Neoliberal Political Economy, Biopolitics and Colonialism

A Transcolonial Genealogy of Inequality

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Abstract

Foucault's analysis of the relation of power and the economy in the lectures given at the Collège de France between 1975 and 1979 opens up modern societies for a radically different interrogation of the relations of force inscribed in historically heterogeneous forms of wealth creation and distribution, but more specifically within the period of liberal capitalism. Its vast scope clears the ground for genealogies of power, political economy and race that demonstrate their intertwinement, yet he underplays several elements which have been central for the institution of the political economy of liberal capitalism, particularly regarding colonial expansion and subjugation, the prior existence of trade and other networks operating on a world scale, and politico-economic and technical developments, such as banking and finance, that acted as conditions of possibility. By redressing the balance, this article outlines a different genealogy of the emergence of biopolitics and the mechanisms supporting global capitalism, making visible the constitutive role of colonialism. It suggests elements for a more fundamental critique of inequality, one that relays the Foucaldian themes of economy, territory, security, population and race according to a longer periodization that reveals most economies to have been zero-sum games of 'winners' and 'losers'. Transcending this situation requires a radically different, transcolonial and transindividual understanding of the essentially collaborative and co-implicate character of the production of all life. The implications mean the rejection of ontologies that support not only neoliberalism but other forms of dispossession and pauperization, often allied to the hierarchization of difference, opening the way for a different history of the present and for imagining new economies and socialities.

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Reconstructing Foucault

AN ACCUMULATION of studies, even from people who simply want to reform the existing global economy, like Stiglitz (2001, 2002),[1] or Mann (2003), show that market capitalist economies are zero-sum games of winners and losers, unless systematic efforts are made to re-distribute wealth among all those who produce it. As Stiglitz bluntly puts it: 'Today, there is no respectable intellectual support for the proposition that markets, by themselves, lead to efficient, let alone equitable outcomes' (2001: vii). Yet, as this literature also demonstrates, neoliberalism has introduced systematic deregulation and privatization that have tilted the balance in favour of the power of 'capital' and devastated the poor. Stiglitz again:

> . . . the 'free marketeers' went further [in liberalization], with disastrous consequences for countries that followed their advice. . . . there was ample evidence that such liberalization could impose enormous risks on a country, and that those risks were borne disproportionately by the poor, while evidence that such liberalization promoted growth was scanty at best. (2001: ix, x)

To offset this reality, supporters of a mythical 'laissez-faire' system assert that the growth that liberal economies bring enables wealth to be shared around for the collective good, often referred to as the 'trickle-down' effect;[2] a supplement of this view, inscribed in neoliberalism, is that the poor have only themselves to blame, because of their backwardness, underdevelopment or their inadequacies as economic subjects.[3] This 'grand narrative' has its roots amongst the founders of laissez-faire liberalism like Adam Smith, who thought that an economy left to develop according to its 'natural' tendencies, without the distorting effects of state intervention, would not only reach equilibrium about the 'just' and 'fair' or 'true' price of commodities – a telling equivalence – but ensure the 'mutual enrichment' of both buyer and seller and benefit the society as a whole (Smith, 1812 [1776]: 352, 354).

Many issues clamour for attention here, not only questions of principles and models of the nature of the economy, the sustainability of economies based on unending aggregate growth, the causes of poverty, but also questions about underlying discursive and non-discursive mechanisms, such as economic theories or banking practices that link the two in the form of dispositifs, that is, in the form of mechanisms that can be operationalized to achieve desired ends; there remains in the background the problem of imagining a just society and alternative socialities, a problem which raises fundamental ethical and ontological issues. The reconstruction of Foucault's analysis of liberalism and biopolitics which this article is attempting does

not have the scope to address all these issues, yet it is informed by two related propositions that cross them, namely, that poverty is the result of a process of the production of the poor, through mechanisms established for the transfer of wealth that creates the categories of rich and poor, and that economies, unless limited by circumscribing rules, operate as zero-sum games of winners and losers. In Deleuze and Guattari's terms, such mechanisms are 'apparatuses of capture' (1988: 443–7). My aim in outlining a different genealogy of the emergence of liberalism is to demonstrate the fact that historically, on a world scale, liberal capitalism, as well as economies that have no place for redistributive justice, have always operated as zero-sum games; in short, what is accumulated by the rich is taken from the poor through a dispossession that pauperizes them. This dynamics operates at national as well at international levels through various forms of dispossession, subjugation or colonization, whether of territory, or minds, or of global assemblages and dispositifs; to some extent, Stiglitz's (2001) critique of neoliberal globalization updates such a standpoint, as Joxe (2002) and Harvey (2005) do more explicitly. The focus on pauperization counters the surprising neglect in many critiques of the present, say Hardt and Negri's *Empire*, where the issue of poverty only appears in a brief excursus (2000: 156–9), when we are told that the 'multitude' is 'the common name of the poor' (2000: 158). An implication of my approach is that the idea of free market capitalism as the best mechanism for the equitable and efficient distribution of resources, and the identification of the general or common good with what is good for business, is an ideological claim, made credible only by the erasure or invisibility of a counter-history of pauperization; it is this counter-history which is the stake in the alternative genealogy proposed here. Political power can thus be seen to be bound up with devices and strategies, that are both discursive and material, put in place to secure accumulation and inequality in its many forms.

Foucault's work, though insufficient by itself, helps to ground this aim because his demonstration of the intertwinement of political economy, biopolitics and power in his lectures given between 1975 and 1979 – *'Society Must Be Defended'* (1975–6; published in English 2003); *Security, Territory, Population* (1977–8; published in French 2004a, in English 2007) and *The Birth of Biopolitics* (1978–9; published in French 2004b, in English 2008) – brings to light a number of neglected correlations and transformations in Europe leading up to the modern assemblage of power. His demonstration that transformations in the form of state power can be correlated to the emergence of liberalism as a particular economic rationality, and to specific 'dispositifs' or apparatuses for the regulation of conduct, provides the backdrop for what one could call a transcolonial genealogy of political economy. At least, this is the perspective from which this article makes more visible the dynamics linking forms of political rationality to systems for the appropriation and accumulation of wealth and to biopolitics as a government of the social; from this perspective, colonial dispossession can be seen to be but one form of a more general economy of inequality and

violence, as passages in *'Society Must Be Defended'* and Deleuze and Guattari's (1975: 266–75, 1988: 437–48) analysis of the interrelationship of accumulation, money and capital allow us to conclude.

