, becoming thereby the actor of one's own events – a *counter-actualisation* (Deleuze 2004: 171).

The process of counter-actualization is the eternal return in a cyclical repetition of the future of the past. The event is actualized in its present happening, from a proliferation of virtual possibilities. It marks an eternal wound on the present since it has an effect on us; then, in *willing* and *expressing* its presence in the present, as one of difference, one can access a sublimation which can counter-actualize its wounding. Deleuze builds his conception of *willing* the event from Stoic philosophy: 'Stoic ethics is concerned with the event; it consists of willing the event as such, that is, of willing that which occurs insofar as it does occur' (Deleuze 2004: 163). Deleuze then uses the example of French poet Joe Bousquet's injury, suffering, replaying, channelling and then counter-actualizing his wound to talk about how one can actually *will* the event:

He [Joe Bousquet] apprehends the wound that he bears deep within his body in its eternal truth as a pure event. To the extent that events are actualised in us, they wait for us and invite us in. they signal us: 'My wound existed before me, I was born to embody it.' It is a question of attaining this will that the event creates in us; of becoming the quasi-cause of what is produced within us, the Operator; of producing surfaces and linings in which the event is reflected [...] (Deleuze 2004: 169).

The motor of this function is the repeating cycle of ontogenesis, in the becoming of the future of the past, which composes the sense of the present. In this context our wounds are the marks that make us real, and which demonstrate our contact with the world. As Jack Reynolds comments, in Deleuzian ethics we are all wounded: 'we are all traversed by some kind of fault-line (a virtual, impersonal intensity) that is supra-individual and not confined to the realms of bodies and states of affairs. [... I]t is the concept of counter-actualisation that he

uses to more fully describe what is involved in the appropriate manner of giving body to an incorporeal event-effect' (Reynolds 2007: 154).

In this context sense is the fourth dimension of a proposition, which is an expression of being-in-the-present. The other three dimensions are the denotation, manifestation and signification of a proposition. Sense and the event 'are the same thing' (Deleuze 2004: 191). The event has an intrinsic relation to sense through the process of counter-actualization. Buchanan says it: 'The event is the sense *we make* of what happens. […] To the extent we take charge of events we counter-actualize what occurs, we see beyond actions and live the purity of the event, the crystal of sense awaiting us in all phenomena' (Buchanan 2000: 79). As such, the event is something we have to *will*, rather than something to which we succumb, not as a figure of *resentment* to its eternal or damning trauma, but in expression comes counter-actualization and the opening for difference: 'The event is not what occurs (an accident), it is rather inside what occurs, the purely expressed. It signals and awaits us' (Deleuze 2004: 170).

Deleuze uses Bousquet to describe how the moral actor acts by diminishing Chronos, or the wound, and using it to become something different (Deleuze 2004: 169–72). Bousquet uses his wound to inspire his Surrealist writing. There is a moment of elevation or sublimation, whereby the wound becomes something different. The tortured individual sublimates their wound and pain, releasing its counter-actualization, through replaying the event with creativity and expression: 'He apprehends the wound that he bears deep within his body in its eternal truth as a pure event' (Deleuze 2004: 169). Creation counter-actualizes the pain by re-enacting the wound and putting it in touch with values that run to counteract its suffering and injuries.

Deleuze argues that a stoic moral philosophy, which he upholds in *The Logic of Sense*, is about creative lives, and 'a concrete or poetic way of life (Deleuze 2004: 169). The idea is that we can deal with moral problems by replaying the event of their occurrence with creativity, which can counter-actualize these problems' destructive or painful connotations. James Williams explains how the act of counter-actualization of the wound by replaying the event defines Deleuzian morality:

> The moral problem is […] how to redouble the events occurring to us. These events are signs of the future and the past, but they have no necessary path. Deleuze's moral principles never recommend a particular course of action or align to necessary rules or models. On the contrary, they put forward guidelines and examples for picking our own way through the events that happen to

us. His gift is of moral freedom in a complex structure and not compulsion or imperatives (Williams 2008: 162).

Williams argues that Deleuze brings forward six moral principles in the twentieth series of *The Logic of Sense*, 'on the Moral Problem in Stoic Philosophy' (Williams 2008: 139–45). These principles present Deleuze's sense of how the individual can and should react to each singular situation that presents moral problems, and how one can *will* and respond creatively to them. Williams sources 32 further principles from Deleuze in the twenty-first series. He says that Deleuze's use of examples like Bousquet or Fitzgerald presents case studies that illustrate his principles and provide a practical guide for how to act morally. On the one hand, Deleuze's engagement with art, and the necessity for creativity in dealing with pain and moral problems, is very important. But before we get to that point further moral questions are raised. Do we have to suffer, and then replay suffering, to be free? How can the tortured individual know how to replay the events of their wound to find acceptance (or self-acceptance), nurture difference, and source counter-actualization of suffering?

Deleuze asks similar questions to these himself in later chapters of *The Logic of Sense*. He talks about alcoholics, citing Fitzgerald's *The Crack Up*, which he uses to think about those who might suffer by reacting to the world in ways which Deleuze then wants to use to define his new philosophy. He is thinking about whether or how it is possible to use the 'Crack Up' as a figure of thought that engages with the body, but without actually cracking up:

> Is it possible to maintain the inherence of the incorporeal crack while taking care not to bring it into existence, and not to incarnate it in the depth of the body? More precisely, is it possible to limit ourselves to the counter-actualisation of an event – to the actor's or dancer's simple, flat representation – while taking care to prevent the full actualisation which characterises the victim or the true patient? (Deleuze 2004: 178–9)

It is hard to know whether any of the questions that Deleuze asks himself here can be answered by following his moral philosophy. But they touch upon the same questions that direct Deleuze's work with Guattari and schizoanalysis. Schizoanalysis is concerned with founding a new way of thinking about desire, which engages with the body and can create a 'place of healing' for both the schizophrenic and all of us. Here Deleuze is asking how we can think with the body, replay the event and counter-actualize the process of cracking up. He goes on to discuss, with insight and sympathy, the alcoholic's pattern of behaviour and the reasons behind his dependence on drinking, as a 'process of demolition'.

He ends the chapter with compassion, stating the hope that the effects of drugs or alcohol can be revived and recovered independently from the use or abuse of these substances:

> We cannot give up the hope that the effects of drugs and alcohol (their 'revelations') will be able to be relived and recovered for their own sake at the surface of the world, independently of the use of those substances, provided that the techniques of social alienation which determine this use are reversed into revolutionary means of exploration (Deleuze 2004: 182–3).

This provides a stark contrast to Deleuze and Guattari's work with the *'schizo body'* and the *'drugged body'* in *A Thousand Plateaus*, where they advocate experimentation with clinical problems, in the name of dismantling the self: 'we haven't found our BwO yet, we haven't sufficiently dismantled our self' (Deleuze and Guattari 2004a: 166–7). We see this experimentation throughout *Anti-Oedipus*, where they say 'one can never go far enough in the direction of deterritorialisation' (Deleuze and Guattari 2004b: 353). They do argue that caution and prudence are still necessary here, saying we should all be 'cautious' when we follow the schizoanalytic direction and adopt the mental processing of the drug addict, anorexic, masochist, etc.: 'Were you cautious enough? Not wisdom, caution. In doses. As a rule immanent to experimentation: injections of caution' (Deleuze and Guattari 2004a: 167/187). So it would be *better* if we could gain the thought process of the drug addict or alcoholic, *without* relying on drugs or drink.[1]

In *The Logic of Sense* we see a different side to Deleuze, where his moral philosophy thinks about how we might be able to access and effect counter-actualization in response to these clinical problems. Through the examples of art therapy and Art Brut we will see how counter-actualization might be made available. This will then open up the schizoanalytic practice operated by Guattari, in which art-making helps one of his patients evolve a way of making sense of life experiences that offers not just counter-actualization, but also 'new assemblages of enunciation and analysis' (Guattari and Rolnik 2008: 376).

How to counter-actualize the event: Art therapy and the schizophrenic

The process of counter-actualization is, as Ian Buchanan argues, central to Deleuze's constructivist philosophical enterprise (Buchanan 2000). In this section I will think about how we can apply it through art, which then

demonstrates that: 'Counter-actualisation, Deleuze argues, is what the free can do, or more precisely what the free do; by free he means free of resentment and envy (the free do not try to profit from their wounds, they want only to own them)' (Buchanan 2000: 87). Deleuze draws on clinical problems, such as the alcoholic, the drug addict, the anorexic, the pervert, and in particular the schizophrenic, to consider how one should live, and to define his under-standing of being. We will now think about how *art* can help us deal with these clinical problems and the moral problem of how one should live. We can see how *art therapy* can help us to counter-actualize the wounding of the event.

First of all it is important to define what we mean by art therapy; although this is precisely the institutional edifice that Deleuze wants to destruct, my contention here will be that art therapy offers a form of counter-actual-ization that will benefit schizophrenics in a way that activates a schizoanalytic procedure. I will accept and work with the institutional medical definition because it provides a helpful solution for sourcing counter-actualization. The British Association of Art Therapists defines it in these terms:

> The use of art materials for self-expression and reflection in the presence of a trained art therapist. Clients who are referred to art therapy need not have previous experience or skill in art, the art therapist is not primarily concerned with making an aesthetic or diagnostic assessment of the client's image. The overall aim of its practitioners is to enable a client to effect change and growth on a personal level through the use of art materials in a safe and facilitating environment (Quoted in Ruddy and Milnes 2005: 2).

Art therapy is an activity based on the assumption that visual symbols and images are the most accessible and natural form of communication to the human experience. Patients, or clients, are encouraged to visualize, and then create, the thoughts and emotions that they find difficult to talk about. The resulting artwork is then reviewed and interpreted by the patient and therapist. Making sense of the artwork produced in art therapy, during this review, typically allows patients to gain some level of insight into their feelings and lets them work through these issues in a therapeutic manner. The creative process involved in artistic self-expression helps people to resolve conflicts and problems, develop interpersonal skills, manage behaviour, reduce stress, increase self-esteem and self-awareness, and achieve insight. The ethical, restorative results of art therapy are obtained through the phenomenological process of interacting with art materials and using them to create some kind of form that responds to what

is on the patient's mind, and also from the conversation and process of sense-making that the process of art-making then instigates.

It is a broadly held opinion that art therapy offers remedial effects in the assessment and treatment of a variety of illnesses and conditions, and in particular psychiatric disorders and situations that involve anxiety, depression and mental or emotional problems.[2] Recent research has demonstrated that art therapy is effective for those who suffer from psychotic illness, such as schizophrenia (Brooker et al. 2007; Crawford & Patterson 2007). In this context, art therapy does not 'cure' or judge schizophrenia as an inferior way of being, and nor does it degrade or slur the 'schizo' and condone any conformity to a neurotypical stereotype. Rather, it enables the patient who suffers to cope with, understand and talk about the symptoms of their illness.

The Use of Art Work in Art Psychotherapy with People Who are Prone to Psychotic States: An Evidence-Based Clinical Practice Guideline presents a detailed survey of the ways that art therapy can help the schizophrenic (Brooker et al. 2007). This research emphasizes the way that art-making offers a language with which the client can communicate their emotions and feelings, and express what they cannot say in words. Art gives them a way to give form to the unspeakable complexities that constitute their life, and then it provides a method of making sense of themselves and the world:

> […] research has shown that Art Psychotherapy offers a stepping-stone from isolation to the outer world for people who have experienced, and are experiencing, psychosis. Making art in Art Psychotherapy provides a form of engagement that enables the maker – the client – to become absorbed, this being one of the tasks of therapy. The Art Psychotherapist fosters the evolution of the client's language through their artwork; this enables a mediation to occur between the client's concrete and symbolic thinking and helps him or her to develop symbolic functioning. These symbolising ego functions enable the development of communication and relationship that are severely impaired in psychotic and borderline psychotic states (Brooker et al. 2007: 20).

We can see an example of the diagnosed psychotic gaining a restorative ethic from art-making with the case study of Lena, which is brought forward by the Jungian psychoanalyst and art therapist Joy Schaverien in her article 'Transference and transactional objects in the treatment of psychosis' (Schaverien and Killick 2007). Schaverien describes the situation and case history of Lena, a woman suffering from a paranoid psychosis who is admitted to hospital after a serious suicide attempt, where she engages with art therapy. We are presented with images created by Lena, which demonstrate how she uses the practice of

art-making to communicate with the therapist who is guiding her, and also as a method of making sense of her own condition and situation which then offers her some degree of counter-actualization and liberation.

One of Lena's creations, *Arrows*, is the shape of a basic human figure, outlined in black, which is intertwined with a yellow wire coiling around the body, as if it were trapped within its physical form. Its basic skeleton is made from a black stick figure and disjointed shapes of white, with an overlay of red lines that seem to indicate the nervous system. Black arrows pierce the outline of this figure and seem to be attacking it like daggers, pressing momentous pressures onto the body. The figure cries, and tears fall from its eyes and drip down its body. In the background are green vertical lines, with more arrows, which seem to suggest that this is a puppet. It is an intense and simple image, which brings forward an impression of how Lena was feeling when she made it. Schaverien describes how this work then provides therapy for Lena:

> There are no words in this picture which graphically and wordlessly embodies Lena's state. It reveals the pain of the potential fragmentation of psychosis in a way which no words could convey. There are times when words can add nothing to an image: the picture says it all – it is its own vivid and powerful interpretation. […] Lena was able to communicate her state to me through the vehicle of the picture. […] Lena realised that it both confirmed her feeling and conveyed it to me because I took the picture very seriously. Lena then began to value her pictures as both an expression of her state and a way of communicating. To speak directly to anyone was to lose herself, but the picture made this possible; it mediated, holding the space in-between us (Schaverien and Killick 2007: 28–9).

The image provides Lena with a method of communicating with the world. It also provides her with a method of getting in touch with how she is feeling, and allows her to express this to the therapist. The sense of her illness is somewhat impossible to capture in words, but can be immediately expressed in this image. By looking at the image, and relating it to her patient, Schaverien is able to gain a sense of the momentous physical pressures that Lena has during her tactile hallucinatory experiences, which are indicated by the arrow daggers, and the yellow line that encircles the figure. The image is powerful because, as Schaverien says: 'The picture is "outside" and offers a reflection of some aspect of the self. There is a dawning of consciousness and the beginning of differentiation' (Schaverien and Killick 2007: 24–5). Lena creates an image that helps her to make sense of her being, in terms of the psychotic pressures that she is feeling, and she makes an object that is separate to these pressures, and whose autonomy provides some sense of distance and relief from them. In this way

Lena can embody the event of her feeling like a puppet attacked by dagger-arrows, and direct or will her autonomy from it. This results in a connection with her being, and beyond her being, with the therapist, which can counter-actualize the persecutory elements of Lena's inner world and take a step towards a place of healing from them. In this process Lena finds a way to objectify her symptoms, or make an artwork from them, which then reinterprets and so counter-actualizes what brings her discomfort and pain. Creating this artwork provides Lena with a method of maintaining a degree of subjectivity that offers her a restorative ethic. As a consequence, art therapy seems to provide this individual with counter-actualization and a process of liberation.

In this way the case example given by Lena illustrates how 'the inherent communicative value of artistic endeavours seems particularly important for a specialised and idiosyncratic understanding of the schizophrenic person. Moreover, art works of schizophrenics may be not only prognostically significant but also lead to interventions which enhance the problem solving process for both therapist and patient' (Amos 1982: 142).

In this context, emphasis is given to the 'meaning' of the artwork that is made, as though what the client creates has a special and secret meaning beneath its exterior form. I would argue that in fact the meaning of their work is not separate from the physical construct of what it is made from. In this way my understanding of meaning is what Deleuze and Guattari call 'usage' (Deleuze and Guattari 2004b: 86/92). Meaning is effect; it means what it does. There is meaning in the process of making because this process has restorative effects in itself. The process of interpreting, or making sense, of what is made also has restorative effects. Making sense is the process of interrogating the sensuous-intellectual data and ideas that constitute the elements of the composition, or the abstract machine, that pull the work together. It involves understanding the sense of the here and now – the material presence of the artist-client, their situation, emotions and needs, which charge their creation, and their rapport with the world, the therapist and the materials they are using. Meaning is immanent in the process of production, interaction and sense-making that constitute the artistic practice and the therapeutic communication which it creates. We can draw this through Deleuze's logic of sensation, since there is a similar dissolving of contradictions and oppositions into a plane of immanence, during the therapeutic and artistic process, which provides a replenishing and nourishing production of the new.

The object made can provide a talisman that may be interpreted and which then makes sense of an illness or disorder; it is thus diagnostic. It can also

provide a means of communicating what is inexpressible in words. These factors may require a trained professional who can make sense of the artwork made in relation to the client who made it. But in other cases the presence of the therapist is only to provide the materials with which someone can interact and make some art from, and there is no clinical interpretation of what is made beyond sharing the sense that can be made during the process of creation itself.

Art therapy from a Deleuzian viewpoint is not necessarily meant to restore a patient-cum-participant to a previous state of being, nor a teleology of perfect health. It does not supply a superior state that involves the politics of the 'cure', since cure is not the only path to existence. But art can nurture a new way of being where existence is replenished and suffering is counter-actualized, not to achieve or judge a 'better' state, but to open a way by which individuals can accept their circumstances, and so create something new from them: to be able to *will* and make a world from them.

The artwork made in the context of art therapy can also be taken as a form of *Art Brut*. Deleuze says himself that his philosophy is producing 'a kind of *art brut*' (Deleuze 1995: 89). Art Brut is a genre of art that was created by Jean Dubuffet in 1948. Originally meant to denote art created by trauma survivors or people with mental illness (whose trauma or illness influences their work), Art Brut refers to artists who are self-taught and who do not participate in the 'mainstream art world' or who operate outside the institutions of Western culture. We can describe the artwork created in a therapeutic setup in accordance with this genre because it requires no training, it often involves making art in response to illness or injury, and it is something that we can all engage with. Creating an artwork offers the individual a means by which they can will and replay the event, thus producing an ethical process of counter-actualization, through a Deleuzian morality. In this way art-making becomes a schizoanalytic procedure.

How to counter-actualize the event: Art Brut

Dubuffet presented his manifesto for Art Brut in 1949:

> Art Brut. We understand by this works by those untouched by artistic culture; in which copying has little part, unlike the art of intellectuals. Similarly, the artists take everything (subjects, choice of materials, modes of transposition, rhythms, writing styles) from their own inner being, not from the canons of classical or fashionable art. We engage in an artistic enterprise that is completely pure, basic; totally guided in all its phases solely by the creators own impulses.

It is therefore, an art which only manifests invention, not the characteristics of
cultural art which are those of the chameleon and the monkey (Dubuffet 1967:
198–202; Harrison and Woods 1993: 595).

To think about the sense made in Art Brut, and then see how we can use it to
fulfil Deleuze and Guattari's project of schizoanalysis, we can turn to the schizo-
phrenic artist Adolf Wölfli (1864–1930). Wölfli lived the majority of his adult life
in a Swiss psychiatric hospital, after repeated paedophilic episodes with young
children and the diagnosis of schizophrenia. During his time at the Waldau
Clinic in Berne Wölfli began to draw. He was outstandingly prolific, producing
45 volumes, which contained over 25,000 pages and 1,600 illustrations.

His pictures illustrate his psychotic fantasies and delusions. He built his
very own world from them, by interpreting his existence in the form of an
autobiographical epic, with fantastical stories of his sainthood and adventures
illustrated with kaleidoscopic pages of music, words and colour. For Wölfli
art becomes a way of being-in-the-world, since his whole sense of existence is
created by his art-making. His creativity becomes the way that he makes sense
of his existence and how he deals with life at the psychiatric hospital. This is *raw
art*: 'It is Wölfli's greatest achievement that he could create his art both within
the domain of his illness and in spite of it. With the pictorial and literary means
of this art he was able to express the existential condition that the psychosis
forced him to experience, and in so doing, he allows us an insight into his
particular *condition humaine*' (Spoerri 1997: 88).

We can see the world that Adolf Wölfli created for himself by examining
his *General View of the Island Neveranger*. This is a labyrinthine composition
created with colour pencil on a sheet of newsprint. It brings us an assemblage of
colours, words, musical notes and images, which bring forward the cartography
of a magical space. The piece is infinitely complex, with mandala-like circles
bursting with queer creatures, symbols and crosses, and the whole composition
is held together by a skeletal musical stave. We can practically hear a gypsy
playing this strange, jolly tune on an accordion to a crowd of skulls with their
creepy black eyes, death stares and glum faces. Words are squeezed in all the
spaces so this image is infinitely complex and utterly engrossing. It is a privilege
to be given the chance to see a vision of Wölfli's world. He spent his life locked
up; art became his liberation and his sense of being: it provides the realization
(or realising, manifestation, enunciation) of his condition and the counter-
actualization of his suffering. 'Wölfli experienced the "full collapse in a person"
through his illness, and he saved himself by his art, which gave self-assurance to
him and meaning to his life' (Spoerri 1997: 88).

Luke Skrebowski argues that Art Brut offers 'a practical approach' for fulfilling Deleuze's schizoanalytic enterprise of 'dismantling the disciplined, unitary self' (Skrebowski 2005: 14–15). Skrebowski's horizon is the opposite of ours, since he would argue that the way Wölfli is saved through his art then contradicts Deleuze's project of schizoanalysis, but what my argument shows is how Wölfli's practice and Art Brut itself are in harmony with Deleuze's moral philosophy and Deleuze on counter-actualization. Skrebowski's article is still useful, however, because he states that by turning to Art Brut we can also fulfil the Stoic philosophy, as outlined in Deleuze's moral philosophy, by activating the kind of philosophy that operates as a 'practice of living', as 'explicitly a practical art, *technê* rather than *episteme*' (Skrebowski 2005: 5). Skrebowski quotes the Stoic Zeno's aphorism that defines art as 'a habit of road-building' in order to bring forward a sense of the materiality of Deleuzian thinking and its immediate application as a way of living (Skrebowski 2005: 5).

We can see from the example of Art Brut how the artist Wölfli used his creativity to provide a method of making sense of his condition and the world of his delusions, while it also provided a method of maintaining some marginal degree of subjectivity or *being* in the present. The genre of Art Brut is defined by untrained artists who use their creative process as a way of life, which is similar to how the Stoics defined their philosophy, and how Skrebowski interprets Deleuzism.

By now we can see how art-making is able to provide a machinic enterprise for counter-actualization of the wound, and therapy, as well as a method of making sense of existence and being in the world. From this viewpoint, art-making fulfils some of the intentions of schizoanalysis that Deleuze and Guattari pose in *Anti-Oedipus*, by opening a 'place of healing' and a 'new earth' for its activists. It can thus be seen as a schizoanalytic procedure.

To conclude, I turn to Guattari's work (without Deleuze, in collaboration with Suely Rolnik), in *Molecular Revolution in Brazil*, where he outlines a schizoanalytic practice that applies 'a diversification of the means of semiotization' to build an understanding about subjectivity and subjectivation from a political, ethical and psycho-clinical setting (Guattari and Rolnik 2008: 376). This raises the same discussion of psychiatric disorders such as addiction or psychosis in relation to clinical detainment and the institution as we saw in *Anti-Oedipus*. But here Guattari is using schizoanalysis not to *destroy the clinic*, eradicate the institution, or to endorse psychiatric illnesses or problems such as addiction or schizophrenia ('that has *never* been among my intentions!') (Guattari and Rolnik 2008: 375). Indeed, 'There is not the slightest

doubt that it is absolutely necessary that asylums and refuges should exist' (Guattari and Rolnik 2008: 376). However, Guattari wants to expand and open the largely monadic, narrow and punitive process of institutionalization, so it can operate as a 'polyphony' that can bring into play 'anthropological, social, and ethical dimensions that concern the whole of society' (Guattari and Rolnik 2008: 376).

Conclusion: Art as schizoanalysis

Guattari gives us examples of his own interventions (as an analyst at La Borde) with schizoanalytic case studies, to illustrate his new schizoanalytic vision. He talks about a young schizophrenic named Jean-Baptiste, who had been living in and out of a psychiatric hospital for about ten years, with multiple admissions and intermittent violent psychotic episodes. His life when outside of the clinic consisted of a sheltered living with his elderly parents, on whom he was entirely dependent. He would see Guattari for 'analysis' (or 'therapy') once a week. Guattari describes how these sessions would be largely repetitive and consist of the same rituals: Jean-Baptiste would always begin by giving Guattari some chewing gum. It seemed that not much happened during 'analysis', and yet the threat of another psychotic episode and hospitalisation was always present. Jean-Baptiste had a restricted life: 'he lived in a kind of total apraxia' (Guattari and Rolnik 2008: 357).

Guattari decided to conduct a radical, therapeutic experiment, by organizing for Jean-Baptiste to have more independent living, some financial income, and 'the suspension of the threats for hospitalisation' (Guattari and Rolnik 2008: 358). There were severe risks involved in this process – throwing Jean-Baptiste out on a limb, so to speak: he would be much more susceptible to provocation for another episode, by being alone with his distorted perceptions and problems with social relations. How could he cope with the real world, after such a sheltered, interned existence?

But this *schizoanalytic* experiment was a tremendous success. Although difficulties and a series of problems were raised, Jean-Baptiste shone with his new independence. This was demonstrated during the changes that took place at his weekly sessions with Guattari. What is most important for our purposes is the way that Jean-Baptiste's incorporation of *art* in his analysis and/or therapy sessions enabled him to continue his process of growth and making sense of his new-found existence. Guattari describes how Jean-Baptiste *began making*

drawings. This simple activity involved describing and interpreting his new daily activities, achievements, failures, and relations with his family. This was possible because Jean-Baptiste was able to build a new kind of assemblage through the creative process of art-making. This process provided a form of therapy that exceeded and replaced the restrictions posed by 'treatment' at the institution, in psychoanalysis, and even in Guattari's individual sessions, because: '*In this new solitary assemblage, he began to create a mode of expression and develop it, creating a kind of cartography of his own universe*' (Guattari and Rolnik 2008: 360).

We can see here how art-making provides Jean-Baptiste with 'the invention of new assemblages of enunciation and analysis', which is 'something that he couldn't develop in the family territory, nor, of course, in the territory of a psychiatric hospital, nor even in his therapeutic relation' with Guattari (Guattari and Rolnik 2008: 360). By operating as a machine that functions to express, interpret and evaluate one's existential, inter-relational, situated presence in the world, art-making offers a method of counter-actualizing the difficulties or sufferings that this presence, and the world itself, raise. Guattari's new, transformative process of schizoanalysis does not *psychoanalyse* Jean-Baptiste's psychosis, but rather opens 'the different modes of consistency of territories or different kinds of […] "machinic processes" […] that could be set into operation to provide healing and a new way of living' (Guattari and Rolnik 2008: 359). The motor of this process is fuelled by art-making.

So we have seen different interpretations of Deleuzian morality through an art practice: the psychotic patient having art therapy, and the example of Art Brut with the schizophrenic artist. These examples have demonstrated how the process of counter-actualization can be accessed through the creative process of art-making, which then offers a degree of liberation for the artist, patient or participant. This in turn opens the fulfilment of a schizoanalytic economy, which leads us to conclude by citing Guattari's own practice as schizoanalyst, where simple art-making (without being directed or managed by an assigned therapist, enclosed by an institution or exposed and (mis)valued by the art world's canonization) provides counter-actualization. This advocates schizo-analysis: we reach a new earth, which is a place of healing.

Notes

1   'Could what the drug user or masochist obtains also be obtained in a different fashion in the conditions of the plane, so it would even be possible to use drugs without using drugs, to get soused on pure water, as in Henry Miller's experimentations' (Deleuze and Guattari 2004a: 183).

2   There is a lot of literature on art therapy, which can be seen in *Remedial Art: A bibliography* (Pacey 1972). Specifically for art therapy in relation to schizophrenia, see pp. 286, 319, 357, 363, 364, 403, 409.

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Part Three

Art as an Abstract Machine

The Audience and the Art Machine: Janet Cardiff and George Bures Miller's *Opera for a Small Room*

Susan Ballard

Deleuze and Guattari's *Anti-Oedipus* begins not with words but with a painting. A black-and-white full-page illustration of Richard Lindner's *Boy with Machine* (1954) shows a young boy about to set a sequence of machines in motion. The child smiles out at his audience, his chubby pleasure hard to avoid. He seems to be listening, waiting. His hands are tangled, knotted within the levers that will set one machine against the other. One foot is caught inside the lower bucket of a large machine while the other hovers, floating within a dark mass, not fully machine and not completely organic either. *Boy with Machine* is an artwork that welcomes us into a text that will result in the proliferation of machines both organic and technical.

Machines are everywhere in Deleuze and Guattari's writing. Towards the end of *The Machinic Unconscious* Guattari suddenly asks: 'Is schizoanalysis a new cult of the machine?' (2011: 194). In this interim space – a solo text written amidst his collaborative work with Deleuze – Guattari suggests the need to rethink the machine as it emerged within the schizoflows set off by Lindner's boy in *Anti-Oedipus*. In *Anti-Oedipus*, Deleuze and Guattari use a series of machines to ask how humans might move beyond the established normative institutions of the subject (1983: 368). They seem to despair of ever escaping the structural alliances of commodity capitalism. One potential answer is found in the formation of new relationships. They name this new formation the machinic assemblage: a particular set of open relationships between the human and the world, animals and objects. It is flux and motion (Guattari 1993: 14). The machinic assemblage is not a technical machine, and not yet part of a cult. Later, in *A Thousand Plateaus,* Deleuze and Guattari propose many

other relationships, many ways to approach the assemblage and the political economies of the social (the events within which it forms). However, the crisis of the cult of the machine remains present throughout all their texts. Picking up this particular moment of the emergence of the machine as an aesthetic or cult object in the schizoanalytic discussion, this essay takes a journey into the realm of the art gallery. I highlight experiences within the machinic assemblage of the art gallery that suggest a specific formation of the machine; one that moves beyond Guattari's feared cult status and creates a new kind of machine called the art machine, and a new event that we will call 'the audience'.

In the last few pages of *Anti-Oedipus* Deleuze and Guattari suggest that, despite being implicated in the machinations of capital, art and science offer two possible means for critical engagement with the coded structures of desire (otherwise known as society). They begin with art. Over a few paragraphs, and ignoring art historical practices that tend to keep artists temporally and materially discrete, Deleuze and Guattari's discussion slips from Lorenzo Lotto to J. M. W. Turner to John Cage. This obscure grouping describes what they call an 'other' art: a set of artworks that are formed from relations and experimentation, strange flows, materials and energies. Deleuze and Guattari identify within these particular artworks a 'force [that] fractured the codes, undid the signifiers, passed under the structures, set the flows in motion, and effected breaks at the limits of desire' (1983: 369). Like other desiring-machines the breakthrough is effected by the artwork as machine set in motion by affects flowing underneath 'a signifier reduced to silence' (1983: 370). This force-fed artwork is a machine in motion that breaks and reforms until it becomes a different kind of artwork: 'art as a process without goal' (1983: 370). New flows, new assemblages, new breakages, new experiments. Although they don't name it as such, the definition Deleuze and Guattari give us is of the specific machine called the art machine. Located within the histories of Western modernism, Lotto and Turner start the art machine in motion, and it rapidly becomes a Stygian river of harrowing filth and confusion – at one point propelled by both Artaud and Burroughs. At the heart of the work is a machinic 'experimentation in touch with the real' (Guattari 2011: 171). It is art machine as process, as 'schizorevolutionary', as non-representational expression and content. All too quickly it is over. After just two pages Deleuze and Guattari move on, entering a new schizoflow (of science) they abandon the art machine at the moment it breaks through the forces of modernity.

Perhaps in 1972 this was the right place to leave the art machine: bashing at the operations and structures of modernity, opening slivers where experimentation

can slip through. It is an art machine formed of process and event. Still riding the flows of experimentation abruptly abandoned at the end of *Anti-Oedipus*, the art machine reappears Frankenstein-like in later texts where Deleuze and Guattari, both together and apart, attempt to revisit the affective form that we call the artwork. In *The Machinic Unconscious* Guattari opens the possibility for the re-formation of the art machine, following up his question 'is schizo-analysis a new cult of the machine?' with a list of 'machinisms of all types, in all domains' (2011: 194). It seems logical that Guattari's monstrous machinisms of all types include the social and material assemblage called the art machine. Today the art machine occupies contemporary art galleries where it forms from a group of abstract operations including not only the artist and the artwork, but also viewers and the art gallery itself. The art machine is no longer just process, it has objects, and it is noisy, relational and unpredictable. This contemporary art machine distinguishes itself as a particular way to think aesthetics (the cult) within the art gallery and because of the way that it forms audiences into events; it has the potential to shock viewers out of measured pre-existent relationships with art objects. The remainder of this essay will focus exclusively on one art machine as a way to understand the complexities of materials, affect and percept that occur within the art gallery.

The art gallery and the audience

What exactly is an art gallery? Over time, the architectural construction we name the contemporary public art gallery has persuaded objects and their viewers to behave in certain ways. Developed out of the private spaces of the eighteenth-century salon, the nineteenth-century art gallery was a cavernous public space. Designed for viewers in motion it was a location for experiences and education, where all visitors would be treated equally and become an audience for art. The public gallery was reworked in the mid-twentieth century into a sequence of white cubes, which more recently have been interleaved with black boxes. The windowless white cube remains the dominant gallery form; clean and uncontaminated it suggests an idealized proportion-free pure nothingness into which artworks can float unimpeded by conflicting infor-mation. Small incursions occur; objects leave the room and in their place are participatory experiences or subtle amendments. The walls of the gallery remain unbroken and continue to define the boundaries or edges between artworks and each other. Artworks within the gallery have been separated into obedient

object categories, and viewers – whether following the crowd at a blockbuster biennale, or the wine at the local artist-run space – tend to stick to the centres of the rooms, moving pliantly from one object to the next. The black box performs the same function, abandoning viewers in pitch-black nothingness with only the glow of the artwork to guide their way. Curatorial practice attempts to shift these boundaries, by placing works in conversation, and alongside each other. In recent post-disciplinary curatorial practices these art objects find themselves sharing spaces with other kinds of objects: cars, chickens, computer systems. Mediation becomes a force exerted through elements beyond the direct materials of the artwork, walls, headphones or didactic panels. Despite these transformations artworks continue to remain discrete. They may impact on their audiences but rarely each other.

In this context Deleuze and Guattari's activation of the art machine suggests that art works in the art gallery offer new subject modes where audiences are bought into being via social assemblages. In darkness and in light the gallery takes individualized viewers and constructs from them a certain kind of subject-event that we call the audience. Audiences are multiple, more than one, and connected by auditory as much as visual affects. This is the power of the art gallery as an assemblage of subjectification. Together the new subject-event of the audience and the social assemblage of the art gallery form the art machine. That is, art and the art gallery do not represent or provide a pre-existent box into which audiences are poured; instead the art machine inside the assemblage named the art gallery creates the event of a temporally situated audience.

The artwork that is the centre of this essay, *Opera for a Small Room* (2005; Figures 6.1–5), is a mixed media installation by Canadian artists Janet Cardiff and George Bures Miller.[1] *Opera for a Small Room* is an art machine that simultaneously disrupts the constructions of the gallery and its viewers. It constructs relationships that are dependent on the architectural structure of the art gallery (the assemblage) at the same time that it stretches the temporal and sonic boundaries of the gallery experience (the event). In this it opens up a new set of material behaviours for objects, sounds and spaces. By focusing on *Opera for a Small Room* this essay raises questions of the visual and social structures that cement certain behavioural relationships for viewers and art works. I'm interested in how relations formed within the art gallery can be unnatural and accidental, how art works assemble momentary and durational audiences from their viewers, and how the boundaries of the art work are not solely material. Although it sounds like a familiar landscape for twentieth-century art, this essay suggests that *Opera for a Small Room* is an example of an art machine that

Figure 6.1 Janet Cardiff and George Bures Miller (2005) *Opera for a Small Room*. Mixed-media installation with sound and synchronized lighting. 20-minute loop. Construction: Kyle Miller. *Roadkill Crow* song: composition, voice: George Bures Miller; guitar, drums, mixing: Titus Maderlachner; bass guitar, organ, orchestration: Tilman Ritter. 102⅖ × 118 × 177 inches (260.1 × 299.72 × 449.58 cm). Courtesy of the artists and Luhring Augustine, New York.

moves away from the concerns of modernism and its legacies. I pick up from where Deleuze and Guattari left the art machine and think about what role the art machine continues to have today. Embracing the multiple resonances of the machinic as technical, organic and collective, I outline the operations of the particular art machine that is *Opera for a Small Room*. Looking both into and out from the artwork, I examine the confusing affects produced by the multiple subject modes of the work (that suggest reasons for the shock of the visual and sonic uncertainty it engenders). In particular I focus on the shifting dimensions and temporalities of the audience as we contribute elements to the formation of the assemblage called the art gallery.

