Deleuze/Guattari and the Arts



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Intensities and Lines of Flight

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Deleuze/Guattari and the Arts

Edited by Antonio Calcagno, Jim Vernon
and Steve G. Lofts

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Contents

Abbreviations

AO	Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, trans. Mark Seem, Robert Hurley and Helen Lane (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1983).
C1	Gilles Deleuze, *Cinema 1: The Movement-Image*, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986).
C2	Gilles Deleuze, *Cinema 2: The Time-Image*, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Robert Galeta (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989).
DR	Gilles Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, trans. Paul Patton (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994).
KF	Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *Kafka: For a Minor Literature*, trans. Dana Polan (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986).
L	Gilles Deleuze, *The Logic of Sense*, ed. Constantin V. Boundas, trans. Mark Lester (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990).
LS	Gilles Deleuze, *Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation*, trans. Daniel W. Smith (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2004).
PS	Gilles Deleuze, *Proust and Signs*, trans. Richard Howard (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000).
TP	Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, trans. Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987).
WP	Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *What Is Philosophy?*, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Graham Burchell (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994).

Introduction

In his work on Proust, Gilles Deleuze asks, "What is an essence, as revealed in the work of art? It is a difference, the absolute and ultimate Difference. Difference is what constitutes being, what makes us conceive being. This is why art, insofar as it manifests essences, is alone capable of giving us what we sought in vain from Life"[1]. These essences are individual and they individualize. Art, then, can be said to do this as well. Deleuze remarks, "But what is an absolute, ultimate difference? Not an empirical difference between two things or two objects, always extrinsic. Proust gives a first approximation of essence when he says it is something in a subject, something like the presence of a final quality at the heart of a subject: an internal difference. . . . In this regard, Proust is a Leibnitzian: the essences are veritable monads, each defined by the view point to which it expresses the world, each viewpoint itself referring to an ultimate quality at the heart of the monad"[2]. We see in this early work the anticipation of what is to come with Deleuze's philosophy of multiplicity, the event and sensation as they relate to art. Deleuze sees works of art as individuated subjects insofar as they are not to be subsumed under the traditional objectifying and unifying rubrics of styles, genres and kinds, all typical ways we understand individual works of art as belonging to a school or form of expression. Such groupings obscure and even take away the very unique intensity of a work of art. Its very individuation, concretized in sensation and by its giving to us that which cannot be given by Life alone, manifests the work of art as a unique or different being. This is what Deleuze calls the essence of an artwork. If we take seriously what Deleuze says, we no longer have movements and styles of art; rather, we have a multiplicity of different artworks, each marked with its own unicity or essence.

Later in his life, Deleuze's collaboration with Félix Guattari had profound implications for his theory of art. Deleuze himself remarked that the collaboration of the two thinkers was so intimate that it became impossible to tell what properly belonged to whom, and even their single-authored works bear the considerable imprint of the other's ideas. The chapters assembled here pay close attention to the individual as well as collaborative works of both philosophers, always making clear what is properly collaborative, understood as Deleuze-Guattari, and what is proper to each philosopher alone.

The last decade has witnessed a veritable explosion of studies devoted to exploring the philosophical contributions of Deleuze and Guattari to the philosophy of art. While one finds a larger number of books devoted to cinema[3] and literature[4], the two media to which Deleuze most often returns in his own thinking, volumes on performance[5], architecture[6] and Deleuzo-Guattarian aesthetic concepts[7] have also appeared. This volume differs from already published works in two significant ways. First, we bring together both theorists and art practitioners to reflect upon Deleuze and Guattari's work. True to the differentiating and pragmatic spirit of Deleuzo-Guattarian philosophy, we present theorists informed by artistic practice, as well as artists informed by aesthetic theory. Thus, the intersection of theory and practice is one of the central foci of this collection. Second, it presents a diverse set of critical analyses of Deleuze and Guattari in relation to a multitude of art forms, rather than focusing on one art form or theoretical framework. Many excellent studies of Deleuzo-Guattarian aesthetics have been produced[8], although many remain within the purview of Deleuze and Guattari's own theoretical commitments[9]. By treating a wide variety of artistic media through a panoply of theoretical lenses (philosophy, art history, communication studies and literary theory), as well as including texts by working artists and curators, we have produced a multi-themed, interdisciplinary and international collection of chapters on Deleuzo-Guattarian aesthetics that serves to complement the existing literature by adding both practical applications and critical challenges to their philosophy of art.

Although volumes exist that focus on a number of arts, especially film, dance, poetry and the digital arts[10], the volume here extends what we already have by investigating drawing, installation art, curatorial practices and Indigenous art, amongst other fields. By including contributions from Alphonso Lingis, Dolleen Manning, Dorothea Olkowski and other philosophers who, although admiring of Deleuze and Guattari, also show key limitations in their work, this volume challenges much of the predominant literature on both thinkers. Amongst the excellent recent publications[11] that focus on Deleuze, Guattari and the arts, one also finds studies that focus on the relation between politics and art. Although our volume touches on certain political themes, its focus is more aesthetic than political. Finally, our book does not concentrate on the relation between ontology and art[12], nor does it look at aspects of contemporary art in the same way as does the volume edited by Stephen Zepke and Simon O'Sullivan called *Deleuze and Contemporary Art*[13]. Given that contemporary art is so vast and diverse, we feel that our volume can also contribute to theoretical issues and artistic practices in the arts today.

Most of the chapters that compose this volume were initially written for and presented at a conference called "Intensities and Lines of Flight: Deleuze, Guattari and the Arts", held at the Centre for Advanced Research in European Philosophy at King's University College, London,

Canada, in May 2012. Other papers were solicited from various scholars and artists, mindful of the thematic parameters discussed above. The first part of the book focuses on Deleuze and Guattari's aesthetic theory, examining such issues as sensation, performance, perception, reception and time. The chapters do this from two specific vantage points: either they look at specific Deleuzo-Guattarian aesthetic concepts and bring them into direct discussion with other philosophical problems (for example, that of time and the duration of the past) or they focus on specific aspects of Deleuze and Guattari's philosophy of art, critically challenging certain key assumptions, including those surrounding representation and perception. Central here are methodological considerations in aesthetic theory, usually informed by specific artistic practices or works. The second part of the book focuses on the application of Deleuzo-Guattarian concepts to diverse artistic practices, including television, drawing, architecture, literature and cinema. By engaging artists and philosophers, we hope to present not only critical appraisals of Deleuzo-Guattarian aesthetic theory but also its effects on artists working in diverse fields, including architecture, drawing and installation art. Here, the reader will see how artists and curators working in and with different media both interpret Deleuze and Guattari and challenge their respective claims on, for example, subjectivity, the nomad, difference and even repetition: artistic practices manifest potential limits of Deleuzo-Guattarian aesthetic theory.

Jay Conway's chapter opens the volume, setting the stage, as it were, by exploring the general framework of Deleuzian aesthetics. In his chapter, "The Role and Place of Art in Deleuze's Philosophy", he claims that the conjunction "Deleuze and art" brings to mind two features of Deleuze's system. Conway explains how, first, Deleuze defines art as a practice of building "blocs" or compounds of sensations, which are percepts and affects: individual works of art, then, are blocs or compounds of sensations. The second feature concerns the degree to which Deleuze references pieces of art: novels, poems, plays, paintings, musical compositions and films. Countless allusions to and citations of aesthetic sensations populate Deleuze's writings. Conway underscores the importance of seeing each feature as philosophy in the Deleuzian sense of the word. Just as art is the practice of creating sensations, so philosophy is the practice of creating concepts. Deleuze distinguishes art from philosophy and its concepts, but Conway shows how art comes to condition philosophy itself: concepts can become art. By closely examining Deleuze's treatment of Bacon and texts of the *Logic of Sensation*, Conway demonstrates how the aforementioned classic Deleuzian distinction must be read as a mutually conditioning relationship between art and philosophy.

If the concept is important to philosophy and art, as Conway shows, then Jay Lampert's chapter, "Do Sheets of Past Exist?", shows us how a specific concept—namely, sheets of past—manifests the intimate relation-

ship between philosophy and art. The chapter looks at Deleuze's writings on cinema, especially his analysis of Orson Welles's *Citizen Kane*. Deleuze uses the unique flashbacks in *Citizen Kane* to develop his concept of "sheets of past". The concept of the pure past (*Aion*) is rendered audio-visible, and explored and manipulated, in the plastic medium of film. Deleuze's aim is, in part, to give a uniquely cinematic analysis of time (involving depth of field, sequence shots and "radiophonic centres"); in part to give a general aesthetics of time (in terms of character development and percepts); and in part to give an onto-phenomenological analysis of time (memory and the past as such). The concept of sheets of past is one of Deleuze's most brilliant inventions, according to Lampert. But each element in the theory is a quagmire. Lampert focuses on Orson Welles's radio plays as well as Deleuze's preferred illustration (the "Susan's suicide attempt" scene in *Citizen Kane*) and argues that we have a difficult time deciding whether sheets of time exist, or whether they are perceptible at all. If sheets of past are like Henri Bergson's pure memories, they are perceivable not in any present, but rather in the past. How can such things exist in a movie? Here, Lampert mines aesthetic theory in order to provide an account for the possibility of the past. Ultimately, Lampert's chapter shows how Deleuzian aesthetics possesses a specific temporality.

The next two chapters of part I examine the concepts of presentation, representation, reception and perception, all keys elements in Deleuzian aesthetic theory. Jim Vernon's contribution, "Deleuze on the Musical Work of Art", argues that while Deleuze's discussions of music tend exclusively to examine works of composed, "serious" music, most treatments of his philosophy of music focus on examples tied to individual spontaneity and/or social assemblages (e.g., jazz and techno), thus suggesting that his theory of music is as effectively (or better) illustrated by music intimately tied to concrete performance. By shifting emphasis from the concept of the refrain, or *ritornello*, to that of the percept, Vernon argues, against the received view, that Deleuze's theory of musical art requires the subtraction of works from both performance and reception. He also discusses some limitations of this view.

David Fancy's "Deleuze and Guattari, Architecturality and Performance" reflects on the primacy of architecture and performance by looking at one of Deleuze and Guattari's more interesting claims: "Art begins not with the flesh but with the house. That is why architecture is the first of the arts" (WP 186). Fancy examines the notion that Deleuzo-Guattarian aesthetics necessarily involves hierarchies of the arts. The aforementioned statement by Deleuze and Guattari, made partway through the chapter on the constitution of art in their final collaboration *What Is Philosophy?*, is read as a challenge: a call to demonstrate that in fact *other* arts—be they the result of human or of other-than-human expression—have from an immanentist vantage point some form of claim to prece-

dence *over* architecture, to being first on the "dance card" of the artistic originary. Fancy writes, "Specifically, I am wondering how the confluence of architecturality and flesh might be explored when considering the question of acting, of human embodied—or indeed *enfleshed*—performance. In turn, how might the philosophical considerations around the artful flesh's own architecturality, following a number of the recursive lines of inquiry opened up within Deleuze's *Difference and Repetition* and related texts, resonate with what might be described as the performative elements of thought or, in effect, the performative elements of ontology?" Ultimately, Fancy contemplates what it means for us to think of the enfleshed artist in terms of architecturality and other related concepts that foreground onto-genetic production.

The last two chapters of part I deal with conceptual applications, but not from the vantage point of artistic practice; instead, they look at how Deleuze applied his own concepts to works of art. The authors offer critical assessments of Deleuzo-Guattarian aesthetic theory and approaches to art. Alphonso Lingis's chapter, "Concepts and Colours", examines Deleuze's reading of the painter Francis Bacon. While he admits that Deleuzo-Guattarian aesthetic theory presents a view of what it is to create and view art, Deleuze's use of Bacon also makes manifest certain limits that a philosophy of art must take into account—namely, history and biography. By mining the history and biography of Bacon, Lingis shows how the central concept of becoming is given another valence that Deleuze ultimately must acknowledge as vital for understanding art.

Dorothea Olkowski's "Birth in Beauty and the Power of Sensation" investigates the limits of an aesthetics built upon sensations, looking at the work of artists like Sally Mann to argue for a broader understanding of sensation and the beautiful. She establishes a parallel between Wilhelm Worringer's critique of empathy in art and Deleuze's own dismissal of art as representation. She writes, "This repudiation arises out of the uncanny amalgamation of organic empathy and non-organic abstract form, out of which is created a type of art characterized by the so-called Northern line. This is the art to which Worringer gives the name 'Gothic'. Following Worringer, it is precisely this Northern line, with its broken trajectory, that Deleuze calls upon in his book, *Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation*". Drawing upon the work of Henri Bergson and the photographer Sally Mann, Olkowski takes a critical view of Deleuze's notion of art based on sensation. She argues that art based only on sensation is inferior; instead, we need to understand art as suggesting emotions that communicate a multiplicity of sensations, feelings and ideas, which may be called beautiful. Olkowski urges us to rethink the category of the beautiful in and against a Deleuzian aesthetic framework.

Part II looks at the complications that arise from applying Deleuzo-Guattarian aesthetics to artistic practice. Jac Saorsa's contribution, "Drawing Out Deleuze", examines what it means for her as an artist to

"draw out" such Deleuzian concepts as the "nomad". She looks at themes of multiplicity and diversity, especially as elaborated in Deleuze's earlier work, *Difference and Repetition*. We have included some of her drawings in this volume to give concrete examples of what she intends by her own reception of Deleuze into her own artistic practice of drawing. Here, one feels and senses the intensities and lines of flight that mark Deleuzo-Guattarian aesthetics.

Marian Tubbs, an installation artist, meditates on the prevalent view that Deleuze and Guattari consider contemporary art as derivative or even the antithesis of art, as the very structure of sensation is subverted. Tubbs uses aesthetico-politics to examine assemblage-based installations to show how such contemporary art can be read within the Deleuzean discussion of difference. Important here is Manuel De Landa's understanding of Deleuzian "new materiality" as a method of relating to the world for the creation of assemblages. The installation works discussed mark the experience of the finitude of the world and thus, Tubbs argues, reveal practices that have a greater chance of establishing "difference" and "the new".

Gary Genosko's chapter, "Transversal Television: For Guattari, by Kafka", focuses on the television arts. This contribution concentrates on a text by Guattari on Kafka and argues that the affects that Kafka saw at play in his own work can be transmitted through Guattari's own work with television. Genosko examines the ambivalence of Guattari's analysis of television, mining its resources, but he also looks at how certain experiments in television, including Telestreet and the *télé-auteur*, can assist us in re-conceiving TV along Guattarian lines. Genosko writes, "Rather than taking the route of connecting minor with autonomous media experimentation, such as the bold example of Telestreet (or Telestrada), which, by teaching many 'how to do television', made it minor and culturally and politically liberatory . . . I turn elsewhere. Instead, the long-standing but recently renovated idea of the *télé-auteur* working in a creative capacity for the small screen has been in circulation in Europe for many decades, and has recently found a new place in discussions of American specialty cable networks and select series".

David Jarraway examines literary production in his chapter, "'In Any Event': A 'Literary Resonance' between Painting and Architecture". As a non-relational relationship between various pairs or binaries, the "resonance" that he explores is that between "house" and "home" in the context of American literature. In *What Is Philosophy?*, for instance, Deleuze and Guattari remark, "Everything begins with Houses", and they further suggest that the ironization of the house in American fiction is part and parcel of an attempt to "dissolve the identity of the place"—and, by implication, human identity—"through variation with earth". Jarraway's own allusions to such dissolution are to the recent American fiction of Joyce Carol Oates and its resonant implication in both the contemporary

architecture of Frank Lloyd Wright and the painting of Edward Hopper attended to by Oates.

Deleuze and Guattari often use the concept of architecture in different and provocative ways, especially in relation to the question of the hierarchy of the arts. Bryan Norwood's chapter, "Working on a Diagonal: Towards a New Image of Architectural History", examines their aesthetic theory in relation to the practice of architecture and establishes a rich relationship between life, history and architecture. He argues that when life becomes distanced or alienated from itself, this is not to be understood purely in negative terms, as it could also be a sign that a new epoch may be beginning. He sees this move echoed in architecture and the history of architecture. Norwood contends,

> The displacement of life from itself can be read in the irrational breaks of historical stratification. It is expressed in a number of ways, but we encounter this displacement most readily in architecture that clearly exceeds its epoch, in architecture that not only is for its time but also makes its own time, in architecture that engages what Deleuze calls the "power of the false" to produce new ways of thinking. Rather than Giedion's constituent facts or merely unending contingent facts, the historian must think *unconstituent facts*, facts that are neither the unity of architecture nor its particular contingencies. The encounter with the extraordinary in history allows the historian to move along a diagonal, to think the virtual displacement of life through the actual displacement of architecture and to open up new differentiations of life for new, creative actualizations.

Dolleen Manning's chapter, "The Becoming-Human of Buffalo Bill", sits at the important crossroads of Indigenous studies and visual art. Manning is an artist, theorist and curator, and she examines various works of art and how they rework the representation of Indigenous peoples: she sees in these reworkings not only traces of Deleuzo-Guattarian aesthetic theory but also the very transformation of the work of Deleuze and Guattari. She employs the artworks *Buffalo Bill*, *Buffalo Boy* and *Belle Sauvage* to set the stage for an encounter between *Anishinaabe* (original peoples of the Americas) and Western theory. Manning writes,

> This encounter is a meeting of radically different systems of thought, one of which has attempted to assimilate and eradicate the others, while at the same time appropriating and romanticizing them. On the side of the Wild West, in this analogy, is the concept "becoming-animal", elaborated in *A Thousand Plateaus*. In this text, itself a kind of performance, Deleuze and Guattari appear as contemporary versions of Buffalo Bill, caught undecidedly between colonial thought and their own transformations initiated by their anomalous Other, the Indian. On the one hand, becoming-animal represents an effort to re-conceptualize difference or its engagement by re-examining the concept of encounter through affect. On the other hand, while Deleuze and Guattari

> posit their theory of becoming as a shedding of privilege, it depends on that very privilege for the efficacy of its praxis. For Indigenous peoples, becoming-imperceptible and becoming-dispersed (aspects of becoming-animal) are by no means to be desired, since these processes are associated with colonial violence and its institutionalization.

Manning argues that the concept of the becoming-animal treads dangerous waters as it tries to navigate posthumanism as well as dehumanization. Ultimately, she shows that the romanticized terms of this concept naïvely overlook the deadly consequences of dehumanization and deterritorialization for Indigenous peoples while redeploying misinformation about them. Manning concludes, "Indigenous philosophies notably are neither humanist nor posthuman, but rather emerge as something else entirely. Becoming-animal negates both individual subjectivity and collective political agency, and reflects a subaltern position of incomprehensibility and unintelligibility into which Indigenous peoples have been swept up".

Rather than focus on a specific art form, we have gathered together chapters on a variety of art forms with the hope that the reader will see resonances and divergences across a multiplicity of artistic expressions, creating a dialogue between theory and practice in relation to art. Overall, we seek to stimulate further research into the validity of Deleuzo-Guattarian aesthetics in terms of both theory and practice; our hope is that philosophers and art practitioners alike can draw upon the resources presented here to advance our understanding of not only art but also two of its more recent, important interlocutors.

This volume would not have been possible without the help of all of our contributors. Special thanks also go to the Centre for Advanced Research in European Philosophy at King's University College at Western University, London, Canada. Steve Lofts, the Co-Director of the Centre, is gratefully acknowledged for his ongoing support and hard work. His love for philosophy and art is inspiring. The Principal, Dr David Sylvester, and the Academic Dean, Dr Sauro Camiletti, of King's University College have been instrumental through their generous support of the Centre's work and this volume. Loads of thanks go to Dr James Patten as well as Catherine Elliot Shaw of the McIntosh Gallery at Western University. Their enthusiasm and collaboration helped give birth to this volume. Allan Irving was wonderful in assisting us with the organization of the conference that gave shape to this volume. Finally, Dr Fadi Abou-Rihan, whose unending support saw this volume through to its completion, is gratefully acknowledged.

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NOTES

1. Gilles Deleuze, *Proust and Signs*, trans. R. Howard (New York: George Braziller, 1972), 41.
2. *Ibid.*
3. D. Martin-Jones and W. Brown, eds., *Deleuze and Film* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2012); Richard Rushton, *Cinema after Deleuze* (London: Continuum, 2012); and E. Holland, M. Smith and C. Stivale, eds., *Deleuze, Image and Text* (New York: Continuum, 2009).
4. L. Mills and B. Kaiser, eds., *Post-Colonial Literatures and Deleuze: Colonial Pasts, Differential Futures* (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012).
5. L. Cull, *Deleuze and Performance* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2009).
6. H. Frichot and S. Loo, eds., *Deleuze and Architecture* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2013).
7. J. Zdebik, *Deleuze and the Diagram: Aesthetic Threads in Visual Organization* (London: Continuum, 2012).
8. Most recently, Anne Sauvagnargues, *Deleuze and Art*, trans. S. Bankston (London: Bloomsbury, 2013).
9. For example, Ronald Bogue, *Deleuze on Music, Painting and the Arts* (New York: Routledge, 2003). See also Simon O'Sullivan, *Art Encounters Deleuze and Guattari: Thought Beyond Representation* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006).
10. For example, Brian Massumi, ed., *A Shock to Thought: Expression after Deleuze and Guattari* (London: Routledge, 2002).
11. For example, Elizabeth Grosz, *Chaos, Territoriality, Art: Deleuze and the Framing of the Earth* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008). The novelty of this work consists in its feminist and postmodern critique through the work of Luce Irigaray. See also Stephen Zepke and Simon O'Sullivan, eds., *Deleuze, Guattari and the Production of the New* (London: Continuum, 2008).
12. For example, Stephen Zepke, *Art as Abstract Machine: Ontology and Aesthetics in Deleuze and Guattari* (New York: Routledge, 2005).
13. Stephen Zepke and Simon O'Sullivan, eds., *Deleuze and Contemporary Art* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2010).

Part I

Aesthetics, Concepts and Critical Appraisals

ONE

The Role and Place of Art in Deleuze's Philosophy

Jay Conway

For Joe Elias Tsambiras, artist

The conjunction "Deleuze and art" brings to mind two features of Deleuze's system. The first is his definition of art: art is the practice of creating sensations (percepts and affects); individual works of art are blocs or compounds of such sensations (WP 164). The second is the degree to which Deleuze references pieces of art: novels, poems, plays, paintings, musical compositions and films. Countless allusions to, and citations of, aesthetic sensations populate Deleuze's writings. In what follows, I underscore the importance of seeing each feature as philosophy *in the Deleuzian sense of the word*. Just as art is the practice of creating sensations, so philosophy is the practice of creating concepts. For Deleuze, philosophical concepts warrant the title of "creation" because they depart from established positions—from intellectual habits. Given this gap between concept and habit, the reception of the former is invariably divided. On the one hand, there is what Deleuze calls the "academic" reception or "malicious stupidity": the concept is rendered familiar through the imposition of pre-existing coordinates[1]. On the other hand, there are "becomings". Concepts can serve as mediators; they can fracture intellectual habits *and* enable thought to be reorganized in novel ways. Here, too, the unfamiliar is rendered familiar. But *this familiarity* is indicative of the concept mutilating us, not us mutilating the concept.

DELEUZE'S METAPHYSICS OF ART: SENSATION

The most explicit and sustained appearance of Deleuze's definition of art is found in chapter 7 of his 1991 *What Is Philosophy?* (co-written with Félix Guattari). There are, however, several areas of convergence between this chapter and *Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation* published a decade earlier. These "zones of indiscernibility" include the notion of art as sensation, the connection between sensation and becoming, the concept of aesthetic athleticism and the view that art's problem is that of capturing the non-sensible forces that condition experience[2]. Furthermore, at precise (although surprising) moments in *The Logic of Sensation*, it becomes difficult to distinguish Deleuze's discussion of "matters of fact", "common facts", "force", the "body without organs", "catastrophe" and the Figure's relationship to time from passages in *Empiricism and Subjectivity*, *Spinoza: Expressionism in Philosophy*, *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, *A Thousand Plateaus*, *Proust and Signs* and "Michel Tournier or the World without Others" (WP 164, 172, 173; LS 14, 19–20, 31, 40, 48, 69). In short, Deleuze's definition of art is neither obvious nor simple. In its internal composition, and in the way it connects to other Deleuzian concepts, the concept of sensation possesses a tremendous density. A viable reconstruction of the concept would be a major undertaking. As a modest contribution to this effort, I would like to identify some of the concept's general features. Just as importantly, I want to do so in a way that underscores the concept's importance and originality.

Deleuze's definition of art is intended to be sufficiently general. It is intended to be valid for the history of art and valid across the different artistic mediums: "We paint, sculpt, compose, and write sensations" (WP 166; LS 48). Additionally, the definition's character is decidedly positive, metaphysical and normative. Understanding the concept of aesthetic sensations requires us to wrestle with each of these dimensions.

The negative determination of art is a longstanding tendency within philosophy. Frequently, philosophical definitions of art say very little about what art is; they only tell us what art is not. We find this tendency at work in Plato's opposition between the philosophical life and epic poetry—between authentic and counterfeit representations of justice. We find it in the logical empiricist use of the word "poetry": when grammatical correctness is confused with conveying propositional content, the result may be "non-sense" or "poetry". We see it in the deconstructionist or anti-foundationalist position that philosophy's delusions of grandeur should be contrasted with literature's honesty. If philosophies are advanced as authoritative explanations, literature is a self-consciously non-foundational enterprise. The anti-foundationalist *may claim*, however, to retroactively render philosophical writing and the history of philosophy honest. This is the theme of philosophy as art. This is the theme of philos-

ophy as literature, a variation on the theme of scripture as literature (words are neither sacred nor foundational).

These negative definitions of art—the counterfeit, the non-propositional, the non-foundational—delineate philosophy's relationship to art as one of straightforward opposition. Even the position that philosophy is literature is, in a sense, the view that a philosophy demystified is a philosophy that has become its opposite. At the same time, the relationship between philosophy and art is situated within the parameters set by the notion of representation and its critique. To be philosophical is to represent authentically the Idea, or to differentiate the Idea's representations from pseudo-representations (e.g., Platonism). To be philosophical is to determine whether a sentence is a proposition or pseudo-proposition, a representation or pseudo-representation (logical empiricism). To be philosophical is to mistakenly believe that one's words constitute a definitive representation (anti-foundationalism). As for literature, it is deemed the counterfeit representation—the simulacrum (Platonism) or the pseudo-proposition (logical empiricism). Alternatively, "literature" denotes writing that occurs at a distance from philosophy's representational aspirations, or philosophical writing following the deconstruction of its representational aura (anti-foundationalism).

Deleuze's positive definition should be seen as an effort to move us beyond the tendency to determine art negatively; it is one expression of Deleuze's aversion to and critique of "negativity". Aware of the limitations of thinking difference as opposition, and aware of the lines of reciprocal influence running between philosophy and art, Deleuze refuses to identify art as philosophy's inverse (WP 199). Similarly, for Deleuze neither philosophy nor art can be captured by the notion of representation. Neither practice should be understood as the production of representations. But stating that conceptual systems and compounds of sensations are not representations will not suffice. Deleuze's rejection of the distinction between representational and non-representational art ("no art and no sensation have ever been representational") is part of a larger critique of the notion of representation (WP 193). And this critique is thorough in that it challenges the belief that we can adequately define philosophy or art as the inverse of representation. Saying a work of art or a philosophy *is not* a representation tells us very little. Of course, part of representation's appeal as a notion is that it relates philosophical and artistic works to the world. For Deleuze, the goal is not to deny that such a relation exists, but to redefine art and philosophy in a way that illuminates their character, including their relationship to the world, with greater precision. The notion of representation suggests transcendence (the representation is outside of the world it represents), passivity (the representation is a duplication rather than a creation) and sterility (the representation records rather than impacts). Deleuze's definition of the philosophical concept and his notion of counter-actualization provide a positive alter-

native to the view that philosophies relate to the world by representing it. The notion of sensation and the notion of extracting, wresting or liberating sensations provide a positive alternative to the view that art relates to the world by representing it.

The language of Deleuze's presentation suggests that sensation is a metaphysical or ontological concept. First, he repeatedly characterizes the work of art as a kind of entity—a being of sensations (WP 164–65). The question "What is a sensation?" is actually "What kind of being is a compound of sensations?" or "What kind of entity is a work of art?" Second, in answering this question, Deleuze employs the expression "in itself" (an expression drawn from the history of metaphysics). A work of art is a being that "exists in itself", a being whose "validity lies in itself", a being "preserved in itself" (WP 164). In terms of Deleuze's mediators, the reader is reminded of Spinoza's definition of substance as what is in itself and conceived through itself[3]. Spinoza's definition was itself an echo of the kind of language historically used to link substantiality to ontological independence[4]. Deleuze's allusion to Spinoza is reinforced through his incorporation of a phrase from part 1 of the *Ethics*: there is "roughly the same relationship between the barking-animal dog and the celestial constellation Dog"[5]. Both Spinoza and Deleuze invoke the notion of equivocal meanings in order to underscore an ontological gap. In the *Ethics*, the analogue of the referential distinction between canine and constellation is the distinction between substance and mode, or God and man[6]. In *What Is Philosophy?*, the operative distinction is between aesthetic sensations and lived experience. Taking the phrases "being" and "in itself", as well as the echoing of Spinoza, as our lead, let us see if we can discern the basic contours of Deleuze's metaphysics of art.

For Spinoza, a being is only in itself and conceived through itself if the explanation for its existence, character and effects lies within it. If you explain a substance by appealing to an external principle, you contradict the very notion of substance as something that is in itself. Similarly, Deleuze elaborates on the "in itself" by describing blocs of sensations as "autonomous", "self-sufficient", "self-positing" and "standing on their own" (WP 168). In the *Ethics*, of course, Spinoza develops his definition of substance into the view that there can only be one substance, a substance whose relationship to everything else is that of an immanent cause. His opening statement—substance is in itself—becomes the position that everything else is within the one thing that is in itself. When Deleuze defines the work of art as a being in itself, the point is simply that true art possesses a certain kind of ontological independence relative to its outside. Referencing the outside risks concealing this independence.

Having stated that a being of sensations is in itself, Deleuze goes on to assert its independence from any external being that may have served as its "model", from the spectator (the viewer, listener, hearer or reader) and from its creator (the artist) (WP 163–64). Sensations are also deemed

independent of lived experience in general. Lived experience includes the voluntary or involuntary recollection of lived experience and "opinion", which Deleuze defines as a function of lived experience (WP 164, 167, 170–71, 174–76). In his analysis of Bacon's art, Deleuze distinguishes between the sensation and the figurative. The non-figurative status of sensation includes its independence from "the lived body", and from the "figurative givens" that saturate the canvas *prior to* the act of painting (LS 10, 12, 39, 71–75). These givens are visual clichés—ready-made images—governing both how and what we see. Summarily put, for Deleuze, the substantial, in-itself quality of artwork is concealed when we think of sensations as representations of other beings in the world or of lived experience, when we confuse sensation with opinion or when we fail to recognize the distance between true sensations and pre-fabricated images, sounds and words.

Let us take a closer look at the statement that a compound of sensations is independent of the artist. Clearly, the artist is responsible for bringing the compound into existence. Is the message, then, that creating is a matter of one being producing another that is spatially and temporally distinguishable? This is the point Sartre makes in the course of contesting subjective idealism. The reduction of objectivity to subjectivity, of being to being-perceived, is incoherent because one can only "conceive of a creation on condition that the created being recover itself, tear itself away from the creator in order to close in on itself immediately and assume its being"[7]. Although this line of interpretation is tempting, especially when Deleuze refers to aesthetic compounds as "standing on their own", it fails to capture his criterion of art. Spatial and temporal distinctness is not a sufficient condition for aesthetic independence. Moreover, it may not be a necessary condition. It seems to me that Deleuze's aesthetics can accommodate the notion of artwork that is both in itself (i.e., independent of the artist) *and* composed on or out of the artist's body. Consider, for example, the references to acting and performance art in *A Thousand Plateaus* (TP 274).

Percepts and affects are creations in a much stronger sense—a Bergsonian one. Creativity involves bringing something radically new into existence: *creation versus re-presentation*. Even the notions of realizing a pre-existing possibility or reserve of potentiality are incompatible with such a notion of creativity (the Deleuzian virtual is not potential)[8]. When Deleuze describes Proust's fiction as adding affects to the world, we should be reminded of Bergson's notion of interior, qualitative multiplicities (WP 175). These are genuinely novel, and thus unnameable, progressions of disparate, albeit interpenetrating, states[9]. The in-itself of beings of sensations is, therefore, their irreducibility to what pre-exists them. This includes the lived experience of the artist. In Spinoza's metaphysics, the notion of an external cause causing substance is at odds with the definition of substance as in itself. In Deleuze's metaphysics, the notion of a

sensation representing lived experience contradicts the in-itself character of beings of sensations. Moreover, Deleuze wants us to regard representations of lived experience as *extraordinarily derivative*. This is because he conceives of lived experience *as itself* derivative. Lived experience is *itself* a *re-presentation*. By "lived experience" or the "lived body", Deleuze means the dominant, entrenched structure of experience. In *The Logic of Sensation*, this structure is referred to as the order of clichés or figurative givens. These givens are not only "ways of seeing" but also "what is seen, until finally one sees nothing else" (LS 24). Lived experience represents or conforms to the order of the cliché. Deleuze's concepts of "opinion", "conversation" and "debate" are tied to this conception of lived experience[10]. An "opinion" is a generic viewpoint expressed by a generic subject. "Conversations" and "debates" involve an exchange of opinions or clash of opinions (i.e., platitudes).

There is a risk of confusing aesthetic independence with the view that works of art should be regarded as hermetically sealed vessels—as unrelated to other beings. After all, for Spinoza the in-itself character of substance entails the absence of an outside. But all art has an outside. There are multiple beings of sensations, and every being of sensations is surrounded by other beings. What needs to be recognized is the degree to which Deleuze's notion of aesthetic independence is actually a way of envisioning the relationship of art to other beings, particularly the beings who create or encounter art. The same is true of Deleuze's statement that philosophical systems are "self-referential" (WP 22). Here it is helpful to remember the way Deleuze's theory of being in *Difference and Repetition* scrambles Spinoza's concepts of substance and mode. Deleuze depicts individual beings as Ideas, substances, essences or problems (terms that function interchangeably). Recalling Spinoza's substance and its infinite, "really distinct" attributes, the Deleuzian Idea is an internally diverse immanent cause existing within a set of heterogeneous expressions. This, in fact, is how Deleuze delineates art history, contemporary art and Bacon's art in *The Logic of Sensation*. He presents each as a series of disparate actualizations of a virtual principal (or immanent cause), in which this principal is itself composed of different tendencies (it is a differential). As with Spinoza's modes, though, the Deleuzian Idea is open to an outside; it affects and is affected by surrounding entities.

In *What Is Philosophy?*, artwork is characterized as in itself, and philosophies are characterized as self-referential. These statements recall Spinoza's substance. The independence of a compound of sensations or network of concepts resides in its uniqueness (they are creations, not representations). Moreover, when Deleuze describes such a compound as in itself or self-referential, he is drawing attention to its systematic character. Deleuze argues that Bacon's paintings constitute a "highly precise system" (LS 9, 27). A sensation is related to the other sensations in the compound, and a compound of sensations is related to the other actual-

izations of the artist's Idea (an assemblage of virtual tendencies). Similarly, a concept is related to other concepts, and conceptual groups are actualizations of one and the same philosophical Idea or plane of immanence. But, like Spinoza's modes, artworks and philosophies are beings that are connected to external things, including the very things of which they are "independent". For the notion of representation, with its connotations of transcendence and sterility, Deleuze substitutes a vision of independence and becoming: a bloc of sensations or conceptual system is autonomous *and* operates as a term within a sequence of becomings. This explains the subtle, unannounced shifts that occur in Deleuze's discussion of "becomings" or "bodies without organs". At first the analysis is restricted to sensation, but very quickly it begins to move from art to artist, from art to audience.

The sequence of becomings can be reconstructed as follows. The production of art grows out of an artist's encounters in the world. In *What Is Philosophy?*, the artist is portrayed as "breathless" and "fragile"; the artist possesses "blood-shot eyes" because they have witnessed something "too great", "too much", "too unbearable" (WP 171–72). In *Proust and Signs*, the violence of contingent encounters elevates the faculty of writing to the level of urgency and necessity (one *has* to write, one *has* to create) (PS 95–97). A thread running through Deleuze's two books on Spinoza is the challenge of organizing one's environment in a way that is suitable for creativity, of increasing the likelihood of interactions that increase one's power to act and of decreasing the likelihood of interactions that diminish one's power to act[11]. In *What Is Philosophy?*, the artist searches for the right materials and procedure. This is not a struggle to represent the encounter, but rather a labour to create that is forced by the encounter. Just as the resulting sensations are irreducible to the experiences of the artist (a work of art that simply represented those experiences would not be a work of art), so it should not be confused with the experiences of its audience. A work of art is not art because it is experienced as such (Deleuze refers to the experience of art as an afterward) (WP 8). Moreover, the average experience of art and philosophy qualifies as lived experience. That is, it takes the form of a cliché rather than an encounter or becoming. But compounds of sensations *are* able to draw external beings into a relationship when those beings "have the strength for it" (WP 164, 175). This relationship is a becoming when the sensations trigger the reorganization of these other beings (when they alter how those beings act, see and feel). The artist creates and does so with a sense of necessity and urgency because of an overwhelming encounter in the world. In turn, we can be overwhelmed by what they create: art can be "too much", and art can be "unbearable".

To be a display of creativity rather than representation, there must be a gap between sensation and lived experience, percept and perception, affect and affection. This gap, however, does not preclude a deep connec-

tion. The difference can be a difference within the creative process. Thus, we find Deleuze portraying the artist as "extricating" or "wresting" sensations from lived experience; as "raising" perceptions to the level of percept, and affections to the level of affect; and as "liberating" the aesthetic Figure from figuration (WP 167, 170; LS 6). What is this act of extrication, wresting, raising or liberating? How does it illuminate rather than belie the distinction between sensation and representation? Deleuze seems to present us with more than one scenario. At one point, he suggests that affects and percepts *can be* "preserved" affections and perceptions. But lived experience that has been preserved is independent of lived experience and thus qualifies as a creation rather than representation. This is because an essential feature of affections and perceptions is their ephemeral, transitory character. Lived experience is the transition from one perception to another, or one affection to another. By contrast, sensations remain constant for as long as their material support (e.g., the canvas) endures. The duration of perceptions and affections (how long they are lived) has to be distinguished from the duration of the material support. And both of these durations have to be distinguished from the duration—the eternity—of sensations: "Even if the material lasts for only a few seconds it will give sensation the power to exist and be *preserved in itself in the eternity that coexists with this short duration*" (WP 166). Art preservation involves treating the material support (making the material support endure), but the work of art is itself a preserving—a "preserving in itself".

A second scenario turns on the distinction between lived experience and its ground. In the *Ethics*, Spinoza argues that sensory experience is composed of ideas corresponding to our body's modifications, and that the content of these ideas does not extend to the environmental forces responsible for these modifications[12]. In other words, what we regard as the experience of external bodies is really the experience of the alteration of our bodies. Deleuze invokes this theory of experience when, in *The Logic of Sensation*, he states that a "force must be exerted on a body" in order for experience to exist, and that experience "gives" something completely different from the forces that condition it (LS 48). A problem shared by all the arts, according to Deleuze, is that of rendering sensible this non-sensible, non-empirical ground of experience. Aesthetic sensations, therefore, do not represent lived experience. Rather, they capture the basis of lived experience: forces such as gravity, heaviness, germination, deformation, dissipation, coupling, isolation and so on (WP 181–82; LS 48–54).

A third scenario is found in Deleuze's detailed description of the creative process in *The Logic of Sensation* (WP 179; LS 80). A distinguishing feature of Deleuze's concept of art is the degree to which he emphasizes the *labour* of creating sensations—the difficulty of creating sensations. Like *Proust and Signs*, chapters 11–13 of *The Logic of Sensation* should be

read as a highly unorthodox contribution to the philosophical genre of methodological treatise. Deleuze redefines philosophy as a creative endeavour—as the creation of concepts. As a corollary, identifying the conditions of creativity becomes of singular importance: the conditions of creativity, not the conditions of recognition, representation or discovery. For this task, Deleuze considers a text like Descartes' *Discourse on Method* less useful than Proust's *In Search of Lost Time* or than *The Brutality of Fact* (Bacon's interviews with David Sylvester). Deleuze argues philosophers should listen far more carefully to artists when they talk about their work. This is, in part, because their words will often, directly and powerfully, address the challenges of creating[13]. Their description of the struggle to produce sensations aids philosophers wanting to detach themselves from the dogmatic image of thought: thought as recognition or representation, thought as a spontaneous act or as a voluntary conformity to *pre-existing methodological rules* (DR 129–67). Deleuze's discussion of method is also unorthodox because he repudiates the notion of a universal method. There are heterogeneous solutions to the general aesthetic problem of producing sensation. The rigor and precision of each of these techniques or solutions warrant calling them methods. The struggle to produce sensations is the struggle to find a method for producing sensations. Rather than establishing, or conforming to, "universal solutions", true artists develop their own unique "paths" (WP 167, 180; LS 76).

Deleuze does, though, use Bacon's interviews to formulate a general picture of the creation of sensations. And this picture can help us discern the third way in which the difference between affect and affection, percept and perception, can be a difference within the creative process. At one point in *The Brutality of Fact*, Bacon argues that experience is heavily shaped by the "assault that has already been made on one by photography and film"[14]. Throughout, he describes himself as operating with a stockpile of felt images[15]. But in the middle of developing a voluntarily selected image on the canvas, Bacon introduces chance or accident into the equation by throwing paint with his hands or scrubbing areas of the canvas[16]. No image is a reference point for these actions; as such, they represent a break with the stockpile of pre-existing images. According to Bacon, success turns on restricting these deliberate accidents to part of the canvas, and on being able to develop them into what he calls a "fact". The objective is to generate an order and appearance through utilized, developed accidents, and to have the appearance be a function of "irrational" or "non-illustrative marks" (i.e., marks that diverge from the obvious, photographic mode of depicting something). Bacon characterizes such an appearance as more immediate, poignant and real than the pre-existing image and mode of depiction[17].

Actively reading the interviews, Deleuze produces the concepts of figurative givens, diagram and catastrophe (LS 71–90). The work of creating sensations begins with a heightened sensitivity to clichés; the page,

canvas or the like is not a blank surface, but one overloaded with givens. The challenge is to engineer an "operative diagram". A diagram consists of moves and gestures that both negate the order of clichés (that produce "catastrophe") and suggest possibilities that can be developed into sensations. Producing sensations requires catastrophe, but it also requires a positive alternative to the cliché to emerge from the catastrophe. The risk, of course, is that the destruction is too modest (the cliché returns) or excessive (no sensations are suggested). In this respect, the concept of catastrophe in *The Logic of Sensation* is simply an aesthetic expression of the more general concept of catastrophe that Deleuze formulates in "Michel Tournier and the World without Others". The collapse of a structured, well-ordered "perceptual field" needs to be followed by a novel restructuring[18]. A successful critique (or act of destruction) is one that facilitates invention, not one that operates as an end in itself.

We are now in a position to grasp a third way that sensation can be related to lived experience within the creative process. Sensations develop out of the diagram—the partial negation or disruption of figurative givens. As Deleuze points out, the result may very well be figurative or representative in the familiar sense (LS 79). For example, we may be able to plausibly describe a compound of visual sensations as a picture of *x* or *y*. But when Deleuze states that art has never been representational, his point is that sensations are creations rather than representations. Sensations are in themselves, and their independence includes an independence from lived experience. But this statement of independence is more than a negative definition of art. When Deleuze states that art is not a representation, or that sensations are not representations of lived experience, he means the following: a compound of affects and percepts is made up of preserved affections and perceptions, *or* aesthetic sensations render sensible the forces behind lived experience, *or* sensations are extracted, liberated from the auditory and visual clichés governing lived experience.

A clear normative impulse runs through this positive definition of art—this metaphysics of art. The presence of clear aesthetic judgments in *What Is Philosophy?* is often overlooked (WP 164, 170–71, 198). Compounds of sensations, Deleuze states, are able to "stand on their own". They are able to stand on their own (or "hold up") because they are precise, organized departures from the formula, from generic experience, from the cliché. The independence of sensations is hard won; it is the result of an arduous process of trial and error. The fact that an object is referred to as "art" (by its producer, a spectator or the "art world") is not sufficient to make it a bloc of sensations. Deleuze uses the word "art" as he uses the words "philosophy", "reading" and "thought": in a highly restrictive, even combative, sense. Moreover, this is bound up with Deleuze's project of identifying the conditions of creativity (identifying the nature of the creative process). The production of sensations or concepts

requires a high degree of evaluation in the form of self-criticism. One of the most moving aspects of Bacon's interviews is the refrain "work": he tries to make something that works; most of what he makes fails to work; sometimes he destroys what works by trying to take it further[19]. For Deleuze, true artists and philosophers escape from the cliché, and do so by being severe ("so severe") with themselves and their work[20].

ART IN DELEUZE'S PHILOSOPHY

A striking feature of Deleuze's writing, at least since 1964's *Proust and Signs*, is the number of references it contains to specific works of art. The shifts in how Deleuze wrote philosophy (he did not have a single style or "taste") are also shifts in how art is referenced. The variation involves population, speed and duration. Some books contain no references to art and some focus on the work of one or two artists, while others are full of references to both art and artists. In individual texts, the movement between references can be slow or extremely fast. Similarly, the time spent discussing art in general, a particular artistic medium or a particular piece can be brief or extensive. For the present purposes, however, what matters is not this set of differences, but the difference between all of Deleuze's references and three familiar models of "philosophy on art".

In the first model, the philosopher, literary critic or art historian applies philosophical concepts to works of art. One component of this notion of application is the idea that the applied concepts are fully formed prior to, and independently of, their application. Another is the idea that application is in the service of comprehending art. Philosophy is applied to art—philosophy reflects on art—so that art can be understood. The second model is the notion of illustration. The philosopher uses art to illustrate concepts or positions. As with the notion of application or reflection, illustration suggests a pre-existing, fully formed theory. The difference lies in the function of the reference to art. In the first, philosophy is the means for understanding difficult art. In the second, art is the means for clarifying a difficult philosophical position. Of course, art is often used to illustrate utterly banal views (positions requiring no clarification). The third model is not so much a matter of philosophy referencing art as it is an attempt to dismantle the very distinction between philosophy and art. What I have in mind is the belief that philosophy should be considered a genre of literature as well as vague endorsements of "intertextuality" and "interdisciplinarity".

None of these models succeeds in capturing the place of art in Deleuze's philosophy. Both application and illustration involve a clear distinction between a pre-existing concept and a work of art: either the concept explains an external being or the concept and an external being are deemed analogous. In Deleuze's writings, though, the references are

essential to the very process of philosophy. They do not simply belong to the presentation of concepts—they are part of the construction of concepts. Furthermore, Deleuze rejects the view that philosophical concepts are needed for "reflecting on" or understanding art: "The only people capable of thinking effectively about cinema are the filmmakers and film critics or those who love cinema. Those people don't need philosophy to think about film"[21]. Deleuze's work on Bacon's art suggests a philosophical immersion in, and heightened receptivity to, Bacon's paintings *and* words (e.g., the interviews with Sylvester): "We do not listen closely enough to what painters have to say" (LS 81). Finally, Deleuze encourages us to think of his work with Guattari as a different way of writing and practising philosophy—a different way of creating and presenting concepts—rather than as literature or as a hybrid. In response to the query "Is *A Thousand Plateaus* literature?", Deleuze stated, "It's just plain old philosophy"[22].

In *Gilles Deleuze: Affirmation in Philosophy*, I argue that grasping the relationship between the apparently disparate metaphysics one finds in Deleuze's writings—grasping the integrity of his philosophical system—requires us to distance ourselves from habitual ways of thinking unity and difference. Moreover, I argue that the best tools for accomplishing this task are found within Deleuze's writings, particularly the definition of philosophy and philosophical systematicity formulated in *Empiricism and Subjectivity*, *Bergsonism*, *What Is Philosophy?* and *Difference and Repetition*. Throughout the book, I approach Deleuze's philosophy as an instance of what he calls a "problem", "Idea", "substance" or "essence".

The same strategy is warranted when it comes to understanding the role that art plays in Deleuze's philosophy. Readers immediately sense that familiar models—applying philosophy, illustrating philosophy and intertextuality—will not do. This is not to say they are able to articulate why the models fail, and they may ultimately retreat to the models. Here too, though, Deleuze comes to our aid. The best tools for understanding Deleuze's numerous references to art are found within his philosophical system. Three conceptual neighbourhoods (or groupings of concepts) are particularly relevant. The first is composed of the concepts of external relation and desiring production; the second, of the concepts of sign, encounter and becoming; the third, of the concepts of Idea, portrait and counter-actualization.

Art as Partial Object

Through Hume's philosophy, but also Proust's *In Search of Lost Time*, Whitman's poetry and Bacon's paintings, Deleuze privileges the notion of external rather than internal relations. To say a relation is external is to say that it cannot be explained without remainder by the content of the related terms[23]. For Hume, there is a mental relation between the idea of

smoke and fire (the impression of smoke leads to the idea of fire), but the basis for this relation is not the observation of a necessary connection between the two terms. Rather, it is the result of the principles of association organizing ideas of sensation (the experience of a constant conjunction of smoke and fire) into habits (the habitual association of the ideas of smoke and fire). Thus, external relations are produced rather than discovered: they are a difference (a new relation) established between the different (the heterogeneous terms).

According to Deleuze, there are aesthetic parallels to Hume's conception of subjectivity (the subject as a system of external relations). He describes the literature of Proust and Whitman as non-organic assemblages of fragments. Instead of a principle of unity beneath the parts, one that would render them parts *of* a whole, there are only moments of unification or synthesis *amongst the parts* (the whole is simply a part amongst other parts)[24]. Within *The Logic of Sensation*, Deleuze identifies Bacon's techniques for bringing together multiple figures in both the isolated paintings and triptychs. Drawing upon the interviews, he presents these as strategies for producing relations that avoid narration. And, in a clear allusion to and reworking of Hume's theory of relations, Deleuze calls the distinction between non-narrative and narrative relations the distinction between "matters of fact" and "relations of ideas" (LS 7, 55, 58).

This theory of relations reappears in *Anti-Oedipus* as one component of the concept of desiring production: the connective synthesis. The process of desire includes, and is primarily, the production of connections between "partial objects". The identification or interpretation of this process ("here is what all this connecting means") is simply a residual product of the process. To say the connections are established between parts, rather than wholes, is to say they cannot be explained without remainder by the role the parts play in any pre-existing wholes to which they belong. One of the remarkable features of the opening chapter of *Anti-Oedipus* is the way the presentation of desiring production is simultaneously a *display* of desiring production: the authors pull fragments from other texts and reassemble them into concepts (the *connective synthesis*), the names (the familiar and unfamiliar ones) they give to their concepts all drive home the distance between these concepts and established intellectual coordinates (the *inclusive disjunctive synthesis*), and this conceptual production occurs without preface and with few statements of clarification (the residual nature of the *conjunctive synthesis*).

The textual fragments are fragments because their appearance in *Anti-Oedipus*—the work they do in *Anti-Oedipus*—can be neither explained nor predicted by looking at their original setting. Many of these partial objects are drawn from the literary works of Beckett, Artaud, Proust, Miller, Burroughs and so on. One could never confuse these references to art with explanations or interpretations of art. One should not take them for

illustrations of pre-existing, fully formed concepts, but as essential features of the conceptual work being done (i.e., the production of concepts through connective synthesis). The aesthetic fragments are within the concepts, and this is why *Anti-Oedipus* may be confused for literature or a kind of philosophy-literature. But when a sensation is extracted and placed within a philosophy, it is transformed. The sensation is now a concept or conceptual component. The sensation is inscribed in a coherent, consistent philosophical system through the creation of a concept. Consider, for example, the reference to Artaud in *Anti-Oedipus*: "the body without organs". The reference is not an interpretation or explanation of Artaud's *To Have Done With the Judgment of God*. Deleuze and Guattari's body without organs is not a representation of Artaud's piece. At the same time, it is important to say that the reference to Artaud is not arbitrary, but rather extremely precise. Artaud's text includes an attack on what he calls the "organism", and a call to refashion the body; it includes a distinction between the body and how the body is organized[25]. But the notion of a body without organs in *Anti-Oedipus* is a component of the concept of desiring production, and this concept of desiring production is related to the other concepts in the book, particularly the concepts of Oedipus, capitalism and schizo-analysis. As stated in *What Is Philosophy?*, a philosophical concept is a structure defined by its "endoconsistency" (the arrangements of its components) and its "exoconsistency" (its relations to the other concepts in the system) (WP 18–19).

Art as Medium of Becoming

Let us now consider a related role played by Deleuze's references to art. In *Proust and Signs*, *Spinoza: Practical Philosophy* and *Difference and Repetition*, Deleuze, concerned with the conditions of creativity, develops the concept of encounter[26]. Instead of being spontaneous or voluntary, creativity is compelled through contingent encounters with signs. Signs are those entities (people, animals, artworks, etc.) that we cannot fail to notice, that draw us in, that we obsess over, that we urgently deepen our involvement with and that inspire creativity. To use the language of Spinoza, a mode encounters another mode that increases its power to act—that increases what it can do.

In *A Thousand Plateaus*, the view that invention requires contingent encounters is expressed through the concept of becoming (TP 273–75). The sign is the medium or mediator of becoming. And like the aesthetic diagram, an object serves as a medium of becoming when it facilitates the negation of an organization *and* the production of a new organization. The subject of becoming encounters an object that loosens or undoes his or her habitual way of thinking, perceiving, feeling, desiring and acting. At the same time, the object serves as a point of reference enabling the creation of a new organization, a new way of thinking, a new way of

perceiving, a new body. In Deleuze's reading of Tournier's *Friday*, Robinson's encounter with the title character is what enables him to be restructured; it is what enables him to avert "catastrophe" or the complete absence of structure[27].

As with the first conceptual neighbourhood (external relations and desiring production), we see in the second (sign, encounter, mediator, and becoming) the thought of structure tied to the thought of creativity. Creativity is the creation of relations; creativity is the process of restricting. How does this help us understand the place of art in Deleuze's philosophy? Deleuze's references to art are a measure of art's influence on Deleuze's philosophy. Deleuze was able to create his concepts because he had signs or mediators, and many of these were works of art. The references register the becoming-art within Deleuze's philosophy. They are not a matter of Deleuze imitating art, nor are they a matter of him moving away from philosophy towards art. If anything, Deleuze applies art to philosophy (the creation of concepts) rather than the converse. But the notion of application fails to capture the involuntary dimension of the becoming: it is the violence of the encounter with art that forces the creation of concepts.

Philosophical Portraits of Art

We have identified two functions of Deleuze's references to art. The reference can denote a sensation that has become a partial object by way of the connective synthesis. The sensation has been extracted from the aesthetic compound and transformed into a conceptual component. As a conceptual component rather than sensation, its identity is a function of the philosophical concept to which it belongs—the endoconsistency and exoconsistency of that concept. With the second, the reference to art names the encounter, sign or mediator of becoming. Through the reference, Deleuze is identifying the art that has elevated his production of concepts to the level of necessity: the art that made creating an urgent matter. Needless to say, Deleuze's references routinely perform both functions: they can name an aesthetic mediator, and they can name an element of this mediator that has become a conceptual component. As stated earlier, a compound of sensations fulfils the role of mediator when it forces creativity, and it serves as a reference point for philosophical creativity.

But what about Deleuze's book-length references to art: the books on Bacon's paintings, Proust's literature and cinema? With these books, it is extremely tempting to regard Deleuze's conceptual production as the production of an interpretation, explanation or representation. These formulas (the clichés or givens governing how we think about philosophy's relationship to art) need to be resisted, and the best way to do this is to

listen carefully to Deleuze when he describes his own creative process or methodology.

His point of departure is an encounter with art, and this encounter takes the form of an intimate involvement or heightened receptivity. One enters or is drawn into the work: distance is supplanted by a "unity of sensing and sensed" (LS 31). Similarly, one pays close attention to how the artist talks about his or her work[28]. As Deleuze states, the challenge is to produce concepts within this state of receptivity. He distinguishes concepts from simple descriptions of art and from "indeterminate", "emotional gushing"[29]. The obvious parallel is to Bacon's efforts to evade both figuration *and* an indeterminate abstraction; the diagram needs to erase the cliché and suggest possible sensations. In fact, just as Deleuze describes Bacon as extracting the sensation, so he describes his own task as extracting concepts[30]. Obviously, this language of extraction suggests that the concepts are, in a sense, within the work. Reinforcing this view is Deleuze's statement that artists' words (i.e., artists' reflections on their art) "suggest" the concepts that are "emanating from their work"[31]. The challenge, therefore, is to produce philosophical concepts of art that capture the concepts *within the art*. Better yet, the philosophical concept has to capture the nature of art, and this nature is a *non-philosophical concept*—an aesthetic concept.