If we take the three lectures as forming a series, one could argue that there are two overlapping genealogies running through them: first, that of shifts in the form of power in Europe, from the sovereign form of power and the 'discourse of race war' prevalent before the 18th century, through the notions of police, and disciplinary and pastoral power after the Westphalian settlement in 1648, then to modern biopolitical governmentality in the 19th century and finally to an environmental 'vitalpolitics' of the social in contemporary times; second, that of political economy from mercantilism (16th to 18th centuries) to the physiocrats in the 18th century, to the emergence of liberalism (mainly 19th century) and its reconfiguration as ordo- and neoliberalism more recently. In Foucault, a number of key concepts, principally those of security, population, circulation, liberalism, biopower and biopolitics, punctuate and hook up these two series, enabling us to follow the logics at work; equally, this line of thought makes it possible to reconstitute these key developments as a history of the postcolonial present, namely, by re-inscribing in this history the elements which have a purchase for an analysis of our times but which are absent or signalled without elaboration in the lectures.

It must be said that the critique of liberalism and neoliberalism in Foucault focuses largely on discourses – those of the physiocrats, classical political economy and the key works of the German ordoliberals and American neoliberals – and on Europe (regarding the genealogy of biopolitics); it thus neglects the effects of the rest of the world on their emergence – and there is more than just colonialism as a condition that is missed in this neglect. There are, however, two crucial if underdeveloped arguments that recognize the place of colonialism in the mutations he reconstructs, namely, in *'Society Must Be Defended'* when he relates colonialism to the development of 'political and juridical weapons' re-exported to Europe (2003: 103) and to racism and 'colonial genocide' (2003: 257), and later, in an important section in *Security, Territory, Population*, where he points to the role of colonialism in the remaking of Europe by reference to Westphalia, to competition among states and to 'economic domination' as characteristic of Europe's relation to the rest of the world from the 17th century (2004a: 299–306).[4] Yet the term does not appear in the index of the latter book or in *Birth of Biopolitics* – which may well say more about the editors' eurocentrism. Nevertheless, this relative absence opens up a space for my contentions.

The connection between colonialism and unequal accumulation is now well established, say in Jalée (1981), Amin (1976), Emmanuel (1972), Todorov (1992) and more recently explored in Arrighi (1994); it is acknowledged in Adam Smith who highlights the great benefits for Europe of the 'discovery of America' contrasted to the 'savage injustices of the Europeans' that made colonization 'ruinous and destructive to several of those

unfortunate countries' (1812 [1776]: 348). Smith was speaking about the transformation in trade and the fortunes of Europe that the New World made possible, but one can go further and link the conquest of America with the emergence of mercantilism, and extend this wider view of economic transformation to relate liberal, 'laissez-faire' capitalism with the opening up of the 'East' for colonial empires and increased trade with Asia from around the middle of the 18th century, after the end of Portuguese monopoly in the region (India and South-East Asia, then later China and Japan). Arrighi (1994), Braudel (1986 [1979]) and Polanyi (2001 [1944]) agree about the crucial role played by this European expansion for the triumph of liberal capitalism, Braudel, for example, notes the inestimable importance of 'the "primitive accumulation" that the plundering of Bengal (after 1757) meant to the English' (1986 [1979]: 222). Arrighi has shown that the 'liberalization of the Indian trade' (referring to the abolition of the East India Company's monopoly) and 'political control over large, captive, unprotected economic spaces became the main source of external economies for British business. The Indian subcontinent, with its huge textile industry and commercialized agriculture, was by far the most important of these captive and unprotected economic spaces' (1986 [1979]: 262). Ruthless exploitation followed the imposition of 'free trade' – supported by the most brutal military means (Colley, 2002; Newsinger, 2006; Semmel, 2004) – while:

> Railroads, steamships, and the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 transformed India into a major source of cheap food and raw materials for Europe. . . . In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the large surplus in the Indian balance of payments became the pivot of the enlarged reproduction of Britain's world-scale processes of capital accumulation and of the City's mastery of world finance. (Braudel, 1986 [1979]: 263)

The fortunes made directly helped to consolidate and ground the politico-economic hegemony that Britain exercised in Europe during what Arrighi calls the 'Long Twentieth Century', starting with the defeat of the French by Britain in 1814 – a war financed by the loot from India – and inaugurating what Polanyi refers to as 'Pax Britannica' (Polanyi, 2001 [1944]: 14).

Furthermore, to complete the *longue durée* history of the relation of colonialism to economic discourse, we could add to it the third phase of European expansion, namely, the 'Scramble for Africa' and the 'Middle East' in the 1880s, tied to the second industrial revolution, built on oil, new minerals like aluminium, and the electrical and chemical industries, for which trade with Africa for raw materials and the appropriation of new unprotected economic spaces were vital. A new phase of globalization has a point of departure here too, that one can connect with the development of new financial instruments like the introduction of the Gold Standard (Polanyi, 2001 [1944]) – from which India is excluded to ensure unequal exchange – as well as new rivalries among economic and imperial powers, rivalries that led to the world wars. Much more can be said about this phase

than I can pursue here; my aim is simply to highlight the fact that the neglect of colonialism in Foucault results in an incomplete view of the economic landscape, while masking the function of pauperization or wealth transfer – say regarding the oil fields of the Arab region – in the twinned growth and consolidation of liberal capitalism and classical political economy in the 19th century that grounded biopolitics as a new form of power.

The bigger picture underlying the genealogy of liberalism and biopolitics that I am outlining makes visible not only the constitutive role of colonialism from 1492, but binds the genealogy not just with mercantilism at one end and neoliberalism at the other, as Foucault does, but also with the genealogy of Western modernity (Venn, 2000), with the development of the Industrial Revolution, with phases of globalization and with military power. By adding the historical context beyond Europe, one can begin to construct an analytical framework that integrates the economic, the political, the technical and the discursive in a more complex and revealing way than Foucault does. It makes visible too what the 'invisible hand' of free market or laissez-faire capitalism hides from view, that is, not only the pauperization which is intrinsic to it, but also the fact that:

> [T]here is nothing natural about laissez-faire; free markets could not have come into being merely by allowing things to take their course. Just as cotton manufactures – the leading free trade industry – were created by the help of protective tariffs, export bounties, and indirect wage subsidies, laissez-faire itself was enforced by the state. (Polanyi, 2001 [1944]: 145)

I can now proceed to uncover the line of development in Foucault's three texts, using this reconstruction to bring to the fore the elements I have been outlining and to account for their functioning in constituting the global situation that a 'transcolonial' genealogy tries to reveal; this analysis throws new light on the relations of biopower and biopolitics to economy, power and inequality.