The art machine

Janet Cardiff and George Bures Miller's *Opera for a Small Room* is an art machine formed within these layers. It is at once a machine and a room within a machine. On first viewing both the audience experience and the movements of the work seem structured into a strict narrative with a distinct beginning and ending. The machine that is the artwork performs a precise sequence of activities over and over again with predictable regularity. In the middle of a large dark gallery is a 2.6 × 3 × 4.5 metre wooden shed. The shed glows and sounds emanate from its pores. The sound of the shed is both familiar, overtly so, and strange. Peering in through the unglazed windows, and gaps in the boarded up walls, the audience witness a miniature space of occupation. More than 2,000 LP records are stacked to the roof against the internal walls; there is a comfy chair, a few tables, trinkets, suitcases, lights, a set of dusty chandeliers, and a ratty carpet. Books are held open by stones, and an uneaten meal rests alongside a shoe rigged up to a light made from an old tin can. The shadow of a ghostly individual moves between the record stacks; there is the sound of shuffling and selection, before tunes are deployed by unseen robotic arms onto one of the eight record players spread across the shelves. The music that plays through 24 antique loudspeakers is at times synched with what seem to be stage directions spoken intermittently through a large central megaphone. Mostly the music is snippets of familiar songs and arias by the 'great' tenors; occasionally there is a vividly sharp pop tune. Some of the records are labelled 'R. Dennehy' in neat black biro. There is a needle lifted by an invisible hand. A tenor booms. After a while an alt-styled rock and roll song emerges, part Nick Cave part Tom Waits: 'She was walking down the road with her shoes in her hand … I didn't know what to do, seems I'll forget her'. The room transforms into a stage where multi-coloured theatrical lights illustrate the moody wailing of the desolate individual. This must be R. Dennehy himself, the clichéd man alone howling at the walls. His misery reaches a crescendo. The lights flicker and growl as a train passes by. 'Music don't change anything', he says 'but it helps in some way. It's an opera after all, everyone dies in the end'. The whole room shudders: not just the small room but also the one the audience are lost within. Suddenly the work grows, it is more than the small room – the large room too is full of noise. A train is passing overhead, thunder claps and all the lights go out. The gallery is pitch black and everything falls silent and dark. It is shocking, invasive. The audience is dislocated, physically and affectively trapped within a narrative yet present here before it. Inside and outside. After 20 minutes the loop is complete.

Figure 6.2 Janet Cardiff and George Bures Miller (2005) *Opera for a Small Room*. Mixed-media installation with sound and synchronized lighting. 20-minute loop. Courtesy of the artists and Luhring Augustine, New York.

A dim light comes on, R. Dennehy reaches for another record, the newly formed audience move on to another work in another gallery.

The work is visually and sonically folded inside itself: a room within a room defined by sound rather than space. It is a radio booth, isolated yet networked and connected to the world via the limbs of the audience. It offers the space that amplifies the sound. It is sound that controls the volume (in a sculptural sense). As sound sculpts the architecture a different kind of machine is created. This installation that inhabits a strange borderless space of art solicits certain responses. The small room invites viewers to become part of an intimate audience, yet anyone who lingers is immersed within a sonic space where they find themselves sheltering under a railway line and threatened by loud storms. *Opera for a Small Room* is a peep show box of extraordinary dimensions. Iconographically and semantically it draws us into the story of a solitary individual and his record collection.

This descriptive and literal reading is satisfying and follows the usual trajectory of art writing. The work can be explained as part of the growing

oeuvre of works by Cardiff and Bures Miller that manipulate sound and instal-
lation techniques to generate intimate and disturbing experiences where known
unrealities are mixed with strange realities. Cardiff and Bures Miller manipulate
materials and sensations in order to give the audience 20 minutes of action that
forms a continuous loop with the potential to transcend this small room and
continue in many other small rooms. The narrative arc of *Opera for a Small*

Figure 6.3 Janet Cardiff and George Bures Miller (2005) *Opera for a Small Room*.
Mixed-media installation with sound and synchronized lighting. 20-minute loop.
Courtesy of the artists and Luhring Augustine, New York.

Room enables the audience to empathize with R. Dennehy and begin to invent stories of his life. The music helps me, as part of this audience, to extend my critical description into an imagined relationship with the main character.

This is the soundtrack to a life. R. Dennehy has created a home within this small room, between stacks of newspapers and dirty coffee cups, revelling in the miniature, in the enclosed sonic spaces of sound. I can imagine R. Dennehy emerging once a week to carefully scour the second-hand bins for new albums. He finds them in shops that smell the same whether in Canada, Germany, Australia or New Zealand. Immersed completely in a small world of his own making, R. Dennehy takes the new record back to his room, inscribes his name on the faded manila of the inside cover, lovingly washes the mould from the vinyl in the sink, leaving it to dry between two sheets of paper before finally lifting the tone arm and engaging the needle. R. Dennehy is a name shared by displaced individuals on the outskirts, beside the railway line. In a descriptive and narrative sense the work imitates a short film; it is a self-contained story of absence, loss and solitude. However it is not a film. It is also not theatre, or opera.

Nor is *Opera for a Small Room* a sound installation, sculpture, mechanical performance, or architecture, and it is not reducible to any one of these material definitions. The description given so far can in no way capture the work, nor reflect its modes, even in selected detail. This is because the work is event rather than object, machine rather than medium. The best way to describe it is not only to focus on the psychology of the characters or the audience (as I do above), but to add to this an analysis of how and in what way *Opera for a Small Room* forms an art machine within the assemblage of the art gallery. *Opera for a Small Room* reflects many current concerns in contemporary art at the same time that it embraces a Baroque excess of illusion and total immersion. Deleuze and Guattari's thoughts about the art machine, the assemblage and the event are essential concepts that enable an understanding of *Opera for a Small Room* as an art machine that grows from the audience event it engenders, the assemblage space it inhabits, and the broader histories of art it references.

Gesamtkunstwerk and the audience

Cardiff and Bures Miller draw on a history of other machines inhabiting gallery-like spaces. In the mid-nineteenth century at Bayreuth, German musician Richard Wagner constructed a utopian art machine based on his concept of

the *Gesamtkunstwerk*, the total work of art. Built to house all aspects of his operatic vision, Bayreuth was Wagner's physical realization of a factory for the production of art (Kittler 2010: 172). At its best the *Gesamtkunstwerk* presented an experience of near delirious immersion. At its worst it was to become a tool of Third Reich aesthetic control. Romantic ideas of nature were about immersion and loss of the human body; the *Gesamtkunstwerk* sought to take this to an extreme conflating nature with art, by embracing and controlling all the senses and modalities of the body, including sight, sound, taste, time and space. All were put towards performing the very particular task of art. To make the immersion more complete Wagner separated the operations of the *Gesamtkunstwerk* from those of mass culture, commerce, reproduction and industrialization. Drawing on his readings of Schiller's aesthetics, Wagner argued that in order to recover the lost organic unity of the individual subject within the social body, life and art, the audience needed to be absorbed into nature. He believed that the machine (by which he meant mechanical reproduction, the spectacle of mass culture, and all forms of industrialization) focused the audience (incorrectly) towards a degraded culture. Wagner's aim was a complete immersion of the audience in art as organic nature.

However, it was the invisible machine within Bayreuth that enabled the distinction between nature and the spectacle to occur. This ambiguity at the heart of his machine was further problematized by Wagner's dislike of the human body. As Matthew Wilson Smith explains, the distinction between absorption within culture/machine and nature/art set up a twin neurosis in Wagner's practice (2007: 4). A fear of absorption from the larger totality of mass spectacle occurring outside the work of art was held at bay by a fear of the corrupt bodies of the Other, understood to be the material body found within the audience and the artwork. Wagner's solution was an ambitious technical one:

> In Bayreuth the darkened room became the objective. It was also an entirely surprising stylistic device at that time. 'A completely dark night was made in the house, so that it was impossible to recognise one's neighbours, and the wonderful orchestra began in the depths' (Wieszner, quoted in Kittler 2010: 172).

To machine the total work of art Wagner hid the technical beneath the organic. Wilson Smith describes how Wagner embraced the machine: 'In a dynamic that will prove ironically fruitful for the whole tradition, mechanisation would become the means by which the total work of art restores humanity to an Edenic condition' (2007: 4). The machine was the enabler of nature and of art. Wagner

then dealt with the material body by turning the auditorium into a dark domain in which the audience were separated from the spectacle and invisible to each other. Not even the Kaiser could be seen (Kittler 2010: 172). The Other was rendered invisible. Wagner's final step was to insert a 'mystic gulf' between the audience and the action:

> Between [the audience] and the picture to be looked at there is nothing plainly visible, merely a floating atmosphere of distance, … while the spectral music sounding from the 'mystic gulf' like vapors rising from the holy womb of Gaia beneath the Pythia's tripod … (Wagner, quoted in Wilson Smith 2007: 32).

The contamination of mass spectacle was kept at bay by the total mechanical control of the work of art. Even the orchestra itself was an invisible machine. Between the audience and the stage was a deep pit. As well as housing the musicians, the orchestra pit served as home to the multitude of technical mechanical devices necessary for the onstage illusion, including the huge gaslights that would illuminate the stage. The mechanical production that was anathema to the aesthetic machine of nature was at its core. In part because of its denial of its own mechanical nature, Wagner's performance-machine also represented the height of modernism; it stood for the moment when 'we leave behind the assemblages to enter the age of the machine' (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 343). Bayreuth produced an audience aware of the illusionary mechanisms before them, and – in anticipation of the cinematic media about to make this all rather logical – able to suspend their disbelief.

However, audiences are not as obedient as Wagner imagined, and a complete and total immersion was never going to be possible. There are two things that the *Gesamtkunstwerk* did achieve that are crucial for our story and the future development of the art machine called *Opera for a Small Room* and its audience. Wagner's modern age of the machine encompassed an entire cosmos of sound and image, nature and light. In '1837: Of the Refrain', Deleuze and Guattari describe how after Wagner there is a focus shift away from the romantic individual towards the political cosmos, and towards events where 'matters of expression are superseded by a material of capture' (1987: 342). This is modernism as a shifting force no longer of expression but of the energy of nature. Kittler calls it the moment when images learnt how to move (2010: 22). Wagner imagined the *Gesamtkunstwerk* as organic media that encompassed everything: sound, voice, light, image, body, sensation and audience. It brought all media into one and even though the audience was kept in the dark they became unified. Deleuze and Guattari document how Debussy reproached

Wagner for 'not knowing how to "do" a crowd or a people'. They say Debussy argued that 'a crowd must be fully individuated' (1987: 341). Debussy is not completely correct here. Wagner understood that the formation of the audience into a new kind of subject was a key function of the total artwork (Hansen 2004: 167). Wagner's organic machine operated through the generation of multiple and various audience subjectivities, it did not require a fully individuated crowd but rather a shared event.

Figure 6.4 Janet Cardiff and George Bures Miller (2005) *Opera for a Small Room*. Mixed-media installation with sound and synchronized lighting. 20-minute loop. Courtesy of the artists and Luhring Augustine, New York.

The legacy of the *Gesamtkunstwerk* for *Opera for a Small Room* is found first in the naming of an all-encompassing and energetic cosmic media that we can now call the art machine, and secondly in the process of audiencing where a crowd forms yet retains its individuality. The art machine does not always snap into action at the moment an audience forms and at any one point a person can break off and leave the audience. Cardiff and Bures Miller achieve the apothe-osis of the total artwork by situating one art machine (the

Figure 6.5 Janet Cardiff and George Bures Miller (2005) *Opera for a Small Room*. Mixed-media installation with sound and synchronized lighting. 20-minute loop. Courtesy of the artists and Luhring Augustine, New York.

small room) and its invisible agent R. Dennehy inside another art machine. What they transform is both the visibility of the audience and the subject of the opera. In *Opera for a Small Room* the assembled audience is open to capture, but can escape.

Before we walk into an art gallery, viewers are singular and pre-existent; we all have different reasons for arriving in that one space at that one time. When we enter the art gallery we become part of the multiple, subject-event known as the audience and bought into being by the art machine. *Opera for a Small Room* forms the audience as an event within the walls of the art gallery, transforming these individual viewers into a temporary collective audience. The audience occupies the orchestra pit suspended between the two rooms. Drawn to the darkened room like mice to cheese, they become machinic materiality operating as a series of processes and operations within the specified assemblage that we call the art gallery.

To recap: a man alone moves around a small room. Well, not quite alone. He has his thoughts and his records. Records of a daily life etched into vinyl surfaces by a diamond needle. His life in opera. His opera in a small room. The audience stands outside the room, listening. They hear snippets of Verdi, or is it Wagner? They peer in through cracks in the walls and gaps in the windows to see only a shadow passing between the lamps that give the room an eerie glow. The audience are in the dark; the room is illuminated; yet with the help of the sounds moving around them the audience can break the walls down. There is no longer a mystic gulf between the audience and the Opera. In the small room Cardiff and Bures Miller have produced a *Gesamtkunstwerk* for the twenty-first century. An art machine that not only creates a space but also generates new mobilized audience events, new subjectivities.

Broken machines and mice

In the multi-layered machinic world generated by Deleuze and Guattari, the art machine is found to be a very particular kind of machine. This does not mean that it is isolated from other machines, or discrete, but that it is a specific machine formed in a specific location within the machinic phylum (Guattari 2009: 92). In 'Balance-sheet for "desiring machines"', written as an appendix for *Anti-Oedipus*, Guattari presents a systematic definition of the machine and details how it should be distinguished from tools and gadgets. If thought of as an extension of the body, the machine will always be a tool. It is only when

the machine 'functions as a component part in conjunction with other parts' (Guattari 2009: 93) that the machine is constituted. Because it is already inside social and technical systems the machine is found at many different scales and in multiple modalities. In one instance it encompasses the human, in another it forms a techno-social machine with other subject-machines. In both instances it is a communicative ensemble. Machinic assemblages modulate and articulate differing material relationships. Guattari explains that a machine has two powers: the power of the continuum (no matter what its scale the machine is always a part of the machinic phylum) and the rupture in direction; 'each machine is an absolute break in relation to the one it replaces' (Guattari 2009: 96). In this ecology, machines behave according to a functional emergence rather than adapt via evolution. In order to distinguish itself the machine breaks from the phylum, yet that break remains part of its operations.

> Maintaining a machine's operationality – its functional identity – is never absolutely guaranteed: wear and tear, fine balance, breakdowns and entropy demand a renewal of its material components, its energy and information components, the latter able to be lost in 'noise'. Equally the maintenance of a machinic assemblage's consistency demands that the element of human action and intelligence involved in its composition must also be renewed (Guattari 1995: 41).

We understand the art machine by becoming part of its process when we are formed into an audience. The material components of the machine are balanced by energy and information components that at some point will encounter or get lost in noise. The audience will lose interest, will escape capture, and will break free. And here Guattari's final point becomes important. The maintenance of the machine is dependant on the renewable resource of human intelligence and action. Guattari (2009: 92–3) explains that the machinic phylum is not whole, complete and fully functioning, nor are the machines and assemblages that form from it.

The technical machine has its own history that is outside the histories of art. In slipping between types and kinds of machine, between the machine and the machinic, we have opened up a space where the literal begins to inhabit the space of the model. Technically, a machine generates, transforms and uses energy. It cannot do this in isolation. All around it are other machines generating, transforming and using energy. Machines generate mechanical energy, machines transform mechanical energy, and machines utilize mechanical energy. 'That which makes a machine, to be precise, are connections, all the connections that

operate the disassembly' (Deleuze and Guattari 1986: 82). In each situation the machine is part of a system of connections. Here the machine and the machinic join forces. Any machinic system found within the phylum does not operate around the human or alongside the human – the human is part of the system as a constituent material of the machinic assemblage (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 71). The audience and the art machine *Opera for a Small Room* are the result of machining rather than the formation of a mechanical object. This is why Guattari says 'the reproducibility of the machine is not pure programmed repetition' (1995: 42). Each time an audience is formed it is a different machine. In this context then the art machine is a minor assemblage within the machinic assemblage of the art gallery. It is not a static thing. In art, assemblage is a process that has always made use of material flows of electricity, space, sound, image, viewers, software, time and light. As an art machine *Opera for a Small Room* is provisional and durational, which means it is not a closed system, and is always at risk of breakage.

The formation of the audience-machine means that R. Dennehy is not the only subject of *Opera for a Small Room*, nor is he a subject onto which we can place a straightforward narrative construction. When describing *Opera for a Small Room* at the start of this essay I presented a simple narrative arc of encounter and empathy; however it was a false description based on the generation of a narrative between the work and its characters. I took on the role of a viewer who entered the work at the precise moment it began; this mythical viewer had read something of the wall texts, or contexts that surround the work; she approached the shed, and looked inside, and there were moments of recognition, a tenor voice, a record collection. All these were elements of my own making. With their proliferating machines, Deleuze and Guattari present a different method, one based in the interrogation of the relationships between subjectivity and all other kinds of things. As Deleuze says, 'there is no enunciating subject, only assemblages' (quoted in Guattari 2009: 11). The triple play of the machine within the phylum, the assemblage and the formation of the audience co-ordinates a different kind of experience of artworks. The art machine enables a movement towards the affective capacities of the artwork, and a mobilization of the limits of description and the subject.

The mobilization of the subject within the art machine might account for the problem named R. Dennehy. In *Opera for a Small Room* the differing visibilities of the machine depend on audience-forming relationships produced and generated by R. Dennehy. R. Dennehy is a megaphone. At first he speaks

in the third person: 'In the middle of the stage a man sits alone in a room filled with speakers, amplifiers and records.' His use of stage directions reinforces the sense that he is a man alone, trying to create a dramatic world for himself. R. Dennehy is an inscription on an album cover, a figure suggested by the artists and invented by the audience as we listen and construct an inhabitant of the room. R. Dennehy is also an opera, a room, a mouse and a mechanical voice. He is the producer of the becoming-collective of the audience as we are formed through the assemblage into being more than viewers.

In *Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature* Deleuze and Guattari describe the assemblage of the subject 'K' across three of Kafka's novels, as K proliferates across different forms: animal, insect, banker, witness. They write:

> Ultimately, it is less a question of K as a general function taken up by an individual than of K as a functioning of a polyvalent assemblage of which the solitary individual is only a part, the coming collectivity being another part, another piece of the machine (1986: 85).

Kafka locates a rupture in the relationships formed within the machine. At the centre of that rupture is the subject 'K'. As one of the many subjects within *Opera for a Small Room*, R. Dennehy is also a machine, a variously assembled shadow, a placeholder for linearity, and a voice watching the large room alongside the audience watching the small room. R. Dennehy is a line of escape, a broken machine that impacts on the machinic process. In thinking about machinic processes in Kafka's *The Penal Colony* Deleuze and Guattari write:

> To enter or leave the machine, to be in the machine, to walk around it, to approach it – these are still components of the machine itself: these are states of desire. Free of all interpretation. The line of escape is part of the machine. Inside or outside, the animal is part of the burrow-machine (1986: 70).

Ruptures such as these are the irrational points where the art machine opens up (Zepke 2011: 126). The events produced by the art machine are states of desire that only the audience possess. In their discussion of Turner's late and traumatic landscapes such as *The Slave Ship* (1840) where sky and sea blend in the horror of the event, Deleuze and Guattari write 'All that remains is a background of gold and fog, intense, intensive, … Everything becomes mixed and confused, and it is here that the breakthrough – not the breakdown – occurs' (1983: 132). The breakthrough is positive, it connects the machine to other machines in other locations. In the event of viewing, the artwork constructs the audience. At once inside and outside the image Turner prevents the flight of the audience, the breakthrough holds us before the machine, and we cannot escape.

The making of others (audiences) into active participants that become part of the machine is what Serres and Deleuze call the subject-function of the machine (Serres 2007: 224–34, O'Sullivan 2010: 199). The art machine has particular connections, particular subject-functions that create certain possibilities (for example, the audience can become mice sheltering under a railway line). In *Opera for a Small Room* the desiring-machine that is R. Dennehy intones 'This place is falling apart. The animals are taking over; mice chewing on the walls. ... If they start on the records, I'll have to poison them.' As an audience, we share our fears with R. Dennehy. It is irrational to believe the voice over, nonetheless a concern does grow. What if the mice do break through? What kinds of secret might be hidden in the walls? Mice inhabiting an art gallery is unthinkable. Neither subject nor object, the mice are entropy at the heart of the art machine. They are always present, noisily chewing away. If the mice bring down the walls, they will enable another kind of breakthrough of the audience: we will be able to enter the small room and step into the Opera.

If the work were by Turner, we would find ourselves on the surface of the ocean, bobbing with other impossible floating objects, chains, shackles, bodies; we would enter a fantastic machine of the imaginary, the kind found throughout modernist art. Here in this small room something else is happening. The art machine is a desiring machine within which affective rupture is permissible as long as the record collection remains untouched. If the mice (audience?) chew on the records, another level of breakdown will occur. The art machine is formed on and from the records; break these, and the multiple spaces of the subject within the machine will rupture.

It is not at all irrational. The mouse-entropy at work in the heart of the art machine in the small room is crucial to its definition. It is entropy that forces the machine to maintain its cycle of operation; the dynamo winds up, admitting a new audience. In the large room the repetition creates new conditions beyond the subject-object. In the small room the opera continues across time.

When the audience enters the space of the large room, they are at risk. In the contemporary art machine as opposed to the modernist art machine, the division between machine and organism is not purely technological. The *Gesamtkunstwerk* broke down divisions between the audience and the total work of art, and left the audience for the most part immobilized. *Opera for a Small Room* mobilizes the audience. As the audience forms around the small room they become extensions of the body of the small room into the large room, like limbs or tails they are an essential structural aspect of the work. As the audience come and go, form and dissolve, the machine that

is *Opera for a Small Room* never reaches a state of stable equilibrium, it is perpetually machinic, perpetually in assemblage. The machine that is the small room is irrevocably tied to its audience. Like the mice chewing at the walls, the audience know that to be caught in a machine is to be damaged in some way.

In *Opera for a Small Room* the entrapped audience have the same impact as the mice chewing through the walls. The mice are entropy that keeps the machine running. Although it is selective, the audience is also necessary for the running of the machine. The audience is a mobile and distributed yet defining part of the body of the machine. The art machine that encompasses the audience is always in need of replacement parts. In *Opera for a Small Room*, the differing visibilities of the machine depend on audience-forming relationships produced and generated by R. Dennehy. In order to avoid burnout, *Opera for a Small Room* resets every 20 minutes. The audience come and go. Mice might inhabit the room, yet it is the audience that occupy the place of the demon sorting hot from cold within the machine (Clarke 2002). Carolyn Christov-Bakargiev identifies this schizophrenic audience when she writes: 'what is most fearful in this work is the sense of loss of control over consciousness, as the primary narrative voice express[es] a personality that verges on splitting continuously into various oneiric persons' (2002: 17). It is not just R. Dennehy who is on the verge of splitting in two. Mice are chewing and the audience forms and disperses. The audience are not immobilized in chairs. They have limbs and tails. There is always the potential for movement, for further assemblage, for flight.

Coda: Art-writing and the art machine

This text has employed a glossary of the machine and the machinic drawn from Deleuze and Guattari to talk about the art machine. In some ways it has opened up new ways of thinking art objects. In others it has elided and distressed the very object of its concern. This is the problem with making subjects out of objects. Guattari's 'Glossary of Schizo-analysis' (2006: 415–21) begins with an entry on *Arch-writing [arche-écriture]* that highlights his objection with totalizing Derridian structures in language. The dominance of the text in art-writing meets with the same objections. Writing on art has been dominated by textual modes of analysis that ignore the specific material modalities of the art object (Bal 2001). Explanatory art histories that claim to unpack artworks via the tools

of textual and visual analysis or biographical storytelling locate the artwork as a stationary and fixed object. Everything becomes immobilized in the time of writing. The kind of art-writing demanded by *Opera for a Small Room* must do something different. In Bal's words what is required is writing as a supplement that examines the work in the present time of viewing (2001: xii). It is art-writing as process, as machine.

This essay has enfolded the art machine with the subject-event of the audience and the assemblage of the art gallery. In some ways the bringing of concept (philosophy) to a bloc of affects (art) is like the layering of acoustic perception in the background of a concert. *Opera for a Small Room* is a particular art machine within a larger molar assemblage that we call the contemporary art gallery. The small room demands analysis that the audience cannot provide. The audience refuses anyway, unable to find a clear path through all the noise. This art machine is anti-analysis, anti the mechanisms that ask 'what does it mean', and anti the desire to piece it all together. It holds close the horror of being within and without. It is a machine formed within the meta-architecture of the art gallery, an art machine within which individual visitors to the gallery form into temporary site-specific audience-events. Alongside all this is the machine of art-writing, at once present before the work and conjuring up that work into the future.

Guattari writes 'Desiring machines cannot be equated with the adaption of real machines, or fragments of real machines, to a symbolical process, nor can they be reduced to dreams or fantastic machines operating in the imaginary.' (Guattari 2009: 90) Instead of trying to work out what *Opera for a Small Room* represents, or utilize an interpretation of its symbols (the voice-over as subconscious, the records as substitute love) this essay has focused on the affects *Opera for a Small Room* produces – the connections, breakthroughs, moments of intensification and convergence that are specific to it. Significantly, the artwork is not read as a mirror or 'a reflection of a subjectivity already in place' (O'Sullivan 2010: 200). Cardiff and Bures Miller are not Foley artists sharpening the image through appropriated sound in order to deceive a listening audience; instead, *Opera for a Small Room* thrusts subjectivity back onto the audience. 'We are outside the cabin but inside his head at the same time: the impossible hearing from within' (Schneider 2006: 27). *Opera for a Small Room* is a machine for the creation of art.

An art gallery is a meta-architecture with a long and vital history. Like the pyramids in Egypt, it is a space designed to house other spaces, moments and transitory events. The pyramid is in constant flux yet presents itself as an eternal

object (Deleuze 1992: 76). Museums and galleries pretend the same. Both the pyramid and the art gallery are stationary assemblages that enable transformation. They transmit different intensities, which occur over multiple durations defined by the attentiveness of the audience. The objects and situations that are presented are forever transitory, behind the scenes is always full of activity. Into this space Cardiff and Bures Miller assemble an apparatus of capture, a particular kind of art machine that is temporal, sonic and cyclical. Like Wagner's *Gesamtkunstwerk*, *Opera for a Small Room* is an event that draws bodies into it. It is a multilayered and complex machine that creates audiences across different thresholds. In *Anti-Oedipus* Deleuze and Guattari write that 'Machines [do not only] extend the organism, but [Samuel Butler] asserts that they are really limbs and organs lying on the body without organs of a society' (1983: 284). Butler was aware of the temporary nature of machines. He found them threatening, violent and unpredictable. The art machine is a broken machine always on the cusp of rupture, and like Lindner's *Boy with Machine*, audiences are at risk of auditory hallucinations. *Opera for a Small Room* traps its audience; to leave before the time is up would mean extracting a limb, or losing a tail. Entering the art machine is a process of slowing down, stillness and then acceleration. Individuals submit to their position within the audience and within the art machine, perhaps out of curiosity, but also perhaps out of fear of what might be in the next room.

Note

1   This discussion is based on my experience of the installation in November 2009 as part of 'The Dwelling' curated by Juliana Engberg, at ACCA, the Australian Centre for Contemporary Arts, Melbourne.

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Tilman Ritter. 102⅔ × 118 × 177 inches (260.1 × 299.72 × 449.58 cm). Installation as part of 'The Dwelling' curated by Juliana Engberg at ACCA, Melbourne, 2009.

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1780 and 1945: An Avant-Garde *Without Authority*, Addressing the Anthropocene

jan jagodzinski

New earth?

This essay concerns itself with the intersection of two concepts: the Anthropocene and an 'avant-garde without authority' that identifies an artistic response towards what Deleuze and Guattari called a 'new earth', which I call a future 'Oekoumenal', from the Greek root Oikuménë, meaning the inhabited world or, better, inhabited universe. Oekoumenal refers to Deleuze's call for a 'concrete universal,' as a *u-topos*, a new universality that has no place *hic et nunc*, which cannot 'be' but can only *become* (Deleuze 1994: 173). The challenge is, of course, to answer Deleuze's call for a 'belief in this world' modified by 'as it is' that grounds it empirically, a rather daunting task given the historical moment humanity faces.[1] When facing the 'what is', climate change has become the iconic signifier for the impending Apocalypse. To remind ourselves, apocalypse means an 'unveiling' or a 'revealing'. Climate change, however, is a very small part of the story. Leading climatologists at the Stockholm Resilience Centre like James Hansen have identified no less than nine planetary boundaries that are crucial to sustain an environment where our species can continue to exist (Foster et al. 2010). Besides climate change, they keep abreast of ocean acidification, nitrogen and phosphorus cycles, atmospheric aerosol loading, chemical pollution, stratospheric ozone depletion, global freshwater use, changes in land use and the loss of biodiversity. By comparing the statistics of these nine indicators with pre-industrial levels and current industrial outputs, it seems that three of the nine processes have already crossed their planetary boundaries: climate change, the nitrogen cycle and biodiversity loss. The earth's 'carrying capacity', its global footprint, has surpassed the ability of the planet to regenerate

already by a whopping 30 per cent.[2] To this can be added population growth, increased consumption of natural resources as well as the potential of a global epidemic. The survival of our species doesn't appear that likely. It also highlights and makes starkly evident that our species has enjoyed its continuous expansion, and use of 'free' natural resources at the expense of other species, not to mention the extraordinary global inequalities between the affluent core industrialized countries with capitalist world economies which use up more or the planet's natural resources and emit more greenhouse gas emissions than the 'rest' of the globe (Roberts 2001).

Avant-garde without authority: Towards an oekoumene

> The overman shall be the meaning of the earth! I entreat you, my brethren, remain true to the earth, and do not believe those who speak to you of supra-terrestrial hopes! (Nietzsche, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, Prologue section 3)

The avant-garde is 'dead', wouldn't you know it, yet conceptually they are continually revived and discussed.[3] The question of an 'avant-garde without authority' that I wish to develop obviously dismisses the vanguardism and universalism that has plagued its past resurrections, as if artists are 'ahead of their time', heralded as the carriers of 'truth'. This is only the 'half' of the problematic. Rather, it is the avant-garde's *poietic force* that holds our attention, their ability to destabilize common sense as embedded through the political, social and cultural institutions that universalize state and capitalist interests.[4]

The best way to put forward this concept is to consider the twenty-first century avant-garde without authority as being *folded* over the 'historical avant-garde' of the twentieth century, something like a parallax effect, to generate a new subjectification that addresses the Capitalism|Anthropocene problematic of today. This folding takes into account the historical avant-garde's attempt to critique capitalism, and their programme of bringing 'art into life', thereby asserting a 'utopian transvaluation' of the social order[5] introducing a new sensibility by a pursuit of 'new' forms of life for a 'life to come', as Jacques Rancière is willing to admit. The 'historical' avant-garde 'in accordance with Schiller's model, is rooted in the aesthetic anticipation of the future' (Rancière 2004: 29).[6] However, the problem with Rancière's formulation is his separation of the autonomy of aesthetic experience from the autonomy that takes place within historical and institutional social practices as well (Rancière 2004: 45). For Rancière, the aporia between autonomy and the heteronomy defines the

avant-garde. It has to give up its autonomy in order to initiate its political agenda of revolutionary change. So, the danger is that art becomes reduced to mere life or trivialized as mere art. But art has already entered 'life' through the aestheticization of the *Lebenswelt*, supported and abetted by the 'creative' class of immaterialist labour where 'experience' alone through the senses constitutes the contemporary commodified product.

There is perhaps no position left to write from that is not already caught by the dictates of the capitalist global economy today, save one: the future of our species extinction, from what would be the penultimate moment and condition of such a final event. It is the thought that such an event has happened (but we do not know it yet or are unaware of it) or is about to happen, but is never quite happening. Our collective denial prevents us from beginning to counteractu-alize its effects that are *already* evident globally as a persistent and permanent mode of disaster that has infiltrated all modes of being, a state of permanent precarity. The future event of our species extinction marks the catastrophe that summarizes our current global schizophrenia populated by schizoid types suffering from the psychic pain that capitalism continues to inflict, the 'walking wounded' (Malabou 2012). The trope of the zombie now becomes a paradigm for immaterial labour as the colonialization of the brain and the nervous system begin to be captured for modification (Larsen 2010; Wallin 2012). The brain becomes a zombie category – the 'brain-dead' (must) work for the pleasure of consumer capitalism. The artist, as part of the 'creative industries', now emerges as someone who 'paradoxically' escapes this schizo instability through the innovation of products that are created. Capital and success are conferred on those who are able to maintain the frenzy of productivity.

Anthropocene

The Anthropocene, coined by Paul Crutzen, a Nobel Prize-winning atmos-pheric chemist, marks a new geological epoch wherein human activity has begun to tip the planet's geological and biological levels that sustain us. Humans have become a 'geological agent' on the planet, who are now able to affect the balance of life on earth. It is the first time that a global awareness of what we are doing to ourselves as a species has emerged – like fish in water who finally 'get it': they are in 'hot water' just about to boil. They better figure out a way to cool themselves down as the oxygen begins to escape and they suffocate, floating belly up. The years 1790 and 1945 provide us with two markers, events that

identify the acceleration of the Anthropocene.[7] The depositing of the carbon layer that has infiltrated all parts of the earth's crust, in lakes as well as Arctic ice, began with the industrial age in the eighteenth century with the burning of fossil fuels, especially coal; and then the explosions of the atom bomb and subsequent leakages in nuclear plants such as Chernobyl, Russia, and Fukushina Daiichi, Japan, means the level of global radiation has infiltrated the earth's crust and has begun to affect all living things globally. The separation between nature and culture that defines anthropocentric thought of modernism is more and more problematic to maintain.

'Natural history' and 'human history' have now merged together. The merging of geological time and human time force new conceptualizations for we have become one species amongst many, while remaining *the* species of domination and destruction. We are thus intimately involved in the parametric condition of our own existence with the 'rest' of them. We have reached a historical point where we are not 'free' to do whatever we like. In relation to art, heteronomy now supersedes autonomy. We are like the proverbial Coyote who has run over the cliff while chasing the Roadrunner and has not yet realized he is ready for a long fall to his death. We have yet to look 'down', for our species is already without any planetary ground to stand on. The 'ground' has been gradually clearing away.[8]

Jared Diamond (2006), a respected geographer and popular science-book writer, drawing on a series of historical examples, notably the collapse of Mayan and Easter Island cultures, presents the case for this probable apocalyptic 'collapse' by dwelling on 12 ecological problems, any one of which spells doom for our species.[9] Diamond's conclusions seem optimistically cautious, maintaining a call to a 'world as a polder', analogously basing his optimism on the ecological consciousness of the Netherlands, whose people are constantly aware of the need to keep the dikes functional. Unfortunately these conclusions also play into the inviolability of the capitalist system. Diamond highlights corporations like Chevron as a primary example of where capitalism supports sustainable ecological developments like their ornithological sanctuary in Papua New Guinea. The World Wildlife Fund, on whose board Diamond sits, supports this initiative as well. It seems what alludes Diamond is that corporations such as Chevron dole out equal support to anti-environmentalist groups as well (Karliner 1997). When it comes to the Anthropocene, globalized capitalism is where the structural problem lies.

Capital

Capitalism's system of exploitation works on commodity production where everything is treated as if it had a price. Yet, much of what enters the capitalist system is *not produced* as commodities. Labour-power is a purchased commodity, but it is reproduced within the family and through the educational institutions. This is also true of natural resources such as water and air, which cannot be assigned a market price since they are not strictly 'produced' as commodities either. Human and natural resources are wild cards in relation to commodity calculation. They are necessary preconditions for production, but their 'value' is open-ended. The old-fashioned Oedipal family that was sufficient for industrial capital has gone through modification to include both women's labour and increasingly more McJobs for the growing children who can't quite support themselves. Add to this progression of extracted labour, the contemporary development of flexible time where work and play no longer are separate categories, and we have capitalist expansion via yet another increase of labour by the elimination of leisure time. Precarity appears on the lips of the Left as the situation worsens. Consumption is calculated in two different ways: the first makes all producers consumers where production *is* consumption; all processes from the extraction of natural resources to their end use are 'counted'. There is an investment by producers involved in this process. In contrast, economic consumption refers only to the purchases of consumers. This economic calculation is based on the demand of consumers and not the investors. The capacity to produce in a capitalist economy requires investment, which is not factored in when consumers are asked to 'cut' consumption and 'save', thereby also 'saving' the planet. Such rhetoric covers up the obvious claim that capital always converts saving into investment to generate new forms of capital that expands the scale of the economy. Capitalist expansion is therefore the chief worry for the tolerance levels of the planet Gaia.

Deleuze and Guattari maintain that the capitalist commodity-production system has no intrinsic limit. Any limits are continually displaced in the processes of expanding and intensifying global production and profit-taking. Regardless of the catastrophe – war, natural disaster, political crisis – not to mention any form of health issue or human folly, there is some company that will manage to exploit it for profit, or some reality television show that will turn it into entertainment. The capitalist exploitation of the environment has now settled into an ecological modernization where a managerial approach spreads over technology, consumption and market-based solutions under the master

signifier of 'sustainability'. Green capitalism moves into 'sustainable capitalism', sadly a position promoted by Al Gore (2009), much like Jared Diamond. Multinational companies and multilateral financial institutions are charged with a new developmental role to initiate sustainable development initiatives in developing countries. As brilliantly demonstrated by Peter Jacques et al. (2008), Conservative Think Tanks (CTT) around the globe have succeeded in introducing a skepticism to the impending scientific research on the ecological crisis. The writings of Adrian Parr (2009, 2011), from a Deleuze and Guattarian perspective, capture this newly found fervour extremely well. She shows how the sustainability 'movement', which promotes principles of equality, stewardship, compassion, renewal and sustenance is hijacked by corporate and state interests through ecobranding tactics (her examples are Wal-Mart and British Petroleum). Hollywood gets a 'piece of this green action' by supporting animal rights and reducing its ecological footprint by spending part of a film's production budget on partnering with 'green industries' that plant trees and recycle material through waste management.