What does Deleuze tell us about the aesthetic concept? Bacon's paintings *and* techniques are a concept in the sense of a "highly precise system" (LS 9, 27). In other words, the concept within a body of art is its principle of structure or organization. This concept is complex—it is composed of other concepts—and it enters into the composition of higher-order concepts. Thus, in chapters 12–14 of *The Logic of Sensation*, Deleuze locates the concept of Bacon's art within the concept that is contemporary painting; the concept of contemporary painting is located within the concept that is the history of painting; the history of painting is located within the concept that is art in general. Concepts within concepts, systems within systems: Deleuze's analysis ascends to the nature of art and descends to the level of the individual painting. Key phrases in this movement are "tendency", "co-existence" and "variation".

Deleuze agrees we can periodize Bacon's trajectory. But to simply divide Bacon's body of work into periods is comparable to regarding his triptychs as narratives to be read from left to right. To reach the level of the concept requires us to extract from the various periods the "perpetually present" or "co-existing" aspects (LS 27–30). Similarly, the differences between Bacon's isolated paintings and triptychs should be seen as secondary to "co-present" aspects: "even the isolated painting are, more or less visibly, composed like triptychs" (LS 70). Concepts are, therefore, assemblages of different unifying (co-existing) aspects. Each aspect is a tendency, and a tendency is a variable or variation (LS 62). Therefore, an aesthetic system is a concept composed of different, abstract tendencies.

These tendencies are abstract because they only exist *within* a concrete series of heterogeneous actualizations. This means that Deleuze's definition of art (a work of art is a being of sensations) is folded into his general theory of being. To be is to be an Idea, substance, essence or concept. To be is to be a *differentiation* (a set of heterogeneous, but interrelated, tendencies) that is *differenciated* (the heterogeneous actualizations of this virtual or immanent cause) (DR 209). Deleuze regards art (the production of sensations), the history of painting (the production of visible sensations), contemporary painting (the escape from figuration) and Bacon's painting (the extraction of a Figure from an operative diagram) as beings: as *differenciations* of *differentiations*.

The philosophical concepts that Deleuze produces under the influence of Bacon's art are intended to capture the concept that is Bacon's art. Why is it a mistake to regard these philosophical concepts as explanations, interpretations or representations of the aesthetic concepts? On the one hand, the traditional notions presuppose a certain distance between commentary and subject: a clear distinction between representation and represented. But, for Deleuze, the goal is to produce an analysis that is *extremely close* to the aesthetic subject. The philosophical concept is suggested by the artist's own words, and it can only be formed when one is immersed in the art (when one is inside of the art). The philosophical concept should, in a certain sense, be the aesthetic concept; it should be identical to the art; it should repeat the art. On the other hand, explanation or interpretation suggests a lack of distance in the sense of creativity: the commentary re-presents rather than creates. But, for Deleuze, the distance between the philosophical concept and the aesthetic system *is too great* to be captured by the notion of representation. Any true philosophical concept is a display of creativity.

Where do the proximity and distance, the repetition and difference, between the philosophical concept of art and art itself reside? The concept that is a system of art is the concrete universal; the heterogeneous, abstract tendencies constituting the concept exist *within* the concrete works of art. The defining, co-existing tendencies of Bacon's art exist within his various paintings. The formation of the philosophical concept requires an act of counter-actualization: the tendencies are extracted from their concrete expressions (the various paintings) and re-inscribed within a philosophical system[32]. The tendencies are now in the philosophical system, but as philosophical concepts rather than sensations. As philosophical concepts, they can only be understood by considering their overall place within the philosophical system.

Therefore, Deleuze encourages us to see *The Logic of Sensation* as the counter-actualization of Bacon's system: as an act in which he incorporates Bacon's system into his own. Of course, he does not put Bacon's paintings into his philosophy; instead, he puts the concept (the virtual tendencies) that these paintings actualize into his philosophy. But this

"putting into" is a display of creativity. The system of art is now a complex philosophical concept: it exists independently of the aesthetic actualizations, and operates in relationship to the rest of Deleuze's system. Furthermore, Deleuze's concept of art and commentaries on art are aesthetic actualizations of the Idea that constitutes *Deleuze's own system*. *The Logic of Sensation*, for example, is a concrete actualization of the abstract tendencies at the heart of Deleuze's philosophy: to identify the conditions and risks of creativity, to circumvent habitual forms of unity and difference.

This is the third way that art is referenced within Deleuze's philosophy. The "reference" is, in fact, a portrait: a philosophical portrait of art. Like Bacon, Deleuze regards portraiture as a combination of extreme fidelity and creativity, repetition and difference[33]. Deleuze constructs a portrait of art when he fashions concepts that simultaneously repeat the art and his philosophy. The concepts are an aesthetic Idea (a system of art) that has been counter-actualized (i.e., rendered philosophical). The concepts are a novel actualization of Deleuze's Idea (the heterogeneous tendencies constituting his system's immanent cause). The concepts are a true *philosophy of art*.

NOTES

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1. Jay Conway, *Gilles Deleuze: Affirmation in Philosophy* (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2010), 6–7, 107–25, 221–22. See also Gilles Deleuze, *Negotiations*, trans. Martin Joughin (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), 90.

2. WP 164, 172, 173, 181–82; and Gilles Deleuze, *Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation*, trans. Daniel W. Smith (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2003), 14, 19–20, 31, 40, 48, 69.

3. Baruch Spinoza, *Ethics*, trans. Samuel Shirley (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1992), part 1, definition 3.

4. In the *Categories*, 2a11–b6, Aristotle identifies individual things as substances because they are "neither said of a subject nor in a subject". Aristotle, *Categories and De Interpretatione*, trans. J. L. Ackrill (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963). In the *Principles of Philosophy*, part one, principles 51 and 52, Descartes identifies God as the only substance because it is the only thing that is truly ontologically independent. He goes on to explain that minds and bodies will be referred to as "substances" (mental and physical) by analogy. René Descartes, *The Philosophical Writings of Descartes*, vol. 1, trans. John Cottinham, Robert Stoothoff and Dugald Murdoch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985).

5. Baruch Spinoza, *Ethics*, part 1, the *scholium* following proposition 17; and WP 172.

6. The distinction between substance and mode is the ultimate analogue. The narrower context is the need to resist projecting real or imagined human qualities onto substance (i.e., the narrower context is the distinction between substance and the modes that are human beings).

7. Jean-Paul Sartre, *Being and Nothingness*, trans. Hazel E. Barnes (New York: Philosophical Library, 1956), lviii.

8. Conway, *Gilles Deleuze*, 8–9, 59–60, 184–85.

9. Henri Bergson, *Time and Free Will*, trans. F. L. Pogson (Mineola, NY: Dover Publications, 2001), 85–87.

10. WP 145–6; and Conway, *Gilles Deleuze*, 83–87, 108–10.

11. This is found in Deleuze's treatment of Spinoza's theory of common notions. Gilles Deleuze, *Expressionism in Philosophy*, trans. Martin Joughin (New York: Zone Books, 1992), 282–83; and Gilles Deleuze, *Spinoza: Practical Philosophy*, trans. Robert Hurley (San Francisco: City Lights Books, 1988), 54–58, 118–19.

12. See, for example, Baruch Spinoza, *Ethics*, part 2, proposition 25.

13. Gilles Deleuze, *Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation*, 8; and Gilles Deleuze, *Two Regimes of Madness*, trans. Ames Hodges and Mike Taormina (New York: Semiotext(e), 2006), 85.

14. Francis Bacon and David Sylvester, *The Brutality of Fact: Interviews with Francis Bacon* (New York: Thames and Hudson, 1987), 30.

15. *Ibid*., 164, 182.

16. *Ibid*., 58, 90, 160.

17. *Ibid*., 40–41, 58, 105, 126, 148.

18. Gilles Deleuze, *The Logic of Sense*, trans. Mark Lester with Charles Stivale (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990), 313. See also Conway, *Gilles Deleuze*, 80–82.

19. Bacon and Sylvester, *The Brutality of Fact*, 50–51, 53, 65, 89.

20. *Ibid*., 73.

21. Deleuze, *Two Regimes of Madness*, 313.

22. *Ibid*., 176.

23. Gilles Deleuze, *Empiricism and Subjectivity*, trans. Constantin V. Boundas (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), 98–101.

24. Deleuze, *Proust and Signs*, 112–15; Gilles Deleuze, *Essays Critical and Clinical*, trans. Daniel W. Smith and Michael A. Greco (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), 56–60; and AO 42–43.

25. Antonin Artaud, *Watchfiends & Rack Screams: Works from the Final Period*, trans. Clayton Eshleman with Bernard Bador (Boston: Exact Change, 1995), 283–307.

26. Deleuze, *Proust and Signs*, 4–16; Deleuze, *Spinoza: Expressionism*, 282–83; Deleuze, *Spinoza: Practical Philosophy*, 54–58, 118–19; and Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, 138–40.

27. Deleuze, *The Logic of Sense*, 315–16.

28. Deleuze, *Francis Bacon*, 81; and Deleuze, *Two Regimes of Madness*, 185.

29. Deleuze, *Two Regimes of Madness*, 183.

30. *Ibid*.

31. *Ibid*., 185.

32. Conway, *Gilles Deleuze*, 66–67, 70–73; and WP 159.

33. Bacon and Sylvester, *The Brutality of Fact*, 105, 126–30, 146, 198; Deleuze, *Negotiations*, 102, 135–36; and Conway, *Gilles Deleuze*, 22–23.

TWO

Do Sheets of Past Exist?

Jay Lampert

FLASHBACKS

> [Thrilling music] Announcer: Presenting Orson Welles as the Third Man. [Zither music from *The Third Man*.] Announcer: *The Lives of Harry Lime*, the fabulous stories of the immortal character originally created in the motion picture *The Third Man*, with zither music by Anton Karas. [Gunshot] Orson Welles/Harry Lime: That was the shot that killed Harry Lime. He died in a sewer beneath Vienna, as those of you know who saw the movie *The Third Man*. Yes, that was the end of Harry Lime. But it was not the beginning. Harry Lime had many lives, and I can recount all of them. How do I know? Very simple. Because my name is Harry Lime. [Thrilling music]
>
> —weekly opening sequence of *The Lives of Harry Lime* radio show

Orson Welles made thirty-nine episodes of *The Lives of Harry Lime*[1] for radio in 1951: flashbacks remembered by a dead person. Many shows have flashbacks, sometimes composing the whole movie, remembered by a person just about to die, or by a ghost, or even by the decaying brain of a dead person (e.g., Welles's radio production of *The Brain That Wouldn't Die*). The preview for Oliver Stone's *Savages* has a woman's voice-over saying, "Just 'cause I'm telling you this story doesn't mean I'm alive at the end of it". Flashbacks are more than prequels; they entangle secondary temporal sequences into a film's succession of present moments. Some flashbacks occur in a continuous block, like Harry Lime's; some are dispersed in between presents but reproduce the past's original order; some are out of order—anything the editor wants.

Deleuze argues that the flashbacks in *Citizen Kane* (1941) are the world's first "sheets of past", the first cinematic pure-past direct time-images. To give a preliminary definition, these are images of time independent of action, in which the past is not merely a former present but also the whole past co-exists contemporaneously with the present. I assume that readers of this chapter know *Citizen Kane* by heart. In the first scene, Kane dies. His last word is "Rosebud", but what does it mean? A reporter hopes to find Rosebud on one of the sheets of Kane's past, as Deleuze puts it. He gets Kane's acquaintances, now elderly, to remember what they can. Most of the flashbacks begin when the reporter asks the question—as obvious as a ripple fade introducing a memory[2]. Thatcher's flashbacks begin with his written journal[3]. The opening newsreel is a kind of montage flashback, an index for the later flashbacks. Other directors have trickier ways of introducing flashbacks, but Deleuze has a taste for straightforward chaos, rather than gimmicky chaos. Deleuze discusses many types of flashbacks: Carné's destiny-oriented flashbacks and Mankiewicz's forking-path and multiple-personality flashbacks (C2 48–55). He contrasts *Rashomon*'s (1950) unreliable flashbacks (the memories in *Citizen Kane* are inconclusive, but usually reliable)[4] with the time-machine flashbacks in Resnais's *Je t'aime je t'aime* (1968).

We sometimes neglect one of Deleuze's preferred images of thought: the numbered list. Deleuze counts six "principles" of the rhizome, three "avatars" of the movement-image (C1 64–65), four "aspects" of impulse (C1 127–30) and five "laws" of action (C1 151–55). I count at least ten more flashback types: (1) reparation flashbacks, as in *Sourcecode*; (2) flash-laterals, which are more like daydreams; (3) flashforwards that turn out to have only been dreams, like Season 8 of *Dallas*; (4) flashbacks that enter the past through madeleines, postcards, paintings or scenes from old films; (5) time-travel recursions, in which the character leaves multiple versions of himself behind, as in *Timecrimes*; (6) flashbacks to past lives (one's own or someone else's, as in *Dead Again*); (7) flashbacks narrated by children and liars; (8) flashbacks in which the character gets only a blank screen, as in *Arrested Development*'s "Footage not found" gag[5]; (9) flashbacks to implanted memories, as in *Total Recall*; and (10) flashbacks by suggestion, in which all we see is a present gesture intimating a flashback[6]. There are also parodies of each form. There are films in which we do not know if we are seeing flashbacks, as with Ruiz or Lynch. I do not know if there are films yet in which a live animal or a computer has a flashback (an animated tiger in *The Simpsons* has a flashback), or when two characters co-author a flashback. (Deleuze raises "the paradox of a memory for two people" [C2 116], but his case, *Last Year in Marienbad*, has two characters compete for flashback rights, which is not the same as co-authorship; *Wayne's World* might be a better example.) Some day, nano-cameras will pull flashbacks out of our own brains, as *Johnny Mnemonic* predicts. And there are implicit flashbacks in amnesia and identity-theft

films, films about twins separated at birth, historical dramas with "Long, long ago" preludes and last-day-of-the-world films[7].

Of course, temporal entanglement is found not only in cinema but also in living memory; it is a structure of time itself. Cinematic sheets of past are variations on Deleuze's ontological theory of the pure past in *Difference and Repetition*. There is a methodological problem here. If sheets of past, the co-existence of past and present independent of action sequences, can be proved to exist by ontological analysis, is their cinematic instantiation merely secondary? Conversely, if sheets of past exist first and foremost in cinema, does that prove they exist in real time?

How can we use a work of art to discuss a philosophical concept? A work of art can "say" that times overlap even if times cannot overlap, just as a fiction can *say* fascism is good[8]. Deleuze usually suggests there really are sheets of past in the real world. He says we find them in life whenever we follow two paths of action at once; we might one day find them in faster-than-light physics (C2 102). But at other times, Deleuze suggests that sheets of past are specifically cinematic: that film is what "makes [directly] visible relations of time" (C2 xii). Now, sometimes, when Deleuze talks of a "direct" image, he means something straightforward: talkies made sound "direct", whereas silent film showed sound indirectly through intertitles (C2 226). But the idea of a "direct image" is a tricky point for Deleuze, who says, "The image is not just given to be seen. It is legible as well as visible"[9] (C1 12). An image is not merely what is in a frame, but also includes what is outside of and sutured to the frame, what is before, after and read into the frame. So when he says that the time-image is direct, time may be a direct image but not immediately visible.

Action, in contrast, is straightforwardly visible: in action movies, each image "expands" the present (C2 68) "organically" (C2 80), into a "large circuit". If an action sequence rotates around a single image, it makes a "short circuit", which we call a flashback. Kane's death is such an image; the rest of the film flashes back from it. If several series flash back, they are like aspects of a crystal, or films within films—still action-images, but loopy in their own way. Normally, flashbacks are re-arranged action-images. But Deleuze argues that flashbacks can do more than add scenes about the past to scenes about the present; they can also make the past survive into the present, and hence can split one event into two times that exist at once, simultaneously presenting the passing present and one or more pasts. When they do this, Deleuze calls them not "flashbacks" but "sheets of past". Do sheets of past exist?

It sounds funny to ask this, as if it is a matter of descriptions corresponding to the facts. But Deleuze is not interested in metaphors (C2 129); he is interested in encounters between language and reality, between expression and content. In any case, Deleuze says exactly this: "the sheets of past exist" (*les nappes de passé existent*; C2 115, 150)[10].

As metaphor, "sheets" suggest layers, strata or regions (*couches* or *strates*, as in the "Geology of Morals" plateau; *régions*), or the planes of Bergson's memory cone. (Bergson calls them *plans*, but that is confusing here because in cinema, *plan* in French also means "shot".)[11] *Nappe* is a sheet of water or a tablecloth.

Deleuze's ontological thesis is that the pure past exists independently of the passing present. Here is another preliminary definition: the pure past is the virtual repeatability of an event, its remember-ability, and an event has this property at the same time that it passes in the present. The pastness of the event in this way co-exists temporally with the present, but in a different kind of temporal order. Present and past are not two moments in time, but two kinds of time (there are three if we count the future as eternal return), so at any given moment, there are two temporalities in progress, not one. Cinema flashbacks, in theory, show this.

I believe Deleuze's arguments in *Difference and Repetition* for the existence of the pure past are his very best creations. There are difficulties with those arguments that Deleuze studies has yet to solve, but for this chapter, I will assume that they work and that the pure past is a good idea.

Now, of course, film presents images in succession. This creates tricky problems for the theory of cinematic sheets of past. In flashbacks, even if there are sheets of co-existing past, they still have to be presented in succession. The image of co-existing time has to appear sequentially in the medium of film; the best film can do is *re*-sequence events, and thereby force pasts to co-exist in spite of the intervals[12] within and between them. Time is made pure by undoing the succession we find in events; pure time undoes what we usually call time. As we will see, Deleuze's time-image of the past is not exactly past, not exactly time and not exactly an image.

Deleuze ties sheets of past to three on-screen paradigms (C2 99). First, there are stages of a character's narrative; each narrative is on screen at a different time, but if they are cut[13] discontinuously, their order of succession can become irrelevant, so they all pertain at once. Second, sheets of past can be parallel narratives told from different characters' "points of view", like the flashbacks of *Citizen Kane*[14]. Third, in a deep-focus image, there are different planes of depth on view at the same time, each of which could represent a different time period. The three paradigms for sheets of past—stages of character development, perspectives of narrators and planes of depth—are very different, but all allow Deleuze to say that we "jump" (C2 99) from one sheet of past to another in the course of the film, or all at once. It is difficult to specify the exact "limit" of a particular sheet of past (C2 99), when a timeframe, point of view or depth of focus begins and ends. But this is OK.

The section of *Cinema* 2 on sheets of past focuses on Welles, and it is eleven pages long (C2 105–16). The first two pages distinguish sheets of

past from standard action flashbacks. Four pages deal with depth of field. The last five follow Welles's development[15].

Sheets of past are chronosigns, and they are contrasted with another species of direct time-image: "peaks of present"[16]. Peaks of present are at play if the same event is presented at different times—for example, if the same childhood event is shown at different times in a film[17]. The scenes arise in succession, but because their contents cover the same diegetical timeframe, the scenes pull us into a simultaneous time (C2 101). In contrast, sheets of past are at play if different events are presented at the same time—for example, if a character's childhood and adulthood are shown somehow in the same shot.

It is possible that Deleuze could be right about sheets of past but not about peaks of present, or vice versa. A Freudian might agree that traumatic repetition generates peaks of present, but not agree that sheets of past could all be present at once. Conversely, a Hegelian could agree to sheets of past, and histories re-capitulated, but not agree that the same present could be relived.

A sheet of past contains an event, an explorable region of history, which contains internal sequences of past, present and future. The sheet of past is a film within a film; it will take time to look through it, although it may be there just for a moment. It appears both as a single moment *and* as a sequence, as both a "slice"[18] *and* a "continuum" (C2 105), both a part *and* the whole (C2 106). The sheet of past as continuum suggests a flashback. The sheet of past as slice of time suggests a composition in which we might see the past in the background—perhaps embodied in a toy from the character's youth.

As we said, Deleuze reserves the term "flashback" for mere chronological fillers, and uses "sheets of past" for co-existence effects. However, Deleuze allows that classical flashbacks also sometimes confuse past and present. Some commentators on *Citizen Kane* happily use the term "flashback" to explore the same entangled time-structures that Deleuze insists should not be called "flashbacks". Andrew Sarris says, "Time is thrown back and brought forward" in the four flashbacks of *Citizen Kane* (the flashbacks narrated by Thatcher, Bernstein, Leland and Susan)[19]. Peter Wollen[20] uses the term "flashback" to say that the final "tracking shot over the accumulation of objects in the great hall of Xanadu passes over the residue of different periods of Kane's life in inverse order".

Speaking of inverse order, Deleuze does not emphasize this, but it is relevant. In back-from-the-future films like Réné Clair's *It Happened Tomorrow*, the future has already happened, and the past is what we are seeing *now*: the past is more like the present than like a former present. And since the past contains options not limited by the present, the past is most like the future. (Combining past, present and future in one movie is the *Christmas Carol* gimmick.) Strictly speaking, backward-running films like *Memento* order the *scenes* in reverse, but each scene proceeds forward;

otherwise the dialogue would be garbled (frame-by-frame reversal produces slapstick). *Memento* puts the main narrative in backward order, but intersperses the secondary "Sammy Jankis" scenes (in black and white) in forward order. In fact, it does not really make sense that *Memento*'s protagonist, who lacks short-term memory, should experience a series of recent pasts at all. In any case, the disadvantage in time-reversal is that showing a scene from the past after a scene from the present necessarily explains the present, even if it is a little confusing. This is why time-reversal is not an ideal form for sheets of past. Reversing the time order makes events fit into their rightful place; backward time is common sense. The crazy thing about time is when it moves forward, when what happens next is the future, which does not even exist. In short, the past becomes pure when it has not already taken place but takes a line of flight through the labyrinth of the straight line forward. Does this mean that the pure time-image should show a blank screen of the future? Occasionally, Deleuze favors blank-screen cinema, like Michael Snow's experiments (200, 244; C1 122–24). But usually there is something on screen, and it is the past in the present that has to function as future.

Some commentators on *Citizen Kane*, as we were saying, preserve the term "flashback" to discuss temporal entanglements. But others interpret flashbacks to be less about time at all than about doubles. Laura Mulvey's interpretation is that "two psychoanalytic motifs . . . divide the plot of *Citizen Kane*. . . . The first, male-dominated section of the film tells the story of the Oedipal Kane battling against his surrogate father. The second, Susan-dominated section shows him . . . fetishistically amassing things, attempting to fill the void of his separation from his mother"[21] (Mulvey 228). Deleuze is all for psychic doubling[22], but for him the doubling of childhood and adulthood is a synthesis of time, whereas for Mulvey doubles are "held in the timelessness of the unconscious"[23] (Mulvey 235).

So now, assuming as I do that Deleuze is right that the embedded narratives in *Citizen Kane* are about time, and are not traditional flashbacks, in what sense are these narratives "images"? Deleuze needs to pinpoint the techniques whereby the medium of cinema makes time visible.

DEPTH OF FIELD

Some of Welles's techniques for temporal re-sequencing are classical: extra-slow cross-fades, overlapping dialogue and montage. His innovation in generating sheets of past is depth of field, combined with long-duration sequence-shots (or tracking, travelling or moving camera shots)[24]. André Bazin thinks this combination democratically gives the viewer time and depth to explore events[25]. (Welles endorsed Bazin's thesis, al-

though he later wondered if that hadn't been a bit pompous on his part[26]. Welles in interviews downplayed "the use of time and all that" or "the overlapping thing". See Welles and Bogdanovich, 88–89[27].) Deleuze agrees that depth of field is tied to long-duration sequence shots. It sounds funny to say that the contraction of time into a single frame in deep focus is carried out by lengthy shots, as if a still photograph in deep focus moves like the paintings in the *Harry Potter* films, as if a continuous shot expresses time without succession. It seems funny to link spatial depth with temporal duration. But Bazin's idea is that as long as there is no cut, a character can walk through the set diagonally, covering three-dimensional coordinates throughout the frame, and it is deep-focus photography that tracks the movement[28]. To imagine an artificial example: If a character is looking for his wallet, walks towards the background and finds it in the pants he must have put in the closet last night, the camera has found the past in the depth of field.

Clearly, almost every point in the relation between deep focus and the presentation of the past admits exceptions. First, deep focus is surely not necessary to express sheets of past; Deleuze admits that lateral differences across the screen can also refer to different points of the past (C2 109). Second, deep focus is not sufficient to produce sheets of past[29]. Third, long-duration shots are not necessary for sheets of past; cut-up shots can entangle time just as well. Fourth, long-duration shots are not necessary for depth of field. Some films with ultra-long shots do explore depth of field (*Russian Ark* does, although *The Werkmeister Harmonies* does not). Deleuze said sheets of past "jump" across times, so why must they do so in continuous shots?

In general, how do we verify when we look at a shot whether depth is making a sheet of past? In fact, Deleuze says that only a certain type of depth on screen has a temporal force. When deep focus contains *merely parallel* planes of depth ("depth *in* field"), it need not express any temporal relation; only when characters move or "address" one another across planes of depth ("depth *of* field") does depth imply temporal distance. The movement makes the two phases of time co-exist. In the wallet scenario, the background becomes the foreground's flashback. Deleuze says that if a scene is about to force a character to have a memory, then the scene "justifies" the use of deep focus (as when the deep-tracking shot zeroes in on Susan to force her memory)[30]. Just as a certain theory demands that music in a scene be "justified" by the presence of an orchestra or radio visible in the shot, so perhaps we should only see the back of the set if the story is about to flash back.

In Deleuze's first example of depth and time, it is less a matter of bringing two times together as it is of coordinating elements into the field of a single event. In this example, Kane walks forward through the newspaper office; addresses Leland, who is in another plane of depth; and moves through planes of depth (creating "violent" foreshortening per-

spectives along the way), and when Kane arrives at Leland's plane of depth, they meet in a slice of time, and their friendship breaks exactly then and there. The place where they meet is stretched into a sheet of time, *at* which the action pauses and events for a moment co-exist. To make this sort of thing visually explicit, think of the original *Thomas Crown Affair*, in which the action on screen is frozen, and then shrunk into a frame-within-a-frame, so that a frozen sheet of the past occupies a particular spot on screen simultaneous with the present, which carries on. But if the storyboard had called for Kane to take a few extra steps past Leland's plane of depth and then broken their friendship, would there not still have been a sheet of co-existing time, but one unrelated to depth?

Deleuze's second example of depth and time is Kane walking through the objects he has accumulated in Xanadu: "Images in depth express regions of past, each with its accents or potentials, and mark critical moments in Kane's will to power. The hero acts, walks, and moves, but it is the past that he plunges himself into and moves in" (C2 106). This sounds right in general, but since we do not know the date of Kane's various purchases, the planes of depth here do not exactly "mark" sheets of past, each with distinct potentials.

I have taken Deleuze literally when he connects depth of field with sheets of past. Sometimes Deleuze is comically literal. When discussing the "small" figure of the action-image (small action includes documentary or melodrama rather than adventure movies), he cites Herzog's film *Even Dwarves Started Small* (C1 184). However, it is not literally the case that different planes of depth always represent different time periods[31]. Perhaps it is enough for Deleuze's point that characters and (audience members) jump, or glance, from one time to another. Figuratively, different characters meet while at different stages in their lives, so in that sense sheets of time communicate on screen. Deleuze's overall point may be plausible even if we take "depth" figuratively.

Indeed, Deleuze wants the uncertainty about when and where the past occurs. Deleuze likes to say we are looking for the sheet of past with Rosebud on it, but that is not quite right. All Rosebud tells us is that Kane lost his mom, and we, and all the characters, already knew that. Old-fashioned flashbacks may locate where past events occurred, but sheets of time are supposed to make events temporally mobile. We do not need a unique plane of depth to represent a unique sheet of past. However, if nothing is at stake in whether there is a past in depth, then depth is more about space than time. It may be, as Deleuze says, that Welles "deforms space and time simultaneously" (C2 144), so that we should not even distinguish depth and time. Still, what is depth?

Deleuze uses the term "depth of field" in an unusual way. In most film vocabularies, depth of field measures the extent of the distance, from foreground to background, where the focus is sharp. For a given scene, the filmmaker may want the deep depth of field to carry deep into the

background, or for the focus to be shallow and the background (or the foreground) to be out of focus. All the options fall under the heading of depth of field. To get deep focus, use a wide-angle lens (i.e., a lens with short focal length) and step the aperture down; as you narrow the aperture, you will need more ambient light. With deep depth of field, there will seem to be a lot of space between background and foreground, so a character moving towards the viewer will seem to cover a lot of ground, and appear to be moving especially fast; time will seem contracted. For shallow depth of field, do the reverse; movements perpendicular to the screen seem to cover less ground, to slow, as time elongates. If you want the viewer to see that the focus stays sharp all the way from background to foreground, have Kane throw his jacket from the background to the foreground during the "office celebration" scene[32]. Deep focus was common in 1920s German Expressionism, as were Welles's high-contrast shadows and unusual angles. In the 1930s, Hollywood distanced itself from things Germanic. And coincidentally, with the advent of sound recording, the bright studio lights needed to close the aperture to get deep focus were too noisy. Hence the soft-focus glamour photography of Hollywood in those years, when depth of field persisted only in the horror genre, as in *Mad Love* (1935), photographed by *Citizen Kane*'s cinematographer Gregg Toland. By 1940, the year of *Citizen Kane*, manufacturers had quieted the studio lights, and Toland improvised new lenses, so luckily deep focus became available again just when Welles wanted it.

Deleuze narrows the term "depth of field" to mean only *deep*, not shallow, focus. But he sometimes broadens the term "depth of field" to include not just deep sharp focus but also the deep overflow of shadows, whether in focus or not. Although Deleuze states that "regions of past are defined by *optical* aspects" (C2 108), sometimes he broadens "depth of field" beyond optics altogether, to mean the overflow of one character's point of view onto another's. And when he associates depth of field with diagonals, this is broader still, since film images, whether in focus or not, are almost universally diagonal, from the train at the La Ciotat Station to every wagon train in the West[33].

Deleuze's very best example of depth of field in relation to sheets of past is the "Susan's suicide attempt" scene in *Citizen Kane*.

At this point, the reader should watch the scene from 1:35:20 to 1:36:12.

Kane enters from the back door, in sharp focus. Susan lies in midshot; a bottle of poison is in close-up. Kane sees Susan in the foreground. His visual address contributes depth. Deleuze refers to visible ceilings that constrain space (a famous innovation of Welles, although the ceiling is not actually visible in this scene; Deleuze sometimes went from memory, which was not a big deal). A backlight spills shadows across planes; the dark foreground forces the viewer to look into the background. As one

body overflows its plane, it enters the other's shadow pool. Deleuze calls all of this the "freeing of depth".

"Welles invents a depth of field along a diagonal or gap crossing all planes, making elements from each interact with the rest, and in particular having the background in direct contact with the foreground (as in the suicide scene where Kane bursts in through the door at the back, tiny, while Susan is dying in the shadow in mid-shot and the large mirror is seen in close-up [actually, it's the bottle])" (C2 107). Deleuze concludes, "[Welles's] new depth directly forms a region of time, a region of past which is defined by *optical* aspects or elements borrowed from interacting planes. It is a set of non-localizable connections, always from one plane to another, which constitutes the region of past or the continuum of duration" (C2 108).

How justified is the inference from this scene to the ontology of sheets of past? When Kane approaches from the back door, how can we tell whether he is coming from a life in the past, or just coming from outdoors? Characters do cross planes of depth, although they are not very non-localizable (Kane is not like the Alien hiding in the plumbing). Kane is not literally in two places at once, and yet in moving through pools of light, he is, in a sense. Kane, as it were, closes in on the present. But any shot of movement expresses some temporal entanglement. Where do we look for pure sheets of past?

Now the reader should watch the sequence again, starting a bit earlier, from 1:33:50.

Kane orders Susan to continue singing. A flash-future montage of performances overlaps with (1) fade-over newspaper headlines, and Kane's headshots; (2) the light bulb filament that wraps them up into one pool of shadow; and (3) the continuous audio behind the discontinuous visuals. Perhaps thinking of these continuities, Deleuze says that Susan's "accumulated efforts emerge into one scene in long shot" (C2 106); the succession of failed performances collapses simultaneously into one result. But every action sequence culminates—that cannot be a sheet of past. We could imagine symbolic sheets of past—if Kane had worn a youthful hat when he came through the door and it fell off, revealing a bald spot, by the time he got to Susan; or if Kane wore a youthful grin and an old man's hat at the same time—but that is not the case here. In terms of character perspective, Kane enters still thinking that Susan will be his opera star, but he arrives in a foreground where that has already not been the case for some time. His movement through depth does force two temporal expectations into confrontation, a disparity which in turn was prophesied in the past, but this interpretation—that Kane was always destined to have his way blocked, that his future co-existed with his past to drive a March of Time—is largely action-image. As for the depth of field, as you saw, the foreground and background are in sharp focus, but the middle ground, where Susan is, is in soft focus. How is this

optically possible? The answer is that this shot is not typical depth of field, made by light and lenses. It is an in-camera matte shot. Robert Carringer explains, "First, the foreground was lighted and focused, and shot with the background dark. Then, the foreground was darkened, the background lighted, the lens refocused, the film rewound in the camera, and the scene reshot" (Carringer 82), and double exposed. But that does not really matter: Deleuze is less interested in technology than he is in aesthetic effect. However made, the scene is deep.

Do I actually see sheets of past here? I do not wish to be the Luddite who gloats that he sees nothing in "modern art". But I have to say, it is not there. I could talk myself into seeing it—there are effects that are something like what sheets of past should be; I do not want to expect too much. Maybe sheets of past are more visible in other scenes or other movies, but . . .

What a great theory . . . but I am not seeing them here.

Except that there is that problem with what should be visible in a visual. Much of modern aesthetics, for example, hangs on whether Laocoön is in full scream: Lessing says he is not, and cannot be, because sculpture, unlike poetry, can only present one moment of time. The sculpture cannot make that the moment when Laocoön is in full scream, since screams are ugly. So the sculptor presents the penultimate moment, and relies on the viewer's tendency to narrate the rest of the scene. But when we look at Laocoön, do we see a full scream? Lessing says no, but Goethe says he does; this is crucial since, if we do, it follows that there is no difference between the arts of space and time. I think it is not clear what we actually see when we look at visual art. Indeed, when we look at another person's face, it is not clear that we can judge what it means. For Merleau-Ponty, we are conscious of the consciousness of others not by observation, but by interaction, when the other pulls for or against us. In film, however, we cannot interact with the characters. The "Kuleshov effect" proves that a face shows nothing but what a montage says it shows: the same neutral face shows hunger if the face is succeeded by an image of food, or sorrow if by a coffin. So should we expect to "see" a sheet of time? Is time visible and bendable in the medium of cinema, or is that just a manner of speaking?[34] If sheets of past do appear directly on screen, how could we be in doubt? If they do not, are they in the viewer's imagination? Or are they *in* the film, but at no time visible?

FLASHBACKS AGAIN

At a certain point, Deleuze switches the definition of sheets of past away from optics and towards an issue of narrative—namely, the way a character "evokes" memory. The topic of memory reminds us of the topic of flashbacks, which optical depth did not. Now that we return to[35] the

main plot, Deleuze distinguishes three problems in memory: how a character evokes memory, whether the memory can be *accessed* and whether it can be *used* by the character in the present. The twist is that memory "justifies" the use of flashbacks, but it is the "disturbance of memory" that evokes pure time (C2 55).

There will never be perfect access to memory, unique representation of the past or verifiably faithful use of it. But different memories are fixed to the present to different degrees. In *Citizen Kane*, the fixed point of Kane's death is what provokes the sheets of past and organizes their intervals. The fixed point need not show a character trying to remember; the flashback cue might simply be a camera angle, or a voice-over, what Deleuze calls a "sound-present" or a "radiophonic center" (C2 116). Of course, in cinema, one can simply splice together temporally distant events. But plot disorder does not always count as a direct time-image. Plenty of movies have plot holes or waste time with CGI, but still appeal to normal succession. What should be fixed and what should be unfixed in the threshold of the present, in order to affirm a time-image?

Kane's death is too fixed for the other characters to find the key to his life in their pasts. Their sheets, their memories, Deleuze says, are "sterile" and "suspicious" (C2 112). The suspicious past is a perfectly good time-image, but maybe a different flashback starter with a less fixed present could simultanize past and present better. Deleuze finds such experiments in Welles's later films.

The Magnificent Ambersons flashes back from several characters, so it has more pasts to explore, although less chance of using the past[36]. It is specifically unusability that Deleuze means when he says famously that "time is out of joint" or in "crisis", and that sheets of past "float . . . beyond recollection images in all directions" (C2 112). In *The Lady from Shanghai*, sheets of past are more like hallucinations[37]. In *Mr. Arkadin*, the title character assassinates everyone in his flashbacks[38] (C2 114).

In Welles's film of *The Trial*, K seeks the sheet of past in which he might have committed the crime he is accused of, like seeking Rosebud. But at this point, Deleuze shifts to yet another model. What Deleuze now names as sheets of past are not periods of K's life, but rather themes: "regions" of women, books or religion[39] (C2 114). These sheets have no recollection character, but are simply "juxtaposed" "presences"; yet this is what Deleuze now calls pure time. "Pure time" for Deleuze becomes so pure that it is not really time—at least, Deleuze's story about Welles's development is that the sheets of time in his films become more and more unhinged from both present and past.

On this theory of "the past in general", it doesn't even sound right anymore to say that time is in crisis; it is just an immanent "universal becoming" with a "non-chronological order" (C2 115). This is Hallward territory (Hallward's interpretation is that Deleuze's ontology is indifferent to the world): a picture of becoming divorced from worldly history.

Deleuze says we "come from" this "primordial time" of the "Earth", a "universe of prehistory", the "prehistory of consciousness at the birth of time", before there was any "separation", when all co-existence is "adjacent". Deleuze calls time a "muddy vital medium". (He has the muddy sets of Welles's *Macbeth* in mind.) Yet Deleuze says that "there is no confusion in this" (C2 115); "non-chronological time" is not "incoherent"; "everything is *not* equivalent to everything else" (C2 146). But how can muddy time not be confused, if it threatens to reduce to indeterminacy what both the paradigm of flashbacks and the paradigm of depth of field had earlier treated as an assemblage of very specific sheets of past?

Anyone who has tried to make a film knows there is a difference between confusion, which is easy to produce, and obscurity, which is hard. When merely confused—as in what Deleuze calls "bad arty films" (*mauvais films esthétisants*; C2 253)—differences are juxtaposed incoherently, resulting merely in generalization. In contrast, differences can be serialized so that specific particles of one element are also particles of another (mud); specific percepts are rendered by what overlays them (image); specific moments at one slice of the timeline are also moments at another slice (simultaneity and delay: the pure past time-image). In short, muddy but unconfused timelines could in theory retain their specificity, but we need to say more about how the whole earth of time could overlap in the editing.

Deleuze's comment on mud ends the section on sheets of past[40]. Eventually, he will posit the brain as holding together the "non-localizable relations between sheets" (C2 125), a kind of inner screen on which flashbacks and framing presents run at their own times and places at the same time.

The challenge is that the brain is not the same as consciousness; the brain, or the editing program, may contain a time-image, but not a conscious image of it. Let me recapitulate the flow of ideas we have followed in this section: pure time has to un-fix the present; that leads to mud; mud is what the brain is full of; the brain cannot see itself; therefore, time is an invisible image. This suits Bergson's thesis that pure memory is the retention of an event, its virtual persistence, regardless of whether the mind is conscious of it at a given moment. Pure memory for Bergson exists *as* the past, even *in* the past (C2 80); memory is not as an experience that one could be having in the present. Once experienced in the present, the pure memory, the retained past, is transformed into a present recollection, no longer a past. So Deleuze says, the "extension of sheets of past" "exists outside of consciousness, in time" (C2 80, 143). The past exists in time—fair enough. The directness of the time-image means precisely that it cannot be the content of any frame passing through the projector in a present moment. To put it differently, since, as we said, every event is repeatable as a past at the same time that it passes through the present, the past might be the secondary content of *every* frame. So

what should a sheet of past look like? Perhaps it should look the same as an action shot; it should look like John Wayne saving Jimmy Stewart's butt in *The Man Who Shot Liberty Valance* (the film whose flashbacks are action-images if ever there was one); a sheet of past should look like *any* event *as* past no matter what the gaffer is doing with the lights.

In any case, the idea is that we see the past *in* the past; we go back to the past to see it. Past time is not represented in art; art enters into the past. Maybe this is what Hegel meant by saying art is in the past. But still, how does cinema go to the past? Blank screens are too indeterminate, and memory twists are too determinate[41].

The difficulty we keep running up against is that Deleuze has three different models of the direct time-image, and each one has some instances. One is the deterritorialized time-sequence: the pure past serialized and relayed throughout the duration of the film—a time-image, but maybe not exactly direct, maybe more like what Deleuze calls "indirect discourse", "indirect vision" (C2 183) or the "free indirect" (C2 242). The second model is the deep-focus composition immediately present in a single shot that escapes succession—a direct image, but maybe not exactly time. The third model of the pure past is thought[42], but not perceived at any time during a film—direct time, but maybe not exactly an image. Deleuze's approach is to manage one of these models until it proves an obstacle, then to flash back to one of the others. It is part of Deleuze's theory of time that there are different kinds of time, and each one has different functions and images. The time-image as re-sequencing is easiest to perceive, and the time-image as concept is easiest to prove, but Deleuze still wants staggered time to show itself somewhere in a single, even if complex and moving, image—as a direct image, even if only indirectly visible.

It should be as if everything happens at once, but that the at-once unfolds as we watch. If we construe the end of *Cinema 2* as Deleuze's solution to this problem, it may lie in the faultline between visual and audio content, with their separate timelines given at the same time[43]. Perhaps the optical and the audio will be each other's sheets of past in the depths of a single shot.

RADIO

In L-cuts, the audio of a shot is cut earlier or later than the visual. The meaning of the audio sometimes conflicts with that of the visual. Different tracks of audio (words, noise and music) can be staggered. For example, Kane's resonant whisper of "Rosebud" was made by overlaying two recordings of Welles's voice with different reverberation patterns[44]. Deleuze cites the well-known influence of Welles's radio work on his cinema, although it is not likely that Deleuze had access to much of it[45].

The scripts for Welles's radio dramas for Mercury Theater of the Air, and Campbell's Playhouse from the 1930s, were not written precisely to the one-hour timeslots available. Since it was better for the script to be too short than too long, the performers would often "run ahead of schedule and have to slow down to avoid an embarrassing gap at the end"[46]. If there was dead air, Producer John Houseman would run upstairs to the CBS library and send random novels down to the soundstage for Welles to read aloud. Houseman and Howard Koch wrote the scripts in all-night restaurants, revising down to the last minute. Reading live on the air without rehearsal, Welles might have to change his tone in mid-performance, along with the sound effects, which he improvised himself, when the plot went in a direction he did not expect[47]. As Houseman puts it, Welles "wrestled with chaos and time"[48].

An audio-only medium manipulates time without the interference of space[49], and it has its own speeds. Hugo Münsterberg had said about silent film, "The rhythm of the play [in a silent film] is marked by unnatural rapidity. As the words are absent which, in life fill the gaps between the actions, the gestures and deeds [in silent film] can follow one another much more quickly"[50]. Ditto for radio speed, since radio edits out the visual and so erases that redundancy. (Real life is highly redundant, and excruciatingly slow.)

Welles is a master of the fast read and the dead stop, of lingering and throwaway lines[51], repetition and the "frequentative"[52]. In the *War of the Worlds* broadcast, audience members believed that an awful lot of action happened in the real world during just a few minutes of airtime: alien voyage, army defeat and civilization collapse, in half an hour[53]. The slow-paced beginning of the show makes the increased pace later on seem faster by comparison, to "spiral its action to a speed as wild and reckless as its base was solid". Meanwhile, listeners had been trained by radio "to accept the telescoped reality of dramatic time". And recent events in Europe had primed them for shocks. And the newscaster character in 1938's *War of the Worlds* re-created the same timing as the reporter on the real newscast of 1937's *Hindenburg* disaster, who had taken a full second after the sound of the crash before telling radio listeners what had occurred[54]. Welles used the audience memory of the real slow-action report to accelerate the imagination of second-time-around listeners.

Many of the Mercury Theater radio productions abridge long novels to a fifty-minute format. One might expect a radio version of *The Count of Monte Cristo* or *Treasure Island* to run through the early scenes quickly, to leave time for the adventure. But Welles lingers over the early scenes proportionally longer than the books do[55]. When the action finally arrives, the characters, affects and milieus have been established, so no explanations need to interrupt. The short but purified action absorbs the past into a recency effect. In *Citizen Kane*, the fast pacing is instead front-loaded, while Kane is young. But in some ways, its peaks and troughs

resemble those of radio serials; serial episodes, against Aristotle, begin *and* end in climax, partly to control station surfing[56].

Since Deleuze's sheets of past are less about speed than depth, the most relevant radio feature for us is deep-focus sound. Audio cannot show a character walking away from the viewer; it can only convey it by lowering his volume. In the boardinghouse scene, young Kane in the background is heard, "realistically", at lower volume than his parents in the foreground[57]. But dialogue levels are only partly determined by distance from the virtual viewer; levels are also partly determined by how important the words are for the viewer to hear. In fact, the very notion of realism in deep-focus sound leads to contradictions. The characters have to hear each other, and we have to hear them. So when characters rotate, remaining equidistant from each other, but one of them moving away from the camera eye (or the microphone ear), should the character more distant from us get quieter? The audience hears the action both from the standpoint of the interlocutor and from the standpoint of the camera lens, so she hears the action from two contradictory perspectives at once. In deep-focus photography, characters at visibly different distances from us are equally sharp: they have depth and distance. But if we *hear* the distant character as sharply as the near character, there is deep-focus sound, but we lose the distance. Indeed, "since volume varies proportionately to the inverse of the square of the distance, we might expect that the sound reaching the ears of the audience from a near foreground character would be as much as one hundred times (or more) louder than the sound of a background character" (Altman 108). And in shot-reverse shots, one character in a conversation would end up briefly sounding louder than the other, which makes no sense. The solution developed for John Ford's *How Green Was My Valley*, the year of *Citizen Kane*, was basically to just avoid deep-focus photography in any scene with dialogue[58] (Altman 104). In short, contradictions between visual and audio produce a staggered temporal effect as fundamental as overlaid flashbacks[59].

Adorno and Eisler wrote in the 1940s that the eye in twentieth-century culture learned to see the world in a cubist manner faster than the ear learned to hear atonally, so that the sense perceptions in our own heads function about a century apart from each other. At least until this changes, the audio will always be the sheet of past for the visual.

All of these radio-inspired functions—abridgement, depth of sound, atonality and audio-visual disparity—could contribute to cinematic sheets of past. However, none of these is at play in the "Susan's suicide attempt" scene. Although I have posed questions about Deleuze's use of the film, *Citizen Kane* is certainly about the problem of the survival of the past. If I were to give my own account of time in *Citizen Kane*, I would start by rejecting the common view that the film is about what Kane loses as he ages, as if it were a premonition of Orson Welles's own so-called failed potential. As I see it, the break between young and old Kane occurs

just after Susan's suicide attempt, at her sickbed. She tells Kane nobody wants to hear her sing; Kane says that's when you have to keep fighting; Susan says she can't; Kane concedes that she doesn't have to; and thereafter, Kane also stops fighting. To my mind, the rest of the film is a bad dream, and never really happens. The thing about memory is that if we can flash back to young Kane once, we can do it again; we can still see youth under the makeup; and *Citizen Kane* is certainly much re-watched. In spite of what Leland says, I find young Kane convincing: intense, active, sincere, witty, interested and Wellesy. The old man Kane is another person that somebody else, who is now old, saw. Flashbacks may interpose one type of sheets of past, the layers of shadows may impose another, but for a character told only through memories, young Kane remains on a sheet of his own. The shadows show us the other time, and the otherness of time does not make Kane not young anymore; it makes him still be young. Not a month goes by when I do not think about that young man.

I think that cinematic sheets of past are not a given, but rather a research problem. Further explorations of depth and time might consider the following: the relation between 3D and futuricity, iPhone mini-screens and any-time-whenever showtimes, instagrammatological images that are neither shallow nor deep, and pixels of past.

It seems to me that the theory of the pure past must be right, based on extra-cinematic ontological arguments about time. I have raised a lot of small difficulties that might seem minor in relation to Deleuze's great idea. But philosophies need to work at the molecular level. And whatever else, we ought to decide who sheets of past are images *for*, if they even exist. Sometimes it seems the pasts exist in the memories of the characters, or for viewers who identify with the characters. Or is it the filmmakers who apprehend sheets of past best? Or is it the film theorist who thinks sheets of past by remembering hundreds of films? Can the reader of Deleuze's book about film imagine sheets of past even if he has seen only five hundred of the six hundred films that Deleuze cites? Can a theory of sheets of past in cinema even show someone who does not watch movies how to make time visible? Or are sheets of past literally *in* the past, and not experienced by anyone who exists in the present? For that matter, while we are watching movies, perhaps we do not exist in the present ourselves.

At times, Deleuze says that sheets of past are proper to cinema, available to the camera eye but not to the human eye. But we still might be able to adjust our brains to them. As a final exercise, the reader should try to flash back into the deep-focus past right now. Try a present-past-present (Pr-P-Pr) form: interpose a past event directly into your present and come straight back. Anyone can do a Pr-Pr/P-Pr form: a lived memory in the present, *about* the past, but never leaving the present. But try a

Pr-P/Pr-Pr form: *go* to the past for a minute, while your body (the meat, as cyberpunk calls it) remains here in the present.

APPENDIX

Peaks of Present	*Sheets of Past*
Same event fills P-Pr-F	Different P-Pr-F events fill the same scene
Simultaneous "points of view"	Co-existing "aspects" (C2 101, 104)
Living the same event differently	Living different events simultaneously
The same childhood event exhibited in P-Pr-F	Childhood and adult events exhibited in the same moment
Resnais	Welles
Repeated present image	Pure past image
Plastic "jumping"	Architectural "enveloping"
"Inextricable differences"	"Undecidable alternatives"
An "and" structure	An "or" structure
versus Robbe-Grillet	versus Resnais (C2 104–5)
Whether an event belongs to it is	Whether an event belongs to it is

NOTES

1. At the time of this writing, all the episodes of this radio program were available for purchase on the Internet.

2. It may sound funny that character points of view play such a large role in the pure form of time. In one way of thinking, temporal geometries are formal and abstract, whereas characters are merely concrete, but a character can be an abstract machine, and can twist into formal relations, as we can see by comparing the subtle variability of close-ups to the anemic variability of circles and spirals. So it is not surprising that abstract time-forms revolve around characters.

3. The archive administrator tells the reporter not to use any direct quote from the journal, so what we see on screen cannot be exactly what Thatcher wrote.

4. *Citizen Kane* is not what Peter Wollen calls perspectivist, the "pattern of nesting, overlapping, and conflicting narratives"; Peter Wollen, "Citizen Kane", in *Orson Welles's Citizen Kane: A Casebook*, ed. James Naremore (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 250–51. There is some overlapping of the narratives, but not much conflict between them. Bernstein admires Kane more than Thatcher does, but the stories do not conflict the way those in *Rashomon* do.

5. I owe this example to someone whose name I failed to catch.

6. In Resnais's *Mélo*, a man is talking to his married friends, coveting the wife. He tells them of a time that his former mistress glanced at another man. While talking, he

glances at the wife. Telling a story about the past is not a flashback. But is the visual glance at the wife a vicarious flashback to the mistress's glance long ago? See Jonathan Rosenbaum, "The camera circles in three major characters in the first act: *Mélo*", in *Defining Moments in Movies*, ed. Chris Fujiwara (London: Cassell, 2007), 600.

7. Perhaps some of these do not count as sheets of past, since they deal with action, or alternative rather than co-existing pasts. But after all, *Citizen Kane*'s flashbacks do not co-exist either, except virtually. Typically, for Deleuze's *Cinema* books, action- and time-functions are not exclusive, but variable. "Film is movement, but the film within the film [is money,] is time" (C2, 78).

8. Deleuze follows the chapter on sheets of past with the powers of the false. Maybe Deleuze thinks sheets of past are a powerful but false image.

9. In Metz's terms, it is both diegesis and discourse. Deleuze defines "reading" not in linguistic terms, but as "re-linking" what is visually merely linked (C2 245).

10. When necessary, the citation from the original French text follows the English citation. Gilles Deleuze, *Cinéma: L'image-mouvement*, vol. 1 (Paris: Minuit, 1983) (C1); and Gilles Deleuze, *Cinéma: L'Image-temps*, vol. 2 (Paris: Minuit, 1985) (C2).

11. So in C2, Deleuze calls them "sections" (*sections*) of the cone.

12. It is not easy to define "interval". In *Cinema 1*, Deleuze defines an interval not as the gap between two events, but as the shortest way to contract a whole movement into a single present. The interval describes a "variable present" rather than "time as a whole" (32). Time as a whole is described not by intervals, but by "simultanism" (46). Later, Deleuze says the brain contains the "interval" between perception and movement (62).

13. One sign that the time-image has succeeded the action-image is that "the cut has importance for itself" (C2 213).

14. Deleuze says Welles "gets deep inside a situation" (C2 110) when it is covered by more than one narrator's flashbacks.

15. The subsequent section of the text is either saying that Resnais makes something almost as interesting out of peaks of present as Welles does with sheets of past or saying that Resnais pushes sheets of past further than Welles—I am not sure which. Deleuze frequently pairs directors as rivals who wind up in each others' camps.

16. Deleuze says pasts "split off" from the present, whereas sheets "stretch away from" the present (C2 99). (It is not obvious that the flashbacks in *Citizen Kane* are more like stretches than splits.) The whole idea of a passing present is that "different events" or moments are included in the depths, "inside one single event" (C2 100).

17. Deleuze calls these "points of view" (POVs) on the event (not necessarily shot with POV camera angles). Deleuze says we "jump" between peaks of present. Confusingly, he also says we "jump" between sheets of past.

18. Or "cut" (*Coupe*; C2 105); or "point" (C2 106).

19. Andrew Sarris, "Citizen Kane: The American Baroque", in *Focus on Citizen Kane*, ed. Ronald Gottesman (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1971), 102–8.

20. Each flashback narration in *Citizen Kane* has a "different kind of time structure" (C2 257), with its own rhythm of ellipses and overlaps, "variations [away] from unilinear order" (C2 256). Flashbacks do not just compress duration from a lifetime to two hours of screentime; they also double the narration. See, for example, Wollen, "*Citizen Kane*", 249–62.

21. Of course, there are still temporal sequences. Kane meets Susan on the street just as he is about to go to his mother's house to look through things she had put in storage when she died. It is at Susan's house that Kane first sees the glass ball with the snow scene inside. So Susan's chronology is the same as the glass ball's. This scene occurs in the middle of Leland's narration, at the turning point between the two halves of the narrative. Susan "stops, as it were in its tracks, Kane's journey back into his past" (Laura Mulvey, "*Citizen Kane*: From Log Cabin to Xanadu" (1996), in *Orson Welles's Citizen Kane*, ed. James Naremore [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004], 226). But temporal sequence in this interpretation is more a symbol of psychic doubling, not a structure of time, as it is for Deleuze (Mulvey 217–47). As James Naremore says,

Citizen Kane has two sleds, two wives, two friends and two endings (141). James Naremore, "Style and Meaning in *Citizen Kane*" (1978), in *Orson Welles's Citizen Kane*, 123–59.

22. *Difference and Repetition* treats the delayed reaction to traumatic childhood events. Rather than accept Freud's account of the slow impact of trauma, postponed in childhood and accelerated later after puberty, Deleuze argues that the child is always already judging herself in the guise of an adult, and the adult is still re-enacting the child.

23. "and relate to each other metonymically". For that matter, what Deleuze describes as the contraction and expansion of time is interpreted by Ira Jaffe as the containment and release of space. See Ira Jaffe, "Film as the Narration of Space: *Citizen Kane*", in *Perspectives on Citizen Kane*, ed. Ronald Gottesman (New York: G. K. Hall, 1996), 353–66.