Unpacking Neoliberalism: From Naturalism to Enterprise Society

In his analysis of the elements that characterize neoliberalism, Foucault highlights the underlying politico-economic rationality that has increasingly been generalized to the domain of the social, reconstituting the latter in the form of an 'enterprise society' conducive to its logic, with implications for the form of the subject, as a new *homo oeconomicus*, and the form of power that it creates and inscribes. The ordoliberals well understood that economies do not arise from the play of natural forces that would generate markets and appropriate conduct; they are instead historically specific constructs that require the active and constant support of a whole range of state apparatuses, laws, norms of conduct, practical know-how, particular subjectivities and so on, that is, dispositifs that will have emerged and

evolved as historically specific mechanisms for constituting particular economies. This is why they argued for the importance of controlling the rules of the game through frame-setting, in order to constitute appropriate institutions, practices and conducts (Foucault, 2004b: 123–5, 145, 153–5). Foucault spends considerable time detailing their arguments – people like von Mises, Wilhelm Ropke, Walter Euken, Friedrich Hayek connected with the Freiburg School, many of whom helped establish the Chicago School, and thus arguably the views of Milton Friedman and others in America, who have formulated the main lines of neoliberalism.

In reconstructing their economic discourse, Foucault picks out the ordoliberals' agreement with classical liberalism's opposition to state intervention in the economy and their emphasis on the freedom of anyone to enter the market; they share their concern with security as one of the essential conditions for a free market. Apart from agreement on these three key parameters, the important difference, he argues, is that the ordoliberals emphasize competition against liberalism's privileging of exchange, and recast the role of the state as that of establishing the apparatuses or dispositifs that enable the economy to work on the basis of competition. In asserting the importance of the framework, the ordoliberals reject 'naive naturalism', for, 'competition, in its operation, in its mechanisms and in its positive effects . . . is not at all a natural phenomenon' (2004b: 123). The conditions for competition to work must be 'carefully and artificially furnished. . . . Competition is thus an historical objective of the art of government . . . [T]he market, or rather pure competition . . . cannot emerge unless it is produced, and unless it is produced by an active governmentality' (2004b: 124, 125). Securitization is part of these conditions, not just in the form of 18th-century 'police', or in the control of 'pauperism' and criminality in the 19th century, but also in the form of 'insurantial technologies' that protect and modulate circulation and supply and demand (Donzelot, 1979).

The implication which Foucault draws from the point of view of the contemporary 'mission' of neoliberal government is that: 'One must govern for the market' (2004b: 125). That is, one must govern according to the rules of the market, by drafting laws, by instituting (fiscal and other) regulatory apparatuses, recalibrating the functions of socio-cultural institutions to bring them into line with the new language and new objectives of the enterprising state, and by constituting appropriate subjectivities, notably *homo oeconomicus* as 'enterprise man' (2004b: 14 March 1979 lecture); the latter is, besides, a notion that one can correlate with the radical individualism of neoconservatives. The aim is to establish the environments that would enable the market to operate as the kind of artifice or assemblage suitable for an economy based on competition; the environment or milieu itself must be marketized. As Foucault explains, the task of government becomes that of ensuring society operates as 'an enterprise society' (2004b: 152). The means for this are revealing: 'It is this multiplication/transmission (*démultiplication*) of the "enterprise" form inside the social body which

constitutes, I think, the stake in neoliberal politics' (2004b: 154). Furthermore, for a variety of reasons, these dispositifs must operate on a global scale, partly to unify market practices in the arena of an economic system already globalized from the time of liberalism, partly to manage the frictions and conflicts produced by 'enterprise society', and partly to prevent monopolies becoming endemic, though Polanyi (2001 [1944]), Braudel (1977), Arrighi (1994) and others have shown monopoly to be an intrinsic tendency of capitalism. So, capitalism is far from a natural state of affairs, since the particular type depends on such assemblages and the practices and values inscribed in them (see also Boltanski and Chiapello, 2007 [1999]) as well as on state interventions, either of the Smithian, Keynesian or ordo- and neoliberal type, the latter 'liberalizing' the economy by privatizing collective wealth and state agencies, and by instituting a 'government of society' in line with the 'enterprise form' and with economic man (2004b: 152, 153).[5]

Another key element of neoliberalism and ordoliberalism which supports the thesis of pauperization or systematic dispossession is its claim that inequality is not only a by-product of a system based on competition, but is required as a condition; inequality is seen to be an inherent and necessary feature of free market economy, and is justified on the basis of its necessary and regulating role as a mechanism, which means that the state must not intervene to 'compensate the effects of economic processes . . . social policy cannot take equality as its objective', and this is because 'the economic game, precisely with the inequality effects proper to it, is a kind of general regulatory mechanism of society which, obviously, everyone must support and accept' (2004b: 148; see also 2004b: 122, 147, 148). The ordoliberals recognize the systematic production of inequality by 'what is cold, callous, calculating, rational, mechanical in the play of properly economic competition' (2004b: 247–8), but their argument is that the effects of the 'savage economic processes' of laissez-faire would be countered by the 'socialization' of medical, cultural, or 'collective' elements of consumption, such that they are made available to all, equally, as consumer goods (2004b: 147); this system is supposed to be made manageable by the provision of a 'vital minimum' for those unable to provide for themselves (2004b: 149). The formula is that 'inequality is the same for all' (Ropke, in Foucault, 2004b: 148). This politics is rooted in the privileging of competition against the Keynesian interventionist and redistributive politics of the welfare state, which was the ordoliberals' target, and is the neoliberals' *bête noire*. Classical liberalism, as Foucault points out, drew comfort from the belief that an 'invisible hand' works to benefit society as a whole in spite of the fact that, as they saw it, every invididual seeks his own self-interest, or, as Smith had put it, every individual 'neither intends to promote the public interest, nor knows how much he is promoting it . . . he intends only his own gain . . . [yet he is] led by an invisible hand to promote an end which is no part of his intention' (Smith, 1812 [1776]: 354).