On a broader scale there have been more clever ways of promoting the postmodern 'Noble Savage' as tied to issues of environmentalism evidenced by the success of James Cameron's *Avatar*,[10] and producing apocalyptic scenarios via the movies, of which a great deal has been already been written (Buell 2004). The spectacle and fantasies of our species destruction and environmental catastrophes through these steady streams of films ends up, paradoxically, 'naturalizing' our extinction. The worst scenarios (be they a global epidemic, a nuclear winter, meteoric impacts, and so on) enable audiences to take in these 'final days' as domesticated fantasies, which often end with heroic conclusions. There is a normative sense about our destruction, as if humans are still around to tell the tales of our own obliteration, making it seem as though the future anterior is still operable by assuring us that 'we' will not be forgotten as a species.[11] These forms of an apocalyptic future dull the public to the worries that lie ahead. Rather than disturb the complacency of state policies and capitalist greed towards the fate of our survival, they comfort us through spectacular scare tactics that distance the impending ecological and social catastrophe rather than bringing it home to our 'general intellect'.

George Sessions (2008) has tirelessly, throughout his academic life, attempted to present the case for what he calls 'dark green' ecology as opposed to the spread of the neo-pragmatism of the 'bright' green ecology that continues to 'sustain' the global capitalist system.[12] As a planetary economic system, its current line of flight, or trajectory, suggests planetary suicide. Its zealous defenders count on

a technocratic technological fix to avoid this scenario. This seduction is easy to understand. Michio Kaku (2012), the quantum physicist, co-founder of string theory and host of an intriguing television series, *Sci Fi Science,* is very dynamic and persuasive in his projections for the future, including the possibility of fusion energy by 2050, the ubiquitous use of computer technologies where processing power continues its exponential growth, and the myriad potential that neuro-logical brain research is revealing, including such miraculous possibilities as telepathy and lifting and moving objects by harnessing brain waves. Although Kaku is willing to concede the 'dark side' of ecology, this is downplayed, as are any socio-political implications of these technologies. He avoids such issues. Physicist inventions and discoveries are perceived as 'gifts' to humankind. What we do with them is another issue. The Internet becomes a 'planetary telephone', while English will become the lingua franca of the planet. The question of a planetary consciousness is left in the balance. Rather than Big Brother being the problem, he claims it will be 'little brother' that is the problem. In the future, everyone's genetic background and identity is readily available. Michio Kaku, the physicist, would be a superlative example of 'bright green ecology', while his opponent David Suzuki, the geneticist, also of Japanese descent, certainly leans to the dark(er) ecological side. The spectacularization of technology in *Sci Fi Science* compared to the more sober and thoughtful exploration of ecology in the television series *The Nature of Things* as hosted by Suzuki offers an inkling of the tensions between the bright–dark tensions of productive desire.

Climate change, as can be seen, has been widely discussed, debated, and while it is a 'no brainer' for scientists who have made the necessary calculations and projections, the gap between knowledge and belief persists. Ecological disaster is inevitable but the symptoms as to its inevitability appear in various paranoid forms. Deleuze and Guattari maintain that under capitalism there are two poles of *social psychic* libidinal investment, paranoia and schizo-phrenia. Schizophrenia is a free form of desire in the psyche and refers to deterritorialization as well as decoding. Paranoia on the other hand refers to those obstacles that prevent free-form potential desire. Reterritorialization and artificial recording are imposed by private capital to ensure profit accumulation. Capitalism is basically a system of unsustainable development, a crisis-ridden mode of a cyclical economic system. Through such an economy, earth has been territorialized into one 'flat' presence through the geo-technologies of mapping and surveillance. And while the Canadian astronaut Chris Hadfield can excite the sense of wonder of the planet from his orbiting International Space Station (ISS) through social media, the 'truth' of the matter is that the zits and scars on

the earth are incomprehensible and impossible to phantom by humans alone, as demonstrated by the Cantor set, where the infinite set of points between the 0,1 interval become unfathomable. The infamous Kantian distinction between the 'is' (science) and the 'ought' (morality, Ideas, ethics), and the gap that it creates remains even more worrisome given that the 'is' is never an 'is' (we can never get to the bottom of 'things'). There is no sound way to avoid transcendental thought that establishes an 'ought', yet it is the 'ought' that is of profound concern given the state of ecological affairs. There is no escaping the 'ought'. Every philosopher and historian worth their salt speaks 'as if' they are 'stupid', believing that they have the last word by ignoring their unconscious presuppositions. Deleuze's invocations of the 'powers of the false', which is another way of saying all 'things' have a 'dark side', reveal themselves constantly in their becoming. 'Things' are not captured through the nets of presence, essentialism or representation. This forwards axiology as the ontological condition of 'life' (Deleuze 2001). If that is the case, then *precarity* 'is' our ontological situation that requires counteractualization.

Given the state of precarity, Tim Morton (2007, 2010) presents a 'dark ecology' that is much 'darker' than that of the already 'radical' ecocritical' environmentalists such as Arne Naess and George Sessions. Such concepts as Nature, or Earth in the Heideggarian sense, or environment that emerged from modernism are no longer useful concepts to face this new problematic. What is required then is a politics and ethics that can think the non-human, what Deleuze identified as 'passive vitalism' (Colebrook 2010, 2012). This issue opens up the debates around object-oriented ontologies and 'speculative realism' that dismisses 'correlationalism' (we cannot know reality in itself but only how it 'correlates' with consciousness).[13] The so-called 'hermetic' side of Deleuze addresses this through the mystic and sorcerer as ideal types of human life where their intense spirituality opens up a connection between unconscious mind and material depth through a series of becomings calling on techniques that implicate the human and non-human in the 'interkingdoms' of Nature: mantras, tantric states, hypnosis, entheogenic trances and spirit possession.[14]

A 'dark' accelerated aesthetic

In relation to these insidious capitalist developments, an *avant-garde without authority*, as I envision it, is trying to bring about a transvaluation of values (*Umwertung aller Werte)* in Nietzschean terms,[15] where the shift towards

intensive rather than extensive differences in the way Deleuze[16] uses these terms is being developed: rather than the calculations that are extensive in relation to the environment, measuring the future of our existence in more or less time, the shift to intensive differences mark speeds and thresholds that initiate a qualitative change or 'phase transition'. Intensive differences have a transcendental status in relation to extensive differences; they are its genetic conditions, which are themselves structured by Ideas that are transcendent and immanent, a different understanding of a concrete Universal.[17] It is the Idea of art – the necessary differential elements that attempt to de-anthropomorphize man in relation to the Anthropocene so as to transvalue the currency of what I call 'designer capitalism' (jagodzinski 2010).

Just where can an avant-garde without authority operate from, given the urgency of continued capitalist ecological devastation and species survival? To realize the potential of a 'generalized intellect', to call on Paolo Virno's (2007) plea, taken from Karl Marx, that challenges the universalism of the state and global capitalism in relation to ecology would require a radical rethinking of labour, work and action, and is unlikely to happen until the state of global emergency begins to boil – to reach a point of differentiation. It requires new forms of public education to form an imaginary that would address *what will have already arrived*, as the tense of the future anterior. An oekoumenal planetary consciousness needs a 'dark' accelerated aesthetic[18] as a wake up call, rather than the continuous 'green washing' and the continual calls to husband resources such as forests, fish and clean water that are continuously hijacked by capitalist lobbyists who hedge their bets on all fronts. That's not working.

One direction towards this 'dark' accelerated aesthetic would be from the creation of smooth time-spaces wherever they might be forged for the duration that they become possible and permissible.[19] This raises the attribute that qualifies 'without authority' as one that (re)confirms the Nietzschean 'will-to-power', where the concept of agency is radically overturned as it is commonly understood: there is no separation between a will and what is willed; they are one and the same. An act (what is willed) and the subject who wills it are constituted simultaneously, so there is no pre-constituted subject who wills this or that act. A subject is constituted in the act of thinking. Deleuze says a *subject is immanent to its expression.* Added to these clarifications is the close-proximity of Deleuze's appropriation of the Nietzsche's *Übermensch* to the notion of an avant-garde without authority when it comes to the transvaluation through art at the minoritarian or micropolitical level that generates the paradox of both negation and affirmation as simultaneous gestures for becoming – destructiuon

and creation. In his book on Foucault, Deleuze (1988) follows his thought by developing resistance as an aesthetics of existence where the *fold* – taken as the outside drawn (folded) inside – forms a new subjectivation redefining what it means to be autonomous. It is in the fold that life is created (de Miranda 2013).[20] Such a gesture reaches out to the *Übermensch* that Deleuze addresses in the Appendix: On the Death of Man and Superman in this book, the Nietzschean concern over the 'sick becoming' of our species, as we 'do' ourselves in.[21] '[T]he overman as the vision of a non-anthropocentric future of the human. This would be to conceive of the "human/transhuman" as neither as predicate nor a property that belongs uniquely to a ready-made subject (such as "man")' (Ansell-Pearson 1997: 161–2). The transhuman condition is not about the transcendence of the human being, but concerns its non-teleological becoming in an immanent process of 'anthropological deregulation' (Ansell-Pearson 1997: 163). Such a subject is a 'free anonymous, and nomadic singularity, which traverses men as well as plants and animals independently of the matter of their individuation and forms of their personality' (Deleuze 1990: 107).

The 'birth' of man spells the 'death' of God, but Nietzsche is interested in the 'death' of man. An avant-garde without authority addresses this very trajectory. The qualifier 'without authority' vigorously applies to the concept of *Übermensch*. Nietzsche ceaselessly maintained that this term has nothing to do with a higher kind of man, a half-saint or half-genius, or someone who is 'emancipated' and/or a 'master of a free will'. *Übermensch* in no way designates an ontological state that can be instantiated. What is required is an experimental approach to find the 'way' and the 'way' does not exist. The way has to be created.[22]

The *Übermensch* ends the trilogy of folds Deleuze discusses in this Appendix by presenting a new relation of inside|outside forces termed the *Superfold,* which is characterized by an 'unlimited finity'. Unlimited finity is another name for Nietzsche's 'eternal return', and designates future 'folds': the fold of molecular biology, microbiology (the DNA genetic code), the fold of silicon and carbon (third-generation cybernetic machines) and the fold of language, where the affect of 'strange language' within language itself explores the 'limits' of grammar. Unlimited finity refers to pure differences in the way 'a finite number of components yields a practically unlimited diversity of combinations' (Deleuze 1988: 131). Deleuze is referring to the codings of serializations, and the subtle changes that they undergo through their decoding and recoding.[23]

Given the precarious state of the Earth and the proposed technological possibilities (the first two folds of the Superfold), it seems humanity is not faring any

better … only worse. It is the third fold that might 'stammer' the other two, if we see this as the fold of art (visual, literature, music and so on… the realm of affects and percepts). This is the closest to what an avant-garde without authority would mean today. Adrian Parr sees this necessity as a transversal between 'science and art', what she refers to an injection of *unimaginableness* (Parr 2009: 162). '*Unimaginableness* differs from *unimaginable* because as an immanent condition it does not aspire to realize what is otherwise impossible – the unimaginable – which would seem to suggest that it merely indulges in the production of imaginary worlds. Rather the operative mode of the unimaginableness is onto-aesthetic' (Parr 2009: 165, original emphasis). It is the onto-aesthetic that can 'stammer' us into a new subjectivation by identifying the Idea of such an art as a form of 'war machine'.

The art-world remains dominated by curators and graduates from select branded art academies all vying for bodies to feed the 'creative industries'. We are left only with singularities loosely networked together in a Leibnitzian monadic city: there is no overall view, only a series of windows offering different views. There is no aggregate world, but only amassed perspectival fragments. The singular examples about to be presented embody the form of precarity of the Earth and ways of exposing capitalism as the necropolitical death machine that it is. These two dimensions of art*work, as forces that are mobilized by an avant-garde without authority* can only 'demonstrate' the affective necessity of a dark and foreclosed future, and the urgency of planetary consciousness that something needs to be done, something that needs to be globally awakened. Such artwork is simulacral – marked by an undecidability with regard to the precarity of Earth's ontological status, the foreboding that is generated as to whether such an end catastrophe has occurred or can occur or will occur. That there is 'no' world becomes 'literal', as there is nothing outside of it. If, as Marx says somewhere in the third volume of *Das Kapital*, the only limit to capital is capital itself, then an avant-garde without authority stages that very limit, as its internal limit through the algorithmic possibilities of *intensive infinity* of a 'dark' accelerated aesthetic rather than through an extensive counting.

'The death of poetry is the death of the Earth'[24]

The fold of cybernetic extensivity that generates the flexible accumulation of capitalism can be radically challenged by the singularities of artistic desire produced by an avant-garde whose *combinatoire* of forms make up the potential

for an emerging *Kustwollen* designated as an Oekumenal in the way it addresses the relationship between capitalism and the apocalypse. Dan Fineman's claim that forms the heading of this section provides the bottom line. The elimination of poiesis is concurrent with the elimination of our species.

My first exemplar of desiring production is representative of an eco-avant-garde who concerns itself with capitalist limitations. In *Black Shoals Stock Market Planetarium*, 2001/2004, London based artists Lise Autogena and Joshua Portway projected an array of otherworldly constellations onto a planetarium-style dome, making the night sky disturbingly different from the one we are all familiar with. Each astral body in the night sky corresponded, not to nature but to a publicly traded company, as a computer program translated the real-time financial activity of the world's stock exchanges into glimmering cluster of stars. In 2001, the artwork was connected to a Reuters news feed. In 2004 when the artwork was displayed at the Nikolaj, Copenhagen Contemporary Art Center, it was wired to the local stock exchange. The stars flashed more brightly whenever stock was traded. They gathered into clusters or dispersed according to market momentum. Added to the complexity of this celestial panorama, the artists introduced digital creatures into this luminous ecosystem. This ecosystem was solely artificial, devoid of any natural life. Cefn Hoile, an artificial-life researcher and programmer, designed evolutionary algorithms so that these creatures could feed on the energy of the 'stars'; they grew into complex beings and repro-duced in order to better survive in this media ecology. With a market downturn, these 'creatures' experienced famine and died out, overcome by darkness. They were 'accelerated', so to speak!

The project puns and utilizes the so-called Black-Scholes option-pricing formula, published in 1973 by University of Chicago professors Fischer Black and Myron Scholes, which set the course for the trading of financial derivatives on an unprecedented scale. *Black Shoals Stock Market Planetarium* reduces such complex calculations to the level of a video game's seductive visual logic, whereby the ravenous AI life forms simulate the speculative passions that have led to real-life suffering and disasters. Hoile, their creator, maintains that the creatures' relationship with their artificial world of stars is like a mirror of our own relationship with the financial markets. The creatures survive by competing with each other in a world whose complexity they are too simple to fathom, just like those who 'play' the stockmarkets. The *Black Shoals*'s creatures are nothing but a purified expression of self-entrepreneurship – approximating the biopolitics of *Homo economicus*, the subject of neo-liberalism. Picturing a life-world merged with capital, Autogena and Portway's starry sky presents the

activity of the stock market via a technology of visualization, showing just how artificial the financial system is – and revealing the vulnerability of life exposed to a purely economic rationality. The market is seen as a second Nature, as if global capitalism and trade is the 'natural' economic activity of our species. The artwork is not just a means of visualizing abstract data but an existential model for predatory life under advanced capitalism, within a zone where nothing else – not bodies, social life, religion or aesthetics – matters much. The fact that the 'creatures' have repeatedly rendered themselves extinct during the running of the artwork proposes that, at its most extreme, the project be taken as a dark allegory – and a stark warning – for our precarious existence as a species whose actions are putting our very viability at risk.

The second exemplar of desiring production identifies (post)apocalyptic cinema that presents the very opposite of their Hollywood variety. Here the use of *off-screen space*, the space–time of the open Whole, and *skewing the milieu anamorphically* become the prominent forms where the question of the apocalypse generates an affect of uncertainty, the sublime terror of not being able to identify the forces of its causation, as well as a strange optimism that impacts on our present-day situation as a result of what has been fingered as the terror of the 'romantic anti-sublime' (Shaviro 2012). A primary example is Lars von Trier's *Melancholia*, where the poietical force of the schizo (romantic depressionist) Justine's acceptance of the end of the planet presents a strange exclamation mark for viewers, a becoming-child when the end draws near. The same may be said of Michael Haneke's *Time of the Wolf*, where the post-apocalypse non-time brings its protagonists into a space where *translation* with the Other is constantly negotiated and worried. It presents what is a constant state of never-ending terror that many feel throughout the globe today, the terror of precariousness, whether this means getting another hit of drugs to sustain a habit, which, as harsh as this analogy seems in a post-apocalyptic setting, could just as well be getting a hit of water to keep going. It too ends with a becoming-child. We can add to the list such post-apocalyptic films as *It's All about Love* and of *Children of Men*, as in both films the anamorphosis of the milieu is what is forwarded to diagnose the despair and emptiness of capitalism, especially where love has lost its meaning and spiritual fertility has all but disappeared. Lastly, the amazing Korean film, Jang's *Save the Green Planet* is a prime example of a 'dark' accelerated aesthetic where the fate of the earth is played out through the struggle between a psychotic killer, whose trauma confirms his madness through a justifiable ethic, and the alien-CEO of a company engaged in genetic manipulation of our species. All of these movies are extraordinary examples

of how we might accelerate into the future anterior to become affected to an historical moment that is 'out of joint'.

The third exemplar of desiring production works with the precarity of human existence by playing with *multiplicity of difference* via *minimalist monumentalism*. On the cover of Adrian Paar's book *Hacking Sustainability* (2009) appears Spencer Tunick's photograph taken on 18 August 2007 of 600 nude bodies banded together in the midst of the Aletsch glacier in Switzerland, which is receding at 377 feet per year. In 2080 the majority of glaciers within Swiss borders will be gone. The glacial site frames the precarity of human bodies on display, the survival of 'bare life' (*zoë*), literally in this case, and presents the viewer with a stark interrelated juxtaposition of two future extinct but heterogeneous 'species'. I offer two further examples that demonstrate the paradoxes that surround the transitivity of identity. *Army of Melting Men* by Brazilian artist Néle Azevedo is a repeated installation performed in Brazil, France, Japan, Italy and Germany. It addresses global warming, and presents the precariousness of existence under climate change. One thousand to 1,300 cast mould ice figurines, generically male and female, approximately 18 inches high, are placed on site usually on the steps of some well-known state building of legislative authority (but not necessarily) by a participating public. Like the melting of the Artic ice in Greenland and Antarctica (sea levels will rise over a metre by 2100), these statuettes begin to 'disappear' as they melt – in as little as 20 minutes. During this time, the melting 'sculpturines' undergo subtle differences of form before 'becoming extinct'. Their inactivity as they melt away speaks directly to the inactivity of humankind towards climate change. The sculptural minimalism and autonomy addresses 'every[man]' who cannot escape, regardless of class, wealth and power, the impeding apocalypse.

The second example is the *One Million Bones* project organized by The Art of Revolution from 8–13 June 2013 on the National Mall in Washington, DC. The form of the artwork mimics the People's Global Action (PGA), founded in Geneva in 1998. They in turn mimic the resistance of Zapatistas. PGA is the network behind many World Trade Organization demonstrations. The bones were crafted by students, educators, artists and activists around the world to create a site that petitions against genocide and atrocities in countries such as Sudan, The Democratic Republic of Congo, Burma, Somalia, Syria and so on. Such global activist projects provide a moment of intensification in an attempt to create an event that at least intervenes and somewhat ruptures such violence as it brings together 1,000,000 virtual perspectives of intensive quantities as actualized by the multiplicity of bones. No judgements are made, however. The

bones are the symbolic excesses of these conflicts. The nets of capitalism cannot capture the desiring power of such labour production easily. As a collective action it forms a 'free radical' in Brian Holmes terms. Its value is produced in a public site for its duration, demonstrating once again the precarity of the global situation. The 'bones' might be sold to further the cause of peace, as we know war and capitalism are intimately related. This action shows a shift from old forms of communism to a commons that takes back and uses public space.

The last exemplar of desiring production relates to the interkingdom of the human–non-human divide. Here I wish to separate this discussion from the more 'domesticated' forms of this relationship, as notably developed by Donna Haraway (2008) and Jacques Derrida (2008), who limits himself to animals rather than inorganic life. The conceptual artist, Mel Chin's *Operation Paydirt* (2006) is an art installation project, which tackles the problematic of lead poising exacerbated by Hurricane Katerina as it washed into New Orleans even higher amounts of heavy mentals than were on site. The lead levels far exceeded Environmental Protection Agency standards even before the storm, poisoning between 30 and 50 per cent of the inhabitants. To raise the money for the clean up, Chin initiated a fundraising project where kids would make 'fundred' dollar bills, 300 million of them around the United States, that would be exchanged for goods, funds and services when they were delivered to Congress in Washington. The precarity of the situation here is to face a hyperobject (heavy metals), which, in effect, will never go away in any one generation. Transgenerational habits have to be put in their place.

Shimabuku is a Japanese artist who exemplifies nomadism in ways that escape the usual accusations of relational aesthetics.[25] Becoming nomadic means to place oneself in situations where one learns to re-invent oneself in an ethically accountable way. The poietics of nomadism has much to do with the non-human. In this regard, Shimabuku's sensibility is light-hearted and yet demonstrative. To take one striking example, in 2000 he caught an octopus in the sea at Akashi, which he took with him to Tokyo and toured the fish market with the octopus before returning it to where he had caught it. The video of this trip (*Then I decided to give a tour of Tokyo to the octopus from Ashaki, 2000*) is accompanied by a written text where Shimabuku tries, but fails, to see the journey from the octopus's perspective. This certainly appears as a whimsical and some would think silly or mad thing to do, but his encounter as an event itself is what is being explored from the problematic of otherness – that of the octopus. It's not like taking your dog for a walk. It is only when 'things' become 'signs', in the Deluezian sense, when 'things' look back at us, so to speak, that we

begin to experience a 'thing' as a sign. It shows up as an *atopos*, as something that exceeds our recognition and a border is crossed. Only then the 'world' opens up for us. The octopus 'looked back'.

In this sense another example of inhuman encounter is Mark Dion's *Neukom Vivarium* (2004–2006), which puts a 'dead' hemlock tree on a life-support system within a specially constructed greenhouse located in Seattle Art Museum, making visitors aware of what loss of diversity is about, the fragility of ecosystems and the incredible technology it requires to keep this tree in a state of 'suspended animation', much like the precarity of living in immigrant settlements and refugee camps where life maintains itself only through the generosity of those who maintain the infrastructure of their survival. Presenting a particular tree as a singular 'thing', to make its impact felt, serially repeats itself with Jean-Claude Didler's installation *Trapped Inside* (2006) of yet another tree put on life support on the grounds of the United Nations Environment Programme grounds located in Gigiri, Nairobi. This time the *Warburgia ugandensis* (African Greenheart) was specifically selected because of its endangered status and its spirituality in the use of traditional medicine. Similarly, Mark Halsey (2007) explores the Ada Tree, a species known as mountain ash (*eucalyptus Regnans*) and renowned for its monstrous size and rarity. Drawing on Deleuze and Guattari, Halsey treats the tree as a multiplicity that is caught within the complexities of striated and smooth spaces in what is protected forest; he attempts to show how the very singularity of the Ada Tree, its 'thingness', cannot possibly be accepted by the state of Victoria, Australia despite the fact that each tree occupies a monstrous spiritual place that demands protection from the chainsaws of destruction.

There you have it. An attempt to outline the force of art engaged in a 'dark' accelerated aesthetic by an avant-garde without authority bound by a poietics, which, if lost, readily means our death.

Notes

1   For a very comprehensive exploration of Deleuze's 'to believe in this world, as it is', see Kathrin Thiele (2008, 2010). For an exploration as to why Deleuze's call for a new earth supercedes that of Heidegger see the dissertation by Andrea Janae Sholtz (2009).

2   World Wildlife Fund, *Living Planet Report* 2008, p. 2. Available at http://wwf. panda.org/about_our_earth/all_publications/?169242/Living-Planet-Report-2008 (accessed 1 February 2014).

3   See Evan Mauro (2013) for a review. Gerald Keaney (2011) offers yet another revival. In a special issue *of New Literary History*, Jonathan P. Eburne and Rita Felski (2010) present a cadre of 13 authors who query the concept by decentring its Eurocentric bias via postcolonial critiques. The Russian collective *Chto delat?* (What is to be Done?) (2007) devoted a special issue to the avant-garde.

4   The poietic force of art in relation to artistic research is addressed in jagodzinski and Wallin (2013).

5   Utopian not in any idealist future sense but the striving for transcendent values, virtues and virtuals as a symbolic transfer as actions, hopes, sympathies, purposes and enjoyments. Paolo Virno (2004) calls this dimension of action *virtuosity*. These are the intensities that help to reconcile and affirm the mutual immanence of all environments and organisms by changing our concepts, percepts and affects towards a new sensibility to non-human differences (Faber 2011).

6   The 'aesthetic regime' of modernity that Rancière develops is beset by a central antinomy whereby the self-destruction of aesthetic autonomy presents itself as freedom from political determination and, at the same time, the ability to effect political change as the demand for heteronomy is hampered. My argument is that this tension is evident today between art & design, the ampersand standing for the antinomy of 'art into life' and 'life into art' (jagodzinski 2010).

7   I take these dates as developed by Tim Morton throughout his oeuvre.

8   Hurricane Katrina ravaged New Orleans on 29 August 2005; earthquakes shook the interior of China, the suspicion being that their cause was the building of the gargantuan Three Georges dams, which resulted in a huge artificial lake that changed the balance of the surrounding landscape; floods and fires in Australia in 2012 seem cyclical, as they are in US states like California, as well as the 'superstorm' named Hurricane Sandy that hit the eastern seaboard of the United States on 30 October 2012. All these are obvious indicators that the earth's atmosphere is undergoing radical change. When New York, New Jersey and Staten Island are devastated, even disbelievers begin to question climate change under their breath.

9   This was supplemented by an exhibition called *Collapse* (2005–6), held at the Natural History Museum of Los Angeles County.

10   This trope has to be continually rethought by Hollywood to appease the growing Indigenous crisis that persists throughout the world, whether it is in Canada with the recent 'Idle no More' movement, in Finland with the Sámi people, or with the New Zealand Maori, Australian Aboriginal populations and so on. In the mid-1980s, the Noble Savage trope was high on the Hollywood film list because of the 500-year celebrations that marked Columbus's landing. But this has now died down. Yet, the outreach to Indigenous Peoples as being ecological stewards is more to appease tensions than to take seriously their lifestyles and economic ways.

Many ecological groups see hunting and fishing as a bygone economy that does more harm than good.

11 Two excellent examples are mentioned by Tim Matts and Aidan Tynan (2012). *Wall-E* presents a robot that acts as a proxy for humanity. Having developed a glitch, he rummages through the trash of human history on the deserted planet Earth, assuring us that the human archive will persist. In *The Age of Stupid*, a similar scenario repeats itself. A lone archivist presides over the entire digitalized memory of humanity in a future world of 2055 that has suffered environmental collapse via climate change. Through a series of narratives of actual news and documentary footage, he reconstructs just how our species destruction came about. In both cases the future anterior is operable to teach us the 'lessons' we need.

12 George Sessions sides with the Deep Ecology Movement as spearheaded by the late Arne Naess. The concern is whether or not Naess's ecosophy, as characterized by his 'Self-Realization' position, remains anthropocentric. While Sessions defends the ambiguity of its meaning as a reference to an emerging 'totality', when compared to the ecosophy of Félix Guattari, some feel this falls short (Tinnell, 2012). My own position sides more with Guattari.

13 See Jeffrey Bell (2011), who deftly answers the speculative realism of Quentin Meillassoux, demonstrating Deleuze's unique position 'between realism and anti-realism'.

14 On the hermetic tradition of Deleuze, see Ramey (2012). Isabelle Stengers (2010) particular take on the inhuman–human issue is more 'sobering', as she discusses obstacles as well as her approach in the frame of an ecology of practices, which include promoting a 'culture of hesitation', 'minority techniques', and 'diplomacy'.

15 Deleuze uses the term 'transmutation of values'. I am also thinking of a historical analysis by Karl Jaspers (1953) of the Axial Age (800 to 200 BC), where such a transvaluative shift took place via Confucianism, Taoism (China), Hinduism, Buddhism, Jainism (India), Zoroastrianism (Persia), Judaism (Canaan) and sophism (Greece). So there is a historical precedent. In this regard an 'ecumenical environmental ethic' has already been proposed that extrapolates from these world religions. Edwin Etieyibo (2011) proposes a fourfold ethic: 1) compassion or loving-kindness for life forms (all religions), 2) respect for living things, 3) responsible use of nature and natural resources (especially Judeo-Christianity, Buddhism and Hinduism), and 4) the stewardship principle (especially Judeo-Christianity). His proposal is not radical but restorative and utopic, drawing on religious roots with secular understanding of a relationship to Nature. Some form of harmony remains paradigmatic in this utopian vision.

16 This is developed in chapters 4 and 5 in Deleuze's *Difference and Repetition* (Deleuze 1994). See also the 'difficult' writings of Roland Faber (2011), who

attempts to think intensity through both Whitehead and Deleuze when it comes to ecology.

17 Here the paradigmatic example (taken from Bergson) is white light, where the Idea of colour 'perplexes' (or folds in itself) the generic relations and elements of all the colours. White light is the virtual and multiple state of the Idea of colour. It is a concrete universal, not a genus or a generality.

18 See *e-flux* journal no. 46, 06 2013, for a series of essays that explore this possibility. I am using 'accelerated' aesthetic rather than 'accelerationist aesthetic' to suggest that there are many speeds, as developed in the last part of this essay.

19 Even the *Documenta* site becomes striated despite the best of intentions (Martin 2007). Brian Holmes, among others, would identify the series of ruptures to the globalized elite that took place in Seattle, Genoa, Porto Alegre, Seoul, Buenos Aires, Cancún and Hong King as sites of activist art, and see the global Occupation demonstrations as forms of carnivalesque strategies that open up smooth spaces (Holmes 2008). The emphasis here is to specify an avant-garde without authority specifically engaged with the precarity of life on Earth from 'end of days'.

20 I take this development as having parallels with Jacques Lacan's notion of the 'extimate' and his development of the *sinthome* late in his career as an answer to Deleuze and Guattari's challenge to psychoanalysis. The *sinthome* drives the artist to establish a 'world' that no longer answers to the demand of the Other, which is another way of confirming another nuance of the qualifier 'without authority'.

21 In the Appendix, Deleuze presents the *Übermensch* as something that can come after the passing of the 'God-form' and the 'Man-form' as read through Foucault's oeuvre. The God-form of the 'classical historical formation' opens up life to infinity. It represents the idea of the *unfold* to the infinite outside that is in constant need of explaining. Given that man is limited, any encounter between 'his' infinitesimal forces inside and the infinite forces outside would only end in producing variations of the God-form. The nineteenth century introduces the Man-form through new finite forces of labour, language and the life science of biology. God becomes hidden or, as in deistic thought, God creates the world and then leaves, so man must now discover the laws that are in operation. In Foucault's oeuvre, these forces of finitude are characterized by a *fold*. The fold is a typology of surface and depth as man's internal forces enter into the relations with outside forces that are themselves finite yet can never be completely understood, so they are subject to an infinite deferral.

22 For an account of this see Schrift (2000).

23 Deleuze is ambivalent about the future in relation to the *Übermensch*. Earlier he writes 'Nietzsche said that man imprisoned life, but the superman is what frees

life *within man himself*, to the benefit of another form, and so on' (Deleuze 1988: 130, original emphasis). Here there is optimism that continues: 'Man tends to free life, labor and language *within himself*' (p. 132, original emphasis). But then an ambivalence regarding this creative capacity is heard for it opens up forms of domination. 'The superman [...] is the man who is even in charge of the animals (a code that can capture the fragments from other codes [...]. It is man in charge of the very rocks, or inorganic matter (the domain of silicon). It is man in charge of the being of language. [...] it is the advent of a new form that is neither God nor man, and which, it is hoped, will not prove worse than its two previous forms' (p. 132). It has proven worse.

24 Attributed to my friend Dan Fineman.

25 Relational aesthetics, as developed by Nicholas Bourriaud (2002), has had major critiques since the late 1990s, dismissed as an 'arty party' by the influential art critic Hal Foster (2003).

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Strategies of Camouflage: Depersonalization, Schizoanalysis and Contemporary Photography

Ayelet Zohar

[Devenir comme tout le monde] to be like everybody else (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 279) Becoming is never imitating (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 305)

The first time the idea of camouflage as a survival strategy was discussed was Charles Darwin's 1859 publication of his theory *On the Origin of Species.* It offered a radical discussion of camouflage in nature, initially suggesting that invisibility had crucial implications on the ability of certain species to survive:

> When we see leaf-eating insects green, and bark-feeders mottled-grey; the alpine ptarmigan white in winter, the red-grouse the colour of heather, and the black-grouse that of peaty earth, we must believe that these tints are of service to these birds and insects in preserving them from danger. […] Hence, I can see no reason to doubt that natural selection might be most effective in giving the proper colour to each kind of grouse, and in keeping that colour, when once acquired, true and constant (Darwin 1859: 84–5).

Following Darwin's sensational declaration, when scholars discussed issues of visibility and the invisible, they revisited natural phenomena, attempting to find some specific indications in it, while philosophers and thinkers like Nietzsche, Kafka and Lawrence returned to the animal kingdom to identify their ideological references in biology, presuming that the natural world was an orientation to the world of humanity and culture (Norris 1985: 52–72).

This text explores Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari's discussions of the imperceptible, its relation to affect and becoming, and how the phenomena of camouflage and the clandestine can enlighten our experience of space and the question of personal presence in the real world.

Mimicry and camouflage: Assimilation and depersonalization

Roger Caillois's[1] 1935 article, *Mimicry and the Legendary Psychasthenia* (Caillois 1935) challenged the common notions of natural camouflage that were already common knowledge by its time. In that text, Caillois discusses the concept of camouflage from the point of view of the concealed (rather than from the eye of the beholder), arguing that mimicry and camouflage are magical ideas, acting like a knot revealing the relationship between things similar: it is like an ultimate witchcraft, which imprisons the witch in the trap she had created (Caillois 1964). According to Caillois, mimicry is an act that causes disturbance in space observance and the deconstruction of distance between viewer, subject and background. Hence, the assimilation of the subject into the surrounding environment is experienced as the flattening of space, eventually leading to imperceptibility. For Caillois, this kind of invisibility describes a desire to assimilate, disappear, and become one with the contiguous setting, loosening individual borderlines, in a pantheistic dream of mergence into nature.

As a result, cracks in the envelope of sanity appear, and psychasthenia symptoms start to show (Caillois 1964). Moreover, Caillois argues that the battle for life in nature happens in the field of smell (and not in the visual arena); therefore, he identifies the psychotic desire to merge into space as a failure to protect one's integrity: the body collapses, liquefies, doubles the space, in order to be possessed by its own surroundings. Just like in psychotic episodes, the world seems to be consuming one, the skin as a boundary dismantles, and the *self* watches itself from the outside (Caillois 1964).

> […] Space seems to be a devouring force. Space pursues them, encircles them, and digests them in a gigantic phagocytosis. It ends by replacing them. Then the body separates itself from thought, the individual breaks the boundary of his skin and occupies the other side of his senses. He tries to look at himself from any point whatever in space. He feels himself becoming space, dark space where things cannot be put. He is similar, not similar to something, but just similar. And he invents spaces of which he is 'the convulsive possession'. All these expressions shed light on a single process: depersonalisation by assimilation to space (Caillois [1935] 1984: 30).

It becomes the world of the Lacanian *Real*, transgressing the symbolic order and its separations. If to continue the logic suggested by Caillois, the assimilation

of the self into the background becomes an experience of *depersonalization*, as explained by R. D. Laing in *The Divided Self*:

> Loss of coherence brings [...] the experience of devouring space that cause the occurrence of disintegration of self. [...]The world is full of danger [...] the obvious defence against such danger is to make oneself invisible in one way or another (Laing 1977: 46–7, 108–13, 109).

Laing's narrative overlaps and closely echoes Caillois's description. Further in the same chapter, Laing tells a story of a young patient who makes the link between *depersonalization, imperceptibility* and *schizophrenia* clearly evident:

> I was about 12, and had to walk to my father's shop through a large park, which was a long, dreary walk. I suppose, too, that I was rather scared. I didn't like it, especially when it was getting dark. I started to play a game to help to pass the time [...] It struck me that if I stare long enough at the environment that I would blend with it and disappear just as if the place was empty and I had disappeared. It is as if you get yourself to feel you don't know who you are or where you are. To blend into the scenery, so to speak. [...] I would just be walking along and felt I had blended with the landscape. Then I would get frightened and repeat my name over and over again to bring me back to life, so to speak (Laing 1977: 109–14).

The girl's story constituted her mental state, recalling the incident as the episode that changed her life for ever and pushed her into the psychotic state she lives through. The experience of disappearance became the moment of disintegration of her individuality, and the instance of what Deleuze and Guattari indicate as the link between *becoming-imperceptible* and *schizoanalysis*.

Becoming-Imperceptible: Camouflage and simulacrum

In their 1980 text, *A Thousand Plateaus*, Deleuze and Guattari have defined the idea of *becoming* as a fundamental process of existence, stating *becoming-imperceptible* (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 279–82) as the highest goal in the chain of the *becomings*: 'The imperceptible is the immanent end of becoming.' Their answer to the question of 'what is *becoming-imperceptible*?' is 'to be like everybody else', (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 279), an unexpected answer which constitutes their world-vision: it is counter-individual, and it is not about physical hiding or concealing. *Becoming-imperceptible* is an extension of how *becoming everyone is becoming everything*.[2] In French – 'devenir tout le monde, ça veut dire – faire

le monde' (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 280).[3] *Becoming everyone* ('devenir tout le monde') marks the subject's presence against the background (like the common practice of portraiture, painting and photography alike), but to offer a possibility of blending into the background, by dissolution and disappearance into everything else, losing uniqueness, separateness, individuality, originality and subjectivity. When understanding this phase of *becoming-imperceptible* the link to the concept of camouflage clarifies – becoming everything through the reduction of difference and distance between subject and background, subject and object.