24. André Bazin, "The Evolution of Film Language", in *What Is Cinema*, trans. Timothy Barnard (Montreal: Caboose Press, 2011), 106.

25. Bazin thinks Welles almost always uses long-duration shots (Bazin, "For an Impure Cinema: In Defense of Adaptation", in *What Is Cinema*, 111), but that he "sadistically" overuses depth (Bazin, "William Wyler, the Jansenist of Mise en Scéne", in *What Is Cinema*). Peter Wollen thinks Welles mostly used long-duration shots "in the framing story [where the reporter is the main character] rather than in the flashbacks" (Wollen, "Citizen Kane", 253).

Bazin says that Wyler's alternation of deep and shallow depth of field (as in *The Little Foxes*, when Bette Davis, in the focused foreground, ignores her dying, out-of-focus husband in the background) "equalizes the reader's mind and the story" (Bazin, "William Wyler", 45–72). "The lens carries out a series of investigations, introducing a sort of second level of temporality through its analysis of the space of a reality which is also unfolding in time" (Bazin, "William Wyler", 53).

In general, the framing story is a neglected aspect of the flashback structure. Of course, the framing story can be another level of flashback, if the film has several layers of films within films. But normally, we expect the framing story to be in the present, to stay still while the flashback runs and to pick up again when the flashback is over. But what if the framing story kept running in the background while we were watching the flashbacks, and by the time we came back to it, we had missed the events that had been occurring in the meantime?

26. Orson Welles and Peter Bogdanovich, *This Is Orson Welles* (New York: Da Capo Press, 1998), 53–54.

27. Techniques, Welles felt, were pretty easy; Gregg Toland (his cinematographer) taught them to him over a weekend.

28. The single composition in this way contains maximum information to explore at one's leisure. James Naremore made similar points a few years before Deleuze—that Welles puts more information in each shot than is present in a montage sequence: "Several conflicting elements are presented . . . simultaneously, as if the camera were slicing through a cross section of the moment, looking down a corridor of images and overlapping elements" (Naremore, *Orson Welles's Citizen Kane*, 126). When we look at the deep-focus photography in *Kane*, we do not see everything in the frame at once: we are aware of an overall composition which exists simultaneously, but, as Bazin has noted, we need to make certain choices, scanning the various objects in the picture selectively (Bazin, "For an Impure Cinema", 130).

Regarding diagonals: "Actors [in *Citizen Kane*] often assume unnatural positions, their figures arrayed in a slanting line that runs out in front of the camera, so that characters in the extreme foreground or in the distance become subjects for the director's visual commentary" (Bazin, "For an Impure Cinema", 127).

29. Early in C1, Deleuze rehearses almost all the connections we find here—deep focus, parallel planes, diagonal movements, seventeenth-century painting and Susan's suicide attempt scene—but without mentioning the past at all (C1 26).

30. Leland's flashback begins in an exaggeratedly shallow depth of field. Bernstein's flashback begins with a medium shot in which he is symbolically reflected on the surface of his desk. Susan's is set up with a high-angle deep-tracking shot. The camera starts with her picture on a billboard, flies through the glass ceiling of a cocktail lounge, and then down onto Susan's head. This is part of what focuses her into evoking her memory—plus the reporter asks her to remember. In fact, the reporter asks Susan twice; the first time, she refuses. The deep-tracking method of forcing memory works only 50 percent of the time.

31. It cannot be that all planes indicate the past, and none the present.

32. Or the way the sailor trips and slides towards the camera in John Ford's *The Long Voyage Home* (1940), shot by *Kane*'s cinematographer Gregg Toland. For a technical explanation, see Garner Simmons, "*Citizen Kane*: The Camera", *Film Reader* 1 (1975): 38–39.

33. If A were behind B *not* on a diagonal, it would be hidden by B's body, or directly above or below it; it would not appear to be behind it.

34. Do we "hear" smooth time in unpulsed music?

35. Of course, optics are relevant to the way a character evoking a memory is shown. Deleuze maintains that "high and low angle shots form contractions, just as oblique and lateral tracking shots form sheets", as though the high angle on Susan in the cocktail lounge scene "forms" the present, and the tracking shot in the suicide scene "forms" the past. But the issue of a character trying to remember something is much more about narrative than shot composition.

36. In this case, the town has modernized and cannot use its past. The past in this story is not suspicious, but instead a "crushing certainty" (C2 112).

37. They are "inexplicable" to Welles's character, and possibly "projections of his own past" (C2 113).

38. Making it "impossible" to reconcile past and present. *Mr. Arkadin* is fiction, so the universal does not really follow. True, the distinction between fiction and non-fiction is broken at many points: Perrault's non-fictions work only when the people being interviewed relate tall tales, and Cassavetes's fictions are improvisations on the actors' realities (C2 152). Still, the primary effect of these cross-overs is to undermine the desire for truth in non-fiction; they do not entail that fictions are immediately true for all of us. (Some fictional characters as well known as Hamlet or Oedipus function like "names of history" that do have virtual causality for everyone who knows about them, but the practices of scriptwriting, script supervision, audience testing, rewriting teams, sequel writing and so on make fiction sometimes more like indirect discourse than like conceptual personae.)

39. The hinge to sheets of past is now simply an "empty door".

40. The next section surprisingly returns to Resnais's peaks of present.

41. The unseen will not generate sheets of cinematic anything.

42. Deleuze proposes two models of "thought" cinema: the thought of the whole (Eisenstein) or thought as the crack (Artaud). Deleuze says that in either case, thought infects the visible, but is not itself visible (C2 169).

43. These twin peaks make a paradigmatic multiple time-image. Of course, music was played live in theatres during silent films (and in Japan, live actors spoke the lines mouthed by silent film actors). But in spite of being separate from the technology of recording and playback, sound was largely in the service of the visual storytelling. It is in sound film that music is "liberated" from the movement-image (C2 238).

44. Robert L. Carringer, *The Making of Citizen Kane* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), 101, 104.

45. The 1938 "War of the Worlds" broadcast was released on LP in 1968, and some episodes of *The Shadow* from 1937–1938 were released on LP in 1976.

46. Paul Heyer, *The Medium and the Magician: Orson Welles, the Radio Years, 1934–1952* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005), 92.

47. The script adapting Chesterton's *The Man Who Was Thursday* was so late that during the show, Houseman had to cut pages directly out of the novel and give them to Welles to read on air.

48. John Houseman, *Run-Through* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1972), 391–92.

49. Welles was proud of inventing radio narration (Orson Welles and Peter Bogdanovich, *This Is Orson Welles* [New York: Da Capo, 1998], 88). Theatre and film have voice-*off*, but voice-*over* is pure audio.

50. "Happenings which would fill an hour on the stage can hardly fill more than twenty minutes on the screen"; from Hugo Münsterberg, *The Photoplay: A Psychological Study* (New York: D. Appleton, 1916); excerpted in Phillip Lopate, ed., *American Movie Critics: An Anthology from the Silents until Now* (New York: Library of America, 2006), 12.

51. On Welles's acting in *Citizen Kane*, Naremore says his "resonant, declamatory voice speaks the lines rapidly, almost throwing away whole phrases but then pausing to linger over a word" (Naremore, *Orson Welles's Citizen Kane*, 138).

52. *Citizen Kane*'s music falls into repetitive motifs. The Xanadu melody, for example, recurs when Xanadu is offscreen. François Thomas says that music is "in the present tense" in its own scene, and in the future or past tenses otherwise. François Thomas, "Musical Keys to *Kane*", in Gottesman, *Perspectives on Citizen Kane*, 172–96.

53. The listener glued to the car radio couldn't even race out of town before it was all over.

54. Houseman, *Run-Through*, 399–402.

55. The percentage of the book that precedes the main action is generally much less than the percentage of the radio play that precedes the action.

56. And to keep the listener tuned to the final commercial. (Rick Altman wonders what Hollywood films would have been like if viewers had to insert a coin after each ten-minute slice of the serial—like HULU, I suppose.) Rick Altman, "Deep-Focus Sound: *Citizen Kane* and the Radio Aesthetic", in Gottesman, *Perspectives on Citizen Kane*, 94–121.

I cannot agree with Robert Carringer's claim that the Mercury productions consisted of "a succession of high spots from the literary source" or that that format shapes *Citizen Kane*.

57. This seems realistic (although the background music is not realist).

58. Deleuze cites Comolli's thesis that talkies abandoned depth of field (C2 233).

59. In a medium that is both audio and visual, it would be a waste to match them, to treat a film as "a radio play with silent illustration", as Bazin says in "*Diary of a Country Priest* and the Robert Bresson Style" (153).

THREE

Deleuze on the Musical Work of Art

Jim Vernon

When Deleuze discusses music in detail, he tends to draw exclusively upon works from the canon of European scored, "art" music (Messiaen, Debussy, Mahler, Stockhausen, etc.). By contrast, most of the scholarly literature on the implications of his philosophy for music focuses on works more closely tied to individual spontaneity, specific performance setting or both (techno/industrial[1], jazz/free improvisation[2], pop/metal[3], etc.). By focusing on the musical process involved in concrete performers and performances, many commentators seek to emphasize the political and social *consequences* of Deleuze's theory of music, arguing that, for Deleuze, the "measure of any music is its ability to create new possibilities for life"[4], or its "fabulating function that brings real parties together to produce . . . the germ of a people to come"[5], or its capacity to provide "a model for permanent revolution in society at large"[6]. Thus, the dominant strains in the literature on Deleuze and music[7] presuppose that the formally composed works treated by Deleuze are, at best, contingently personal examples of a theory with wider scope[8] or, at worst, misleading illustrations of a philosophy of music better actualized by works more intimately tied to concrete performer and/or performance, which better (perhaps alone) enact the personal and social becomings sought by his supporters in his wake[9]. In this chapter, I defend the contrary view, arguing that composed, "pure" works of music alone satisfy the strict conditions for musical art stipulated by Deleuze, precisely because they alone achieve an enduring autonomy from the non-musical functions of sonorous affects that embed them in shifting subjective, social and political relations. I conclude with some brief remarks on the limitations of such a view.

Like any good empiricist, Deleuze begins his account by presupposing no particular relations whatsoever to hold between any given materials, but seeks to derive the structures of art, and more specifically music, from the universal variation of pure difference in general, or what he sometimes calls chaos. How can music be born from chaos? Deleuze argues that relations in general can only arise from the given if "[c]haos is not without its own directional components", or "milieus" (TP 313)[10]. That is, chaos can only give rise to relations if, somehow and contingently, "block[s] of space-time constituted by the periodic repetition of the[ir] component[s]" arise within it (TP 313). Chaos is, then, not necessarily relational; there is nothing inexorable about the rise of such milieus. However, insofar as repetitious blocks do arise within chaos, it "has a chance to" become relational (TP 313), and thus ultimately musical.

There is a distinction, however, between the mere repetition of milieus that found relations—which he also calls "meter"—and the originary relations he discusses under the heading of "rhythm". Rhythm, he argues, arises not from repetition, but rather as a relation between distinct metric milieus as they interact. Every milieu arises from chaos with its own specific meter, or "code" of repetition (e.g., materials contingently form into organisms, which subsequently seek self-preservation); rhythm, by contrast, arises through the chance interaction between metered milieus (e.g., organisms interact in competition for food, space, mates, etc.). Coded blocks have a directional tendency to repeat, but when such tendencies cause the blocks to confront each other, each code must coordinate its repetition in the face of the other's influence in order to preserve its identity; in other words, each milieu must incorporate the effects of the other(s) as they repeat, translating their codes into each other, producing a "passage or bridging" or "transcoding" between milieus (TP 314). This is rhythm derived, yet also distinguished, from meter, much as the metrical feet of a poem are the ground of, and yet remain distinct from, the rhythmic interaction of the phonemes that occupy them across the poem as a whole (rhyme, assonance, etc.).

Chaos, then, under particular conditions becomes metric, producing the coded milieus whose varied interactions, under other conditions, become rhythmic. Nothing in this, however, gives us anything specifically musical. While Deleuze, as usual, does not intend the musical language he employs to be taken metaphorically (meter really is a coded pattern of repetition, just as rhythms emerge between metrical units), it remains unclear how artistic, and thereafter specifically musical, assemblages would differ from any rhythmic interaction that develops from the given. More generally, it remains unclear how an assemblage of creativity, or art, arises; all we have so far is differences productively interacting through transcoding. As he puts it, "we do not yet have a *Territory*, which is not a milieu, not even an additional milieu, nor a rhythm or passage between milieus" (TP 314), and all art, he claims, begins with territory.

What makes a territory, and how does it produce specifically artistic assemblages?

"There is a territory", he writes, "when milieu components [set in rhythm] cease to be functional to become expressive" (TP 315). Milieus, continually inundated with codes from their others, lack consistency, as their repetitions and transcodings are tied to particular kinds of functional action (e.g., those of finding patterns of interaction with others in rhythms that ward off their influence to preserve meter), and thus remain in continual flux via heteronomous influence. Territorial assemblages, by contrast, arise when some affective property of a block "acquires a temporal constancy" distinct from its active functions (TP 315). That is, rhythm gives way to territory precisely when the components preserve themselves in the face of external influence by the specific nature of their organization, producing an "expressive quality" or "signature". When an animal marks its territory, for example, it neither simply repeats itself as an enclosed entity nor merely accommodates itself to an exterior, but rather creates a sign that is both abstractable from and independent of its rhythmic and metric functions: a sign that draws material out of its functionality into pure expressivity. The expressive creation of territory clearly demands a particular level of internal organization and a particular spatial and/or temporal distance from external influence, and thus can only be produced by particular species or individuals in certain contexts. Moreover, even though territories arise to preserve metric identity in a world that demands rhythmic accommodation, territorial expressions cannot be deduced from or read back into either their origin in a metric block or the rhythmic transcodings it enters into (i.e., from what might respectively be called the subject and audience of expression); instead, and fundamentally, "to express is not to depend upon [the subject or audience]; there is an autonomy of expression" (TP 317). It is just because expression is autonomous and non-functional that Deleuze suggests that the "chancy formation" of territories might "be called Art" (TP 316). Art, then, is not (or at least not yet) a specifically human activity; it is the becoming-expressive of rhythmic milieus as territories, or the emancipation of qualities from their subjective meters and rhythmic functions. As such, in its most basic structure, art is defined by the enduring self-subsistence of an autonomous, non-functional expression. Just as an animal burrow outlasts the creature that created it, and does so even if the creature fails to ward off, or even never encounters, predators, "Art preserves, and it is the only thing in the world that is preserved", and it does so as a "gesture that no longer depends on whoever made it", and that remains "independent of the viewer or hearer, who only experience it after" (WP 163–64).

The question, then, is precisely how such works endure; in other words, "What does a matter *do* as a matter of expression?" (TP 317). Well, as with meters, expressive qualities do not exist in a vacuum, but in

differential relations with other territories, expressed by other individuals. Thus, while remaining autonomous and self-subsistent, territories nevertheless "*enter* [into] *shifting relations with one another that 'express' the relation of the territory they draw to* [both] *the interior milieu of impulses and the exterior milieu of circumstances*" (TP 317). On the one hand, the expressive qualities of a territory relate to each other internally, constituting territorial motifs (as when the call, urine and burrowing action of an animal creatively express its possessed habitat); on the other hand, such motifs inevitably run up against others outside their territory, entering into relations of counterpoint (as when a predator marks its sign on the possessed territory, or when rains come, forcing the animal to refresh its urine to re-mark its habitat). This is not, however, a mere return to the transcoding of rhythm; rather, what is at stake is a deepening of the autonomy of expression, for it is precisely in the creation of a preserved self-movement (the assemblage of specific affects that mark the habitat) that one liberates affect from rhythmic pressure. A territorial sign must draw from its internal resources and accommodate external pressures in order to be constructed, but it must also distinguish itself from their merely given functions and relations to preserve itself as expressive. That is, while the contingent presence of scented urine in the animal allows it to mark territory, and the equally contingent presence of rain and competing scents forces it to be replenished, the territorial construction itself is distinct from both natural excretion and external obstacles, and this distinction is only enhanced by the channelling of excretion into patterns of marking and the reiteration of them over time, such that it may be mimicked by competitors or re-enacted by rote. That is, "even when the impulses and circumstances are given, the [expressed] relation[s are] prior what [is placed] in relation" (TP 318), for the autonomous self-consistency of the expressive territory must be able to both withstand external pressure (e.g., replenish itself when altered) and vary internal meter (i.e., put habitual functions to alternate uses). Thus, what distinguishes an artistic territory from a non-artistic one is "precisely this aptitude for [internal] motifs and [external] counterpoints that, [even] if they are variable, or even when they are constant, [expressively] articulate rhythm and harmonize melody" (TP 318).

Such an "*aggregate of matters of expression that draws a territory and develops into territorial motifs and landscapes*" is called a *refrain* (TP 323). While drawing on musical language, Deleuze, again, by no means intends to restrict such assemblages to sonorous blocks; all aggregates that develop variable internal expression while retaining consistency in counterpoint are refrains. The primary question posed by the refrain, then, is "what holds these territorializing marks, territorial motifs, and territorialized functions together in the same intra-assemblage?" (TP 323). This is the question of consistency, which is not, he notes, a feature of refrains; rather, refrains "[a]t first . . . constitute no more than a fuzzy

set [which only] later takes on consistency" in art (TP 323). Why, then, is the refrain, which draws elements together in an autonomous territory, not yet truly consistent?

All refrains, understood as autonomously expressive, are creative, but they remain defined by and tied to the functional habits from which they arise (the territory of the burrowing creature is still a habitat, and thus is constantly altered in response to shifting threats and food sources; similarly, the spontaneous melody hummed by a scared child arises and alters based on noises heard in the dark). Refrains are determined both by their audiences (the real predators or imagined ghosts) and by their subjects (the hungry creature or apprehensive child). Refrains create and express, but what they create and express are harmonic counterpoints to external stimuli, and thus, while producing potentially autonomous expressions, they are ultimately still functional and thus heteronomous. Expressive refrains point towards the self-consistent autonomy of affect, but ultimately fail to break free of both their internal origin and external reception; their consistency is not self-defined, but is determined by the degree to which they ward off external influence and satisfy inner lacks (i.e., by the degree to which they successfully represent the interests of subjects to their relevant audiences). As Deleuze puts it, "Animal and child refrains seem to be territorial: therefore they are not 'music'" (TP 303), for music, like all art, must be preserved in its own autonomous consistency alone. To the contrary, the "refrain is rather a means of preventing music, warding it off, or forgoing it" (TP 300) in order to preserve the expressive subject, through its territory, in reaction to others, whose subsequent responses define its success. Such territories, of course, are bound to collapse; life cannot be preserved, and death always comes too soon. Territorial expressions thus mount a defence against a specific outside out of the interests of a certain inside, and as such remain functionally tied to their fragile subjects and/or fickle audiences. As Deleuze puts it, one may, for example, "admire children's drawings, or rather be moved by them, but they rarely stand up" on their own (WP 165), tied as they are to subjective desires to please or ward off parents and others.

If expression arises as a refrain, and yet as refrain remains tied to a tenuous and heteronomous functionality, then art, *qua* self-preserved affect, can only arise if "a territorialized, assembled function acquires enough independence [from territorial functionality] to constitute a new assemblage, one that is . . . en route to deterritorialization" (TP 324). What is required for the refrain to tip into genuine art is the liberation of the expressive elements of the territory from their territorial functions (i.e., an opening of them onto the forces that threaten them from without in order to separate them from the forces that construct them from within). Motifs and counterpoints must be divorced from their various territorial roles and combined in new assemblages without function, or into "pure", autonomous affects. The methods of deterritorialization and affect crea-

tion are assuredly multifarious[11]. All, however, are by definition not spontaneous efforts at expressing habitual subjectivity in performance setting; instead, they are deliberate constructions of affect alone that render their expressive assemblages autonomous from interest and function. Thus, while analogues to human art may be found amongst versatile animals or precocious children, they essentially fail to truly distinguish themselves from territorial functionality, individual interest and audience reaction. Nature is certainly creative and expressive, and all art proceeds from it, but it remains too enthralled to interest—to the territory—to create creation itself. That which represents the territorial interests of a creature to its allies, its foes and even itself is not true art, for such works draw too much from already acquired resources (the habits of meter and the reactions of rhythm) and remain too directed to functional goals (the fearful threats, the needed food and the preservation of territory).

Art thus truly begins when creative expression is liberated from habit, interest, goal and reception—that is, when affects are assembled simply as affects, without subject or audience. In addition, art requires a deliberate creation not present in mere nature, for it requires the creator to think in deterritorialized affects alone. Art proper, then, is a strictly human activity, for only we assemble affects at a distance from territorial function. Art is nothing more than the composition of affects as affects, and thus "composition is the sole definition of art . . . and what is not composed is not a work of art" (WP 191). Since art is specifically opposed to habit and function, why speak of composition and not, for example, improvisation? Or, more precisely, why is such composition the only method through which one truly "hazards an improvisation" (TP 311)? While surprisingly silent on this key point[12], Deleuze arguably would agree with the composer and strident opponent of spontaneous music, Gavin Bryers. Tiring of the strictures of classical, jazz and other "idiomatic" forms of music, Bryers (along with Derek Bailey and Tony Oxley) helped inaugurate so-called free or non-idiomatic improvisation in the collaborative group entitled Joseph Holbrooke, pursuing spontaneous music without harmonic or rhythmic strictures. However, after the very brief existence of the group, Bryers moved back exclusively to scored music, arguing,

> In improvisation you could develop a whole armoury of devices and things you could do and then do them. You might permutate the order but you were limited to those things you could do. It could, if you worked very hard, be very sophisticated, but you were always going to finish [with] those things you had developed. . . . I knew [then that all improvising musicians] were practising effects during the day and playing them in the "improvisation" at night.[13]

Improvised music draws from established habits of expression, and repeats them in response to new rhythmic influences. The arsenal of such

habits can be wide and varied, but the need to respond to stimuli external to the affects (other players, audience or ambient noises, one's own contingent emotional states, etc.) dictates that habitual forms of expression dominate creation. This is, of course, why, even in the "freest", least "predetermined" forms of improvisation, Bryers found that "pieces always started tentatively, [built to] something big in the middle, and then finished quietly. That sort of arc happened every time"[14]. By necessity, the improvised work arises immediately from the subject, in the situation the subject finds itself in, and as the subject's response to that situation from their habitual resources. The work lasts only as long as the performance does, and is intrinsically tied to the performer, their habits and the stimuli to which they consciously or unconsciously react. As such, "in any improvising position the person creating the music is identified with the music. . . . And because of that the music, in improvisation, doesn't stand alone. It's corporeal"[15] and thus tied to the circumstances of its origin and reception.

Even completely "free" improvised music, then, fails to liberate affect from either internal or external resources, and remains the personal reaction of a habitual subject to external territories in counterpoint. The same, by extension, goes for all improvised and/or contextually performed music, which typically involve far larger degrees of premeditation, as well as audience and performer interest, from the intuitive DJ who knows how to work a room to the black metal band trying to distance itself from doom and death bands in order to draw or alienate particular fans and/or critics. Bryers turned to composition precisely because only by moving away from the strictures of performance can the artist "stand apart from one's creation[, thus d]istancing yourself from what you are doing. . . . If I write a piece, I don't even have to be there when it is played. They are [aesthetic] conceptions [and] I'm more interested in conception than reality. Because I can conceive of things that don't [yet] have any tangible reality"[16]. To move beyond habitual reactions, to gather forces external to one's resources into an affective assemblage with one's own resources in order to render them all autonomously expressive as though they have no origin, or, as Deleuze puts it, to create as though "the world has had different aspects, will have still others, and that there are already others on other planets [thus opening] up to the Cosmos in order to harness forces in a 'work'" (TP 337), requires the sober, de-personalized distance of the composing artist or, perhaps more appropriately, the artisan, who "leave[s] the milieus and the earth behind" (TP 345), forsaking performance and reception, and with them habit and function, for the purity of autonomous affect alone. Composition is the only true improvisation, as only it leaves behind the habits of meter, rhythm, territory and counterpoint[17].

As such, this does not imply either an abstract formalism (like that of Schoenberg's serialism)[18] that stands above affects in order to submit

them to externally developed plans or a haphazard immersion in sounds, submitting compositions to their chance natures (as in many works by Cage)[19]. The former subordinates the territorialized affects to the will or interests of the composing subject (however abstract), while the latter, inversely, subordinates the subject to the contingent meters and rhythms of given affects (however creative). Rather, what is at stake is a deliberate, sober deterritorialization of various territorialized refrains, or the creative liberation of expressive affects from whatever shifting subjective interests, assembled milieus and receptive audiences in which they happen to be involved. There is every difference in the world between the songs of birds, "spontaneously" developed to mark territory, fool enemies or attract mates, and the birdsongs transcribed by Messiaen, transposed via tempo and pitch reduction to organs, pianos, strings or brass, and transplanted into various cycles and tone poems, all of which can be performed in the absence of the composer, and any audience, as singularly themselves. While music begins with territorial refrains, understood as autonomously expressive, musical art has its task and end in deterritorializing them all from their habitual and receptive domains into purely non-functional percepts and affects: that is, in composing "the song of the universe, the world before or after man" (WP 189). Hence, "the peculiarity of art is to pass through the finite in order to rediscover, to restore the infinite" (WP 197).

This, moreover, explains the dominance of musical terminology in Deleuze's account of art: unique amongst the arts, the scored compositions of music can distinguish themselves not just from composer and audience but also from all specific affective materials (particular instruments, conductors, musicians, etc.), and they can be actualized anywhere, anytime, enduring in autonomous self-subsistence through all change of performer, instruments and performance[20]. Musical composition is not simply a work on paper (they are composed with sonorous affects, not with visual or linguistic ones), but scored works depend upon the presence of no particular conductor, performer, instruments or halls, and may even, without much loss of autonomy, be transposed to other instruments, larger and smaller ensembles and so on. Thus, when "sound deterritorializes, it becomes more and more refined [and] autonomous" (TP 347), because it assembles affects which rest within no physical media, as opposed, for example, to painting, which necessarily produces localized "bodies of light and color" (TP 348) on specific canvasses that age, fade and deteriorate. Music, liberating sonorous affects from all ties to the specific bodies whose territories they form, "strips bodies of their inertia, of the materiality of their presence; it *disembodies* bodies" (Bacon, *The Logic of Sensation*, 47)[21]. Music is the most artistic of the arts because it is the least bound to materiality, or the most affectively autonomous, and thus the measure of music in Deleuze's aesthetics lies in the degree to which a composition liberates sonic affects from their territorial functions

(i.e., from subjective interest and audience reaction) by composing them into purely musical assemblages. Deleuze thus formulates the creative maxim: "Produce a deterritorialized refrain as the final end of music" (TP 350), and by extension the final end of art.

It is precisely this "final end", I would argue, that reveals the limits of Deleuze's philosophy of music. While certainly, through its accounts of meter, rhythm, the refrain and the various methods of deterritorializing it, offering resources for understanding the construction, appeal and uses of non-composed, "impure" music, Deleuze nevertheless resolutely subordinates all improvised and contextually performed music to the final end of art, which scored music (and only rare cases of it, if any at all) uniquely attains. While music, he readily acknowledges, possesses a unique capacity to move a people (TP 348), musical art must forsake the people to retrieve affective forces from all social functions, lest it return to the hypnotic trumpets of fascism or the hum of the frightened child[22]. Music, for Deleuze, must be composed for an absent people, not to move or alter present ones[23]. A theory of music that valourizes the radical divorcing of the compositions from both performer and audience, of works from their performance contexts and intentional origins, and of musical art from its residual effects on the listener—in short, a theory of musical art that prescribes the final "goal of an absolute musical interiority, purified of all relations to extra-musical criteria"[24]—seems to deprive music of its most essential aspect: the emancipatory processes and effects of aesthetic creation. If, as Deleuze insists, musical art initially arises when we not only cease to act out of habit and reaction but also begin to create signs that represent our autonomous self-liberation from merely given conditions, then the emancipatory potential of composing, performing and experiencing such creations seems to lie at the heart of music. Rather than directing music towards its own purified rarefication, then, a philosophy of musical art grounded in its origin would evaluate music in terms of the emancipation from merely given structures that it allows composer, performer and audience alike to collectively achieve. If music first represents our capacity to rise above contingently developed habits and contingently imposed relations in autonomous expressions, then measuring a musical work of art by its capacity to both represent and bring about such emancipation would not only preserve the originary essence of music but also widen the scope of truly musical works to include examples from all genres and eras. Of course, as noted at the outset, this would be a philosophy of music broadly in line with the stated goals of Deleuze's various supporters. In order to construct it, however, they would need to turn away from Deleuze.

NOTES

1. For example, Michael Goddard, "Sonic and Cultural Noise as Production of the New: The Industrial Music Media Ecology of Throbbing Gristle", in *Deleuze, Guattari and the Production of the New*, ed. S. O'Sullivan and S. Zepke (London: Continuum, 2008), 162–72; and Drew Hemment, "Affect and Individuation in Popular Electronic Music", in *Deleuze and Music*, ed. I. Buchanan and M. Swiboda (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2004), 76–94.

2. For example, Rogerio Costa, "Free Musical Improvisation and the Philosophy of Gilles Deleuze", *Perspectives of New Music* 49, no. 1 (Winter 2011): 127–42; Jeremy Gilbert, "Becoming-Music: The Rhizomatic Moment of Improvisation", in Buchanan and Swiboda, *Deleuze and Music*, 118–39; John Corbett, "Out of Nowhere: Meditations on Deleuzian Music, Anti-Cadential Strategies, and Endpoints in Improvisation", in *The Other Side of Nowhere: Jazz, Improvisation, and Communities in Dialogue*, ed. D. Fischlin and A. Heble (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press, 2004), 387–95; and Gary Peters, *The Philosophy of Improvisation* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009), esp. 145–65.

3. For example, Greg Hainge, "Is Pop Music", in Buchanan and Swiboda, *Deleuze and Music*, 36–53; T. S. Murphy and D. W. Smith, "What I Hear Is Thinking Too: Deleuze and Guattari Go Pop", *Echo: A Music-Centered Journal* 3, no. 1 (Spring 2001): http://www.echo.ucla.edu/Volume3-Issue1/smithmurphy/index.html (accessed April 26, 2012); Marcel Swiboda, "Minoritarian + Music", in *The Deleuze Dictionary*, ed. A. Parr (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), 167–69; and Ronald Bogue, "Becoming Metal, Becoming Death . . .", in *Deleuze's Wake: Tributes and Tributaries* (Albany: SUNY Press, 2004), 83–107.

4. Ronald Bogue, "Violence in Three Shades of Metal: Death, Doom and Black", in Buchanan and Swiboda, *Deleuze and Music*, 95–117 (115).

5. Daniel W. Smith, "Introduction 'A Life of Pure Immanence': Deleuze's Critique et Clinique Project", in *Gilles Deleuze: Essays Critical and Clinical*, trans. Daniel W. Smith and Michael A. Greco (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), ix–lii (xlv), cited in Marcel Swiboda, "Cosmic Strategies: The Electric Experiments of Miles Davis", in Buchanan and Swiboda, *Deleuze and Music*, 196–216 (214).

6. Eugene Holland, "Studies in Applied Nomadology: Jazz Improvisation and Post-Capitalist Markets", in Buchanan and Swiboda, *Deleuze and Music*, 20–35 (32).

7. It is worth noting that some recent works—mainly those by musicologists, like the excavation of his varied relations to Pierre Boulez in Edward Campbell, *Boulez, Music and Philosophy* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), esp. 141–53, and the contributions to Brian Hulse and Nick Nesbitt, eds., *Sounding the Virtual: Gilles Deleuze and the Theory and Philosophy of Music* (Farnham, Surrey: Ashgate, 2010)—tilt towards composed, "serious" music.

8. See, for example, Gilbert, "Becoming-Music", who argues that "to further the project of a Deleuzian cartography/historiography of music, the issue of improvisation must be taken seriously, something Deleuze and Guattari themselves do not appear to take very seriously at all" (126), and thus their account should perhaps be read as "indicat[ing] the desirability of adding to and problematizing" their aesthetics (136).

9. See Eugene Holland, "Jazz Improvisation: Music of the People to Come", in O'Sullivan and Zepke, *Deleuze, Guattari and the Production of the New*, 196–205: "deterritorializing music is *precisely* what jazz and *jazz alone* [my emphasis] is known for: a jazz band will take a well-known 'standard' tune and put it to flight through improvisation, deterritorializing it so that what was recognizable to the point of being stale becomes new, and perhaps even nearly unrecognizable. The standard tune in jazz becomes the point of departure for a collective line of flight that involves musicians and audience alike in a creative endeavor that aims at making the old tune into something unheard of. . . . [As such,] in the *jazz* assemblage, participation and creativity are *widely* dispersed and shared, whereas in the classical assemblage they are very

narrowly restricted to the composer. . . . [Thus,] the collective creativity of jazz improvisation . . . epitomize[s] the deterritorializing force of music itself" (204).

10. While written with Guattari, this account differs in no substantial way from the accounts in the (now known to be essentially sole-authored) Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, *What Is Philosophy?*, and it follows a trajectory essentially identical to that of Gilles Deleuze, *Cinema 1: The Movement-Image* and *Cinema 2: The Time-Image*. Thus, I subsume Guattari's contributions under Deleuze's name.

11. Deleuze cites classicism's organization of chaos, romanticism's construction of an earthly territory and modernism's elaboration of the forces of the cosmos (TP 338–43). An excellent account of Deleuze's historical account of musical innovation can be found in Ronald Bogue, *Deleuze on Music, Painting and the Arts* (New York: Routledge, 2003), esp. 33–53, although he fails to properly distinguish aesthetic autonomy and territorial function in Deleuze's account of art (see 69–72).

12. Deleuze actually shows little interest in developing accounts of the nature of composition; how a composition relates to its varied performances; how one might distinguish, for example, computer-generated scores from traditional ones; and the like. There is no doubting the originality of his aesthetic, and by extension musical theory, but in many ways it remains skeletal.

13. From an interview with Derek Bailey in his *Improvisation: Its Nature and Practice in Music* (New York: Da Capo, 1992), 114.

14. *Ibid*.

15. *Ibid*., 115. By contrast, it is precisely this ephemeral lack of consistency—what we might call its territoriality—that Bailey finds attractive about improvisation, and in fact defining of music and musicianship: "In all its roles and appearances, improvisation can be considered as the celebration of the moment. And in this the nature of improvisation exactly resembles the nature of music. Essentially, music is fleeting; its reality is the moment of performance. There might be documents that relate to that moment—score, recording, echo, memory—but only to anticipate or recall it. . . . It exists because it meets the creative appetite that is a natural part of being a performing musician" (*Ibid*., 142). There could hardly be an account of music more diametrically opposed to Deleuze's, although, as indicated above, it certainly finds support amongst those who self-identify as Deleuzeans.

16. *Ibid*, 115. A similar desire to extinguish the performer/author is expressed by Deleuze's beloved Messiaen, who, before the premiere of *Réveil des oiseaux*, reportedly said, "I'm anxious to disappear behind the birds"; quoted in Alex Ross, *The Rest Is Noise: Listening to the Twentieth Century* (New York: Picador, 2007), 492.

17. Compare Michael Gallope, "The Sound of Repeating Life: Ethics and Metaphysics in Deleuze's Philosophy of Music", in Hulse and Nesbitt, *Sounding the Virtual*, 77–102: "[*P*]*roperly* improvising is far from easy. It is much more complicated than taking a solo, trying out a new part, or ornamenting a notated figure. Making music that deterritorializes and reaches the heights of the cosmos means making something *exemplary*—far beyond the mundane clichés of most music" (95). While I agree with much of Gallope's critique of Deleuze, he overemphasizes the role of the audience, eventually arguing that the "only proper sensation, affect, or percept Deleuze will speak of takes place *impersonally* between the audience and the musical work, to such an extent that the rare sensation set free in a 'line of flight' *escapes the score*" (98).

18. Cf.: "We may say long live Chabrier, as opposed to Schoenberg. . . . We do not need to suppress tonality; we need to turn it loose" (TP 350).

19. Cf.: "Sometimes one overdoes it, puts too much in, works in a jumble of lines and sounds; then instead of producing a cosmic machine capable of 'rendering sonorous,' one lapses back to a machine of reproduction that ends up reproducing nothing but a scribble effacing all lines, a scramble effacing all sounds. . . . A material that is too rich remains too 'territorialized': on noise sources, on the nature of the objects . . . (this even applies to Cage's prepared piano)" (TP 343–44).

20. See Peter Hallward, *Out of This World: Deleuze and the Philosophy of Creation* (London: Verso, 2006), 107: "Art, we might say, creates an echo chamber in which pure

sensation can vibrate in itself, in its undiluted intensity, free of both the subject that senses and the object that is sensed. Such sensation is free of any actual object, because art is defined by its ability to make sensation or affect endure for its own sake, without regard for the transient existence of its material support".

21. Interestingly, Deleuze goes so far as to divorce even operatic music from character and drama: "Motifs in operas can . . . be connected to people, for example: a Wagnerian motif is supposed to designate a character. Such a mode of listening is not empty or without interest: perhaps at a certain level of relaxation it is even a necessary passage. Yet everyone knows it is not enough. At a higher level of tension, sound does not refer to a landscape, but music itself envelops a distinct sound landscape inside it (as with Liszt)"; Gilles Deleuze, "Making Inaudible Forces Audible", in *Two Regimes of Madness: Texts and Interviews 1975–1995*, ed. D. Lapoujade and trans. A. Hodges and M. Taormina (New York: Semiotext(e), 2006), 156–60 (158–59).

22. It is interesting, in this regard, to note two major composers who never figure into Deleuze's pantheon: Nono and Xenakis, both of whom eventually came to critique the dominant Darmstadt composers—in particular, the "cosmic music" of Stockhausen cited as exemplary by Deleuze (e.g., WP 191)—for "an excess of self-referential, hermetic activity" to the detriment of music's effect on the listener; cf. Ross, *The Rest Is Noise*, 433.

23. While many accounts of Deleuze's aesthetics focus on the "absent people", his account of their relation to art is highly ambiguous: "What relationship is there between human struggle and a work of art? The closest and for me the most mysterious relationship of all. Exactly what Paul Klee meant when he said: 'You know, the people are missing.' The people are missing and at the same time, they are not missing. The people are missing means that the fundamental affinity between a work of art and a people that does not yet exist *is not, will never be clear* [my emphasis]"; in Gilles Deleuze, "What Is the Creative Act", in *Two Regimes of Madness*, 324. While all true music may be composed for an absent people, their reaction to it is by no means the measure of musical creation.

24. Nick Nesbitt, "Deleuze, Adorno, and the Composition of Musical Multiplicity", in Buchanan and Swiboda, *Deleuze and Music*, 66. While developing a critique of Deleuze's philosophy of music with which I am quite sympathetic, Nesbitt grounds it in a misleading opposition between the "internal relations" of Deleuze and more "dialectical, external relations". For a discussion, see my "Deleuze and Hegel on the Logic of Relations", in *Hegel and Deleuze: Together Again for The First Time*, ed. Karen Houle and Jim Vernon (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 2013), 115–30.

FOUR

Deleuze and Guattari, Architecturality and Performance

David Fancy

> Art begins not with the flesh but with the house. That is why architecture is the first of the arts. (WP 186)

This statement by Deleuze and Guattari, made partway through the chapter on the constitution of art in their final collaboration, *What Is Philosophy?*, could perhaps, if one were feeling contrary, be read as a challenge in some sense: a call to demonstrate that in fact *other* arts—be they the result of human or of other-than-human expression—have from an immanentist vantage some form of claim to precedence *over* architecture, to being first on the dance card of the artistic originary. One could, for example, quickly find one's way to Plateau 11 of *A Thousand Plateaus*—"1837: Of the Refrain"—and revisit the "child in the dark, gripped with fear" who "comforts himself by singing under his breath" and observe that it is this tune, this musical line that serves "as a rough sketch of a calming and stabilizing, calm and stable, center in the heart of chaos" (311). It would seem here that it is in fact this tune, functioning as an inherent aspect of the refrain, that serves to differentiate between the external milieu of materials and the internal milieu of composing elements and substances (314), and that in so doing the tune *permits* the child to have a home, an architectural structure: tune first, house second. But were one to pursue such a line of inquiry, it would not be long before the question of the tune's architectural function as "an intermediary milieu of membranes and limits" (313) between exterior and interior—one of a number of constituting elements of a body in the refrain—would come to the fore. One would then have to abandon the counterclaim

concerning the lack of primacy of architecture and turn instead to a discussion of the *architecturality* of music and/or the musicality of architecture. Housefulness of the tune; tunefulness of the house. Perhaps, then, feeling contrary and seeking to make definitive statements about more or less originary forms of artistic expression are in fact dead ends for the simple reason that there would appear to be a transcendent impulse informing such pursuits. One might instead more productively engage with Deleuze and Guattari's assertion that "architecture is the first of the arts" by invoking their own additive logic of the AND, and stating instead that "architecture, like other arts, is *a* first of the arts", using "a" rather than "the". In other words, architecture, as a first among a series of firsts, emerges informed by a logic of aparallelism that mitigates against the foreclosures of both origin and telos, but that nonetheless can be understood to demonstrate a consonant quality across a range of expression: a discernable abstract machine operating within the assemblages of a house, a song, a painting, a poem, a video, a bird's song and so forth. So, architecture not necessarily "first", but rather the primacy of architecturality—or a certain type of virtually informed and differentially derived generativity of structure integral to Deleuze's version of immanent ontology—inhering within a variety of individuated art forms.

Yet to let things rest there would be to decontextualize the statement somewhat and miss the opportunity to usher further the question of onto-genesis and the emergence of individuated art forms. I am thinking in this instance, coming to this inquiry as I am with significant investment in theatre studies and in performance studies, of what Deleuze and Guattari assert as necessarily coming *after* architecture in the quotation above—namely, the flesh. Specifically, I am wondering how the confluence of architecturality and flesh might be explored when considering the question of acting, of human embodied—or indeed *enfleshed*—performance. In turn, how might the philosophical considerations around the artful flesh's own architecturality, following a number of the recursive lines of inquiry opened up within Deleuze's *Difference and Repetition* and related texts, resonate with what might be described as the performative elements of thought or, in effect, the performative elements of ontology? In other words, how do we talk about the human actor as an enfleshed artist in terms of architecturality and related concepts from Deleuze that foreground onto-genetic production? And, by association, how can concepts relating to performance that appear with surprising regularity in Deleuze—from his use of dramatic character to discuss the "heroes of repetition" in Kierkegaard and Nietzsche to his conception of a theatre of "pure forces, dynamic lines in space which act without intermediary upon the spirit" (DR 10)—inform understandings of onto-genetic production, as well as perhaps lead to productive modulations of a key contemporary performance-related concept cluster that I invoked a moment ago,

one recently promulgated most forcefully by Judith Butler: namely, questions of "performativity" and the "performative"?

Abjuring nineteenth-century playwright Eugène Scribe's Aristotelian encouragements to follow the form of the "well-made play" and starting instead right in the middle of things, it is worth noting that Deleuze and Guattari's assertion that "art begins not with the flesh but with the house" brings us to the very *matériel brut* of acting: flesh, the body, the human body. The fact that they present house as coming before flesh is, of course, part of their own challenge of the importance placed by Straus, Merleau-Ponty and others on "the flesh" as the site of an affective and perceptual *a priori*: the latter's assertion that sensation results from a relationship of the body and the world (WP 231). Deleuze and Guattari note, "A curious Fleshism inspires this final avatar of phenomenology and plunges it into the mystery of incarnation" (178). Accompanying such a plunge, the fleshly subject that perceives is provided with a transcendent function that exceeds the art that is experienced through it, enacting a questionable *Urdoxa*, an original transcendent opinion about the body serving as a proposition (142)[1]. Can flesh actually even "support percept and affect", Deleuze and Guattari wonder; "can it constitute the being of sensation, or must it not itself be supported and pass into other powers of life?" (178). Art can indeed be understood as a bloc of sensations, "*that is to say, a compound of percepts and affects*" (164; emphasis in original), but, they affirm, flesh "is only the thermometer of a becoming", for the "flesh is too tender" for sensation to emerge solely from it, or even to wholly contain it. Thus, percepts and affects are not simply human-experienced perceptions or affections; rather, they are *independent* of those who undergo them, of the flesh of those in whom they may momentarily inhere. Deleuze and Guattari further explain of those "other powers of life", "Sensations, percepts and affects are *beings* whose validity lies in themselves and exceeds any lived. They could be said to exist in the absence of man because man, as he is caught in stone, on the canvas, or by words, is himself a compound of percepts and affects. The work of art is a being of sensation and nothing else: it exists in itself" (164).

It would appear then that in terms of architecturality, the general concept invoked here to engage the power and capacity of formation as a process inherent in phenomena, the enfleshed body of the human actor as a work of art involves at least a double structuration. On one plane, human bodies are understood to consist of composites of perceptions and affections, while on another plane the role played, the character created as a work of art (or at least as part of an element of a theatrical work of art), is composed of beings of sensation, percept and affect that, existing in themselves, generate—as Deleuze and Guattari suggest in *What Is Philosophy?*—a *monument*. Not entirely unlike the human actor in which they inhere, such a performance monument may last for only a very short duration (the human actor as singularity tends to endure what is com-

monly understood to be a biological lifetime), for even though art "preserves and is preserved in itself", it "lasts no longer than its support materials—stone canvas, chemical, color, and so on" (163).

That the actor leaving the stage door of a traditional Western narrative-driven theatre is occasionally mistaken for the character they were playing a little earlier in the evening is a clear indication of why, even with the comparative ephemerality of its duration as an artistic monument, the figure of the actor is to be approached with caution through the lens of a text such as *Difference and Repetition*. On one hand, understanding an actor to be *representing* someone or even something else through their role could conceivably save a passer-by from confusing the actor they are observing with the character they have just seen; yet such a perception is from Deleuze's perspective clearly grounded in a superannuated and identitarian image of thought centrally constituted by processes of recognition and identification. Similarly, and in a related fashion, to understand the actor as *resembling* the character (or vice versa) is also to fall into the common-sense approach of capturing inevitably new phenomena by way of previously established identity categories. In each of these cases, identification and resemblance subscribe to a logic of identity that necessarily posits a pre-existing coherence being replicated through the work of representation, with the corollary effect of relegating difference to a position of negativity and of the unthinkable. Such a Platonic conceptualization refuses the possibility of encountering a world in the state of change and becoming in which it continuously finds itself, enforcing instead so many gradations of originals and variously deficient copies. For his part, in *Difference and Repetition*, Deleuze calls for a post-identitarian "theatre of repetition" in which can be experienced "pure forces, dynamic lines in space which act without intermediary upon the spirit, and link it back directly with nature and history, with a language that speaks before words, with gestures which develop before organized bodies, with masks before faces, with specters and phantoms before characters—the whole apparatus of repetition as a 'terrible' power" (DR 10).

Thus, the proximity between the actor and the role in the traditional Western theatre is not to be understood within a discourse of resemblance. Given Deleuze's commitment to non-representational perspectives on thought, it is fitting that Deleuze and Guattari suggest, "If resemblance haunts the work of art, it is because sensation refers only to its material: it is the percept or affect of material itself, the smile of oil, the gesture of fired clay, the thrust of metal, the crouch of Romanesque stone, and the ascent of Gothic stone" (WP 166). However, understanding the smile, gesture, thrust, crouch and ascent of not only stone, paint or metal but also the actor, whose work can be understood to be more than a repetition of the same or pursuit of resemblance, can be a tall order for an art form in which the actor's own iconicity—his or her referentiality within the history of the signifying discourses of the human—inevitably col-

lapses the distance that Deleuze and Guattari stress exists between the creator and the created when they state that art "is independent of the creator through the self-positing of the created, which is preserved in itself" (164).

It follows that in Deleuze's only extended piece of writing to deal exclusively with the art of the theatre, a text entitled "One Manifesto Less" that focuses on the work of Carmelo Bene, a logic of subtraction dominates the discussion of the actors and characters in Bene's version of Shakespeare's *Richard II*. Following a similar procedure, which he and Guattari undertake in the discussion of the constitution of the rhizome in *A Thousand Plateaus* when describing multiplicities being understood equationally as (n−1) (6), Deleuze foregrounds the removal of both the power of identity and the identity of power as a means of destabilizing the identitarian coherences of character. By cutting text, simplifying movement, removing extensive elements of the plot and so forth, identitarian structures of character and plot are overrun by the differentials of speed, language, movement and affect that precede recognizable coherences understood in the terms of more traditional "common sense" to be identities. Mimesis, imitation and identification—as fundamental processes rather than simply *post-factum* determinations, qualifications and designations—become impossible in this model regardless of how much they have historically imbued and currently impact theatre studies' and performance studies' methodologies and prejudices. The indices available to us in texts such as *Difference and Repetition*, "One Manifesto Less" or *A Thousand Plateaus* invite what is commonly understood to be "imitation" to instead be conceived as a process of becoming-other characterized by differentiatory attempts to resonate with the speeds and velocities—those affective and perceptive constitutionalities—of other bodies. "We fall into a false alternative if we say that you either imitate or you are", say Deleuze and Guattari: "What is real is the becoming itself, the block of becoming, not the supposedly fixed terms through that which becomes passes" (TP 238). "The actor Robert De Niro walks 'like' a crab in a certain film sequence", they write in *A Thousand Plateaus*, "but, he says, it is not a question of his imitating a crab; it is a question of making something that has to do with the crab enters into composition with the image, with the speed of the image" (274). Deleuze and Guattari are most commonly associated with that theatrical pioneer of the non-representational, Antonin Artaud, an individual who comes to serve for them as a benchmark of the kinds of affective courage that can be mobilized in the service of a radical schizo stroll, with all of its concomitant deterritorializations, disavowals of social orthodoxy and access to zones of indiscernibility. Nonetheless, it is important to note their reference in *A Thousand Plateaus* to De Niro, one of the better-known Hollywood figures of their day. That they speak of more mundane and inherited kinds of acting reminds us of the need for conceptual engagement with very identitarian

forms of human performance in order to begin sketching not chronologies or lineages per se, but rather a complex of moments in the larger project of what could be described as an immanentist ontological historiography of human performance.

What are some of the contours of this larger project? It will involve accessing texts and records from a diversity of historical and geographical moments and will proceed in the spirit in which Deleuze and Guattari discuss taking up the work of certain philosophers and making monstrous children from them. Zones of inquiry in this project focusing on more contemporary performance practices can be undertaken specifically with a view to unmooring these texts and records from the Platonist discourse and conceptual apparatus by which they have traditionally been stratified. It will most certainly involve discovering immanent and pre- or supra-identitarian tendencies in key figures such as one of De Niro's precursors and inevitable influences—the iconic early twentieth-century acting theorist and trainer Konstantin Stanislavski, a man who is traditionally understood to be "the father of psychological realism". The political and social implications of the investigation could not be more pressing in his case, as Stanislavski is generally and rightly perceived by cultural materialist performance scholars to be a great essentializer (the reader of *Anti-Oedipus* would also justifiably add "oedipalizer" to the list of accusations)[2]. These same critics would also note with equal accuracy that Stanislavski's followers have justified any number of forms of "representational" violence on minoritized human groups by naïvely and/or perversely protesting the allegedly natural and inevitable nature of the racist and heteronormative theatrical and filmic stereotypes that continue to be facilitated by unreflective forms of actor training influenced by Stanislavski's approaches. Nonetheless, potentially fruitful moments in Stanislavski's thought and career can be brought forward here to provide a brief example of how his increased commitment to spontaneity at certain moments in his career leads him to begin to question his own transcendent tendencies. Such a moment occurs when, of his own volition, he pursues elements of what Deleuze will later describe in "One Manifesto Less" as being the keys to a renewed theatre to come—namely, (1) deducting the stable elements, (2) placing everything in perpetual variation and (3) transposing everything into the minor[3]. Although recent postmodern critiques of Stanislavski's work accurately point out his identitarian assumptions around self, spirit and role as foundationalist givens, as well as critique his problematic assumptions about the author's intentions being allegedly embedded in the playtext, hints of the post-identitarian are in evidence when he asserts, "We protested against the old manner of acting, against theatricality, against false pathos, declamation, against overacting, against the bad convention of production and design, against the star system that spoils the ensemble, against the

whole construct of the spectacle and against the unsubstantial repertoire of past theatres"[4].

The post-identitarian potential is borne out in his main strategy for evasion from the restrictions he enumerates: a commitment to *perezhivanie* or the *experiencing* of a role. The *experiencing* actor, Stanislavski explains, creatively engages their organism in the flow of circumstances on a moment-by-moment basis, or what we might, with reference to Deleuze and Guattari's project in *What Is Philosophy?*, describe as the affects—or pre-individual intensities, feelings and energies—making up the particular event of each unique performance. In contradistinction, Stanislavski explains how those he calls *representational* actors pursue only a limited creative engagement with flows of affect, and usually only when privately creating the role *before* the performance itself, in order to generate the ready-made theatrical signs that are brought out at specific predictable and pre-planned instances. Experiencing a role as it unfolds is in some sense a call to engage with events as they are occurring, a key facet of Deleuze's ethology of the event as propounded in texts such as *Logic of Sense*[5]. We also witness in Stanislavski a seemingly crypto-Spinozan commitment to a process of attempting to tune to differing velocities as integral to the actor's process of transformation into character when he states, "We make combinations of all sorts of different speeds and measures", as well as "You cannot get along with just one tempo-rhythm. You must combine several of them"[6]. Stanislavski acknowledges the unpredictability of the outcome of these explorations of rhythmic attunement when he states, "The overall tempo-rhythm of a dramatic production usually creates itself accidentally, of its own accord" (214). Of course, it is important not to overstate Stanislavski's immanentist tendencies, for while the role of chance is acknowledged (if not necessarily celebrated) here, neither the recognition of contingency nor the movement towards becoming-character via attunement rather than by resemblance necessarily equates with the onto-genetic positions affirmed by Deleuze and Guattari. In the same way that Stanislavski can be understood to proceed via the limited multiple notion of the "multiple" rather than actual/virtual multiplicity in his articulation of tempo-rhythm, his identitarian discussions of soul, self and so forth become tiresome, predictable and politically restrictive even and especially as they continue to play themselves out in the studios of contemporary acting conservatories[7]. Nonetheless, seeking out moments in the work of those such as Stanislavski at the precise instant when the identitarian façade is near to cracking under the pressure of the change and flow of immanent life can be an important way to generate the creative and conceptual resources necessary to further usher non-representationalist and post-identitarian creative expression into our theatres and performance spaces. Additionally, seeking these moments from within the identitarian tradition can help prevent needing to engage in the wild de-stratification of the Artaudian project; in other words,

adopting Deleuze and Guattari's various warnings to take care within *A Thousand Plateaus* can facilitate becoming imperceptible without necessarily becoming dead. Following Bertolt Brecht, who pursued a gestic criticism in his epic theatre that carefully deployed acute forms of actorly reflexivity to draw attention to the constructedness (architecture) of represented character as well as that of the capitalist social and economic assemblages that affected the actions of the characters in his plays, we might describe such an immanent creative and conceptual approach as an onto-genetic or *epic machinic gestic criticism*, extending the telotic journeys of Brecht's characters into a post-identitarian field towards the reflexive embodiment of new equitable and capacity-increasing relations of the theatre/world to come.

With questions of human artistic performance, of the body and of the flesh of the actor invoked, let me now turn to the question of what can very much be understood to be a "performative turn" in Deleuze and, by association, Deleuze and Guattari's emphasis of the architectural and onto-genetic conception of the constitution of all phenomena. Although the notion of the performative has been carefully mobilized and scrutinized through significant debates between Derrida and Searle over readings of Austin's work on the subject of language's capacity to *do* things, and then actively remobilized by queer and feminist theorists such as Judith Butler and Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick for the purposes of key questions in cultural politics around gender, corporeality and identity, the term remains comparatively unexplored *vis-à-vis* contemporary immanentist thought. To paraphrase Deleuze's oft-quoted question about Spinoza and the untold potentialities of human and other-than-human bodies, I am wondering "what can performance do?" in the immanentist ontological landscape. Although a broader study can provide more substantive insight across a range of sole-authored and collaborative texts by Deleuze and Guattari concerning the role of performance and the performative, some further remarks here on the role of the distributed theatrical architecturality presented in *Difference and Repetition* and in a related shorter text can provide an understanding of possible intersections with and amplifications of relevant aspects of Judith Butler's currently influential articulation of performativity.