In the background of these shifts in the discourse of liberalism is a long-standing view about inequality as the natural order of things, a belief

we encounter in the mercantilist conviction that the economy is a zero-sum game, that is: 'What is acquired by one person must be taken from someone else; one can only become rich at the expense of others' (2004b: 54). Equally, many other discourses, and not only in Europe, support this assumption that inequality is natural and inevitable, or have instigated juridico-political or juridico-theological systems that have institutionalized it, say in the form of the caste system or in feudalism. The arguments trail a long history relating to the origins of inequality; in Foucault's analysis, it is outlined by reference to what in *'Society Must Be Defended'* he calls the 'discourse of race war', namely, a history of inequality that points to wars of conquest and subjugation at the origin of an initial dispossession that creates winners and losers, that is, inequalities, in the distribution of wealth and power, an argument developed besides in theories of accumulation and unequal exchange generally (see for example Emmanuel, 1972). The analysis further suggests that the maintenance of such differentials depends on a combination of the use of military might and the exercise of sovereign power, as understood in *'Society Must Be Defended'*, supported by legitimating discourses of authority and right.[6] Incidentally, in Western colonialism, the combination of military might, sovereign power and a discourse of authority took the form of an imperial governmentality (Venn, 2006), that is, a hybrid form of power that combines the 'right to kill' of sovereignty – that Foucault associates with 'racism as a basic mechanism of power' (2003: 254) – with elements of the disciplinary and normalizing strategies of biopolitical power.

What is interesting with the emergence of the political economy of liberalism, Foucault argues, is that there appeared a discourse that proposed both a different form of power and the possibility of a non-zero-sum game (for Europe at least, 2004b: 56), whereby the progressive accumulation of wealth, though created within unequal systems of ownership and reward, was supposed to benefit everyone; furthermore, 'this idea of a progress that is a European progress is, I think, a fundamental theme of liberalism' (2004b: 56). It underlies the idea of the economy as a non-zero-sum game for Europe, on condition that an extension of the market is established covering the totality of possible goods, that is, provided that there be a 'globalization of the market' (2004b: 56). So, for Europe to move from a game of winners and losers to one of mutual enrichment, it must act as an economic subject that takes the world as 'its economic domain'; this would ensure that Europe as a whole would be 'in a state of the permanent and collective growth of wealth brought about by its own competition, on condition that it is the whole world that makes up the market' (2004b: 57). As he concludes: 'The game is in Europe, but the stake is the world' (2004b: 57).

A new attitude to the rest of the world appears alongside this new idea of a Europe of nation-states, which Foucault explains thus:

> . . . while being a geographical division, a plurality, it [Europe] is not without a relation to the whole world, but this relation to the world marks the very

> specificity of Europe with regard to the world, since Europe can only have, and begins to have with the rest of the world but one particular type of relation, that of economic domination or colonization, or at least commercial utility. (2004a: 306)

This attitude, it must be said, has a longer and quite complex history (see, for example, Gilroy, 1993; Hourani, 1991; Pagden, 1993; Todorov, 1992), although what shifts from the point of view of political economy is the linking of the prosperity of Europe in a more systematic way with the yield, in profit and return on investment, from economic and commercial activities in the colonies, perceptively theorized by Adam Smith. A large literature exists to show that this exploitative attitude to the rest of the world, the 'South', or 'developing' countries of the old empires, remains largely unreconstructed today (Gray, 1998; Joxe, 2002; Stiglitz, 2001, 2002; Venn, 2006).

The argument in this article, supplementing Foucault's analysis, is that when we take proper account of colonialism and neocolonialism, it becomes clear that liberal capitalism and neoliberalism are zero-sum-games: in the 19th century, Europe was the 'winner' (though massive class inequality remained predominant inside each state, see Engels, 1969 [1887]), while today managerial and wealthy elites across the globe (often in the form of kleptocracies and mafia capitalism, Klein, 2008) reap disproportionate benefits from a vaster economy. In *'Society Must Be Defended'*, the politico-economic division understood as a zero-sum game doubled as what I would call a politico-ontological division, operated by biopower and the (mutable) 'discourse of race war' (2003: 65ff.). Within the frame of biopolitical power, the politico-ontological component of the discourse of power is figured in terms of racism:

> In a normalizing society, race or racism is the precondition that makes killing acceptable. . . . So you understand the importance . . . of racism for the exercise of such a power: it is the pre-condition for exercising the right to kill. If the power of normalization wished to exercise the old sovereign right to kill, it must become racist. . . . When I say 'killing', I obviously do not mean simply murder as such, but also every form of indirect murder: the fact of exposing someone to death, increasing the risk of death for some people, or quite simply, political death, expulsion, rejection, and so on. (2003: 256)

The latter indicates the elaboration of a new form of power over life, exercised over both populations (migrants, 'illegal' refugees, etc.) and individuals (the abnormal, the criminal, the dissident, etc.), a power which has become even more entrenched than it was, institutionalized in new forms of governance and individuation (see Lazzarato, 2009; Terranova, 2009).

In what follows, I will use Foucault's analysis in the three texts I have mentioned both to unpack the constitutive elements that have established the conditions for this new power over life, through the technologies and discourses of the social that he has described as biopolitics, and insert the

counter-discourses that open up avenues for counter-conducts in opposition to liberal capitalism in its various forms. Together this will provide a fuller picture of the constructed and contingent character of the 'free' market, and make visible the underlying relations of force sustaining it – and the metaphysical suppositions framing it. The elements are reorganized in terms of the coexistence of mutually constitutive processes of territorialization (here, the formation of the post-Westphalian nation-state and the apparatus of 'police'), de-territorialization (particularly, the global networks of markets and exchange through which circulation of goods, money, people, wealth was managed and then intensified prior to the emergence of liberal capitalism) and re-territorialization (of lands, frontiers, populations, products, etc., following colonial conquests and occupation).[7]

The Emergence of Political Economy

Westphalia, Territorialization, Pauperism

Security, Territory, Population (2007) occupies a strategic place in the twinned genealogies of biopolitics and political economy developed by Foucault. The key terms that provide the scaffolding for the analysis of the interrelationship of biopolitics and political economy find their elaboration there, namely, those of population, police, security, circulation, political economy. A good place to start the reconstruction I am developing is Westphalia (1648), though it comes towards the end in the text, after the analysis of the 'security-population-government series' and the 'government, population, political economy triangle' (2004a: 91). This is because Westphalia is the event, or the culmination of a series of events, that makes possible a radical shift in the political imaginary at the level of state power and the body politic that makes sense of later developments in the relation of population, security and economy, for it enables us to conceptualize this relation in terms of the interrelationships of territorialization, de-territorialization and re-territorialization, a dynamics affecting not just Europe but the rest of the world. For Foucault, the Westphalian settlement inaugurates a new period in the genealogy of the modern state, institutionalizing the ending of the Holy Roman Empire and marking a new 'historical reality' built on the recognition that competition rather than rivalry fought out through territorial wars would henceforth shape relations among European states (2004a: 299); the appearance of a new idea of Europe is one of its consequences (2004a: 305).[8] Westphalia institutes the agreement to establish states as territorialized and bordered geographical spaces and so creates the political organism or artifice we know as the nation-state; this form of state is distinct from the constitution of a political body on the basis of categories like fixed orders amongst groups, 'estates' and their hierarchically structured relations (Pasquino, 1978: 50), orders often tied to blood, thus relating to biopower.[9] Furthermore, one needs to relate the importance of the concept of the nation-state to the recognition that, as Foucault remarks in *Security, Territory, Population* (2004a: 302ff.) as well as *'Society Must Be*