> To go unnoticed is by no means easy – to be a stranger, even to one's doorman
> or neighbours. If it is so difficult to be 'like' everybody else, it is because it is an
> affair with becoming […] this requires much asceticism, much sobriety, much
> creative involution: an English elegance, an English fabric, blend in with the
> walls, eliminate the too perceived, the too-much-to-be-perceived […] eliminate
> everything that exceeds the moment, but put in everything that it includes – and
> the moment is not to be instantaneous, it is the haecceity into which one slips
> and that slips into other haecceities by transparency […] to find one's proxim-
> ities and zones of indiscernibility […] 'to put everything into it'; […] To reduce
> oneself to an abstract line, a trait, in order to find one's zone of indiscernibility
> with other traits, and in this way enter the haecceity and impersonality of the
> creator. One is then like grass: one has made the world, everybody/everything,
> into a becoming, because one has made a necessarily communicating world,
> because one has suppressed in oneself everything […] (Deleuze and Guattari
> 1987: 279–80).

Camouflage becomes the equivalent of *imperceptibility*, as it is based on the anticipation that the viewer would misinterpret the viewed: it is not a question of not being seen, but rather of *not being interpreted*; a disappearance possible by the viewer's misconception of what is being looked at, or the expected view. The result is a 'passing', or in Deleuze and Guattari's terms, *becoming like everybody*.

Becoming is used by Deleuze and Guattari to denote a constant alteration of positioning (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 232–53), a pivotal concept in understanding the drama of camouflage as a process of persistent difference. Elsewhere they specifically articulate the difference between *mimicry* and *becoming*, presuming that if camouflage is defined as a blend into a background, then *becoming* is embodied in the need to constantly alter the surfaces of the viewed object in relation to a given space.

Therefore, *mimicry* is to be understood as a stationary repetition of the background – be it with other species or immobile objects – while camouflage

is a process of *becoming*, reflecting the abstract average values of a given space, where the subject can adapt to the constantly changing backdrop, till *becoming-imperceptible.*

Camouflage practices challenge views of space as they confuse two and three dimensionalities, resulting in a lost sense of location, point of view and individuality. A continuous experience of camouflage, parallels psychotic experience in that one loses the 'normal' order of viewer and space. This is why Laing's story of the girl perfectly performs the extreme result of disappearing into the background. In *A Thousand Plateaus*, Deleuze and Guattari expand on the affectous circumstances of this *becoming*: the schizophrenic challenges the Cartesian structure of thought and view, creating a linkage between the unconscious and the rational, which parallels the world of two and three dimensions mixed in camouflage (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 253–8). Affects are unconscious, but are still located in the emotional spectrum and create action, hence becoming the mechanism driving the force of *becoming*. Brian Massumi clarifies that '*L'affect* (Spinoza's *affectus*) is an ability to affect and be affected', corresponding to the passage from experiential state of the body to another state, implying a change in the body's capacity to act (Massumi 1987: xvi–xvii). The convergence of two- and three-dimensionality is best exemplified through Deleuze's discussion of the *fold*, the form that constitutes the tension between these measurements (Deleuze 2001: 139–40). Deleuze's concept echoes Gottfried Semper's theories on the fundamental relations between fabric and structure, textile and architecture, two and three-dimensions (Semper 1989a, b). In *The Fold*, Deleuze identifies the *fold* as the passage to infinity, as the way the flatness of the fabric becomes the three-dimensionality of 'wave, bellowing and flaring […] ever multiplying' (Deleuze 2001: 139). Deleuze articulates the *fold* as the matrix of passage from matter to spirituality, from being to abstractness, from visibility to imperceptibility. The physicality of the *fold* is helpful in understanding how camouflage, often practised through printed cloth and manipulated nets, is meant to record the changes in space over the fabric's surface – as tints and tones inscribe the effects of shades and shadows over the surrounding, posing camouflage at the cross-point between *the fold* and the *imperceptible*, a pivotal concept to the current discussion.

Deleuze and Guattari's articulation of *imperceptibility* brings to mind classic discussions of the perceptible, or the *image* and its qualities: Charles S. Pierce (1839–1914) has related to three possible forms – *icon*, *index* and *symbol*, identifying the special characteristics of each category (Atkin 2013; Johansen 1988). This foundational stratum was trailed by various scholars, of which Rosalind Krauss' discussion of photography as *indexical* sign (Krauss 1977) and

Baudrillard (Baudrillard 1994) and Deleuze's (Deleuze 1983) expansions on the idea of *simulation* are central. In *A Note on Photography and the Simulacral* (Krauss 1984), Krauss has already established these relations, challenging Modernist styles of criticality – the aesthetic description of the image, in the style of Pierre Schneider, or the sociological style of interpretation suggested by Pierre Bourdieu. As an alternative, Krauss constitutes photography as a medium of visual criticality through the repetition of stereotypes and the simulation of visual conventions that contest the place of predictable images in contemporary culture (Krauss 1984: 58–9). In the beginning of that text Krauss discusses two images – by Edouardt Boubat and François Hers – through which she puts forward a visual simulation of camouflage and invisibility, presented by the distorted relations between subject and background. It is significant, I would argue, that in a text that concentrates on Cindy Sherman and the birth of *simulacral*, images of camouflage relations play an introductory role, indicating the importance of imperceptibility to the overall discussion of visibility (Krauss 1984: 54–6).

It is the problem of *simulation* (in disparity to *representation, mimesis* and *copy*) which is echoed in the endeavour to articulate the relations between camouflage visuality and the surroundings in terms of subject and background, or other subjects:

> The simulacrum is not degraded copy, rather it contains a positive power that negates both original and copy, both model and reproduction. Of the at least two divergent series interiorized in the simulacrum, neither can be assigned as original or as copy (Deleuze 1983: 53).

Classic definitions of the *simulacrum*, like that of the Oxford dictionary (Soanes and Stevenson 2006: 1344),[4] have placed the *simulacrum* as 'an unsatisfactory imitation or substitute'; however, the Deleuzian reference to the simulated, as explained in *Plato and the Simulacrum* (1983), places *simulacrum* in a position, one that challenges conventional values of 'original' and 'copy', 'good' and 'bad' ('unsatisfactory'). The *simulacrum* carries only an external and deceptive resemblance to an assumed model, a similitude of means, not end result. *Simulation,* therefore, is a process that produces the real, or even the *more-than-real*. Nonetheless, *simulation*

> does not replace reality […] but rather, it appropriates reality in the operation of despotic over-coding, it produces reality on the new full body that replaces the earth (Deleuze and Guattari 1977: 210).

In difference to Baudrillard's definition of the *simulacrum*, Deleuze's definition 'does not replace reality' but rather places the *simulacrum* as an expansion of

the visual field. Therefore, practices of camouflage are to be read as a process of serial *becomings*: neither *mimesis*, nor *trompe l'oeil*. For Deleuze, camouflage and its visual materializations – the patterned fabric, the net, or the Ghillie suit –are *simulacra*: the relationship between the camouflage layer and the location/landscape becomes complex – it is not a *repetition*, or a *representation* or a *copy*; it is not a *replica* or an *icon* or a *duplicate*; camouflage is possibly the ultimate model of *simulation*, as it differs dramatically from landscape, yet perfectly alludes to it on the retinal level. It constitutes its likeness to landscape through difference. Deleuze urges the viewer to judge the repetitive object for the 'constituting disparity' itself and not to judge or compare it to any previous identity – that is, to avoid any assessment based on resemblance or 'success' in copying. One should think of *similarity* (between the simulacrum and reality) only in terms of their eminent difference, hence achieving the overruling of *simulacra* over *icons* or *copies*.

> [...] for all of time painting has had the project of rendering visible, instead of reproducing the visible, and music of rendering sonorous, instead of reproducing the sonorous (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 346).

Becoming-Imperceptible: Camouflage and assimilation in photographic images

To continue the above ideas, the works introduced in this section use photography, the medium of ultimate visibility, manipulating the photographic surface to create an evasive experience of non-presence. Some of the images discussed are not visible in the text, and this absence serves as another layer of reference to their practice of camouflage and concealment, yet to be (un)viewed through this chapter. This tension between the image and the text, photography and life, photography and alternative modes of description and portrayal run through the examples discussed in this section.

Jeff Wall's 1992 *Dead Troops Talk* is arguably one of the most famous images of this important photographer. In her 2003 essay 'Regarding the Pain of Others' (Sontag 2003: 95–8), Susan Sontag analysed Wall's image as a non-photograph, a tableau made in the tradition of dioramas and alternative modes of display of the real created in the early-nineteenth century, on the eve of the introduction of photography (Sontag 2003: 96). In Sontag's view, Wall's image is successful since it conceals the fact of not being a photograph, neither being a document or evidence, nor being 'for real'. If to borrow Kendall Walton's wording – these

Figure 8.1 Liu Bolin, *Hiding in the City No. 94 – In the Woods*, 2010. Photograph, 118 × 150 cm.

are 'Transparent Pictures', as they allow us to experience a reality beyond the photograph (Walton 1984). Nonetheless, the 'reality' of disappearance of the soldiers, their 'melting' into the dirt, the blood, the shells, the debris of a war scene and destruction – were all reconstructed in Wall's studio. This scene of disembodiment into the background, the loss of bodies into the earth, the disappearance of humans into a rhizomatic formation onto the dirt, is in reality a performance, a staged act, a mis-en-scène which questions perception and articulating of the real vs. imperceptibility and assimilation.

Liu Bolin's works (Figure 8.1) offer a different form of disappearance, which is mostly based on *mimesis* that results in doubling, creating a layer of transparency that directs the viewer's gaze to disperse into the background. Liu's strategy is based on classical forms of *mimesis* – accurately representing the background, while the site of the act of mimicry is the model's body (mostly Liu himself), thereby, completely losing the outlines of the subject against the background. Liu's series holds several hundred images, some are successful in recreating the moment of mergence into the background, while in others Liu chose to 'disappear' into well-known Chinese cultural icons, creating a

Figure 8.2 Jeremy Chandler, Ghillie Suit 3 (Flowers), 2011. Archival pigment print, 40 × 50 inches.

rather complex relation to the question of East–West relations, presenting his consciousness of the desire of Western people to consume things Chinese, mostly exotic, and of the Imperial past. The image discussed in this text, however, presents a seamless option of transparent mergence into a natural background, poignantly embodying Laing's patient's story and her schizoana-lytic state of mind.

Jeremy Chandler's *Ghillie Suits* offer a varying rendition of assimilation into the background: while Liu's image repeated the vertical plane of the scene by means of *mimesis* in painting, Chandler's subjects (Figure 8.2) relate to the horizontal plane that leads into the background. The means by which this image is constructed are *simulative* (rather than *mimetic*) – by using the Ghillie suit, Chandler offers an interpretation of the scene in the spirit of old hunters' practice, as the cover makes use of any material available on the ground. If, to following my previous discussion, it becomes clearer that the Ghillie suit turns the soldier's / hunter's skin (and his fabric uniform) into a *folded, three-dimensional* surface, that allows the concealed body to assimilate into the environment. In other words, the imperceptibility of the Ghillie suit is achieved by altering the surface from *flat*

Figure 8.3 Zwelethu Mthethwa, *Untitled*, from the series *Coal Minders*, 2008. Chromogenic colour print, ZM09.001.

to folded, multiplied, and rich as a pleated garment. The image, which is visually related to Liu's image (Figure 8.1) has, nevertheless, referred to the straw on the ground (rather than the trees in the background). The flower carpet existing on the scene becomes the Ghillie suit of the sniper, presenting a playful possibility that runs between the military purpose, and the folded surface of the field which is now raised to pleat and cover the body, to become a sculptural object.

Zwelethu Mthethwa (Figure 8.3) and Pieter Hugo's images of labourers in their working grounds are an enriching addition to the above collection of images linked to military and hunting scenes seen above. Both photographers are mostly active in Africa, and their images offer a world of the hard-working people who are not dressed for the event or well-equipped to fulfil their specific mission. Mthethwa's *Sugar Cane* and *Coal Minders* series have a large number of images repeating the pattern presented above: a man, exhausted by the continuous efforts of his labour, soaked in sweat and dirt, photographed against the canes at the background field, yet to be harvested or the sacks filled up with coal chunks, piled up behind them. In Hugo's image, the wild honey collector is dressed to conceal and diminish his presence, to avoid the harmful bites he may suffer from the bees' stings. In contrast to Liu's and Chandler's images

presented above (Figures 8.1 and 8.2), Methethwa and Hugo's images converse with the documentary-ethnographic style, being able to undermine Bourdieu's notion of the photograph as a piece of sociological evidence, by presenting the invisibility of the men in the centre as a metonymy to a social/cultural/political non-presence of Africa in Western minds, and the near disappearance of its residents from contemporary discourses and globalizing processes.

Finally, the Arctic whiteness of snowy landscapes as these appear in Erika Larsen's wintery forests and the men disappearing into them broaden the idea of camouflage and imperceptibility to spaces of non-colour, embodying a possibility of disappearance not only occurring by an act of *mimesis* of an outer layer, or the *simulation* of its appearance. The Arctic whiteness becomes the background for absence, operating as a neutral space in the sense that Modernist architecture adopted the white colour as a nullifying method of other systems of signification, allowing the insertion of open meaning. Larsen's images, therefore, may be experienced as camouflage within (white objects are not easily detected in the scene), but it can also perform a mode of camouflage and disappearance into the white walls of the White Cube gallery design.

The group of images presented above perform assimilation as their main means of disappearance: this assimilation is performed through representation of similarities, or by actively repeating the surface image of the environment to enable amalgamation of colour and shape, the 'folding' of the background to become a concealing sheet over the body, the representation/repetition of colour and pattern of skin and surroundings to become visually part of a continuous environment. The specific aspect of schizoanalysis here is a reference to disappearance of a viewing point, of becoming a (missing) object in the scene presented to the viewer, or as means of disappearance from the eye of an evil force or an enemy. Schizoanalysis here is an affective state of being in continuum, with no separation, assimilating and melting into the surroundings in a schizophrenic manner of continuity between being and space.

Dispersion, camouflage and schizoanalysis

Schizoanalysis […] has no other meaning: make a rhizome (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 251).

After introducing questions regarding camouflage, imperceptibility and photography, I arrive at the formation of the term *schizoanalysis* – Deleuze and Guattari's unique view of society, identity and mental state.

The concept of *schizoanalysis* was first introduced and discussed in *Anti-Oedipus*, where they have articulated the specific meaning of the term in a manner that challenged accepted norms of unconscious expression, presenting an option of discussing the unconscious in the social context:

> Our definition of schizoanalysis focused on two aspects: the destruction of the expressive pseudo forms of the unconscious, and the discovery of desire's unconscious investment of the social field. It is from this point of view that we must consider many primitive cures; they are schizoanalysis in action (Deleuze and Guattari 1977: 167).

While Deleuze and Guattari criticize visualization of the unconscious (like *surrealism*), Eugene Holland states that the critical task of *schizoanalysis* is to 'destroy the power of representation' in all forms, from ego to religion, and to 'expunge belief from the unconscious' (Holland 1999: 97). This idea of *destruction of representation* underlies my discussion of camouflage (vs. representation) and *imperceptibility* (vs. visibility)

Twenty-five years later, Félix Guattari (with the aid of Mohamad Zayani) has further expanded his account of *schizoanalysis* to interpret it as:

> assemblages of enunciation that are capable of fashioning new coordinates for reading […] there are assemblages of enunciation which are void of signifying semiological components, assemblages that do not have subjective components and others that do not have components of consciousness. The assemblage of enunciation then 'exceeds' the problematic of the individualized subject, the consciously delimited thinking monad, and the faculties of the soul (apprehension, will) […] (Guattari 1998: 433–4).

As *an assemblage of enunciations*, *schizoanalysis* does not have:

> a normalized schizoanalytical protocol, but a new fundamental regulation, anti-regulation regulation […] The schizoanalytical subjectivity is located in the intersection between semiotic flux and machinic flux, in the crossroads between registered perceptions, material and social facts, and especially in the chain of transformations which ensue from their various modalities of assemblage (Guattari 1998: 435).

By using the term *assemblage,* Guattari suggests that *schizoanalysis* can be compared with methods of early Modernist art: while the modernist collage/assemblage/bricolage aimed at the amalgamation of different sources to create a newly found synthetic unity, *schizoanalysis* keeps the scattered nature of its sources and contributions, aiming to maintain the possibility to become part

of the background, and not to create a new assembly as a separate subjectivity, pointing at the potential to blend into *rhizomatic* settings.

In *A Thousand Plateaus*, Deleuze and Guattari explain the relationship between *schizoanalysis* and the *Body without Organs:* it is *schizoanalysis* that enables the body to deconstruct and see its own desire (Deleuze and Guattari 1977: 9–17 and 354–64; Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 149–66),[5] thus dismantling the sense of subjectivity one is locked into (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 188). *Schizoanalysis* goes beyond the signifying system, to make a *rhizome* (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 251). With this description in mind it is easy to understand why camouflage visuality reflects the *rhizome* and *schizoanalysis*: camouflage visuality offers a scene of a subject merged and subdued by the background; the subject is not the centre of attention, nor the *punctum* of the image. It is hardly observed, it is objectified, it is beyond its individuality, (visually) destructed into the field of vision. Photography, a medium that was first employed to create portraiture – from studio staged portraits to funerary images – has also become the source and cause of camouflage practices: its stillness, monochrome tonality, the employment of aerial and bird's-eye views, and the flattening of the visual field all serve as aides in making the dissolve of the subject into the background part of the practice (Zohar 2013).[6] In their definition of the unconscious in *schizoanalysis*, Deleuze and Guattari say that 'it is not structural, nor is it symbolic', 'its reality is that of the Real in its very production', 'very inorganisation', 'not representative, but solely machinic and productive'. Moreover, the task of *schizoanalysis* is to deconstruct (not just in Hegelian manner – with the aim of reconstructing) – but to become free of the burden of signification (Deleuze and Guattari 1977: 311). For them, the schizophrenic is a perfect model for emancipating oneself from the tyranny of psychoanalysis.

Under this conceptualization, camouflage is a procedure that shifts visual relations in space, a smoothening strategy, which diverts the identity of the subject. Camouflage visuality enables the creation of an alternative (nomadic) presence that constantly becomes 'the embodiment of *smooth space*'. In other words, the meaning of camouflage is to *become-smooth* in an act of nomadization, the reduction of the *striated* system (that differentiates between subject and background), into a smooth continuity, to become a plateau of flat space, a space that contains no permanent objects, depths or altitudes, just the multiplicity of the lines underlying it (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 21–2).

Camouflage is, therefore, the procedure that converts the subject from *striated* into *smooth* existence (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 382), a smoothening device that flattens genealogical organization (a psychoanalytical systems)

into plateaus (a schizoanalytical state), in a twofold manner: flattening three-dimensional objects, then levelling the body into a *Body Without Layers*.[7] If the *Body without Organs* refers to sensations of the body as a whole, going beyond its mechanical reality, then the *Body without Layers* refers to a body beyond the concepts of time and place: a static, present-perfect body. The *Body without Layers* escapes ageing and deterioration, existing only 'here' and 'now'; *Body without Layers* is the consciousness that goes beyond the separation of *me*, *mine* and *Other*, and the re-mergence of consciousness and the unconscious to become part of the flattened world in a *smooth* format of the *rhizome*. Camouflage acts as the epitome of the passage from psychoanalysis to *schizoanalysis*, from *body without organs* to *Body without Layers*, from genealogical to rhizomatic structures.

In their description of being, Deleuze and Guattari look at three archetypal modes of existence – the hunter, the nomad and the farmer. The hunter, speedily running after animals; the nomad, breeding animals to graze and moving after them; the farmer, sedentarily domesticating animals. Each has a different relation with movement and change: the farmer and his cattle belong to a sedentary environment; the hunter is arresting the movement of the animal and consuming its protein; and, by breading and training animals, the nomad is joining the animal in its kinetic force, its speed and movement. The movement of the nomad in space follows a set of points that link together to become a trajectory – it can either be random, or involve a sequence of locations that create a circle wherein each position is eventually revisited at certain intervals. This trajectory represents non-association with the 'universal thinking subject' of the *striated space*, but connotation with the 'tribe in place' (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 380) – the *tribe* (as multiplicity), substitutes the for *subject* (as singularity), and *place* replaces the 'Universal Being' of Modernist thinking. Nomads have no history; they only have geography. History has always dismissed nomads (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 393–4), while victory over nomads was so strong that we are all attached to history. The Foucauldian desire to create a 'discourse' (rather than statement) (Foucault 1971) of 'histories' (rather than a history) is an attempt to diffuse central powers and government in a potential parallel that is drawn between the state's structures and the collective and personal phenomena to be dispersed into a *schizoanalytic* presence.

The first step is to escape the strata of identity for the sake of the *Body without Layers* (Zohar 2007: 30),[8] its escape from the stratification suggested by psychoanalysis, as a critique of what we consider normality. Hence, this description of *camouflage* as *schizoanalysis* examines the position of the concealed in a world

of spectacle and invisibility, a pre-schizoanalytic device, a condition that enables a mapping of relationship established between the gaze and the unseen, the unknown and the analysed.

At a later stage, Deleuze and Guattari suggest replacing these concepts of *self*, *genealogy*, *society* and the *state* with the discourse of the *surface*, *smoothness* and the *rhizome* (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 251). Camouflage may be read as the flattening process, deflating the surface to become a *rhizome*, while *schizo-analysis* enables the attainment of complex modes of existence as a network and a *rhizome* of dispersed knots with multifocal modes of connectivity. Hence, the result of the camouflage process is what Deleuze and Guattari coined as *schizo-analysis*, a constant progression of change and nomadism, disperse and dissolve, and shattering of the individual self into a continuous background.

Multifocality: Camouflage and schizoanalysis in photographic images

Following the discussions of *camouflage*, *smoothness*, *rhizome* and *schizo-analysis*, the final part of this chapter analyses several photographic images, and how their thematic visuality performs the concepts and ideas of *schizoanalysis* and *multifocality*, discussed above.

I start my analysis with Pieter Hugo's 2003 *Looking Aside* series (Figure 8.4), a group of images that displays several dozens of Africans who show the natural phenomenon of albinism, a condition defined by the absence of the melanin pigment in human skin. White skin of an African person culturally places that person outside their own culture, associating them closer to alien cultures of whiteness. Hugo's images therefore externalize the brutality and arbitrariness in applying terms like Black and White to humans, a terminology poorly referring to levels of melanin in a person's skin. They expose how the idea of Black and While skin instigates great suffering and disability caused by a minimal, insignificant factor of being. If Deleuze and Guattari spoke about *becoming-imperceptible* as 'becoming like everybody else', then albinism is a form of exposure and perceptibility that places that person exterior to actual reference group. Nonetheless, this difference, as it is marked in Hugo's image, becomes a conflictual aspect, an embodiment of *schizoanalysis* as a form of resistance to the structures of contemporary culture according to skin colour.

While Hugo's project refers to issues of Black and White presence, and bodily features and their presence within a specific cultural context, Ahlam

Figure 8.4 Pieter Hugo, *Steven Mohapi*, Johannesburg, from *Looking Aside* series, 2003. Courtesy of Pieter Hugo Studio.

Shibli's *Trackers* series (2005), problematizes the question of identity vis-à-vis its assumed transparency, and the inability to identify one by corporeal character- istics alone. In this series Shibli presents a group of young Palestinian men, of Bedouin descent, who serve as soldiers in the Israeli Army. This absurd position in itself is not exposed through the pictures, and only the accompanying text and the information regarding the identity of the photographed reveals the contradiction underlying their special position. Shibli (b. 1970, Palestine/Israel) is herself part of this minority group that endures a long and ongoing struggle for their rights of living within Jewish Israeli society, and the articulation of their terms of participation in that culture. The trackers, all of them volunteering for military service (holding the hope to gain economic earnings and social position within Israeli society), perform the military skill of *tracking*, a skill based on their superior expertise and ability to interpret minor signs in the environment as evidence of earlier presence, such as illegal border-crossings or smuggling activities. I would like, at this point, to make an indirect reference to the subject of imitation and mimicry using Judith Bulter's discussion of the individual. In

her 1990 book *Gender Trouble*, Butler introduced an alternative view regarding the concepts of 'nature' and 'copy'. Doubting the idea of originality, Butler sees any sort of identity representation as *repetition* and *performance* of a specific set of rules and visibilities. Hence, to become X one needs to perform the specific codes and roles associated with X in a specific society/cultural circumstances. Hence, Butler does not view the mimic as a 'copier' or any other degraded position of imitation. Instead, she states:

> Thus, gay is to straight not as copy is to original, but, rather, as a copy to copy. The parodic repetition of 'the original', […] reveals the original to be nothing other than a parody of the *idea* of the natural and the original (Butler 1990: 31).

To continue this logic, Butler's reference exposes the structured failure of Israeli society in this context: to become (the quintessential, prototypical) Israeli, you need to be a soldier; if you become one, you are Israeli, even if, as in this case, the doubleness of identity, and the concealed 'Bedouin' aspect of the men, demonstrates how the masquerade and performance of soldier-hood (performing all its tasks, including life-threatening activities) become the device through which one may participate in the broader grounds of Israeli society (Yiftachel 2003, 2012).[9]

Figure 8.5 Nati Shohat/FLASH90. Yamas police officers struggle with Palestinians in the Arab-Israeli town of Umm al-Fahm. [Yamas is the counter-terror undercover unit, considered to be the most efficient of the Israeli Defence Force's special units]. 27 October 2010.

The mimicry performed by these young men and their participation in the military actions of Israeli Army is an action that goes beyond the individual performance of roles and identity, to actually become the performance of what Homi K. Bhabha has referred to as *hybridity*, which is one of the results accumulated through the act of *mimicry*. This mimic position holds a potential critique, which is encompassed within actions of mimicry that undermine the discourse of the dominant group by presenting its faulty reasoning (Bhabha 1994). The camouflage colours applied to their faces, are actually a distraction from the more important issue of their camouflaged identity and their assumed belonging to the military discourse of Israel, presenting a *schizoanalytical* state of affairs, where there is a significant rapture between visuality and being, presence and identity.

Nati Shohat's *Yamas police officers struggle with Palestinians* (2010) (Figure 8.5) portrays the opposite to Shibli's image. If Shibli's image questions authority and hegemony, positioning the mimic soldier as the one to go beyond limiting discourses of identity, then Shohat's image presents how military forces, the extended hand of the Israeli government and its policy, use strategies of mimicry and concealment to be able to infiltrate Palestinian groups and to impose hegemonic power over decedents by using disguise and camouflaging methods. This operational strategy, first introduced into the Palestinian–Israeli conflict as early as the 1930s by the British Mandate for Palestine military officials, has been in practice in varying formats, with the current setup being deployed since the first *intifada* in 1989 (Cohen 1993).[10]

However, despite the power structure obviously being delivered by such images, there are several disturbing sides to the practice, working perfectly with Deleuze and Guattari's concept of *schizoanalysis*: the undercover soldiers, better known in Hebrew as *Mista'arvim* (*becoming-Arab*), impose some interesting issues over the Israeli system of segregation by ethnicity and nationality (Zohar 2007: 165–71). One of the soldiers said in an interview:

> When I had to *become-Arab*, I did not need to masquerade or disguise. I took my glasses off, and I did not have a problem. My father is from Iraq, my mother from Tunis, so I am an Arab, an Arab-Jew, no? I had only to do a dumb face, expressionless face that we were always mocking as an Arab face […] if you feel yourself to be an Arab, you do not need to masquerade, only if you seem as an exception in the landscape […] (Michaeli 1999).

A close reading of some of the interviews and stories told by these soldiers reveals that the psychological stress of 'passing' was evident in every stage of the

operation. From their personal point of view, there is a huge stress deriving from identifying with whom one is about to fight – positioning oneself, therefore, in a *schizoanalytic*, *third space* of *in-betweeness* – the Arab, the imagined enemy, and that of the Jew, who (one believes) he is, sometimes escalating to problematic situations, when soldiers of the same unit were mistakenly identified by their colleagues as Palestinian terrorists, and shot dead (Binder 1992; Kadmon 1993).

After long periods of masquerading as Palestinians in the occupied territories, some soldiers found their self-borderlines became blurred, resulting in mixed identity and moments of uncertainty as to which side they belonged (Micaeli 1999), a position that could be identified with the concept of *schizoanalysis*. Psychotherapists may argue that this experience happens to those who had loose identity ties in the first place and were, therefore, more vulnerable (Herzano-Lati et al 2001: 252), however, the Deleuzian view stretches beyond

Figure 8.6 Collier Schorr, *Herbert: Weekend Leave (A Conscript Rated T1), Kirschbaum*, 2001. Chromogenic print, 111.8 × 88.9 cm. Courtesy of 303 Gallery, New York.

the subjective individual reality to argue that the deliberate separation of personal–cultural elements, simultaneously posing absolute negative values, turns into an unbearable situation (Schatz 2013: 3–11).[11] Here is what a long-term undercover soldier says:

> I learnt to understand the Arabs in a different way, more from inside. The most interesting thing for me today is to study Islam and Middle-Eastern studies. I would like to learn their culture and beliefs. I feel that this is a very unique nation. There are many contradictory elements. On one hand extreme cruelty for one another and strong religious belief, and on the other hand, loads of beautiful charitable cultural aspects of help for the needy (Nehorai 1991).

Ella Shohat discusses this complex position of Jews of Arab decent living in Israel, and their discrimination by central Zionist discourses, which are

Figure 8.7 Yamashiro Chikako, Untitled from the series *Chorus of Melodies*, 2010. Courtesy of Yumiko Chiba Associates, Tokyo.

mainly entrenched in European world views (Shohat 1988, 1992), while Wendy Doniger argues that *self-imitation* – when one is expected to merge into a human background that one, in fact, already belongs to – is possibly the most epitomizing experience of *schizoanalysis* (Doniger 2005).

Collier Schorr's image of *Herbert* (2001) (Figure 8.6) is part of an extensive series of photographs of young men on weekend leave, relaxed yet dressed in military gear, camouflaged by the heavy shades of the trees in their backyard. It brings to this discussion the importance of what Abbott Handerson Thayer called *Disruptive Coloration*: rather than merging or assimilating into the overall colour scheme of a given area, this strategy of camouflage is aimed to destruct the shape and outline of the hidden subject. Often employed by snipers when locating a hiding point, in Schorr's image, this method becomes a vantage point of mergence into the background by means of deconstruction.

Similarly, Yamashiro Chikako conceals her subjects in the forest by taking a higher point of view, located at the top of the tree overlooking the area. In her project *Chorus of Melodies* (2010) (Figure 8.7) her subjects, the elderly survivors of the Battle of Okinawa are photographed on a day trip to the forest where the horrific events of massive group-suicides took place during the Battle

Figure 8.8 Sanggil Kim, *off-line_Burberry internet community*, 2003. C-print, 188 × 238 cm. Courtesy of the artist and P K M Gallery, Seoul.

encounters. Specifically, the group presented here, based in Seoul, uses fashion, brand name and a particular design as their common interest and the centre point of their relationship. Here, all are shown dressed in a design associated with the British prestigious label Burberry. The *schizoanalytic* aspect here is based on the affect of multiplicity and repetition as modes of deconstruction of individuality and singularity. The over-use of this pattern, including its widespread imitations, makes it a signifier of desire to assimilate. Moreover, Deleuze and Guattari mention tweed, the design associated with British upper-class sport and hunting, as one of the early patterns of camouflage and disappearance (Anderson 2006). In a strange way then, the Burberry plaid is turned into tweed, causing the assembly to become *tout le monde*, to disappear as individuals, to become multiplied identities that dissolve one into the other in group camouflage.

David Chancellor's image (Figure 8.9) marks his continuous interest in the worlds of hunting, and the social effect these practices hold. In this series, titled *Safari Club*, Chancellor documented the receivers of hunting prizes, sitting among their hunted animals, a gathering that mostly stays concealed till their death, when the collection is donated to Natural History museums. The secretive quality of these assembled collections, together with the positioning of the hunter with the hunted, creates an assimilating vision of the hunter into the terrifying background of the stuffed heads and torsos. *Schizoanalysis* here is another facet of a 'group portrait' where power relations are reversed by the act of photography: the 'little death' (Barthes 1980) imposed by the stillness of the photograph merges together the hunter and the hunted, breaking the inherited power relations into a moment of equilibrium and reckoning. Death is hanging in the air, destabilizing the discourse behind the logic of hunting: man wins over animal, man wins over nature, man of power and individualism rules. This image, like the rest of the series, offers a transgressive view of these assumptions, hence articulating a moment of disappearance, camouflage and *schizoanalysis*.

The final strategy of camouflage I present here is what is commonly recognized as *Dazzle Camouflage*. This practice, mainly employed by the UK and US navies during the First World War, created a unique aesthetics of contrasted visibility as camouflage, through the disruption and destruction of the object concealed (Behrens 2012).

Seydou Keita (1921–2001) photographs suggest hybridizations, combined in a mosaic of continuous decorative black-and-white patterns, consisting of backgrounds, dresses, which blend colour into colour, shape into shape, fabric into fabric, subject into object and subject into background, thus suggesting an

enthralling mode of camouflage. Keita ran a commercial studio in Bamako, the capital of Mali, between 1952 and the 1970s,[12] creating a large volume of works (Magnin 1997).[13] In *two leaders of neighbourhood association*, Keita overcomes the binary opposition between black and white by creating complex intertwining of black into white and vice versa: background and dress, matting and headgear are all designed in contrasting colours, creating a dazzling surface (Kaplan 2002: 82–3).[14] Camouflage functions here as intricate patterning; more than just the collapse of black and white polarity, it is the crumbling of the divergence between foreground–background, male–female, photographer–photographed, private–public, commercial photography–art photography, leading to a *schizo-analytic* world of boundary crossing, non-identifiable structures and collapsed categories. With the conglomeration of patterned fabrics, Keita successfully displayed alternative modes of sense of self, one that dissolves, loses contours of identity. It is possibly one of the most innovative visual projects in criticizing concepts of the self in psychoanalysis, presenting an alternative aesthetics of *schizoanalysis*, offering a blended existence, one that belongs to its background and the environment. Despite the fact that Keita worked with a Western concept of image-making (portraiture) using Western technology (photography), these photos are an impertinent endeavour to dismiss the singularly

Figure 8.10 Ayelet Zohar, *The Dazzle Cadillac series*, 2009. C-print 120 × 180 cm.

focused Western eye. The people portrayed in the photographs do not attempt to separate themselves from the background, define themselves, or position themselves as centralized, separated, well-defined subjects. Instead, they are positioned against a mottled background, unknowingly contrasting Western ideals of beauty, separateness and individualism. The *schizoanalytic* element of this position, therefore, links together the Fanonian re-articulation of *blackness*, *whiteness* and the power relations existing between them, with those of Caillois and Bhabha, to create a human condition corresponding to the concepts of *rhizome* and *schizoanalysis*.

Annie Leibovitz' image of Keith Haring (1986), introduces yet another facet that displays the simple brushstroke into a complex photograph. Haring's work, as a graffiti artist embraced by the art world in 1980s New York city, presents a serious challenge to concepts of high and low, craft and art, street art (graffiti) and museum displays. Leibovitz' portrait poignantly externalizes all these qualities, while merging Haring into his own hand-made environment, challenging conventions of photography and painting, subject and background, and instead, introducing the visuality of camouflage and *schizoanalysis*.

Finally, by way of conclusion, I bring my own image from *The Dazzle Cadillac* series (2009) (Figure 8.10), photographed on the streets of Palo Alto, CA. Like a beached old whale, the 1962 *Cadillac Fleetwood 60 Special* was parked for several years in a deserted lot on the main road of town, accurately covered with WW2 US Navy Dazzle Camouflage patters. The combination of a huge car, itself out of production and into disuse, nearly covered by the weeds and roadside plants growing around, and the borrowed pattern of a discontinued line of camouflage, with its reference to the stranded cetaceans, serves as a proper finale to a long path taken between the ideas of concealment and camouflage, imperceptibility and *schizoanalysis*. *Schizoanalysis*, through this trajectory, portrays itself through disappearance, invisibility, stealth, furtiveness and deconstruction. It refuses to be pinned down to one discourse, one definition, one option – instead, hiding and revealing itself through the curves and slots, through ruptures and bends in the strategies of camouflage and imperceptibility discussed in this text.

Notes

1   Caillois' website.

2   Not just everybody – as in the English translation – but *everything*.

3   The French wording is inserted into the English sentence in the original.

4   *Simulacrum* n. 1. an image or representation of someone or something 2. an unsatisfactory imitation or substitute. *Simulate* v. imitate or reproduce the appearance, character or conditions of.

5   The term *Body without Organs* aims to portray a critique of the scientific and medical practices that relate to the body under categorizations of organs and functions, instead presenting a body that exists in its wholesomeness, beyond the commonly applied medical/scientific categories.

6   In my text I discuss the links between photography and the introduction of camouflage theories in modern thought by the American painter Abbott Handerson Thayer (1849–1921).