ONTOLOGY AND PERFORMATIVITY

> The clear and distinct is the claim of the concept in the Apollonian world of representation; but beneath representation there is always the Idea and its distinct-obscure depth, a drama beneath every logos.
>
> —Gilles Deleuze[8]

This quotation is drawn from a 1967 lecture entitled "The Method of Dramatization", a presentation Deleuze launches by asserting that a cer-

tain approach pivotal to the philosophical tradition is, in fact, a less productive and propitious line of interrogation than the frequency with which it has historically been pursued might suggest. "It is not certain", Deleuze asserts, "that the question *what is this?* is a good question for discussing the essence or the Idea" (Method 94). He proposes instead the "method of dramatization", an approach that avoids pinpointing essences and unchanging identities contributing to a restrictive logic of representation. This suggested method instead involves asking a variety of other questions, such as "Who?", "How much?", "How?", "Where?", and "When?" (Method 94). Deleuze complements this apparently simple shift in interrogative orientation with a series of arguments in *Difference and Repetition* concerning the relation between Idea/essence, notions of virtual/actual and of differentiation/differenciation involving two mutually exclusive, interdependent and sufficient components of the real perpetually involved in a process of "reciprocal determination" (DR 209). This pairing is necessary in a world where actual things cause one another to change, but also one in which this type of causal explanation is insufficient for fully understanding how reality operates. Deleuze proposes that the *actual-real*, on one hand, consists of extensive states of affairs, bodies, mixtures of bodies and individuals, with "bodies" understood to be any whole composed of parts (human, animal, social body, ideas) that have a capacity to affect and be affected. The *virtual-real*, on the other hand, consists of intensive incorporeal events and singularities that, although not actual, still have the capacity to bring about actualization. Pivotal to understanding the distinction is that the virtual is not opposed to the real, Deleuze writes, "but to the actual. *The virtual is fully real in so far as it is virtual*" (DR 209; emphasis in original). This reality of the virtual consists of "the differential elements realm and relations", along with the "singular points which correspond to them" (DR 209). Genes, for example, "as a system of differential relations", operate on the virtual and actual planes in that they "are incarnated at once both in a species and in the organic parts of which it is composed" (DR 210).

Deleuze is quick to note that the relationship between the virtual and the actual is not one of resemblance or analogy, as this would effectively over-determine the notion of repetition elaborated in *Difference and Repetition* and reify traditional notions of repetition as the Same. Indeed, the virtual is not to be confused with the possible, as the possible is generally conceived as being opposed to the real (DR 211), making the process undergone by the possible to become real a "realization", whereas, once again, "the virtual is not opposed to the real; it possesses a full reality by itself" (DR 211). The process the virtual undergoes, then, is one of "actualization", although not everything that is virtual is actualized. Ultimately, rather than simply being a question of semantics between the two terms "possible" and "virtual", Deleuze stresses that "it is a question of existence itself" (DR 211) in the sense that notions of possibility restrict

the potentials of virtuality by containing and predicting outcomes: "What difference can there be between the existent and the non-existent if the non-existent is already possible, already included in the concept and having all the characteristics that the concept confers upon it as a possibility?" (DR 211).

Deleuze's use of the term "concept" here points to another essential and related distinction intimately tied to the process of the actualization of the virtual: namely, that the understanding of the "concept" differs from the Idea and that this differentiation impacts on the constitution of the actual. Consonant with his determination in "The Method of Dramatization" to avoid the reductive and falsely essentializing question "What is it?", he suggests that that Idea is "not yet the concept of an object which submits the world to the requirements of representation", but instead is "a brute presence which can be invoked in the world only in function of that which is not 'representable' in things" (Method 59). The "possible" is tied into concepts necessarily linked (at least in our Western philosophical tradition) to a tendency to think with common sense about situations in terms of a direct relationship of representation between concept and reality. Ideas, however, are not yet contained or restricted in the mind; rather, they are the relations in the virtual that are the conditions for the actualization of things. Although they are "obscure" in their virtuality in that they have not yet become actualized and therefore apprehensible, they are at the same time "distinct" (DR 214). It follows, then, that, unlike the possible, which is undetermined in the sense that it does not exist in the real, the virtual is far from being undetermined and is, in fact, "completely determined" (DR 209) (although not permanently fixed) in the sense that all its "genetic differential" aspects in the form of "elements, varieties of relations and singular points" (DR 209) are present within it.

With the application of this notion of the Idea and its "distinctness-obscurity" (DR 214), the limited purview of the commonsensical concept is fractured in favour of "a pure multiplicity in the Idea which radically excludes the identical as a prior condition" (DR 211–12). This entails a superseding of the restrictive confines of traditional conceptions of representation and thought, and liberating everything that can be actualized from the virtual out of the realm of the possible and back into the infinitely more generative realm of the potential. Deleuze explains, "When the virtual content of an Idea is actualized, the varieties of relation are incarnated in distinct species while the singular points that correspond to the values of one variety are incarnated in the distinct parts characteristic of this or that species" (DR 206).

He provides the example of colour, explaining that it is like "white light which perplicates in itself the genetic elements and relations of all the colours, but is actualized in the diverse colours with their respective spaces" (DR 206). When actualized, the differential intensive singularities that populate the virtual develop a variety of different properties. These

include the ability to determine specific actual spaces and times, the ability to determine rules for conceptual engagement and so forth. Deleuze suggests that they constitute "a special theatre" (Method 94) and that "it is through all these different aspects that spatio-temporal dynamisms figure the movement of dramatization" (Method 94). By understanding this process of becoming as one of dramatization, Deleuze feels it is then possible to inquire with more clarity about the nature of the Idea through an understanding of the process of differentiation of virtual intensities into actual properties and back again: "Through dramatization, the Idea is incarnated or actualized, *it differentiates itself*" (Method 94).

And yet what then, according to Deleuze, is the force that instigates the process of dramatization, of self-differentiation? He writes, "Given any concept, we can always discover its drama and the concept would never be divided or specified in the world of representation without the dramatic dynamism that thus determine it in a material system beneath all possible representation" (Method 98).

Who or what is the "director" creating the "work" from what Deleuze calls the "strange theatre" of the virtual when the virtual is "comprised of pure determinations, agitating time and space, directly affecting the soul, whose actors are larva" (Method 98), given that they are not yet differentiated and actualized? What is the force that precipitates this virtual realm (Deleuze suggests, "Artaud's name for this theatre was 'cruelty'" [Method 98]) into the actual? Deleuze explains that virtual differences in intensity must enter into communication with the assistance of "something like a 'difference operator'" that he calls "an *obscure precursor*" (Method 97). He describes the process of dramatization as a lightning bolt flashing between different intensities, preceded by the obscure precursor that is "invisible" and "imperceptible" and that establishes the unfolding of intensities into extension "as in negative relief" (Method 97). This path is considered "the first agent of communication between different series of differences" (Method 97). Rather than being a logos or *metteur en scène* exterior to the system itself, it begins to become clear that the obscure precursor is the capacity for differentiation immanent to the mutually determining arrangement of the virtual and the actual. The obscure precursor is the immanent tendency for precipitative individuation inherent to difference itself. *Dramatization* is, therefore, both the realization of the nature of difference and the unfolding of that realization through the differentiating and individuating nature of becoming. While the language of the theatre and drama—as traditional elements of Western human performance—have been deployed as architectural elements of the overall conceptual structure of *Difference and Repetition*, it is clear that, in fact, Deleuze is moving into the realm of the post-identitarian and distributive "performative", as his notion of dramatization is in no way restricted to human drama[9].

The self-differentiating energy informing the process of ontological architecturality in each of these texts is key to providing some insight into how immanentist performativity can be understood to extend beyond the iterative repetitionality characterizing Judith Butler's performativity. A fuller discussion would demonstrate how even though she moves the performative away from its Searlian and Derridean moorings in language and linguistics and towards the body, her conceptualization of the performative has been accurately critiqued for being always already anchored in the anthropological as a result of its reliance on a transcendental understanding of substance that posits that only socio-historical forms of power (i.e., those from the human realm) affect performances of human identity, gender, sexuality and so forth[10]. For Butler, substance (i.e., human substance) is, regardless of lateral iterative performative chains of influence between persons, ultimately *only* the shaped, not the *shaper* AND shaped. Immanent *nature*, however, with its generative and perennial production of difference, answers anthropocentric conceptualizations of performativity by attributing generative potentiality to all phenomena via their acts of differentiation/differenciation. Deleuze and Guattari stress that the ever-becoming nature of such processes inevitably demonstrates iterative repetition as the Same to be always already recuperated by a discourse of identity, and they note, "A milieu does in fact exist by virtue of a periodic repetition, but one whose only effect is to produce a difference by which the milieu passes into another milieu. It is the difference that is rhythmic, not the repetition, which nevertheless produces it: productive repetition has nothing to do with reproductive meter" (TP 314). What remains in this immanent performativity amplified beyond its solely linguistic and/or anthropological resonances is the question of something's ability to induce itself and something else to do something—in other words, the enactment of "the difference by which the milieu passes into another milieu" (TP 314). This question of the force, of actualization, is the question that J. L. Austin was concerned with in 1955 when he first differentiated between a constative understanding of language—language as a producer of true or false statements, what Austin characterized as the mistaken descriptive fallacy—and the articulation of language as performative or language that *does* something, such that "the issuing of the utterance is the performing of an action"[11]. In the post-linguistic post-anthropological conception of the distributed performative, it is *being itself* that is *uttering* via the performative force of (at least in the language of *Difference and Repetition*) the dark precursor, and in so doing perpetually performing a multiplicity of actions—a thousand tiny stages, and many of these stages are also human stages, with the revolutionary potentiality of the immanent model providing the grounds for the spark or instantiation of new social/political forms ultimately absent in Butler's iterative performativity of the same.

This exploration of the ways in which immanentist thought can productively amplify the conceptual register of the performative has, granted, been very introductory, and yet perhaps enough territory has been circumscribed to warrant finishing with the proposal of some of the conceptual architecture necessary for these future explorations to unfold (given that philosophy is after all the creation of concepts—see *What Is Philosophy?*). It repays consideration first to remind ourselves at this juncture, given the subject of this volume, that although the world unfolds through this process of expressive performative differentiation and individuation certain performances are artistic, and others not. Deleuze and Guattari discuss a kind of bowerbird appropriately called the "stagemaker" that generates *art brut* dwellings in what we might call a performative fusion of territoriality and expression. Following Messiaen, they note how musician birds differentiate themselves from non-musician birds in their "aptitude for motifs and counterpoints that, if they are variable, or even when they are constant, make matters of expression something other than a poster"—they call this "a style" since with their musical performance, these birds "articulate rhythm and harmonize melody" (TP 319). An extensive exploration of the many varieties of other-than-human forms of performative expression that exceed what Deleuze and Guattari call the "placard stage" beckons: not just birds but also plants, clouds, geological formations that "no longer constitute placards that mark a territory, but motifs and counterpoints that express the relation of the territory to interior impulses or exterior circumstances, whether or not they are given". In other words, "No longer signatures, but a style" (TP 318). Birds, dolphins, so-called higher animals, but perhaps even, were we to watch and listen to the world closely enough to resonate with the speeds and slownesses of other-than-human perceptual capacity, *cumulo nimbus* in generative counterpoint with *cumulo cirrus*, a trillium flower generating style in relation to the 800 km Niagara escarpment and so forth.

What, then, to call this distributed performativity and its consonant artistically oriented process? Deleuze and Guattari describe this artistically eventuating expressive procedure as "a kind of geomorphism" (TP 319) in which the relation between elements "is given in the motif and the counterpoint, even if the terms of each of these relations is not given" (TP 319). Given the performative force we can understand to have contributed to the precipitative architectural forming apparent in other conceptual matrices in the Deleuzian corpus, how can a distributed immanent performativity be understood to inhere within this process of geomorphism? In *What Is Philosophy?* Deleuze and Guattari suggest that "[s]ubject and object give a poor approximation of thought", arguing instead that "thinking takes place in the relationship of territory and the earth" (WP 85), with territory being that mobile and shifting centre that is localizable as a specific point in space and time and the earth being the

overarching container in which territories continuously form and unform. It is the term "Geophilosophy"—the title of the chapter of *What Is Philosophy?* in which these statements are made—that is used to mark the effort to formulate a mode of thinking between territory and earth that "arrives at the non-propositional form of the concept in which communication, exchange, consensus, and opinion vanish entirely" (WP 99). This kind of thought seeks to evade restrictive parameters of the primacy of notions of identity and instead affirms the differential and processual complexity of the earth's many territories, assemblages and multiplicities permitting it "to summon forth a new earth, a new people" (WP 99). What I am calling *geoperformance* in answer to geophilosophy is the moment of the becoming artistic of the *geoperformative* nature of all ontological production and expression. Complementing philosophy's function of generating new concepts and bringing forth new events, art desires "to create the finite that restores the infinite" (WP 197) and invites those—be they human or other than human—entering into relations with art to awaken to the individual complexity of the world or cosmos in the specific instances of its performative unfolding. Discussing the relationship between nature and art, Deleuze and Guattari suggest that if nature is like art, this is always because it combines these two living elements in every way: "House and Universe, *Heimlich* and *Unheimlich*, territory and deterritorialization, finite melodic compounds and the great infinite plane of composition, the small and the large refrain" (186). As they state earlier in their careers in *A Thousand Plateaus*, the refrain "always carries the earth with it" (312). Artistically eventuating geoperformances are those performative moments that answer Deleuze and Guattari's call for art to "extract new harmonies, new plastic or melodic landscapes, and new rhythmic characters that raise them to the height of the earth's song and the cry of humanity" (WP 176).

All *human* artistic performance is, then, necessarily also both geoperformance and geoperformative. By extending the beginnings of echoes of geoperformativity and geoperformance that do not deny their immanent provenance as it manifests itself in key canonical figures such as Stanislavski, even if it is to betray these practitioners by pilfering their ideas only to reset them within a more fully immanentist context, theatre studies and performance studies can proceed to understand and work through the implications of the onto-genicity of all performance. This can be essential for fields continuously caught up in discourses of real and illusion, so they might recognize that there is a way of conceiving of performance as non-representational, and that geoperformativities occur in a world of simulation—not Baudrillardian simulation, complete with a crisis and nostalgia around the absence of the referent, but an immanentist simulation in which all is construction, expression and performance, and where socially constrictive transcendent anchors can be abandoned in pursuit of the extraction of new and revolutionary performative har-

monies and rhythmic characters, monuments that can be raised to the height of the earth's song and the cry of humanity. Similarly, further discussion of philosophy as performative can bring to the fore the onto-genetic role of philosophy itself and, with the inhering process of geoperformativity, can further usher into the world Deleuze's recurrent call for a philosophy that *acts* directly on the spirit.

NOTES

1. Deleuze and Guattari suggest that this notion of "flesh" (along with notions such as "being in the world", "ideality" and "signification") "are not vague or fuzzy sets, subsets, but totalizations that exceed all power of sets. They are not merely empirical judgments or opinions but proto beliefs, *Urdoxa, original opinions as propositions*. They are not successive contents of the flow of immanence but acts of transcendence that traverse it and carry it away by determining the 'significations' of the potential totality of the lived" (WP 142).

2. See Philip Auslander, "'Just Be Your Self': Logocentrism and Difference in Performance Theory", in *Acting (Re)Considered*: *Theories and Practices*, ed. Phillip B. Zarrilli (London: Routledge, 1995).

3. Gilles Deleuze, "One Manifesto Less", trans. E. dal Molin and T. Murray, in *Mimesis Masochism, and Mime: The Politics of Theatricality in Contemporary French Thought*, ed. T. Murray (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1998), 246.

4. Sharon Marie Carnicke, *Stanislavsky in Focus: An Acting Master for the Twenty-First Century*, 2nd ed. (London: Routledge, 2008), 28.

5. Such an investigation is part of a current ongoing larger project.

6. Konstanton Stanislavski, *Building a Character* (New York: Routledge, 1989), 213.

7. Again, see Auslander, "'Just Be Your Self'".

8. Gilles Deleuze, "The Method of Dramatization", in *Desert Islands and Other Texts, 1953–1974* (Los Angeles: Semiotext(e), 2004), 103. Hereafter, referred to as "Method".

9. This focus on the post-identitarian is further taken up in *Anti-Oedipus* as Deleuze and Guattari critique Western drama's *Oedipus*, that "private", "intimate" (AO 49, 271) and Freudian theatre of the unconscious manifesting only a reductive portion of a much wider performative potential. The theatre as an art form, understood by performance studies scholars to be one of many possible manifestations of human performance, is discussed in somewhat negative terms in *Anti-Oedipus*, succumbing repeatedly as it has to repressive identitarian and oedipal formations at the hands of practitioners wishing to suppress its more revolutionary potentials. In *Anti-Oedipus*, the theatrical expressive precipitation from virtual to actual and back that characterizes the ontological *mise-en-scène* of *Difference and Repetition* is intensified by another onto-genetic model—as is evident in the notion of the refrain invoked earlier—in which the virtual and actual are immanent to one another and echoes of individualized oedipal expression haunting the notion of the "theatrical" or the "dramatic" are dissipated into the ontological constitution of a world continuously individuating through a process of perennial machinic differentiation. Although it does not deal with the issue from an immanentist perspective, for an introduction to the shift from theatre to performance traced over the past one hundred years as theatre studies opens up into the wider field of performance studies, see Shannon Jackson's *Professing Performance: Theatre in the Academy from Philology to Performativity* (London: Cambridge University Press, 2004).

10. Pheng Cheah, "Mattering", *Diacritics* 26 (1996): 113; and Patricia Ticineto Clough, ed., *The Affective Turn: Theorizing the Social* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2007), 8.

11. J. L. Austin, *How to Do Things with Words*, 2nd ed., ed. J. O. Urmson and Marina Sbisa (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), 6.

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FIVE
Concepts and Colours

Alphonso Lingis

In *Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation*, Gilles Deleuze undertook a detailed analysis of one artist's paintings to show us what they do, and how. Deleuze found in Francis Bacon's art a vision close to some of the conceptions he and Félix Guattari had put forth in *Capitalism and Schizophrenia*. The concepts they had elaborated there guided him to understand what we see in Bacon's paintings, especially the concept that we experience our environment as a field of chaotic intensive forces and, secondly, the notion of different states of the body.

Phenomenologists such as Edmund Husserl had set out to depict the world as we experience it prior to the concepts put on things by speculative, metaphysical or scientific, elaborations. They described it as a spectacle of objects perceived. Martin Heidegger, however, argued that we are from the first active, moving into the environment about us and manipulating things that relay our forces or resist them. Our environment is from the first a field of forces, paths that support our movements, implements or obstacles to our forces and objectives that relay our forces towards further paths and objectives. Deleuze and Guattari argue that prior to that experience, the environment is a field of intensive forces, vibratory or rhythmic forces that prolong themselves. We experience ourselves first in a chaos of pressures, gravitation and waves of forces that affect us and pass through us. To be sure, this corresponds to the way physics describes material reality: a field of elementary vibratory phenomena that prolong themselves and that have no intrinsic telos. But Deleuze and Guattari are describing how we actually experience the environment in fundamental states of our existence, and in moments when the more

specialized operations of our bodies break down, in hysteria or schizophrenia, and, more simply, in states of release and relaxation.

Think of states in which we find ourselves immersed in unbounded fathomless depths of light, in darkness, in heat or in cold, in aridity or in humidity, in buoyancy, in a generalized agitation of space, in gloom, in density, in the heaviness and sluggishness of space in which we are mired. These intensities are everywhere outside, but they also invade us. If by perception we mean apprehension of circumscribed patterns and formed objects, our experience of the environment as a depth of intensive forces is affective, a being affected by them; it is sensibility or sensation and not perception.

Things perceived—trees, clouds, houses and rocks—are pulled out and take shape out of these depths. Sometimes they take form feebly and transitorily, sinking back into the formlessness of light or gloom.

Freudian psychoanalysis had distinguished three psychic structures: the id, a zone of unorganized, uncoordinated instincts and drives, aiming only at pleasure, the infantile psychic state that, however, remains, repressed but finding release, in adult life; the ego, a zone of organized intentions that adjust to reality; and the superego, a structure of repressive forces, originally of the father as representative of society, that have been internalized. Deleuze and Guattari recast these as states of the body. They take the Freudian id to be the infantile state of the body, which is traversed by forces germinating within and also exposed to the chaotic forces of the environment. When warmth, support and nourishment encounter and enter the infantile body, transitory sensations of pleasure form, and, contented with this content, the body closes in upon itself. Warmed and nourished, the infantile body closes its eyes and ears and returns to the state of the egg. Deleuze and Guattari call this state of the body the body without organs, an expression they found in Antonin Artaud. The body can return to this state in sleep, in orgasm, in intense sensations found in lying in the sun, floating in the waves of a lake, absorbed in music, in hedonism and in intense pain.

What Freud called the ego, a psychic state, Deleuze and Guattari identify as the organism, the organized organism, a state of the body. It is the body whose organs have stabilized, coordinated by a posture and focussed upon a task. This state of the body also actively shapes the environment into objects with fixed contours. They acquire significance in relationship to this state of the body; they open before and support its movements, they respond to its manipulations or resist them and they promise nourishment and pleasure. The organism is always geared into organized systems—material systems of tools and machines, social systems of exchange and power relations. Deleuze and Guattari see this organism as a constrained, constricted state of the body: the organism, Deleuze says, is the prison of life (LS 40).

There are moments, states, when the body speaks in its own name—"as for me, *I* think", "I judge that . . .", "I intended to . . .", "I am going to . . .". We have thought of these as moments when we assert personal individuality; Heidegger called them moments of authenticity. But Deleuze and Guattari argue that these are states in fact produced from the outside: the teacher, the boss, the police or the judge require the body to disengage itself from its immersion in the chaos of intensive forces of the environment, and from its insertion in practical situations and social organizations, and they attribute certain conceptions and certain initiatives to that body alone. What we take to be states of personal identity are produced by the judgemental and censorious action of outside forces and authorities: what Freud called the superego.

THE SUBJECT OF FRANCIS BACON'S PAINTINGS

Early paintings by Francis Bacon featured hanging carcasses and slabs of meat, and early and late images showed people painted with the reds and blues and ochres of meat. Flesh hangs and swells in heads and bodies as though the bone structure no longer held it. On bodies seated, lying or in movement, the ectoplasmic flesh drags, bulges, slithers and pools like ganglions. Facial features do not maintain coherent and recognizable expressions, and often are missing from heads. Sometimes there are just heads missing their bodies, and often bodies missing limbs.

Humans are shown devoid of attitude, intention, character or effort undertaken in an environment of real things, as though flesh or meat was their fundamental reality. These bodies of meat are nonetheless alive, zones of obscure (but often intense) sensations. They are weighted down with the weight of flesh, they are agitated inwardly, they are shaken with spasms and they scream and vomit. They are, in Deleuze's terminology, bodies without organs.

It is true that the first painting that Bacon exhibited, and that launched his career, was *Three Studies for Figures at the Base of a Crucifixion*; the three figures were monsters. He subsequently painted grotesque beasts. But in most of the paintings, the bodies are deformed by their own weight in the positions in which they find themselves. They affect us as they do because they are not really monsters; they are states of the body that we share.

And they affect us, trouble us. They make contact with us directly, by affecting, often shocking, our nervous sensibility.

Where a wave of force impinges upon the force at loose within the body, a sensation arises. We have commonly understood the sensory dimension of sensation to be qualitative—a tone, a hue, an odour, a pressure, a pain, a pleasure. But, for Deleuze, that implies a static character to sensation; for him, sensation is intensive and in movement. A wave of

intensity moves across several layers or planes; pain can be dark, shrill, ragged; a colour painted by Bacon can be loud, violent, thick, penetrating, sickly. Deleuze says that the deformations in the bodies Bacon painted depict this movement of intensities across the unstable substance of sensibility (LS 32).

Deleuze cites Immanuel Kant to affirm that even when sensation tends towards a higher level, this can be experienced only by reference to the zero level—that is, in a descent (LS 67). That certainly does not seem to me to be the case. But it is true that the spectacle of a body losing its inner posture, of flesh sagging and dropping from the bones that held it firm, dominates in Bacon's paintings and in them communicates the most violent sensation.

While most viewers and critics saw alienation in the bodies that Bacon painted completely isolated from any background and from other bodies, and saw pain and anguish in images of deformed and mutilated bodies, Deleuze sees the reduction of the organism, the organized and postured organism, to the state of bodies without organs. And he affirms that the body without organs is the state of unrestricted life engendering waves of energies in all directions, absorbing waves of intensity from the outside and discharging its excess intensities to the outside. Reduction of the organism, that structure in which life is imprisoned, to the body without organs is liberation. Instead of seeing in Bacon's paintings violence, degradation and pain, Deleuze sees primal and superabundant life[1].

Yet Deleuze also says that the fundamental emotion in Bacon is not a taste for horror, but pity (LS xxix). He paints humans as meat and produces the most intense sensation of pity, pity for meat. Which, then, is it that we see—primal and superabundant life or piteous, pitiable, suffering meat?

THE COMPOSITION OF BACON'S PAINTINGS

Deleuze distinguishes three areas in Bacon's paintings: the central, isolated figure; the contour—stage, trapeze, seat or sink—in which the figure is set; and the outside field. The figure—pope, head, body, dog, monkey or owl—is most often alone. The figure has been subjected to deformations. A figure arises, Bacon reports, from an accident: he throws some paint or makes a random stroke on the canvas, and it invokes other strokes, and before long a sort of diagram or schema emerges, which he then manipulates to bring it to solidity and clarity. The figure emerges out of the inner logic of the strokes and the colours and not from a pre-existing image that Bacon may have had. The pre-existing images, in the painter's head and already hovering on the canvas, are, Deleuze says, inevitably just clichés.

Deleuze describes the central figure of a painting by Bacon in formal terms. For Deleuze, the essential is not that it is a pope screaming, or two

naked men who are both wrestling and having sex, or Bacon's lover who committed suicide. The essential is the nonrepresentational figure, the rhythmic diagram that began with a chance stroke that suggested its own development and that supplants the human whom we could identify and about whom we could tell some narrative.

The figure is typically set on a circular stage, a pedestal, a bed, an armchair or a ring, and often enclosed with a parallelogram that suggests a glass box, or, in some cases, set behind a curtain. This very closed contour isolates the figure in a space cut off from any real or imagined environment of persons or things.

The field that surrounds the figure and the circular stage or pedestal is most often painted in saturated monochrome—red, violet, mauve, apricot, blue or black. There are sometimes divisions painted in other colours. The bottom is often a receding plane that curves up at the sides. The field is not a background from which the figure emerges; the closed circular stage and the glass box separate the figure from the field. It is not an environment or landscape; it is instead a field of intense colour, of intensities, of unvectored forces that crowd in about the figure. It is an unstructured field of pressure, inertia, weight, attraction, gravitation and germination. It is also timeless, a dimension of aevernity.

The intensive forces of this field encroach upon the central figure, but the figure also expels itself, disintegrates into the field. The top of the head of a screaming pope dissipates into the field; limbs disintegrate; a body dissolves, leaving only a head. In some images the body elongates and seeps into a mirror. A shadow, sometimes of the same colour and saturation as the body, is the body flowing out of itself.

Isolating, deforming and dissipating forces are at work in Bacon's paintings, and, Deleuze judges, they are the most fundamental forces. They are unidentified, invisible, forces of the future. Bacon paints the scream of the pope, but not some horrifying object or spectacle before which he screams. If he, if we, scream, it is as victims of invisible and insensible forces that scramble every spectacle, and that even lie beyond pain and feeling (LS 51).

From the beginning, with *Three Studies for Figures at the Base of a Crucifixion*, Bacon painted triptychs, the panels all 6.5 by 5 feet in size. Bacon said that his work is not illustrative or narrative, and triptychs of three portraits of Lucian Freud or three self-portraits evidently do not narrate a story. What, then, is the relationship between the three images? Deleuze elaborates a purely formal analysis. The field is often empty and of the same colour in each panel; it functions as timeless naked light that separates them eternally. The three or more figures are three kinds of rhythm: one figure is a dilating, expanding, amplifying diastolic rhythm, of increasing variation; another is a contracting, diminishing, systolic rhythm, of decreasing variation; and another is a steady or witness rhythm. One figure rises, another falls, while another lies horizontal.

The colours in the field are most often monochrome, while those of the figure are painted with broken strokes. They are not blended and shaded from light to dark, as in classical portraiture; instead, the broken strokes juxtapose warm and cold—unmixed, unblended yellow and blue, red and green. Bacon painted on the reverse, unprimed side of the canvas, where the rough fibres catch and scatter the strokes he made with broad brushes and also with whiskbrooms, pallet knives, fingers and rags. The viewer, however, may respond to the subjects of Bacon's canvases; everyone is fascinated, captivated by the brilliance, the gorgeousness of his colours, for example, in his portraits. Deleuze links him with Cézanne as the great colourists of the twentieth century.

UNLOCKING THE VALVES OF FEELING

Bacon said his painting must "unlock the valves of feeling and therefore return the onlooker to life more violently" (SY 17). "What directly interests [Bacon]", Deleuze writes, "is a violence that is involved only with colour and line: the violence of a sensation (and not of a representation), a static or potential violence, a violence of reaction and expression" (LS xxix)[2]. Deleuze validates this statement by citing Bacon's explanations that the illustrative and narrative functions of paintings are now taken over by photography.

To unlock the valves of feeling are the aim and function of Bacon's paintings, and to understand how Bacon's paintings unlock the valves of feeling and return the onlooker to life more violently is the central issue for any thinker about them. How successful is Deleuze at doing this in *The Logic of Sensation*?

Deleuze does not show how certain strokes and combinations of colour impact violently our nervous system and how they produce the most intense sensations. How, then, does Deleuze account for the violent sensations Bacon's paintings arouse? Our vision explores things at a distance, but our touch perceives what is in contact with it. Bacon's paintings, Deleuze explains, are laid out for close vision, close contact; the viewer's eye touches the painting rather than envisions and surveys the figures painted. Deleuze calls this haptic vision.

Post-Renaissance painting shaded colours from clear to dark, to represent bodies and things receding in depth and in shadow. It used this shading to depict them in three dimensions. The background receded in perspectival distance. Bacon instead juxtaposes warm with cold strokes of unmixed colours. The bodies he paints are laid out on the surface of the canvas and do not emerge in three dimensions. The figure, isolated from any narrative of the past or future, is all present, all presence. The outlying field around the central figure is as close as the central figure, or, more precisely, it lies around that figure in a shallow depth, where, how-

ever, there is nothing to explore. Figure, arena and field are on the same plane, equally close to the eye, unreservedly exposed to contact.

Deleuze also works with an analysis of the eye and hand of the painter. A painter may have an image of what he wants to paint, and as he paints he views the work, appraises, judges; the eye commands the hand. But in Bacon the figure originates in an unplanned, unforeseen instinctual movement of the hand. Bacon begins by throwing or daubing paint, his hand nowise guided by a pre-existing image. The hand assumes the chaos. The strokes call for further strokes, a diagram begins to form. Then he manipulates it, elaborates it, completes it.

Deleuze explains that abstract painters such as Mondrian and Kandinsky, who eliminate completely the figurative image and eliminate the depth and perspective of post-Renaissance art, also eliminate the movement of the hand that in Bacon itself produces the diagram. They produce a non-manual, purely optical space. In it the design is governed by a code of binary oppositions: vertical/horizontal, white/black, activity/inertia.

In abstract expressionism, such as the works of Morris Lewis and Jackson Pollock, the chaotic manual diagram covers the whole canvas. Lines do not form contours, delimit nothing, do not separate inside from outside; they are not optical lines but manual lines. But sensation, the impact on the nervous sensibility of the viewer, is confused. Bacon understood, Deleuze says, that for sensation to be clear and precise, the diagram has to be limited and controlled.

"There is a common problem among the arts, it is not a matter of reproducing or inventing forms, but of capturing forces", Deleuze says. "For this reason, no art is figurative" (LS 48). But Bacon was a figurative painter. He believed that figures of human bodies were essential to produce maximum effect. He judged that abstract and abstract expressionist painting could not produce the violence of sensation that he sought.

THE FIGURATIVE FACTOR

Deleuze takes seriously, literally, Bacon's assertion that his paintings illustrate and narrate nothing, mean nothing. "We do not listen closely enough to what the painters have to say", he writes (LS 81). But, truth to tell, the reader finds Deleuze's account of Bacon's paintings tamer than Bacon's paintings when he or she turns to them. We see images of Christ howling on the cross, images of his butchered carcass fallen from the cross. We see popes seated next to chunks of meat, and popes screaming. Bacon painted forty-five surviving variants on Velásquez's portrait of Pope Innocent X over fourteen years. The paintings do not depict simply an anonymous body without organs; Pope Innocent X is an individual, depicted by Velásquez with singular austerity, assurance and ruthlessness; he also functions in an ecclesiastical and political institutional ma-

chinery and in a certain conjunction of European history. That it is this pope who is screaming conveys a supplement of violence to the painting. "Rarely", writes Michael Peppiatt, an art critic and historian who knew Bacon for thirty years, "has the dictum not to heed what an artist says, only what he does, been more applicable" (Peppiatt 322).

Deleuze's formal analysis does not account for what is happening in the painting *Two Figures*, in which Bacon has taken a Muybridge photograph of two men wrestling and transformed it into men both wrestling and having sex—this in England at a time when homosexuality was a criminal offence. Is it not the recognition of what they are doing, sexuality as combat and violence, and that it is a criminal act that gives the painting its violent impact on our nervous sensibility?

We see portraits labelled as self-portraits, and others identified as of Lucian Freud and of other friends of Bacon. Peppiatt judges that most of the figure paintings and portraits of the 1950s are either wholly or indirectly inspired by Peter Lacey, the former RAF fighter pilot who was Bacon's lover from 1952 until his death in 1962[3]. Bacon made many paintings of George Dyer, the East End petty thief who was his lover, and he continued to paint him for nine years after his suicide. We can recognize Bacon and Freud in their portraits from photographs of them that we have seen. People who have known Bacon's friends readily identify them in the deformed images of them that Bacon painted. Certainly we come to see a great deal of the very different character of George Dyer and of Bacon's last lover, John Edwards, in the portraits he painted of them.

Bacon painted people he knew. He did not have them sit for him; instead, he painted from photographs and from memory, which retains the pulsations, the individual behaviour that he sought to convey. He destroyed portraits that did not, as he put it, show "the pulsations of a person". "There's no point in doing a portrait of somebody if you're not going to make it look like him", he said[4] (SY 146).

Bacon painted howling monkeys, slinking dogs, owls, elephants and also heads with crooked rodent teeth, animal heads on humans and humans becoming animals. Deleuze says Bacon was not grafting limbs and organs across species; instead, becoming-animal means contracting certain traits, contracting the modes of expansion, propagation, occupation, contagion, multiplication and association of other species. But then, we point out, the image does depict these recognizable styles and rhythms of movements typical of other species.

Bacon painted twenty-eight surviving triptychs. Deleuze denies any narrative in the panels of a Bacon triptych; the three panels are absolutely separate, divided by the same featureless colour of the field in each panel that functions as timeless light that empties space. There is, he says, no progression between the panels—movement from left panel to right is equivalent to movement from right panel to left; thus, there is no narrative. But in the 1973 *Triptych of George Dyer*, we see doorways in each

panel opening upon the black space of death. We see Dyer in the central panel under a bare light bulb casting a cartoonish Batman-like shadow that situates him in the fanciful world of crime. In the right panel, we see him vomiting in the sink the drugs he swallowed in his first suicide attempt in 1968. In the left panel, we see him naked and dead on the toilet, as he was found after his successful suicide in 1971. For Deleuze, who only refers to "the man at the washbasin" and "the man on the toilet", this triptych depicts instead a dilating expanding rhythm in the central panel, and a descending and a contracting rhythm in the two side panels.

The most radical elimination of the identifiable, what Deleuze calls the cliché, in the representation is found in *Three Studies for Figures at the Base of a Crucifixion*, the first painting that Bacon exhibited, in 1945, and which immediately made him a major artist: "Images so unrelievedly awful that the mind snaps shut", wrote John Russell after seeing it. "We had no name for them, no name for what we felt about them"[5]. But the unidentifiable is not the nonfigurative.

To account for the intense sensations that Bacon's paintings produce, we would have to understand how colour can materialize intensive movements that pass through different sensory registers and levels. And we would have to understand the relationship between the diagram that Bacon produced out of a chance stroke on the canvas, and the recognizable figure—Christ, Pope Innocent, Lucian Freud, George Dyer or John Edwards—that was depicted. We would also have to understand the relationship between, in Deleuze's terminology, the organism thus represented and the body without organs into which it falls. We would have to understand the violent sensation produced when we are confronted with the recognized figure painted as he had never before been represented. All this are tasks for the next thinker who seeks to really understand what Bacon's paintings do, and how.

AESTHETICS FOR SPECTATORS AND METAPHYSICS FOR ARTISTS

Friedrich Nietzsche characterized Aristotle's *Poetics* as an aesthetics for the spectators of artworks, and characterized his *The Birth of Tragedy* as a metaphysics for the creators. Deleuze does write an aesthetics *of* the creator, explaining the intentions and methods of Francis Bacon. To what extent does Deleuze sketch out a metaphysics *for* artists? Deleuze is ultimately concerned with forging concepts for phenomena more fundamental than paintings or music or literature or natural science. His concept of haptic space, a space the eye touches, and the concept of rhythm are conceived as concepts that would work in several domains. They are metaphysical concepts for the environment in which we live and in which artists create.

Deleuze's book is also an aesthetics for the spectators of artworks; it guides us to see the structures and movements of the paintings more clearly. But, besides ignoring the properly figurative nature of Bacon's art, Deleuze's study of these paintings is limited in several other ways. It does not show us the evolution of Bacon's art. Bacon painted in series—forty-five surviving screaming popes, twenty surviving portraits of Lucian Freud and twenty-four surviving portraits of Henriette Moraes. When we see what is new or distinctive in a painting by comparison with others in the series, and when we see what is new in a subsequent series, we see the paintings more richly.

Deleuze refrains from any judgment of the quality of the paintings; yet every viewer will find some paintings stronger and more successful than others. Bacon himself did so; throughout his life, he destroyed uncounted canvases that he judged to have failed. He once said he destroyed nine-tenths of them[6]. One day, Bacon passed a gallery and spotted a picture of his that he had thrown in the garbage in Tangier. Going inside, he asked how much it cost and was told £50,000. He immediately wrote out a cheque, carried the painting outside and stamped it to shreds on the pavement (Farson 113). The paintings that he did exhibit he insisted be covered with glass and set in baroque gilt frames.

Deleuze abstracts from the historical context of Bacon's work[7]. Yet Bacon was profoundly knowledgeable about the history of art, and keenly aware of what the other artists of his time were doing, judging their work incisively and often harshly. "From generation to generation, through what the great artists have done, the instincts change", he said. "And, as the instincts change, so there comes a renewal of the feeling of how I can remake this thing once again more clearly, more exactly, more violently" (SY 59–60). Art critics and historians seek to assess both the intrinsic quality and the impact of Bacon's art within the history of art.

Bacon's paintings quickly acquired market value by being promoted by critics such as David Sylvester and Michel Leiris. Bacon was very conscious of the fact that Leiris's father-in-law was Picasso's dealer. Many art critics have written that Bacon is the most important British painter since Turner and the most important figurative painter of the twentieth century. In 2008, a painting by Bacon, *Triptych 1976*, sold for $86.3 million, the highest price ever paid for a post-war work of art, to Russian tycoon Roman Abramovich. This is certainly enough to make us suspicious of the critics who had promoted him in his lifetime, and serious critics of the Tate retrospective in 2008 and the Metropolitan Museum of Art retrospective in 2009 were anything but favourable.

The broader social and political context of Bacon's life and work is also relevant to the understanding of his paintings. He was born of English aristocrats in Ireland, disowned and thrown out by his father at the age of sixteen for homosexuality and throughout his life indulged in a voluptuous taste for pain in the Berlin, Tangier, and London lower

depths. When David Sylvester asked Bacon about the prevalence of violence in his work, he responded with an account of the ways that, since a small child, he had been constantly surrounded by violence and war. "So I could say, perhaps, I have been accustomed to always living through forms of violence" (SY 81). He also said, "Life is so violent; so much more violent than anything I can do!"[8]

Those of us who become captivated by Bacon's paintings will want to pursue these other avenues of understanding.

TO EXPERIENCE LIFE MORE VIOLENTLY

Bacon's work exhibits a vast panorama of crucifixions, screaming popes, soberly suited men howling out their pain, their fear or their pleasure, portraits of Van Gogh, sphinxes and ghostly heads of William Blake, female nudes, portraits of London's demimonde, bloated, boneless bodies, amputees and carcasses, monkeys, dogs, owls, elephants and landscapes of Africa and the Côte d'Azur. Isolation, alienation, sadomasochism and a premonition of impending doom pervade this world. It is an atheist world where individual human life has no intrinsic meaning. It was the world Bacon knew from his childhood in the extraordinary violence of his father's house, with the IRA uprising storming about them, as well as the vast conflagration and slaughter of World War II.

The bold invention of forms, the compositions and the dazzling intensity of colours present all this as facts, without explanation, moral or narrative; Bacon's art directly strikes, shocks, the nervous sensibility. Intense sensations make us see all these things differently—more violently. But then we come to see that this is not simply Bacon's sadomasochistic world but also a cross-section of our world—our world, which we now see and feel more intensely, more violently. The paintings function to, Bacon said, "unlock the valves of feeling and therefore return the onlooker to life more violently".

NOTES

1. "[Bacon] is not a painter who 'believes' in death. His is indeed a figurative *misérabilisme*, but one that serves an increasingly powerful Figure of life. . . . In the very act of 'representing' horror, mutilation, prosthesis, fall, or failure, they have erected indomitable Figures, indomitable through both their insistence and their presence. They have given life a new and extremely direct power of laughter" (LS 53).

2. "Bacon, to be sure, often traffics in the violence of a depicted scene: spectacles of horror, Crucifixions, prostheses and mutilations, monsters. But these are overly facile detours, detours that the artist himself judges severely and condemns in his work" (LS xxix).

3. Michael Peppiatt wrote,

> It is legitimate to ask why the outspokenly atheistic artist would be drawn to such an overtly religious subject as the Pope. Certainly, in terms of pure

> iconoclasm, the choice is very telling. In paraphrasing the Velázquez portrait, Bacon strikes not only at the highest personification of spiritual power, but also at the grandeur of the Western tradition of art. Two faiths are contested at one stroke . . . Bacon himself dismissed any attempt to explain this troubling new series of images. There was, he insisted, nothing to explain. He had been drawn to the Velazquez painting by the beauty of its colour; he was haunted by its perfection, by what he considered the greatest portrait ever made—that was all. . . . Slowly, an effective barrier of non-elucidation grew up around the *oeuvre*. It issued regularly from the artist, resounded through statement and interview, influencing dealer and collector, curator and critic alike. This process continued its crescendo throughout Bacon's career, and it illuminates, from the wings as it were, the artist's abundant natural capacity to foster belief and control opinion.
>
> It is not difficult to sympathize with Bacon's attitude. His imagination excelled at blending the most disparate elements, his technique lay in coaxing oil paint into the most provocative ambiguity: thus an analysis that seemed bent on reducing the process to its individual parts was to be held at bay at all costs. As time went on and he became increasingly famous, the artist revealed himself correspondingly as master at covering his tracks, creating diversions, cleverly contradicting himself, in order to preserve the mystery of his images.

From Michael Peppiatt, *Francis Bacon, Anatomy of an Enigma* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1996), 140. Hereafter, parenthetically cited as Peppiatt.

4. David Sylvester, *Interviews with Francis Bacon*, rev. ed. (London: Thames & Hudson, 1980), 146. Hereafter, parenthetically cited as SY.

5. John Russell, *Francis Bacon* (London: Thames & Hudson, 1993), 10.

6. Daniel Farson, *The Gilded Gutter Life of Francis Bacon* (New York: Pantheon, 1993), 197. Hereafter, parenthetically cited as Farson.

7. He does make strong judgements about decisive turns in the history of art. Egyptian haptic art, which in its bas-reliefs brought figure and background to the same closeness, and Christian art, which recognized that the chance of the fall and of redemption made human nature an event and an accident rather than an essence, are decisive for the history of art. Both abstract art and abstract expressionism have intrinsic limitations.

8. Francis Bacon and Michel Archimbaud, *Francis Bacon in Conversation with Michel Archimbaud* (London: Phaidon Press, 1999), 151.

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SIX

Birth in Beauty and the Power of Sensation

Dorothea Olkowski

INTRODUCTION

The nineteenth-century art historian Wilhelm Worringer disrupted modern aesthetics by objecting to the privileging of art characterized by the concept of empathy. Worringer's critique of the art of empathy is, like Gilles Deleuze's twentieth-century philosophical aesthetics, a repudiation of representation. This repudiation arises out of the uncanny amalgamation of organic empathy and non-organic abstract form, out of which is created a type of art characterized by the so-called Northern line. This is the art to which Worringer gives the name "Gothic". Following Worringer, it is precisely this Northern line, with its broken trajectory, that Deleuze calls upon in his book, *Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation*. By contrast, we find theorized in Bergson and enacted by the photographer Sally Mann the idea that art that gives us only sensations is inferior, whereas art that suggests emotion communicates thousands of sensations, feelings and ideas, and may be called beautiful.

THE ADVENT OF THE GOTHIC

Wilhelm Worringer disrupted modern aesthetics by objecting to the privileging of art characterized by the concept of empathy, along with the notion of organic beauty, and the attitude of aesthetic subjectivism from which these concepts emerged. To balance and counter these concepts, which he takes to be too much in ascendance, Worringer suggests that

there exists at the other end of the spectrum an art characterized by inorganic beauty and the urge to abstraction[1].

Worringer defines empathy as objectified self-enjoyment, an activity of the will, a striving or accomplishment in which one enjoys *oneself* in a sensuous object, particularly a work of art, insofar as it demands apperceptive activity from the viewer. In other words, if the spectator can freely, without inner friction, give themselves over to this demand to let their inner life permeate the object, their experience is one of pleasure (AE 5–7). Empathy yields a judgement that the work of art is beautiful, in which the beauty of works of art is defined as the "ideal freedom with which I live myself out in them", and thus it is free, uninhibited and unconstrained (7). Somehow, Worringer maintains, we project our feeling of life into the work of art, our "happy pantheistic relationship of confidence between man and the phenomena of the external world" (14, 15).

In spite of this, empathy also results in self-alienation. Absorbed into the external object, we feel our individuality flow into fixed boundaries, into a self-objectification that is also self-alienation, a limitation of our potentialities to an ideal "I" (24). Artworks from the fourteenth- and fifteenth-century Northern Italian Renaissance embody this classical ideal by which an individual is "delivered from the differentiation of his [*sic*] individual consciousness", and is able to "enjoy the unclouded happiness of his pure organic being" (33).

Worringer's newly conceived counter to empathy is named "the urge to abstraction". It is described as a tremendous unrest, "an immense spiritual dread of space", primarily amongst primitive humans, inspired by phenomena in the world that incite them to wrest objects out of their natural context and out of the flux of being (15–17). Amongst modern humans, the urge to abstraction offers an escape from the obscurity and entanglement in phenomena, such that in place of the ubiquity of things organic, "the last trace of connection with and dependence on life has been effaced, here the highest absolute form, the purest abstraction has been achieved; here is law, here is necessity" (20).

In place of a pantheistic relationship to natural organic objects, the urge to abstraction is constituted out of nature's mechanical forces, forces which have been removed from nature in order to become visible on their own as the laws governing the formation of crystalline-inorganic matter, solids with a highly regular and periodic (repeating) arrangement of atoms, ions and molecules (19). This was achieved largely by suppressing the representation of space as a three-dimensional plenum linking things together in order to bring forth the material individuality of the thing (22).

The chief distinctive property of abstraction is a feeling of repose that is purified of dependence on the outer world, the release from one's own subjectivity. Abstraction possesses, notes Worringer, a distinct "transcen-

dental tinge" (15). Perhaps this is why, like empathy, the urge to abstraction is also a function of the need for self-alienation. Yet, unlike empathy, the urge to abstraction possesses this to a far greater and more intense degree, expressing the idea that organic life disturbs aesthetic enjoyment, which can only be found in the contemplation of something necessary and indisputable (11).

Worringer's critique of the art of empathy, which Gilles Deleuze refers to in his book on the painter Francis Bacon, is, like Deleuze's own work, a repudiation of representation, if by representation we mean the obtrusive realism overtaking even delight in organic form (28–29). Such art cannot express itself with purely formal means, but rather "degrades these means to bearers of a literary content that lies outside the aesthetic effect and thereby deprives them of their own specific quality" (31). The expression of literary content, characterized as naturalism, was accomplished through an imitation or narration that appears to be true to life and that also delivers the observer from the differentiation of his or her individual consciousness into purely organic being (33). Such imitation can be contrasted with form, which is characterized by regularity and denoted by the concept of style. The latter concept, the pure notion of style, first appears as pure geometric abstraction, the escape to necessity and the absolute of a spirit exhausted by any "caprice of perception" (35). The means by which to accomplish this are, as we have noted, twofold: first, to exclude the representation of three-dimensional space; and second, to externalize objects by transforming them into abstract crystalline forms (37).

The urge to abstraction suppresses the "natural model in its three-dimensionality", which by connecting objects to an infinitely receding horizon, also connects them to observers as habitual and familiar, detracting from the pure materiality of external things (38–39). Likewise, it suppresses impressionistic renderings insofar as they renounce objectivity. The only satisfactory alternative left to Worringer is an image or object that extends horizontally and vertically in a plane, an image whose purest form is found in Egyptian art (39–40). Once depth relations are transformed into plane relations, this plane is no longer optical but haptic—that is, tactile, suggesting the sense of touch (41). This, combined with geometric-crystalline regularity, yields the purest abstraction removed of temporal vagaries.

Nevertheless, out of the impure and uncanny amalgamation of organic empathy and non-organic abstract form, there arises a type of art that Worringer describes as Gothic. It makes no attempt to represent nature; it is originally a pure surface decoration, an interplay of simple forms—dots, lines, ribbons, curves, circles, spirals, zigzags, S's—intertwined, latticed, knotted, plaited, fantastically confused but captivating sight and sense with passionate vitality[2]. That it is described as the prelude to the vitalized mathematics of Gothic architecture that forces sensibility to un-

natural effort is quite significant, as is the full description offered by Worringer:

> When once the natural barriers of organic movement have been overthrown, there is no more holding back: again and again the line is broken, again and again checked in the natural direction of its movement, again and again it is forcibly prevented from peacefully ending its course, again and again diverted into fresh complications of expression, so that, tempered by all these restraints, it exerts its energy of expression to the uttermost until at last, bereft of all possibilities of natural pacification, it ends in confused spasmodic movements, breaks off unappeased into the void or flows senselessly back upon itself[3].

The vitality of the Northern line is independent of we observers and forces on us an activity to which we submit; its expression is stronger than we are, stronger than our life, and after each break, these forces pursue, with increased energy, a new direction.

As stated before, it is this Northern line, with its broken trajectory, that Deleuze delineates in *Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation*. It is a line that is "broken, split, diverted, turned in on itself, coiled up or even extended beyond its limits", bringing mechanical forces to sensible intuitions and constituting a body without organs (LS 46). The theoretical exposition of the Northern line goes beyond mere description to a genetic account that connects it to nature's forces and the physics governing those forces. To account for the Northern line, Deleuze combines something like Henri Bergson's wave theory of sensation with his own theory of algebraic geometry. To follow this, let us begin our account with wave theory.

WAVE THEORY

In physics, waves are energy transporters, moving energy along a medium without also transporting matter. Kinetic energy is transferred all along the wave until it reaches its destination. "Kinetic energy is an expression of the fact that a moving object can do work on anything it hits; it quantifies the amount of work the object could do as a result of its motion"[4]. The amount of energy carried by a wave is related to the amplitude. High-energy waves have high amplitude and low-energy waves have low amplitude, where "amplitude" refers to the maximum amount of displacement of a particle on the medium from its rest position. The greater the displacement of the medium, the greater the amplitude is. Mediums with more mass will resist the force of energy and reduce the amplitude, while a more elastic medium will offer less resistance and allow a greater amplitude pulse to travel through it[5].

Recent studies in the physiology of perception apply these basic models to cortical neurons (brain cells) involved in perception.

> [Cortical neurons] continuously receive pulses—usually at projections known as dendrites—from thousands of other neurons. The pulses are conveyed at specialized junctions called synapses. Certain incoming pulses generate excitatory waves of electric current in the recipients; others generate inhibitory waves. These currents—"dendritic currents"—are fed through the cell body (which contains the nucleus) to a region called the trigger zone, at the start of the axon. There the currents cross the cell membrane into the extracellular space. As they do, the cell calculates the overall strength of the currents (reflected in changes in voltage across the membrane), essentially by adding excitatory currents and subtracting inhibitory ones. If the sum is above a threshold level of excitation, the neuron fires[6].

Attuned to what was then called "psychophysics", Bergson takes up the question of the application of wave theory in order to generate the philosophical concept of the intensity of sensations. He is, however, disturbed that in order to define the intensity of a sensation, we look to the number and magnitude of the objective, measurable causes that have given rise to it. So, for example, behind a more intense light, we imagine a greater number of luminous sources. More simply, we assume that the intensity of a sensation is the measure or the amplitude of the movement of molecules and atoms in the sensory system. There must be, Bergson maintains, two notions of quantity, one that is extended and measurable and a second, called "intensive", which can be called greater or lesser but cannot be measured[7]. The question he raises is this: What are we really saying when we refer to a more intense pleasure or pain?

Certainly, we could claim, along with much of contemporary neuroscience, that every pleasure or pain corresponds to a disturbance of molecules and atoms of the sensory system, and that intensity is a measure of the amplitude of such molecular movements[8]. Does not, after all, Deleuze's theory of the molecular basis of molar entities rely on just such a claim? Yet it appears that Bergson does not accept this hypothesis. What occurs, Bergson inquires, when an obscure desire becomes a deep passion? What happens is that it gradually permeates more and more psychic elements. Perhaps, for example, it begins with someone you have not met but whom a friend tells you about, followed perhaps by a chance meeting with that person at a party or a restaurant; then the person begins to appear in your thoughts and you wonder if you should contact them, until, finally, you meet again and just begin to talk, and the talking goes on and on. And after that, you begin to anticipate joyfully and expectantly the next meeting and cannot imagine the possibility of it not taking place.

Is it not the case that, as Bergson says, your outlook on all of your surroundings has changed and that the same objects and persons no longer impress you in the same manner? Your sensations and your ideas feel brighter and livelier, and your world opens up like that of a child

emerging out of school into the warm spring air and believing that they are the first and only person in the world to ever experience this exaltation. What happens is that the image of the person who now fills your thoughts has "altered the shade of a thousand perceptions or memories". By means of this global sensory phenomenon, you move through the world effortlessly towards that future meeting[9]. So we may want to consider that, in contemporary neurophysiology, although examining properties of individual neurons is a microscopic approach that currently dominates neuroscience research, new research insists that perception depends on the simultaneous, cooperative activity of millions of neurons spread throughout expanses of the cortex. "Such global activity can be identified, measured and explained only if one adopts a macroscopic view alongside the microscopic one". Thus, as when one hears music, in order to grasp the beauty of an ensemble piece, one cannot listen to the individual musicians sequentially but must hear the performers together as they modulate their voices, instruments and timing in response to one another[10].

For his part, Deleuze begins his account of sensation with the claim that the phenomenological lived body is paltry when compared to the "profound and almost unlivable Power" of the body without organs, for which organisms are the enemy that imprisons life (LS 44). This body is, he claims, an *intense and intensive body*, traversed by a wave that traces thresholds according to variations in amplitude, where "thresholds" refer to the minimum intensity or value of a signal that will provoke a response (LS 45). As noted above, every cortical cell calculates the overall strength of the currents by adding excitatory currents and subtracting inhibitory ones. If the sum is above a threshold level of excitation, the neuron fires. Electroencephalogram (EEG) tracings are used by neuroscientists to reflect the mean excitatory state of local pools of neurons lying in a well-defined layer immediately beneath the electrodes. Each EEG is related to the firing pattern of neurons in a neighbourhood of the cerebral cortex[11].