Defended' (2003: 36, 70, 72), historically a state could enrich itself only by increasing the territory under its control or jurisdiction, either by conquest or by politico-territorial alliances, say through marriage; in other words, the accumulation of wealth proceeded from war and violence, and 'politics as the continuation of war', inverting Clausewitz (Foucault, 2003: 15, 16, 48). Military might was the principal means for both enrichment and the exercise of a sovereign power that was necessary to maintain the relations of force between winners and losers, that is, on the one hand, the fact that 'power, the mighty, the kings, and the laws concealed the fact that they were born of the contingency and injustices of battles' (2003: 72), and on the other 'War as both the web and the secret of institutions and systems of power' (2003: 110), inscribing zero-sum games of accumulation (see details in, say, Newsinger, 2006).

The relation of zero-sum games binding together war, wealth and race is illustrated in his analysis of the Norman Conquest, for, as he points out, the memory and the institutionalization of dispossesion by the Normans fed a history of rebellions, 'some of which were no doubt racial in nature' (2003: 101). I point to this relation to the (sovereign) form of power here, and the question of 'race war' or the 'discourse of race war' (2003: 28 January and 17 March 1976 lectures), because I want to keep visible the link between the ideology of a non-zero-sum game and the process of accumulation it authorizes and, as its supplement, war and colonial dispossession; the further link with racism completes the chain. Foucault does signal that the 'discovery of America and the constitution of colonial empires' (2004a: 303) were part of the 'historical reality' that conditioned the transformations in Europe that included Westphalia and the institution of nation-states. These transformations are important because they re-territorialized the space upon which state power could be exercised and framed the development of 'police', disciplinary power and the new 'reason of state', modulated according to the rationality of political economy. Interestingly, the nation-state as a geo-political entity makes possible the identity of capital and state in later periods, an identity that Braudel characterizes as the highest point of capitalism: 'Capitalism only triumphs when it becomes identified with the state, when it is the state' (1977: 64, 65), a condition being achieved in the neoliberal reconstitution of the state to serve the market.

Westphalia, then, is one of a series of developments that relayed the territorialization of the state to the emergent reconstitution of populations in terms of new discourses of rights, law, belonging, exclusion, wealth-creation and the creation of new dispositifs, or technologies of the social. Foucault highlights the following transformations in relation to this new reality post-Westphalia, first, 'the passage from the wealth of the Prince as the parameter of power to the wealth of the State as the force of the kingdom' (2004a: 302). Second, the passage from the calculation of the wealth of the Prince in terms of the extent of his possessions to 'the intrinsic wealth of the State, its resources, its holdings, natural resources, commercial possibilities, trade balances, etc.' (2004a: 302). Third, the transformation from

the rivalry of princes to the idea of a competition between states which he describes as 'one of the most essential mutations in the form of both what one could call political life and the history of the West' (2004a: 302). One should add a fourth feature, implicit in the previous three, namely, the shift in the basis of power from the relation between the prince and and his territory to the state and the people, making the population, the growth of its capabilities and its security the prime object of technologies of government, initially pursued through the idea of police.

After Wesphalia, Foucault argues, and in the wake of the shift in the system for the accumulation of wealth towards competition between states rather than by means of war, a new governmental reason begins to appear. Its key elements were a diplomatico-military dispositif, ensuring the 'balance of Europe' or an equilibrium in Europe, and the 'dispositif of police' (2004a: 304). The latter was seen as 'the mechanism for the growth of the forces of the state' (2004a: 324),[10] a project which is based on the idea of the prosperous state or 'state of prosperity' (Pasquino, 1978). The 'science of police' has the following objectives: first, the population, that is, its size, growth and productivity; second, the necessities of life, principally measures for monitoring and ensuring the supply of food; third, the vitality of the population, including the question of health, not just epidemics or emergencies, but the fact that 'everyone's daily health will be a permanent object for the care and intervention of police' (2004a: 332); fourth, the activity of the population, especially their skills, training, labour, to ensure their productivity; fifth, the circulation of goods and products, including the spaces of their circulation, their regulation, their material supports such as the systems of transportation and communication, the urban environment (2004a: 334).

Pasquino (1978) lists the following amongst the mechanisms of police proposed in the discourses emerging in Germany: specific measures to increase the wealth of the nation; 'information'; and lastly 'public happiness' (Obrecht, in Pasquino, 1978: 49). Information included statistics about the fecundity, health, productivity and longevity of the population, since health becomes a value in the calculations. The population as a statistico-administrative concept becomes the site and object for intervention by the mechanism called 'police' and in the process acquires a specific bio-political meaning: as 'a global mass' which is the target for 'a new technology of power', embedded in 'existing disciplinary techniques', applying to 'man-as-living-being' (2003: 242). Police, then, is what mutates into pastoral power and biopolitics, in the service of increasing the 'forces of the state' through the productivity of the population, developing new apparatuses of security, surveillance, punishment, individuation and incitement to discourse as some of the key instruments (see Foucault's *Discipline and Punish* and *History of Sexuality*, *Vol. 1*).

For Foucault, the practical form in which these problems presented themselves concerns circulation and security: circulation of people, goods, money, diseases, and thus a whole range of problems that have security as a component, and therefore increasingly become a matter of the calculation

of risk, necessitating the differential quantification of possible sources of danger (2004a: 62, 63). It marks a shift from the security of the prince and his territory (the Machiavellian problem) to a problematic of security anchored in the need to enhance and protect circulation within a controllable framework, based on greater knowledge and information about the natural processes connected with population (2004a: 67). The practical aspect of this new rationality is the recognition that events are unpredictable at the level of individual lives or transactions, but are amenable to management at the level of the environment or aggregate wholes, provided the processes are made calculable; indeterminacy at the individual level could be countered by a knowledge of patterns and trends. This is why information, and the linking of information to the norm, becomes a crucial element of this rationality, hence the importance of statistics, classification, codes, the archive and reports from that period (see Hacking, 1981, for an analysis in terms of power/knowledge). Today's 'audit culture', which generalizes and prioritizes calculability, that is, quantitative rather than qualitative measures of value, is driven by similar concerns with control, circulation and security, now expressed in terms of money as the fundamental and ultimate value.