7   I introduce this term here to expand on the *Body without Organs,* the original Deleuzian term.

8   I first used this term in my PhD dissertation, thinking of the idea of the body in the visual field, beyond the prime concern of Deleuze and Guattari, which lies in their analysis of psychoanalysis.

9   In recent years there has been a severe deterioration in relations between the Israeli government and Bedouin society, especially along lines of dispute on ownership of land in the Negev desert. These disputes and governmental minimal investment in Bedouin villages and their life needs turned many in this minority group against the government and the state.

10 There is extensive literature (in Hebrew) on the subject of *Mistàarvim*, consisting of historical records and personal memoirs of these units, from the 1930s to the present. Material in English is less common but Cohen's text could be a good introduction.

11 This dilemma is examplified in Juliano Mer-Khamis's life circumstances – a famous Israeli actor, and a son of a Palestinian father and a Russian Jewish mother, an actor, murdered in Jenin.

12 Later he became an official state photographer and his works, held by the national archive, are not accessible today. For a detailed account of Keita's ownership and copyright issues, see Jedlowski, 2008.

13 Only about 200 pictures of nearly 10,000 produced by Keita have been presented till now in various European and American venues.

14 I have no information on the original colours of the fabrics – but since the photographs were all in black-and-white I consider the contrast to be black-and-white with grey tones. Yinka Shonibare also discusses the patterns and their cross-cultural nature of these fabrics.

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Part Four

Mobilizing Schizoanalysis: Collaborative Art Practice

The Event of Painting

Andrea Eckersley

Painting is customarily understood in relation to materials, arrangements, compositions and surfaces. While a painting can be conceived of as more than a surface, it is primarily the surface, and its characteristic qualities and arrangements, that are said to comprise the material aspects of a painting. However, a schizoanalysis of painting advances beyond the material aspects of the surface of painting to explore its intensive, virtual and affective features. 'Schizoanalysis is at once a transcendental and a materialist analysis' (Deleuze and Guattari 1984: 109). Drawing from this understanding of schizoanalysis helps elucidate how intensity is generated in a painting at its surface. The elements of a painting – which may include canvas, gesso, pencil, pigment, fluids or liquids, along with non-physical or intensive elements such as the artist's intention, desire and intensity – combine within and on the surface. In generating an account of surfaces informed by schizo-analysis, and the concepts of affect, intensity, sensation and encounter, the surface of a painting may be regarded *as an event*, as one body or machine involved in *an encounter* with other bodies or machines. Schizoanalysis further suggests that encounters involve molecular flows of intensity, desire, affect and sensation between the bodies or machines involved in the encounter. Conceiving of painting in these terms reveals the intensive aspects of surfaces, themselves understood as bodies or machines, and how affects are produced in encounters between these bodies or machines. Such an understanding provides a novel conceptual language for describing what a painting does, illuminating Deleuze's (2004: 13) observation that 'if painting has nothing to narrate and no story to tell, something is happening all the same, which defines the functioning of the painting'. Schizoanalysis suggests that this functioning ought to be understood in affective terms. Affect,

experienced in the encounter with painting, is generated alongside, in and on a painting's surfaces.

A schizoanalysis of painting must be seen within the context of a survey of the surfaces of painting, taking into account the art historical debate surrounding Formalism and its privileging of flatness, as evidenced in the paintings of Mark Rothko. In contrasting Rothko's work with the varying treatments of surfaces in the paintings of installation artist Robert Irwin and conceptual artist Karin Sander, an account of surfaces more sensitive to the role of affect, intensity, sensation, event and encounter in painting may be generated. With recourse to schizoanalysis and Deleuze's notion of the encounter, the surfaces of painting can be conceived of as events felt as a difference in intensity. This formulation indicates how affect emerges as a relation between the body of the painting and the body of the viewer. While schizoanalysis is more concerned with the former, a more affective understanding of surfaces, bodies and encounters may open up the notion of painting to avail fresh insights into a range of contemporary art practices.

Formalism and flatness

Existing schizoanalytic studies of visual culture have focused on cinema (see Buchanan and MacCormack 2008, and Rushton and Roberts 2011). Unlike cinema, which can be psychoanalysed, and consequently schizo-analysed, a schizoanalysis of painting proposes novel complications. Suggestions for resolving these complications may be found in the account of painting Deleuze provides in *The Logic of Sensation* (2004). In describing Francis Bacon's paintings, Deleuze refers to 'the spatializing energy of color'. Deleuze goes on to develop the notion of haptic vision to account for the way colours create sensations on the surface of a painting through their relationships to each other. It is through these arrangements and their relationships that colour's spatial-izing energy takes effect. This operation of sensing the object suggests that it is the application of colour that creates sensation. The crucial idea presented is that we sense the material aspects of the painting, such as the combinations of colour, which then transform in a transversal line into sensory experience as the encounter with art. Sensation's happening is explained as the function of the painting and this sensation happening is becoming. Becoming is actualized in a body, in its encounters with the surface of a painting. Even so, the account of painting presented in *The Logic of Sensation* leaves some questions surrounding

the nature of what a painting does unanswered. What exactly is a painting doing as spatializing energies unfold on the surface of the painting, and how does this transcendental surface work? Schizoanalysis provides a means of addressing these problems.

A schizoanalysis of painting deterritorializes painting by invoking a methodology of openness where the focus is on the molecular within the molar (Deleuze and Guattari 1984: 311–15). The molecular nature of the surfaces of a painting can then be examined by taking into account the full intensive activity that arises when encountering a painting. Schizoanalysis is thereby removed in this context from a direct criticism of psychoanalysis and repositioned as a methodology for the study of the molecular. A schizoanalysis of painting emphasizes the 'molecular, microphysical … productive' nature of surfaces in contrast to the 'molar and expressive' (Deleuze and Guattari 1984: 109–10). Yet if schizoanalysis must be regarded as 'a process … inseparable from the stases that interrupt it, or aggravate it, or make it turn in circles' (Deleuze and Guattari 1984: 318), then it follows that one must transcend axiomatic modes of assessing painting, as exemplified in the work of art critic Clement Greenberg. Indeed, discussions of the nature of surfaces in painting have predominately responded to arguments first made by Greenberg.

In a radio programme, later published as a pamphlet *Modernist Painting*, Greenberg (1993 [1960]: 85) identified the key facets of Modernism in contemporary art, noting in particular 'the use of characteristic methods of a discipline to criticize the discipline itself, not in order to subvert it but in order to entrench it more firmly in its area of competence'. Greenberg (1960: 86) adds that this characterization of art's self-criticism in Modernism called attention to 'the limitations that constitute the medium of painting – the flat surface, the shape of the support, the properties of the pigment'. Painting's defining feature, in contrast to other mediums, such as music or sculpture, was thus identified as flatness. The flatness attributed to Modernist painting was further examined in *After Abstract Expressionism*, published in (1993) [1962], where Greenberg examines painters from the beginning to the middle of the twentieth century. Greenberg focuses on how these artists *use* paint by looking at how they dealt with abstraction versus representation and illusion in this period.

Greenberg (1993 [1962]: 126) writes, for example, that Willem de Kooning brings together 'uneven densities of paints, as produced by smearing, swiping, scrubbing and scumbling' to create 'gradations of light and dark like those of conventional shading'. Greenberg is interested in the ways de Kooning utilizes paint's mass, paint's extensity, instead of relying on the values of colour

traditionally used in painting, to build or create a representative image. By contrast, Greenberg (1962: 126) adds that Jasper Johns is more interested in '*representing* flat and artificial configurations which in actuality can only be *reproduced*'. Greenberg (1962: 130) further develops this argument in his analysis of Clyfford Still's work, moving however from the issue of flatness to consider the surface more directly, noting that,

> Still continues to invest in surface textures, and there is no question but that the tactile irregularities of his surfaces, with their contrasts of matt and shiny, paint coat and priming, contribute to the intensity of his art.

The reference to 'surfaces' is important here as it moves the focus of Greenberg's analysis away from a smooth, level or flat painting. Schizoanalysis accelerates this move by suggesting that a painting may be understood as any material (paint, fluid, objects or substance) applied to a *structure*.

Greenberg provides various hints regarding the character of this structure in his analysis of the role of colour for both Still and Mark Rothko. He notes that for each, the use of colour can yield a 'quality' that Greenberg (1962: 131) only describes as 'openness'. While Greenberg refuses to elaborate on this notion of 'openness', I would argue that it can be understood as the *intensive force of affect*. Another way of thinking of colour's qualitative 'openness' is to think of affect's relation to sensation and the surface, which I will elaborate in the next section. However, for now it is interesting to observe Greenberg's (1962: 131) reluctance to clarify this quality of 'openness', when contrasted with another of his statements where he insists that the 'irreducible essence of pictorial art' consists of 'flatness and the delimitation of flatness'. This reductive statement, that the essence of painting is concerned with flatness and/or the restricting conditions surrounding a flat surface, without regard to content or subject matter, is what Jonathon Harris (2005: 67) writes will 'trigger' a critical reaction from fellow art critic Michael Fried in the debate about 'formalism'. Fried, in response to Greenberg, goes on to write about the origin of the term Formalism in the introduction of his book *Art and Objecthood* (Harris 2005: 67).

Fried suggests that Formalism issues from 'problems and issues intrinsic to painting itself' (like flatness, form and composition) analysed in Greenberg's writing on Modernism. Fried (1998: 17) adds that these problems regard the 'matter of "form" […] as distinct from subject matter'. Formalism understood in these terms may then be defined as a critique of the formal or visual aspects of the work of art. Fried (1998: 20) next proceeds to criticize Greenberg for his '*global* claim about modernist painting, in which Greenberg's drive to

distinguish painting from sculpture is said to have pursued opticality along with flatness from the start'. In a note added to the revised edition of *Modernist Painting*, Greenberg (1960: 94) claims that he had been wrongly criticized for being concerned only with opticality and flatness in painting at the expense of content or meaning. Without wanting to enter this debate fully, I would simply note that in his last interview Greenberg was asked 'In terms of the sensuous and the pleasurable, you seem to take pleasure in the intellectual and the optical'. Greenberg (2003: 240) tellingly answered 'they meld. If I could separate them, I would be a greater philosopher of aesthetics than there ever was. It's about distinguishing experiences'.

Picking up this problem of distinguishing experience, I would argue that its solution requires equal attention to the extensive and intensive aspects of the experience of encountering a work of art like a painting. Questions of materiality and in particular the surface are central to this concern, even though one must go beyond a purely formal critique in order to reach the *intensive event of painting*. Hence, my interests differ from the characteristic concerns of Formalism in that I also acknowledge intensity, affect and sensation (or Greenberg's undefined 'openness') as qualities that can abide in or on a painting's surface. Greenberg (1962: 131) hints at these metaphysical attributes and their relation with the material when he writes about colour in Rothko's paintings, stating that 'the ultimate effect sought is one of more than chromatic intensity; it is rather one of an almost literal openness that embraces and absorbs color in the act of being created by it'. Greater attention to the intensity and/or openness of Rothko's painting should illuminate what I mean by the intensive aspects of painting's surfaces.

Rothko's paintings from the late 1940s are characterized by rectangular areas of colour with frayed or highly irregular edges. Rothko's technique involved painting various thin layers of often contrasting colour on unprimed canvas, letting each layer dry before applying the next so the colours would not mix. Anna C. Chave (1989: 71) describes this effect in terms of 'amorphous' shapes which are 'often splotchy, puffy, or wispy'. This technique and the affects it produced culminated in later paintings from the 1950s in a dense mixture of overlapping colours and shapes. The edges of the irregular rectangular shapes are, as Chave (1989: 104) notes, 'often exaggerated … by painting over them with a color brighter or deeper than that used for the rectangle as a whole'. This intensification of colour was often enhanced by not extending the colour to the edge of the shape, or in contrast, by extending past the original rectangle. The varied layering of colour resulted in 'a subtle optical vibration at the peripheries

of the picture and of the viewer's field of vision' (Chave 1989: 104). The viewer cannot see all the layers of thin coloured paint applied by Rothko to the surface of the painting, but together they infuse and resonate.

   According to the terms of schizoanalysis, and advancing beyond the concerns of a 'formal' reading, I would assert that colour insists in Rothko's paintings as both an extensive and intensive element. That is to say that colour resides on the surface of the painting as materiality producing sensations. Yet colours are also caught in relations of force, which further inflect these sensations. Sensation is not simply material but neither is it pure force; it is extensive and intensive, both actual and virtual. Indeed, it is in this transition between the actual and the virtual, realized in the encounter with paintings like Rothko's and their diverse constituents, that the viewer discerns the becoming of sensation and the becoming of colour. Such encounters between colours are immanent to painting. They involve distinctive or singular encounters between bodies. Yet in another sense, I would argue that the body of the painting can be understood not just as coloured paint applied to a canvas or planes of colour, but as many planes, as many bodies, as many machines, as many surfaces (Deleuze 1988: 127). There are of course the planes of colour and their relationships to each other and yet these planes of colour vary depending on the density and amount of pigment used. And so the planes of colour in Rothko's painting should be regarded as a material substance that can be understood from a Deleuzian perspective as *bodies* of colour. There are also the planes of shapes, made up of layers of colour or gesso or canvas and their mass can also be understood as bodies of shapes. Then there is the gallery, building or environment in which the work is encountered; the body or machine of the frame and the cultural and aesthetic context in which the canvas exists; and finally the body of the viewer. These bodies, planes or machines should each be regarded as extensive elements of a painting that are presented as surfaces. So how might these surfaces be understood?

Surfaces (matter, micro-perceptions, affects)

Rothko's work provides various insights into the character of the surfaces of painting. Chave (1989) notes that Rothko's explorations of the use of colour on the surface of the painting cannot be seen but must rather be 'experienced', providing an example of what Greenberg called openness. These 'open' surfaces, which can't be seen but may abstrusely be experienced, can be further

characterized by reference to the discussion of surfaces introduced by philosopher Avrum Stroll. In his book S*urfaces*, Stroll (1988) investigates the concept of a surface only to find contrasting elements when attempting to define what a surface is. By way of example, Stroll (1988: 4) discusses phenomena such as clouds and shadows, things that don't apparently have surfaces and so must be regarded as 'abstractions and also, under a different construal, as physical entities'. An abstraction or the idea of a surface in relation to a physical entity may also explain the relation between intensive and extensive spaces of a painting. These two elements of intensive and extensive space are interrelated in that one cannot exist without the other.

In his book on Francis Bacon, Deleuze (2004: 108) examines qualitative intensity, noting that colour can be understood as sensation alongside the quantitative extensity of colour. This argument, focusing on the colour red, leads to an understanding of the virtual in relation to the actual as the intensive within the extensive (see Rolli 2009). Following from Deleuze's lead, it may be argued that there is a virtual component to surfaces in terms of how we understand or conceive of a surface in relation to the actual surface perceived. The relationship between the virtual and the actual, how we conceive of a surface and the actual surface available to be conceived, continues to be ambiguous. In contrasting surfaces understood as abstractions and surfaces understood as physical entities, Stroll (1988: 75–6) quotes an example first offered by Leonardo da Vinci concerning the nature of the surface of a body of water. Da Vinci notes that the surface of the water is:

> the common boundary of two things that are in contact; thus the surface of the water does not form part of the water nor consequently does it form part of the atmosphere, nor are any other bodies interposed between them. What is it therefore, that divides the atmosphere from the water? It is necessary that there should be a common boundary which is neither air nor water but is without substance … therefore a surface is the common boundary of these two bodies.

Stroll (1998: 41) describes Da Vinci's thinking here as 'paradoxical', provoking the question 'how is it that the two medium are in contact and yet they are separated by a common boundary?' Stroll (1988: 41) responds, 'because it is a boundary that belongs to neither medium, it also separates them, one from the other'. This boundary does not belong to each medium but is of both mediums. The boundary is a relation between mediums.

By way of clarification, Stroll (1988: 38) notes that 'a surface is a boundary', adding that 'all surfaces are boundaries'. When investigating surfaces as

boundaries, Stroll (1988: 40) refers to the work of physicist G.A Somorjai, writing that he

> takes surfaces to be physical entities of a complex sort whose features have ascertainable chemical properties and that certain physical operations can be performed on such surfaces even though they are only one atomic layer thick.

It is largely for this reason that Stroll (1988: 39–40) argues that surfaces can be thought of as a kind of boundary or limit, which are, as he writes, 'invested with systematic and profound ambiguities'. As previously mentioned, clouds provide another example of the ambiguities presented in the task of identifying surfaces. The cloud can be understood as an example of three-dimensional phenomena, as having form, as having a boundary but not a surface. Stroll (1988: 49) notes that the cloud exists somewhere between 'the medium of water lying flat as in a lake … and a medium such as air which … is less dense than the former and more dense than the latter'. However, what of the surface of the individual water drops that make up the cloud? Because we cannot perceive the individual surfaces of each droplet does the cloud then have no surface? What is the effect or affect of a surface beyond our perception? These questions can be explored through what Deleuze argues are the affects of 'micro perceptions'. A brief discussion of micro-perceptions will also shed further light on the intensive and extensive features of the surface of painting.

In his essay *Deleuze on Intensity Differentials and the Being of the Sensible*, Marc Rolli (2009: 51–2), distinguishes micro-perceptions from macro- or conscious perceptions. Just as much as macro-perceptions, micro-perceptions have an impact on the formation of individual bodies, what Rolli calls individuation after philosopher George Simondon. The micro-perceptions may not, Rolli (2009: 51) writes, 'integrate themselves into the present macro-perception but prepare for the next one'. This process of interrelated macro- and micro-perceptions – related in the transition from the virtual to the actual – provides a way of thinking about the surfaces of clouds. While we may not perceive each individual droplet, we require the micro-perception of these droplets in order for the cloud in its individuated totality to be perceived as such. This is also the case with painting, where, for example, an imperceptible blue may mix with an imperceptible yellow. The micro-perceptions Rolli (2009: 51–2) argues 'blend with one another' and make a perceptible green. Another example of micro-perceptions of imperceptible colours mixing can be observed in the paintings of Rothko. Rothko's infusing and resonating layers of coloured paint correlate with Rolli's discussion of perception and micro-perception. For Rolli (2009:

51), 'the object is nothing that is empirically given, but rather the product of those relations in completely determined perceptions'. The surface of painting is not given as such but is a multiplicity of micro-perceptions, which combine in the individuation of the surface, in the encounter with it. Another way of explicating this passage, this transition between the intensive and the extensive, the virtual and the actual, individuation and the individual, may be discerned in Deleuze's concept of affect.

Affects exist as intensive forces as relations in the midst and in-between. 'Affects are no longer feelings or affection; they go beyond the strength of those who undergo them … affects are beings' (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 164). This specific reference to being implies that despite their distinction from the affected, the body and matter are crucial to understanding what affects are, and more importantly in understanding how art, and in particular painting, gives rise to affects. Affects are imbued in and through painting, producing effects at the level of matter, in the viewer's body. Massumi (2009: 188) writes 'there is no … affect … without an accompanying movement in or of the body'. Affect is a verb, a physical, actual act, describing the capacity to affect or be affected, along with the transitions in a body's 'power of acting' occasioned by each encounter (Deleuze, 1988: 125–8). It is the relations between bodies, the collision of bodies, that interests me in relation to painting, in so far as affect is the change that occurs when the surfaces that make up the body of the painting encounter the body of the viewer, the surfaces of the spaces in which this event takes place, and the time of this encounter.

This affective understanding of painting may be further developed in the analysis of Rothko's paintings initiated above. For example, Rothko's work has often been described, as Glenn Phillips and Thomas Crow (2005: 1) note, as 'transcendental … as representative of the void; as opening onto the experience of the sublime'. I would argue that this perceived atmospheric element, which is simultaneously absent (of nothing, 'the void') and present (something, 'the sublime'), may be more productively understood as affect. Affect is the shadow or the atmosphere in Rothko's paintings. Affects, in a very real sense, cause the body to feel and behave differently. Touching on this insight, Chave (1989: 1) notes that 'this atmosphere adduced by Rothko's pictures, by this poignant conjunction of presence and absence, strikes a deep chord in many viewers, evoking emotions and associations that have often been described in mystical or spiritual or religious terms'. Just as Greenberg wrote of 'openness', one is said to be moved by Rothko's art, and while Chave doesn't use these terms, it is arguable that affect is the principal mechanism of this emotional and intellectual

movement in Rothko's painting. Deleuze's distinction of the 'molar' and the 'molecular' provides a further way of distinguishing this affective movement. Deleuze's treatment of this distinction suggests that the movement experienced in the encounter with Rothko's paintings is a stirring of the 'molecular beneath the molar'.

Drawing from the analysis offered in *A Thousand Plateaus*, the molecular can be construed as an adaptable term or flexible movement within the molar, understood as the larger more restricted organization of structure. This molarized structure is not necessarily physical or material but may in addition be a configuration of social segments such as man/woman or work/holiday. Deleuze, when writing with Guattari (1988: 33), utilizes the terms intensive and qualitative in relation to molecular and extensive, and divisible in relation to molar. Deleuze and Guattari (1988: 58) also use the terms molar and molecular as a distinction between content and expression, with content being molecular and expression being molar. Molecularity is the flux, break or fluid modification that can be found or created within molar rigidity. Reflecting on these diverse characterizations, it may be argued that it is this molecularity that is observable in the relationships of and on the surfaces that make up a painting, both intensive and extensive. The painting in its totality can be understood as molar, and the surfaces that constitute the painting can be understood as molecular processes by which this molarity emerges. Deleuze and Parnet (1987: 124) further characterizes molecularity in *Dialogues,* taking into account a subjective psychoanalytic sense by utilizing terms such as 'supple … modifications … detours … fluxes with thresholds'. In other words, molecularity can be understood as the individual flexible movements, the imperceptible moments, the micro-perceptions of the surface like an imperceptible blue mixing with an imperceptible yellow, that occur when encountering a painting, that produce potential openings, producing becomings. Consistent with Rolli's characterization noted above, these micro-perceptions elucidate perception's role in the process of individuation, in the process of becoming. Molecular flux is where potentials are opened, becoming occurs. As Deleuze and Guattari (1988: 308) write, 'all becomings are molecular'. The molecular and the molar are intrinsically linked and their conjunction serves as the threshold that the molecular opens within the molar, thereby permitting becoming to occur. I would add that this process further illuminates the event of painting, understood as a composition of forces, forces that belong to the surfaces of painting, artist, context, and viewer. Every surface can then be then understood as an encounter in the event of painting.

Painting as an event

When focusing on the encounter in the event of painting, both what a painting does and the idea of what can constitute a painting are elaborated. Deleuze's notion of the event is critical to this expanded understanding of painting. For Deleuze (1993), the event describes the totality of relations between actual things, bodies and happenings, and the independent reality of theses entities in themselves. It differs in this way from what Deleuze calls states of affairs, meaning the things that happen to bodies or entities understood as essences or substances. States of affairs describe interactions between bodies or entities rather than the 'pure event' (Patton, 1997). The pure event concerns haecceities, singularities or incorporeal transformations, capturing the intensive becomings that characterize all events for Deleuze. Events do not happen to things, they express modes of individuation that transform affects and their relations

Figure 9.1 Robert Irwin, *Untitled*, 1968. Synthetic polymer paint on aluminium, 60⅜" (153.2 cm) diameter. Mrs Sam A. Lewisohn Fund. Acc. no. 235.1969. © 2013. Digital image, The Museum of Modern Art, New York/Scala, Florence. © 2013 Robert Irwin/ARS. Licensed by Viscopy 2013.

between bodies. In *The Fold*, Deleuze (1993: 77–9) identifies four features of the event, drawing from Whitehead's seminal treatment. These are: space as extension; affect as intensions, intensities or degrees; the subject or the individual; and eternal objects or 'ingressions'. These four features provide a way of interrogating the event of painting, including its intensive, material, affective, spatial and temporal attributes. The expanded concept of painting that follows from Deleuze's account of the event encompasses myriad surfaces, and diverse media beyond just paint or pigment. The event of painting may then include any material on a surface, such as the surface of the gallery, the surface of the viewer, the surface of the wall, or even surrounding phenomena such as the shadows that the painting casts onto the wall. This profusion of surfaces is well illustrated in Robert Irwin's disc paintings, which rely on the materiality of shadows, their boundaries and apparent surfaces (see Figure 9.1). Analysis of Irwin's disc paintings should also help clarify what I mean by the event of painting.

The wall-mounted circular convex discs that Irwin created between 1966 and 1969 are all convex aluminium and about 152 cm in diameter. They have been spray painted white in the middle, with muted colours graduating to the outside. The paint is grainy in texture. Each disc is mounted individually onto an arm that extends about 50 cm from the wall. Crucially, each disc is placed on a large wall with plenty of space surrounding it and lit from four lamps; two on the floor, two on the ceiling, equally spaced and ideally located about two metres from the wall. The optimal viewing position is about three and a half metres from the disc. From this vantage point, the specific lighting on the discs cast, as John Coplans (cited by Weschler 2008: 103) observes, a 'discernible, symmetrical, but elaborate shadow pattern of segments of a circle' on to the wall behind. Lawrence Weschler (2008: 103) notes that the discs and the cast shadow patterns are an attempt by Irwin 'to create a painting that would simply *dissolve* into its environment'. As stated in a conversation between Irwin and Weschler (2008: 110), in creating these discs Irwin was trying to resolve 'how to paint a painting that doesn't begin or end at the edge'. Irwin became interested in light not just as a way of magnifying a painting on the wall, but with the addition of the discs, light becomes an integral part of the painting itself in the way that it creates shadows. For the viewer, 'the three elements – wall, shadow, and painted disc – are equally positive; the shadow, in fact, sometimes becomes almost more positive than the disc' (Weschler 2008: 104). The shadows in Irwin's discs often overlap, resulting in slightly darker shadows that therefore become an explicit element of the work, creating an intensity in each disc (see Weschler 2008: 104). It is equally true that these shadows, and the temporality

of the light on which they rely, are fundamental to the event of Irwin's disc paintings.

It is obvious that the shadow, which does have boundaries but no surface of it's own, can only manifest because of the surface or substrata on which it is cast. Nonetheless, if these shadows are round and are overlapping, creating a further darker shadow, the quality of roundness and the quality of being dark must be considered distinct characteristics of the event of each disc painting, as evinced by the surface or substrata. Focus on the substrata highlights the molecular aspects of these paintings, the existence of perceptible and imperceptible imperfections and impurities on the surface of the wall under the shadows. In this way, the intensive force of affect can be exemplified in Irwin's disc paintings as the quality or intensity of darkness and roundness that must belong to both the shadow and to the surface of the wall, as a relation between them. This relation complicates the boundaries of the painting as they manifest in each event.

As noted earlier in Stroll's discussion of Da Vinci's boundaries, a boundary between surfaces can also be understood as a relation between mediums in that the boundary is not a part of one medium but is of both mediums. The

Figure 9.2 Karin Sander, *Patina Painting 59*, 2005. Stolen on 28 January 2005, returned on 31 January 2005, Berlin–Wedding. Stretched canvas in standard size, white universal primer, 200 × 300 cm. Private collection, Berlin. Image courtesy of the artist.

patination of cast bronze objects works in a similar way. Commonly understood as a coating, a patina is achieved by the application of chemical compounds to a bronze sculpture, which reacts with the copper in the bronze to produce a change in the surface colour. More often than not this change is achieved through the application of heat so that the chemicals penetrate the porous surface of the object. The penetration through heat means that the boundary of where the bronze starts and the patina finishes is not clear. The oxidation process that occurs due to environmental effects on the surface of bronze public sculptures, discernible as a green film, is also considered a patina that penetrates the surface of the bronze. Patination thus concerns the eventalization of bronze in its articulations in sculpture. Another example of this eventalization is the *Patina Paintings,* created by conceptual artist Karin Sander (see Figure 9.2).

Sander created the series of *Patina Paintings,* titled *Gebrauchsbilder*, which Sander (2005: np) notes, 'implies both that the canvases are consumer objects and that they fulfill a need'. This series involved Sanders placing pre-made canvases in selected locations and then leaving them to remain exposed for a period of time. Significantly, the art works were then displayed where they had been made. Sander's (2005: np) intent was for the canvas to, as she writes, 'absorb and reproduce the specific patina of this location'. The immediate environment of the locations, which were as diverse as a garden, a coal cellar and a boat, are absorbed into the painting so that the surface of the canvas is penetrated and imbibed with its surroundings. The *Patina Paintings* demonstrate that the limits of the boundary of the canvas's surface and the environment are unclear, as the environment is incorporated into the painting, blurring any easy distinction between surface and surrounds. Time is equally critical to each painting, inasmuch as each canvas is individuated in the event of its exposure to its environment. Yet consistent with Deleuze's reading of the event, this individuation transpires in an unfolding series, as the surface of the canvas is affected by its surrounds over time. Each encounter with the work therefore differs according to these temporal and environmental aspects. It is notable that in the work *Patina Paintings* no paint is applied to the surface at all but they are still considered paintings because of the use of stretched canvas as a substrate.

Other investigations into surfaces have led Sander to explorations of the surface of walls. Sander's various experiments with wall works include paintings, such as *Water*, where half of a white wall is painted with water (see Figure 9.3).

Max Wechsler (2002: 47) describes the effect for the brief moment before the water evaporates as 'insinuating a transparence'. Any rational understanding

Figure 9.3 Karin Sander, *Water*, 1990. Water on a white wall, 400 × 400 × 400 cm. Whitney Museum of American Art, New York, Independent Studio Program. Image courtesy of the artist.

that the water droplets are disappearing does not explain what we are feeling when engaging with the event of *Water*. The evocativeness of the translucence and evaporating water molecules evokes a sensation or ambience, literally creating an atmosphere. This sensation, this ambience, this atmosphere is a function of the affective elements of the event of *Water*. Even though Sander again uses no paint or pigment in this work, I insist on describing these works as paintings. The water is *painted* onto the wall and despite it's ephemeral nature this is still an act of painting. Such a conclusion is entirely consistent with a schizoanalysis of painting, its concern for affect, sensation, events and intensity, and their generation in encounters between bodies. Each aspect sheds light on the intensive, painterly aspects of Sander's work.

Sander's *Wallpiece* further clarifies the eventalization of painting envisaged in schizoanalysis. Sander creates *Wallpiece* (see Figure 9.4) by sanding down an extremely thin layer (about one-tenth of a millimetre thick) of emulsion paint that has been applied to the wall, which is then polished to a high shine. All of the wall's irregularities are removed from the surface as it is polished to a high gloss.

Figure 9.4 Karin Sander, *Wallpiece,* 1996. Polished wall paint, 300 × 420 cm. Kunstmuseum Bonn. Image courtesy of the artist.

Sander (2002: 111) writes,

> the picture is created not by applying material but by removing it. The polished surfaces of the wall pieces mirror sections of their surroundings and alter their composition according to the position from which they are contemplated.

Contemplated or encountered. The composition of *Wallpiece* is eventalized as it is encountered, as the surfaces mirror their surroundings, as they themselves differ with each encounter in the time and space of the gallery. Unlike the transparency of the walls treated with water, the smoothed surfaces of *Wallpiece* cannot be seen, even though, as Wechsler (2002: 49) writes, they 'offer a virtual mirror image in which one can only see a flickering reflection of what is already there'. Sander's investigations reveal, Wechsler (2002: 47) observes, the 'perceptual complexities' of the wall as a surface, with the illusion of being able to see the wall behind something, and in another instance (or event) the ability to reflect. Consistent with schizoanalysis, I consider Sander's removal of paint to be an act of painting, as much as de Kooning's 'swiping' and 'scrubbing' away of paint, discussed above, ought to be regarded as painting.

Just as da Vinci disputed the proper location of water's surface boundaries, for Sander the limitations of the wall as surface boundary are equally uncertain. In *Water*, Sander is working with both the wall's intensive and extensive

surfaces. She paints a layer of water as a physical entity onto the wall. But as the water molecules evaporate off the wall's surface, the water's extensive properties apparently disappear or dematerialize and we are instead left with an *intensive encounter* with the wall, with the trace of an absence. This intensive encounter illustrates how the boundaries of the wall become uncertain in Sander's work, in that the extensity of the surface is not obvious. This suggests an intriguing ambiguity in the extensive and intensive properties of the surface as each appear to inter-penetrate and then diverge as the extensive water-treated wall is transformed in the evaporation of the water. Similarly with *Wallpiece*, an intensive encounter is revealed when extensive, physical layers are added with emulsion paint and then removed to reveal a polished mirror-like boundary reflecting the fleeting outside. The addition and subtraction of barely perceptible layers of the wall leaves the problem of determining the proper boundaries of the wall's surface. Where does the surface of the wall start and where does it end? Sander's work in this way exemplifies the ambiguous relation between extensive and intensive surfaces required of the eventalization of painting.

For Sander the incompatible ways of conceiving surfaces are made productive in the relations between the intensive and extensive properties of surfaces. However it is when considering surfaces at the atomic, micro-perceptive level (as described by Rolli) that the relation between extensive and intensive properties, between micro-perceptions and intensity, resonate most profoundly. A surface can be understood as a multiplicity of micro-perceptions. And it is this intensive quality, the combination of micro-perceptions on the surface of a painting (which is itself felt as affect), that results in the individuations immanent to encounters in the event of painting. The molar painting contains in and on its surfaces molecular intensities that permit becoming to occur in the myriad affects occasioned by the encounter with the painting.

In other words, to study affects as 'molecular' intensities in Deleuze's terms, is to begin to understand painting's 'intensive quality', or as Simon O'Sullivan (2006: 43) suggests, its capacity to produce intensities of mood, feeling, transcendence or sympathy. To reiterate, the idea of being moved by art is the principle mechanism of affect. Art, like all signifying practices, produces knowledge (or meaning) through the comprehension of content and/or form. However, art is also distinctive for Deleuze in the way it produces affects. Affects generate meaning. To miss this affective element, as formalist or semiotic readings of art that focus on the representational context of art appear to, is to misunderstand what art actually is. An exploration of the purely formal, extensive elements of the work by Irwin, Sander and Rothko cannot begin

to explain Greenberg's 'openness' or the intensive and qualitative event of the encounter with these works. Yet, the discussion of the surfaces occasioned by these artists reveals an intensive dimension in the encounter with painting that may be directly related to the extensive elements of the surface, but are not of it. The encounter is an event involving the entanglement of surfaces resulting in intensity. The passage of intensity felt in the body in the event of each encounter with the surfaces of a painting is affect.

Encounters in the event of painting

A study of painting with recourse to Deleuze and Guattari's schizoanalytic concepts has provided a means of interrogating the surfaces of painting that moves beyond their familiar extensive properties to include intensive, affective properties. I opened this chapter by noting Deleuze's (2004: 13) observation that 'if painting has nothing to narrate and no story to tell, something is happening all the same, which defines the functioning of the painting'. I would argue that any attempt to define the functioning of a painting must start from the surface, bearing in mind both its extensive and intensive properties. Formalism, derived from Greenberg's focus on flatness draws attention to the extensive nature of the surface in painting. However, neither Fried nor Greenberg consider how 'openness' or intensity relates to the surface. Hence, neither critic can properly account for the event of painting evinced, for example, in the work of Irwin and Sander. Surfaces are defined by boundaries. Phenomena such as shadows contain boundaries but do not have surfaces or properties, yet shadows cannot exist without surfaces. Irwin's discs demonstrate how shadows, while restricted within boundaries, nonetheless have distinct qualities or intensities that belong as a relation to both shadow and surface. Indeed, in its expression in or on a surface, shadows become part of Irwin's paintings. Water plays an equally intensive role in Sander's recent painting, as does the work of treating the surface by removing elements. The conceptual tools furnished in schizoanalysis reveal something of the event of Sander's paintings. In *Patina Paintings, Water* and *Wallpiece* individual flexible movements, imperceptible moments, and micro-perceptions of the surface produce becomings in encounters between bodies.

   A schizoanalysis of intensity, sensation, individuation, events and affects thus inaugurates a different understanding of the function of a painting. The event of painting describes its function as a product of an encounter between

the actual and the virtual, where one *encounters becoming*. In developing this logic, a painting can be construed as an event felt as a difference in intensity, thereby explicating how affects emerge in relations between the body of the painting, the space of the encounter, and the body of the viewer. Such relations describe the proper function of a painting, understood in terms of an intensity generated in a painting at, in, or on its surfaces. This produces a novel understanding of painting in which the surface operates in a completely different way compared with traditional characterizations of painting, which describe a surface with pigment applied to it. Schizoanalysis suggests that a painting can and must be reconceptualized as any surface that has a media (not exclusively paint) applied to it – an idea that resonates with much contemporary art practice.

Indeed, a great many contemporary painting practices defy conventional accounts of painting and surfaces. For example, by bridging different disciplines, Irwin's discs could be considered sculptures or paintings. Similarly, Sander's investigations of walls cross the boundaries of interior architecture, installation art and painting in ways that dissolve traditional categories or fields of art. While critics have long acknowledged the breakdown of these traditional categories, indicated for example in debates around medium specificity in art, and the rejection of Greenberg's formal analysis in the late 1970s, the implications of this breakdown are still reverberating in art practice, criticism, analysis and pedagogy.[1] With its focus on intensities, events, affects and surfaces, schizoanalysis provides a language to help clarify what many contemporary artists are already doing, and how expanded fields of art operate or function in practice. Such an expanded field is clearly discernible in the work of Irwin and Sanders. Each artist radically disrupts existing understandings of painting and its surfaces. Schizoanalysis is sensitive to this disruption, helping to clarify the function of each artist's work. Each of the paintings discussed ought to be understood as events, inasmuch as each work involves spatial, temporal and affective encounters. This chapter has attempted to describe how an encounter with the event of painting is structured, and simultaneously how painting constitutes art as an event. A painting is an event felt as a difference in intensity. Its functioning is affective. Affect arises as sensation and moves from extensive space to the intensive space of atmosphere in painting. Affect resides, inhabits, dwells and resonates in encounters in the event of painting.