Sensation in Deleuze's model is not qualitative—thus Bergson's account of sensation as the experience of a change in nature or kind appears to be incommensurate with Deleuze's account of sensation as consisting in "allotropic variations" and vibration (allotropes are different forms of the same element, different structures with different chemical and physical properties)[12]. Both are sensation without specific, limiting senses, but in Bergson's account sensation is described as qualitative, while in Deleuze's sensations are quantitative and measurable. So, for Deleuze, there will be no account of mouth, tongue, teeth, larynx, oesophagus, belly or anus because there is no notion of an organized body. Rather, even though there is something still called a body, it always appears excessive and spasmodic, like the neurologist Jean Charcot's famous traumatized patients. Charcot photographed many of his patients in now-famous hys-

terical poses, and so this kind of sensation is deemed to be hysteric (LS 45). All of these factors qualify Deleuze's concept of sensation as a manifestation of the Gothic style. Sensation is not organic; it is a nervous wave or vital emotion; it is flesh and nerve produced when external forces act on a body, as if the body had no ability to persist or act on its own. A wave of variable amplitude flows through a disorganized body, effecting maximum violence, the violence of forces acting directly on the nervous system producing seated or crouching Figures, which are what remains after the maximum of violence passes through the body (LS 38–39, 47). And so there is cruelty, where cruelty is merely the sensation, the direct and unorganized action of physical forces upon the body producing the human visage that has not found a face and will never find one (LS 45–46).

This is why the Gothic style is exemplary for the logic of sensation; why the paintings of Francis Bacon are, for Deleuze, exemplary with respect to the Gothic style; and why the hysterical reality of the body is implicit in the Gothic style. Its violent movements elevate mechanical forces to sensible intuition. It arises in a wave with variable amplitude flowing through the body without organs and tracing zones and levels on the body according to the variations of amplitude (LS 47). As a result, the organs become polyvalent and indeterminate with respect to their organization and function, which will alter, if the external forces change. Visually, one would then see spastic and paralytic bodies, the hyper- or anaesthetics. If so, we must assume that there are accelerations and delays of the oscillations of waves. Next, there arises a transitory and polyvalent organ; possibly it is the mouth first, then it becomes the anus. And, more explicitly, there is always the direct action of external forces on the nervous system, bypassing the organized body. What is the sensation of this hysteria? It is molecular, the feeling that the transitory organs are under the organized molar body, but nevertheless able to be seen. This is "autoscopy", the experience in which a person sees or feels their body from outside of it or from some other location (LS 49).

Let us not, however, overlook the fact that recent studies (2005) in cognitive neuroscience have referred to these types of phenomena as the "multi-disintegration in body and self processing", arguing that they provide neuroscientific evidence that these forms of perception are attributable to a variety of neurocognitive *dysfunctions*[13]. These illusory experiences occur in persons with posterior brain damage and involve both felt and visual disconnection, dislocation, movement and reduplication of body parts[14]. In Bacon's paintings, this is sometimes manifest in the way the body escapes its organization through the open mouth, in the emotional excess of wiped or scrubbed zones of the painting, in the smile beyond or beneath the face, in the molecular body without organs under the organism and in the Gothic, transitory non-organic forces under organic representation, the scream beyond the mouth. Everywhere, the

hysterical, molecular forces are excessively present, overtaking anything representational in the image, freeing line and colour from organic representation (LS 50–52).

Francis Bacon's work, Deleuze tells us, is about making visible forces that are not visible insofar as capturing forces is the function of the work of art. Forces are exerted on bodies, on a point of the wave, leaving sensation behind. And forces are physical in nature (pressure, inertia, weight, attraction, gravitation, germination), or they are insensible, like time (LS 56–57). Capturing forces is mixed in with a second problem, that of the effects of forces, their decomposition and their re-composition, whether that of depth in single-point perspective, colour in impressionism or movement in cubism, each of which is produced by a unique force, although each can also be decomposed into and recomposed out of a multiplicity of elements. Bacon is working in particular with a static image of bodily deformation. This is accomplished by subordinating movement to force and escaping every form, so matter stirs as chairs bend, walls slide and bodies reorganize, with all of these alterations appearing as visible effects of the violent deformations of force (LS 59). All of the convulsions of force such as those visible in the myriad versions of the scream lie beyond pain or feeling, and instead the painting is the capture of invisible forces, both the physical and the insensible forces.

All other forms of visual art, it seems, are merely ways of *avoiding* this hysteria either by retaining the spatial and figurative three-dimensionality of organic representation or by taking up purely abstract, crystalline form (LS 53). Thus, for Deleuze, the alternatives to the Gothic seem to be either empathy or abstraction, just as Worringer set this out. Earlier, we noted that Bergson distinguished between a qualitative description of sensation and a quantitative measurement of sensation's sources and effects. Let us return to this in the context of the work of art. At first, it appears that Bergson is in agreement with Deleuze's position when he says that there is an art that aims to impress feelings on observers and that art is prior to nature, that this sort of art is consciously produced by the artist such that we may proceed from the work of art to nature. Such an art, claims Bergson, arouses neither empathy with the organic nor abstraction's release from the outer world. But this does not mean that this type of art leaves us in a state of Gothic hysteria. In fact, rather than directly attacking the nervous system, this work of art brings us to a state of responsiveness, suspending the normal flow of our sensations and ideas. It happens via the material qualities of works of art, in the rhythm of music or poetry or architecture, in the pale immobility of the sculpture's stone[15]. Understood this way, art is neither the expression of feeling nor the imitation of nature; rather, it suggests something, the way a hypnotist suggests a memory or thought. This kind of art suggests beauty and the beautiful; it does not represent it, but rather gives birth to it through suggestion.

BIRTH IN BEAUTY

We are, of course, familiar with Plato's conception of birth in beauty articulated in the *Symposium*, in which Socrates announces that the philosophy of love was taught to him by a woman, Diotima of Mantinea, a woman deeply versed in many fields of knowledge and so skilled as to delay the plague in Athens by ten years[16]. Diotima's lessons on love and beauty are couched in images of pregnancy and maternity, as it is birth through procreation that gives immortality to individual mortal humans[17]. Adriana Cavarero has argued that this discourse on beauty expropriates the voice and experience of the wise woman, Diotima. Socrates tells the assembled men that, according to Diotima, "in beauty and love, the lovers . . . finally give birth to and generate the things with which they were already pregnant, forever taking care of the offspring they have produced together"[18]. Cavarero notes that the children the participants give birth to, unlike those of the woman, are immortal ideas and works of art, beauty that neither comes into being nor passes away[19]. In Cavarero's view, the woman's experience of procreation, conception, labour, parturition and giving birth are all handed over to the men of the *Symposium*, who are practising homosexual love and who are encouraged to regard seeking beautiful male bodies as preliminary to seeking beautiful souls that can only be discovered by engaging with other men in conversations about virtue and the good.

It seems to me, however, that we may discern something more in this rare appearance of a wise woman in the philosopher's discourse. As Drew Hyland has stated, there is something striking about the idea that Socrates is learning about love, that most important of ideas, from a woman[20]. What is striking is the manner in which this lesson introduces feminine erotic experience into the previously exclusively male discussion. Not only does Diotima bring pregnancy, birth and nurturing to bear on love and beauty, but she also introduces the idea that the god Eros is the son of Penia, meaning poverty or lack, and, therefore, has precisely the same characteristic that Socrates claims for philosophers—namely, that they lack wisdom and therefore seek it. Diotima also identifies Eros as the child of Poros (resource and plenty), who received these gifts from his own mother Metis (wisdom and craft), a connection that strengthens the philosophically relevant and feminine inheritance of Eros[21].

Additionally, it seems that Diotima's task is surprisingly reminiscent of Bergson's: it is to insist that love is not caught between dualist or binary extremes, but reflects a third option, a sort of middle ground[22]. It is neither inherently and basely mired in the body nor exclusively and nobly directed to the intellect; Eros is, as Hyland maintains, in the middle[23]. This has important implications for the development of the concept of birth in beauty, as does Diotima's clarification that Eros is not himself beautiful but is seeking beauty. Whatever Eros generates is "in beauty",

or in the beautiful. The creative urge is bodily, even erotic, and the erotic body generates in beauty; it generates the beautiful, so that beauty requires both the body and the intellect. That Eros is in between need and plenty or wisdom implies that Eros is both erotic and rational, both of the body and of the intellect, and that birth in beauty requires both[24]. Moreover, Diotima makes the point that the bodily sexual union of female and male for procreation is already divine, as pregnancy and generation make mortals into divine beings[25]. Although we must admit that the poetry of Homer and the laws of Solon are detached from the transience of bodies in order to obtain something in itself eternal and divine, even this birth in beauty must have originated in the bodily birth that Diotima celebrates.

What, if anything, does this tell us about the painting of Francis Bacon? The deformed and destroyed Figures in Bacon's paintings are subordinated to invisible forces, including the force of eternal time, "a task beyond all measure or cadence" (LS 64). The element of the feminine erotic experience, of birth in beauty, is nowhere present. In its place, we view the ravaged body as the simultaneity of past, present and future. This is because the so-called powers of the future are visible now and forever in the painted Figures, in the static deformations and the form at complete rest (LS 59). The forces of pressure, dilation, contraction, flattening and elongation are exerted on an immobile head, said to be like a space traveller immobile in his capsule (LS 58). All sensation is immobilized in the Figure, so in viewing these paintings, there is nothing for the observer to feel, nothing at all; it is all thought, purely the idea, static and at rest.

By contrast, it seems that we find in Bergson the idea that birth in beauty consists of differences of state or nature, an aesthetic feeling, meaning a felt sensation that gradually becomes richer and richer[26]. Bergson's conception of sensation is much less correlated with lack than Diotima's, but nevertheless, for Bergson, the art that gives us only sensations is inferior, yielding nothing beyond the intensity of the sensation itself. By contrast, the art that suggests emotion communicates thousands of sensations, feelings and, importantly, ideas, each one unique, such that one would have to relive the life of the one who experiences this in order to grasp it at all in its original complexity[27]. This, says Bergson, is what the artist who gives birth in beauty does. She aims to gives us the experience of what we cannot possibly comprehend through the intellect alone. The emotion arrives via neither representation nor abstraction nor Gothic hysteria, but by breaking down the barriers between the artist's consciousness and our own. Of course, this requires an artist capable of suggesting the life of the subjects of her images, whatever that subject may be, human or non-human.

Can we now test this idea to determine if, indeed, there are any actual works of art that embody it? I have in mind, in particular, the work of the

photographer Sally Mann. Mann, a child of the southern United States, has lived most of her life with her husband and children on a somewhat isolated farm in Virginia. She came to the attention of the art world in 1992 with the exhibition of a collection of photographs called *Immediate Family*, images primarily of her three children. Her view of these images was and remains that they are tender and maternal photographs of her children[28]. It seems that, in looking at these photographs, we may find ourselves immersed in a world that neither Worringer nor Deleuze has prepared us for. We do not find here the imitation of nature, the immersion in the organic life of works of art characterized by empathy, nor do we find abstraction. Every image is clearly an image with a figure, whether human, animal or landscape.

Perhaps, then, the power of these images lies in the Gothic line, the intense and hysterical line produced by making visible what are otherwise invisible forces? Perhaps we can describe these images as the effect of forces exerted on bodies, on a point of the wave, leaving behind pure sensation. Surely we can see pressure, inertia, weight, attraction, gravitation, germination or the insensible force of time made eternal? And do we not find here everywhere the effects of forces, their decomposition and re-composition out of a multiplicity of elements? Or perhaps we should look again, more closely, to see what is there.

In every image of the children, they are photographed as if they are completely alone, even when they are surrounded by other children or adults, even if there are two or three of them in the image. Not a single image puts them in the foreground with an endless receding representational horizon encompassing them or situates them in the comfortable space of domesticated visibility. Instead, each child stares out of the photograph, fiercely, proudly, prohibiting the empathy that yields a judgement that the work of art is organically beautiful, because the viewer cannot take over the image, and so loses any possibility of ideal freedom with which to live him- or herself out in them. The viewer is thus neither free nor uninhibited or unconstrained. According to Bergson, the artist who creates beauty gives us a share in the emotion of sensations, feelings and ideas permeating every image. It is rich and personal, so original that we do not have a concept for it, but we do experience and intuit it. The artist searches for those outward signs of emotion that our bodies can sense and imitate, whether through mirror neurons or delicate neural pathways. Mirror neurons in the brain are known to fire when an individual performs a goal-directed motor activity or sees someone else performing one. They are thought to provide or reflect a direct experience of another's intentions or emotions, which allows us to imitate others and thus understand the context and meaning of their actions. Thus, both bodily feeling and intellectual understanding are involved in our experience[29]. According to Bergson's thesis, the richer the ideas, emo-

tions and sensations offered to us, the more deeply and intensely we experience the beauty of the work of art[30].

Like her photographs of children, Sally Mann's photographic landscapes generate a feeling but also ideas. The landscapes and the children feel isolated, and childhood, like nature and the abandoned decaying bodies of human beings photographed at a forensic site in Tennessee, feels lonely. In the photographs, they are each of them alone, revealing what mothers who love their children often struggle to hide: the idea of the sexuality of children—their own sexuality, not one imposed on them by cultural norms, not exploiting them but giving them the choice to show themselves. Mann's children, now adults, are immensely proud and protective of their own contributions to this body of work.

Such photographs, like those of Mann's husband, his powerful body invaded by muscular dystrophy and subject to close observation, reveal a Promethean figure, "a man as naked and vulnerable as any wretch strung across the mythical, vulture-topped rock"[31]. And the artist herself must dare to look at him as mythical Psyche dared to look at Eros, even though it subjected her to unimaginable torment and unbearable tasks in order to be reunited with him. There must be, says Mann, "the passions of both eye and heart, but in that ardent heart, there must also be a splinter of ice"[32]. Just so, "man up", the goddess Juno tells Psyche: be a lover but borrow a little male courage and boldly renounce all hope of escape from the furious power of the goddess Venus, who, jealous of Psyche's mortal beauty, searches for Psyche in order to destroy her[33]. In the end, Psyche is reunited with Eros and transformed into a goddess, immortal now in her beauty and through the birth of the female child she has conceived with Eros, the god of love.

This may be precisely what the appropriately named Sally Mann does. She does not make photographs in order to present an eternal idea. There is no static Figure of movement and force. Instead, she dares create both as a mother and as a courageous hero, to photograph the real emotions of children, the real body of a man, the real encounter with death, and to produce immortal images that frighten and disturb even as they are profoundly sensuous. She must do this, not in order to deny her subjects their own voices, not to steal their sexuality and emotions from them by domesticating them, and not to render the image clinically hysterical[34]. Looking at Mann's photographs, one feels what the children feel, sees what they see, and thinks what they think, so that one sometimes must almost turn away from their powerful sensations and ideas.

In her later landscape photographs, Mann uses nineteenth-century photographic techniques and old and damaged lenses that allow for light leaks, imperfections and distortions that are not erased but treated as images in their own right. Sharply focusing on such distortions and blurring them at the edges warp and twist the space of the image[35]. These images have been cited for their "layers of memory and amnesia", and

described as the creation of "embodied abstraction[s]" that materialize the vagaries of vision and memory[36]. Mann's landscape photographs include a series called *Virginia* and a series called *Georgia*, which evoke the recollection that both states were the scarred and deathly sites of battles during the American Civil War.

Mann's photographs of these sacred and deathly lands dissolve the barriers between viewer and image, pulling the viewer into their beauty but also threatening to collapse upon the viewer who, in looking at them, must, like Mann, "man up" and have the courage to enter into the light-blasted hillsides, the wounded, gashed trees and the silent, empty places[37]. Having gained this courage, the viewer feels the emotion, the love and the danger, the reality of life and death. No less than the photographs of human bodies, these images inhabit the passage between the erotic and the intellect without eliminating either. These photographs are the creation of another embodiment, not that of the static and eternal idea, but that of the work of giving birth in beauty, sometimes overpowering and frightening, but just as often joyful and proud flesh.

NOTES

1. Wilhelm Worringer, *Abstraction and Empathy: A Contribution to the Psychology of Style*, trans. Michael Bullock (New York: International Universities Press, 1953), 4. Hereafter, parenthetically cited as AE.
2. Wilhelm Worringer, *Form in Gothic*, trans. Sir Herbert Read (New York: Schocken Books, 1957), 39–40.
3. *Ibid*., 41.
4. See C. R. Nave, "Kinetic Energy", *Hyperphysics*, http://hyperphysics.phy-astr.gsu.edu/hbase/ke.html (accessed January 13, 2014).
5. The Physics Classroom, "Waves: The Properties of Waves", http://www.physicsclassroom.com/Class/waves/u10l2c.cfm (accessed January 13, 2014).
6. Walter J. Freeman, "The Physiology of Perception", *Scientific American* 264, no. 2 (February 1991): 78–85.
7. Henri Bergson, *Time and Free Will: An Essay on the Immediate Data of Consciousness*, trans. F. L. Pogson (New York: Dover Publications, 2001), 2–5.
8. *Ibid*., 6.
9. *Ibid*., 9, 10.
10. Freeman, "The Physiology of Perception".
11. *Ibid*., 79–83.
12. See "Allotropes", *Chemistry Encyclopedia*, http://www.chemistryexplained.com/A-Ar/Allotropes.html (accessed January 13, 2014). Examples of allotropes are boron, carbon, phosphorus and arsenic.
13. Olaf Blanke and Christine Mohr, "Out-of-Body Experience, Heautoscopy, and Autoscopic Hallucination of Neurological Origin: Implications for Neurocognitive Mechanisms of Corporeal Awareness and Self Consciousness", *Brain Research Reviews* 50 (2005): 184–99, www.elsevier.com/locate/brainresrev (accessed January 13, 2014).
14. *Ibid*., 186.
15. Bergson, *Time and Free Will*, 15–16.
16. Plato, *Symposium*, 203.
17. *Ibid*., 208e–9a.

18. Adriana Cavarero, *In Spite of Plato: A Feminist Rewriting of Ancient Philosophy*, trans. Serena Anderlini-D'onofrio and Aine O'Healy (New York: Routledge, 1995), 101.
19. Cavarero, *In Spite of Plato*, 102; and Plato, *Symposium*, 211a.
20. Drew A. Hyland, *Plato and the Question of Beauty* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2008), 45.
21. *Ibid.*, 45–47.
22. *Ibid.*, 46.
23. *Ibid.*, 47.
24. *Ibid.*, 50.
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27. *Ibid.*
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Part II

Artistic Practices

SEVEN

Drawing Out Deleuze

Jac Saorsa

> Difference is not diversity. Diversity is given but difference is that by which the given is given. (DR 208)

Where the relation between art and philosophy in general has been well established in aesthetic theory, its precise nature is continuously questioned by philosophers and artists alike. As an artist myself, my approach to life derives from an innate and relentless curiosity about how we engage with our world and with others in it, and I understand my work as profoundly indebted to philosophy even though, for me, it could never be reducible to it. My particular relationship with the work of philosopher Gilles Deleuze therefore reflects a certain ambivalence, but it is a long-standing association that has been fundamentally influential on my practice as a whole, and this chapter, as an overview of an ongoing visual project that takes the above quotation as a template for an exploration of contemporary drawing practice, examines how I am using drawing as a tool to explore the complexities that are inherent in the "artist-philosopher" relation. The project in question is entitled *Drawing Out Deleuze*, and the primary aim is to put Deleuzean theory to "use" through practice. I am working with a specific text, *Difference and Repetition*, in isolation, but the idea is not merely to create a form of visual explication of this seminal work; rather, over the course of reading it, I wish to engage profoundly and creatively with the content and its theoretical nuances through my personal visual response. In working with the text in this way, I hope to literally "draw out" Deleuze.

Difference and Repetition was originally published in 1968 as both a profound critique of the concept of representation and a proposal for a new "image of thought". It therefore provides me with the ideal basis for

an investigation through drawing practice, which in itself will, I hope, constitute and demonstrate an alternative way of engaging with Deleuzean theory. *Drawing out Deleuze*, however, is a project in evolution. It is initially being disseminated through discrete bodies of work uploaded onto the TRACEY Drawing Research Network website in a dedicated Research Project Space[1]; when complete, these uploads will relate to the preface, the introduction, the five chapters and the conclusion of the source text. I envisage further exhibitions of the work, physical rather than online, as well as more in-depth publications pertaining to the methodology, but as yet it is a work in progress and still in the early stages. This chapter might therefore be considered an "overture", in analogous relation to Deleuze's own introduction in the original source text, more a collection of pertinent relations than a defined structure, and the first relation I will describe in more detail here is that between Deleuze and myself.

Where the Deleuzean conceptual edifice supports and challenges me in my practice, both in terms of the drawing act itself and in the emotional and philosophical context within which it is carried out, an analogous relation between philosophy's concept, and art's percept and affect, becomes embodied in, yet still questioned by, every mark I make on a surface. From my own artist's perspective, I believe that an exploration of Deleuzean theory becomes authentically comprehensive, even where it is never intended to be immediately comprehensible, through visual expression, and, as an artist, I understand myself as a Deleuzean "nomad", operating and practising in the open space of "play", which contrasts with "sedentary space".

> To fill a space, to be distributed in it, is very different from distributing the space. It is an errant and even "delirious" distribution in which things are deployed across the entire extensity of a univocal and undistributed Being. It is not a matter of being which is distributed according to the requirements of representation, but of all things being divided up within being in the univocity of simple presence (the One-All). Such a distribution is demonic rather than divine, since it is the peculiarity of demons to operate in the intervals between the gods' fields of action, as it is to leap over barriers or the enclosures, thereby confounding the boundaries between properties. (DR 46)

I play with imagery, with the relationship between figure and ground, form and concept, and like Deleuze's "demons", I, too, leap over boundaries that, in being leapt, witness the "unsettling difficulties" that my own practice, my own "nomadic distribution", introduces into the sedentary structures of representation. Thus, through my challenging relationship with Deleuze, and, most importantly, with my integrity as an artist intact, I have developed the ability to challenge, in turn, and with this in mind, the following quotation from *A Thousand Plateaus* provides so elo-

quent a description of the way I understand my own creative process in general that it bears no paraphrasing.

> This is how it should be done: Lodge yourself on a stratum, experiment with the opportunities it offers, find an advantageous place on it, find potential movements of deterritorialization, possible lines of flight, experience them, produce flow conjunctions here and there, try out continuums of intensities segment by segment, have a small plot of new land at all times. (TP 178)

Being fundamentally interdisciplinary, my work ensures that I frequently travel, nomadically, in different directions (often at the same time!), but in the end all these directions lead me to encounter myself once again in the same creative space. I therefore understand my visual work as a process of becoming, a constant and self-generating search for something that must nevertheless always remain unattainable because in creative practice it is only in the nature of *process* that any *progress* is made. Moreover, although it is in the nature of the artist to strive for perfection, he or she must do so in the full knowledge that perfection itself must bring process to an end because, I believe, to achieve a creative goal would be to negate the very manner in which it is achievable, and perfection must therefore remain elusive and subservient to process for fear of the threat to the very being of the artist. However, there is hope. Where practice is both supported and challenged by theory, the idea of perfection can be transfigured by the passion needed to engage with our world and explore lived experience. Creative passion here meets a passion for survival.

Through my work, I hold conversations with Deleuze. Long and continuing conversations in which syntax and meaning "de-" and "re-territorialize" through the lines, tones and words. We address the *difference* between talk and action and between thought and practice, and we define the osmotic relation between the two and the two. Through these conversations, and through verbalizing and reflecting on my creative process, I have learned to "stammer" in the Deleuzean "vital" sense of being a foreigner in my own language, and within the perpetuity *of* process that is characterized in the stammering, the and . . . and . . . and . . . , I embrace a creative multilingualism, the interpenetrative relation between visual and conventional language. "And . . . and . . . and . . ." over and over again, Deleuze and I engage in *repetition* in which qualitative orders of resemblance and quantitative orders of equivalence provoke cycles and series of works wherein symbols become as sale items—non-returnable—in an "economic" differentiation between the concept of exchange and that of "theft and gift" (DR 1). In my visual exploration of Deleuze's theory of pure difference, in which "repetition-for-itself" is defined through its non-relation with generality, do I become then an artist-thief, or does Deleuze present me with a gift? Where each mark in a

drawing is a repetition of its predecessor, but at the same time a singularity, am I "practising" his theory as I intend?

I think maybe so. Deleuze himself acknowledges that artists

> do not juxtapose but rather each time combine an element of one instance with another element of a following instance. They introduce a disequilibrium in the dynamic process of construction, an instability, dissymmetry or gap of some kind . . . what matters is the possibility of the cause having less symmetry than the effect. (DR 22)

As separate identities, philosopher and artist, Deleuze and I encounter each other in between accord and discord and within the parameters of our differences, but our relationship is necessarily born of a multiplicity of thoughts and emotions, understandings and misapprehensions, which, just as experimentation is the master of interpretation, must exist in a common space beyond, external to its own terms. Indeed, relations of any kind are always drawn from the middle, and so I begin from the middle, where identity itself is fluid and where philosophy and drawing "become" in mutual relation through the medium of practice. I must always "feel my way" when drawing, and I pursue my own existence in a world where I am sometimes misunderstood. But, like Corbusier's acrobat, I must dance on.

> An acrobat is no puppet
> He devotes his life to activities
> in which, in perpetual danger of death
> he performs extraordinary movements
> of infinite difficulty, with the disciplined
> exactitude and precision . . . free
> to break his neck and his bones
> and be crushed.
> Nobody asks him to do this
> Nobody owes him any thanks
> He lives in an extraordinary world, of the acrobat[2]

As an artist, I must find my place in the crowd that follows and surrounds Deleuze, each individual moving towards understanding, yet sometimes only standing, in their own way. It is *as* an artist, however, that I cannot maintain a total consistency of accord (and this will be explained more fully further on in the chapter). Therefore, while I "use" the concepts and I "practise" Deleuze in a way that I think he would appreciate, I do so hoping that such seeming arrogance will be understood for what it truly is—an exploration of experience that is unavoidably rooted in the experience itself. Where *difference* exceeds the limitations of representation by distant horizons, I engage in complex *repetition* in the creative process, in which difference is internalized and the self-perpetuating relation between philosophy and creative practice works towards defining a reciprocity between how understanding authenticates

drawing acts, and how drawing can itself be constructive of understanding. In the end, the two of us, Deleuze and I as singularities, reflect each other.

YET WE ARE DIFFERENT

In my struggle, in *Drawing Out Deleuze*, to generate a visually coherent "extrapolation" of *Difference and Repetition*, I hope Deleuze would not mock me. I hope that he would not mock me in the manner that Francis Bacon, the artist who became the philosopher's "Apollo of the Muses", mocked the fawners and pretenders who assailed him in unfailing exhibitions of self-annihilation in London's barrooms and restaurants. Deleuze concerns himself with the elusiveness, the frailness of identity, as do I, but where pretenders seek an identity in terms of similarity, I must travel further into a world where reflection is not enough and where true identity is divergent, decentred. I may recognize myself in Lacan's mirror, a "permanent structure of my subjectivity", but just as recognition actually becomes "false" (Lacan's "meconnaissance")[3] and subjugates the individual experience of self to the perceived visual experience, I seek a more profound insight. I must therefore continue to construct, deconstruct and reconstruct my artist "self" through a perpetual process of de- and re-territorialization. My being as a whole, inseparable from the creative process that in itself is at the core of a precarious sense of myself in the world, thereby assumes the inverse character of Butler's *Erewhon*[4] in order that I might perceive and "achieve" myself through my creative aspiration. Lacan's mirror is intact, but I see my own reflection as through a mirror shattered, and my identity as an artist draws on my emotions and my thoughts that draw, in turn, on Deleuze. The objective and the subjective, the cognitive and the emotive, coalesce as the marks I make on a surface echo the words on a page, serving to iterate and reiterate the spatial and emotional depths of our differing levels of perspective.

So we are different.

Although I read *Difference and Repetition* some years ago, it is my deliberate intention within the process of *Drawing Out Deleuze* to reread the text, chapter by chapter, at the same time and pace as I am making the drawings. This way of working will, I believe, serve to increase my understanding of the rather dense prose, as well as lessen as far as possible the potentiality for "contaminating" my interpretation through practice with any preconceived understanding of the theory, or for merely illustrating the text. With due respect to the ever-ongoing debate as to the fundamental nature of illustration in terms of its relation to so-called fine art, I am seeking a deeper involvement with the text than a purely illustrative approach, as I understand it, could provide.

Where my practice is interdisciplinary, I see it also as "intertextual", and I conceive of both written and visual language as text. As such, I am seeking to understand the text that is *Difference and Repetition* through an engagement with what Ricoeur might call its "non-ostensive reference", that which refers to the *Welt*, or symbolic world, and thus to every other text, rather than focus only on the "ostensive reference" to the *Umwelt* or the actual world. For Ricoeur, the "enlargement" of the *Umwelt* into the *Welt* allows us to engage with a text in such a way that our understanding frees us from the "visibility and limitation of situations by opening up a world for us, that is, new dimensions of our being-in-the-world"[5], and we can therefore appreciate and realize the potential of possible modes of existence beyond those that may be prescribed or expected. This is consistent, then, with my engagement with Deleuze in terms of both our mutually challenging relationship and my contention that, in an understanding of the text achieved *through* practice, I am in fact "refiguring" (to use another Ricoeurian concept)[6] rather than simply representing it in visual terms. Refiguration, for Ricoeur, is about the action that is embodied in the author-reader relationship. Where the author configures the text in the act of writing it, the reader, in the act of reading, refigures it according to his or her understanding, and this, in turn, reshapes the way in which he or she acts in the world.

The *Drawing Out Deleuze* project as a whole follows two main trajectories that run in tandem. Intimately related, each trajectory will generate drawings that refer and relate to each individual chapter of *Difference and Repetition*, as well as (and increasingly throughout the project) to each other. The first takes its premise from the title of the text itself and has already generated drawings derived from my initial engagement with the development of the concepts that give rise to chapters 1 and 2, respectively, in the source text. These are "difference in itself" and "repetition for itself".

The second trajectory, premised on the dialectic between identity and practice, addresses Deleuze's contention that difference and repetition are both logically and metaphysically prior to any concept of identity. This challenges the whole idea of representation, especially where "the primacy of identity, however conceived, defines the world of representation" (DR xvii), and indeed, in *Difference and Repetition*, Deleuze seeks to define a "philosophy of difference" which, to quote Protevi, is exemplified in "freeing the thought of difference from the demands of representation"[7]. This depends on the eschewal of representation as it is conventionally understood, but where *Drawing Out Deleuze* is directed through the drawing act itself to an investigation of the individuality of practice, this gives rise to a dilemma, since I am responding to the source text through visual art, within and through which, by its very nature and in terms of both practice and result, representation is profoundly implicated. This dilemma, which clearly has significant impact on the project

as a whole, is the issue over which the *Drawing Out Deleuze* project becomes the most challenging for me, theoretically as well as practically, and therefore the most interesting. Indeed, how to extrapolate Deleuzean theory through a form of practice that is itself embedded in the theory is the irresistible problem that drew me to the project in the first place.

For *Drawing Out Deleuze* as a whole, and most specifically for the drawings relating to the introduction of the source text, an important visual reference in my practical response to the text is a seed. *Eulophia alta*, a species of the orchid family, is more commonly known as the wild coco and is native to tropical America and Africa. It embodies in its natural structure the typical honeycomb pattern: a tessellation of "hollows" that demonstrates the predominant structural adaptation in wind-dispersed, "balloon" seeds. Such a repetitive structure is the strongest that nature provides, but whether it is strong enough to withstand a philosopher's incisive conceptualization (and condemnation) is a matter of conjecture. *Drawing Out Deleuze* will grow from this seed.

Deleuze's fundamental argument in *Difference and Repetition* is based on a contention that, since Plato, difference has been primarily understood with reference to repetition in terms of self-identical objects, difference that is as a difference *between* said objects. Against this, Deleuze wants to rethink the relation between difference and repetition by ascertaining the nature of what he considers "pure difference" or "difference-in-itself", and in doing so he determines that repetition, as a relation of "reciprocal determination" between the virtual and the actual, is in fact itself a *form* of difference, difference that is "without a concept". This complex network of ideas clearly needs to be unravelled, and I will begin to do so, as Deleuze does, by noting that within the network, profound repetition is characterized by profound difference, and this is to ensure that repetition is understood as in no way equivalent to generality.

In *Difference and Repetition*, Deleuze explains the nature of profound repetition or "repetition-for-itself", partly in terms of conduct or "behaviour", in which the first and second conducts of repetition are generality and law. Generality, as repetition, expresses a phenomenon by which one term can be defined by, exchanged or substituted by another, and generality thus both belongs to and must follow laws. For example, tessellation follows the laws of geometry in that the structural character of regular tessellation is confirmed in absolute symmetry and constituted in relations between congruent polygons. Semi-regular and end-to-end tessellation follows less rigorous rules of construction, but they are rules, or laws, nonetheless. According to Deleuze, however, a law, albeit natural or moral, is merely an "empty" form of repetition in contrast to "true" repetition which must be against law. For Deleuze, the "self" of repetition is "the singularity with that which repeats" (DR 2), and repetition-for-itself is therefore transgression of laws. It cannot be generalized and is definable only in relation to that which cannot be replaced. Here, then, is

Deleuze's economic principal mentioned earlier: generality is defined primarily in terms of exchange, whereas repetition is defined in terms of theft and gift.

As the repeat, therefore, of the unrepeatable, "repetition-for-itself" renounces general character in order to embrace a profound and creative reality, and this perhaps is the reality of my seed. The tessellation, exhibited in the honeycomb-like structure of hollows and visualized in the drawing of the actual seed (figure 7.1), provides a pattern, rather than a strict template, for the abstraction below. The repetitive structure inherent in the particular seed therefore neither determines nor is determined by the laws of geometry that govern the generalization of its form in the abstraction, and furthermore, even in the abstraction, which proliferates on the two-dimensional Euclidean plane as opposed to three-dimensional illusion, my deliberate suppression of its form on the right-hand side of the drawing limits any claim to regularity or symmetry and is derived from a creative instinct. The general concept of the seed and of repetition therefore does not dictate; it simply provides a framework for the formulation of particular ideas.

In his argument that principles governing the formation of ideas cannot be equated to causal laws that govern individuals, Deleuze insists that repetition provides the explanation of the relation, or more specifically the "reciprocal determination", between virtual principles and actual laws, in which virtual describes an "event" occurring in the midst of ideas, and actual defines a relative "event" occurring in the midst of actions. Such a relation defines the individual as inherently both virtual *and* actual, the locus in fact for the coming together of sensations and intensities. It also defines the creative process through which rational thought, irrational sensation and the creative act come together. It is indeed the relations between sensations, intensities and ideas that give rise to what Deleuze calls the "individuating factors" that differentiate between us, one and the other, and where repetition thus "echoes" with an internal "secret vibration" within a singularity, I want to suggest that the creative process resonates with this vibration and therefore addresses and simultaneously embodies its own individuality. Where, for Deleuze, repetition must be understood in the "pronominal", the "self" of repetition, it is not about the addition of second, third, fourth and so on to the first, to the singularity; it is rather about carrying that singularity, that first time, to the "*n*th" power. This defines, then, the nature and relation of the single creative act to the creative process as a whole.

But there is more—always more.

Where Deleuze focuses on habit and memory as physical action and psychological effect, which together create a repetitious series in which things are "brought into" existence, I must acknowledge that in my own creative process, habit and memory undeniably play a part in the way that I am "drawing out" theory. This is true even at the very least



Figure 7.1. Seed

through habitual mark making and remembered themes that combine in order to realize the work, which in the case of *Drawing Out Deleuze* is disseminated as a series of discrete yet associated images. James Williams uses the example of an animal prowling its territory to demonstrate the concept of how the two related phenomena of habitual action and memory of the action bring about the creation of fixed boundaries[8], and thus, in both cases, artist and animal, the phenomenon of repetition can be understood to "pre-exist" existence.

The prowling animal example may define how repetition, in terms of habit and memory, serves to generate actual identity, but (and here is the rub) where habit and memory are understood to generate a fixed repre-

sentation of things, the philosophy of difference, as we have already seen, depends on the eschewal of representation in the conventional sense. This is the inherent dilemma that can be resolved perhaps if we understand repetition, as Deleuze does, as forming not one but two series, where the first includes specific "events" that are both actual as in habit and virtual as in memory, and the second includes repetitions pertaining to feelings, circumstances and needs that are infinite in both number and quality. The first series must always be set against the second, in which relations between the repetitions cannot be predictable because changeability, and therefore *un*predictability, are necessarily embodied. Actual and virtual habits and memories that bring about the existence of specific representation are thus always existing against a background of infinitely variable intensities, and it is in these variations that representation in the conventional and most contrived sense is lost. Furthermore, for Deleuze, it is only within infinite variability that life, existence, is both created and, most importantly, sustained. "Repetition-for-itself" thus becomes a double condemnation of habit and memory because

> habit never gives rise to repetition: sometimes the action changes and is perfected while the intention remains constant, sometimes the action remains the same in different contexts and with different intentions. (DR 5)

So much, then, for repetition, but the question remains as to how repetition-for-itself becomes difference "without a concept". My own understanding of Deleuze's definition of a concept is of a particular existing thing that has infinite comprehension, in which finite comprehension is actual rather than virtual, and although this does reinforce the concept of repetition as characterized in extreme resemblance or perfect equivalence, it also extends this notion at a fundamental level by qualifying how "within a concept one thing can pass by degrees from one thing to another" (DR 2). The actual here is understood in the form of predicates or "moments", which are preserved in the concept and can affect their subject, making possible remembering, recognition and self-consciousness. These are specific ideas that take on the character of laws. So, whereas in "fundamental" use, and according to its infinite character, a concept can be understood as virtual in that it must always be set against an inherently variable background of circumstance, in "logical" use it can nevertheless be "blocked" at the level of any predicate or "moment", any "actuality" that constitutes it. In this situation, the specific predicate must remain fixed in the concept, even whilst becoming something else in the thing; the concept of animal, for example, thus becomes something other in the idea of a man or a cat or a horse; the concept of a "hollow" becomes a vacuole in a cell, a single unit of tessellation in a seed or a mouth wide open in a scream of hunger (figures 7.2 and 7.3).

In these terms, having become "other" in the thing, the predicate necessarily becomes the object of another predicate in the concept, and so on, each determination defining resemblance to the extent that it remains fixed in the actual, yet applicable to an infinity of things in the virtual, and according to Deleuze, the rule of the inverse thus guides the relation of comprehension and extension—that is, "what difference is there?" now becomes "what resemblance is there?"(DR 14). This only reinforces the manner in which "repetition-for-itself" provides the explanation of the relation, the "reciprocal determination" mentioned earlier, between the actual and the virtual and becomes itself, difference therefore "without a concept".

According to Williams, the primary questions posited by Deleuze that provide the framework for *Difference and Repetition* are "What is the concept of difference that cannot be thought of in terms of identity?" and "What is the essence of repetition in terms of it not needing to be defined negatively with respect to concepts, and as distinct from a repetition of



Figure 7.2. Seed: red vacuoles



Figure 7.3. Transition from seed to cry of hunger

the same thing?"[9] At this early stage in *Drawing Out Deleuze*, I am in no real position to assume that there may be answers to these questions, and indeed, because of the nature of the exploration, I must consciously avoid trying to find any as that would be getting ahead of myself in terms of "drawing out" the theory. As exploration, therefore, rather than interpretation, it is the experience of the process itself that fascinates me, and what I can allow myself to begin to understand and practise through the process is how, as an artist, I engage with the relation between the "idea" of difference and the "essence" of repetition and traverse the "interferences and intersections" inherent in that relation in a manner that is simultaneously engaged and disengaged from conventional representation.

My understanding to date is that for Deleuze and I, our separate identities as philosopher and as artist are not the measure of the difference between us; the real difference lies in the "idea" of practice. I may follow the philosopher's lead across planes of pure immanence, in which unrelenting connectivity and the sheer artistry of chaotic randomness are the inherent progenitors of the creative process, which we have seen can be understood in terms of pronominal repetition, but still I must question his theory that repetition-for-itself, characterized in the building up of mark upon mark, layer upon layer, is ultimately destined for a catastrophic climax through which I, the artist, am able to pass. Were it not for my being an artist, the theory might well persuade the philosopher in me, but the pass itself becomes the valley of the shadow of death because, were I to negotiate the catastrophe "successfully", and thereby achieve the perfect masterpiece, I would, in achieving it, lose my identity as an artist. Where an artist's being is in searching but never finding, in perpetuating the process of achieving the unachievable, in believing in completion while knowing it is forever an illusion, the constant irony of the creative process is that through its very nature as a process, and according to Deleuze's idea of the catastrophe, representation must become unavoidable, even despite its undesirability in Deleuzean terms. To achieve what I strive for is to cease to strive. To cease to strive is to cease to be. Where the masterpiece represents the identity of the master, it can be created only at the expense of the master.

While inextricably engaged in a self-perpetuating series of actual and virtual events, as an artist I experience, therefore, in a visceral way, the impossibility of realizing "repetition-for-itself", the impossibility of achieving a creative goal, where this means disassociating individuality from practice. I experience, then, that which Deleuze can only describe, and in my attempt to extrapolate theory through visual art, perhaps the most profound difference between artist and philosopher is embodied in the work itself. This leads me to a question with which I will conclude this introduction to the *Drawing Out Deleuze* project. Do the drawings, evidential in themselves of an unending attempt to engage with theory, embody the concept of difference that cannot be thought of in terms of identity, the difference that, according to Williams's interpretation, is difference that requires its own "singularity" on the level of ideas?

Work progresses. . . .

NOTES

1. TRACEY Drawing Research Network, http://www.lboro.ac.uk/departments/sota/tracey/space/projects/saorsa/js1.html (accessed January 13, 2014).

2. Le Corbusier, quoted in A. C. Antoniades, *The Poetics of Architecture: Theory of Design* (London: John Wiley & Sons, 1992), 16.

3. Jacques Lacan, *Écrits: The First Complete Edition in English*, trans. B. Fink (New York: W. W. Norton, 2006).

4. Samuel Butler, *Erewhon; Or, Over the Range*, 1906, http://www.gutenberg.org/files/1906/1906-h/1906-h.htm (accessed January 13, 2014).

5. Paul Ricoeur, "The Model of the Text: Meaningful Action Considered as Text", in *Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences: Essays on Language, Action and Interpretation*, ed. and trans. John B. Thompson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 177.

6. Paul Ricoeur, *From Text to Action: Essays in Hermeneutics II* (London: Athlone Press, 1991).

7. John Protevi, "Outline of Gilles Deleuze, *Différence et Répétition* (Paris: PUF, 1968)", 2006, http://www.protevi.com/john/DG/DR.pdf (accessed January 13, 2014).

8. J. Williams, *Gilles Deleuze's Difference and Repetition: A Critical Introduction and Guide* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2003), 11.

9. *Ibid.*, 54.

EIGHT

Radical Finitude—Difference as Strategy

Marian Tubbs

> What I am saying does not mean that there will henceforth be no form in art. It only means that there will be a new form, and that this form will be of such a type that it admits the chaos. . . . To find a form that accommodates the mess, that is the task of the artist now.
>
> —Samuel Beckett[1]

American philosopher Cornel West, who was one of many arrested for marching in the Occupy protests of 2011, has equated Samuel Beckett's "mess" with Martin Heidegger's being-in-the-world. This chapter asks what it means when artists formally assert themselves within the twenty-first-century mess. The Sydney-based art group Slush and the exhibition *Anti-Social Sculpture* are used as case studies to unpack creation and research strategies. The installation and sculptural matter analysed exemplify how the physicality of art manifests itself from the locus of the material worlds that artists dwell in today, which are built on and informed by history, and which are equally subject to *being*. The chapter's discussion evokes the aesthetic philosophy and political ontology of Gilles Deleuze, Félix Guattari and other post-Marxist enquirers, and posits that these contemporary projects operate on an affective[2] register by way of resistance to the present, thereby reaching towards difference in form.

This chapter begins by laying foundations with speculation on what "the mess" looks like, before moving to case studies of the art projects of Slush and *Anti-Social Sculpture*. Two Deleuzo-Guattarian concepts—namely, "difference" and "resistance to the present"—are the key theo-

retical rubrics explicated to reveal the workings of the art projects. At the same time, I show how the artworks oxygenate these concepts. My use of difference is taken from the chapter of the same name from Deleuze's metaphysical opus *Difference and Repetition*, and resistance to the present is taken from the chapter "Geophilosophy" in *What Is Philosophy?*, which was co-authored with Félix Guattari. While these concepts might appear less political than others (including those stemming from *Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, for example), they are clear through-lines in Deleuze and Guattari's oeuvre and harbour a capacity for abstraction that allows for their application as aesthetic philosophy and political ontology. To introduce "difference" and the "new", a rudimentary but helpful diagram by Daniel W. Smith can be used: Being = Difference = the New[3].

In his essay "Deleuze and the Production of the New", Smith maintains that Deleuze's "being" is a "real" experience of living in the world—stripped back of all semblances, simulations and distractions—in which one experiences difference, which, by its nature, is new. To analyse West's correlation of being-in-the-world and being-in-the-mess, two recent world events can be read as examples: first, the Occupy movement and, second, tax havens in the Cayman Islands. Linguist and activist Noam Chomsky sets this scene well in a letter to Occupy. He writes, "Anyone with eyes open knows that the gangsterism of Wall Street—financial institutions generally—has caused severe damage to the people of the United States (and the world). . . . That has set in motion a vicious cycle that has concentrated immense wealth, and with it political power, in a tiny sector of the population, a fraction of 1%, while the rest increasingly become what is sometimes called 'a precariat'—seeking to survive in a precarious existence"[4].

West, a philosopher and Princeton University professor, was arrested twice during the Occupy protests that spread from Zuccotti Park on Wall Street to downtown New York. He was not the only public intellectual to be arrested in support of the protests targeting the greed of the so-called one percent: feminist Naomi Wolf was also cuffed. Furthermore, other celebrities attended and showed support for the international movement, including Slavoj Žižek, Julian Assange, Alec Baldwin, Lupe Fiasco, Michael Moore, Roseanne Barr, Susan Sarandon and even a silent Kanye West, whose attendance created a special whirlwind in conservative media coverage.

Another symptom of the mess was uncovered in July 2012 by the *Guardian* newspaper, informing us that things were far worse than official statistics had previously shown. An estimated $21–32 trillion was revealed to be stored illegally in tax havens of the Cayman Islands and Switzerland, which equalled, at the very least, the combined GDP of the United States and Japan. The author of the *Guardian* report, James Henry, estimated that just 92,000 people, roughly 0.0001 percent of the world's population, owned about $9.8 trillion of these funds[5].

The above-mentioned list of visiting celebrities is noteworthy because it illustrates an example of what Franco Berardi calls "Semiocapitalism". Semiocapitalism is a condition that the Italian Marxist philosopher would argue is that in which all of us live—that is to say, a regime characterized by the fusion of media and capital[6]. It follows, then, that a lack of criticism of mainstream media and its favoured mode of communication (i.e., the spectacle) are the bulwarks of old forms, philistine tradition and anti-difference. During the height of Occupy's coverage in 2011, the notoriously right-wing Fox News spun profiles of celebrities, including one of Kanye West, attending Occupy as efforts not to show support, but instead to perform acts of self-promotion, while only pretending to care for the cause. Fox and other mainstream U.S. media also falsely reported that the protests were 99 percent white, as if to create fissures in the protests, or at least in the media representations of them. (Indeed, for how many watching could these two appear to be the same thing?) Fusions of media and capital have the power—if they are not resisted—to keep us in a circle-pit of cognitive progress and creativity, leading nowhere different or new. This metaphor of a circle-pit, for anyone who did not grow up going to punk and grunge concerts, is a type of moshing also known as a "circle of death", in which a clearing is haphazardly created in the crowd so that members can enter and run around in circles, often with violent overtones. It was the belief of Berardi's teacher, Félix Guattari, that only in a "post-media condition" can we have the chance to be released into a time of post-postmodernity. Guattari writes in *The Three Ecologies*, "An essential programmatic point for social ecology will be to make the transition from the mass media era to the post-media age, in which the media will be re-appropriated by a multitude of groups capable of directing its re-singularization. Despite the seeming impossibility of such an eventuality, the current unparalleled level of media-related alienation is in no way an inherent necessity"[7]. While there are many ways to examine Occupy, I have noted this visual coverage as interesting because although the Occupy movement consisted of protests of the masses, the multitude, the poor and the 99 percent, it was the moments of celebrity support that the media covered most widely and visually. I want to use these celebrities here as examples of non-difference; their faces are recognizable clichés and repetitions. Easy to digest on videotape, they have power, prestige and what is most essential: namely, the agency to make stories proliferate, agency that the 99 percent does not have. The Semiocapitalist distraction continues.

A concern with agency is a re-trending term in art-world vernacular. As defined by curator Lars Bang Larsen in a talk at Documenta 13 in 2012, "Agency is the 'thing' a thing has, that which enables something to happen". He says—and I note here that this is another example occurring in current commentary focused on the global market—"Today we lend a great deal of agency to the market, we say 'the market is confident' or 'the

market is nervous.' A garden pond also has agency, as an assemblage, it has the agency to contain an ecosystem. The agent is the intervener or catalyst that is part of any adaptive system producing events and affects"[8]. This reading of agency intersects with philosopher Manuel De Landa's developments of Deleuze's thinking with respect to notions of assemblages and what he terms Deleuze's "new materialism". De Landa thinks that the materialist sees the world as more complex than a mere set of totalities made up of a sum of parts. The temporalities of assemblages are precarious and informed by the observation of processes external to the mind—for instance, tectonic process, evolutionary process and so on. De Landa posits that the materialist does not stand for abstract notions such as "letting the market decide" or the concept of "the state". These are the trappings of language: "the market" is too vague; we need, instead, to observe every complex market unto itself. To give a large, vague "market" particular emphasis or power is irresponsible[9]. De Landa holds that the world lived in is structured by language—structured only by human knowledge, which is obviously limited and faulty. This is why a volatile and changeable materiality is allowed to do the talking (so to speak) in the case studies that are to follow.

The group of emerging Sydney artists Slush was conceived in light of the fact that we had very little agency. We were not exotic, and we did not have any money or "agents" in the art world to make things happen. It is by way of this open, nothing-to-lose approach that we produce non-didactic critiques of present forms and wander into the unknown. Slush mixes cheap and ready-to-hand materials with art training for a process-based practice. A statement by the group reads, "Slush is the process of melting and re-solidifying five Sydney based sculpture and installation practices, it is an experimental group interested in the event and multiplicity of events that take place as precursors to form being established and artwork asserted. Art practice here is not allowed to be an artist's provincial abode or far away place, but present, in dialogue, challenging and changing others"[10].

In June 2012, we showed our work in the exhibition *Slush*, which consisted of process-based sculptures contributing to an installation of spotted matter. In the associated catalogue essay, Mathew Abbott wrote, "Their question is not quite how to resist the slushiness of being, how to hold onto objects such that they remain substantial, ordered, trustworthy, solid. It is not about how to escape the slush, but how to get into it in the right way. They are themselves metaphysical problems, problems that are also always already political and economic. The aesthetic and ontological status of these wavering problematic events is ambiguous, which is only fitting, considering the historical novelty of the situation unfolding (melting) around us"[11].

The processes of Slush actively turn it away from the art market and the larger world market to which the former is inextricably linked. Slush

Figure 8.1. ***Untitled*, Slush, Firstdraft Gallery, 2012. Courtesy of the artist.**

refuses to give the market *sensus communis* (that is, an ability for good judgement), for it is not a human, but rather a set of arbitrary agents, that has a history of failing us (the continuing global financial crisis discussed earlier is a case in point). Through Slush's process of melting five practices into one, the group is de-branded, skills and dialogues are shared and, perhaps most significantly, the advice of Marcel Duchamp is taken as the group prioritizes, amusing itself first with the forms it makes. Materiality is present in Slush, rather than dissolved, or it is stated as an

open-ended uncertainty[12], the latter being more aligned with the overstaying party guest of the 1990s, "relational aesthetics" (RA)[13]. In the case of Slush, political content is the presence of form rather than its lack. Gestures of relation do not extend outward into participatory events with audiences, but the artists take on the sole role of relations—a hubristic or needed move in the midst of the RA hangover. In its 2012 exhibition, Slush published an artist book, featuring works of its members, an essay from Mathew Abbott and a poem by Astrid Lorange. The content and design worked collectively to form meetings between images and text that emphasized a productive confusion between process and finished form. The aim of the book and the installation, viewable in figure 8.1, was to rupture anticipatable outcomes. In the installation view seen in figure 8.2, the forms are marked by a lack of finish, problematizing the accepted material thresholds of artworks. In the words of philosopher Claire Colebrook, "to do violence to the cliché"[14] is the fundamental design of Deleuze's oeuvre, the varying waves of which travel over the course of a life's work. This is why it is important to acknowledge some of Deleuze's most frequently referenced terms, such as "affect" and "lines of flight", which have become dulled through overuse. It is the case that without original explications, they read as clichés themselves. This happens with terms that, by definition, are assigned the task of wresting poetic or rebellious art from linguistic representation. This is exemplified, perhaps, by "slippage", a term that recently reached its worldwide peak usage in art gallery press releases, describing otherwise indescribable things, spaces, happenings and gesture, which are said to exist in between other, more describable things. Such terms that can first appear as alluring solutions, providing words for metaphysical problems, become clichéd with each repetition. This chapter does not move to deny such issues, but rather approaches their complexity through a material examination.

A 2013 Slush work, *Spirit Level* (figure 8.2), was part of an installation that resembled parts of a house abstracted from function: its physicality, one large vulnerable pane of glass, is held in place by two clamps at the bottom. The form of this precarious assemblage embodies its uncertain threat, its potential for chaotic re-singularization. In the case of a slight movement, the glass's breaking could exact harm on a viewer's body. The abstract house is set up to produce affective potential. I would say affect here is not dissimilar to Deleuze's difference, as both are fleeting and constantly slipping through fingers: as soon as they begin to be understood, they start to disappear. But for art practice, if there is something latent, some content lying in wait, then there can be an edge that will refuse to be pinned down. This is one thing Slush works with: these inexplicable things that we hold onto that are unresolved in our minds. Henri Bergson wrote on perception, "[T]he eye only sees what the mind is ready to comprehend"[15]. Slush extends this thought to say: every recognizable signifier can act to reduce a "thing"—in our case, art—down to

Figure 8.2. ***Spirit Level*****, Slush, 2013. Courtesy of the artist.**

the status of a commodity along with an attributable value. This is an undercurrent of the work; like its name, the process of Slush is messy and complicated, concerned with what a collaborative material practice can say about the world. "Being-in-uncertainties"[16] is an even more recent take on Heidegger's world from the author of *Neomaterialism*, Joshua Simon. Simon's uncertain place is a scene of debt finance, where the commodity is the historical subject and no art practice can escape its beginning without consumption. To simultaneously open up and trouble this position, the final analysis here is an examination of an exhibition that is not yet of the world, but is directly concerned with new materialism's obsession with commodities and its references to historical materialism. *Anti-Social Sculpture: The Energy Scam of the Western Man* is a premonition of an exhibition that may never take place, precisely because of the institutional critique and resistance to the present that is its structure. A statement by curator Jack Jeweller reads as follows: "It is a response by way of exhibition-making and publishing to the ideological content of Joseph Beuys' discourse of Social Sculpture and his tour/action 'The Energy Plan for the Western Man.' Each artist contradicts the edifying thrust of social sculpture, practising within a paradigm of, either: (i) institutional critique

(ii) post-conceptual art (iii) creative dissent and (iv) *lumpen* criminality—in the Sadean tradition—that explores criminal behavior within the social organism"[17].

For *A Dozen Roses* (figure 8.3), artist Marco Fusinato takes on Beuys's original work *We Don't Do It Without the Rose* (1972). The artist purchases twelve roses and takes them to a commercial photographer, who captures the flowers separately as if for an advertisement. Here the ambivalent gesture of commodification is the active re-presentation of the original work. We find the shamanic symbolism versus easily bought sentiment as the loci of resistance. Jeweller writes, "[T]he photographs empty out the history of Beuys' original, and uses the hollowed out form of the work to critique the commodity nature of contemporary art, while Fusinato is himself as complicit in the same contradiction that Beuys was as a shaman/messiah"[18].