From the point of view of neoliberal government of conduct by way of the constitution of 'man as enterprising subject', one could note that the dispositif of police as well as classical political economy took the question of individual conduct and 'public happiness' to be key targets. This effectively refigured the relation of the state to the population and to every individual – both legal subjects and non-juridical subjects such as women and children – within the wider framework of a moral economy, the principal aim of which was the institution of norms of conduct conducive to individual well-being, as well as the general good measured in terms of an economy (Pasquino, 1978). A moral economy can thus be seen to be central to biopolitics (e.g. 2003: 246). Foucault's genealogy of liberalism shows that, alongside the discourse of political economy and its normative supports, one finds other discourses: about health, indigence, sexuality, pauperism and so on, explored as part of the dispositifs of disciplinary society, but that are effectively about the state taking charge of the process of individuation as an integral aspect of wealth creation. Thus, several discourses became correlated that continue to shape the relation of the economic to the social: on the one hand, those of 'police', 'pastoral power' and a moral economy, that is, key elements of biopolitics, and, on the other hand, the discourse of political economy; we find their congruence, interestingly, in the work of Adam Smith whose *Wealth of Nations* was preceded by his *Theory of Moral Sentiments* (1759), concerned with the positive institutions that would encourage 'frugality', industriousness, 'useful labour', i.e. the conducts conducive to enjoying 'a greater share of the necessaries and conveniences of life' (Smith, 1812 [1776]: 18). Today new apparatuses and techniques manage conduct in terms of framework-setting, a strategy in which the law, finance and the government of conduct function as the determining mech-

anisms, backed up by the production of fear: of the unemployed, of losing one's job, of criminality, of indeterminate ubiquitous risks (see also Lazzarato, 2009).

When we add colonialism to this genealogy, the territorialization enacted in the idea of the nation-state is seen to relate to re-territorialization and to disjunctures in the form of power and strategies targeting populations according to their status as colonized or colonizing. For instance, population, and the relation of state to population, had already become an explicit element of colonial economy and power, in the form of sovereign power and the 'discourse of race war' in the Americas, and then increasingly from the 17th century in the form of a hybrid power combining elements of sovereign power with the new governmental rationality underlying the 'state of prosperity'. This relation of the reason of state to population is exemplarily demonstrated in the career of William Petty, who invented many of the key techniques of political economy as part of the recolonization of Ireland during the Cromwell years, a campaign, significantly in 1648/9 coinciding with Westphalia, that included the appropriation of Catholic lands, their redistribution to Protestant supporters – a large share going to Petty himself – and the massacre and/or displacement of vast numbers (25%) of the population, thus creating massive migration and poverty (Merefield, 2004; Venn, 2008). A 'postcolonial' genealogy of biopolitics and political economy would thus include Petty's census of Ireland, the Down Survey, as a key moment, for it invents techniques for establishing the wealth of the country through a systematic and minute calculation of the population and its distribution, the enumeration of manufactures, the tabulation of all the produce, the calculation of the value of trade, the geography of the 'colony': all the factors that enable a sovereign colonial power to work out the value of its possessions and the wealth that can be extracted; not surprisingly, it became an early model for the calculation of the wealth and value of populations, detailed in his *Political Arithmetic* (1776 [1672]), and initiated techniques later perfected for dispossession in the colonies, especially in India and South Africa – through property laws, taxation, prohibitions, etc., that is, mechanisms that worked in favour of accumulation rather than redistribution (Venn, 2006).

Pauperism

An important component of the apparatus of security is the theme of pauperism – again understated in the lectures, though some elements appear in *Discipline and Punish* – enshrined in Poor Law Acts in England, and the discourse of political economy generally, particularly in T.R. Malthus, Jeremy Bentham, Adam Smith and Utilitarianism, which were the discourses that explicitly shaped the principles underlying the 1834 Poor Law Amendments in England (Ashurst, 2009; Merefield, 2004; K. Williams, 1981). This attitude has two components in tension: on the one hand, poverty, or rather inequality, which is thought to be necessary or inevitable by political economists such as Malthus and Bentham – and later the

neoliberals, as we saw – for a laissez-faire free market economy to work, while, on the other hand, it is a problem threatening the good order and security of society because of theft and popular discontent: 'Pauperism is the class of men omitted by society so that they rebel against it' (de la Farelle, cited in Procacci, 1978: 62) and, since the poor are always on the move: 'The vagabond, the original exemplar of all the forces of evil, is found wherever illegal or criminal activities take place: he is their natural artisan' (Fregier, 1840, cited in Procacci, 1978: 64). A direct link is made in this view between poverty and crime, expressed in the intensification of concern with problems of security, as Foucault notes, and which is inscribed in the 1834 Amendments in Britain. This view of the poor as the dangerous classes, or as an inherently criminal class of people, is a constant refrain in the dominant discourses about poverty from the time of liberalism, whether in political economy or in the countless policy documents and laws introduced to address the 'problem' of the poor. It has been revived in neoliberal policy regarding the treatment of the poor, who are either treated as victims of 'underdevelopment', or marginalized as the 'underclass', or effectively criminalized (Ashurst, 2009; Wacquant, 2004). For neoliberal political economy, poverty is reduced to a negative cost to be minimized; the idea of entitlement on the basis of some notion of social contract or the idea of welfare and state responsibility as a basis for social policy is explicitly rejected by this new, and not so new, discourse (Ashurst, 2009; Wacquant, 2004). What is significant is that when we cease to think of pauperism as a 'natural' or necessary condition, and instead examine pauperization as a process of producing the poor, we find longer histories of poverty that parallel the conjoined history of subjugation, conquest and exploitation, implicating the othering of the other, in the form of the (politically ambivalent) 'discourse of race war' (2003: 76, 77), or 'state racism' founded in racial purity and the vilification of the 'other' (2003: 81). Thus in Ireland, not only does the reconquest immediately produce millions of destitute people, seen as an inferior 'race' in colonial discourse – with all the problems around migration, crime, security, disease and ghettoization that followed – but also the mechanisms introduced subsequently – the tariffs and quotas on goods determining the export of potatos and grain, the laws prohibiting the export of manufactures, the ban on Catholics having the right to own land and so on (Armitage, 2000; Colley, 2002; Davis, 2001; Merefield, 2004) – establish a machinery for wealth extraction tested in Ireland which is later applied in India, Australia and Africa, supported by legitimizing discourses that basically naturalize the relations of force. Clearly, the intertwined problems of circulation and security analysed by Foucault cannot be fully grasped without this focus on pauperization and its consequences.