Note

1   For more discussion on the dissolving categories of art see: Rosalind Krauss 's 'Sculpture in the Expanded Field', *October*, Vol. 8. (Spring, 1979), pp. 30–44; Fares Gustavo's 'Painting in the Expanded Field', *Janus Head 7*(2), 477–87 (2004); and Noël Carroll's 'The Specificity of Media in the Arts', *Journal of Aesthetic Education* Vol. 19, No. 4 (Winter, 1985), pp. 5–20.

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In Response to the 'Indiscreet Questioner'

Jac Saorsa

Scientist: 'How good is your chemistry?'
Researcher: 'I'm an artist!'

This essay constitutes a self-reflective exploration of my practice as a visual artist, using schizoanalysis as the primary conceptual framework. It is an attempt to examine my creative response to another's suffering. Although the inevitably humanistic quality of my approach is not strictly consistent with Deleuze and Guattari, I nevertheless claim some justification in its being underwritten by their assertion that schizoanalysis, as the analysis of desire, is 'like the art of the new' such that 'there is no problem of application: the lines it brings out could equally be the lines of a life, a work of literature or art, or a society, depending on which system of co-ordinates is chosen' (Deleuze and Guattari 1999: 204). My co-ordinates, those that provide the parameters and the focus of this essay, are measured by the idea that 'Philosophy, science, and art want us to tear open the firmament and plunge into chaos' (Deleuze and Guattari 2003: 202) and manifest in drawings that I have been developing as part of *Drawing Women's Cancer* (drawingcancer.wordpress.com), an interdisciplinary art–science project that derives from a collaboration with Cardiff and Vale University Health Board.

In the process of their making, the drawings respond to the dual but related concepts of body and 'being' as they are simultaneous with the concepts of disease and illness. Moreover, as both the concepts and the drawings themselves are produced within a socially constructed capitalist reality where all production, according to the schizoanalytic view, is at once both social production, and 'desiring-production', *Drawing Women's Cancer* provides a basis for discussion of how schizoanalysis might be applied to the relation between these two generative processes in terms of sickness and health. Furthermore, and in terms of potential public impact, drawings produced throughout the project become

Figure 10.1 *The Diagnosis*, oil and chalk pastel on canvas, 140 × 100 cm.

agents, or Deleuzean 'Bodies Without Organs', between the objective, scientific concept of disease, and the more subjective experience of illness.

   My involvement as an artist, and more fundamentally as a human being, with the 'other's' experience of cancer and the suffering it causes, takes me to a particular part of our world that Sontag describes as the 'kingdom of the sick' (2002: 3). Women with gynaecological cancer, citizens of this kingdom, welcome me as a kindred soul, even though they know I live, without pain, in the 'kingdom of the well'. These women understand that actually we all hold 'dual citizenship', and through listening to and immersing myself in their stories I share their certain, yet often unacknowledged sense that divisibility between

objectivity and subjectivity, and between man and nature, is impossible in terms of experience. Thus, while we all have a stake in both the kingdoms of the sick and of the well, and where it may seem that only time, fortune and biomedical intervention allows us to mediate between the one and the other, the aim of *Drawing Women's Cancer* is to elicit a deeper general understanding of individual subjectivity as it is experienced in the former, and within societal norms and expectations. As much therefore as I owe to seminal writings that reflect on human suffering in terms of illness in general, I also refer here to 'personal narratives' shared with me by women who have been so generous with their time and their trust, and to whom I owe a sincere debt of gratitude.

The following quote by Bruner serves here as an evocative introduction to the rest of the essay.

> A life experienced consists of the images, feelings, sentiments, desires, thoughts and meanings known to the person whose life it is … A life as told, a life history, is a narrative, influenced by the cultural conventions of telling, by the audience and by the social context (Bruner 1984: 54).

The project

'And you always think "It will never happen to me."' Cancer patient

Drawing Women's Cancer develops an interdisciplinary strategy where the theoretical and methodological premises of narrative medicine are extended through visual art practice in order to engender a deeper consciousness of the existential 'lived' experience of women's cancer as it relates to physiological and emotional health. Following Lewis's assertion that 'narrative deals with experience not with propositions' (Charon 2006: 9), and based on Bruner's concept of narrative facilitating shared knowledge and understanding (Bruner 1986), women patients' personal narratives generated through our 'encounters' in conversation provide me with the reference material from which I create large-scale explorative drawings.

Although I am a trained therapist, the purpose of the project is not to provide formal counselling, but rather to develop the trust and empathy that allows me to engage sensitively with a woman's lived experience as she narrates it. There is no prescribed set of questions, indiscreet or otherwise; the objective is to elicit the individual's unique understanding of her illness experience through allowing her time and space to tell her story in her own way. Recognition here is of no

use. I cannot presume to recognize the patient's actual pain; I can only share in it by being with her, by listening. I respond to her individual suffering not by attempting to identify with her – this would be pointless – but by involving myself in her experience through the construction of my own understanding of what she is going through based on my own experience of listening to what she is saying. I record the conversations and later transcribe them verbatim and/or use them as a basis for my own narratives about engaging with the experience of the 'other'. This documentation serves in turn as the basis for the drawing process.

The facility of narrative to interrelate verbal communication and the act of drawing, where conventional language is translated through my creative response into visual language, defines its fundamental importance in the project as a whole. This becomes clear in the analogous relations between 'data' and process, and the two primary narrative forms. Linear narrative, fundamentally sequential and premised on logic with a beginning, middle and end, is the form in which subjects 'tell their stories'. Conversely, non-linear narrative eschews logic and includes contradictory elements such as interruption, circular and/ or unfinished references and 'chronological anarchy', all of which are evidenced in the creative process wherein drawings often 'become' in their own right far more than I ever expected as I try to capture the nuances of narrative in and in-between lines, tones, and layers of colour. The drawings are more explorative than interpretive because where Deleuze asserts that people are made up of varied lines – indeed there is a whole 'geography' in people – I seek to explore new landscapes and chase new horizons. Most importantly, the interrelation between lineal and non-lineal narrative gives rise to a third language, neither fully verbal nor visual, which is itself generated in a complex and creative continuum between objective and subjective understandings of the experience of illness. This 'interlanguage', derived from a multifaceted dialogical process that relates verbal to visual, yet remains independent of either, is manifest in the completed drawings.

A language needs speakers, and spoken stories are indeed the driving force of *Drawing Women's Cancer*, but a language also needs listeners. I am a listener, engaging with the experience of the patient speaker, but the true 'listener' is the viewer of the completed drawings. It is through the viewer's individual and subjective experience of the works that the interlanguage comes alive and provides a catalyst for meaningful engagement with the overall impact of cancer on women's lives. Through looking, the viewer comes to appreciate, understand and thus participate in a profoundly empathic way, in the experiences the drawings communicate.

The artist

With an academic background in philosophy, my passion and my guide throughout life has been a relentless curiosity about the way that we, as human beings, engage and/or disengage with our world and others in it. As such, my creative process is fundamentally interdisciplinary and includes both visual practice and the written word. I embrace a creative multilingualism, the interpenetrative relation between visual and conventional language that simultaneously derives from and creates the underlying narrative, the subtext by which we exist both as individuals and in relation to the 'other', and I work with the body as form and with the psyche as content. My process in general is profoundly influenced by a continuing engagement with Deleuzian philosophy and I aim not to simply interpret theory, but to 'practise' it.

Creativity is such a profound part of my being that I understand 'being' itself as a creative process and I construct 'assemblages' of theory and practice in a way that I hope Deleuze himself would have appreciated. Ideas, solutions, even dreams are derived from these assemblages and they provide me with what I perceive as a radical freedom of expression; but they are sometimes, perhaps inevitably, problematic. Creative assemblages rarely tolerate tangible or yet intangible distinction between subject and object, and indeed by their very nature they necessarily manifest at least some form of interrelation between the two. The organization of acts and ideas competes simultaneously with disorganization in assemblages and even as I may recognize myself in Lacan's mirror, a 'permanent structure of my subjectivity', just as Deleuze and Guattari's *Anti-Oedipus* 'takes psychosis […] as its point of departure and constructs a model of the psyche based on psychotic […] dynamics' (Holland 1999: 2), I continue to construct, deconstruct and reconstruct my artist 'self' through a perpetual process of de- and re-territorialization. My being as a whole, inseparable from the creative process that in itself is at the core of a precarious sense of myself in the world, thereby assumes the inverse character of Butler's *Erewhon* in order that I might perceive and 'achieve' myself and my creative aspiration. Lacan's mirror is intact, but I see my own reflection as through a mirror shattered.

The subjective and the objective

As an artist I seek the unconventional, the anomaly, the marginalized, the disassociated and the disregarded, but I have travelled a long road; it was not always the case. For my formative Fine Art training I purposefully chose to master the figure through a classical approach to anatomical drawing, and in the fifth floor ateliers of the New York Academy we rendered the skeleton and musculature of the objectified human form to perfection. We defined the look in the eye, the 'humanity' of the living, breathing model in almost as cold and detached a manner as we drew from the plaster casts that stared, unblinking from perfectly carved corneas; and I set aside sentiment in the belief that in order to render true subjectivity, the true 'content' of a subject with all its imperfections and uncertainties, it would help to understand the object, the 'form', in its perfect state. Only in this way could I develop the integrity that underlies a true relation between objectivity and subjectivity. Only in this way could I manipulate form in order to create 'true' distortions, to embrace content and seek the essence of human subjectivity in terms of its discontent – suffering in all its paradigms.

In the atelier, I used recognition as a means, not to an end but to a beginning. I reduced the artist's gaze to a fundamental analytic scrutiny, a distillation of visual perception, rigorously objective and as unforgivably reflective as a mirror. However, in the encounter with the intact reflection, and given the debt it owes to objectivity, recognition, even as it presupposes clarity and rationality, must become itself an irrational phenomenon in terms of its capacity to marginalize subjective experience. Lacan's original notion of the 'mirror stage' highlights the dysfunctional relation between objectivity and subjectivity, perception and experience, and is based on his assumption that the point at which infants become fascinated by their own reflection in a mirror is the point at which they begin to build their self-image, through recognition. He notes that although the mirror image may seem 'real', in prioritizing objectivity over subjectivity recognition actually becomes 'false' – *méconnaissance* – and serves only to marginalize the individual's subjective experience of self by subjugating it to the perceived visual experience. Objectivity therefore perpetuates the 'field of images' that dictates the 'imaginary order' inherent in reflection and, far from inculcating profound knowledge and engagement with self, it actually facilitates a deception based on a dangerous and very powerful superficiality. Lacan's infant becomes increasingly deceived as he or she builds up a permanent relationship with his or her own body image, while at the same time engaging less and less with individual subjective experience. In schizoanalytic terms, this disassociation

between the objectified and subjective self is not only perpetuated in society, but is in fact an individual manifestation of a more general schizophrenic tendency that is embedded in the capitalist model.

Although the precise age at which this particular formation of the 'ego' is understood to occur has been widely disputed since Lacan first postulated his theory, these contentions are largely immaterial here since it is the disassociation caused by a conflict between our visual and emotional experiences of self that is of primary interest. As an artist, I want to ague that a dysfunctional relation between objectivity and subjectivity on an individual level can refer, in turn, to that between body and psyche, form and content in general. I work with dysfunction in a positive sense, as it is inherent in the creative process that defines *Drawing Women's Cancer*, and where dysfunction is derived from my encounters with cancer patients, it owes nothing to recognition. Indeed for Deleuze, recognition itself is actually the antithesis of encounter as it brings only a false sense of security in a search that must be constantly open-ended if it is to even approach true understanding. This suggests that my own false sense of security was manifest in my early career in my adherence to the 'rules' of classical objectivity. It was essential, yet short lived; I am now very consciously and irretrievably immersed in the insecure nature of creative, ongoing process.

Schizophrenia and the artist

Even if we set Deleuzian antipathy towards recognition and Lacanian *méconnaissance* aside, body and psyche remain as difficult to reconcile, as they are to separate. Where body is form and psyche is content, and equally where disease is fact and illness is experience, the context in which all meet is the existential, 'lived' experience. Yet, experience is not necessarily 'authentic' and without influence as far as it is, according to schizoanalysis, sustained and maintained within a politically and socially constructed society infused with capitalist ambition. The 'truth' or true reality that Deleuze and Guattari allude to in their schizoanalytic approach is therefore found not through experience within society but outside of it. It is perhaps pertinent here that artists have lived 'outside society' ever since Plato, who conceived of visual art as appealing only to the emotions rather than to sacrosanct reason and rationality, bade them languish outside the gates of the Polis.

Where the schizophrenic according to Deleuze and Guattari is a 'universal producer', and moreover, where there is 'no need to distinguish between

producing and its product' (2008: 7), as the creator of art works, my own body and being becomes itself a producer – a conduit through which the exploration that defines *Drawing Women's Cancer* itself is both produced and recorded. As an artist, then, my process is one that conflates production recording and consumption (as the completed drawings are viewed and experienced and 'consumed' for themselves) and the drawings I make, generated through the process of layering narrative language to create a visual multiplicity of experience, therefore respond to the flows of process where process is paramount, and where desire, free from repression, becomes itself in a conflagration of elements and forces. And in Deleuzian terms, my artist being as a whole, reflected in disorganized form in a broken surface, becomes nevertheless more 'real' and integral to my own process at the same time as I become myself 'schizophrenic', viscerally responsive, 'overly connected', and overtly subjective in a capitalist society. Deleuze's description of the schizophrenic as one who passes from one code to the other … never giving the same explanation from one day to the next … never recording the same event in the same way' (2008: 16) resonates as I work nevertheless within a capitalist society where everything is production, where everything is reflected as intact and coherent, and where the objective concept of an organized and universally produced 'picture of health' must define both physical and mental well-being.

Society's notion of a schizophrenic is of one whose mental well-being is in question, but in schizoanalytic terms, it is in fact not the 'sane' citizen but rather the schizophrenic who actually comes closest to 'true reality' as his or her experience, 'both as an individual and as a member of the human species, is not at all any one aspect of nature, but nature as a process of production' (Deleuze and Guattari 2008: 3). This confirms the idea that man and nature cannot be divided and that there are only ever 'processes of production' that produce one within the other, and, for me, this makes a 'visceral' form of sense. In fact it resonates so strongly that if I substitute 'artist' for 'schizophrenic' in terms of Deleuze's conceptual framework, I understand myself as fulfilling the Deleuzean conception of 'possessor of meagre capital' in a capitalist society. I do indeed feel that in my practice I create for myself, beyond the image, a world that Deleuze describes so eloquently, a 'world of parries where the most minute of permutations is supposed to be a response to a new situation or a reply to the indiscreet questioner' (2008: 14).

Schizoanalysis

As a research methodology, schizoanalysis is 'lived'. It is immersive and fundamentally intuitive. Concerned with both subject and subjectivity, schizoanalysis applies itself not only to the subtle nuances of self-reflection, but also to the experiential organization of social models. Its own model of the individual psyche as a 'machine', or rather a collection of connected 'desiring-machines' (Holland 1999: 25) that create organisms and operate through three specific syntheses in the process of desiring-production, is, in the case of *Drawing Women's Cancer,* related simultaneously to the concept of art process and production, and to the concept of the production of 'self' from both an auto-ethnographic and a social anthropological perspective.

The concept of the machine was never intended as a metaphorical one (Deleuze and Guattari 2008: 45). For Deleuze, who always denies the metaphor, the machines are very 'real' where desire is the primary generative force behind the schizophrenic tendency that is embedded in society, and where the man–nature dichotomy becomes an internalized part of the process of production. The first of the three syntheses relating to the machines' modi operandi refers to the connections that desire necessarily precipitates and is characterized in the inherent connectivity that resides in the very nature of Deleuze and Guattari's 'and … and … and'. Connectivity therefore provides the 'vital energies' that allow us to 'stammer' in the way that defines our own identity, and this, on a personal level, relates very much to my own creative process wherein, as an artist, I understand my creativity as driven by such energies. My own 'stammer' is uttered in the 'vital' sense of creating, through multiple layerings of verbal and visual dialogue, a language that is richer than either. It is a language beyond conventional and as such I make myself an outsider in society; yet, in schizo-analytic terms I am still caught up in the process of desiring production.

On reflection, I may insist that the creative process rather than the product is, for me, the nexus that bonds my self to my being, and that this process is characterized by the connective drives and instincts that are involved in the creative act; but, just as self-recognition in the intact mirror serves only to perpetuate the illusion of the autonomous subject, the reflection that generates the illusion actually reverses the relation between process and product such that the subject itself becomes the product. Therefore, as the creator of the drawings for *Drawing Women's Cancer*, I am myself as much subject to, and a product of, the creative process as a whole as are the women who so generously share their experiences with me. Furthermore, these women are also subject to and products of a

much more violent process as they experience the development of cancer as an 'invasive force' (Sontag 2002: 65) within the body.

In actively replacing healthy 'mortal' cells in the body with carcinogenic 'immortal' cells, cancer becomes a repressor of vital energies in the individual in a manner analogous to that in which Deleuze and Guattari suggest the capitalist model of society represses the spirit. Furthermore, where the 'order of process' is intimately and inescapably related to the 'order of production', like metastasizing cancer cells everything is therefore production and 'production of productions' (Deleuze and Guattari 2008: 4). In this scenario, any level of self-autonomy achieved through recognition, however fragile, is threatened by the overall process of a disease/society that produces what can be understood as a 'non-self' within the self (Sontag 2002), and in the case of the cancer patient, the potential loss of autonomy is even further implicated in the compliance demanded of her by medical intervention. In the extreme case, the patient self literally becomes the 'other' – an unrecognizable stranger struggling to survive in a society from which she feels increasingly isolated.

Imagery, the imaginary, the body-self

As an artist I work with images, and in terms of imagery we might note Frank's assertion that Lacan's concept of the 'imaginary order' suggests that what we call the self is always a 'sedimentation of images from elsewhere', and moreover that 'these images are worn like armour' (Frank 1997: 46). The body is protected then by a metaphoric metal carapace so that the body image, as objectified and understood through recognition, can dominate the overall concept of body-self and remain fundamentally unaffected and unchanged by subjective 'lived' experience.

Frank goes on to argue, however, that our individual understanding of body-self depends on more than recognition and our own sense of 'embodiment' is indebted to three distinct levels of control: body-relatedness, 'other'-relatedness, and communication. These are related in turn to four distinct body-selves: the disciplined, the dominant, the mirroring and the communicative. All of these 'body-selves' overlap in the individual to some extent but each is fundamentally monadic or dyadic in terms of the relationship with the 'other', and the monadic self, recalling Lacan, is epitomized in the mirroring body. In maintaining an exclusively outward emphasis but nevertheless understanding itself as essentially separate and alone, the mirroring body evidences

in its need for isolation the schizophrenic disassociation that Deleuze asserts is generated as almost a by-product within society at large. As an instrument of consumption, and evidencing Deleuze and Guattari's third operative synthesis – that of consumption and consummation – the mirroring body is defined in acts of using and 'using up', simultaneously desiring and generative of desire, but non-communicative. Fearing contingency, the possibility of the unknown, the mirroring body obsessively seeks predictability and acts alone in a judgemental society where it is protected, even from itself, through recognition and desire.

Being monadic, the mirroring body has no need to communicate but merely reflects the other's image. It creates itself at the same time as it is being created by society, in and through reflection, and is therefore subject to objectification and categorization within society. Illness damages the 'field of images' through which the mirroring body recognizes and protects itself, but this 'assault' only drives the desire to 'get better', to re-create the healthy image, and the sick body-self thus becomes the paradigm of the 'model patient' in clinical terms, compliant and desiring to be brought back to health. The desiring production process is always towards becoming 'the picture of health', the acceptable face of society. My focus in *Drawing Women's Cancer* is on reintroducing the subjectivity that the mirroring body rejects. In this way, the drawings themselves, through the process of production, become themselves 'fields of images', but they challenge rather than maintain society's objectivity that is inherent in the narrow perception of illness as purely a disease to be treated. The drawings refer not to the recognizable and socially acceptable 'picture of health', but to the existential suffering that is the foundation of the 'picture of illness'. They prioritize subjectivity over objectivity and internalize the undeniable relation between man and nature.

While the mirroring body is self-limiting by a lack of communication, it nevertheless remains an inevitable facet of who most of us are, certainly when considered in terms of the relation between sickness and health and within a treatment regime. Conversely, at the opposite extreme of the line of reasoning that links all of Frank's body types, the dyadic or 'communicative' body-self is also a necessary aspect of our being, one that not only understands the 'other' as one outside of itself, but also acknowledges that the 'other' experiences, and is experienced, as part of lived reality. In terms of suffering, where the monadic body disassociates itself from nature and succumbs to clinical objectivity when sick, the dyadic body understands that such disassociation cannot be equated with the subjectivity of experience. The dyadic body accepts the inevitable and undeniable relation with the 'other', and with nature itself, and in sickness the

dyadic body-self therefore becomes a fully paid-up member of what Schwietzer calls 'the brotherhood of those who bear the mark of pain' (quoted in Frank 1997: 35).

The simultaneous difference and correspondence between monadic and dyadic bodies ably demonstrates the necessity for often-conflicting levels of social communication if society itself is to survive, even when, in schizoanalytic terms, this survival demands that it is self-generating of its own levels of disassociation and disengagement. Frank's point that 'bodies are more than mere corporeality' is significant here as he acknowledges that

> A body's place on the continuum of control depends not on the physiological possibility of predictability or contingency but also on how the person chooses to interpret his physiology … As body-selves, people interpret their bodies and make choices: the person can either seek perfected levels of predictability, at whatever cost, or accept varying degrees of contingency. Most people do both … (Frank 1997: 32)

Society's capitalist ambition, in schizoanalytic terms, makes it perhaps too easy to see the idiosyncratic 'schizo' as a solitary being suffering in her delusional state, and the theoretical basis of *Anti-Oedipus* demonstrates how this should not necessarily be the case when subject and society are understood from a materialistic and experiential analytic standpoint as it is conceived by Deleuze and Guattari, and was actually carried out in practice, on his own terms, by 'radical psychiatrist' R. D. Laing. Laing trained in psychoanalysis but later rejected the 'medical model' of mental illness, arguing very powerfully that 'there is no such condition as "schizophrenia", but the label is a social fact, and the social fact a political event' (Laing 1967: 121). Similarly, in *Anti-Oedipus,* Deleuze and Guattari confront psychoanalytic and political analyses on their essential reductionism and dependence on totality and unity.

Schizoanalysis simultaneously exposes and opposes the powers that Deleuze and Guattari argue exist only to control the manner in which the subject relates to and engages with society and family. Moreover, they argue that through such control these powers serve to construct and manipulate the subjectivity, and the 'ego', in a way that constantly affirms the tangible zone of separation between man and nature wherein territories become defined and demarcated. Oedipus here becomes a fundamental part of the formation of the 'ego' through agencies of the State and the family, and this repression and domination of the spirit itself creates and perpetuates the internal suffering and neurosis that generates the schizophrenic tendency, which, when overtly manifest in the individual,

is considered by society as a mental illness. As a psychoanalytic construct, Oedipus thus becomes more than its maker in a society where neurosis is cultivated and assured through political and analytic dominance; and the individual schizophrenic, disassociated from and marginalized by the same society, is laid out on the analyst's couch in order to be 'cured' through psychoanalysis. But, according to the schizoanalytic view, were this hapless individual given the chance to breathe fresh air she might be less amenable to psychoanalytic interpretation and Freud might not therefore be able to walk into her 'dreams' so easily. 'A schizophrenic out for a walk is a better model than a neurotic lying on the analyst's couch' (Deleuze and Guattari 2008: 2) because through leaving the security of the analyst's office where she is forced to confront her so-called neuroses, and by simply and unselfconsciously 'communing' with her surroundings in a walk in the street, the schizophrenic can take herself 'back to a time before the man–nature dichotomy, before all the co-ordinates based on this fundamental dichotomy have been laid down' (2008: 2). Thus, it is with a breath of fresh air that we might seek to free the 'multiplicity of desire', even if at the expense of the revered 'ego', and in this way the hegemony of the monadic body is shattered with its own reflection as the dyadic body fulfils its own communicative role.

Schizophrenia, health and society

Sontag's concept of our 'dual citizenship' is a sobering one, but in terms of schizoanalysis both the kingdoms of the well and the sick are nevertheless immersed in the overall 'reality' of the capitalist society, which is itself merely a construct steeped in irony, yet necessary to maintain capitalist ambition. In the 'kingdom of the well', the healthy body is experienced as positive and engaged, something to be maintained and perpetuated, but with the assurance that should things go wrong, clinical intervention is available. The 'medical model' is therefore constructed on a necessarily objective understanding of physical health, which is exhibited and documented in illustrious texts from Vesalius's *De humani corporis fabrica* to *Grey's Anatomy*. Psychological health meanwhile, at least in occidental capitalist society, has been fundamentally indebted to and interpreted from the broad confines of psychoanalytic theory and its offshoots. In the kingdom of the sick, however, the relation between objectivity and subjectivity becomes less definable than it ever seems to be in the kingdom of the well, and the 'lived experience' of the subject is often confused and full of uncertainty.

Clinical intervention, obliged to operate on the level of the medical model, focuses primarily on the disease or neurosis in isolation rather than on its overall impact on the 'person behind the diagnosis', and in these circumstances individual sufferers of either physical or psychological problems, or both, may feel themselves marginalized from general 'healthy' society. This is especially the case when, as in gynaecological cancer, there are deep-seated social 'taboos' around the condition which impact on the ability to even talk about it freely and without 'shame'. The subjective experience of disease therefore, where disease itself is considered in terms of the overall experience of illness, becomes a precipitating factor in the disengagement and alienation of the sick subject from a society that on the surface of things seems sympathetic and supportive, but at the same time needs to maintain its objectivity in order to self-perpetuate.

For Deleuze and Guattari, schizophrenia is simply the individual manifestation of a deep-seated schizophrenic tendency that is generated by the capitalist model and reason must therefore be always a 'region cut out of the irrational – not sheltered from the irrational at all, but a region traversed by the irrational and defined only by a certain type of relation between irrational factors' (Guattari et al. 2008: 35). However, they go on to maintain that underneath all reason lies delirium, 'drift', an inherent potentiality residing in a society wherein everything is rational in capitalism, except capital or capitalism itself. The individual schizophrenic here becomes a 'motif' for a general malaise of society at large, and their definition of schizoanalysis in *Anti-Oedipus* incorporates both a diagnostic purpose as well as a healing one. In their concern with society and its subjects, Deleuze and Guattari vehemently oppose the predominance of Freudian psychoanalysis, arguing against the basic premise wherein everything is measured against neurosis, and their own alternative form of 'deterritorialized' schizoanalysis is an attempt therefore to cure the 'cure' itself. As Holland notes, 'the primary aim of schizoanalysis is … schizophrenia as revolutionary breakthrough rather than psychological breakdown (Holland 1999: 3).

Schizophrenia and the cancer sufferer

Schizophrenia then, according to the schizoanalytic conception, is the disassociation and disengagement from perceived reality. Constructed as a mental 'disease' it is generated by capitalist society itself, even at the same time as the same society refuses to tolerate its manifestation and seeks to marginalize the delusional 'madman'. Within this framework the act of substitution of artist for

schizophrenic is more than mere contrivance. Indeed, many artists throughout history have been considered 'mad' in some paradigm of the condition; but moreover, in a similar fashion and intention we might also substitute 'cancer sufferer' for schizophrenic, since for many citizens of the kingdom of the sick, healthy society's seemingly harmonious mantra of 'desiring-production' is made raucous by the disjuncture brought about by a 'litany of disjunctions' evident and inevitable in the existential experience of physical illness.

Such disjunctions generate and are generated in turn by a 'schizophrenic' experience wherein the reality of sickness infects and contaminates general reality, which, as a consequence, begins to take on unique nuances that give rise to further implications and complications, including the complete upheaval of normal day-to-day life. In this case, however, the 'schizophrenic' is not necessarily delusional, not 'mad' as one might appreciate that Camile Claudel, Van Gogh, Ezra Pound, Artaud and many others were considered so. Moreover, for Deleuze and Guattari, 'real' delusion resides not in the schizophrenic experience itself but rather in society's perception of the man–nature relationship as dictating and confirming a distinction between production, distribution and consumption. The 'reality' in schizoanalytic terms is that there is no such relative independence, only the process of production, which voraciously envelops all, and itself consumes all. All is in fact production, and production of production, and in a capitalist society where production, as process, 'constitutes a cycle whose relationship to desire is that of an immanent principle' (Deleuze and Guattari 2008: 5), 'desiring-production' is therefore paramount. Further, and very pertinent here, where such production is towards the perpetuation of health and preventing sickness, the 'picture of health' becomes less an idealized image than a prescribed way of being.

With respect to cancer, production and production of production becomes uniquely cellular. Pathologically over-productive, 'immortal' cells in the body provide the objective reality of a disease that clinical intervention, despite significant advances, has as yet failed to control. Of course in many ways clinical process towards treatment and control of disease must necessarily favour objectivity, and the consequent distinguishing of man from nature, in order to be effective in treating disease. But, in doing so it must operate, according to schizoanalytic theory, on a level of a 'false consciousness' that continues to presuppose 'fixed elements' within a bigger, more inclusive process. This process is the process of illness – the lived experience of cancer.

The schizophrenic, the artist and the sufferer of illness all therefore exist outwith the society that gives them birth. All are alienated and condemned

by their own subjectivity in a world where rational becomes irrational, and only in schizophrenic 'reality' becomes rational once again. But the cancer sufferer is sick only in body; she is not the 'outsider' whose mental problems exile her from 'normal' society but rather the unfortunate sufferer of an illness that healthy society, in order to maintain its own sense of detachment from subjective experience, must objectify as disease. Such objectification alienates the sick person because society, through its own nature, must acknowledge the separation between man and nature in general, even in the face of uncontroversial evidence to the contrary, because this is the only way to establish a basis from which to attack or 'wage war' on the forces of nature, the over-production of immortal cells that cause and perpetuate the onslaught of cancer in the body. In such a scenario, subjectivity is always condemned to become a casualty of war, the civilian who gets caught in the crossfire, as society, without recourse to pity, preserves and perpetuates the schizophrenic experience through objectifying suffering and giving primacy to the objective diagnosis itself over the person who is subject to it.

Where the controlling language of warfare is habitually used with respect to cancer this is not by sheer coincidence. Indeed, Sontag highlights how, as a disease that has been politicized and mythologized in society, cancer is steeped in metaphor where this form of reference takes precedence. Historically grounded conventions of treating cancer operate on the principle that cancer 'occupies' the body and can be experienced as a ruthless attack on the organism during which cancerous cells relentlessly reproduce themselves and, in an process that could be described as assimilation, gradually replace the self with the 'nonself' in a 'triumphant mutation' (Sontag 2002: 69). The cancer patient thus begins to lose her identity, her sense of self, under the resolute assault on her bodily systems, which are exacerbated by her physical being becoming itself a part of the alien production process. Her psychological security suffers accordingly, but it is denied refuge in a society where, as Sontag significantly notes, 'a physical illness becomes in a way less real … so far as it can be considered a mental one' (Sontag 1991: 57). Within this construct Sontag defines the dilemma of the cancer sufferer who, already weakened physically by the condition and so deeply immersed in the disjunctive subjective illness experience wherein there can be no recourse to a distinction between the self and body, finds herself unable to reconcile her own reality with that of the needs of the capitalist society that condemns such inability as indicative of a someone who is less than sane. The cancer sufferer thus becomes the innocent victim twice over, not only of her physical disease and the war waged against it by clinical intervention, but also

of the attendant marginalization from a society that creates, at the same time as it condemns, the tendency towards mental anguish that becomes self-defined as the schizophrenic tendency.

The realization that there is no distinction between man and nature, and moreover, the 'acting out' of this realization in society, is, in extremis, deemed as 'madness', and although there is a great difference between what we understand as mental illness and what we know to be a physical disease, the way in which society accounts for both in terms of human suffering is evidenced in the manner in which a very real experience of illness is objectified and 'contained', by clinical necessity, into an exclusive focus on particularity – the diagnosed condition, either physical or mental. As a citizen of the 'kingdom of the sick', the sense of isolation from the 'kingdom of the well' is therefore based on the internalized need to recognize and objectify, and the cancer patient, her 'suffering-self' subsumed in an individually invasive, metastasizing cellular process of production and subservient to the clinical treatment regime, finds herself marginalized in favour of the specific agent of suffering. In the construction and 'interrogation' of the 'patient-self', the mirror is one-way.

The drawing: The body without organs

Conforming to the meaning of the word 'process', recording falls back on production, but the production of recording itself is produced by the production of production. Similarly, recording is followed by consumption but the production of consumption is produced in and through the production of recording. This is because something on the order of a subject can be discerned on the recording surface (Deleuze and Guattari 2008: 17).

To return now to the *Drawing Women's Cancer* project and the nature of the drawings that result from the creative process, as much as connectivity is embedded in their production, it should be noted that connectivity itself is only the first of the three 'syntheses' that Deleuze and Guattari's define as fundamental to a schizoanalytic approach. The second, the 'disjunctive synthesis', involves the 'recording' functions of the psyche: the memory and the mental images that the connective, creative instinct, in creating organisms and linking form to content, must refer to and draw upon. We have seen that disjuncture occurs as in the reflection in a shattered mirror and in doing so it confronts the autonomy of the intact subject and replaces the universal 'and … and … and …' with the selective 'or … or … or', but most importantly here, where

connectivity 'organ-izes' organs, disjuncture creates 'dis-organ-ization', and the body becomes as much 'anti-production' as production. The schizoanalytic body thus becomes the body without organs, constituting not a productive collection of organ machines but rather a 'recording surface', a slippery and fluid exterior upon which connections are 'inscribed'. Here the restrictions and the repressions of objectivity are stripped away and subjectivity in all its nuances prevails. The visual is primary, and free-association and multiplicity preside over rationality. The drawings I make, being 'in-between' the subjective and the objective, are by their physical nature themselves inscribed surfaces. Moreover, where they facilitate communication in a visual language that is unrestricted by logic or any defined, ordered organization in terms of its being understood by the viewer who engages with them in an individual and subjective way, they become, in themselves, bodies without organs.

In the treatment of cancer, clinical intervention in the form of the surgical removal or mutilation of internal organs and/or the assault on the body through chemotherapy and radiotherapy precipitates a reorganization in physical terms, but where 'body' is conceived rather as a surface, the drawings also 'embody' reorganization in an attempt to engender and communicate the existential experience of illness in a synthesis of objectivity and subjectivity. As noted earlier, *Drawing Women's Cancer* is not about producing pictures of health but is rather about creating and/or 'recording' subjectivity, and indeed the subject, in 'pictures of illness'; but the subject, following Deleuze and Guattari, 'is a strange subject however, with no fixed identity, wandering about over the body without organs …' (Deleuze and Guattari 2008: 17).

Conclusion

In schizoanalytic terms the *Drawing Women's Cancer* project acknowledges the relationship between the monadic and the dyadic by challenging the desiring production process that leads to the necessity to generate the 'picture of health'. In an approach that owes much to the field of medical humanities, the project is premised on an acknowledgement of the interrelation between subjectivity, in terms of patients 'lived experience' of disease and treatment, and object-ivity, in terms of the medical intervention. It focuses therefore on creating a literal 'picture of illness', itself generated through my own creative response to and understanding of the existential and collective experience of cancer, as is evidenced through a synthesis of personal narratives generously given by

individual sufferers. In the context of this essay, as valuable as individual under-standings are in themselves, even more valuable is the acknowledgement that the freedom to seek this level of subjective truth must, in capitalist society, come at a cost, because in order to function in the capitalist model society cannot afford to dwell too long in the subjective underworld; it needs recognition and the attendant objectivity to prevail. According to schizoanalysis, our subjective sense of ourselves is repressed by society in order for society itself to survive and this creates the 'schism', the schizophrenic tendency in us all that makes the sense of disassociation and disengagement a fundamental, if shamefully hidden, part of our general experience. As an artist already perceiving myself through a mirror shattered and therefore acknowledging the disassociation, I am attempting to shatter also all the mirrors around me in order to get closer to the 'truth', or the 'true reality'.

In working with the experience of illness within in the theatre of disease intervention, schizoanalysis has provided me with a particularly appropriate approach to an exploration of my own creative process in its assertion that is at the very heart of production that the organized body suffers from its own being, from the lack of 'other forms' of organization. Unlike disease, these other forms are not 'cancerous', not detrimental to subjectivity, but just the opposite and schizoanalysis applies itself to seeking them out. The drawings for *Drawing Women's Cancer* embody in themselves a diversity of organizational form in the process of their making, and they evidence Deleuze and Guattari's three 'meanings' of process as set out in *Anti-Oedipus* and paraphrased in the following:

1. process incorporates recording and consumption making production self-generative
2. there is no distinction between man and nature where both are perpetually bound together in the producer–product relation
3. process is neither a goal nor an end in itself but nor can it be infinitely self-perpetuating as it must work towards at least some kind of completion.