For the works *Marble Table* and *Unstable Table* (figures 8.4 and 8.5), two similar sculptures have the physical appearance of tables but do not function as such. The work seeks to inspect the unstable, often assumed ability of language to understand actual things. That *Unstable Table* may fall should something of weight be placed on it; it can be seen with the angles of the mismatched legs, some made from spray-painted cheap pine and others from an untreated branch straight from a tree. The latter makes a further pun on the origin of the object's elements—the tree is pulled into the artwork in a highly treated way as well as in the most honest way possible. *Marble Table* was constructed from the same plywood and pine, but the legs have been skilfully turned and the wood has been stained and varnished to look like a more expensive, higher-quality piece. The title comes from the marble piece lying flat on the table and its semblance that sits on top, which is an exact photograph of the marble floating in acrylic such that it also replicates its dimensions. This enables a suspension of understanding for most viewers until they spend some time with the work, looking at it from multiple angles to discover the real material.

Here, we find Heidegger once again intersecting with Deleuze, as both philosophers say that we cannot really know things in themselves. "We cannot grasp at the essence of the table". Heideggerian and object-oriented ontologist Graham Harman has articulated a position not far from De Landa's earlier one; he claims that the power of the mind to know the world is outrun by knowledge embedded in external systems (e.g., environmental ecologies, tectonic systems and dark matter). In a work titled *Anna Schwartz beyond the White Cube* (2010) by the Gives Collective, the door of the prestigious Melbourne Anna Schwartz Gallery is adorned with a long chain of frankfurter sausages that hang on the door handle and extend down the stairs onto the exclusive gallery street of Flinders Lane. By literally connecting the frankfurters to the gallery, the artists physically position their belief that the culture industry is a sausage factory. The artists of the Gives Collective describe themselves as

Figure 8.3. Marco Fusinato, Rose #11 from *A Dozen Roses*, 2006, digital type-C photograph on Fuji Crystal Archive paper. Courtesy of the artist and Anna Schwartz Gallery.



Figure 8.4. Marian Tubbs, *Marble Table*, 2012. Courtesy of the artist.

"using political, conceptual slapstick performance, and intervention to critique the rhetorical dross that clothes the naked emperor of the contemporary culture industry"[19]. Mexican artist Karmelo Bermejo's *Postcolonial Layer* (circa 500–300 BC–2011; see figure 8.6) examines the mismanagement of cultural conservation and funding by exhibiting sculptures and installations that execute institutional and cultural critique. Here we see a pillaged pre-Columbian artefact acquired with public money at a European auction, the artefact dated circa 500–300 BC. Yet, for absurd museological display reasons, it has been artificially aged with patina. Bermejo strikes at the terribly negligent institutional practice he is faced with by exhibiting the work, which is unchanged, thereby allowing the criticism to be read in his visual display coupled with the discursive title.

It is Félix Guattari's feeling that only a critical engagement with the present state of things is capable of producing an eternal return to a nascent state, a state that is not fully in existence, not a form yet set, but the beginning of a display of future potential. Prior to the media-dominated socializing of Web 2.0 and smartphones, the prophetic concept of "Resistance to the present" was illustrated by Deleuze and Guattari in *What Is Philosophy?*: "We do not lack communication. On the contrary, we have too much of it. We lack creation. We lack resistance to the

Figure 8.5. Marian Tubbs, *Unstable Table*, 2012. Courtesy of the artist.

present. . . . Europeanization does not constitute a becoming but merely a history of capitalism, which prevents the becoming of subjected people" (WP 108)[20]. "Difference" and "resistance to the present", for Deleuze and Guattari, concern a rising up and dissolving of known forms[21]. To rise up and dissolve the form sees the philosopher's political ontology quite metaphorically raise its head. It also shows the question of becoming as an inherently revolutionary and critical practice, whether enacted aesthetically or politically. The projects of Slush and *Anti-Social Sculpture* work with strategies of resistance in creating specific differences[22]. While clearly aesthetic visual art forms, they share a direct indexical relationship with activism. Slush and *Anti-Social Sculpture* do not try to fix or tidy up the mess, shade it in a different light or ignore it. Their thought is to critique the mess of the present from within. Consequently, "difference" is not rare when artists and viewers make efforts to recognize its manifestations. A thrust of this chapter is that whimsical, disruptive and difficult

Figure 8.6. ***Postcolonial Layer*****. Pillaged pre-Columbian artefact acquired with public money at a European auction, subsequently covered in a patina of fake antiquity, dated circa 500–300 BC and artificially aged with patina, 2011. Courtesy of Karmelo Bermejo, www.karmelobermejo.com.**

artistic acts are positioned well to achieve this. A philosopher who would have been sympathetic to the aesthetics of the mess, who even dedicated his opus *Aesthetic Theory* to the oeuvre of Beckett, is Theodor Adorno. To close, I recall a statement that reads well as a rejoinder to the statement that we began with: "Under the conditions of late capitalism, the best art, and politically the most effective, so thoroughly works out its own internal contradictions that the hidden contradictions in society can no longer be ignored"[23]. In the examples used, for Slush and *Anti-Social Sculpture*, the "thoroughly working out" is understood as exposing, dialoguing with, categorizing and exhibiting the mess. It is their utilization of "precariat" aesthetics, of volatile materiality, that draws on the mess rather than cleaning it up or surrendering it to a Manichaean perspective on the purpose of art.

NOTES

I would like to acknowledge the artists of Slush and the artists who made the work discussed. Dorian Batycka, Dr Antonio Calcagno, Jack Jeweller and Dr Astrid Lorange are to be thanked for their generosity of thought.

1. Tom Driver, interview with Samuel Beckett, *Columbia University Forum*, Summer 1961, 21–25; reprinted in *Samuel Beckett: The Critical Heritage*, ed. L. Garver (London: Routledge, 1978), 218–19.

2. The notion of affect I refer to is related to the Deleuzian understanding inspired by Baruch Spinoza: "affects", according to Deleuze, are not simple affections; they are independent from their subjects. Artists create affects and percepts. This is related to creativity to a greater degree than the definition belonging to psychology: "Affect is a key part of the process of an organism's interaction with stimuli" (APA, *Dictionary of Psychology* [Washington, DC: APA, 2010]). Contemporary Deleuzian Suely Rolnik has developed this concept further with the help of neuroscience to say that affect occurs within our subcortical capacity; it allows us to apprehend the world as a field of forces that affect us and themselves present in our bodies in the form of sensations. The exercise of this capacity is disengaged from the history of the subject and of language. See Suely Rolnik, "The Geopolitics of Pimping", in *Critique of Creativity*, ed. Gerald Raunig and Gen Ray (London: Mayfly Books, 2011), 26.

3. Daniel W. Smith, "Deleuze and the Production of the New", in *Deleuze, Guattari and the Production of the New*, ed. Simon O'Sullivan and Stephen Zepke (London: Continuum, 2008), 152.

4. Noam Chomsky, letter to Occupy, September 27, 2011, http://www.digitaljournal.com/article/311959 (accessed January 14, 2014).

5. James Henry, "13Tn Hoard Hidden from Taxman by Global Elite", *Guardian*, http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2012/jul/21/global-elite-tax-offshore-economy (accessed January 14, 2014).

6. For further reading, see Franco "Bifo" Berardi, "Market-Ideology, Semiocapitalism and the Digital Cognariat", in *Public Netbase: Non Stop Future, New Practices in Art and Media* (Frankfurt: Revolver—Archiv fur aktuelle Kunst, 2008).

7. Félix Guattari, *The Three Ecologies* (London: Althone, 1989), 61.

8. Lars Bang Larsen, "Documenta 13 Video Glossary", 2012 Kassel, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=25OSLW7UMBU (accessed January 14, 2014).

9. European Graduate School, Manuel De Landa, "Deleuze and the New Materialism", online lecture, 2009, www.egs.edu/faculty/manuel-de-landa/videos/deleuze-and-the-new-materialism (accessed January 14, 2014).

10. Slush, *Slush* (Sydney: Firstdraft, 2012).

11. Matthew Abbott, "All that is solid melts into slush", in *Slush* (Sydney: Firstdraft, 2012).

12. As Claire Bishop presented in her piece of critical reception, "Antagonism and Relational Aesthetics", *October*, no. 110 (Fall 2004): 54–59.

13. The term coined by curator Nicholas Bourriaud in 1996 for an exhibition entitled "Traffic", which was followed by his 1998 book called *Relational Aesthetics*.

14. Claire Colebrook, "The Joy of Philosophy", in *Deleuze and the Contemporary World*, ed. I. Buchanan and A. Paar (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 206), 224.

15. Henri Bergson, *Mind-Energy: Lectures and Essays* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1975), 262.

16. Jack Jeweller, statement on *Anti-Social Sculpture* supplied to author, August 20, 2013.

17. Gives Collective, statement from artist press release supplied to author, July 31, 2012.

18. *Ibid*.

19. "Utopia is not a good concept because even when opposed to history it is still subject to it and lodged within it as an ideal or motivation" (WP 108).

20. Form distinguishes itself from matter or the ground but not the converse, since the distinction itself is a form. In truth, all forms are dissolved when reflected in this rising ground. It has ceased to be the pure indeterminate that remains below, but the forms also cease to be the coexisting or complementary determinations (see DR 40–41).

21. Larger and metaphysical difference implicates, relatively speaking, the general and the abstract.

22. See Theodor Adorno, *Aesthetic Theory* (London: Routledge, 1984), 227.

23. Distrusting expectations that art should do something, either be ameliorative or perpetuate good rather than evil. Idealistic thinking, which some might prefer to believe was defeated when post-modernity allegedly subsumed modernity.

NINE

Transversal Television: For Guattari, by Kafka

Gary Genosko

> A heap of stones is not a machine, whereas a wall is already a static proto-machine, manifesting virtual polarities, an inside and outside, an above and below, a right and left.
>
> — Félix Guattari[1]

Guattari's "Project for a Film by Kafka", translated by Jakub Zdebik for *Deleuze Studies* in 2009, is based on a series of notes for an unrealized project. We know that Guattari was fascinated with Kafka's dreams; he collected and numbered them, commenting that they "engage the most diverse and heterogeneous semiotic means: those of theatre, dance, cinema, music, plastic forms, and once again, to be sure, writing!"[2] Moreover, these dreams are "open, machinic indices" consisting of literary and schizo-analytic machines; they are open in "how they have fertilized and broken such and such semiotic or behavioral chains"[3]. A machinic dream interpretation follows the de-territorializing line and its sputtering flows of particle-signs.

François Dosse[4] reminds us of another Guattari: an inventive curator—although the heavy lifting was done by Yasha David[5] —of multimedia exhibitions, a "Kafka event" on the occasion of the hundredth anniversary of his birth, mounted in the summer and fall of 1984 at the Centre Pompidou in Paris. In this exhibition we find dream texts, dream theatre courtesy of Philippe Adrien, seminars and dream cinema (by François Pain, a good friend of Guattari and a key connection to his visual production). It may be said without exaggeration that Guattari never stopped working on Kafka, who was, after all, his favourite author (AOP 146).

There is, however, a semiotic mode at issue: cinema. To the existing relation of Kafka and minoritarian becoming in a literary key, Guattari adds a cinematic project that passes *through* television. What he envisaged was a made-for-television film in the form of a cultural series that would help to fund the final film project. His ideas were quite practical, since he wanted to attract funding and engage a professional production team.

Project for a film *by* Kafka? Guattari's emphasis is deceptively simple. The affects with which Kafka wrote may live in film and television because they are independent and survive their author, remaining available for "non-human becomings" (WP 173) of readers to come: "artists are presenters of affects, the inventors and creators of affects. They not only create them in their work, they give them to us and make us become with them" (WP 175).

The question is: Does minor cinema assist us in conceiving of a "minor", transversal Guattari TV? For Guattari, minor cinema precipitates minor becomings (practical enrichments of schizo desire) in the mass, just the sort of people he wanted to reach through his participation in *Le Siècle de Kafka*. And to become minor is not to be in a minority or the representative of a minority, or even to formally acquire the characteristics or status (what we call "identity") of a minority through some affiliation. It is not a question of mimesis or membership, but of how to produce becomings that might summon a people with whom minor cinema connects. Guattari thought that anti-psychiatric cinema worked in this way, reaching the uninformed and misled, and changing the way they thought of and connected to madness. The fundamental theoretical problem is what it means to summon a new people without teleological or messianic politics. But the semiotic is also hybrid, for the film at issue involves television. Television was a transitional medium in Guattari's search for a potential public, a public yet to come, with which he attempted to connect through minor Kafka becomings, engaging sensibilities not yet fully entangled within dominant normative modelizations, assembling Kafka affects that connect across existing strata and blend with real material fluxes, intervening in and resisting stolid representations, enriching flight paths of singularization and auto-modelization. Guattari[6] wrote in the exhibition catalogue of reaching the processual dimension of Kafka's polysemiotic productions, especially the a-signifying lines of flight of a dynamic primary process beyond the manifest texts and facts.

Throughout his writings, Guattari's sense of television is often confined to a scene of decoding, to an existential territory bathed in the blue glow of the screen—a vivid machinic assemblage of subjectification and flickering sensory affects of all sorts. At the same time, it needs to be kept in mind that Guattari was no stranger to mass television, appearing on it over the course of his career a number of times, but his attitude towards the medium was often linked to becoming stupid: "I watch tv like every-

body else. I'm just as dumb, no question about it" (commenting on the first Gulf War)[7]. Yet he insisted that one has to watch it but without becoming trapped in its "infernal circle".

Television emerges as a protagonist in its own right in Dosse's biographical account, just as powerful as any drug, as it drags Guattari along in the wake of its transductive detritus. Guattari is no video Buddha before the screen; he is an idiot, a catatonic. Dosse shows him to be hunkered down before the screen night and day, "gaping" as the box aggressively addresses its solitary viewer: a solitude machine. Guattari's daughter Emmanuelle has noted, however, that intellectually "he never stopped, even while he was in front of the television" (D 427). The blue hole of subjectification—television—typically exerts a strong fascination by neutralizing becoming and blocking minoritarian proliferations. By listening to his daughter, it becomes evident that Guattari never let go of mutant lines of flight.

What I wish to reach in this chapter is an understanding of Guattari's ambivalence about television and his desire to work in it by first appreciating the limits of transferring the principles and goals of minor cinema to it. A second task is to find the most appropriate model of television to explain this ambivalence. Rather than taking the route of connecting minor with autonomous media experimentation, such as the bold example of Telestreet (or Telestrada), which, by teaching many "how to do television", made it minor and culturally and politically liberatory (to borrow an expression from Franco "Bifo" Berardi), I turn elsewhere. Instead, the long-standing but recently renovated idea of the *télé-auteur* working in a creative capacity for the small screen has been in circulation in Europe for many decades, and has recently found a new place in discussions of American specialty cable networks and select series. Although Guattari (DYW 152) expressed misgivings about the development of cable channels in the context of "capitalist eros", noting that "nothing guarantees us that what they will develop . . . will not be even more reactionary than what is broadcast by national television", and although he did not witness the blossoming of the cable universe and its passage into territories of art and new assemblages of subjectification, I suggest that his "Project for a Film by Kafka" is closest to auteur TV. Of course, I stake this claim with the proviso that the figure of the *ciné-auteur* is limited, as Guattari was prepared to eschew the signature style of a master for the sake of collective, even anonymous, and more participatory do-it-yourself aesthetic production, and for ethically and politically committed documentary work (one of his exemplars in this respect was Sato Mitsuo, director of *YAMA: An Eye for an Eye* [1985], about a Yakuza-controlled slum in Tokyo). However, with these provisos in mind, it is productive to grasp the incredible care for content and detail of execution that is found in Guattari's "Project" outline as fundamentally different from tactical media and closest to the auteur TV model while not being divorced from the

minoritarian becomings of cinema. The cerebral and abstract qualities of Guattari's "Project" (the emphasis on the wall and faciality), however, as well as the expressionistic elements that he links together in a series of highly austere shots, are punctuated with comic moments, imagistic fragments and incomplete dialogue. It is this kind of content and aesthetic that evokes modernism and the auteur—not bastardized, but shrunk to the size of the small screen. Guattari's "modernism" with respect to painting has been well documented[8], and it is linked not to a flight from art institutions (anti-art) but to a return to them in order to initiate a search for subversive singularizations. Hence, television, despite itself (and its low intellectual standing), remains on the Guattarian agenda.

A further issue may be flagged at the outset of this investigation: the displacement that Guattari operates of the auteur-author-personal directorial style from himself to Kafka—not the author and his intentions, but an assemblage of autonomous affects that Guattari attempts to respectfully gather in his "Project" and to connect with a potential viewership.

AUTEUR TV

The Centre Pompidou Kafka centenary event is instructive because it tells us that Guattari's ambition as a cultural *animateur* was referenced to large public arts institutions with national and international profiles. He was not toiling in obscurity, building a labour of love.

In this respect, I consider the place of Guattari's minor television to be in the arts programming of public or state broadcasters, perhaps even independent commercial interests that develop new projects. But this location should remind us of the mutual imbrication of Guattarian concepts—minorizing the mass or traditional media is cultivating a rhizome in the branch of a tree (that is, one cannot think the minor-micro without the molar-macro). Therefore, one cannot jump the traditional media reference for the sake of independent, autonomous or tactical media (like Japanese micro-TV or Italian Telestrada). Guattari TV, rather, is embedded in the tradition of modernist (and later) experiments with television, from Godard to Lynch, and the intellectualism (the *Grands Entretiens*) and multiple aesthetics of the Institut National de l'Audiovisuel (INA). The INA has a long tradition of co-production with public broadcasters around the world as well as with private and public specialty channels such as Sundance in the United States and ARTV in Canada; moreover, it engages in extensive preservation activities and software development and training.

The signature of "Guattari" may have been enough to participate in the *télé-auteur* model of "creative television" in France[9]. Thus, "auteur TV" was a likely model, and he would have been familiar with the idea of seeking something along the lines of an INA commission for his project

(the INA ceased *producing* television in the 1980s, so it is doubtful that he would have made it under the wire), or at least a co-production agreement between a sponsoring producer and a commercial channel with a legally mandated requirement to assist national film production. Guattari would have joined filmmakers like Raul Ruiz and Eric Rohmer, who had found the little screen much to their liking; he also liked the new opportunities it afforded in terms of distribution in a changing technological environment: "TV is seen as a lifeline of cinema rather than as a proverbial Cain"[10]. Indeed, Guattari did not rehearse the traditional split between cinema and television, but recognized how the former had absorbed the latter, even if the motivation (commercial) was largely unpromising (DYW 152). Yet he hoped for something new, something to come that might renew television from the inside.

Guattari worked with Yasha David on the Kafka exhibition. Here and there he mentions this collaboration, sometimes referring to it as a joint project, and at other times suggesting he had "entrusted" the running of the event to David (RMB 235; O 1). Whatever the case may have been, Guattari also notes in every instance the trouble he experienced with the arts administrators at the Centre Pompidou: "Those in charge at the Pompidou Centre made it so difficult that, on several occasions, we thought we would have to abandon the project" (RMB 235). So, Guattari, in a very Kafkaesque manner, plugged into a bureaucratic machine and came face-to-face with strategies of denial and meta-languages of control and demoralization. One wonders how he would have fared in a highly bureaucratic television environment.

A WALL

"The whole film takes place along a wall", Guattari indicates[11]. Continuing, Guattari explains, "The design and musical unity of this wall should traverse the whole film, the different scenes somehow detaching themselves from it". The scenes are "the wall of the farm at K's arrival; the wall crossed by a fissure of light, indicated by the woman who writes in the night and whom children join; the wall of the inn which Frieda indicates Klamm sleeping; wall along which two children run and 'catch' little Hans; wall of the farm, this time seen from the inside and that will open to let official procession go past". Why a wall? It divides and conceals a mystery, which is later exposed as not so mysterious after all.

The wall is "synonymous with the absence of face and the absence of eyes", Guattari specifies (PFK 154). But we know from Guattari's writing on photography that faces accomplish "existential transferences of enunciation" to viewers[12]. From another perspective, faces are already walls, white or black walls of the signifier. And walls are Kafka materials par excellence: the abstract machine of faciality, as one discovers in Kafka's

"novella 'Blumfield': the bachelor returns in the evening to find two little ping-pong balls jumping around by themselves on the 'wall' constituted by the floor" (TP 169). Guattari immediately considers as an alternative an immobile face shot close-up (augmented by a booming voice) which turns into a wall. Like Keiichi Tahara's photographic de-facing and resurfacing of the celebrity artists who posed for portraits, the face is a wall that might recur and have projected upon it cityscapes and offices, corridors and the like to underline the "whole paranoid, bureaucratic discourse". Guattari also "thought that at a certain moment, this face could perhaps be composed of about forty videos showing the same urban images, a sort of ballet of changing figures, with systems of gliding lines, symmetries, and dissymmetries, rhythms, images that skip, etc." (PFK 155). The face de-composes into a wall, perhaps moving from noisiness to silence; the face is a "megaphone" (TP 179), but the wall may be bounced off of or crashed into or broken through. The wall is a molecularized face, a face of geological strata, cement, moss and the pissing of men.

TV BY KAFKA

The first part of the draft script has four segments. First, a horse-drawn cart races towards a wall and crashes into it. In the second segment, the cart moves in the same way but suddenly stops short of the wall. An explosion of sorts takes place, but it is a dance of peasants in hooded habits like tiny medieval monks. In the third segment, the cart slowly rolls along parallel to the wall; the legs of a young boy hang over the wall. In the fourth segment, two men hail the cart and it pulls over. The legs of the boy go down a ladder.

Guattari breaks the text into images and sounds in describing a series of shots. The first shows the wall as a surface of inscription that is "suggestive" (TP 168) in its "greyish whiteness", an off-white wall; in "double exposure . . . a face in extreme close-up, but that we can barely distinguish. As the camera imperceptibly approaches the wall . . . the face loses its contour, only the fixed eyes and a talking mouth still vaguely appear" (PFK 156). Akin to the face pushed up against the white wall of the breast in nursing (TP 169), this close-up heightens intensity but through a voice that has a "bass tone" and enunciates in a rather didactic way Russian bureaucratic desire in the form of a speech from the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR in January 1937 concerning the treason trial of Karl Radek (PFK 157). Having confessed, Radek rambles on about not defending himself but ensuring that those who have known him for decades recognize the truth of his testimony. This speech is voiced over an "arrhythmic sonic mass" that becomes the wind and then silence. The bureaucratic speech comes in jolts; it is the rhythm of its self-pleasure.

The second shot breaks through the wall with a "fade-in dissolve or another device" (PFK 157). But there is nothing behind it. And nothing changes in the process, as there is no loss of continuity, no change in the intensity of light. Yet, "little by little", a line appears on the horizon—it is a wall that cuts across the shot. The camera jerks several times, and our point of view is of a passenger in a cart pulled by a mule, obstructed by a roughly textured sleeve of an arm and a hand wearing a ring; one of the aforementioned peasants appears, accompanied by K. The first, third and fourth segments contained references to K as well. The Kafka references are numerous but fleeting. Here, Guattari deploys mannerisms in the manner of Kafka's "schizobuffoonery" (KF 80): there is a hand signalling from a window before K's execution (first segment); K finds two old men eating soup in a room at the farm, and they are joined by children (third segment); two old men get up from the table and lead K through the barn door (fourth segment); likewise, two gentlemen functionaries from *The Trial* lead K to his execution (KF 80). The soundtrack is a grinding cart and the mule's steps.

The third image is a series of shots (some establishing, some close-ups) in rapid succession—cart, mule's eyes, hands and so on. Yet "in passing we catch, but very quickly, without really distinguishing what it is: three heads above the wall" (PFK 158). Nothing about sound is indicated.

The fourth shot reveals the cart aligning itself before the three heads: the middle one is higher than the other two and sports a long red beard. K returns, gesticulating with one of the peasants, who refuses to go further. Again, nothing about sound is noted.

Shot five presents a white screen and sounds of the projector. This "dream screen" is not the result of a technical problem as, little by little, Guattari notes, numbers appear, and then, vaguely, the three heads. Together, these constitute a facial unit. One is reminded of how the "Year Zero: Faciality" plateau ends with the question about three states or heads (primitive, Christ and probe): "Must we leave it at that . . . ?" (TP 191).

Shot six brings K back in a long shot in which he turns back to the wall, after advancing towards a "sombre tree", as if looking for the heads, and starts up a conversation with a peasant. A shot from close-up K calls out, "Who was that guy we could see awhile ago above the wall? No answer" (PFK 159). The peasant is not very helpful with any request. Shot seven continues the conversation as the peasant points in the direction in which K came in response to the question about where he can find an inn. The eighth image shows K pissing on the wall. The last image is a fragment involving Frieda and Klamm (from *The Castle*) and a peasant woman who spies on them from the tree. The text breaks off at this point.

THERE IS NOTHING ON TV

Let us say that some people will watch anything, or simply watch, and others will be intrigued by Guattari TV, by Kafka, because the wall gets one dreaming, it operates by drawing one into its own assemblages and in this way summons a viewership, a following. What is it to follow a televisual series? It consists in joining an assemblage by diagramming its potentialities: this wall concerns everyone. This is the kind of catalysis of home viewers that images are good at tripping, even if all this means, at a base level of academic *jouissance*, is citational play of the sort: oh yes, that wall reminds me of the "high white wall" from the first fragment of the eighth octavo notebook, the one that the coachman drives along and notes that its bulges make it "a forehead"[13]; or, isn't the sound of the cart similar to the creaking of a cart in the summer heat in the short fragment "Children on the Road"[14]? Guattari seems to confirm that the televisual cocktail includes hypnosis, distraction and daydreaming. An "attractor" that, in Brian Massumi's words, "induct[s] sensation"[15], oscillates between interesting and boring—not between recognition,which is boring, and uniqueness, which is interesting—and gets one dreaming and running off on tangents and losing focus in a sketchy and dynamic diagram whose intensities at least make available one existentializing function: joining the Kafka assemblage. The diagram would be productive of a new kind of machinic reality: the Kafka literary machine and the Guattari machine dance, conjoined, and "open like a non delimited collection" (AOP 404). Guattari's draft would be then reticent about being converted into televisual formats, and would transmit this, after all he underlines it, coiling it through the drafts and into production and post-production and the broadcast-ready succession of images. But not just this—a certain randomness, too, hard-to-understand bits that seem involuntary alongside the obvious and not-so-obvious references to Kafka texts. These are the non-passive seeds of subjectivity's production before a program that does not feed pap to its viewers but interfaces with them. Guattari was ambivalent about television, and we can sense this in his description of the hypnotic experience of watching. If the hypnotic dimension of this machinic drug trip services mediatic alienation by erecting an artificial neurosis that masks more serious family social problems, then television withdrawal by remote control is the consequence[16]. Yet Guattari wanted to mount a counterexample that would inspire, an extraordinary television that would engage viewers as potential users and makers, in addition to providing impetus for their mobile imaginaries that move towards dismantling the artificial neurosis. This would require seizing upon and redeploying the already permeable television buzz for the purposes of ethico-aesthetic resingularization. It is easy to get lost in this ambivalence and, like my colleague Janell Watson, throw up your hands and ask about a fictional solution: "Where are the independent basement TV sta-

tions such as that imagined in *Wayne's World*?"[17] Indeed, can we imagine transversal TV on YouTube, where the illusion of participation is often too opportunistically framed by feedback in real time? In the age of live audience responses to webcast events, joining the Kafka assemblage might be construed as nothing more than contributing to the feedback loop of cheap content and exploitable data.

Struggling with his own scepticism, Guattari wondered about the prospects for a "person who comes home exhausted, spent after a draining day, who automatically turns on his television" in search of a minor buzz through "another personal reterritorialisation by totally artificial means"[18]. Television interminable. Guattari's television project by Kafka not only is designed to unleash fabulation but also, through television's boring formal machinic effects, implants complex affects not in virtue of representational content alone—although we have seen that this is carefully wrought—but in a way that pours out of the home-viewing situation and that turns its passivity inside out. Guattari's Kafka project is not a spectacularization, but concerns itself with little triggers—intensities, gestures and particle signs—that help viewers put some distance between themselves and television's banal tendencies and strive to exist differently through the "alterification" of joining the Kafka assemblage.

Any link between television and becoming is hard to grasp for a scholarly community that has not wanted to appreciate television's potential. Perhaps the most powerful statement of this suspicion is Maurizio Lazzarato's claim that television produces a subjectivity that neutralizes becoming and blocks minoritarian proliferations[19]. Lazzarato is referring to a mass medium rather than a post-mediatic television, and he echoes Guattari's own comments on the erosion of subjectivity by the former and the need for "aesthetic reappropriation of the production of images, of audiovisual production", in the latter (DYW 134). Lazzarato precludes minoritarian becoming through television.

However, another approach is framed by Massumi as part of a "dynamic midst" of an "event-space"[20]. "Project for a Film *by* Kafka" might diagram the transduction of the general form of Kafka as a collective assemblage into the televisual medium as an idea for a "cultural series". We can only imagine as readers the experience of the arrival of such a series into the living rooms of a people to come, and we can do this with Massumi's help, although his example is a live transmission of the Super Bowl game and ours is a sound stage and set production of a work with an entirely different sensibility. Having scrambled the literary signal of Kafka by running interference through multiple semiotic media, Guattari TV flows into the room through scrambling the already constituted sociohistorical arrangement of the household with its delicate divisions of gender, labour and generation. The series acquires the status as a "catalytic part-subject" by potentializing the homebodies in terms of how they can go about joining the Kafka assemblage; this is not an insect-transform

but an initiation into a not-so-strange universe. Admittedly, this potential is unevenly found in the bodies that would realize it in different ways; indeed, the catalytic part-subject needs a boost, thinks Massumi, because there is typically "nothing on TV", and this makes "distraction . . . more catalytically operational"[21]. The fields of an event's potential are layered with intersecting and overlapping subfields and codes (informal regularities that govern households). The Kafka series becomes through its transmission of images (inductive signs); upon their arrival in new spaces, a re-conditioning of the space takes place. A television broadcast is an extremely complex and variable event; what's on the screen is but a small part (and, frankly, the audience for Guattari TV would be small). The program arrives into a relatively porous space whose entrances and exits are monitored, and enters the mix of a collective assemblage with its coded but open enunciations; this program is only one of many flowing through the home alongside other semiotic transmissions[22].

Let us say that something is on TV, and it's Kafka. But the images are of a wall. Is there a potential public for Guattari TV by Kafka? Will this remain a marginalized broadcast within a sea of banality? For instance, "one is subjected to tv insofar as one uses and consumes it, in the situation of a subject of the statement that more or less mistakes itself for a subject of enunciation . . . one is enslaved by TV as a human machine insofar as the television viewers are no longer consumers or users, nor even subjects who supposedly 'make' it, but intrinsic component pieces. . . . In machinic enslavement there is nothing but transformations and exchanges of information" (TP 458). It is instructive to compare this explanation with another concerning television in *Chaosmosis*.

Guattari TV by Kafka contributes to polyphonic subjectivity production in the manner described in *Chaosmosis* (16ff.). When Guattari wants to embed his theorization of machinic subjectivity production in everyday life, he selects watching television to organize his presentation. His explanation recapitulates an earlier discussion of the same points in an appendix to *Cartographies schizoanalytiques*, but with reference to the red curtain in his apartment, and he softens a somewhat dualistic typology of problematic (fading and thickening) and sensory affects (immediate and perceptible). There is a "complex refrain", Guattari indicates, that holds together diverse components of subjectivation before the television set:

> When I watch television, I exist at the intersection: 1. of a perceptual fascination provoked by the screen's luminous animation which borders on the hypnotic; 2. of a captive relation with the narrative content of the program, associated with a lateral awareness of surrounding events (water boiling on the stove, a child's cry, the telephone . . .); 3. of a world of fantasms occupying my daydreams. My feeling of personal identity is thus pulled in different directions. How can I maintain a relative sense of unicity, despite the diversity of components of subjectivation that pass through me? It's a question of the refrain that fixes

> me in front of the screen, henceforth constituted as a projective existential node. (CH 16–17)

The risk of machinic enslavement that characterized the description of television in *A Thousand Plateaus* gives way in *Chaosmosis* to the problem of assemblage consistency and the role of the refrain. The sensory elements of fascination, of the "gluey" screen to which one may be stuck, and the force of narrative that drags one forward, yet is not so exclusive as to be beyond insistent interruptions of lateral awareness, introduce the scenario and lead into more abstract matters like fantasms that sweep one away. Guattari is a tributary of the figure on the screen because enunciation enjoys a certain autonomy—"my identity has become that of the speaker, the person who speaks from the television"—and the refrain fixes the sensory environment and props up the world of fantasms. This refrain is a "motif" and "attractor" that installs itself in the scene, as if under collective ownership, enjoying both independence from a functional anchor and transversal potential to circulate freely, and it combines the diverse components at play as it marks the existential territory of Guattari as TV viewer. Guattari is no more than a "fluctuating intersection" or constellation of relatively heterogeneous components and inchoate affects held in place by a stabilizing, existentializing refrain, which is a non-ordinary, non-semiotic, repetitive motif (a hypnotic feature), holding together different kinds of worlds (emergent existential territories and universes of reference catalysed by refrains). Refrains help negotiate intra- and inter-assemblage passages. In this example, the refrain owes much to the tone of the voice emanating from the television, which can close down the viewing experience because it is so clichéd or loosen something from the viewer and refresh him or her by helping one move along in some manner. The scenes of reception of television and cinema are quite different to the degree that the complex social semiosis of televisual decoding is, at least in terms of sensory affect, muted by the darkened public space of the theatre, whereas the blue glow of the television screen is a milieu component that becomes purely expressive without any content as it marks a territory of viewing for all irradiated in its range and subjected to its flashes. Turning on a television is an important step in understanding how a territory is built.

CONCLUSION

Transversal television, by Kafka, shows how Guattari was actively thinking through the relationship between his theoretical principles and different kinds of artistic production. While there has been an unfortunate tendency to trap him in the vicissitudes of free radio, this strategy of critique has limited significance[23]. Guattari worked directly with the playwright Enzo Cormann, curators such as Yasha David and filmmak-

ers like François Pain (and planned a film with the aforementioned Tahara), and thought about the need to get involved in television as well, despite his own ambivalence about the medium's role in formatting capitalistic subjectivities.

The example of auteur TV would have been familiar to him, but of limited interest in its pure form of directorial personal signature. However, by displacing the centrality of the director's distinctive vision, but without losing it entirely, Guattari sought in affect the autonomy necessary to stake the claim that his project was *by* Kafka. "*By* Kafka" does not signal another auteur, but rather affect's distance from intention and the contagiousness of its channelling and passage through different media to a potential viewership. A television for a people to come: this, as Zepke rightly insists, is the source of Guattari's modernism. The readiness of this imagined audience to join in the Kafka assemblage through the affects delivered by television is evident in Guattari's sense of himself as a viewer and a tributary of intensities that are not obviously positive or negative, but ambivalently transformative. His is a transductive television that unevenly realizes its capacity to affect viewers with impulses of potentiality that pass through and compete with other transmissions in a porous space of watching.

NOTES

1. Félix Guattari, *Chaosmosis: An Ethico-Aesthetic Paradigm*, trans. P. Bains and J. Pefanis (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995), 42. Hereafter, parenthetically cited as CH.

2. Félix Guattari, "Projet pour un film *de* Kafka", in *Soixante-cinq rêves de Franz Kafka* (Paris: Lignes, 2007), 29.

3. Félix Guattari, *The Anti-Oedipus Papers*, ed. Stéphane Nadaud and trans. Kélina Gotman (New York: Semiotext(e), 2006), 46. Hereafter, parenthetically cited as AOP.

4. François Dosse, *Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari: Intersecting Lives* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), 246ff. Hereafter, parenthetically cited as D.

5. Félix Guattari, "The Refrain of Being and Meaning", in *Soft Subversions*, trans. Jill Johnson (New York: Semiotext(e), 1996), 235. Hereafter, parenthetically cited as RBM. See also Félix Guattari, "Un oubli et un lapsus dans un rêve", *Chimères* ("Les séminaires de Félix Guattari") (October 30, 1984): 1, http://www.revue-chimeres.fr/drupal_chimeres/files/841030.pdf (accessed January 13, 2014). Hereafter, parenthetically cited as O.

6. Félix Guattari, "Kafka: procès et procédés", in *Le Siècle de Kafka*, ed. Yasha David and J.-P. Morel (Paris: Centre Georges Pompidou, 1984), 263.

7. Félix Guattari, "Did You See the War?", in *Soft Subversions*, trans. Andrea Loselle (New York: Semiotext(e), 1996), 139. Hereafter, parenthetically cited as DYW.

8. Stephen Zepke, "Art as Abstract Machine: Guattari's Modernist Aesthetics", *Deleuze Studies* 6, no. 2 (special issue: "Félix Guattari in the Age of Semiocapitalism") (2012): 76–91; and Stephen Zepke, "From Aesthetic Autonomy to Autonomist Aesthetics: Art and Life in Guattari", in *The Guattari Effect*, ed. E. Alliez and A. Goffey (London: Continuum, 2012), 213–14.

9. Susan Emanuel, "Quality, Culture, and Education", in *Television Broadcasting in Contemporary France and Britain*, ed. M. Scriven and M. Lecomte (London: Berghahn, 1999), 86.

10. D. Ostrowska, "France: Cinematic Television or Televisual Cinema: INA and CANAL+", in *European Cinemas in the Television Age*, ed. D. Ostrowka and G. Roberts (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2007), 32.
11. Félix Guattari, "Project for a Film *by* Kafka" (trans. Jakub Zdebik), *Deleuze Studies* 3, no. 2 (2009): 154. Hereafter, parenthetically cited as PFK.
12. Félix Guattari, *Cartographies schizoanalytiques* (Paris: Galilée, 1989), 311.
13. Franz Kafka, *The Blue Octavo Notebooks*, trans. Ernst Kaiser and Eithne Wilkins (Cambridge: Exact Change, 1991), 79.
14. *Ibid*., 3.
15. Brian Massumi, *Parables for the Virtual* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2002), 84.
16. Félix Guattari, "Toward an Ethics of the Media" (trans. Janell Watson), *Polygraph* 14 (2002): 18.
17. Janell Watson, "Guattari's Black Holes and the Post-Media Era", *Polygraph* 14 (2002): 43.
18. Félix Guattari, "Machinic Junkies", in *Soft Subversions*, trans. Chet Wiener (New York: Semiotext(e), 1996), 102.
19. Maurizio Lazzarato, *Les Révolutions du capitalisme* (Paris: Les Empêcheurs de penser en rond, 2004), 165.
20. Massumi, *Parables for the Virtual*, 82ff.
21. *Ibid*., 84.
22. See Gary Genosko, *Remodelling Communication: From WWII to the WWW* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2012).
23. Richard Barbrook, "The Holy Fools: Revolutionary Elitism in Cyberspace", in *Micropolitics of Media Culture*, ed. Patricia Pisters (Amsterdam: University of Amsterdam Press, 2001), 159–75.

TEN

"In Any Event": A "Literary Resonance" between Painting and Architecture

David R. Jarraway

> It is part of morality not to be at home in one's home.
>
> —Theodor Adorno[1]

As a non-relational relationship between various pairs or binaries, the "resonance" that I undertake to explore in this chapter is that between "house" and "home" in the context of American literature—a literature whose eventfulness Deleuze pays especial attention to in *The Logic of Sense* and, along with Félix Guattari, in *A Thousand Plateaus*, *What Is Philosophy?* and elsewhere. The writing of American novelist Joyce Carol Oates provides an initial invitation to take up this resonant eventfulness in the literary context. In one of Oates's most recent fictions, *Missing Mom*[2], the tiny iconographic representation under-pointing each of the novel's five sections appears to be a tiny house, a cartoon-like structure outlined in contrasting black and white with four misshapen holes punched out for windows and possibly a door. Visually, this icon has intimate connections to the title of this particular novel, as cousin Lucille reveals to its chief protagonist, Nikki Eaton, near the end of the story: "Missing your mom can be a place to hide, see? Like that house" (*MM* 393). But the tropology of house and home, particularly in some of its unsafer aspects, has thematic links to other of Oates's recent fiction. In her slightly earlier *The Falls*, for instance, son Royall Burnaby belatedly shudders at the prospect of "liv[ing] with [his mother Ariah] in that narrow cramped house", where his fiancée "would be gobbled up alive,

and made over into a second daughter for Ariah"[3]. With the decidedly unhomely import of its iconography both literally and metaphorically, then, the architecture of houses provides the opportunity for musing about its thematic significance in Oates's own later work, but about the Deleuzian resonance of "home" in relation to modernist painting and architecture in American culture as well.

In *The Poetics of Space*, Gaston Bachelard observes, "There is ground for taking the house as a tool for analysis of the human soul"[4]. Yet in the context of American culture, Emerson gestures towards something intensely problematic about strict demarcations of domestic space. "The experience of creativeness", he remarks in an essay on Plato, "is not found in staying at home, nor yet travelling, but in transitions from one to the other"[5]. Taking Emerson at his word, therefore, in novels like Oates's *Missing Mom*, *The Falls* and, even earlier, *Broke Heart Blues*, in which the strict demarcation of domestic space is troped as "the black hole in the firmament where God used to be"[6], such narratives serve as invitations to explore the deep sense of irony attached to the troping of house and home generally in American fiction. And it is a sense of irony, as I shall argue, that Dorothy's repeated invocation of "no place like home" from *The Wizard of Oz* suggestively endeavours to impart in her own traumatic states of transition throughout much of Victor Fleming's 1939 American film. Yet, long before Oates's fiction and Fleming's film, the writing of Herman Melville serves as the provocation for Deleuze and Guattari to remark that "Everything begins with Houses", and further to suggest that the ironization of the house in American fiction is part and parcel of "a kind of deframing following certain lines of flight . . . in order to open it onto the universe" and thereby "dissolve the identity of the place"—and, by implication, human identity—"through variation with earth" (WP 189, 187)[7]. The fearful mother-daughter likeness in *The Falls* mentioned earlier would appear also to be the occasion for such subjective deframing: "the more we know of each other, the less it signifies" (240). Such subjective deframing thus establishes a considerable "resonance" with the fiction of Pierre Klossowski, whose "entire work", according to Deleuze, "moves to a single goal: to assure the loss of identity and to dissolve the self". Continues Deleuze, "This is the shining trophy that Klossowski's characters bring back from a voyage to the edge of madness. But as it happens, the dissolution of the self ceases to be a pathological determination in order to become the mightiest power, rich in positive and salutary promises" (L 283). If Oates's own recent work can be seen to example the dismantling of identity in resonance with Klossowski, how might this decomposition play itself out more particularly in a narrative like *Missing Mom*?

In a recent essay, Oates remarks, "All my life I've been fascinated with the mystery of human personality. Who are we?—so diverse, yet, perhaps, beneath diversity, so much akin? Why are we here? And where *is*

here?"[8] The placeless sense of mystery surrounding the human personality here accords rather well with David Macey's own Lacanian view of subjectivity as something "non-known" and rather like "an absence" or "a void", an "always-already [] lost object", hence "a mirage of totality"[9]. "Caught between the imperatives of the super-ego and the instinctual demands of the id", Macey observes, "the ego is not, however, master in its own house, and cannot aspire to Cartesian certainties" any longer[10]. Instead, Macey concludes that "the ego is a collage of identifications, the work of a psychic bricolage", and underscores his houseless characterization by emphasizing the ego's inability to exist "in situation", an "abstraction", which therefore "becomes an opaque obstacle to the understanding of concrete subjectivity"[11].

In line with an anti-Cartesian formulation of subjectivity as "a mysterious coherence" or a "Cogito for a dissolved Self" (DR 58), Macey thus nudges us towards the dismantled self in Deleuze and Guattari's *A Thousand Plateaus* whose veritable "becoming" lies precisely in "one who knows how to be nobody, to no longer be anybody. To paint oneself gray on gray" (DR 197). "From Hardy to Lawrence, from Melville to Miller", write Deleuze and Guattari, "the same cry rings out: Go across, get out, break through, make a beeline, don't get stuck on a point . . . *break through the wall* of the signifier . . . toward the realms of the asignifying, asubjective, and faceless" (DR 186, 187, emphasis added). Dismantling Cartesian certainty even further, Oates herself in an earlier essay contends, "It is the *fluidity* of experience and not its Platonic essence that is significant", adding that "identity is not permanent; it is a philosophy of the individual, stubborn, self-reliant, and ultimately mysterious"[12]. In Deleuze's own Lacanian meditation on the mystery of identity, "the paradoxical element or object = x, missing always its own equilibrium", Deleuze, in clear Oatsean fashion, tags that missing equilibrium as a "resonance" somewhere between "excess and deficiency":

> never equal, missing its own resemblance, its own identity, its own origin, its own *place*, and always displaced in relation to itself. It is floating signifier and floated signified, place without occupant and occupant without place, the empty square. . . . It is the phallus which brings about the resonance of the two series that we earlier called pregenital and oedipal . . . [whose] surface nonsense . . . distributes sense to the two series, as something *happening* to the one and something *insisting* in the other . . . [so that] [t]he two series are discontinuous and divergent . . . [whose] excess and lack . . . do not resonate *by* their resemblance, but rather *by* their difference. (L 228)

All of these "resonant" observations would appear to converge in the character of fifty-six-year-old Gwen Eaton, the eponymous "Missing Mom" of Oates's recent novel. In sum, it tells the story of a mother brutally assaulted and left to die in her own home early in the narrative by a

transient petty thief and drug dealer by the name of Ward Lynch whom Gwen had once befriended on one of her community-service forays as part of the volunteer work she had undertaken in the years following her husband's untimely death at age fifty-nine from a heart attack. It is the novel's chief narrator and unattached thirty-one-year-old daughter Nikki who first discovers Mom to be missing and, shortly thereafter, murdered. But the older married daughter, Clare, reluctantly rallies around her younger sister (who will then move from her apartment in Chautauqua Falls back into Mom's bungalow in Mt. Ephraim) in order to dispose of all their mother's worldly goods, including her house, while awaiting the trial of Ward Lynch.

Between the arrest and ultimate sentencing of Mom's vicious assailant, two years transpire, and it is within that time period that the larger mysteries and opacities of Gwen Eaton's motherly character become partially revealed. While it may appear to be the case that Gwen Eaton was living out in widowhood the mostly tranquil and uneventful life she had supposedly enjoyed in blissful domestic partnership with her husband Jon—"She wanted her Nikki to be happy like her Clare and that meant marriage, kids, home. *Family*" (*MM* 25)—the word "*Nice*" (*MM* 34) hardly seems the appropriate construction for capturing "the measure of Mom's life" that Nikki is so insistent upon early in the story, perhaps out of guilt for her own failed attempts at long-term relationships. As the two daughters sort through the things in Mom's house, darker revelations with respect to their mother's personal life begin to manifest themselves: first, according to Aunt Tabitha, that Gwen had from time to time thought of leaving the marriage to her husband of some forty years; second, that, when much younger, she had had a previous sexual relationship with another man by the name of Brendan Dorsey, which had produced a pregnancy (and soon after an abortion that ultimately terminated the relationship); and third, that at an even much younger age, as an eleven-year-old child, Mom had been witness to the death of her own mother, not from some "wasting-away disease", as Gwen was later given to embroider upon this unfortunate event, but rather the grisly death of a suicide, her mother Marta Kovach "having slashed both her forearms with a butcher knife" (*MM* 390).

As cousin Lucille, once again, recounts this grisly circumstance:

> See, it was kept secret. Only just a few people knew. It was such a terrible thing, that woman hurting herself so bad, in such a way, right in her bed, where Gwen was the one to find her. Gwen would never talk about it afterward only just around it, sort of, you know how she was, she'd "talk" with me about it, sometimes. But nobody else. . . . When Gwen was a little girl, her dream was to be married and have her own house. And she'd be so safe in that house! (*MM* 390, 391)

The fact that Gwen Eaton will eventually lose her own life in a very real house ironizes the safety of such domestic settings from a literal point of view to be sure. But if, as Diana Fuss remarks, "literary critics present the house as *nothing other than* subjectivity, [as] a self under construction"[13], from a metaphorical point of view, as readers we are inclined to think that the safe harbouring of subjectivity is likely to be a considerably ironic undertaking to the same degree. As Oates further observes in her *Journal*, while "[t]he obvious motive for much of literature is the assuaging of homesickness, for a place or a time now vanished", "less obviously, the reader kept at a little distance by the writer's coolly crafted 'art'" tells a different story about how unsafe houses can sometimes serve as quasi-extensions of the human self[14].

In a further meditation on this more ironic sense of house and home, Deleuze and Guattari invite us to view the chaos of worldly experience as "an immense black hole in which one endeavors to fix a fragile point as a center" (TP 312). "But home does not preexist", they tell us; "it was necessary to draw a circle around that uncertain and fragile center, to organize a limited space" (TP 310). Deleuze and Guattari continue,

> Sometimes one organizes around that point a calm and stable "pace" (rather than a form): the black hole has become a home. Sometimes one grafts onto that pace a breakaway from the black hole . . . [so that] the point launches out of itself, impelled by centrifugal forces that fan out to the sphere of the cosmos. . . . [In other words,] [o]ne opens the circle not on the side where the old forces of chaos press against it but in another region, one created by the circle itself. As though the circle tended on its own to open onto a future, as a function of the working forces it shelters. . . . One launches forth, hazards an improvisation. . . . One ventures from home on the thread of a tune. (TP 312, 311)

In such terms, the home in American literature ideally bespeaks a state of homelessness—"One launches forth, hazards an improvisation"—or what Fuss once again, in her compelling reading of "The Dickinson Homestead", tags as "limitlessness". Fuss writes, "[Emily Dickinson's] experience of reading [a] letter in [her] room's farthest corner enlarges the speaker, expanding the boundaries of 'narrow wall' and 'narrow floor' to accommodate her limitlessness"[15]. Here, we may recall Gwen Eaton's own insistence on keeping the door to her house's attached garage always open: "A garage door open to the street is like a wall missing from someone's house", daughter Nikki alarmingly remarks (*MM* 279). "In fact", however, as Deleuze and Guattari further observe, "the self is only a threshold, a door, a becoming between [] multiplicities" (TP 249) as it stages its breakaway from the home's black hole in the passage previously cited, thus corroborating their compelling remark in *What Is Philosophy?* that "even houses are drunk and askew . . . like a poem by Emily Dickinson" (WP 164–65)[16]. A further gloss from Emily Dickinson thus

serves to summarize Nikki's missing mom most appropriately: "Peruse how infinite I am / To no one that You—know—"[17].

Now in Joyce Carol Oates, the "no one that You—know—" answers precisely to a "night self" that she riffs off the "interiority" of Edward Hopper's justly famous painting entitled *Nighthawks, 1942*[18]. In a prose meditation on this painting, Oates comments that, as a young teenager, she found this aberrant notion of subjectivity descending upon her, as in Hopper's *Nighthawks*, during "[t]hose long, lonely stretches of time when no one else in the house was awake (as far as I knew); the romance of solitude and self sufficiency in which time seems not to pass or passes so slowly it will never bring dawn"[19]. In clear contrast to the night-self's "mystery in the insomniac night" under the influence of the enigmatic Hopper, Oates pits the very conventional and the very house-bound "day-self": "a 'self' that was obliged to accommodate others' expectations, and was, indeed, defined by others, predominantly adults". Hence, the homeless join between Oates's "night-self" and that identity on the futural and improvisatory side of Deleuze and Guattari's "immense black hole", referred to previously when Oates writes, "*Yes, but you don't know me* . . . in adolescent secrecy and defiance. You really don't know me!" (*Where* 346). In a further meditation on contemporary art, this time on Charles Sheeler, Oates discloses her being overtaken by variations of her very own "night-self" while perusing Sheeler's painting entitled *Upstairs* (1938): "simple geometric figures are so arranged to suggest stairs leading up from a well-lighted room into the darkness of an unseen upstairs—an ominous unknowable future . . . [where] All is still, silent, utterly mysterious. One seems to be gazing upon one's own future" (*Where* 353).

As in the case of this novel by Oates, then, "through the mimetic act of unlocking [an Emily Dickinson] poem", Fuss contends "that readers are invited to discover their [own] unbounded interiority. . . . For Dickinson, the most private spaces are the most public, and hiding is simply the best way to be seen"[20]. "One ventures forth on the thread of a tune", as Deleuze and Guattari might gloss this intermingling of private and public noted previously—the venturing upon "unbounded interiority" here establishing "a sort of *internal resonance*", just as Deleuze describes in *The Logic of Sense* "a forced *movement*, which goes beyond the series [of identities] themselves", and whose "phantasmatic power" or "affective charge . . . is explained by the internal resonance whose bearers are the simulacra" as a kind of Emersonian "decentering of circles" (L 261). And as in the case of this novel as well, Fuss further remarks that "the door in Dickinson's poetry is a completely indeterminate figure", like the "instability" of the human subject itself, and finds further corroboration in the work of German philosopher Georg Simmel "that the door is far superior to the dead geometric form of the wall [since to] Simmel, a wall is 'mute,' but a door 'speaks'"[21].

Thus, in *Missing Mom*, we encounter passages like "*As if we'd been brought to the threshold of a door long locked against us and at last the door has been opened but—what is inside?*" (*MM* 179, italics retained). And because "a door more successfully transcends the divide between the inner and the outer[,] a door [being] where the finite borders on the infinite"[22], windows in Oates's novel take on an added importance with respect to the opacities of human character as well: "We were alone together in the kitchen. Mom was looking so sad, staring out the window at the bird feeder where a swarm of small birds . . . were fluttering and darting at the seed. Yet she didn't seem to be seeing them" (*MM* 38). Oates elsewhere observes, "I spend most of my time looking out the window. (I recommend it.)" (*Faith* 138).

Not unexpectedly, the act of peering out of windows recurs numerous times throughout Oates's *Journal* (see esp. 222, 274, 342, 458 and 490) and could arguably explain her hypnotic attraction to Edward Hopper's painting[23]. As Gail Levin, Hopper's most important biographer, records, "the one important feature" shared between Hopper's artist studio in New York City and his summer home in Truro, Massachusetts, was their "treasured sense of openness—of openness that he could look out on, no matter how small his own interior space might be"—that is, "the kind of view [Hopper] had as a boy in the family house at Nyack [New York] with its unobstructed view of the river down the hill"[24]. I might argue even further that Oates's hypnotic attraction to Hopper's artwork is enormously instructive in helping readers to decode this "outsideness"—"the *amplitude* of the forced movement" of "internal resonance" (L 261, emphasis added)—that is truly "home" in American narrative in broader terms, in view of the obsessive thresholding of doors and windows throughout much of the Hopper portraiture canon[25].

I contend that the epistemological conundrum alluded to previously—"You don't know me, you really don't know me"—accounts precisely for the difference between "house" and "home" in Oates's *Missing Mom* here, and in a good deal of her other later fiction as well[26]. Thus, in a quite unknowing way, the "house" is much like the "territory" that, according to Deleuze and Guattari, "is constantly traversed by movements of deterritorialization that are relative and may even occur in place, [and] by which one passes . . . in order to wed to the Cosmos". To which definition we are perhaps invited to fit the notion of "home": "A territory [] always en route to an at least potential deterritorialization, even though the new assemblage may operate a reterritorialization (something that 'has-the-value-of' home[])" (TP 326). Oates captures a similarly mobile dynamic in her *Journal* that, once again, may be construed as internal resonance's "affective charge" (L 261):

> This way, and then that way; gravitational tugging this way, that way, this way, backward & forward, yearning to be at home & quiet &

> composing my chart of people, as I am doing, yet also wanting (though less powerfully) to be out with my friends . . . and so it goes, and so it's a ceaseless tug-of-war. . . . My God, what a sobering thought. (*Journal* 419)

In *Missing Mom*, therefore, "The secret lives our mothers live" that daughter Nikki remarks upon quite late in the novel (*MM* 388), at least in Gwen Eaton's case, would appear to be mapped precisely along these unhomely and deterritorializing lines of flight—multiple paths by which Mom continues to enlarge her own very mysterious sense of identity in constant Emersonian transit between house and home in her encounter with other people and other places in the larger cosmos that lies beyond. In quite Deleuzian terms, then, house and home are rather like "two series of independent images, whereby the Event [of identity] is disengaged only through resonance of the series [as] in the phantasm . . . to the extent that [the phantasm] makes both series resonate" (L 226). "The event [or identity] to be comprehended", Deleuze explains further, "is no different from the resonance itself (in this capacity it is not confused with either of the two series). In any case, it is the resonance of the two independent and temporally disjointed series that is essential" (L 226).