Networks, Circuits and the Global Apparatus of Accumulation

A third element missed out by Foucault needs to be brought to light to reconstruct the genealogy of biopolitics; it requires the re-insertion of the rest of

the world in the analysis of the conditions of possibility for biopolitics, making visible the wider networks and circulations, as well as other dispositifs of the networks such as finance, international trade and population movements. These conditions were not only the new discourses Foucault examines in the lectures at the Collège de France and the recognition that epochal shifts were necessary for a new balance in Europe; one must add the following as conditions: the rise of the merchant class and mercantilism in the previous two centuries or so; the role of banking and monopolies controlling the network of commercial exchanges linking Western Europe to the more developed market economies of India and China via Arab states (Arrighi, 1996: 40, Braudel, 1986 [1979]: chs 1–3); the importance of the great economic cycles in Europe, particularly the shifts in financial power from Genoa and Venice (15th to early 17th century) to the Dutch and Amsterdam from the late 16th century.[11] Braudel, for example, has detailed the importance of trade networks and sites of economic activity, mainly cities, fairs, trading compounds, already put in place linking Europe with India, China, Japan, the Muslim world and, from 1492, the Americas. Regarding the latter, one can consider the case of the circulation of silver that shows the correlation of production – say, the huge mines at Potosí in central Brazil in the 18th century and earlier mining centres – with export, then the minting of coins in different parts of the world, and circulation in the form of currency in Europe, India, China, Japan (in 1614, 400 different currencies circulated in the Netherlands; Braudel 1986 [1979]: 196, 197), while up to 'half the silver mined in America between 1527 and 1821 found its way to China', which already had an extensive market and money economy, and widely used silver currency in internal and external trade (Braudel, 1986 [1979]: 198). Indeed, as Braudel demonstrates: 'For long ages – centuries before the Europeans sailed round the Cape of Good Hope – there had been immense networks of trade covering the Indian Ocean and the seas bordering the Pacific' (1986 [1979]: 219). Describing the system of networks within networks, of relays linking all parts of the world, especially after 1492, he says: 'The Portuguese, Dutch, English, and French traders borrowed from Muslims, from Banyans (in India) or from the moneylenders of Kyoto, the silver without which no transaction was possible from Nagasaki to Surat' (1986 [1979]: 220, 221). In short, 'The networks of trade encircled the world', notes Braudel (1986 [1979]: 148). He also points out that: 'Equal and unequal exchange, balance and imbalance of trade, domination and subjugation serve to draw a map of the commercial world' (1986 [1979]: 204). In this new phase of market economies, with Europe deriving enormous wealth from the pillage and exploitation of the resources of the Americas, it was the merchants who reaped the greatest benefit: 'The rich became excessively rich, and the poor wretched' (1986 [1979]: 211), a familiar story, even today, with neoliberal privatization, deregulation and 'liberalization', as Stiglitz (2001), Townsend (2000) and Wilkinson and Pickett (2009) have demonstrated.

Few cases exemplify the complexity of these developments as explicitly as the mechanisms that emerged in the form of the Triangular

Trade system linking the slave trade, plantation economy and industrialization through circuits and the circulation of goods, raw material, people and wealth between Europe, Africa, America/the West Indies (Fryer, 1984; E. Williams, 1964). It illustrates, on the one hand, the centrality of colonial relations in the emergence of (territorialized and re-territorialized) populations, the problem of security and a new economic rationality as elements of biopolitical power, and, on the other hand, the de-territorialized yet embedded character – through specific relays such as merchant families, trade circuits, banking practices, trade routes, etc. – of many of the mechanisms supporting the process, especially the economic instruments such as letters of credit, international loans, the commission system, the circulation of currency (Arrighi, 1994; Braudel, 1986 [1979]). The Triangular Trade linked English (and European) commerce and manufacturing to the slave trade and to the plantation economy in the Americas and West Indies, growing in importance from the 18th century at the time of the emergence of liberal political economy and liberal capitalism. A focus on the English economy, as in Adam Smith, provides the exemplary instance of the range of activities that were thereby linked and the profit derived, fuelling industrialization (Fryer, 1984; E. Williams, 1964) and transforming the economic power of Britain and Europe. The slave trade was, of course, the lynchpin in that period (Fryer, 1984: 16, 17), replaced later by trade in other arenas of colonization and dispossession, namely, in the East, then Africa, as I have pointed out. Basically, ships left English ports (London, Bristol, Liverpool) laden with textiles, weapons, cutlery, copper and brass rods, beer, manufactured in all parts of England. These were sold or bartered on the African coast to buy slaves who were shipped as cargo in the dreadful 'middle passage' to the West Indies and sold there; the ships were loaded with produce from the colonies (sugar, rum, spices, molasses, tobacco) and carried back to England to be sold. Profit was made on each leg of this triangular circulation of goods, people, money. Huge wealth was made, much of it by merchants and shareholders rather than planters themselves, as detailed by Fryer (1984) and as Braudel shows (1986 [1979]: 197, 272ff., 198), although many small investors also benefited, since many shopkeepers, smallholders, etc. regularly bought shares in each trip. Banking gained an enormous boost – e.g. the Barclay brothers – and so did insurance – Lloyds became the principal underwriters for many ventures. Braudel, for his part, speaking about the plantations, says:

> More straightforward than the regions of second serfdom, these were capitalist creations par excellence: money, credit, trade, exchange tied them to the east side of the Atlantic. Everything was remote controlled from Seville, Cadiz, Bordeaux, Rouen, Amsterdam, Bristol and Liverpool. To create the plantations, everything had to be brought over from the old continent: the masters . . . black Africans . . . the plants themselves, except for tobacco . . . the techniques of sugar production. (1986 [1979]: 272–3)

The Triangular Trade is but one among a host of other examples that demonstrates that, underlying the process of accumulation, we find the deliberate and planned establishment of dispositifs[12] to ensure wealth transfer to the rich and powerful. These mechanisms are discursive (say, liberalism, political economy), institutional (colonial governors, the Banyans in India in relation to banking), material/technical (sugar plantations and refining, mines, currencies), administrative/legal (colonial administration, taxation, property laws, rules of exclusion, the joint-stock company, etc.), material/technical (factory production, navigational instruments, slave ships, plantations, military technology, etc.). Thus regarding colonial economic regimes we can signal the following: in India the introduction of free trade as well as a whole series of laws, such as about land ownership – which introduced the basis for new, often crippling, taxes and tariffs (Arrighi, 1994; Birla, 2009; Merefield, 2004; Prakash, 1990); in Ireland, similarly, laws such as the 1660 Navigation Act, which prohibited all Irish export to the colonies, or the Cattle Acts of 1663 and 1667 that restricted cattle production, or the Staple Acts of 1671 that ended the flow of sugar and tobacco into the colony (Armitage, 2000: 148–51) ensured that the Irish economy could not compete on equal terms and could only become a dependent economy serving British interests alone.