Although I do, as an artist, have some quibble with Deleuze over his third meaning of process, this argument was fully developed in a previous book, *Narrating the Catastrophe: An Artist's Dialogue with Deleuze and Ricoeur,* and space prohibits an extensive explanation here. Most important in the present case is the idea that where schizoanalysis goes beyond the radical psychiatry of R. D. Laing, even beyond the inchoate voices of the sick and the dying, towards the 'inhuman in man', that which itself is beyond the mere mortality that death

brings to an end, the drawings for *Drawing Women's Cancer* manifest the schizoanalytic paradigm. It is the creative process itself, of which the drawings are a product, that moves towards the inarticulable gasps and cries that emanate from the radical conflict between Deleuze and Guattari's desiring-machines that produce organisms, and the anti-productive capacity of the body without organs. Metastasizing cancer cells override mechanisms that restrain growth and create of the self a 'nonself', but this is not the same unregulated, abnormal and incoherent growth that sloughs off the restrictive skin of capitalism's repression and allows the schizophrenic and capitalism itself to emerge. In *Erewhon*, the artist, myself, may well be flayed and vulnerable, but in producing the drawings I am truly immersed in the flow of creative process and I must encounter and negotiate the slippery surface of the body without organs, which

Figure 10.2 *The Cut*, chalk pastel on paper, 60 × 60 cm.

itself rebels against repression of all kinds and sets up 'counterflows' of pure vital energy, attracting and recording the processes of desiring-production and social production and appropriating them for its own. Artistic appropriation is therefore radical appropriation and the artistic attitude is the ungendered, 'non-productive' attitude that is the spirit of the body without organs and provides for the essential nature, the essential freedom, of the truly creative act.

Schizoanalysis, as the politically biased analysis of desiring-production, pushes schizophrenia to the limits that are imposed by the paranoia that is itself the product, or rather 'by-product' of capitalist society. Here politics precedes being, in the same way that the concept of disease and how to treat it precedes that of illness, and the existential experience of illness in society becomes secondary to biomedical intervention even as the third operative synthesis of desiring-machines, the conjunction of consumption – consummation, intervenes and orchestrates the interaction between the extremes of connective instinct and the complete catatonia that characterizes the totally anti-productive, or 'full', body without organs. The third synthesis precipitates the formation of all forms of subjectivity, and, as Holland notes in his reading of *Anti-Oedipus*, 'the subject emerges only as an after effect of the selections made by desire among various disjunctive and connective syntheses'. My argument therefore is that it is not the subject, but rather the body without organs that is the 'agent of selection', the agent between existential experience of illness and objective disease, and the body without organs, in the case of *Drawing Women's Cancer*, is manifest in the work of art. Illness, like the schizophrenic, like the artist, like the shattered mirror, 'never records the same event in the same way'. This is the true being, the true delirium, of the creative process.

Figure 10.3a *The vulva before surgery*, charcoal and chalk pastel, 20 × 29 cm.

Figure 10.3b *The vulva directly after surgery*, charcoal and chalk pastel, 20 × 29 cm.

Figure 10.3c *The vulva some weeks after surgery*, charcoal and chalk pastel, 20 × 29 cm.

Figure 10.4 *Transience (detail)*, chalk pastel on oil ground.

Figure 10.5 *Transience*, chalk pastel on oil ground, 320 × 120 cm.

Figure 10.6 *Acceptance*, chalk pastel, 60 × 50 cm.

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The Sinthome/Z-Point Relation or Art as Non-Schizoanalysis

David Burrows and Simon O'Sullivan (*Plastique Fantastique*)

Prologue: Air Time

Vito Acconci looks at his image in a mirror. He addresses the reflection and speaks about a relationship that has gone wrong: 'I'm talking to you so that I can see myself the way you see me … I'm acting something out for them'. His words become cruel. He says 'I' but also 'you' and 'them'. As Rosalind Krauss observes, Acconci utters pronouns that Roman Jakobson terms shifters, for the meaning or content of these pronouns is contingent, depending on who says 'I' and what or who is being referred to as 'you' or 'them' (1997: 196–8). Acconci's words and their attendant referents slip and fail to knot: 'I' and 'you' and 'them' are all at sea … they drift every which way. We know of Acconci's confessional discussion with his mirror-image through the documentation of the 1973 performance Recording Studio From Air Time, *acted out in isolation at Sonnabend Gallery. The artist's performance is re-presented as an audio-video work: Acconci's image is seen on a monitor, his voice is heard through speakers. The performance and recording might be thought of as some kind of strange therapy – for Acconci, but also for us – but it isn't, or it's somehow more than that.* Recording Studio From Air Time *is precisely a* presentation *in which 'I' and 'you' and 'them' collapse.*

Introduction: 1 + 1 = 3 (or 4, 5, 6 … n)

Our contribution to this volume on *Schizoanalysis and the Visual Arts* follows directly from our collaborative art practice, the performative fiction *Plastique Fantastique,* and might be understood as a meta-reflection on – or metamodelling

of – some of the experiments and gambits of the latter. In general, with this essay we aim to contribute to a thinking of art practice as itself a form of schizo-analysis or, as we hope to make clear in what follows, a *non*-schizoanalysis. In proposing the latter we follow François Laruelle, who attaches the prefix 'non' to philosophy to designate forms of thinking that use the 'tools' and concepts of philosophy for non-philosophical ends. Similarly, our proposal for art as non-schizoanalysis signals our reservations in positioning art as a therapeutics and thus also our reluctance to transfer Félix Guattari's analytic framework (our essay, in the main, concerns itself with Guattari's solo writings) directly to contemporary art practice. In the first instance, art practice as non-schizoanalysis recognizes that Guattari's schizoanalysis is concerned with certain clinical and ecological issues and problems demanded by the therapeutic and socio-political contexts Guattari worked within, whereas the experiments of contemporary art practice do not necessarily involve such responsibilities. For art practice, as we understand it, rarely has therapeutic designs and intentions *per se*. Secondly, a non-schizoanalysis would experiment with the insights and approaches of schizoanalysis without fully signing up to the ethico-aesthetic paradigm or orientation espoused by Guattari (and to a lesser extent by Guattari and Gilles Deleuze in their collaborations).

In fact, following this particular attitude to the conjunction schizoanalysis *and* art, we are proposing that many art practices (from the inception of the avant-garde onwards) do not produce new subjectivities as such, but rather operate as the presentation of a certain *scene* (of rupture) for others to engage and exper-iment with. In so far as this goes, in our own practice, we are concerned with the production of avatars and images but also with the gathering, mobilization and *holding* of what we understand as points of *collapse*. In what follows, our proposal for art as non-schizoanalysis draws directly upon Guattari's discussion of Z-points (in *Chaosmosis*) and, more indirectly, from Deleuze and Guattari's notion of diagrams as presentations of points of collapse within signifying regimes. However, we also look to the psychoanalytical modelling of Jacques Lacan as laid out in the later seminars and especially the development of a theory of knots of subjectivity bound by a *sinthome* (symptom). In approaching contemporary art through such Guattari–Lacan assemblages, we would also maintain that the theoretical workings out that follow are themselves a form of art practice in so far as analytic material is explored through the drawing of composite diagrams and the syntheses of different schema. (It hardly needs adding that the expanded field of visual art now goes well beyond the production of gallery-bound objects to include a whole host of different practices.)

One further point by way of introduction. The essay was itself written between the two of us and, as such, evidences a certain tension that is indicative of each of our particular perspectives and competences. Although this could not simply be articulated as a dialectic of schizoanalysis and psychoanalysis, or Guattari versus Lacan (indeed, the essay intends a hybrid assemblage of a kind), there is a sense of two threads running throughout our writing (sometimes more, sometimes less successfully knotted together). The threads might be characterized (abstractly) as production and contingency. In fact, to say it once more, we believe it is the holding of these two together in what might be called a pattern of *minimum consistency* that characterizes art as non-schizoanalysis and, indeed, our own art practice as *Plastique Fantastique.*

Metamodelization

Chaosmotic knots

In the essay 'Schizoanalytic Metamodelisation' (in *Chaosmosis*) Guattari offers a distinct articulation of what he sees as the four ontological functions that determine any given 'discursive system' or 'refrain of ontological affirmation' (2005: 60). The organizational schema he utilizes owes much to Hjelmslev, from whom the expression/content framework is taken (and which is Guattari's response to the Saussurean signifier/signified framework determinant in Lacanian modelizations of discursive structures).

In the schema overleaf (Figure 11.1) any given being – or enunciative assemblage – is constituted across four distinct realms. Here, Guattari makes an important distinction between the real and the possible. As far as the real goes, F denotes the actual constitution of any given entity within space and time, while T denotes the chaosmosis out of which that entity has emerged (and, crucially, towards which it tends in a movement of its own dissolution). On the possible side, Φ denotes the actual machinic nature of the entity – its autopoietic and allopoietic character as it were, whilst U denotes the virtual 'universes of reference' or 'incorporeal complexity' that are available to, or opened up by, this machinic discursivity. The importance of this schema for us is that F–Φ is the sphere of production (actual and discursive), whereas T–U is the register of contingency (virtual and non-discursive) – and hence what Guattari (1995) is modelling, in our terms, is a set of relations and processes that is also a particular production–contingency assemblage.

Figure 11.1 The assemblage of the four ontological functions (from *Chaosmosis*).

The schema given in *Chaosmosis* is a more condensed and worked through version of the one laid out in the sprawling *Schizoanalytic Cartography*, where Guattari points to the particular processional nature of his own modelling, which he pitches against what he sees as limited (and ultimately moribund) Lacanian formularizations. As he puts it towards the beginning of that book, in the section on 'Analytic Cartographies':

> … rather than returning constantly to the same, supposedly foundational, structures, the same archetypes, the same 'mathemes', schizoanalytic meta-modeling will choose to map compositions of the unconscious, contingent topographies evolving with social formations, technologies, arts, sciences, etc. (2013: 22)

Schizoanalytic Cartographies is not an easy read, not least because it is Guattari's most inventive and experimental attempt to free himself from the afore-mentioned Lacanian formularizations and thus involves a dizzying array of new terminology and novel schema. *Chaosmosis*, written a few years later, is less marked by this and thus might be said more adequately to lay out a specific schizoanalytic framework as a challenge to Lacanian psychoanalysis, although its is certainly less technical, analytically speaking. Guattari's critique of Lacanian mathemes, found in both books, declares his dissatisfaction with Lacan's privileging of structure over forces (or contingencies), a privileging found specifically in the diagrams of Lacan's Four Discourses:

$$\uparrow \frac{S_1 \rightarrow S_2}{\$ \; // \; a} \downarrow \qquad \uparrow \frac{S_2 \rightarrow a}{S_1 \; // \; \$} \downarrow \qquad \uparrow \frac{a \rightarrow \$}{S_2 \; // \; S_1} \downarrow \qquad \uparrow \frac{\$ \rightarrow S_1}{a \; // \; S_2} \downarrow$$

$$\text{M} \qquad\qquad \text{U} \qquad\qquad \text{A} \qquad\qquad \text{H}$$

Figure 11.2 Lacan's Four Discourses of the Master, University, Analyst and Hysteric.

However, importantly, it can be said that forces *are* inscribed within Lacan's diagrams that are not simply mathemes (lessons or structures) but, indeed, are referred to by Lacan as 'machines on paper' (2007: 49). Lacan's definition relates to the way in which four elements – S1 (primary or little ego), S2 (Other or knowledge), $\$$ (barred subject) and object *a* (the trace of partial objects in the symbolic) – move through and occupy different positions within the matheme itself, producing the structures – or precisely discourses – of the Master, University, Hysteric and Analyst (through rotation clockwise or anti-clockwise). To add more detail: the elements below the two horizontal bars are unconscious aspects of a given structure and themselves influence (but also result from) the relation of the elements above the two bars. Simply put, various forces, productions and impasses inscribed in the mathemes index the influence of the four elements on each other – all of which animate the machinic operation of the matheme. In a further definition, Lacan explains that each quarter of the matheme has a specific function or plays a specific part within the structure:

$$\text{agent} \;\longrightarrow\; \text{Other}$$

$$\uparrow \qquad\qquad \downarrow$$

$$\text{truth} \;/\!/\; \text{production}$$

Figure 11.3 Positions within Lacan's matheme.

The top left quarter of the machine is the position of agent, which inter-venes in the sphere of the Other, located in the top right quarter (sometimes designated as work or knowledge). In the bottom right quarter of the machine is production (that which is produced or lost as surplus jouissance through the intervention of the agent into the sphere of the Other – the price of the relation as it were). Lastly, truth (that is, the unconscious myth) of the subject or discourse is located in the bottom left quarter of the machine. While there is no relation between truth and production (or surplus jouissance), the influence of the unconscious (truth) on the agent – the unconscious agent of a myth – pulses through the machine.

These operations can be understood as being driven by *pathemes* (the affective capacities of human exchange and interaction). Or, put differently, diagrammed in the mathemes is the influence or affect of the unconscious *on* subjectivity. Despite this, what is important for Lacan here is how a subject's structure can be communicated through discourse *and* on a symbolic level. Perhaps, for Guattari, we could say that this privileging of the symbolic is a kind of foreclosure (in reverse), and thus that Guattari's analytic contribution is, first, to stress the significance of the pathic, and second, to (re)inscribe a zone of contingency or chaosmosis within discursive structures, something that Lacan can be said to elide.

The crucial point here is, however, twofold. On the one hand, it seems to us that Lacanian modelizations, although privileging symbolic structures, are themselves processional (in so far as the mathemes are machines, productive of and, in turn, animated by pathemes). On the other, although Guattari certainly privileges the processional and creative over the scientific (hence the ethico-aesthetic paradigm), he nevertheless relies on mathematical formularization or frameworks (grids) – that is, mathemes or lessons – at least of a certain kind. Guattari does claim (in *Schizoanalytic Cartographies*) that the 'intensive indices, the diagrammatic operators' of his schema 'do not have any universal character' (2013: 35), but then they must, as it were, be able to communicate inter-subjectively in order that they have an analytic function. They must be at least generally applicable across different subjectivities, or present generic ontological functions for any given enunciative assemblage. Guattari's inscriptions of chaosmosis, however experimental and processual, must have a relation to, if not a purchase on, the sphere of discourse and its structures.

In fact, it is our contention that *both* Lacanian and Guattarian modelizations diagram a relation of production–contingency (patheme–matheme) but with different emphases, and a different casting of unconscious and affective registers. In Lacan's mathemes the unconscious is barred. It is the truth of the subject – the myth of prohibition or the holes in discourse that mark the Real of human relations. For Guattari the unconscious is machinic and productive. It is chaosmosis itself, the multiplicity of forces (human and non-human) that allows for, but also threatens, any given subjectivity.

What this means, however, is that Lacan's mathemes maintain a certain specificity in relation to the production of different subjects (not least in the way in which the mathemes imply a large number of subject positions (or discourses), some of which Lacan himself did not map out). Indeed, a criticism might be made that Guattari's grid cannot account for how *different* (historical, cultural, desiring) subjectivities are produced. On the other hand, the Lacanian

mathemes can be said to be enclosed machines, returning to, or repeating, the same positions and relations, with no connection to an 'outside' (which Lacan would have thought too metaphysical an idea perhaps, or certainly not something that could be communicated in discourse). We suggest that these problems and differences might be explored through an experimental metamodelization, one that does not necessarily lead to an accord between the two different models, but, rather, experimentally forces relations between them, and, like a collage, leaves joins, incongruent relations and abstractions visible (thus allowing for a productive and generative presentation of the different models in question). In our first metamodelization then, we place Lacan's matheme within Guattari's assemblage of the four ontological functions after the latter grid has been rotated ninety degrees anti-clockwise:

	real	possible
Expression actual (discursive)	F energetico-spatio-temporal discursivity S_1	Φ machinic discursivity S_2
Content virtual enunciative nuclei (non-discursive)	T chaosmic incarnation $\$$	U incorporeal complexity a

Figure 11.4 Lacan–Guattari metamodelization 1.

Without doubt this new assemblage/schema is somewhat brutal in so far as we are superimposing something of a dialectical machine (Lacan's matheme) onto an abstract machine (Guattari's assemblage). Indeed, affinities are outnumbered by incongruent comparisons in our metamodelization. The most significant of these is presented through the placing of Lacan's barred subject ($) in the bottom left quadrant of Guattari's grid. Nevertheless, and although T (chaosmic incarnation) is in no way equitable with $ (the barred subject), our metamodelization does allow for a pointed reflection on the non-discursive or unconscious functions of both Guattari's assemblage and Lacan's schema. We suggest that just as $, for Lacan, is in the position of truth – as an unconscious influence on the relation S1 → S2 (producing symbolic order but also threatening breakdown) – similarly, T is the truth of any enunciative assemblage – that from which any given entity is produced, but also that which threatens their dissolution.

Following on from the above, a perhaps more contentious gambit would be to begin to rotate F, Φ, U and T through the four quadrants of Guattari's assemblage (and even to compare the relations of real and possible expression, and real and possible content with the position of agent, Other, production and truth in Lacan's mathemes). In this way, we might begin to address the issue we pointed to earlier, concerning the limitations of Guattari's assemblage in accounting for how different kinds of subjectivitity are produced.

Returning to Figure 11.4, and despite our recognition of a discrepancy between Lacan's $ or barred subject (the myth of prohibition produced by the impossibility of human relations, registered as gaps or ruptures in discourse) and Guattari's chaosmic incarnation (a more radical 'outside'), our metamodelization does gesture towards a point of accordance. S1 and S2 might be understood in terms of a machinic discursivity (real and possible respectively), which in our metamodelization is placed above and in tension with T and U (Guattari's chaosmic incarnation and incorporeal complexity, which read through Lacan's matheme are, precisely, below the 'bar', or unconscious).

Guattari himself performs a similar assimilation of the Lacanian model in his own metamodelization of 'The Place of the Signifier in the Institution', positioning *signifying semiologies* in a 'larger' asignifying economy that again owes much to Hjemslev:

Figure 11.5 The Place of the Signifier in the Institution (from *The Guattari Reader*).

In this particular diagram (in which we suggest that matter would be the sphere of the real, and substance and form – semiotically formed substances – the sphere of the possible) we note that Guattari himself surrounds the place of the signifier in the institution with arrows (a-signifying semiotics). Importantly, the arrows traverse matter, substance and form (both the possible and the real). 'The Place of the Signifier in the Institution', then, marks out Guattari's specifically schizoanalytic contribution to clinical thought: the drawing out of a relation between a-signifying and signifying semiotics or semiologies within discursive regimes, and the proposition that such relations are generative (and themselves productions) of enunicative assemblages.

In that we are not here concerned with the production of subjects so much as aesthetic productions and their relation to contingency, our interest in Guattari's schemas is that a place for chaosmosis and for the non-human is marked out within discursive assemblages (something, as already suggested, lacking in Lacan's mathemes). Our specific aim though is to explore how these points of chaos or collapse (an 'outside') can be presented in art, that is, we are concerned with how the register of contingency can be tied or held by the domains of the actual and the discursive. In this we find a comparison between the meta-modelization above and Lacan's knots helpful.

In the seminar on *The Sinthome* (2013), Lacan demonstrates how different ways of knotting the Real (that which resists symbolization), the Symbolic

and the Imaginary (the RSI) produce different modelizations of subjectivity. Borromean knots – three-dimensional objects composed of three strands – are introduced in Lacan's late seminars to figure how specific subjectivities are produced through the binding of the three registers of the RSI. As Lacan's thought develops, he suggests that RSI knots are, in fact, bound by symptoms or sinthomes. That is, RSI rings are not tied into one another, and, as such, require the sinthome to maintain a knotting, for without sinthomes knots unravel or have no consistency:

Figure 11.6 Lacan's RSI and sinthome.

This development marks Lacan's radical reassessment of his own past conceptions of subject structures and his abandonment of the mathemes that Guattari found so problematic. Lacan's knots diagram a new topological thinking and a radical revision of past ideas on psychosis and neurosis – each understood now as being in a more fluid relation with the other. Simply put, psychosis is no longer thought to be lacking something that neurosis itself possesses to maintain 'normality'. Indeed, at this time, Oedipalization – the belief in the Other and the myth of giving up desire for the Other (the Master–Slave dialectic) – becomes simply one more way of knotting Western subjectivity, one more 'name of the father' or sinthome that regulates or produces a consistency for a given subjectivity. Importantly, Lacan suggests that psychotics, who do not have the same access to the symbolic that neurotics have, knot the RSI in different ways

to the latter. Lacan's key example here is James Joyce, who produces a writing to confound critics for hundreds of years to come, allowing 'Joyce' to become a 'great writer', 'writing' operating here as one more 'name of the father' – or sinthome – that provides a consistency for Joyce's subjectivity.

In comparing Lacan's knots to Guattari's schema, we can return to the question of how F–Φ (the actual and discursive) are tied, untied and retied with T–U (the register of contingency, or the virtual and non-discursive). (And, indeed, how F–Φ might capture T–U.) Lacan's answer might be that this is achieved with forms or activities, like Joyce's writing, which find a place within the symbolic or discourse *as* art. That is as *presentations* that are lodged within discourse without necessarily being fully contained by that discourse. This art of 'displaying' points of contingency and collapse (for example non-sense) involves the presentation of a holding pattern, a repetition or a sustained gesture of some kind: that is, a *practice*. We might suggestively 'illustrate' this particular metamodelization with the knot below:

Figure 11.7 Lacan–Guattari metamodelization 2.

In our second Lacan–Guattari metamodelization we collapse a number of terms, with the understanding that their joining is forced but not without points of adhesion. Lacan's RSI – the Real, Symbolic and Imaginary – are paired respectively with Guattari's concepts to produce the rings of our knot: the Real is paired with 'energetico-spatial-temporal discursivity' (the actual constitution of any given entity or relation; again, as we suggested above, this

pairing is particularly forced as we have here two different concepts of the R/real in play), the Symbolic is paired with 'machinic discursivity' and the Imaginary with 'incorporeal complexity'. To these three registers we add a fourth ring Guattari's 'chaosmic incarnation' (for which Lacan has no equivalent term). In our metamodelization, the sinthome, which is not exactly a material object but more akin to a kind of writing – that is the inscription of a signifier – passes through the 'symbolic/machinic discursivity' and 'imaginary/incorporeal complexity' rings, and, in doing so, 'traps' the remaining two rings.

We are attempting to address two problems here. The first is that Lacan's conception of RSI knots tied together with sinthomes, in lacking Guattari's concept of chaosmosis (or, indeed, any virtuality), has no way of accounting for the contingencies that Joyce's writing and other such art practices register, in that Lacan's knots do not point to anything outside the discourses, affects and images produced by human relations and rationalizations. At the same time, we are suggesting that Lacan's knots, and especially the development of the concept of the sinthome, ought to be thought of alongside Guattari's idea of real/possible or actual/virtual assemblages *and* his concept of the 'outside' (namely chaosmosis), to account for the consistency of productions spun out of or around chaosmosis. For what else might art be than a marking of chaosmosis, a (signifier) pointing to an 'outside'? And what else might Joyce's writing of *Finnegan's Wake* (or, indeed, Acconci's *Air Time* of our Prologue) be said to be other than a presentation of multiplicity, contingency, collapse – that is, chaosmosis?

It seems to us then that this particular 'chaosmotic knotting' produces an interesting metamodelization that doubles the patheme–matheme synthesis we discussed above. But as with all metamodelizations, the limits of specific diagrams are exposed, for we are proposing artworks as holding points for chaosmotic ruptures that neither grids nor knots adequately diagram. Although Lacan's sinthome and Guattari's concept of chaosmic incarnation have enabled us to explore art practice as a registering of an outside, our production–contingency synthesis requires a further diagrammatic form (a diagrammatic object that might be more appropriate to art production than the diagrams of subjectivity so far presented).

Voids and points

To help us produce this new diagrammatic object we will extend our interrogation of concepts from the late work of Lacan and Guattari, but before that we want to explore two terms that further engender a conjunctive synthesis – or

knotting – of the matheme–patheme. First, returning to Lacan's sinthome, it seems to us that the binding performed by the latter involves a fiction or myth – or a certain activity and attachment that produces a fiction or myth. It is worth noting here that Lacan develops his conception of the 'name of the father', the myth of prohibition, under the influence of Levi-Strauss and his concept of the *mytheme*, defined as the 'kernel' of a belief that is found across myths and thus names a structural and intersubjective binding element. In his later work Lacan understood the 'name of the father' not as a special signifier but as any signifier used in a specific and distinctive way to tie chains of other signifiers together and thus give consistency to a symbolic order. Indeed, as we stated above, Lacan, in his later seminars, declares that there are many 'names of the father' (prohibition is named here as just one among others). Or to say it differently, there are many myths that produce (impossible) relations within the Symbolic. We wish to appropriate and recast the word mytheme as a good name for this binding operation and as a term for a machine that functions to maintain consistency for (and belief in) specific practices, relations or activities within intersubjective or symbolic structures (such as the sinthomes of writer, artist, experimenter, creative).

In contrast to this sinthome–mytheme binding machine, we would like to propose another invention, a schizoid machine we name *mysteme*. Mystemes are less to do with cohesion and consistency than with a given subject or entity's relations to an 'outside' – to contingency or the unconscious. They install a different kind of myth (or, indeed, in Georges Bataille's terms a non-myth/absence of myth): the grafting of an 'outside' (or, again, multiplicity or contingency) onto existing discursive regimes or subjective structures. They are, we would argue, more a-subjective than Guattari's enunciative assemblages, implying, as they do, radical cuts or punctures – being 'opened up' by an 'outside', or, at least, the myth of such a possibility. In Reza Negarestani's compelling turn of phrase they involve making 'a Good Meal out of yourself' for the universe (or, as Negarestani's calls the latter, the 'Life-Satan') (2008: 200).

To further expand this idea, we would say that mystemes are not knots of organization or cohesion but presentations of points of collapse or *holes* around which the edges of sense can be felt, seen, tasted, smelt, heard or thought. Put simply, mystemes are placeholders for chaosmosis that destabilize discursive or symbolic regimes. In this, mystemes are analogous to black holes that bend and collapse space–time and suspend the known laws of physics. Mystemes are lodged within but not contained by the myths and structures of a symbolic order (rather, they threaten to collapse sense and cast a heavy influence on all

that encounter them). Like black holes, mystemes have event horizons beyond which chaosmosis resides. Indeed, they are registered by the accretions that form on this horizon or surface: warped objects, images, patterns, rhythms – and other gestures and discourses that circle them. Again, it is not the holes themselves that are important in this schema, but rather the *feeling* of the points of collapse, the *feeling* of the edges and the holding patterns that need to be marked out. For us, this is where art, among other practices, comes in, in so far as art practice (as one mytheme among others) is able to register such singularities within discourse, through repetitive gestures and as absurd dark noises, strange avatars, jokes and laughter, abstract and alien bodies, disorientating rhythms, and intense images and silences.

For ourselves this is also, once more, where the limits of clinical schizoanalysis might itself be marked: where the latter calls for responsibility and an ethico-aesthetic paradigm (and rightly so perhaps when treating psychotics or proposing an ecological politics for the environment, subjectivity and social relations), art practice *as* non-schizoanalysis involves itself in something that is precisely *non*-responsible. Becoming a good meal for the universe, or creating such a myth, is a de-stabilizing of structures, including the structure or myth of a self. This *might* be a form of therapy, but, if it is, it is one that is of a very strange kind, a schizostrategy (in Negarestani's terminology) – or, again, a *practice* that operates critically upon what exists (in the production of holes) through art and performance, or even the fiction of speculative thought. Such a practice is marked by an indifference to, if not refusal of, all the idealist notions of schizoanalysis: creativity, balance, ecology, harmony, differentiation, social production and the potential of the human (for all this turns out to be, precisely, 'all-too human', a domestication that can curtail the disturbing and radical affect of chaos and its myths).

Such a practice will then return a specifically *different* subject to the world – one that has, as it were, *been through* an 'outside'. (In this, the ethics or myth of such a practice is closer to Lacanian analysis perhaps – or even to a Buddhism, which calls for a passing through the Real – rather than to a schizoanalysis in which an actualization of immanent forces is called for to produce new subjectivities). Here we might think of the abject performances of Paul McCarthy or the joyful and excessive projections of Pipa Lotti Rist, each of which produces hyper-affective encounters (in that they give us *too much*: too much mustard and tomato sauce as bodily fluids, too much hyper-real fruit that produces hallucinogenic scenes). True, these examples circulate as named practices (as mythemes perhaps) within the field of art but they are also schizoid productions and presentations for others to encounter and engage with.

To qualify this notion of non-schizoanalytic art we propose that the sinthome–mytheme machines of art (similar to other practices, identities and traditions) attend to and make room for mystemes (schizoid machines), giving them a place in discursive regimes. This operation has three distinct temporal modes: 1) A calling forth of the mysteme (an incantation or gathering); 2) A paralleling of the mystemes 'work' (the production of a scene, assemblage, rhythm or pattern); and 3) A 'reflecting on' the mysteme (a modelling). Another way of putting this is that non-schizoanalytic art allows for a kind of continuous 'being in the world' for points of collapse (precisely a narrative, at least of a kind). This sinthome–mytheme–mysteme relation answers the question of 'how to live being the meal' without entering into auto-destruction. Again, this is *not* a production of subjectivity in Guattari's sense; rather it is, once more, a strategic *practice* of sorts (that might involve a *series* of actions, even a *programme*). Indeed, we would suggest that this defines our own art practice: the sinthome–mytheme (or fiction–myth) of *Plastique Fantastique* gathers – *and presents within discourse* – a mysteme or a constellation of points of collapse or multiplicity.

Towards a non-schizoanalysis

Z-points

We promised a new diagrammatic object and have sketched out a preliminary account of it (the schizoid machine we name mysteme, with its relation to the sinthome–mytheme machine of art). There are, however, still questions to be answered about how such an object – or practice – might be produced or function. In order to answer these – and to prevent our new object merely hovering as a discursive mirage – we turn back to Guattari and to his theorization of the autopoietic nucleus or what he calls 'Z-point', with the intention of understanding his innovation but also, ultimately, to appropriate and invert its function, so as to further develop the operations of our schizoid invention.

What is a Z-point? Any point whatsoever. Indeed, anything (or, apparently, 'nothing') might operate as this point. An object (from a different regime perhaps?) *or* a subject (what else could love be?). It could be a shoe, sunlight on strands of hair, the opening notes or chorus of Beyonce's 'Crazy in Love'. Such an intensive point pins, ties or holds something (attention, desire, a gesture, the feel of leather, the gaze, lips mouthing the words of a song). Guattari himself relates these nuclei to a more typical analytic discourse in the essay 'Machinic Orality and Virtual Ecology' (in *Chaosmosis*) where these pre-objectal 'entities' – as he

calls them in 'The New Aesthetic Paradigm' (again, in *Chaosmosis*) – are defined in psycho-, or schizoanalytic terms:

> In the wake of Freud, Kleinian and Lacanian psychoanalysts apprehended, each in their own way, this type of entity in their fields of investigation. They christened it the 'part object', the 'transitional object', situating it at the junction of a subjectivity and alterity which are themselves partial and transitional (1995: 94).

In passing it is worth noting that this notion of part objects is important for the genesis of Deleuze and Guattari's 'desiring-machines' (in *Anti-Oedipus*, 1984) that further 'rupture with Freudian determinism', situating the latter in more expanded and incorporeal 'fields of virtuality' (Guattari 1995: 95).

Guattari's essay on 'The New Aesthetic Paradigm' goes into even more detail about these entities, but, in fact, the whole of *Chaosmosis* concerns itself with a similar territory in so far as it tracks the different ways they might be articulated (autopoietic nuclei, part objects, object *a*, Z-points). Although analytic terms are used, Guattari also looks to the terminology of the new sciences in order to adequately layout his particular modelling of these entities as chaotic-complex assemblages (though, tellingly, he also refers to them, simply, as 'subjectivities'). In particular, and, again, in 'The New Aesthetic Paradigm', Guattari addresses a key question – 'from where do these nuclei emerge/arrive?' – attending to what he calls an 'infinite twisting line of flight' – a strange attractor – that slows chaos down, in the process organizing it and giving it a consistency (1995: 116).

Again, this subjective-entity or 'complex entitative multiplicity' has to be cohered, or 'indexed' to use Guattari's term, by 'an autopoietic nucleus' (1995: 114). This moment of grasping occurs then when the complex-chaotic field of multiplicity encounters the above line of flight – or what Guattari also calls a certain 'trans-monadism' (1995: 114). The latter introduces within chaos an 'ordered linearity' that allows 'the ordination of incorporeal complexions to crystallise' (1995: 114). Guattari likens this process to 'the pickup head of a Turing machine', arguing that 'linearity, the matrix of all ordination, is already a slowing down, an existential stickiness' (1995: 115). Like a tape-head that spools tape, or perhaps a turntable stylus that picks up dust and static, 'the chaotic nothing spins and unwinds complexity', carrying out 'an aggregative selection onto which limits, constants and states of things can graft themselves' (Guattari 1995: 114).

Is then a Z-point a binding point of a kind? It is at least a point around which subjectivity can coalesce. A strange idea perhaps, in that a Z-point might be but a brief disturbance within an environment, routine or life. However, for

Guattari, even such fleeting events can produce an accretion, consistency or continuity of and for subjectivity.

These chaotic-complex entities maintain a relationship with the chaos or multiplicity out of which they are formed. Indeed, they are, as it were, of the same nature. They are a chaos given consistency. It is in this sense that the Z-point is a point of cohesion *but also* a point of dissolution. Guattari does not address this directly, but it seems to us that the Z-point is the void-point around which any given subjectivity is spun (and, in this, subjectivity maintains a cohesion of sorts, but one that is structurally precarious).

For us, the proposition that a Z-point and its accretions operate as a production–contingency assemblage, or as point of subjectivity *and* chaos, is valuable, not least in that, despite our claim that Guattari is somewhat too ethical, the above processuality – the spinning of consistency around a Z-point – certainly demonstrates that something more non-human can be involved in the production of subjectivity than the Lacanian clinic would allow. To add meat to this bone, a good example of such a production–contingency assemblage is Robert Smithson's *Spiral Jetty* in which human time collapses into geological time, creating a fault line that the artist claims to have felt within his body when traversing the jetty.

However, despite Guattari's detailed description of the operations of Z-points and their relation to chaos, the question of whether Z-points produce consistency in ways similar to Lacan's binding machines remains. A further comparison between the inventions of Guattari and Lacan is necessary.

From quilting points to sinthomes

In the more early seminar on *The Psychoses* Lacan discusses the difference between neurotics and psychotics and speculates on how many 'quilting points' are needed to produce a 'normal' person, and, in contrast, how many points need to be lacking for the event of psychosis (1997: 268–9). Lacan's quilting point (*point de caption*) is envisaged as giving a certain cohesion and consistency to subjectivity ('the name of the father' – *the* paternal signifier – being the crucial quilting point during this period of Lacan's writing). Indeed, a quilting point functions to hold other signifiers in place. The term itself refers to buttons used by upholsterers to stop the padding – or stuffing – from moving about (chaotically) under the leather covering of a chair. It seems to us that this image is not so far from Guattari's own figuration of Z-points that we tracked above which also 'pin' chaosmosis.

As we have already mentioned, in Lacan's later work the notion that a psychotic lacks a quilting point is dropped and the concept of the sinthome is developed. From quilting point to sinthome, Lacan is exploring points that arrest chaos or dissolution. In relation to this, there is the Lacanian observation that psychotics manage to exist in the world through specific arrangements of signifiers and relations, through mimicry or by anchoring themselves into the Symbolic by identifying with ideal ego positions – such as has been argued by Darian Leader in the case of Dr Harold Shipman for whom the role or mandate of 'Doctor' was, precisely, an anchoring point (2012: 273–93). Lacanian psychoanalysis is, in this sense, a discourse concerning binding points of one kind or another – might the same be said of Guattari's schizoanalysis? Does a Z-point operate as a signifier that gathers other signifiers?

It would seem to us that a differentiation can be made here in so far as a Z-point has no positive content or signification in the Symbolic (or at least it is not articulated in those terms by Guattari). We can perhaps say then that a Z-point operates as a kind of a-signifying quilting point, one that is specifically extra-discursive. Indeed, a Z-point might be constituted by any object or thing – as we suggested above – but also, we would further suggest, by a specific *practice* or *abstract gesture*. We are reminded here of the regimes, work, theatre and plays – the realm of 'heterogenetic encounter' as Guattari called it – of *La Borde* clinic that itself tied a community of psychotics and neurotics, patients and clinicians together, and, indeed, gave a certain kind of structure, however fluid, to each of the latter.

In fact, it seems to us that these practices might also be productive of Lacanian sinthomes. After all, the gestures and encounters at *La Borde* often led to and, indeed, involved 'named' roles: pharmacist, chef, artist, cleaner, actor, and so on. Guattari's specific contribution to this diagram of the clinic is that he draws Z-points from the register of contingency or chaosmosis, as precarious but significant points within subjective arrangements. But was there not also a role for certain practices, sinthomes or mythemes at *La Borde*, making room for, or giving consistency to, otherwise precarious subjective arrangements: A Z-point/Sinthome relation? In the schizoanalytic therapies and aesthetic experiments at the clinic, do we not find our sinthome–mytheme–mysteme machines at work?

In this, Guattari shared with others at *La Borde* an *aim* and an *ethics* – to save if not make bearable the lives of those who are suffering *and* to explore what such subjects might become. In this context, chaos and contingency (as an influx of bodies and signifiers) can be as dangerous as the imposition of

impossible relations or signifiers (that cannot be received as anything but hostile by a psychotic). And here, once more, we can mark the difference between *schizoanalysis and the clinic* that promotes aesthetic activities as a therapeutics and *art as non-schizoanalysis*. For, if, as Jean Oury has stated, clinicians at *La Borde* attempt to 'graft an opening, a graft of transference at the level of originary narcissism' onto the delimited world of psychosis (as Oury suggests, a 'very delicate and complex work'), then art (as non-schizoanalysis) intends the opposite move, to graft an opening for chaos, contingency, and multiplicity (all the fears and fantasies of the people) onto existing social and symbolic representations, regimes and myths (Oury quoted in Novello and Reggio 2007: 40). Schizoanalysis and non-schizoanalysis might, at times, appear similar (indeed, as we have suggested above, they arise from the same insights), *but*, we would maintain, one is the mirror-image of the other.