In any event, self-effacement or self-occlusion or self-opacity, the "internal resonance" underwriting the "missing" in Oates's novel-title and recapitulated in the holes punched out of that iconographic cartoon house continuously underwriting each of its chapter units—this conundrum sets the tone for Oates's treatment of character set against the Deleuzian dynamic of "home" whose "re-distribution of [domestic] space" (TP 312) thus opens onto a new future as a function of the forces it shelters *in potentia*. Under the impress of Mom's secret life—"Even those secrets of Mom's I would never know" (*MM* 401)—it's arguably the especially transitory Detective Strabane investigating Mom's homicide who most visibly enacts this potential deterritorialization, "the movement of the object = x", as Deleuze might say, "the resonance, and the forced movement of an amplitude greater than [his] initial movement" (L 239). In Strabane's to-ing and fro-ing throughout the story, he thus becomes the true catalyst for daughter Nikki's dynamic transformation beyond the self's anchorage within the territory of past time simply by refusing to follow Nikki back into her timeless abode. "Each time you saw me, like around the house", he tells her, "the meaning of me would be lessened. The past would be lessened" (*MM* 423). By eventually removing with Nikki to a holiday in Key West by the end of the novel, and perhaps a more long-time partnership, Strabane hazards an improvisation on customary domestic space in the very way his affecting words to Nikki at the end of the novel predict: "The future becomes wider, see? As the past is lessened" (*MM* 423). Deleuze might conclude that Strabane's "initial movement . . . the movement of Eros, which operates on the intermediary

physical surface, the sexual surface, or the liberated area of sexual drives", only takes us so far. With the further "resonance" of Strabane's deterritorialization, we are offered "the forced movement which represents desexualization" *tout court*—that is, "a forced movement that extends beyond the base and the limits of life, plunging into the [very] abyss of bodies" where "the entire struggle" for human identity is endlessly waged (L 239, 240).

As we take our leave of *Missing Mom*, therefore, what continues to abide at the Eaton residence at 43 Deer Creek Drive is a certain sense of mystery engaged by all its characters. To this extent, an argument for "housing" a novel like *Missing Mom* within a canon of American narrative literature is likely to end up with something quite opposite—an argument, that is to say, whose house-hunting rationale is more likely to be "haunted", ironically, by its very own unhousing. In Oates's own case, this further ironic sense of "home" haunting various of the houses in her recent fiction contributes, undoubtedly, to a kind of Gothicism colouring much of her prodigious fictional canon in works like *Mysteries of Winterthurn* (1984), *Haunted: Tales of the Grotesque* (1994) and *American Gothic Tales* (1996), amongst several others, and perhaps points to the hugely significant Gothic tradition within American narrative particularly, and likely to its importance within other canons of literature more generally.

Earlier, I pointed to a link between Oates and Emily Dickinson in their ironic treatment of house and home. Undoubtedly, a shared sense of the "Gothic" forges an even stronger connection between them, at least in the sense of that term as conceived by Deleuze[27]. "Gothic art" for Deleuze, as Peter Hallward argues, "allowed the emergence of an irregular, mobile and disruptive line, a haptic art, an art of dynamic becomings, of linear connections and disconnections"[28]. And it is impossible not to view these "dynamic becomings" in relation to the deterritorialized "matter-movement" underwriting the "Barbarian Gothic art" of the great Russian director Sergei Eisenstein, and graphically depicted in a photo image from Eisenstein's film entitled *Strike* (1925) as a myriad of its characters are seen to emerge from what Deleuze and Guattari describe as their "holey space" in another clear separation between "home" and "house": "On the one side of the nomadic assemblages and the war machines, it is a kind of rhizome, with its gaps, detours, subterranean passages, stems, openings, traits, holes, etc. On the other side, the sedentary assemblages . . . plug the lines of flight . . . [and] impose upon the connections a whole regime of arborescent conjunctions", and so on (TP 414, 415).

Wholly resistant to such stopped-up and arborescent sedimentation, then, the "holey space" of Gothic in all of its terrifying deterritorialization is clearly no place like home: "not a principle of organization but a means of transportation. No form develops, no subject forms; affects are displaced, becomings catapult forward" (TP 268); hence Oates's own remark that "the gothic mode [provides] the metaphor for all we can't name and

can't bear" in its "mysterious aesthetic bond between pleasure . . . and cruelty" (*Journal* 418). Haunting that mysterious aesthetic, as I have attempted to outline, is the notion of a nameless sense of selfhood—"subjectless individuation", Deleuze and Guattari term it (TP 266)—rigorously installed in Oates's own fictional holey or mad house, where "the essence of sanity", to gloss a further *Journal* entry, lies in our "ability to tolerate openness, doubt, ambiguity" (TP 185). And it is an "ambiguity" that "modernist women writers" especially "try to produce by challenging distinctions between home and world, private and public, self and other, whether they realized it at the time or not"[29]. Nevertheless, because "Gothic" is precisely the term with which American architect Frank Lloyd Wright himself was predisposed to characterize many of his own revolutionary new designs for "Prairie houses"[30], and because "ambiguity" was intended to be the very hallmark of their construction—"Exactly where does the desert floor end and the foothills begin?" Wright's most recent biographers remark[31], going on to say, "It happens so gradually that one can never point to the spot . . . [because] this kind of ambiguity . . . celebrated the blurring of boundaries"—the American architecture of Frank Lloyd Wright may instructively serve to underscore further what is in fact "no place" like home within the narrative *terroir* of a "modernist" like Oates[32].

That significant join between Dickinson and Oates just noted[33], I might conclude, finds a further corroboration in Deleuze and Guattari, as we might expect. In their well-known "Treatise on Nomadology", in which the remarks on Eisenstein's filmmaking appear, Deleuze and Guattari develop further their theory of "Gothic architecture" in much the same terms with which Dickinson and Oates view the mysteries of human identity. For them, "the static relation" of form to matter (or mind to body) gives way, instead, to "a dynamic relation [of] material forces" symbolized by the Gothic "vault", "a series of successive approximations, or placings-in-variation" (TP 364), which perhaps returns us to that "perpetual metamorphosis" of character that Deleuze and Guattari are inclined to link to the "Everything" of "Houses" cited at the outset[34]. And so, I would argue, for the haunted subjects in Oates's later fiction: houseless nomads rather than "universal subject[s] within the horizon of [an] all encompassing Being" that, according to Deleuze and Guattari, "constitutes American literature" itself (TP 379). In an important *Journal* entry, Oates herself writes, "I feel myself at the center of a multitude of 'selves,' of voices. I can be anyone, I can say anything, I can be literally anything. Whatever lends itself to belief . . . on the realistic or mythical level" (*Journal* 110).

Later on in the *Journal*, the novelist is given to remark further upon "[t]he puzzle of identity and personality! There isn't any adjective that I can apply to myself, or to anyone, with confidence. 'Adjectives' are simply fractured viewpoints . . . expressing only the viewer's response. . . .

A veritable logjam of selves, and how to maneuver through them . . . how to navigate . . . negotiate" (343). Ultimately, then, narratives like Oates's *Missing Mom* provoke readers of American literature to query the degree to which its various representations of human identity can ever be dependent upon absolute and total mastery of one's own house. From Hawthorne's *The House of the Seven Gables* through Cather's *The Professor's House* to André Dubus III's *House of Sand and Fog*, can the home truly be where the heart is in American fiction? Is a "House of Fiction", in Henry James's famous phrase, ever a viable notion for conceptualizing a canon of literature in America yesterday and today? In any event, why, in fact, *has* Elvis left the building? Such an "event to be comprehended", I have been arguing, following Deleuze, "is no different from the resonance itself" (L 226); hence, a "literary" comprehension of a quite unusual order to be sure—somewhere "in between" painting and architecture. "In any case", as Deleuze reminds us once again, "it is the resonance of the two independent and temporally disjointed series that is essential" (L 226).

NOTES

1. Theodor W. Adorno, *Minima Moralia: Reflections from Damaged Life*, trans. E. F. N. Jephcott (London: Verso Editions-NLB, 1978), 39.

2. Joyce Carol Oates, *Missing Mom* (New York: HarperCollins, 2005). Hereafter, parenthetically cited as *MM*.

3. Joyce Carol Oates, *The Falls* (New York: HarperCollins, 2004), 298.

4. Gaston Bachelard, *The Poetics of Space*, trans. Maria Jolas and Foreword by Etienne Gilson (Boston: Beacon, 1969), 6. "American writers", Chandler observes, "have generally portrayed the structures an individual inhabits as bearing a direct relationship or resemblance to the structure of his or her psyche and inner life and as constituting a concrete manifestation of specific values", such as "Poe's labyrinthine houses mirror[ing] the twisted minds of his crazed narrators" or "Isabel Archer's conjoined duplex reflect[ing] her ambivalent nature" and so forth. Marilyn R. Chandler, *Dwelling in the Text: Houses in American Fiction* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991), 10 and *passim*.

5. Quoted in David R. Jarraway, *Wallace Stevens and the Question of Belief: "Metaphysician in the Dark"* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1993), 30n10. Oates strikes a peculiarly Emersonian note in her *Journal* when she observes how she also "crave[s] travel" and, by implication, "anonymity": "I really did not want to come home this time. The anonymity of travel beckons me. No mail! No telephone calls! No constant restriction to a few cubic feet of consciousness"; Joyce Carol Oates, *The Journal of Joyce Carol Oates: 1973–1982*, ed. Greg Johnson (New York: HarperCollins, 2007), 80. Hereafter, parenthetically cited as *Journal*.

6. Joyce Carol Oates, *Broke Heart Blues* (New York: Plume, 2000), 92.

7. Although not Deleuzian, Thomas Foster's characterization of the career of female protagonist Janie in Zora Neale Hurston's *Their Eyes Were Watching God* (1932) as "a line of flight [and] access to the world beyond the walls of the private home" nonetheless finds Janie deframing a "falsely universalized femininity" whose domesticity formerly instructed women everywhere "to distinguish interior and exterior spaces and keep them from mixing"; Thomas Foster, *Transformations of Domesticity in Modern Women's Writing: Homelessness at Home* (New York: Palgrave, 2002), 150.

For the historical evolution of the "homely domesticity" within Western culture that ultimately epitomizes "the woman's role in the home" by the turn of the twentieth

century, see Witold Rybczynski, *Home: A Short History of an Idea* (New York: Penguin Books, 1987), 75 and *passim*; and, further, Nora J. Rubinstein for the sometimes "traumatic" implications of such emplacement in "There's NO Place Like 'Home.' Home as 'Trauma': The Lessons of the Unspoken", in *EDRA Proceedings, 24th Annual Meeting* (Oklahoma City: EDRA, 1993).

8. Joyce Carol Oates, *The Faith of a Writer: Life, Craft, Art* (New York: HarperCollins, 2003), 37. Hereafter, parenthetically cited as *Faith*.

9. David Macey, "On the Subject of Lacan", in *Psychoanalysis in Contexts: Paths between Theory and Modern Culture*, ed. Anthony Elliott and Stephen Frosh (London: Routledge, 1995), 75, 77.

10. *Ibid*., 74.

11. *Ibid*., 75, 81.

12. Joyce Carol Oates, *(Woman)Writer* (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1988), 377–78. Undoubtedly, it is this philosophy of the impermanent that provokes Oates in her *Journal* to caution the novelist, as an empirical "observer of facts . . . objective and subjective 'reality'", to "guard against the demonic idea of imagining that he possesses or even can possess ultimate truth". This caution tends further to underscore that "image of mystery" with respect to human identity, a sense of existential vagueness that Oates claims she borrows from Emily Dickinson (xii–xiii).

13. Diana Fuss, *The Sense of an Interior: Four Writers and the Rooms That Shaped Them* (New York: Routledge, 2004), 3.

14. Commenting on a similar distance in Gertrude Stein, Foster notes, "Reimagining domestic space as a site of travel across the distance separating herself and [other], and language as the means of transport, is how Stein defines the hint of 'more' that inhabits 'every space,' the architectural become intersubjective" (Foster, *Transformations of Domesticity*, 142).

15. Fuss, *The Sense of an Interior*, 60.

16. Parallel with Oates, then, "Architecture", for Deleuze, Giuliana Bruno concludes, "and film [as well] are not only sites of movement, but also 'moving' sites. They are doors that create a passage between interior and exterior and windows that open this passage for exploration. In the habit of habitation, they house tangible interactions—passages of private space, itineraries of lived space. As spaces of affect, they are sites of public intimacy"; Bruno, "Pleats of Matter, Folds of the Soul", in *Afterimages of Gilles Deleuze's Film Philosophy*, ed. D. N. Rodowick (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2010), 215. The architectural resonance of 'home' between private and public space I take up in much of what follows in my argument.

17. Fuss, *The Sense of an Interior*, 60.

18. Ivo Kranzfelder, *Edward Hopper, 1882–1967: Visions of Reality* (London: Taschen, 1998), 148–49.

19. Joyce Carol Oates, *Where I've Been, and Where I'm Going* (New York: Plume, 1999), 346. Hereafter, parenthetically cited as *Where*.

20. Fuss, *The Sense of an Interior*, 60.

21. *Ibid*., 43.

22. *Ibid*.

23. Joyce Carol Oates, *Conversations with Joyce Carol Oates*, ed. Lee Milazzo (Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 1989), 175.

24. Gail Levin, *Edward Hopper: An Intimate Biography, Updated and Expanded Edition* (New York: Rizzoli, 2007), 258–59.

25. In the Kranzfelder sampling of Hopper paintings, the following are fairly representative on this point: "Morning in a City, 1944" (51); "Morning Sun, 1952" (52); "Cape Cod Evening, 1939" (96–97); "South Carolina Morning, 1955" (100–101); "High Noon, 1949" (102); "Cape Cod Morning, 1950" (103); "Summertime, 1943" (122–23); "Sunlight on Brownstones, 1956" (129); "Summer Evening, 1947" (156–57); "People in the Sun, 1960" (164–65); and "Rooms by the Sea, 1951" (176).

26. The epistemological conundrum of the "unknown self" is a central claim of Oates's *Journal*: "the wish to *know* and the dread of knowing, that is, *knowing too much*"

(410). Hence, Oates's important self-characterization as "The Invisible Woman" (269). "Invisibility" thus tends to be coordinate with Peter Hallward's suggestion that Deleuze "abandons the category of the subject altogether"—that is, "abandons the subject in favour of our more immediate subjection to the creative life or thought"; Peter Hallward, *Out of This World: Deleuze and the Philosophy of Creation* (New York: Verso, 2006), 163.

27. In *Emily Dickinson's Gothic*, Wardrop underscores a certain "hesitation" in face of the synthesis and integration of human identity coterminous with the "epistemology of Western thought" (108 and passim). "We meet no Stranger but Ourself" is Dickinson's unsettling riposte to such subjective consolidation (quoted on 115). Such hesitation "beyond the pale of [] 'normal' individuation" (Wardrop 195n13) is arguably a Deleuzian formulation in light of my preceding argument, and allows the Gothic project to pass from Dickinson to Oates and beyond in what now follows. Daneen Wardrop, *Emily Dickinson's Gothic: Goblin with a Gauge* (Iowa City: University of Iowa Press, 1996).

28. Hallward, *Out of This World*, 110.

29. Foster, *Transformations of Domesticity*.

30. "In contrast to Renaissance buildings, which are said to draw the eye to their surfaces (often covered with frescoes)", Friedland and Zellman elaborate, "the Gothic was designed from inside out, giving rise to massive volumes of interior space flooded by exterior natural light through enlarged windows. This awesome inner space is the defining substance of the architecture. . . . Architects, Wright believed, should compose with space, not surface and mass"; Roger Friedland and Harold Zellman, *The Fellowship: The Untold Story of Frank Lloyd Wright and the Taliesin Fellowship* (New York: Regan/HarperCollins, 2006), 23. Hence, Wright's inside-out "vernacular idiom" becomes for Rybczynski (1989) precisely the deterritorialization for "The Most Beautiful House in the World", one whose structure "neither totally enclosed nor totally open . . . is almost devious in its undramatic complexity"; see Witold Rybczynski, *The Most Beautiful House in the World* (New York: Penguin Books, 1989), 110, 191.

31. Friedland and Zellman, *The Fellowship*, 23, 335.

32. The architectural "ambiguity" so instinctive with Wright's "blurring of boundaries" between indoor and outdoor space is an especially prominent thread throughout much of the photographic assemblage of Wright's American house architecture by Alan Weintraub; see Frank Lloyd Wright, *Frank Lloyd Wright: The Houses*, photographs by Alan Weintraub, text by Alan Hess (New York: Rizzoli, 2005). A representative sampling might include the "George Gerts Cottage, 1902" (158–59); Wright's own "Taliesin I, 1911–1925" (160–61); the "Liliane and Edgar J. Kaufmann House, 1935" (238–39); the "George Sturges House, 1939" (330–31); the "Gabrielle and Charlcey Austin House, 1951" (350); the "Lowell and Agnes Walter House and River Pavilion, 1948–1959" (382–83); the "Raymond Carlson House, 1950" (440–41); the "Louis Penfield House, 1952" (444–45); and the "Aime and Norman Lykes House, 1959" (510–11).

33. "[M]y connection . . . with the distinguished dead Emily Dickinson", Oates observes, is "[felt] so like oneself . . . in [a] void"—"The universe squeezed into a single room", she elsewhere remarks (*Journal* 421, 255; further in *Faith of a Writer* 26). "By this pathway Emily Dickinson created herself as a poet", Oates surmises. "And I am exactly the same" (*Journal* 255).

34. "Successive approximation" comes fairly close to what Wardrop, once again, foregrounds as "hesitation" in Dickinsonian Gothic, since "hesitation prolongs a moment of happening in the now, and a series of such moments, nows, gives itself over to suspense . . . [or] Uncertainty, the Heideggerian principle manifested as literary space [which] implies the condition of nearing as opposed to the condition of arriving"—approximation, in other words (15, and further on 130, 140, 141, 143 and *passim*).

ELEVEN

Working on a Diagonal: Towards a New Image of Architectural History

Bryan E. Norwood

DIAGONALITY, METAPHYSICS AND HISTORY

In his book on Foucault, Deleuze contrasts the Foucaultian archivist's diagonal methodology of *statements* with the vertical *propositions* of the transcendental articulator and the horizontal *phrases* of the empirical encyclopaedist[1]. The statement is neither a pre-determined order for history, a transcendental (or axiomatic) conditioner of all possibilities, nor merely one amongst many actual, historical facts. It is, instead, a real but virtual multiplicity—it is an *Idea* or a *problem* in the language of *Difference and Repetition* (DR 168–221), a *multiplicity* in the language of *A Thousand Plateaus*, and a *concept* in the language of *What Is Philosophy?* (WP 15–34).

The mediums of the vertical and horizontal methodologies could be put in another set of terms: *structure* and *genesis*. The vertical thinker works with hierarchies, typologies of fixed specific differences and other homogeneous, atemporal structures of organization. The vertical historian characterizes structural and disciplinary totalities (of a fixed period or all of history) by organizing different levels of analysis, from the general to the specific. In architectural history, in particular, this method manifests itself in attempts to order all the contingencies that are internal and external to the practice—to explain the structure of architecture (e.g., architecture is ordered form and space) that enables the contingent differences between various periods of production[2]. But today this methodology has waned in popularity as history has limited itself to timid structuralisms, to the diachronically and spatially constrained.

The horizontal historian, in contrast, works through dialectics, interpretations, collections, evolutions, genealogies and narratives that collect empirical facts and contextualize events. In particular, the survey books and architectural history courses that constitute the historical training of most practising architects treat history as a series of developments, the explanation for something new found in the particular facts of the past (whether within or without the discipline). But the horizontal historian has two particular problems. First, they themselves are on the timeline of history, at the head of the narratives that they tell. As Alasdair MacIntyre puts it, "Can the genealogist legitimately include the self out of which he speaks in explaining himself within his or her genealogical narrative? Is the genealogist not self-indulgently engaged in exempting his or her utterances from the treatment to which everyone else's is subject?"[3] Second, the moment of genesis in a horizontal history is always highly problematic, as it is either fuzzy and underdetermined or overdetermined by theorization—it is either the always-out-of-reach "pre-historical" or the theorized "primitive hut" (or some variation thereof). Said in the terms of Bergson, the horizontal historian is simultaneously in the traps of finalism and mechanism, dealing with a telos of the personal pronoun and an unavoidable abstraction of the first cause[4].

While vertical propositions always have an external referent in the non-discursive formations they describe and catalogue—for example, particular instantiations of species—and horizontal phrases are always spoken by an "I" existing in the present historical moment that acts as the intrinsic constant describing extrinsic variables, statements, in contrast to both, are to be derived and spoken from themselves. Statements "contain their own functions of subject, object and concept in the form of 'derivatives'" (F 9). They are, according to Deleuze, "an anonymous function which leaves a trace of the subject only in the third person, as a derived function" (F 15). This methodology thus goes hand in hand with a metaphysics of immanence in which signifier and signified are not separated, nor are the speaker and the spoken about or the intrinsic concept and the external referent[5].

Deleuze's conception of the *encounter* encapsulates this merging of the methodology of statements with a metaphysics of immanence, of metaphilosophy and metaphysics[6]. The encounter begins not from an experience defined by recognition, but rather from a surprise or trauma at the limits of sensibility. It is not the everyday but the extraordinary that we encounter. This moment of surprise, once identified, should not be understood as negation of the normal or the majority, as mere naysaying, but as evidence of a "past that was never present" (DR 82–85). That is, in order for the present to pass, there has to already be a past that the present passes into, and this pure past is the virtual registry beyond all empirical representation. Marking out the virtual essences is a process of counter-actualization—a move away from the things that presently *are* to

their conditions. But these essences are not generalities, nor are they qualitative or quantitative wholes. They are not identities and are not the conditions of possibility for all experience. Rather, they are undetermined but determinable problems, singularities, points of convergence that make infinite production of the finite possible. They are not a set of prestructured possibilities; rather, they are a differentiated field of ideas, an "n-dimensional, continuous, defined multiplicity" (DR 182). Thus counter-actualization, the process of moving up the diagonal from the actual to the virtual pure past, is a creative process in which undetermined but determinable multiplicities are engaged and new modes of actualization (differenciation) are enabled. The diagonal historian, when she encounters history, moves from actualized accounts of things that happened to the condition of history as being past, and produces new modes of the actualization of the past, new ways of becoming[7].

But if this doubling of metaphysics and inquiry through the encounter is possible, and the creative diagonal historian is not to engage in mere structuring or genetic explanation, how does she encounter history? Whereas in the physical sciences one can with some precision identify critical points in systems that induce unique qualitative change, in history identifying whether an event (e.g., a practice or a piece of architecture) fits within an episteme or makes a critical shift involves less certainty, since the nature of history is to be absent, not present. Deleuze's most extended written engagement with the history of a particular practice outside of philosophy comes in his two-volume study of the *Cinema*. And in the English and French prefaces to *Cinema 1*, he notes that his aim is not to give a typical or proper history of cinema, but to "isolate certain cinematographic concepts" and to build taxonomies of the types of cinematic images and the signs that make up these images (C1 ix–x, xiv). Briefly sketched, his account of the history of the constitution of film moves through three phases: the silent film; the *movement-image*, in which movement is the primary presentation; and the *time-image*, in which time itself is presented (although, as discussed below, the case of silent films is much more complicated than merely being a precursor). The three stages work through a unity of audio and visual, to an autonomy that is paired (even if indirectly), and finally to a heautonomy, where the audio and visual intersect in an irrational cut. But how do these taxonomies avoid the trappings of the transcendental articulator and the horizontal encyclopaedist, a reduction to the vertical or to the horizontal? I would like to suggest that Deleuze navigates a diagonal between these two limits in the *Cinema* books by engaging explicitly and repeatedly the relationship of history to its two conditioners: *pre-history* and *non-history*.

The pre-philosophical for Deleuze is the *image of thought*, an image constituted by *noosigns* (WP 37; C2 277–78). An image of thought is that "in terms of which" we know what it means to think (DR 130–31). It is what makes it possible for us to say "Everybody knows . . ." or "No one

can deny . . .". An image of thought allows one "to find one's bearings in thought", to define "what thought can claim by right" (WP 37). Thus, in parallel, the pre-historical can be characterized as the *image of history*, constituted by historico-noosigns that enable the organization and production of history. For example, in the *Cinema* studies, the contrast between the noosign of the rational cut and the noosign of the irrational cut is one of the key differences in the production of the movement-image and the time-image, a contrast that bears a striking resemblance to Heinrich Wölfflin's characterizations of the classical-baroque contrast[8]. While linked to distinct historical epochs, the baroque and the classical, for Wölfflin, are also "modes of representation" (i.e., structures of thought), and these ways of seeing can repeat themselves in contemporary discourse—for example, the nineteenth century for Wölfflin is marked by a return to the classical. The image of history that constitutes pre-history, then, is both the structure of a historical epoch's relationship to its history and that which structures the character of our act of historicizing—*history is never done without an image of what history is*[9].

Non-history takes the form of the primitive, the earth, the plane of immanence and the body without organs. It is a plane from which production of the actual is enacted. Wölfflin, like Deleuze, has two main taxonomies of images, but also an excessive third term that he calls the "primitive", which roughly characterizes everything preceding Renaissance classicism. Deleuze's characterization of the silent film as a unity of sound and visual components into one image occupies a similar moment. To be clear, the absolutely silent, completely naturalized and unified film is essentially non-existent. While silent films may be speechless, the division of the seen-image and the read-image—that is, between the seen-image and the intertitle—already prefigures talking. It already opens up the division of the discursive and the non-discursive. Furthermore, the injection of movement through montage immediately renders the film an open set, and the injection of sound through music already breaks open the silent film's unity. In the same way, for Wölfflin, pre-Renaissance architecture, while lacking a clearly determined representational system, is nonetheless never lawless, but rather proto-lawful[10]. The non-history of pure architectural primitivity and pure filmic silence is non-representational and unsayable. They are approximations of the essence of their respective mediums, just as Deleuze identifies the essence of colour as being like white light and sound like white noise (DR 206–7). Thus, the primitive and the silent, while characterizing a sort of before-history, are more fundamentally a non-history always present with historical organization—a primitivity that is constantly returning but always in excess of what is said. And in Deleuze's thought, there is always an excessive term that is fundamentally some form of a "non"; philosophy has non-philosophy, art non-art and science non-science[11].

Historical statements are created between the virtual non-historical plane of immanence and the process of filtering and organizing this plane through a pre-historical image of history. The process of moving towards non-history, what was described above as counter-actualization, is fundamentally an engagement with what is outside history, which injects new, creative forms of imaging into the practice of history. The statements of the *Cinema* study—that cinema is about movement, or about time—are created through the reconstruction of the taxonomic structure of images and their constitutive signs between the non-cinematic silent unity of sound and optics and the pre-cinematic images of thought that divide and organize these images. But whereas Deleuze is creating historical taxonomies of the cinema itself, I want to explore the historical taxonomies not of architecture itself, but rather of architecture's history—to create historical taxonomies of the history of architecture. Thus, instead of filmic intervals, I speak of historical epochs; instead of rational and irrational cuts, I speak of rational and irrational historic breaks. Instead of speaking of the representation of *time*, whether indirectly in the movement-image or directly in the time-image, I will speak of the representation of *life*, both indirectly in the form-image and space-image and directly in the life-image.

GRAND NARRATIVES OF IDENTITY: THE FORM-IMAGE AND THE SPACE-IMAGE

In any attempt to navigate between the genetic and structural, we run the risk of thinking of the structure *as* the genetic point (or, said another way, thinking that the structure *is present* in the genetic point) by collapsing the distinction between the two. That is, we run the risk of thinking the being of beings *as* the most beingful being, of conflating the projects of vertical, structural ontology and horizontal, genetic theology—of committing to metaphysics as what Heidegger dubbed *ontotheology*[12]. The Foucaultian archivist is always in danger of trying to be both a transcendental articulator and an empirical encyclopaedist. And the grand narrative of architecture as a series of developments in spatial organization, a sweeping narrative that arose with architectural modernism's development of a self-reinforcing form of historiography, is a quintessential version of this sort of collapse[13].

Previous versions of architectural historiographic ontotheology revolved around what I label the *form-image*, an image of history in which the "signaletic material"—the term Deleuze uses to characterize the unimaged and non-linguistic material transformed into the images and signs of cinema—of architecture is *in-formation*, that which differentiates and is ordered into form in a process of informing (C1 29). Information as signaletic material is not an undifferentiated chaos (the plane of imma-

nence never is for any system of signs or images); rather, it is a differentiated but non-architectural order that is *transformed* into architectural form. The key condition that makes the form-image into an ontotheology is the nature of the process of informing. While information is not always a set of exact forms, it is always an order that is impressed or in-formed into architecture. And this order is informed through a process that unifies architectural form with the information that generates this form—a process that makes the relationship between form and information one of tracing, revealing, re-presenting or analogizing. The architectural actual and its signaletic material are put in a complementary, homogeneous relationship.

We can identify several versions of the historical form-image from the Renaissance to the late nineteenth century, such as the classification of architecture by systems of proportion, ornament, styles and typologies, but it is at the end of the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth centuries, with historians and philosophers like Winckelmann, Alois Hirt and Hegel, that we begin to see a serious development of large-scale historical architectural narratives based on form[14]. For example, the system of architectural classification used by Hegel in his lectures on the philosophy of art—a dialectical progression through symbolic, classical and romantic phases—revolves around the attempt of architectural form to embody spirit—a task which begins with the purely symbolic Tower of Babel and seemingly reaches its limits in the romantic stage of the thirteenth-century Gothic cathedral[15]. Another example by Marc-Antoine Laugier posits the primitive hut as the archetypal origin of architectural form—a hut that simultaneously determines the form and function of architecture[16]. This primitive hut is neither just a type of architecture nor necessarily a form to be directly replicated; instead, it acts as both the signalectic material of architecture and the first interval in the sequences that make up the history of architecture.

While many of the form-images of the early nineteenth century found their in-formation in the private or public domain established by the primitive hut or the Tower of Babel by literally positing an originary ontogenetic form, in the twentieth century more sophisticated versions of the form-image have cropped up. In particular, a variation we may call the experience-image or the dwelling-image, developed in the work of "phenomenological" architectural historians like Christian Norberg-Schulz, has focussed on the concept of "dwelling" rather than the specifics of built form as architecture's origin, on a concept of the in-formation of architecture in lived experience. Nonetheless, these are still images of history grounded in the representation of an original identity. Unfortunately, a more developed critique of contemporary form-images, and in particular the experience-image of architectural phenomenology, cannot be developed in this short chapter.

Shifting from the form-image, *space* became a key typological trope for organizing the history of architecture in the early twentieth century, and perhaps no better version of this grand narrative has been worked out than that of Sigfried Giedion. In one of his last books, *Architecture and the Phenomena of Transition*, Giedion neatly sums up the narrative running through his entire historical project[17]. Architecture is divided into three spatial epochs: (1) the space-radiating volumes of the first high civilizations of Mesopotamia and Egypt; (2) the interior spaces inaugurated by the Romans persisting up until the nineteenth century; and (3) the combination of radiating volumes and interior space, developed by Corbusier and other moderns. In between the distinct phases are transitions: between the first and second phases sit the Greeks and the development of democracy, and between the second and third is the nineteenth century, with the development of new building materials and techniques by engineers and new conceptions of space by artists.

While it lingers barely below the surface of contemporary architectural history, and in the teaching of architectural history in architecture schools, Giedion's narrative is now dismissed on the grounds of its operativity and simplistic teleology. Indeed, Giedion treats historiography as a productive practice carefully positioning the possibilities of future architecture, and at times he combines this operativity with an implicit belief that modern architecture is the pinnacle of architecture's productive possibilities. As he suggests, if contemporary architecture is able to understand the "constituent facts" of its past, then it can create forms without disjunction from the needs of its epoch—an architecture that grasps contemporary spatiality in its unity and purity (STA xxxiii, 17–19, 27, 30). Giedion's way of structuring the narrative architectural history unifies the spatial Zeitgeist of the epoch with particulars of actual architectural objects within their epoch (in terms of both the account of past epochs and the prescriptions to contemporary architects), and it unifies the activities of feeling and thinking, taste and function, that the nineteenth century had ripped apart (STA 13, 430–33).

This double unification is worked out through a collapse of the vertical structure of architecture's typology and the horizontal timeline of architecture's phases[18]. In this operation, Giedion's pre-historical image of thought mirrors that of the cinema's movement-image: it is premised on (1) rational cuts in the historical epochs of spatialization and (2) the doubly articulated process of differentiation and specification that combines structure and genesis (C2 277–78). I will call this *schema* (i.e., the structure of the image of history produced by noosigns) of double unification through dual articulation the *bent-L schema* (figure 11.1). In the cinema, the movement-image sets up a series of intervals of movement in which each interval connects rationally with the last: the break or cut is either the end of one interval or the beginning of the next. Scenes progress in a reasonable order, and time is understood indirectly through

the movement of characters and the camera through a stable cinematic world. Each interval is doubly articulated, as all of the images that make up the moving interval are specific differentiations of the movement-image, while at the same time the beginning of the interval in the *perception-image* works like a degree zero of movement that extends by a process of rational specification through the other types of images (affection, action and relation). Understood as an ontotheology, the dual articulations of the *perception-image* and *movement-image* are linked through an identity that does not think of the difference between specified sets and differentiated wholes, regardless of the fact that these two movements are open-ended.

Similarly, in Giedion's narrative of architectural history, the epochs and their transitions are built around a differentiation of the various images of spatialization from the space-image, a process that is simultaneously articulated by the specification of the facts of history through a continuous evolution of the formation of space-images. The movement of history begins with the *cross-image*, the degree zero of the spatialization of architecture established through the erection of the vertical and the laying of a horizontal plane. Primitive, pre-architectural space did not order either of these; it lacked orthographic articulation, working instead quite



Figure 11.1. *The bent-L schema*. The movement-image and the space-image are constituted by the double articulation of differentiation and specification.

literally on a diagonal. For example, many cave paintings pay little respect to maintaining a horizontal or vertical organization[19]. Importantly, the fact that the primitive is excluded from the epochal grand narrative of architecture as space means that Giedion is in fact thinking, like Wölfflin, a non-history in primitivity. The primitive is outside of the narrative precisely because it is non-architectural. But although Giedion has a non-history, because his pre-historical image of thought is constituted by the noosigns of the rational cut and dual articulation, he is only indirectly able to present the architectural virtual—the non-architectural, purely primitive, bare life—in the same way the movement-image in cinema can only indirectly present time[20]. From the *cross-image*, the process of specification moves through the *radiating-image*, the *interior-image* and the *integrated-image*, all of which are simultaneously described in terms of being specific differentiations of the concept of space. While transitions in the history of architecture are initiated by something from without (e.g., politics, technology or art), for Giedion, space is nonetheless contained in a unified taxonomy in which beginning, structure and end are expressions of a combined architectural mechanism and finalism, an operative architectural ontotheology generated by a grand narrative of identity. Just as the movement-image represents time in its empirical form, as a succession of present moments, the space-image gives us life in its actualized form, as architecturally ordered taste and function.

SMALL NARRATIVES: THE CONTINGENCY-IMAGE AND THE SURVEY

The unapologetic assimilation of history into a grand narrative by Giedion is today a model to be, at the very least, avoided. Writing a unified architectural history, whether as a series of progressively developing stages or as a unified theory, has for some time been seen as repressive and untenable, and thus anything expansive is treated as a chopped-up, intervallic survey for the architecture student (in the form of a textbook or a sequence of history classes) that avoids grand narrative by chronicling facts and multiple small narratives. Fifty years ago, Thomas Kuhn observed a similar situation in the history of science and noted the impact these publishing practices had on science's own self-conception[21]. Textbooks and popularizations of science that attempt to think on a large scale are written in the aftermath of scientific revolutions, thus presenting a narrative that stabilizes the past in the form of present normal science. These books, from which students learn the character of their practice, combine with increasingly specialized publication practices within the discipline itself to produce an image of the history of the discipline as progressing by *accumulation* and *aggregation*. As Kuhn remarks, science is in a better position than most disciplines to rewrite its history in periods

of stability (and to view itself as without a doubt progressing) because its current body of knowledge does not appear to be dependent on the past for its legitimacy. However, this relative autonomy of explanation from the history of inquiry in science should not, when compared to a discipline like architecture, keep us from seeing an analogous image at work in architectural history.

The *contingency-image* of architectural history pushes back against the grand narrative by focussing on the particulars of history, although this is not to say that the narrowly focussed article or book is necessarily written with a contingency-image (although many are). Some tightly focussed books may even work to maintain a distinct conception of the body of architecture within a larger historical field, such as Eve Blau's *The Architecture of Red Vienna*[22]. Rather, the contingency-image is a particular image of history whose noosigns are between that of the space-image and what I will describe below as the *life-image* (and, analogously, between the movement-image and the time-image in Deleuze's cinema study). The contingency-image abandons the space-image's conflation of structure and genesis in the *bent-L schema* for the alternate noosign of (1) *non-totalizability*, which Deleuze describes as the "absolute contact between non-totalizable, asymmetrical outside and inside" (C2 278)—the condition in which history can infinitely generate new narrative-images that are always outside of existing narrative-images. However, (2) it does not exchange the noosign of the rational cut for the *irrational cut* that Deleuze identifies in the time-image. The contingency-image gets rid of the genus "architecture" defined as a specific condition (form, space, function, etc.), but it does not rethink the means by which one systematically organizes the field of architectural history. It thinks through an *aggregated schema* (figure 11.2) in which the vast number of contingent particulars can be gathered together and sorted to varying degrees by varying operations—a process often described as being empirical or "bottom-up"[23].

By opening up all the various particular images and signs within history to each other, by not delimiting a unified taxonomy of architecture, the contingency-image allows all historical particulars to collect and integrate with one another, making architecture co-extensive with life, and it allows for the distinction of constituent and transitory facts to be rejected[24]. The contingency-image dismisses the grand teleological model in which the past is tied to the present in one overarching order, and it maintains a necessarily incomplete conception of the unity of the Zeitgeist and architectural object and of taste and function at any particular moment. It carries out this rejection of unity and the grand narrative's ontotheology, however, by simply not writing the big narrative. It does not replace the noosign of the rational cut, but rather opens up the rational serialization in any direction. One can now write a narrative through any particulars that can be made adjacent.



Figure 11.2. *The aggregated schema*. The contingency-image rejects the noo-sign of double articulation by rejecting the unified genus of specification, but it nonetheless maintains the notion of horizontal rational breaks by associating the events and facts of history in multiple ways.

The danger of the contingency-image mirrors that which Deleuze identifies in contemporary philosophy: "it's become a commonplace these days to talk about the breakdown of system, the impossibility of constructing a system now that knowledge has become so fragmented ('We're no longer in the nineteenth century. . . .'). There are two problems with this idea: people can't imagine doing any serious work except on very restricted and specific little series; worse still, any broader approach is left to the spurious work of visionaries, with anyone saying whatever comes into their head. Systems have in fact lost absolutely none of their power" (N 31). Deleuze and Guattari repeatedly go to great lengths to remind us of the importance of systematicity, and even of the importance of universal history[25]. And while "all becoming is minoritarian", there is "a universal figure of minoritarian consciousness", a schema of creation and continuous variation that must be thought (TP 106).

The contingency-image is produced by giving in to the temptation to "ghettoize" and "regionalize" (TP 106) by hiding or ignoring the system at work, or, worse, by handing over the grand narrative to the uninformed visionary, to the architect who uses history for pre-determined operative means or to the navel-gazing amateur. Serious work is done only on the tiny series of particular lives, periods or locations, and the sweeping survey becomes a textbook for undergraduates and amateurs—serious thought on the historical system and on the figure and image of history is given up. When architectural history proceeds like a normal science, it silently reinforces the narrative of the past that normal science keeps in present operation, and thus, while proclaiming to think differently, the minor narrator merely resigns to the rational cuts of the grand narrative (and one should not miss the nature of the term *re-sign*:

to give up the sign). No longer focussed on the difference or transitions between epistemes, it thinks through rationally isolated identities[26]. Aggregation proceeds by rational breaks, just an infinite number of them. While Giedion's work unbearably reveals itself to be an ideological operation that rewrites history in the terms of the present, the surveyor and the aggregated narrator, by remaining silent on the character of the whole that they have diced up and splayed open, block revolution and leave the door open to ideology of all stripes[27].

SYSTEMS OF DIFFERENCE: THE LIFE-IMAGE AND IRRATIONAL CUTS

The empirical encyclopaedist, the aggregator and the surveyor, regardless of how they approach new production in the design studio, treat history as a repressive practice. Writing history is, in the end, not an activity of creativity, and thus has a negative relationship with the practising architect, who can choose either to ignore history, looking only towards the future and ahistorical theory, or to treat history as a fixed set of precedents, assimilating it wholesale or eclectically appropriating from the grab bag of the past. And the experience-image does not fare any better: it only works to privilege the "I" in a different way than the space-image—to ground interpretation in a different form of transcendental subjectivity. Deleuze repeatedly attacks history itself as the force that unavoidably represses creativity in philosophy and in other fields[28]. Perhaps, then, the contemporary surveyor has it right and just continues to participate in this practice of history ironically (or because it is what the institution of the architecture school demands)[29]. But what exactly is the "history" that Deleuze is attacking? We can say without a doubt that it certainly includes the work of the encyclopaedist named in *Foucault*—the one who treats history as a science of actuality. More than this, it is also the historico-philosophy of Hegel and Heidegger as described in *What Is Philosophy?*, in which "philosophy necessarily becomes indistinguishable from its own history"[30]. And, third, it also includes "state history" that is attacked in *A Thousand Plateaus*, the majoritarian history that can never involve creative becoming (TP 23).

To go beyond these forms of history while still practising history, we must think the diagonal that subverts the binary of historicism and the philosophical, the actual and the transcendental. The approach must be neither top-down nor bottom-up; it cannot merely replace the categorical with serial organization, the stable with the dynamic, or succession with co-existence. But the binary also cannot be overcome through the onto-theological both-and approach that is taken up by the space-image. By fixing an abstract concept of what architecture is and laying out the stages of architectural history as differentiations of this genus, the state

history of the space-image denies revolutionary change at any place within its system. In universalizing stasis, difference and revolution are reduced to a secondary role—to specific differences and transitions within a rational structure. And to respond with a refusal to think of historical systematicity is no better because it allows the status quo to be maintained. No, the real task at stake is to write the history of the body of architecture without a genus that defines the limits of the body of architecture. Revolutionary actions can be enabled only by constructing planes of consistency, through systematically prioritizing difference and allowing new becoming from outside the plane of organization (TP 266, 471–73). The question, then, is this: Can we say what architecture is without saying beforehand what the body of architecture can do[31]? I want to conclude with a preliminary affirmation: a suggestion that the body of architecture is an undetermined but determinable statement of *life*[32].

In Deleuze's *Cinema* study, the time-image directly presents what the movement-image only indirectly represented, and essential to this new presentation is a different set of noosigns: (1) nontotalizablity replaces the dual articulation of differentiation and specification, and (2) the irrational cut replaces the rational (C2 278). The irrational cut enables the presentation of time itself because the cut is of an entirely different order than that of the visual-images and sound-images that combine to create the readable appearances (the lectosigns) of cinema. While they stratify into an order and are in absolute contact, the visual-images and sound-images of a film like *Last Year at Marienbad* are able to present time itself because they are always out of joint with one another—presenting not merely the readable material of the series but also the autonomy of the cuts in the intervals. Time gives cinema its body, it cuts up the images, but it does not determine what the cinema can do—the cut does not determine the possibilities of images. Life plays the same role in architectural history.

Why life? Like time in the cinema, life has long been a concern of the architect and the historian. The analogy of architectural forms and life—for example, the "life of forms", the "life of architecture" and the "body of architecture"—and the autonomous or semi-autonomous unity of the observed architectural body constitute one aspect of this concern[33]. And architecture's service to human life—through the needs of functionalism, the desires of taste and the demands of ideology—constitutes another. If we were to only concern ourselves with these two images, the biosigns of the body and its service, the organism-image and the tool-image, architecture would only be thought through actualizations of life. It would only be approached through the pictures of life it presents to us—as either a life itself or an imprint of how life is lived[34]. But statements are Ideas, and Ideas are problems, and the problem of architecture is found precisely in this unresolvable antinomy of being a body and being for bodies, being a life and in service of life. It is a condition that has had historians and theorists lining up for both sides, and many have said that

architecture is a both-and: an art and a science, a taste and a function, a tradition and a service industry, a form and a culture. It is precisely this disjunction of the organism-image and the tool-image, the fact that they refuse to line up, that constitutes the life-image and the *disjointed schema* (figure 11.3) of history—the problem that calls for solutions, the statement from which architecture continuously determines new actualities.

Architecture's body is not a unity with internal, secondary difference; rather, it can only be understood in relationship to a non-architecture becoming-architecture. The architectural life-image, like the cinematic time-image, generates constant displacement through spacing or hiatus that allows self-affection within immanence[35]. That is, within the cinematic time-image, the displacement between and within visual- and sound-images generated by the irrational cut makes present the relationship of the past and present that is passing in the discontinuities of simultaneous images. In the architectural life-image, displacement is generated by the out-of-jointedness of architecture as *an* organism and architecture *for* organisms, of architecture as pure taste and architecture as pure function.

In addition to being self-conscious of her image of history, the creative historian also always needs to think of primitivity. In addition to prehistory (what comes before architectural history in thought), she needs non-history to encounter (what is always in excess of architectural history). It is here that we can follow life further up the diagonal to the character of displacement or difference itself[36]. While the life-image of architectural history produces actualized, readable biosigns (the organism-image and the tool-image), this production is fundamentally generated by the irrational break of virtual bare life, of a non-architectural life constituted by the zoesigns (the parallel of the chronosign in the time-image) of life's *nontotalizable* facticity and its irrational displacement[37]. Key here are Heidegger's notions of angst and uncanniness, of life that is not at home and that is fundamentally characterized by fallenness, an understanding of life which should be set in contrast to the experience-image's insistence on the fundamentality of dwelling and place[38]. The displacement of life from itself can be read in the irrational breaks of historical stratification. It is expressed in a number of ways, but we encounter this displacement most readily in architecture that clearly exceeds its epoch, in architecture that not only is for its time but also makes its own time, in architecture that engages what Deleuze calls the "power of the false" to produce new ways of thinking[39]. Rather than Giedion's constituent facts or merely unending contingent facts, the historian must think *unconstituent facts*, facts that are neither the unity of architecture nor its particular contingencies. The encounter with the extraordinary in history allows the historian to move along a diagonal, to think the virtual displacement of life through the actual displacement of architecture and to open up new differentiations of life for new, creative actualizations[40].



Figure 11.3. ***The disjointed schema*. The time-image and the life-image function by generating irrational disjunctions between cinematic and historical images. The disjunction in the life-image points to zoesigns (the parallel of the chrono-sign in the time-image), while the readable images of architectural history, the archisigns, reorganize the organism- and tool-images into a legible, actualized present.**

NOTES

I would like to thank David Rodowick, Jay Conway, Lynn Holt and Todd Satter for their very helpful comments on earlier drafts of this chapter.

1. Gilles Deleuze, *Foucault*, trans. Seán Hand (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988), 3. Hereafter, parenthetically cited as F. As Paul Patton has argued, it seems that Deleuze's characterization of Foucault is misleading, making their methodologies appear much closer than they actually are. I am here only concerned with Deleuze's position, and thus the "Deleuzian Foucault" that Deleuze presents. See "Deleuze, Foucault and History", in *Time and History in Deleuze and Serres*, ed. Bernd Herzogenrath (London: Continuum, 2012), 69–83.

2. For example, see Sigfried Giedion, *Architecture and the Phenomena of Transition: The Three Space Conceptions in Architecture* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971); Bruno Zevi, *The Modern Language of Architecture* (New York: Da Capo Press, 1994); and Christian Norberg-Schulz, *Intentions in Architecture* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1966). This is a common methodology for the practising architect as well: see, for example, Le Corbusier's iconic *Towards an Architecture*, trans. John Goodman (Los Angeles: Getty, 2007).

3. Alasdair MacIntyre, *Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry: Encyclopedia, Genealogy, and Tradition* (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1990), 210. A further ethical question arises out of this hermeneutical situation: How can the genealogist take responsibility for her past actions if the project of genealogy is constantly subverting the metaphysical continuity of the past and present self (210–13)? How can one express an "unironic relationship to the past" self?

4. See Henri Bergson, *Creative Evolution*, trans. Arthur Mitchell (New York: Modern Library, 1944), 42–56.

5. Deleuze describes this diagonal metaphysics at the end of *The Fold*, where he concludes that Leibniz's world of horizontal and vertical articulations is no longer tenable; we now live in a diagonally composed world: "To the degree that the world is now made up of divergent series (the chasms), or that crapshooting replaces the game of Plenitude, the monad is now unable to contain the entire world. . . . It now opens on a trajectory or a spiral in expansion that moves further and further away from a center. A vertical harmonic can no longer be distinguished from a horizontal harmonic. . . . The two begin to fuse on a sort of diagonal, where the monads penetrate each other, are modified, inseparable from the groups of prehension that carry them along"; from Gilles Deleuze, *The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque*, trans. Tom Conley (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993), 137. I am calling this a metaphysics, following Deleuze, but there are others who argue that the aim of immanence is an elimination of metaphysics. For example, Leonard Lawlor advocates for "life-ism" as a replacement of metaphysics; see Lawlor, *The Implications of Immanence: Towards a New Concept of Life* (New York: Fordham University Press, 2006). In my mind, this is a terminological dispute over whether the word "metaphysics" can be used to characterize thought on immanence after Heidegger's critique of ontotheology.

6. For an excellent, detailed account of the encounter, see Levi Bryant, *Difference and Givenness* (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 2008), 92–175.

7. Deleuze quite often opposes history and becoming, but I will argue below that he is opposing particular types of history to becoming. I will further argue that we should understand the creative architectural historian as the one who enables new possibilities of architectural production. For an excellent sketch of the possibilities of creative history in Deleuze, see Craig Lundy, *History and Becoming: Deleuze's Philosophy of Creativity* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2012).

8. Of course, in *The Fold*, Deleuze explicitly relies on Wölfflin's pairing. See also Gilles Deleuze, "Doubts on the Imaginary", in *Negotiations: 1972–1990*, trans. Martin Joughin (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), 62–67. Hereafter, parenthetically cited as N. Also see D. N. Rodowick, *Gilles Deleuze's Time Machine* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1997), 5.

9. This hermeneutic doubling over of describing a period's relationship to its history with our historical position's relationship to that period as our history is again part of the reason that a historiography, the history of history, tends towards a less definite characterization than the direct study of the objects of a science.

10. See C1 36, 43, 82–83; and C2 225–30, 241.
11. Following the divisions in WP.
12. See in particular Martin Heidegger, *Identity and Difference*, trans. Joan Stambaugh (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969) 54–61; and Iain Thomson, "Ontotheology", in *Interpreting Heidegger*, ed. Daniel O. Dahlstrom (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 106–31. Heidegger's desire to overcome metaphysics is predicated on the idea that metaphysics is unavoidably ontotheology, a fact about metaphysics that Deleuze rejects. Miguel de Beistegui has discussed the general situation of post-Heideggerian metaphysics with clarity in "The Ontological Dispute: Badiou, Heidegger, and Deleuze", in *Alain Badiou: Philosophy and Its Conditions*, ed. Gabriel Riera (New York: SUNY Press, 2005), 45–58.
13. For a good overview of the historians and their various approaches to historiography in modern architecture, see Panikotis Tournikiotis, *The Historiography of Modern Architecture* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1999).
14. Roughly by the end of the seventeenth century, mysticism about proportional absolutes had largely been discredited, and form-images began to find their signaletic material in more robust notions of history and science.
15. G. W. F. Hegel, *Aesthetics: Lectures on Fine Art*, 2 vols., trans. T. M. Knox (Oxford: Clarendon, 1975).
16. Marc-Antoine Laugier, *An Essay on Architecture*, trans. Wolfgang and Anni Herrmann (Los Angeles: Hennessey & Ingalls, 1977).
17. Giedion, *Architecture and the Phenomena of Transition*, 1–6. Also see Sigfried Giedion, *Space, Time, and Architecture: The Growth of a New Tradition*, 5th ed. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1967), lv–lvi. Hereafter, parenthetically cited as STA.
18. The historian John Summerson critiqued Giedion for confusing history with philosophy, mistaking the attempt to understand the past with describing the present state of experience. See Summerson, "The Philosopher Historian: Review of Giedion's *Space, Time, and Architecture*", *Architecture Review* (May 1942): 126–27. This is precisely the point on which the Deleuzian project of the diagonal turns: how one relates the passing present to the past. Philosopher or historian, these are not the only two positions from which to think this relation.
19. The potential here is actually to suggest that the diagonal history of the life-image discussed below can be found in the primitive, in the same way that Deleuze finds aspects of the time-image in the silent film.
20. On bare life, see Giorgio Agamben, *Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life*, trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998).
21. Thomas Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), 1–3, 136–38.
22. Eve Blau, *The Architecture of Red Vienna* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1999). See in particular the discussion of historiographical method on pages 2–15.
23. See Manuel De Landa, *A Thousand Years of Nonlinear History* (Brooklyn, NY: Zone, 1997).
24. For a clear example of this methodology, see the introduction to Aggregate, *Governing by Design: Architecture, Economy, and Politics in the Twentieth Century* (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2012), vii–xv.
25. AO 139–40. On the critical role of systematicity in Deleuze's metaphilosophy, see Jay Conway, *Gilles Deleuze: Affirmation in Philosophy* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 13–34. Also see Lundy, *History and Becoming*, 104–44.
26. There is a strong relationship between Foucault's concept of "epistemes" and Heidegger's "ontotheology". See Thomson, "Ontotheology".
27. I use "surveyor" and "aggregrated narrator" in the sense of conceptual personae (WP 61–84)—an actual historian usually has several personae. The attitude of the persona of the author of the survey is undoubtedly not equivalent with the historian herself—a condition often quite clear in the resignation present in the introduction to many of these types of books. My goal here is not to condemn particular historians or their practice, but rather tendencies of thought and publication.

28. Gilles Deleuze and Claire Parnet, *Dialogues II*, trans. Barbara Habberjam and Hugh Tomlinson (London: Continuum, 2002), 13; and N 170–71.

29. I mean "ironically" here in the way Hayden White uses it to characterize the emplotment of history as a satire in which one treats all narrative forms as inadequate and through which self-critical history is formed into a sceptical and viciously relativist framework. See Hayden White, *Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth-Century Europe* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973), 37–38.

30. WP 94–95. Whether the characterization is fair is another issue, one that cannot be addressed here.

31. See Gilles Deleuze, *Spinoza: Practical Philosophy*, trans. Robert Hurley (San Francisco: City Lights Books, 1988), 125.

32. C2 271. There is a large amount of work to be done here in establishing the relationship of the time-image to the life-image, particularly regarding Bergson's discussion of duration and the *élan vital* in his *Creative Evolution*.

33. See, for example, Isaac Ware and Inigo Jones, *A Complete Body of Architecture* (Farnborough: Gregg, 1971); Henri Focillon, *The Life of Forms in Art*, trans. Samuel Lane Fiason and George Kubler (New York: Wittenborn, 1948); and STA 19–21.

34. I mean "tool" here to capture the full range of what is intended in Graham Harman's extension of Heidegger's discussion of the tool; see Harman, *Tool-Being: Heidegger and the Metaphysics of Objects* (Chicago: Open Court, 2002).

35. I am drawing on Leonard Lawlor's discussion of life in his *The Implications of Immanence*. There are other modes of life, such as animal-life, that I am leaving unaddressed here. See also Claire Colebrook, *Deleuze and the Meaning of Life* (London: Continuum, 2010).

36. As Lawlor describes it, "life is always out of joint"; Lawlor, *The Implications of Immanence*, 142.

37. I am following Agamben in the distinction between *bios* and *zoe* in *Homo Sacer*. However, this distinction is, of course, not a clean one, as Agamben admits. The general issue I wish to convey, however, is that the life-image deals with the irrational cut, the unqualified life, *zoe*, and at the same time the qualified and ordered life that actually appears in architecture, *bios*. On facticity, see Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York: HarperOne, 1962), 82.

38. Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 228–34. Of course, this is a constant theme in Heidegger's work, but see in particular his *Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle*, trans. Richard Rojcewicz (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1985), 61–115.

39. See C2 126–55; and Gilles Deleuze, "Mediators", in *Negotiations: 1972–1990*, 121–34.

40. The city has often been treated as the architectural virtual. See K. Michael Hays's account of Aldo Rossi and Bernard Tschumi in his *Architecture's Desire* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2010). I think this is inadequate for multiple reasons, the most important of which is the worry that this merely produces a situation of tracing the architectural virtual from the actual, the transcendental from the empirical—architecture from the city grid.

TWELVE

The Becoming-Human of Buffalo Bill

Dolleen Tisawii'ashii Manning

Buffalo Bill's Wild West was a spectacular site of encounter between North American Indigenous peoples and settler societies. This turn-of-the-twentieth-century circus-like show featured rodeo skills and theatrical depictions of battle scenes between settlers and native peoples. These performances were set in the context of "historical events". Once the most popular show on earth, Buffalo Bill provides a rich illustration of colonial evils, ripe for parody and critique[1]. Consider, for instance, the performance art personas *Belle Sauvage* and Buffalo Boy, developed by Laurie Blondeau (Cree, Sauteaux and Métis) and Adrian Stimson (Silsika). While Buffalo Bill is himself a performance artist, whose exhibitions assembled performers (such as Sitting Bull, Molly Spotted Elk and Annie Oakley), artists Blondeau and Stimson offer queer Indigenous reinterpretations of Buffalo Bill's Wild West. These campy contemporary characters refuse to submit to the subjectivities demanded by the Wild West, including both the racialized Red Indian and hegemonic colonial identities, for these artists are tricksters who traverse the in-between of these polarized possibilities. Buffalo Bill likewise finds himself deconstructed in his colonial encounters. He exploits and colonizes Indigenous peoples, but ultimately finds himself transformed by his own becoming-animal encounters with difference. In this chapter, Buffalo Bill, *Belle Sauvage* and Buffalo Boy set the backdrop for a second site of encounter: this time between *Anishinaabe* (original peoples of the Americas) and Western theory. This encounter is a meeting of radically different systems of thought, one of which has attempted to assimilate and eradicate the others, while at the same time appropriating and romanticizing them. On the side of the Wild West, in this analogy, is the concept "becoming-animal", elaborated in

A Thousand Plateaus. In this text, itself a kind of performance, Deleuze and Guattari appear as contemporary versions of Buffalo Bill, caught undecidedly between colonial thought and their own transformations initiated by their anomalous Other—the Indian[2]. On the one hand, becoming-animal represents an effort to re-conceptualize difference or its engagement by re-examining the concept of encounter through affect. On the other hand, while Deleuze and Guattari posit their theory of becoming as a shedding of privilege, it depends on that very privilege for the efficacy of its praxis. For Indigenous peoples, becoming-imperceptible and becoming-dispersed (aspects of becoming-animal) are by no means to be desired, since these processes are associated with colonial violence and its institutionalization. As such, the becoming-animal concept treads a slippery slope between posthumanism and dehumanization. The romanticized terms of this concept naïvely overlook the deadly consequences of dehumanization and deterritorialization for Indigenous peoples while redeploying misinformed Western interpretations about them. Indigenous philosophies notably are neither humanist nor posthuman, but rather emerge as something else entirely. Becoming-animal negates both individual subjectivity and collective political agency, and reflects a subaltern position of incomprehensibility and unintelligibility into which Indigenous peoples have been swept up.

Yet the *Anishinaabe* are not passive victims in this relationship. Like *Belle Sauvage* and Buffalo Boy, Aboriginal thought is a trickster that turns relations to becoming-animal around. Indeed, Deleuze and Guattari, like Buffalo Bill, are caught in the spell of their anomalous Other, since *Anishinaabe* philosophy is structured as a relational transformative discourse of becoming. Indigenous peoples have long waited for the West to enter this conversation. Deleuze and Guattari, ridiculous though they may look in their shaman costumes of suede and turkey feathers, awkwardly turn towards this discursive invitation. A conversation (or, rather, a conversion) begins.

HUMANISM

In this chapter, I do not just address struggles with the emergent posthuman era, which is engaged in the worthwhile project of dismantling binaries such as self/other and nature/culture. My concern, rather, is that underneath the posthuman becoming-animal concept persists a liberal humanism that continues to permeate contemporary lived realities. Where the human is the ground of ethics, politics, capitalism, democracy, colonization and subjectivity, with becoming-animal, Deleuze and Guattari call for a disruption of humanism, through an emphasis on difference and dispersion, rather than commonality. The theory of becoming-animal critiques humanism in several ways. First, there is a shift from individu-

ality to multiplicity, as the authors point to "modes of expansion, propagation, occupation, contagion, peopling" that occur as one encounters others (TP 239). Second, faced with the difference of the Other, a person is transformed, jolted from one's identity, rather than identifying with others along lines of similarity. Third, the concept of freedom is dislodged from free will, and tied to the involuntary transcendence of individuality that occurs when one's sense of self is disrupted by pure difference. It is a movement from the autonomous to the anomalous. Deleuze and Guattari write, "Wherever there is multiplicity, you will also find an exceptional individual, and it is with that individual that an alliance must be made in order to become-animal . . . there is always a pact with a demon. . . . Every animal swept up in its pact has its anomalous" (TP 243). The anomalous is not a characteristic, but "a position or a set of positions in relation to a multiplicity" (TP 244). The emphasis on disrupting identity and shifting from individuality to multiplicity reflects the authors' critique of the bourgeois tenets of liberal humanism, including its emphasis on individualism, autonomy and reason as the essence of humans.

This disruption of identity, moreover, suggests that multiplicity is a space of pure plurality, which does not gather around commonalities nor organize along lines of similarity. This space creates the possibility for a new kind of politics, one that would be free from the hierarchies and exclusions of both state and identity politics, and thus, ideally, colonization: Deleuze and Guattari propose a shift from what they term the "macro-politics" of states, institutions and subjects to a "micro-political" posthumanism that disperses around multiplicity and relationality. The terms for the agents of these types of politics are "majoritarian" and "minoritarian". Minoritarian refers to "groups that are oppressed, prohibited, in revolt, or always on the fringe of recognized institutions, groups all the more secret for being extrinsic, in other words, anomic" (TP 247). Such groups express the disruptive politics of becoming-animal, a politics that "rupture[s] with the central institutions that have established themselves or seek to become established" (TP 247). That is to say, the confluence of external forces perpetually breaks with the histories and memories of unified internally constructed subjectivities. Thus disrupted by the chaos of mutating assemblages, these externally summoned "blocks of becoming" forge a kind of forgetfulness. This amnesia materializes in relation to the entrenched molar positions (or striated spaces) that are passed through by minoritarians. As such, minoritarian concerns circulate in a collapsing economy rather than fixating on an embedded and particularized majoritarian state or molar territory.

Deleuze and Guattari draw heavily on concepts associated with indigeneity such as nomadism and shaman mysticism. They valourize themselves as "author/sorcerers" endowed with "clandestine" modes of becoming, and yet they dismiss "totemic relations", which they understand erroneously as static and correlative. They adamantly contend that the

term "minoritarian" does not refer to social or political minorities, which are aggregate identities, bound by hereditary, religious, gendered or racial affinities. Accordingly, totemic affiliated Indigenous populations are excluded from such micro-political claims, since minoritarians engage in modes of becoming that depart from any such homogenizing correspondence. Majoritarians or molar identities are specifically associated with ideological domination and immutable standards (forming the basis for rights), which are supported by the historical roots and rational partitions that territorialize difference. The term "majoritarian" thus refers to a standard rather than a quantifiable majority of constituents. Hence, the negotiation of parameters through which members of any group (including social minorities) gain their sense of belonging likewise unavoidably entrenches the fixed coordinates that establish a majoritarian rule. Minoritarians conversely remain heterogeneous by setting themselves at odds, even with minority identification, and by resisting normative claims.

Like contemporary European re-creations of Indian villages, whose participants purport to be more Indian than the Indians[3], Deleuze and Guattari also map minoritarian politics by replicating nomadic lifestyles, but ones that always already disperse from majoritarianism. Similar to German and Czech Indian re-creationists, *A Thousand Plateaus* may be an impeccable imitation, but, uncannily, these *superior* Indians are blonde and blue-eyed. This positions the text, like the re-creation village, as a kind of contemporary Wild West Show, filled with nomadic warriors, neighing horses, mysterious shamans and heroic cowboys, all swept up into one shifting assemblage. Foremost, in this spectacle, is the weight of humanism, under which *real* Indians—that is to say, the tired and hungry Indigenous cast members shot over and over again in Buffalo Bill's Wild West—are dehumanized. There is no glory in becoming-animal for them, no great adventure in deterritorialization. Instead, these Wild West cast members have been cobbled together from poverty-stricken reservations, their homelands devastated by colonial violence. Here, we find the humanism that Deleuze and Guattari so urgently struggle to shed, but that, nonetheless, pursues them in the haunting of becoming-animal and its implication in the history of colonial dehumanization. Buffalo Bill aptly sets the backdrop for this sideshow of reversals and becomings-dehumanized.

BECOMINGS-BUFFALO

Born William Cody in 1846, this American soldier, buffalo hunter and entertainer was transformed from William Cody to Buffalo Bill, and experienced a becoming-animal of his own. He earned the nickname "Buffalo Bill" by killing more than four thousand buffalo while under a six-month contract to supply buffalo meat to the Kansas Pacific Railroad.

Cody's prowess at buffalo killing occurred in the context of a mass slaughter by settler societies (often for sport) that brought the buffalo near extinction (along with the Indigenous inhabitants that were dependent upon them). Cody was also celebrated as an "Indian Killer", which he proudly recounts in *An Autobiography of Buffalo Bill* (in some editions, the story appears under the subheading "How I Killed My First Indian"):

> Presently the moon rose, dead ahead of me. And painted boldly across its face was the black figure of an Indian. There could be no mistaking him for a white man. He wore the war-bonnet of the Sioux, and at his shoulder was a rifle, pointed at someone in the bottom below him. I knew well enough that in another second he would drop one of my friends. So I raised my Yaeger and fired. I saw the figure collapse, and heard it come tumbling thirty feet down the bank, landing with a splash in the water. . . . "What is it?" asked McCarthy. . . . "Hi!" he cried. "Little Billy's killed an Indian all by himself!" (n.p.)[4]

Hence, when young Cody meets his anomalous Other, he kills him—the first of many whose humanity would obscure his vision of the Americas as vacant and free for the taking. Reduced to an "it", the "Indian" is dehumanized and thus, like the buffalo, is fit to be slaughtered. In order to validate young Cody's actions, the threat to his friend is hyper-contextualized in the anonymous and menacing characterization of the Sioux, which presents Cody not as a murderer but as a heroic hunter (of beasts). This narrative underscores the social acceptability of Indian killings, while skewing the colonial context in which this Sioux is found defending his homeland. The demonization of the Indian is located in the overly dramatized silhouette, the contour of which denies the seat of identity—the face, where a subjective recognition might occur. Consequently, this outline, or "it", becomes a screen that prevents Cody from responding ethically to his personhood. The description "painted across its face" also evokes culturally specific practices of body painting (often equated with primitivism) employed by many Indigenous populations, including the Sioux. Cody's deployment of this trope thus not only conflates diverse Indigenous cultures into one vilified Other (as Red Indian) but also dissolves distinct personages into this one disfiguration[5].

Biased colonial attitudes regarding *Indianness* obscured the historical context, for young Cody, to such a degree that he could not conceive of this Sioux as human in a relatable sense. Instead, the recognition of individuality is compressed into a projection that underlies colonial consciousness but is perceived as lining the surface of the face as Other. Hence, a disruption and contradiction reveal a semblance of a *thing*, which is discerned, via his "war-bonnet", as an "Indian". This judgement contests the humanity of Cody's counterpart, which is reluctantly identified, but only as ominous figuration and non-identity, disclosed in the designation "it". Ergo, the becoming-animal of Cody becoming-Buffalo

Bill signals his becoming-inhumane. In other words, for Aboriginal and Western peoples alike, this colonial encounter involves a process of reversals and dehumanization.

WILLIAM CODY'S TRANSFORMATIVE INTRIGUE

William Cody's encounter with his anomalous Other transforms him into Buffalo Bill. Yet this intrigue already pervades the colonial imaginary, and thus is returned a second time by Western audiences fascinated by the carnivalesque. It is an intrigue that Buffalo Bill's Wild West spectacle promised to fulfil. These alliances created monstrous demonizations in the figure of the Indian—an integral façade necessary to rein in the wild, vast and furious frontier. This feedback between Buffalo Bill and his audiences formed what Deleuze and Guattari celebrate as "illicit unions" (TP 246). Here, the tepid waters of homologous same-species procreation are contrasted with the exhilarating turbulence of profane and aberrant amalgamations that precipitate such illicit unions. This anomalous "relation of alliances" spreads heterogeneously through contagion to form "abominable [inter-kingdom] loves" (TP 246). According to Deleuze and Guattari, "it is the return of the alliance . . . [and] the reaction of this alliance on the first family, that produce werewolves by feedback effect" (TP 246). This feedback transformed seemingly humane acts of civility into beastly atrocities (as witnessed in colonial attempts to "educate" the Indian through forced residential schooling and religious interventions, in which Indigenous children and youths were subjected to extreme physical, sexual, psychological and cultural abuses, which many would, in turn, bring home to their own communities). These colonizing tactics (initiated to eliminate cultural difference) thus produced werewolves in the form of contemporary abuses that now infect Indigenous communities. This savage alien not only comprises but also *compromises* the border between settler societies and Indigenous cultures from within the structures that support their differences. This constructed image of indigeneity both divides by distinguishing what falls within and outside of these *authentic* categories and interpenetrates and spreads out to infect subsequent realities (Western and Indigenous)[6]. Settlers envisioned painted Indians creeping menacingly along the edges of their homesteads. Yet, alongside this becoming-dehumanized process, these fears and secret desires also disclose the feedback effect of the becoming-inhuman of the colonial West (as the first family of Buffalo Bill). That is, in terms of the "white man's burden", the West was compelled to provide evidence of his own humanity in the imaginary face of the "it" inscribed as the nonhuman Other. Despite this complicated relationship, Indigenous peoples are not considered nomadic, in Deleuze and Guattari's use

of the term, because Indians band together under affiliating totemic relations.

Since this figure was conjured from the Western imaginary, one might argue that there are no "authentic" Indians left, nor did they ever exist[7]. One might venture further still to suggest that this figure actually represents "white" settlers themselves (a Frenchman, perhaps). Yet what of the Indigenous inhabitants whose cultural, philosophical, technological, political and scientific knowledge was exported to Europe to become appropriated, molested and distorted in order to form the basis of those fictions? Association with the imaginary Indian and the buffalo transfigured William Cody into the Buffalo Bill icon, whose exploits, in turn, gave way to the "initiatory journeys" of Aboriginal peoples (real and imagined). Thus, each "changes" according to the "stages of a journey", with each intensity inter-dispersing to become all the more intricately embroiled, one with the other (TP 249).

A PACT WITH THE RED INDIAN

It is with the Red Indian that William Cody—and, I daresay, Deleuze and Guattari—forge a pact. Although constructed in the West, this fiction contaminates actual Indigenous realities. Buffalo Bill's becoming-Indian and becoming-inhumane are especially poignant for contemporary Indigenous peoples who, as a result of colonial violence, must negotiate a slippage between complex Indigenous cultures and impoverished stereotypes. Romanticisms emerge as complicated encrustations of peripheral and primary engagements and characterizations that accompany Western and Indigenous expectations. The interplay of these expectations renders actual and desired circumstances difficult to distinguish. The romantic dimensions of such images combine with the invisible lines that blur given norms and their accompanying forms of discrimination. This tightly woven knot might be further complicated by positive enforcements evoked in localized settings. Nevertheless, these seemingly affirmative characterizations also always transmit traces of their reversed derogatory implications. As such, romantic images are also repudiated in efforts to shed the inertia inherent to such fossilized terms.

The figure of the Indian has something in common with actual Indigenous realities. Regardless of the nature and origin of this relationship, the attributes and history of this figure have become forever enmeshed with the many distinct Aboriginal cultures of the Americas. This homogenized figure elicits alliances that create new assemblages amongst new peoples that politically mobilize around the many forms of discrimination that it yields. If there are similarities between these diverse peoples, they do not lie in this worn-out figure (though at times usefully deployed), but rather in a shared eco-ontology. These Aboriginal philosophies operate outside

of liberal humanism, as *other* to humanism. Many regard animals as well as plants and "inanimate" objects (such as stones) as relations of human beings. This is to say that the definition of human subjectivity is not limited to a bounded particular. Moreover, these ontologies throw the entire concepts of humanity and animism, and even notions of what constitutes life itself, into question. Concepts like *Indinawemaaganidog*,[8] for example, suggest a completely different understanding of agency and what it means to be human. Although *Indinawemaaganidog* is translated as "all my relations/relatives", the nature of this relationality is indeterminate. But it is most often pragmatically transcribed along Western conceptions of human correspondence or, in other words, as familial kinship. Yet no equivalent term in English conveys the expanding and contracting sense of this concept. *Indinawemaaganidog* does not externalize the world via anthropomorphism. But, in reverse, it apprehends the world as conditioning consciousness, selfhood and agency.

In a sense, these *Anishinaabe* ontologies assert that *humanity* is *given* to *humans*, or, rather, that subjective consciousness is acquired through this interrelationality with other forms of "being" or expressions of existence. They are *Indinawemaaganidog* in the sense of interrelations and interdependence. Contact with the West threatens multiple distinct Aboriginal cultures and their becomings, which collide with the monolithic Red Indian image. New Age Indian lovers and the like may see the "noble savage" as becoming more human (when self-possession is mistaken for a civilized measure of self-restraint), while affronted by the harsh contemporary realities that refuse these romantic Indian ideals. Ironically, the simultaneous rupture with becomings (the ones that are re-inscribed as becoming more human in the face of the West's inhumanity) also offers the route by which these groups gain the political gravity of a majoritarian politics, while remaining stigmatized as primitive savages according to Deleuze and Guattari's molar standards.

Becoming-animal, exemplified here in the becomings of Buffalo Bill through his pact with the imaginary Indian, is thus an ambivalent becoming for *Anishinaabe* peoples as opposed to the inherently revolutionary becomings that Deleuze and Guattari specify. It is a journey initiated by the contagion between the West and its Indigenous Others. Caught up in the swell of this *postcolonial* aftermath, it is difficult to conceive of such "contagion" as anything but catastrophic, given that exposure to new diseases, including intentional contagion via the distribution of smallpox-infected blankets, quite literally eradicated up to 80 percent of the North American Indigenous population after contact[9]. Yet, for Deleuze and Guattari, contagion is valourized as the very mode by which experiences of multiple becomings commence. They write, "Bands, human or animal, proliferate by contagion, epidemics, battlefields, and catastrophes" (TP 241). It is through a fascination with the perceived multiplicity and its subsequent affectuation that "the human being encounters the animal"

(TP 239). Perceived as such, individuals are stirred by a horror for what they sense dwelling within themselves (TP 240).

Deleuze and Guattari urge us to accept an experience of a dispersion of molecules. Yet this "awareness" of existing as indistinguishable beings and becomings is a horror that seems too overwhelming, too divergent for them to fathom, at least, as anything more than the correlative affect of a self-positing agency (TP 240). The tale of "Little Hans" dispersing with horse and street, for example, elucidates the experience of intensities arising from the entwinement of form and abstraction that result from an interaction between phenomenal bodies and abstract cognitive processes (TP 256). This is made evident in Deleuze and Guattari's assertion that one does "not imitate a dog; but [rather] make your organism enter into composition with something else", in which case, the *making* of one's organism suggests that becoming is a wilfully produced engagement (TP 274). Yet the "mak[ing of] your organism" could just as easily be interpreted as allowing an opening for affect to overwhelm. It can also be defined as an endeavour, which is manufactured insofar as each instance requires an active self-invested agent. Where Deleuze and Guattari become "fascinated with a peopling of rats", they relate to the similitude located "within" and "through" humanity as well as in the "interstices" of a "disrupted self" that they "experience the animal as the only population before which they are responsible in principle" (TP 240). Thus, they are bound not only through modes of expansion but also through the very "filiation by heredity", which they disavow, not *if* but *as* "the two themes [pack and classification] intermingle and require each other" (TP 241). This multiplicity, achieved through modes rather than by classification, also identifies the banding together of Indians as a proliferation of difference—in which case Indian bands waver between civilised societies (albeit ones still identified as *primitive*) for adhering to hereditary lines and, at the same time, collapsing with animal packs, which run together without apparent justification other than proximal relations. This fascination with pack modes and their becoming-possibilities, which these writers relate to as an Othering within oneself, is the same fixation that sets the "initiatory journeys" of Buffalo Bill with his Indian Other in motion (TP 249).

There is a contagion between Bill Cody and the figure of Buffalo Bill that spreads through his pact with Western imperialism as well as through his unwitting pact with the demonized Indian. This contamination filters back and forth between these zones of becoming, infecting the contemporary consciousness of the Americas. This feedback loop thus offers a "rupture with the central institutions" and their homogenizing structure (TP 247). This rupture results from the emergence of becoming-human in relation to becoming-animal for both molar and minor realities as they disband and forge fleeting alliances that swell together and, at the same time, become monstrously Othered to one another in the dispersion

of minoritarian concerns. This in turn disrupts a fixed majoritarian politics. Deleuze and Guattari write of these dissolving identity affiliations,

> [B]ecoming-animal is an affair of sorcery because (1) it implies an initial relation of alliance with a demon; (2) the demon functions as the borderline of an animal pack, into which the human being passes or in which his or her becoming takes place, by contagion; (3) this becoming itself implies a second alliance, with another human group; (4) this new borderline between the two groups guides the contagion of animal and human being within the pack. (TP 247)

In a like sense, Buffalo Bill's Wild West exhibition and *A Thousand Plateaus* forge a pact with audiences that unite around the spectacle of the Indigenous Other. It is a pact/pack, in which audiences/readers advance the dehumanization of Indigenous peoples by passively or uncritically engaging with it. Western humanism historically distinguishes its own humanity by making animals or *sub-humans* of its Others. Such conflicts inspire the call by Deleuze and Guattari to become-animal, to follow the swell of that anomalous other and release oneself from one's molar assertions. Becoming-animal, as such, is an attempt to shed privilege. Referencing William Faulkner in that endeavour, Deleuze and Guattari write that "to avoid ending up a fascist there was no other choice but to become-black" (TP 292). However, this misguided effort to disperse with Faulkner merely erases the very blackness that it claims to become. This approach hence fails to abandon privilege and, instead, sheds only the responsibility that one must take for one's privilege.

The term "becoming-animal" thus signals a complex and conflicted terrain with respect to Indigenous peoples. In this, a majoritarian politics is necessitated in order to gain access to basic human rights in a colonial context, which not only privileges certain individuals over others but also privileges humans over all else. Where, for Deleuze and Guattari, becoming-animal is a strategy intended to shed one's privilege, for First Nations peoples, *becoming-human* (an oxymoron for Deleuze and Guattari) is a necessary majoritarian strategy to gain rights and representation in states that did not, officially, acknowledge the humanity of the Indian until as recently as 1956. But becoming-human is also a form of assimilation that renders Aboriginals imperceptible in the worst kind of way. Indeed, it is intended to make these culturally distinct peoples disappear altogether (through a process of "whitening"). In point of fact, cultural genocide was an overt policy objective of the Canadian and American governments that has resulted in the extreme exploitation and marginalization of Aboriginal peoples today.

CRITIQUE OF BECOMING-ANIMAL

The distinction between becoming-animal and dehumanization possesses an interesting twofold dilemma for Aboriginals in the colonial context of the Americas. First, there are the difficulties of cultural misconceptions and their subsequent romanticizations (i.e., "stewards of the land" or "at one with nature"). In such instances, First Peoples' relationship to nature/animals is interpreted as a self-referential kind of agency that simply domesticates nature/animals by assimilating them into a totemic collapse of "symbolic correspondence" (TP 247–48). According to Deleuze and Guattari, totemic relationships merely draw "us into a narcissistic contemplation" (TP 240). On the other hand, First Peoples are persistently dehumanized on the basis of their *Indianness*. Indeed, debates ensued throughout the colonial era questioning whether native peoples were, in fact, even human. In the United States, Indigenous inhabitants gained legal *human* status in the 1879 Standing Bear trial[10], whilst in Canada they did not enjoy the citizenship rights of adult humans until 1956, nor did they have the right to vote until 1960[11].

Indigenous philosophies and methodologies are strikingly different from those of the colonial newcomers. While Aboriginal ontologies vary, generally, they understand existence as a kind of relational becoming, a discourse between all that exists. Humans do not assume primacy in these theories of co-existence. Rather, agency and interdependence are not only recognized between human and animal relations but also identified in and amongst animate and inanimate, material and incorporeal entities. Political and social structures, reflecting this cosmology, tend to be consensual rather than hierarchical, acknowledge fluid subject positions and non-binary gender variance, have equal gender relations and are often egalitarian. These realities, which might be defined as "minoritarian", were not only foreign to emerging settler societies but also inconceivable as anything other than a beastly threat. Even so, the continued impoverished existence of Indigenous populations today challenges the growing idealized fantasies of an impartial posthumanism. Both derogatory and romantic *Indian* images project versions of becoming-animal onto Aboriginal peoples, in modes that have resulted in complicated social inequities, which are equated with a depraved and essential animality (wild and domestic). In this, complex Indigenous cultures are reduced to mythologies, their assertions defined as reactionary and previously as instinctual, instead of a kind of reason undertaken along culturally distinct lines of co-responsiveness (equated with intuition). As such, they are rendered as dependent Others to the tolerant West.

The identification of injustices makes necessary a majoritarian politics by, and for, Indigenous populations confronted with the harsh realities of living in a colonized homeland. Yet majoritarian politics concretize these groups as hapless minorities, once more stripped of agency (yet again

depicted as teetering on the edge of extinction)[12]. This *charitable* gesture at inclusion (extended to the "underprivileged") both solidifies this space of oppression and is contaminated with the residue of a *self-inflicted primitivism*. Hence, Aboriginal peoples continue to be feared, pitied and romanticized, for the unknown Otherness of the constructed Indian retains the façade of a self-generating beastliness. The view that Indigenous cultures lack sophistication is often alluded to as the "real" underlying source of the inequities experienced by their members. This perspective unfolds as a form of blindness, or denial, of the socio-political and economic structures that perpetuate disenfranchisement arising from colonial policies and their contemporary consequences (such as the complex and continually unfolding devastation resulting from residential school abuses). Oversights such as these fail to address the radical disparities that still exist between Western and Indigenous philosophies, values, and cultures (despite any cross-fertilization). These profound differences (some obvious and many others intricate and subtle) aggravate postcolonial relations, but herein also lies the possibility of a new conversation and a new set of relations.

UNDRESSING THE BEAUTIFUL SAVAGE

The difficulties presented by this mix of stereotypes with so-called authentic traditional expressions is the dilemma that artists Lori Blondeau and Adrian Stimson subvert in performance works that take up the theme of Buffalo Bill and the Wild West. These performances address the relationship between historical and contemporary Western fears and desires, which are identified in the figure of the Indian. Having formed new assemblages with the West, traces of this imaginary figure can be glimpsed haunting the critical and uncritical terrain of contemporary Indigenous cultures. Stimson and Blondeau seize the contradiction, whereby the imaginary Indian figure is both taken up and resisted by contemporary Indigenous peoples.

Blondeau's persona *Belle Sauvage*, based on real turn-of-the-twentieth-century Buffalo Bill's Wild West performers Molly Spotted Elk and Lost Bird, is, as art critic Lynne Bell describes, both believable and absurd. In *A Moment in the Life of Belle Sauvage* (2002), Blondeau creates a cathartic camp melodrama in the guise of a historical Wild West show. She uses parody to disrupt the hegemony of colonial memory, as Bell writes, "challenging and disempowering the inherited violence embedded in Western ways of knowing the world"[13]. Queer Indian cowgirls and cowboys who live between worlds populate Blondeau's Old West. Stimson's Buffalo Boy likewise represents the negotiation of multiplicity: Bell describes Buffalo Boy as multi-gendered, "neither human, beast, boy nor

girl—giv[ing] us access to the *trans*, to the crossing of boundaries, to metamorphosis and the hybrid"[14].

Stimson's 2005 site-specific exhibition, *Buffalo Boy's Heart On: Buffalo Boy's 100 Years of Wearing His Heart on His Sleeve*, presents a centennial counter-memory that disrupts dominant provincial histories of white settler culture by inserting the parodic, campy Buffalo Boy into historical photos. In these, Stimson re-envisions the assimilationist project of residential schools, recounts the buffalo slaughter and points to other colonial events. In a performance series called *Buffalo Boy's Wild West Peep Show*, Buffalo Boy camps it up while dancing to powwow music, the soundtrack of *Dances with Wolves* and techno-Aboriginal music. As Stimson changes costumes and roles, audience members witness the transformation of Buffalo Boy as he crosses multiple identities that range "from the corporate Indian to traditional powwow dancer to shaman-exterminator" while spectators watch through a peephole in his studio or performance space (Bell 2007, 47). The phenomenological experience of bending down to voyeuristically peer through a peephole, beyond closed doors, forces audience members to embody the perverse historical advances made by the West. It implicates and challenges audiences to consider the continuation of these roles in undressing and redressing Indigenous becomings as the monstrous and profane. In their performance works, Blondeau and Stimson flaunt their queer bestial intersubjective becomings as that which continues to lie beyond the taming reach of the West.

Blondeau and Stimson engage with transforming identities/stereotypes of North American Indigenous peoples by creating personas that are multiplicities, patching together stereotypes and traditional Aboriginal roles. As the "*Sauvage*" and "Buffalo" nominations suggest, these roles are cast in a spectacle of the becoming-animal. The performances employ humour in order to confront the limitations and complexities of contemporary Indigenous identities as they evolve in relation to settler societies. In the passing through of becoming, these artists form a block between the multiple positions to which each has been subjected and to the expectations placed on them by both Aboriginal and Western contexts. Blondeau and Stimson's critiques emerge from Indigenous worldviews that operate outside, and simultaneously inside, Western human/posthuman conventions. As a result, unlike Deleuze and Guattari, they are able to avoid the persistent infection of humanism in its alternative.

BECOMING-HUMAN

Deleuze and Guattari's complex analysis of becoming appears, on the surface, to break with traditional Western epistemological models. However, not only do they begin with a humanist approach, but the sweeping intensities, stirred in these blocks of becoming, also arise in conjunction

with the embodied cognitive subject intersecting with his or her surroundings. This thinking subject, furthermore, defines and thus also colonizes his or her reality even while moving in amongst these torrents of relational becomings. These becomings-animal must be rethought at the intersection of contingency and deliberation. The many instances of power exerted through or amidst an infinite set of purposeful calculations and unforeseen ruptures in identity formation work hand-in-hand to undo lines of flight that become arrested in the *will* and *choice* necessary for making microdistinctions. Thus, Deleuze and Guattari's becoming-animal not only erases the majoritarian cause of dispossession for minority groups but also allows individual accountability for privilege to fade out of sight, as a different sort of vanishing line or line of flight. Similarly, the blocks of becoming, as proposed by these authors, perpetually cast away human responsibility. On the one hand, the phenomenon of "becoming" in Deleuze and Guattari's sense appears to be marked with a kind of abandonment, in which one is swept up into "interassemblage haecceities" in an experience of pure affect (TP 262). Yet, with regard to the "thought-provoking" composition that becoming-animal stirs, they write,

> [I]t is in him that the animal "bares his teeth at monstrous fate". It is not a feeling of pity, as he makes clear; still less an identification. It is a composition of speeds and affects involving entirely different individuals, a symbiosis; it makes the rat become a thought, a feverish thought in the man, at the same time as the man becomes a rat gnashing its teeth in its death throes. The man and the rat are in no means the same thing, but Being expresses them both in a single meaning in a language that is no longer that of words. (TP 258)

This assemblage between rat and man does not merely arise from an uncontrollable rupture that sweeps the man away by affect. Regardless of the intensity of the fever, or however passionate the impulse, that wells up inside the block of becoming experienced by the man (which plummets him into dispersing with the dying rat), this affect of becoming-rat is filtered through what "is in him" as an embodied experience operating in conjunction with abstract cognitive processes (TP 258). This affect is filtered through a "thought" that not only is "in the man" but also *becomes* the man (TP 258). These becomings depend on this "feverish thought" (TP 258), but this undertaking also requires subjective volition, which is "applied in the course of events" to the "criteria" that "guide us through the dangers" indicative of becomings and multiplicities (TP 251). To reiterate, Deleuze and Guattari write that one should

> not imitate a dog; but make your organism enter into composition with something else in such a way that the particles emitted from the aggregate thus composed will be canine as a function of the relation of move-

> ment and rest, or of molecular proximity, into which they enter. (TP 274)

This rationale, necessary in determining the "criterion" along with the decisive act required for motivating "your organism" to assemble with a particular aggregate in a particular way, implicitly conveys the idea that such a self-possession and endeavour unequivocally proceed from a self-willing agent who would, presumably, do so according to the balanced calculation of gains and losses. Even the momentary lapses, when one is swept up into the affect of the pack without predetermined reflection, are overridden by the *decision* to act according to the *making* of a subjective agency.

The deterritorialized becomings of becoming-animal thus take on a decidedly humanist aspect, for its authors cannot help but territorialize their Other, as they mark out their own space of deterritorialization. These self-identified sorcerer/shamans usher in our more recent reflections on affect. However, along with Buffalo Bill (the great entertainer and Indian killer), they, too, represent a new breed of colonizer. This veiled imperialism is dressed in drag to conceal humanism, dressed down as posthumanism, for the show. Yet the becoming-animal concept is dependent on human-centric practices:

> ([Y]ou can become-dog with cats, or become monkey with a horse), or an apparatus or prosthesis to which a person subjects the animal (muzzle and reindeer, etc.), or something that does not even have a localizable relation to the animal in question. (TP 274)

The "you" addressed is clearly directed towards human consciousness. Moreover, it is directed towards the subjection of all else that is drawn into this vortex of human-centred general causalities. Thus, the subject as such transforms difference into what is most human and most relatable to itself.

The human centre, concealed in Deleuze and Guattari's complex *post-human* labyrinth, is the threshold through which the concept of becoming-animal is underscored by its link to becoming-woman. Here, sexual difference is ranked first in a hierarchy of oppressions that characterize (Western) human relations to difference (as in second-wave feminism). To this effect, these Western theorists contend that "becoming-woman is the first quantum, or molecular segment, with the becomings-animal that link up with it coming next" (TP 279). On the one hand, their theory of merging and dissipating blocks of becoming attempts to obviate a misperception of time, read as chronological points of reference, since (according to Deleuze and Guattari) existence is composed of pure process, in which we are always already on route to becoming something else. However, by stating that becoming first arises from humans, Deleuze and Guattari suggest that this "first", even if it jumps between and enters the middle, implicitly conveys the idea that the movement proceeding

from this entity (an assemblage that spreads from a "minimum" amount of retained form) is paramount as a centrality of force (TP 270). It would then contract, expand and circulate around and within these particles. Becomings-animal, in this instance, is implicated as a human-specific—or at least human-centred—endeavour (driven by the micro-instances of the human consciousness—around which Deleuze and Guattari constantly reassemble in their collaborations), which in turn evokes subjectivity that further entrenches the becoming-animal theory in the thinking subject of humanism.

CONCLUSION

These criticisms notwithstanding, Deleuze and Guattari do present a philosophy of becoming that strives to open itself towards difference. However, the fact that this can also be said of humanism (that rationalizing agent of imperialism) should not be forgotten. No doubt, these authors are sincere in their efforts at decolonization and see themselves as allies who strive to think about becoming and multi-species relationality, according to the philosophical principles of Indigenous peoples, amongst other influences. And they are not entirely without success, although a comparative analysis of *A Thousand Plateaus* in relation to Indigenous philosophies is beyond the scope of this chapter. Nevertheless, there is a tendency, especially in popular scholarship responding to this text, to romanticize these authors, along with concepts such as becoming-animal and nomadism, and to overlook or even celebrate their territorialization of Indigenous thought. Deleuze and Guattari are philosophers whose texts are grounded deeply in the Western canon: uncritical and romantic readings fail to do them justice. And they certainly fail to do justice to complex Indigenous philosophies and violent colonial histories. Such misguided readings provide the context in which *A Thousand Plateaus* begins to resemble the greatest show on earth, and they also reduce becoming-animal to the fictional status of a New Age shaman.

Yet, even the greatest show on earth can be a site of decolonization, and an opening for Indigenous critics to talk back. This is certainly the message forwarded by those tricksters *Belle Sauvage* and Buffalo Boy, who simultaneously subvert cowboy and cowgirl conceptions along with the iconic Buffalo Bill image (which epitomize American political *shoot-from-the-hip* ideals). Indeed, William Cody is initiated into becoming Buffalo Bill through his encounter with the anomalous Indian (synonymous to his buffalo-hunting excursions). It is also through this meeting that his majoritarian stardom, as the figure of the West, is won. However, with their re-envisioning, and trajectories of becoming, *Belle Sauvage* and Buffalo Boy "deflower" the machismo of Buffalo Bill's hetero-normativity and dispute the dehumanizing objectification of Aboriginal peoples by

critically engaging with these Western stereotypes. They become, in their humorous performance characterizations, the object becoming-nonobject with their interrogation of these crucial junctures.

The transformative becoming-minoritarian influence of the Indian or, rather, of Indigenous peoples is not restricted to these contemporary performance artists, for it would appear that the Aboriginal performers of Buffalo Bill's Wild West (including Sitting Bull, twenty of his warriors and their families) also possessed the transformative powers of the anomalous Other. Historical testimonies portray Buffalo Bill as a humanitarian and an environmentalist who provided decent work to disadvantaged peoples. Ironic as this seems, for the celebrated buffalo hunter and Indian killer, it appears that William Cody's anomalous Other did have the effect of stirring a real becoming-animal, in Deleuze and Guattari's revolutionary sense, initiating a new assemblage in a context that was shifting under Cody's own transformations.

The later Buffalo Bill did experience a dispersal of personal identities that led to his recognition of the molar possibilities of his new Lakota Sioux friends. In this regard he became an advocate, not only for the rights of native peoples and the honouring of treaties but also for the establishment of a hunting season (to prevent the extinction of the buffalo) and for the rights of women to work of their own choosing for equal pay. One can only surmise that his change in attitude resulted from years of living, in a line of flight, between worlds, in close proximity with his anomalous Other—under the influence of these Indigenous cast members. Although Buffalo Bill still represented Aboriginals as bloodthirsty savages in the exhibition battles, he also included an Indian village in the show that portrayed Lakota Sioux cast members as human—just regular families from another culture. This was achieved by having cast members set up and dwell in their nomadic settlements alongside the exhibition grounds, which gave audiences access to their actual homes and day-to-day activities. Here again, we see the to-and-fro becoming-exploitation of the transformation from beast to domestic animal through the assimilation or becoming-human of these Indigenous performers.

Deleuze and Guattari contend, "All so-called initiatory journeys include these thresholds and doors, where becoming itself becomes" (TP 246). The multiple and divergent choices of William Cody and the becoming of his celebrity alter ego Buffalo Bill arise at the cost of First Peoples' exploitation and misrepresentation as savages in his Wild West expositions. Likewise, the initiatory journey of *Belle Sauvage* and Buffalo Boy's plural identities are ushered in through Buffalo Bill's imaginary relation to the territorialization, and simultaneous deterritorialization, of the Americas (which physically displaced Indigenous populations).

The characterization of Aboriginal peoples as savages, brought to life in the figure of the Red Indian, justified measures aimed at assimilation and eradication. This colonial project was epitomized in the widespread

slaughter of the buffalo, the backdrop against which the buffalo killer reels out of fear of his own dissection and dispersion. Buffalo Bill's subsequent humanitarian efforts do not distance him from his more famous earlier exploits any more than Stephen Harper's apology for residential schools[15] erases the history of colonization (despite the Prime Minister's efforts to do just that when the following year he made the audacious claim that Canada "has no history of colonization")[16].

North and South American Indigenous populations still live with colonial violence; yet they persist as culturally distinct societies with unique philosophical traditions. At the same time, these cultures are not immutable. They exist in dialogue with settler societies and continue to adapt in the current context of global diversity. Moreover, despite the deployment of strategies to re-invigorate cultural distinctiveness, in response to state assimilation policies, Aboriginal peoples are "traditionally" open to newness as an inevitable aspect of their relational ontologies and oral practices. As such, storytelling is an engagement of iterable repetition as opposed to a mere restaging of fossilized narratives. This call to newness or to the "unknown" permeates many of these philosophies, often as a tacit subtext that paradoxically conforms to established conventions. Encounters with global philosophies, assimilation policies and the prevalence of misrepresentations and stereotypes render these distinctions impossible to fully disentangle from the doorways that usher in their transmutations.

Thus, while Deleuze and Guattari may be "content to mark the thresholds through which an idea passes" (TP 235), Indigenous peoples cannot afford to *uncritically* allow ideas (either about them or appropriated from them) to float freely across their borders. Indeed, such ideas threaten to (de)territorialize them once again, for these thresholds are not only "marked" but they also have the capacity to mark back. These inscriptions not only verify that a threshold has been traversed but also record a series of permanent transformations. This is particularly problematic considering that such encounters have consistently resulted in explicit attempts to efface divergent Indigenous practices. Knowledge derived from these practices is, subsequently, displaced as myth (too fragmentary, varied and disparate to authenticate). In contrast, Western thought is equally often aligned with fact, which is profoundly validated by its own history of textual citation and logical correspondence.

Becoming-animal is an affair of sorcery because it involves being and becoming multiple things at once—Cody and Buffalo Bill, killer and rights advocate, human and animal, becoming-animal, becoming-dehumanized and becoming-inhumane as he becomes-human through the Other: memory and counter-memory. The line that vanishes as it takes flight is a tricky one—the *Anishinaabe* capture it in tales of tricksters like *Belle Sauvage* and Buffalo Boy. Deleuze and Guattari might be tricksters too, for that line of flight, in becoming-animal, is an undecidable one. Yet

to glamorize this dispersion is to deny this perpetually reassembling and inherent passage through liberal humanism. Regardless of how fleeting, this fluctuation between dissolving and assembling unfailingly inaugurates a subjective historically positioned and particularized mark of individualism. Thus, these assemblages also circulate within, re-gather around and perpetuate molar assertions, which are all the more veiled but, nonetheless, actualized.

NOTES

1. Joy S. Kasson, *Buffalo Bill's Wild West: Celebrity, Memory, and Popular History* (New York: Hill and Wang, 2000), 15.

2. The term "Indian" is employed ironically throughout this chapter to refer to the misnomer (still embedded in policies such as Canada's Indian Act) that collapses all the diverse Indigenous cultures of the Americas into one monolithic stereotype; while I refer to *actual* Indigenous peoples as Aboriginal, native, First Nation, First People, *Anishinaabe*, or in their specificity as Ojibwe, Lakota Sioux and so forth, "Aboriginal" is another generalizing term used in Canadian policy, and thus it, too, is a source of contention.

3. See, for example, John Paskievich, dir., *If Only I Were an Indian* (National Film Board of Canada, 1996).

4. William Cody, *An Autobiography of Buffalo Bill* (1879), Project Gutenberg, http://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/12740 (accessed January 14, 2014).

5. It was rumoured that upon John Cabot's inaugural voyage to the "Americas", he had observed the Newfoundland Beothuck "Indians" with their entire bodies painted in red ochre. This contributed to the widespread identification of all Indigenous peoples of the Americas as the "Red Man". See James P. Howley, *The Beothucks or Red Indians: The Aboriginal Inhabitants of Newfoundland* (Toronto: Coles, 1980), i. This misnomer spread throughout Europe and mutated into the "Red Indian".

6. As opposed to dismantling the threat posed by the "Red Man", these early assimilation projects actually created, pronounced and doubled his menacing presence. This then produced racialized fictions with material effects (such as abject poverty and the disproportionate incarceration of Indigenous populations). However, the offensive "offspring" of these interventions (that being the intergenerational effects of colonialism) assume the form of so many communal abuses that range from minor dysfunction to extreme expressions of trauma. As such, these symptoms have now penetrated that perceived *essential* difference, which undergirds these stereotypes. Indeed, today trauma lines the very consciousness of Indigenous communities who grapple with how to appreciate their distinct cultures before, aside and amidst these colonial catastrophes.

7. Daniel Francis, *Imaginary Indian: The Image of the Indian in Canadian Culture* (Vancouver: Arsenal Pulp Press, 1992).

8. *Indinawemaaganidog*, "all my relations/relatives", is an Ojibwe expression of respect and gratitude. It is a mediating phrase, often employed in prayer, acknowledging our openness and dependence (as the youngest and most fallible entities) towards all that is *unknown* and Other, but that, nevertheless, makes possible our own existence.

9. Donna M. Wilson and Herbert C. Northcott, *Death and Dying in Canada* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2008), 25–27.

10. Stephen Dando-Collins, *Standing Bear Is a Person* (New York: Da Capo Press, 2004).

11. John Leslie and Ron Maguire, eds., *The Historical Development of the Indian Act*, 2nd ed. (Ottawa: Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, 1978).

12. This is not unlike the images of vanishing tribes, popularized in American media, scholarship and Wild West literature of the recent past. Indeed, the theme of the vanishing Indian was a key marketing ploy of Buffalo Bill's Wild West (Kasson, *Buffalo Bill's Wild West*, 17).

13. Lynne Bell, "Scandalous Personas, Difficult Knowledge, Restless Images: The Work of Lori Blondeau", *Canadian Art* 21, no. 1 (2004): 51.

14. Lynne Bell, "Buffalo Boy at Burning Man: Camp, Mourning and the Forgiving of History in the Work of Adrian Stimson", *Canadian Art* 24, no. 2 (2007): 44.

15. Stephen Harper, "Statement of Apology—to Former Students of Indian Residential Schools", Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, June 11, 2008, http://www.aadnc-aandc.gc.ca/eng/1100100015644/1100100015649 (accessed January 14, 2014).

16. Canada Newswire, "Prime Minister Harper Denies Colonialism in Canada at G20", *Canada Newswire*, September 29, 2009, http://www.newswire.ca/en/story/534215/prime-minister-harper-denies-colonialism-in-canada-at-g20 (accessed January 14, 2014).

Conclusion

Some Questions in Lieu of Conclusions

Jim Vernon

A collection of voices on topics this diverse obviously does not admit a summary conclusion. Rather than seeking to draw firm lessons from the preceding chapters, I would like to close by simply indicating two sets of questions regarding the relationship between art and philosophy in the work of Deleuze and Guattari. These questions are tentatively posed and do not necessarily reflect the views of the contributors. Thus, I raise them not so much because they clarify the status of art in the philosophers' thought, but because it is precisely the tensions surrounding that status that lead us from art to broader issues in Deleuzo-Guattarian philosophy that, in my view, demand further research.

Many of the chapters in the first part raise concerns about the incorporation of aesthetic works or terms into Deleuze or Guattari's conceptual creations. Several authors express reservations regarding the accuracy with which aesthetic components are rendered in philosophical works that treat them either conceptually or as exemplars. One problem arising from these chapters concerns what is lost in terms of the specific nature of the actual percept at issue (e.g., Susan's suicide attempt), the material context of the work's production (e.g., Bacon's tortured upbringing), the wider field of aesthetic production (e.g., non-"serious" music) or other aesthetic and conceptual "externalities" (e.g., colonial history), when such beings become components of a distinct, previously unrelated concept. In drawing aesthetic (and other non-philosophical) material into their philosophical work, Deleuze and Guattari often seem insufficiently precise and sometimes even cavalier.

Of course, as *What Is Philosophy?* informs us, a concept "has no *reference*: it is self-referential [and] posits itself and its object at the same time as it is created" (WP 22). A concept relates components, which exist independently outside of it (in other fields, or other concepts), into unique condensations, rendering them inseparable (if still distinct) within itself. As such, a "concept is an incorporeal [and thus is] not mixed up with the state of affairs in which it is effectuated" (WP 21) or from which it draws components. If philosophy's concepts draw upon states of affairs either

in their creation or in their exposition, their radical subtraction from such material entities as "blocs of percepts and affects" (WP 164) ensures their freedom from constraint by them. The "task of philosophy . . . is always to extract an event from things and beings, to set up a new event from" them (WP 33). As such, philosophy's creations are not to be judged in accordance with the nature of the beings and things from which such events are extracted. A philosopher's concepts, although extracted from extra-conceptual beings and things, "can only be assessed as a function of their problems and their plane" rather than by anything external to them (WP 27). Since a "concept always has the truth that falls to it as a function of the conditions of its creation", it cannot be judged as true or false, or careful or careless with its external components (WP 27). While concepts clearly must be consistent, and thus not arbitrary or slapdash assemblages of components, as many of the previous chapters indicate, such "creative" philosophy nevertheless often makes idiosyncratic or possibly implausible use of artistic materials, even as rendered consistently in concepts, aesthetic or otherwise. Nevertheless, regardless of the material, social, historical or critical relations that inform artistic creation, Deleuze and Guattari insist that philosophy remain uncontaminated by concerns arising from its extra-philosophical component materials, and thus are unperturbed by such judgements.

As such, one set of questions this volume raises concerns this very distance that Deleuzo-Guattarian philosophy grants itself from the artworks upon which it draws so heavily. If philosophy can (and, arguably, can only) create concepts by drawing components out of non-conceptual fields, why should philosophers (and even non-philosophers) not judge the consistency of the resulting conceptual creations in accordance with the precise nature of the external components of which they make use? If the sheets of past are not, in fact, discernible in *Citizen Kane*, does this amount to a refutation, or at least require a modification, of the concept formed from or expounded through it? If Bacon's twisted figures are inseparable from the violence of the world outside them, does the philosophical presentation of them as so independent not seem lacking? If Deleuze's central example of his and Guattari's own conceptual creation, the refrain or *ritornello*[1], is so constituted that its aesthetic consequences exclude the vast majority of music, is this concept not of limited theoretical or pragmatic value? If the answer to such questions is negative, then it seems there are no real limits to philosophical use, or even abuse, of aesthetic (and, by extension, scientific, historical, etc.) material, so long as the philosopher can show some manner of consistency for what results from it.

This, of course, invokes one of the traditional charges laid against Deleuzean thought, perhaps first laid out by the infamous "harsh critic" of Deleuze's "Letter"[2] (i.e., that it makes use of material from outside its purview without either understanding of or sympathy for the varied,

nuanced and specific relations that constitute it). It would seem, at least intuitively, that there must be *some* limits to conceptual creation, and that drawing these must invoke some role for the judgement of practitioners better qualified in non-philosophical fields to judge the use of some components. Many of the authors collected here, maintaining their broadly Deleuzean orientations, have begun to indicate alternate conceptualizations or expositions that preserve the gains made by Deleuze and Guattari while incorporating corrections that preserve the specificity of various external components. However, Deleuze and Guattari appear to "have nothing to admit" to their critics on this score, with Deleuze insisting, "Why shouldn't I invent some way, however fantastic and contrived, of talking about something, without someone having to ask whether I'm qualified to talk like that?"[3] With many of their adherents increasingly reliant on developments in art, science and other fields as "proofs" for their conceptual creations, future research into Deleuze and Guattari should be devoted to settling questions concerning the status of extra-philosophical components in their philosophy.

Of course, since "Deleuze is the first to recognise [that] it is futile to argue about whether . . . a concept is literally right or wrong"[4], Deleuzeans have often defended such concepts by their pragmatic consequences, or what they allow us to do. In other words, for many, the "question is not: is it true? But: does it work? . . . What new sensations and perceptions does it open" up for us[5]? This leads to my second series of questions, raised by the aesthetic "applications" in part II. As these chapters indicate, (often critical) appropriations of Deleuzean and/or Guattarian concepts (aesthetic or otherwise) by working artists can be and have been remarkably effective in producing novel and potentially philosophically interesting artworks. This, of course, seems entirely in keeping with the spirit of such a thoroughly pragmatic, creative and experimental philosophy. As they write, "A rich tissue of correspondences can be established between" art and philosophy precisely because "[e]ach created element" in one field "calls on other heterogeneous elements, which are still to be created on other planes" (WP 199). Thus, Deleuzo-Guattarian philosophy seems particularly suited to inspire the proliferation of varied forms of artistic production.

However, the very incorporeity of the concepts invoked in this book to set limits on the influence that artists and artworks can have on philosophy is also, in part, utilized by Deleuze and Guattari to set limits on the "true" creation of percepts. While always at pains to affirm that thoughtful creation occurs "through concepts . . . or sensations, and no one of these thoughts is better than another" (WP 198), Deleuze and Guattari nevertheless maintain that the "concept belongs to philosophy and only to philosophy" (WP 34). As such, artists who seek to either create or aesthetically effectuate concepts find themselves subject to philosophical critique. The account of the percept in *What Is Philosophy?*, for example,

closes with a critique of "conceptual artists" for seeking to synthesize two modes of thoughtful creation (WP 198), and, at various times, abstract painting (e.g., Mondrian)[6] and music (e.g., Schoenberg)[7] are similarly charged with weakening affective creation by employing non-aesthetic modes of thought. Such works, relying on conceptual material for their constitution, inevitably (and often consciously) raise the questions "But is it art?" "Is this music or just noise?" and so on, and thus force the work's existence as art to "depend . . . upon the simple 'opinion' of a spectator who . . . decides whether or not it is art" (WP 198), rather than on perceptual material alone. Art, seeking to render concepts perceptual or percepts conceptual, attains neither the concept nor the percept, but falls from abstraction into the subjective opinion of artists and audiences.

Thus, my second set of questions concerns philosophy's jurisdiction over the arts. As several of this volume's chapters indicate, Deleuze and Guattari seem unnecessarily to draw limits to the possibilities of artistic production, either within the specific arts or in contemporary artistic production in general. Why, precisely, should artists not seek to extend the regime of aesthetic production to include effectuated concepts or to create works intended to inspire conceptual development? Why should art necessarily be unconcerned with either subjective satisfaction or audience reaction? If artists and art theorists cannot judge philosophy from their own external expertise, why, precisely, do Deleuze and Guattari retain the right to appraise art as art from the position of philosophy?

This last question, of course, could be asked of any philosophical aesthetics, but it seems particularly pressing when it comes to the philosophers who form the focus of this volume. There are perhaps no late twentieth-century philosophers whose work seems ripe to inspire—and arguably has inspired—more artistic production than Deleuze and Guattari, and yet they insist on retaining the traditional division between concepts and affects, as well as the traditional hierarchy that grants philosophy special rights over all of its "others", art included, rather than the reverse. If philosophers can talk about art without qualifications, why should artists not feel free to paint or compose philosophically, no matter the results? Are artists who draw upon their philosophy, then, in fact violating its austere, sober letter? Or are they, to the contrary, actualizing its pragmatic, creative spirit precisely by evading its proscriptions against certain artistic fields and modes of creation?

I do not raise these questions because they are definitive, but they do strike me as indicative of how (at least some) future research into Deleuze and Guattari and the arts (and in general) must proceed. On the one hand, the brilliance of their conceptual creations seems to demand that we work to "correct" tensions in them produced by what they draw from art (and science, history, etc.), but, on the other hand, this contradicts their own definition of philosophical activity, re-instantiating "true" and "false" reference or effectuation as modes of conceptual judgement. Simi-

larly, their work seems to call implicitly for artistic (and scientific, political, etc.) effectuation, and yet nevertheless makes "schizo-nomadic art" (and science and politics) a contradiction in terms, blurring the boundaries, as it does, between distinct modes of thought. Are we truer to the enterprise of philosophy if we appraise Deleuze and Guattari's thought from the outside? Or should their account of conceptual creation liberate us from the "accurate" deployment of aesthetic components in philosophy? Should artists be wary of drawing too insistently on Deleuzo-Guattarian concepts, lest their work lose its aesthetic rigour, or is it precisely by crossing lines that their work gains speed and vigour? We hope future researchers will find these chapters useful both in posing these questions more precisely and forcefully and eventually in answering them.

NOTES

1. Gilles Deleuze, *Two Regimes of Madness: Texts and Interviews, 1975–1995* (New York: Semiotext(e), 2006), 381.
2. See Gilles Deleuze, "Letter to a Harsh Critic", in *Negotiations: 1972–1990* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), 3–12. Amongst other, less serious charges, this critic claimed (in Deleuze's summary) that he and Guattari were merely "capitalizing upon other people's experiments, on gays, drug-users, alcoholics, masochists, lunatics, and so on, vaguely savouring their transports and poisons without ever taking any risks" themselves (11), and thus lacked the qualifications to use the results of such experiments philosophically.
3. Deleuze, "Letter to a Harsh Critic", 12.
4. Peter Hallward, *Out of This World: Gilles Deleuze and the Philosophy of Creation* (London: Verso, 2006), 159.
5. Brian Massumi, "Translator's Foreword", in TP ix–xv (xv).
6. LS 84–85.
7. TP 350.

Index

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