Intermission: Plastique Fantastique *summon all the fantasies of the people!*

There are eight performers in all – eight feedback loops – playing music that is sparse and meditative at first, then more urgent until an intensity is reached and then … silence. A voice, sometimes audible and sometimes drowned out, sometimes

Figure 11.8 *Plastique Fantastique* summon all the fantasies of the people!, Wysing Art Centre, Cambridgeshire, 2013.

calm and sometimes shouting, speaks of eight avatars for our times, representing all the fantasies of the people, including: Roy Burns*, 'soft spoken loner', psychotic reaction, the killer from* Friday 13ᵗʰ Part 5*;* The Little Jockey Riding the Big Jockey*, embodying perversion and perverse relations;* Staabucks Fukkee*, inverted logo and poisonous draft that intends harm; and* Voidrider*, suicidal nihilist, unfolding like a sea anemone. One by one the avatars are introduced, described and diagramed through a film projected during the performance, until finally* Twiglett*, redundant rave remnant, is manifested before all present: a standing stone for our times in flesh and branch. All the fantasies of the people were summoned by* Plastique Fantastique *at Wysing Art Centre, Cambridgeshire, in August 2013. It is an art work presented as the fiction of a community of non-community – a holding pattern of void points – in which anything can be played, any gesture can be made, and all fears and monsters can come out to say hello and dance.*

S/Z

In presenting our final metamodelization above, a new diagram of production and contingency, that both inverts schizoanalysis and then encircles or bundles up Z-points with sinthome–mytheme machines, we are perhaps moving too fast and have still to address a pressing question: What kind of relation are we drawing between sinthomes (S) and Z-points (Z)? Is such a relation impossible or useless – as Guattari (and Lacan too) might have it? How can we write or draw this relation? It cannot simply be that S + Z = the S/Z machine, for it is necessarily an unequal or asymmetrical relation: The two registers do not add up and pull and move in different directions.

What complicates this problem is that Guattari is less concerned with discourse (in the Lacanian sense) and the Symbolic, and further, in switching terminology from the psychoanalytic framework to the new sciences – and replacing desire with chaosmosis – Guattari jettisons the whole idea of an unconscious, at least in Lacan's terms (a 'below the bar'). Something is certainly lost in this move – specifically the idea of the barred subject (or, to put it another way, the Lacanian disjunction disappears). But something is also gained: a different kind of – materialist – account of the production of subjectivity in which the role of the Symbolic is less determining (or, in other terms, a continuum between finite–infinite, or subject–object is affirmed). As we have already suggested, it seems to us that this particular modelization is perhaps more amenable to the idea of art practice than to the production of a subject.

Indeed, here again lies the trap of too therapeutic a perspective, of under-standing art as a point of subject formation, or as a process for the benefit of an individual (art as a technology for the production of a self). For art is also necessarily a presentation, or even a presentation of presentation (gestures for others to encounter and engage with) – otherwise it is simply existing 'life'. Our suggestion is that art as non-schizoanalysis – or simply aesthetic practice beyond therapy – would capture or hold Z-points through a process of sinthomic organization, but then would also *present* points of rupture, rather than engender new subjectivities. We might write this relation – of signifiers or sinthomes and Z-points as art – as:

$$\frac{S}{Z}$$

However, this writing still privileges structure and the matheme. What is needed is something – a drawing, a model – that introduces the pathic and the 'outside'. An impossible object that pictures the above relation:

Figure 11.9 The sinthome/Z-point relation.

We have drawn a fizzing apparition full of voids, full of static, insects, plasma, teeth, full of pulsing and popping boils and hungry mystemes (full of soul-murderers and nerve-communications as Schreber might say). But in this diagram, the fizzing voids (the Z-points part) are circled, *drawn* and presented through art (the S part or sinthome/signifier). The thickness of S might grow as more gestures or discourse circle the Z-points which might then become benign with age. Indeed, S might harden and thicken, mummifying or fossilizing the diagram; but the Z-points themselves might spill over too, and wash S away, for S might become too porous a gesture to prevent the Z-points from escaping. This, we take it, is the physics – the proportional analysis – of a practice, the working out of ratios and relations that can only be done *on the ground* and thus, always, in and as experimentation.

Conclusion: Opened by the outside

Our S/Z drawing is an impossible object with strange qualities. A fiction of a kind. In fact, we should acknowledge that the diagram of non-schizoanalysis that we have attempted to articulate operates, like most mad inventions, in the Imaginary, and as a figure precariously positioned if not entirely detached from the actual order of things. Again, it is not, as it were, clinical, but functions through the production of strange narratives or myths – as well as producing untimely images which *speak back* to their producer. Such images and myths – that have been produced through accretion and layering and that include points of collapse within them – might work to counteract the increasing colonization of our unconscious (however that might be figured) by the culture and media industries.

It seems to us that this kind of myth-science is something that marks out Guattari's work with Deleuze, and especially *A Thousand Plateaus* (1988). Unlike Guattari's solo project that is undoubtedly clinical (and, as such, is indebted to Lacan), Deleuze and Guattari writing together produce something that is not strictly clinical but, rather, to invent a further term, is *imaginal* (the production of a narrative that operates in the Imaginary). It is perhaps this that makes their joint work so attractive to art practitioners, who also, it seems to us, practice in this register.

In the plateau 'On Several Regimes of Signs' Deleuze and Guattari provide a kind of meta-reflection on their own work, and, thus, the kind of practice we have in mind, that will invariably involve:

> … making a *tracing* of the mixed semiotics, under the generative component; making the transformational *map* of the regimes, with their possibilities for translation and creation, for budding along the lines of the tracing; making the *diagram* of the abstract machines that are in play in each case, either as poten-tialities or as effective emergences; outlining the *programme* of the assemblages that distribute everything and bring a circulation of movement with alterna-tives, jumps, and mutations (1988: 146–7).

While there is an affirmative, and still therapeutic and analytic, aspect to their tracings and transformational maps, there is also potential for 'points of collapse' in the programme outlined here. As Deleuze and Guattari remark, after looking into the possibilities of translation and transformation:

> … one could try to create new, as yet unknown statements for that proposition, even if the result were a patois of sensual delight, physical and semiotic systems

in shred, asubjective affects, signs without significance where syntax, semantics, and logic are in collapse … cries-whispers, feverish improvisations, becoming-animal, becoming-molecular, real transsexualities, continuums of intensity, constitutions of bodies without organs (1998: 147).

The work moves from tracing and mapping already existing regimes to something more experimental, something riskier: the production of new regimes of signs. It is in this sense that art leads us beyond the known, 'forming strange new becomings, new polyvocalities' (Deleuze and Guattari 1998: 191). Here we can say we favour the risk of Guattari's collaborations with Deleuze to Guattari's ethico-aesthetic orientation. Simply put *A Thousand Plateaus* might be said to open up another direction to that of *Chaosmosis*.

In fact, reflecting on our own understanding – and deployment of – schizo-analysis, and although there has been little direct reference to it, we would suggest that it is the practice as laid out in *Anti-Oedipus*, rather than, again, in Guattari's solo writings, that we take as our model. This is not so much in the mechanics of the machinic production of the residual subject which that book maps out (the three syntheses of the unconscious), but rather its experimental and *wild* style – the chance it takes – and the way in which it is peopled by strange diagrams and a dizzying array of literary characters and intensive states. Indeed, following this lead, we want to suggest that schizoanalysis – including, here, our own idea of a non-schizoanalysis – is always a work in progress and always a necessary *betrayal* of any given definitions (including of itself).

As such, and in conclusion, we understand schizoanalysis as a 'positive' therapy in Guattari's terms, but we also believe there is a further function for schizoanalysis beyond therapy, what we have called the function of art as non-schizoanalysis. This function might simply be called an ethics of rupture. It is this other function of schizoanalysis that might deliver paralysis, panic and joy for the human (or, indeed, a kind of humiliation in the face of contingencies – such as those produced by Copernicus, Darwin and Freud, as the philosopher Robin McKay argues (2011: 3)), and through which new relations to an 'outside' might be formed. This would be a very different ecology or economy to the autopoietic organization of subjectivity suggested by Guattari.

In his book on *Foucault,* after writing about the ancient Greeks and the folding in of the 'outside' as a subjectivation that is invented by the latter, Deleuze refers to the 'Oriental fold', which, in fact, he suggests might not be a folding in of the outside at all, but, something radically different, a kind of unfolding – or cut – to the outside (in our terms, a kind of mysteme), that is, precisely *not* the production of a subject (see Deleuze 1988: 36). This idea of an

opening to an outside is close to a Buddhist technology (though there is also an emphasis on preparation and the consolidation of a territory in Buddhist practice that will allow for this opening). Ultimately though it is certainly not that a Buddhist is able to access the outside (an assimilation of the outside *by* a given subject), because, at this point, there is no subject to do the accessing and assimilating. This is not an analysis or therapeutics but something else, something that involves a kind of work, but not necessarily the production of a subject. It is not a human technology in this sense but something more alien. It seems to us that art as non-schizoanalysis is as much about these inhuman practices as it is about anything human.

Coda: Cloud gives birth to new animal: Plastique Fantastique *welcome* Neuropatheme *– a.k.a. subject-without-experience, empty-the-cave, etc.*

Clouds of incense and the flickering of a strobing projection. A song starts up. A 'subject' is selected – and then covered with honey and glitter. A microphone is held to the subject's mouth, prompting them to echo or repeat the words of the song – Neuropatheme Sutra *– that tells the story of a figure who resists all regimes of communication and connection. Then, with some force, the microphone that hitherto had been a mode of communication (at least of a sort) is inserted into this entities mouth (putting an end to its singing) before ribbons are tied around and around the head. The figure can no longer speak or sing but it can make a noise through the use of the muscles and organs in the mouth, throat, and chest, which the microphone channels to a mixing desk and sound system. Attendants welcome this figure as* Neuropatheme. *The creature continues to make sounds and to listen to its own noise, with the sole intention of becoming a feedback loop, and nothing else.* Neuropatheme *stands before an audience who behold an absurd figure – a comical monster – a non-subject-object. The audience watches this bizarre performance, expressing verbally their discomfort with, or amusement at* Neuropatheme's *abjection. All become immersed in, or indifferent to, this spectacle, but all sense that* Neuropatheme *is hollow, an empty cave, voided. The myth and production of the living void* Neuropatheme *was presented at the Institute of Contemporary Art, London in June 2013.*

Figure 11.10 Cloud gives birth to new animal: *Plastique Fantastique* welcome Neuropatheme, ICA London, 2013.

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Art as Schizoanalysis: Creative Place-Making in South Asia

Leon Tan

Introduction

Schizoanalysis is a theory, a toolbox of concepts developed by Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari in the last half of the twentieth century, pertaining to the collective dynamics of subjectivation, processes by which individuals enter into composition with each other through expressive encounters to produce assemblages or *agencements* (social arrangements or compositions).[1] It is a critical theory, meaning that every schizoanalysis proceeds by way of a critique of assemblages that diminish vitality and creativity, a mapping, in other words, of what Guattari (1996: 132) called 'systems of modelisation in which we are entangled'. At the same time, it is also a clinical practice, meaning that it is always concerned with potentials for the invention of new subjectivities, with tracing and amplifying lines of flight in a given system of modelization, so as to free up the powers of collective creativity.

Since the emergence of the term 'schizoanalysis' in Deleuze and Guattari's (1972) *L'Anti-Œdipe* (*Anti-Oedipus*), the figure of the schizoanalyst has tended to be associated with Guattari, and that of the philosopher with Deleuze. While it is true that they set out from these respective positions, it is also the case that through their extensive collaboration they accomplished a profound displacement in Western culture, a transformation that ultimately 'made the practice of thought (and not just the theory of it) at once ethical, political and therapeutic' (Rolnik 2013). It would thus be a misunderstanding today to persist with such divisive associations, which function as 'unconscious devices to neutralize the shift their work has produced' (Rolnik 2013).

Suely Rolnik's work indexes an important deviation from the habit of associating schizoanalytic practice primarily with Guattari. 'Deleuze, Schizoanalyst'

(2011), published earlier in Portugese, presents us with what Rolnik herself describes as 'the unexpected figure' of Deleuze as schizoanalyst, as clinician. It was a gesture, a gift of music from Deleuze, and a suggestion to listen closely to the cries of two women, Lulu and Maria, in two different operas by Alban Berg, that figured prominently in the author's recovery from the traumas that led to her exile from Brazil to Paris.

> The direction he had pointed me in with Lulu and Maria installed itself imperceptibly in my body and operated in silence, slowly oxygenating the fibers of desire, reactivating their drifts and the vital work of thought that normally accompanies them. Six years later, my Tropicalist birdsong announced that Lulu's affirmative timbre against brutality had, over and against Maria's negative timbre, returned to my voice (Rolnik 2011).

Rolnik's example suggests that schizoanalysis has no requirement of a clinical setting such as *La Borde*, where it was invented, nor is it necessarily the domain of mental health professionals, psychoanalysts, psychiatrists and psychotherapists. A gesture, a song, a book, an essay, a conversation, a documentary film, a painting, a performance, any of these may become points of departure for schizoanalyses. At a minimum, all that is needed is an expression that sets off diagrammatic effects, a release of 'mutational signs-particles' (Guattari 2011: 172).

Arguably, Deleuze himself considered writers and artists better equipped for schizoanalytic intervention. He even suggested that artists and writers could go *further* than traditional clinicians 'because the work of art gives them new means' (Deleuze 1997: xvii). Of all the professional disciplines then, perhaps artists have the most to offer as symptomatologists of the worlds in which they, and we, exist. The public art of Navjot Altaf (b. 1949, Meerut, India) demonstrates how artists who take up this function (symptomatology) may contribute to potent collective expressions with clinical resonances across a variety of publics.[2] It raises the possibility that schizoanalytic practice may well exist without its practitioners using the standard terminology to describe their work, or needing to have read anything of Deleuze and Guattari's writings.[3]

Altaf's art, like that of collectives such as WochenKlausur and Temporary Services, is characterized by collaborative projects with social transformation objectives and consequently by a blurring of the boundaries between art and activism, artist and audience. Public projects such as these belong to the recent history of socially engaged or participatory art. Sometimes called the 'social turn', this shift to social interaction as a medium was heralded in 1998 (2002 in English) by the publication of Nicolas Bourriaud's influential book *Relational Aesthetics*.[4] Bourriaud cited artists he curated in the *Traffic* exhibition (Bordeaux

Museum of Contemporary Art) as exemplars of an emergent relational practice. Many of the artists discussed, such as Liam Gillick and Rikrit Tiravanija, while interested in social relations, largely restricted their work to exhibitions in art galleries and museums.

Bourriaud represents one of two major tendencies in contemporary art theory and criticism relating to the social turn. This first tendency would confine the understanding of relational or social art to practices embedded in institutional spaces, eschewing criticality in favour of a highly formalized sociality. The other tendency, represented by the art critic Claire Bishop (2006, 2012), suggests that artistic collaboration dilutes aesthetic value, meaning that a great deal of social art, especially what she calls 'community art', would be dismissed from the outset as inconsequential. Bishop also believes that 'do-gooding' practices, meaning those with social therapy agendas, are necessarily devoid of criticality.

In contrast to these tendencies, a theoretical framework built on concepts constelled around schizoanalysis opens up new ways of understanding and experiencing social works intended to increase the vitality of a community and locale. The critical dimension of this framework lends itself more readily to analysing projects outside the formal spaces of galleries and museums, while its emphasis on collective creation means that public and collaborative projects may be appreciated in all their complexity, and need not be condemned by default to 'the lowest circle of Hell' (Kester 2006: 22–3) .

We might continue to call this framework schizoanalytic (schizoanalysis 2.0 perhaps), but we might also speak of assemblages that are at once critical and clinical. The latter acknowledges what Deleuze (2004: 280) wrote after the publication of *Anti-Oedipus*, 'we no longer want to talk about schizoanalysis, because that would amount to protecting a particular type of escape, schizophrenic escape'. Four decades after the invention of schizoanalysis, a case study of public art in South Asia provides the occasion for reformulating the critical and clinical experiment in terms of creative place-making, meaning interventions that make social spaces more habitable, and existential territories more tolerable, if not even convivial.

Navjot Altaf – Nalpar

Navjot Altaf is a pioneering figure in public art[5] and collaborative practice in India. She belongs to 'the first generation of artists who sought out a viewership beyond the art world' in South Asia, and has since the 1990s 'worked in

collaboration with artists from other disciplines and other milieus' (Adajania 2006: 372). Altaf's public practice has taken her into some of the most marginalized and traumatized sectors in Indian society, including professional sex workers in Mumbai and Sangli, *Adivasi* villagers in Bastar, survivors of the 2002 Gujarat riots, and auto-rickshaw *wallahs* in New Delhi. Her accomplishments in these communities merit attention for the fact that they depended on empathic and critical social interventions, as well as the facilitation of collective creativity.

The public art project that stands out the most has now exceeded a decade in duration. Called *Nalpar*, meaning 'hand-pump', it consists of ongoing collaborative interventions led by Altaf and *Adivasi* artists Rajkumar, Shantibai and Ghessuram in Bastar, Chattisgarh. Adivasi is Hindi for 'indigenous' and is a term that numerous tribal groups use to describe themselves.[6] Bastar is an area where the lives and livelihood of numerous Adivasi villagers have taken a turn for the worse in past decades, owing to the discovery of valuable mineral resources beneath their customary lands (lands that in some cases have been continuously inhabited for up to 4,000 years). It is also a region traversed by India's 'Red Corridor', a Maoist (Naxalite) controlled belt across the jungles of central and eastern India.

City-dwelling readers may find it difficult to conceive of living without electricity or running water. These conditions are, however, typical in Bastar, making it imperative for villagers, always women, to spend a sizeable portion of their daily lives collecting this vital substance from communal sources. *Nalpar's* primary objective was, and continues to be, the amelioration of living conditions by ensuring access to clean water. A look at Figure 12.1 should readily reveal why such an objective, basic as it seems, would be useful for the villages in question. The image depicts a *nalpar* site before the artists' public intervention. The pump itself is in poor repair, and the area surrounding it prone to collecting water in stagnant pools (ideal for the breeding of disease-carrying mosquito populations). The physical strain that the lifting and carrying of water imposes on the body is evident in the postural adjustments made by the girl lifting a full water vessel.

Given the subcontinent's strong economic performance in the past decade, its growing middle classes, and its reputation for being the world's largest democracy, it would seem that the circumstances in Bastar are symptomatic of a failure in the system of representative government. *Adivasi* interests and living conditions remain largely unrepresented to the present day. Not only that, the Indian government also works hand in hand with corporations to, quite literally, extract resources from beneath the land on which these peoples live. These

Figure 12.1 Pre-existing hand pump site in Bastar, 2000, image courtesy of the artist.

social conditions are what Altaf, Rajkumar, Shantibai and Ghessuram consider important to remediate.

Contrary to Bishop's logic, that socially ameliorative 'community art' is necessarily devoid of criticality, Altaf and her collaborators' public art project in fact depends on a high level of criticality for its yield of large-scale therapeutic changes. In terms of our schizoanalysis-inspired theory, we might say that it depends on mapping the assemblages that diminish the vitality and creativity of Bastar's *Adivasi* communities. Evidence of such an analysis comes directly from the artists, who discuss the crisis as one of *dispossession* of India's 'original dwellers' through government collusion with national and multi-national corporations (Altaf 2012).

Recent scholarship suggests that *Adivasi* communities themselves have sustained a long-term critical position, for example in relation to British colonizers of the past. One *Adivasi* interviewee even observes, 'We know all our problems today are because of colonialism (*samrajyobad*) and capitalism (*punjibad*) and these MNCs, NGOs, DfID/UK and the government are its forces' (Kapoor 2013: 18). State and capitalist assemblages, then, are the forces that must be countered in some way, if indigenous cultures in the locale are to recover some degree of vitality and dignity. The 'assistance' of

development agencies funded by international aid organizations must similarly be neutralized.[7]

If some *Adivasis* believed that decolonization (1947) would bring equality, they rapidly found that, like the British administrators, the Indian government viewed them as primitives, with Hindu nationalists believing them to be in need of the civilizing effects of conversion to Hinduism. Thus various *Adivasi* communities experienced the subjectivating pressures of a state and its police and military organs 'deploying an internal colonial politics' against them (Kapoor 2013: 18–19). To make matters more complicated, these communities today also confront pressures to support or convert to the Naxalite cause of armed resistance against the Indian state. Given that the two forces are engaged in civil warfare, siding with the Naxalites would leave *Adivasi* villagers prone to military attack and an intensification of already-existing police brutality.

The critical dimension of the *Nalpar* project rests, at least partly, on the building of affective and creative ties between Altaf and *Adivasi* artists and villagers, such that the public interventions have been, and continue to be,

Figure 12.2 *Nalpar* public artwork in Bastar, 2000, image courtesy of the artist.

autonomous and *self-organized*. This attention to group autonomy meant that *Adivasi* communities could begin to dis-identify from dominant models, in order to re-imagine or re-define themselves as assemblages capable of self-realizing previously undreamt of solutions to the problem of clean water access. Figures 12.2 and 12.3 show two such solutions, completed *nalpar* structures resulting from extensive workshops, conversations, and the pooled desires and labour of the villagers, Altaf, Rajkumar, Shantibai and Ghessuram.

In contrast to the site in Figure 12.1, the *nalpar* in Figures 12.2 and 12.3 feature wide and level concrete platforms. They drastically minimize possibilities for stagnant pools of water to gather, thereby reducing risks of malaria and dengue fever outbreaks. Additionally, each *nalpar* also contains resting zones for the water vessels to break the intensity of lifting, an action that otherwise unnaturally contorts the body. The thinking and design that went into this project effectively re-choreographed the movements of women's bodies in the daily cycles of water collection and carriage. The corresponding physiotherapeutic reconfiguration of bodies might be considered an altogether new (and more vital) assemblage produced as an act of collective creation.

Nalpar is, in fact, a feminist intervention, as Altaf (2012) herself acknowledges. The *Adivasi* women of Bastar have always been subject to 'a pervasive

Figure 12.3 *Nalpar* public artwork in Bastar, 2005, image courtesy of the artist.

scopic regime' (Kester 2011: 79), in common with women throughout much of the subcontinent. Altaf's *nalpar* are intentionally surrounded by high walls, which create zones outside of this scopic regime. The walls disrupt the territorial parameters of the male gaze, functioning as reclamation of public space for women, by women. *Nalpar* exploits a leakage point in patriarchal assemblages, creating a place for women to gather as groups and to feel *at home* as women. At the same time, the monumentality of the *nalpar* structures, in comparison to their nondescript predecessors, indexes the vital importance of these places of women's work to village life, signalling a revaluation of the women's side of the social division of labour in *Adivasi* life. Strategically, the project engages both men and women villagers in the construction of the structures, thereby *implicating* both men and women in this revaluation.

In the absence of adequate and consequential representation within the official framework of Indian politics, the *Nalpar* project operates in a mode akin to direct democracy. It is a form of political claims making and contention, in the first instance by women villagers concerning patriarchal living conditions, and in the second instance by *Adivasi* tribes concerning their material livelihood and well-being. *Nalpar* is remarkable in its consequentiality; it resulted in real improvements for *Adivasi* villagers, and ongoing transformations in the relations between men and women (mutations in gendered assemblages). How did Altaf, Ghessuram, Rajkumar and Shantibai accomplish all of this?

In line with what we know of the requirements of large-scale change,[8] Altaf and her collaborators' work in Bastar required the brokering of alliances among different groups, including collaborating *Adivasi* villagers, the *Nagar Palika* (municipal government office) and forest officials. It also involved stimulating and maintaining commitments to change, for example, at the level of beliefs and expectations held by different persons and groups towards each other. *Nalpar* is an exemplary social work because of its skilful and extended reliance on conversation and interaction rituals.

It is easy to imagine that we know all there is to know about conversation, since most of us engage in such interactions on a regular basis. The sociologist Erving Goffman, however, demonstrates that conversation rituals are complex, and involve a great deal more than just words. Goffman's (1967: 5) work usefully augments our understanding of Deleuze and Guattari's writings on 'faciality' and group formation.

> Every person lives in a world of social encounters, involving him either in face-to-face or mediated contact with other participants. In each of these contacts, he tends to act out what is sometimes called a line – that is, a pattern of verbal

> and nonverbal acts by which he expresses his view of the situation and through this his evaluation of the participants, especially himself. Regardless of whether a person intends to take a line, he will find that he has done so in effect ... The term face may be defined as the positive social value a person effectively claims for himself by the line others assume he has taken during a particular contact. Face is an image of self delineated in terms of approved social attributes – albeit an image that others may share, as when a person makes a good showing for his profession or religion by making a good showing for himself.

Social encounters do not simply happen as ineluctable facts of fate. For Goffman, brokering a social encounter involves 'face-work', a ritual process of identity production that is at once individual and social. Face-work does not refer to individual faces so much as it concerns the projection of desired or socially valorized self-images. Contrary to the wisdom of pop psychology, this is not simply a matter of projecting whatever self-image one wishes to. A community must always ratify a new member since, once a part of the community, the person's reputation may thereafter be tied up with that of the entire community.

When successfully performed, face-work results in what Goffman calls ritual equilibrium. It is only at this point that conversations may finally take place. Over repeated encounters, more enduring relationships may develop. On the other hand, if an individual does not live up to the face given, this disrupts an established equilibrium, placing all participants into a state of relational crisis necessitating repair. Face-work is thus a vital component in the emergence of new assemblages, as well as in the erosion of the identity of existing assemblages; it is a crucial 'cog' in the machinery of collective subjectivation. It does not cease upon the establishment of enduring relationships. As Guattari (2011: 75) reminds us, 'A voice is always related to a real, imaginary, or composite face', which is to say, face is omnipresent in conversation.

All this is the domain of Altaf, Ghessuram, Rajkumar and Shantibai's public practice – ephemeral encounters (interaction and conversation rituals), some of which, over time and at different rates, coalesce in concert with the daily life of a village to produce new assemblages, such as we have seen. The dynamism of these social exchanges, harnessed over several years, is what makes possible experimental mutations in group-being in *Adivasi* life. *Nalpar* is a form of creative place-making, to the extent that it stimulated and continues to stimulate self-organized improvements through artistic processes, making social spaces more habitable and existential territories more convivial. Such place-making constitutes schizoanalysis in action, in so far as the participants operated and continue to operate *critically* from within a locale and community,

to experiment with the leakage points in 'systems of modelisation' within which the communities are entangled, such that new subjectivities become possible at individual and collective levels of scale.

Aesthetics of collaboration

One of the harshest critics of collaborative practices that seek to improve living conditions in the world in recent times has been Claire Bishop. In an influential *Artforum* essay, she (2006: 180) disparaged the Turkish collective Oda Projesi's work in the following manner, 'their conceptual gesture of reducing the authorial status to a minimum ultimately becomes inseparable from the community arts tradition', while elsewhere 'the "do-gooding" impulses of … social practices in Liverpool, Los Angeles, San Sebastian, Rotterdam, and Istanbul were critiqued for their uncritical gestures of "responsibility"' (Jackson 2011: 47). In contrast, Bishop champions Phil Collins, Arthur Zmijewski, Jeremy Deller and Carsten Höller as 'collaborative' artists who have laudably resisted 'authorial renunciation'. She constructs a hierarchy of art that places 'social practices' at the bottom and 'aesthetic practices' at the top. In so doing, it would appear that she establishes a mistaken opposition between the social and the aesthetic.

Bishop's is a world where the authorial gesture of the individual artist is paramount. She makes the mistake of methodological individualism, assuming that authorial agency can only belong to individual persons. She cannot, it seems, conceive that large-scale social entities are also individuals, with a measure of their own autonomy, agency and identity, and might quite seriously be considered 'artists' in their own right too. Criticism of this nature, so reliant on judgement and the tendency to divide the world into oppositions or contradictions, means that the complexities and nuances of many public art projects will be overlooked, just as the complexities and nuances of collective authorship or creation have been missed.[9]

Certain social practices, particularly of the 'community arts' kind, break from traditions of thought in which the intentionality or agency of the lone artist is necessarily interwoven with the critical and aesthetic value of the works produced. This is certainly the case in the *Nalpar* project. What is sorely lacking in contemporary art theory and criticism is a concept of collective creation. We do, however, find much earlier conceptions of distributed artistic agency. According to the anthropologist of art Alfred Gell, many indigenous arts took place in ritual contexts, which is to say they were inherently social practices.

In certain traditions, such as *Ta moko* (Maori tattoo), it was always an individual person's *belonging* to a larger collective that was emphasized; through the *moko*, an individual 'achieved identification with the ancestors' (Gell 1993: 251). Creation in this case was less a personal affair than it was the manifestation of ancestral and collective agency and identity. Gell showed us the existence of a concept of collective creation quite different from what we find in aesthetic traditions that inform much of the debates on social art today. Consider how Maori understood their *marae* or meeting houses:

> The house was not a surviving trace of the ancestor's existence and agency at some other, distant, coordinates, but was the body which he possessed in the here and now, and through which his agency was exercised in the immediate present. At the same time, the house was a multiplicity of connected bodies, a bodily 'fractal' in Wagner's sense, since it consisted of the bodies of the ancestor's descendants, by genealogical succession, both living and deceased … The living members of the community, gathered in the house, were, so to speak, only 'furnishings' (Gell 1998: 253).

Gell's work raises questions about why it is so commonplace to conceive of artistic agency solely in individualistic (and humanistic) terms. Like that of Goffman, it augments our theory of critical and clinical expression. Schizoanalysis, after all, concerns experimentation with new forms of *collective* being, and the concept of assemblages displaces that of human 'deliberating subjects' (Guattari 2011: 156) in favour of all manner of subjectivities, organic and inorganic, at all levels of scale. From this point of view, collaborative creations, such as the many *nalpar* scattered across Bastar, have their own aesthetic value proper to their own level of scale and complexity. As collaborative works, they are more than the sum of their contributing parts because social interactions yield emergent properties. Furthermore, through cycles of interaction, the collaboration-assemblage acquires a degree of autonomy, and even an identity or style.

Where it concerns collaborative practices such as Altaf, Rajkumar, Shantibai and Ghessuram's, it makes more sense to speak of the 'authorial' gesture or style of a social individual rather than that of an individual person. Thus the full experience of each *nalpar* depends on an understanding of the significance of specific sets of signs, symbols and objects as they relate to the ritual and social functions of that community; it depends on entering into the shifting semiotic regimes of the different *Adivasi* village cultures.

Through participation, and by revitalizing 'minor' (indigenous) sign systems, *Nalpar* enabled *Adivasi* women to model themselves as groups to improvise

at the 'borders' of a patriarchal culture, to carve out public gathering places secluded from the gaze of men. It enabled *Adivasi* villagers to model themselves as resourceful, creative assemblages capable of self-healing and revitalization. The interaction and conversation rituals gave rise to *solidarity* and even to the creation of a financially self-sustaining arts organization, the Dialogue Interactive Artists Association (DIAA) in Kopaweda. Quite literally, this public art project consisted of the invention of peoples and possible worlds. This brings us to another sense of aesthetics, another conception of art, which Deleuze (1989: 217) explains as follows:

> Art […] must take part in this task: not that of addressing a people, which is presupposed already there, but of contributing to the invention of a people. The moment the master, or the colonizer, proclaims, 'There have never been people here,' the missing people are a becoming, they invent themselves, in shanty towns and camps, or in ghettos, in new conditions of struggle to which a necessarily political art must contribute.

Such invention may as well characterize the work of art oriented around place-making, for is place-making, not about publics re-imagining, and ideally, reshaping locales to make them habitable, and even hospitable, for future generations? This is an aesthetics far removed from Bishop's. It does not care for judgements, or believe that authorship is somehow diluted when two or more people work together on an artistic project, but asks instead whether the art leads to an increase or decrease in vitality, and whether it lends itself well or poorly to the struggles of those concerned, especially those who have been dispossessed. It is a more relevant framework for the criticism of collaborative public works with ameliorative goals than that advanced by Bishop (or Bourriaud, for that matter).

The attunement to the social level of creativity is the *artistic* difference that Altaf and her collaborators bring to the table. It sets the *Nalpar* project apart from the work of NGOs and government agencies involved in development, aid and the provision of basic material necessities. *Nalpar* is especially interesting because it illustrates how *artists*, and not scientists, engineers, urban planners, government agencies or corporations, can act as motors for vital social transformation. This is not to dismiss the potential contributions of all these actors, but rather to highlight the pivotal role of artists in a successful place-making experiment, embedded within extremely challenging political-economic circumstances of historical and contemporary psychosocial violence, collective trauma and institutional disorders.

Conclusion

Contemporary art in the public sphere can help to remediate collective traumas most effectively when enough desire has accumulated, when collective efforts have become sufficiently concentrated, and when fault-lines in life negating systems of modelization are exploited as openings onto possibilities for entirely new subjectivities. In the above case study, groups of *Adivasi* villagers ceased to be powerless victims of external forces, including the Indian government and its military, Naxalite resistance fighters, and timber and mining corporations, becoming artists or artisans instead. By making it possible for individuals and groups to re-model or reinvent themselves, *Nalpar* unleashed previously untapped resources as well as emergent properties (such as solidarity), making *Adivasi* communities in Bastar that much more habitable, and their existential territories that much more bearable.

Schizoanalysis, reformulated as a theory of critical and clinical assemblages, and recast as a creative place-making practice, allows for new 'readings' and experiences of collaborative public art projects with social change agendas, evading prevailing theoretical tendencies in participatory or social art. It also issues a challenge to critics such as Bishop (and there are many), for whom authorial status or style is chained to the scale of individual persons, to make explicit their ontological assumptions, to explain why creativity must necessarily be limited to the human domain and personal scale.

Nalpar exemplifies a 'practice of thought at once ethical, political and therapeutic' (Rolnik 2013) .While also fundamentally aesthetic in so far as it involves the composition and decomposition of assemblages, it 'exceeds the field of art' to concern 'education, psychiatry, all the domains of social life' (Guattari 2011: 44). Perhaps creative place-making serves as a better concept than art in our times, for it concerns the fundamental conditions for the thriving of life. This seeking and tapping of vitality or vital potential, and the con-formation of artists with this vitality, is not a Deleuzian and Guattarian secret (as the *Nalpar* project shows us), even if they, among Western philosophers and clinicians of their generation, have done more than most to give to this vitality the highest regard. What Deleuze and Guattari do, though, is to enable us to better understand, experience and value creative practices around us that are allied with this vitalist commitment.

Notes

1   These social arrangements constitute *individual wholes* and exist in nested sets across spatiotemporal scale. The concept of the assemblage allows us to circumvent the reductionism of methodological individualism and holism.

2   For our purposes, publics are constituencies and the spaces, rituals, material and historical inheritances these entities collectively share. Often the term is used synonymously with 'the commons', 'the people' and 'the state', with the assumption that we can speak of such entities in general terms, people in general, the state in general, and so on. It is preferable to discuss *individual* peoples, states and commons, rather than generalities, because the latter are by nature relevant to no one, that is, relevant to no one individual person, state, or commons. This also means that we can avoid situations where a generality like 'the commons' masks asymmetrical relations between different publics or commons, exploitative relations whereby the arts and artefacts of numerous indigenous cultures around the world have ended up in The British Museum, to name just one institution, primarily for the benefit of British publics.

3   Altaf herself makes no claims about her artistic practice as schizoanalysis, nor is she especially familiar with the schizoanalytic literature.

4   Social practices, and those that attempt to effect social transformations for different publics, cannot really be considered 'new' in the history of art, at least, not if one has expanded this history to include regions such as Asia and Oceania. If the anthropologist Alfred Gell (1998) is to be believed, many indigenous cultures from these regions and elsewhere practiced art as social systems of action intended to transform the world.

5   Public art is art made by, for, or in one or more constituencies, typically *outside* formal art institutions such as galleries and museums. For some, the term may bring to mind public monuments, statues of leaders of the past or memorials to the war-dead (e.g. Maya Lin's Vietnam Veterans Memorial). For others, it brings to mind 'community art' aimed at social care or improvement (e.g. village theatres for HIV/AIDS education). Research into over 140 projects across the world for the inaugural International Award for Public Art (Becker 2013) suggests that contemporary public art practice is extremely diverse, including murals, sculpture, installation, performance, social activism, space conversion and urban renewal projects. What all these projects share, however, is an emphasis on the place-making, and thus social, dimension of art.

6   This self-chosen designation displaces the categories created by British administrators in colonial India, describing these peoples as 'aboriginals', 'early tribes' or 'jungle tribes'. (Bhukya 2008: 103).

7   DfID, the British government's Department for International Development, is implicated in land grabs, in partnerships with various multinational corporations (MNCs) in Asia as well as Africa and Latin America (Kapoor 2013: 17).

8   '(T)he larger the spatial scale of the change, the more extensive the alliances among the people involved have to be, and the more enduring their commitment to change has to be' (DeLanda 2006: 42).

9   The very notion of 'authorship' is problematic when applied to the entire domain of artistic expression, since it over-privileges the literary or linguistic.

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Index