Another essential element in the transcolonial genealogy of liberal capitalism and biopolitics that I am sketching is the commodification of land, labour and money – these 'fictitious commodities', as Polanyi calls them, on the grounds that they were not produced for sale on the market, and have often not been thought of as objects that could be privately owned (2001 [1944]: 75, 76, 204). Land became 'de-territorialized' and thus available as commodity for the market after the enclosures in Europe and land grabs in the colonies – in Australia and the Americas under cover of *terra nullius*, and in India and Africa through forcible 'legalized' privatization (Prakash, 1990).[13] The history of colonization is marked by the privatization and commodification of land previously regarded as common wealth and subject to customary rights, say, among Native Americans, or Aborigines, and in parts of India and Africa before British occupation; indeed, the idea of common land in Europe before the enclosures retained the crucial distinction between wealth and property, upon which Arendt (2000, see also Venn, 2006) insisted, and that liberal capitalism abolishes. Within economic discourse, the argument for considering labour as a commodity is theorized by the physiocrat Abeille in 1768, while Sir George Downing noted in a report that: 'Money that in former time was only used as the measure to value all commodities by is become now itself a commodity' (1660–61, cited in Braudel, 1986 [1979]: 201). Of course, slavery had already turned human beings and their labour into commodities in Europe and elsewhere for millennia. Increases in the velocity and volume of circulation of these new commodities, correlated to the rate of profit (as the physiocrats knew, see Braudel, 1986 [1979]), intensified wealth creation for owners of 'capital', while also unsettling

equilibria, thus adding to the pressures to rethink the economy in terms of a free market and free trade.

This picture shows that inequality is not simply about 'relations of production', but rather about the dispositifs (and the subjectivities) invented for the purpose, working in a pragmatic manner, and subject to constant tactical and strategic modifications. Today, the global machinery of extraction and transfer of wealth has grown in sophistication, operating through trade agreements that perpetuate unequal terms of trade and unequal exchange, through mechanisms like 'conditionalities', subsidies, soft power, the vicious circle of debt, licensing regulations, rules about technology transfer, tariff barriers and so on (see Venn, 2006: 141–60). Genealogy needs to take account of these politico-economico-technical networks and assemblages if it is to have a purchase on the historicization of the events leading up to the emergence of biopolitics and liberal political economy, and if it is to lead to the radical reorganization of economies and social relations.

Conclusion

A greater wealth of evidence exists that would substantiate the critique of political economy than I have the space to present. Foucault's genealogy, while pointing the way, has been limited by the focus on Europe and on discursive formations, to the detriment of being able to draw out the political implications from his critique of neoliberalism and biopolitical power more explicitly. It could be argued that his later writings, such as the turn to an ethics and an aesthetics of existence as part of a 'critical ontology of ourselves', say, in his essay on the Enlightenment (Foucault, 1984: 50), provide missing elements for this project, for example, the suggestion of non-repressive forms of power implied in the search for the 'growth of capabilities' allied to different becomings (1984: 47, 48), yet much remains undeveloped, especially if we are looking for new grounds for non-individualist, non-egocentric, thus fundamentally anti-capitalist, forms of being.

My concluding remarks will return to the question of inequality as a way of addressing this issue of a new political and ontological space for imagining transcolonial and transindividual socialities. This is not only because it had been the core issue for Enlightenment thinking, and at the heart of neoliberal political economy, as Foucault demonstrates: it has today become the central politico-economic problem, affecting social cohesion and conflict. For, the evidence increasingly shows that it is not just inequality as a necessary regulating mechanism which is in question, but the return, after the interregnum of the welfare state, to a zero-sum game of systemic dispossession not offset by active redistribution at the national or the global scale (see Fan et al., 2009, with regard to China, and Townsend, 2000, for Europe, or Collins et al., 2008, regarding America). This zero-sum economic game, because of the conflicts it generates, requires new mechanisms that attempt to ensure relatively docile, if not compliant, populations in the form of massively intrusive surveillance, new forms of subjugation using new

tools for the government of conduct and new forms of 'sovereign power', the latter operating in many countries in the shape of state-terrorism-supporting kleptocracies.

But the problem of reinventing new ways of life (Revel, 2009) is not only about the critique of these new forms of power over life, but about how life is to be understood at all. My analysis has shown that neoliberalism's view of the individual as a living being is premised on the universalization of property and competition as founding principles of society. This is pursued through the commodification of everything, backed by a fundamentalist individualism in which self-interest is seen as the motor of human endeavour or 'enterprise'. The ordoliberals recognized the negative consequences of this system, advocating 'hot' values of social cohesion and a *vitalpolitik* to counter what they saw as the 'cold', 'callous' and 'calculating' values of *homo oeconomicus* and 'enterprise society' (2004b: 247, 248). This admission seems to suggest that there are values, beyond those inscribed in and promoted by liberal capitalism, that trump those of the market; the constant reference to collective benefit in liberal discourse since Adam Smith, and the emphasis on growth as the means for achieving this, reinforce the recognition of higher values, even if it has an ideological purchase. Social cohesion has historically depended on forms of redistribution (and religious belonging, the two often supporting each other) – say, through taxation, the periodic cancellation of debt (in ancient Greek city states; Joxe, 2002), charity and alms among Christians and Muslims (*zakat* and *sadaqa*), and other forms of protection against destitution as part of advancing the general good. In the light of the autistic tendencies in neoliberal capitalism, it could be argued, as does Lazzarato (2009), that neoliberal politics of life, or biopolitics, in rejecting the idea of redistributive justice can only foster 'social' and 'cultural' values of cohesion by promoting reinvented racism and nationalism, stiffened by militarist values, that is, by a return of the 'discourse of race war' congruent with all forms of the exclusion and objectification of the other.

Against this dystopian vision, I want to briefly signal a number of other considerations that direct attention to new grounds for breaking with the neoliberal doctrine as well as with other socialities based on hierarchizing difference by reference to rights, life chances or ontological worth. My first point is that the universalization of property and commodity as the principle determining value necessarily privileges the calculable over the incalculable, indeed reduces the incalculable to the status of the calculable; it must eliminate the ineffable and the spiritual, that is, everything relating to finitude, to the aesthetic and the ethical dimensions of being, thus, all the aspects of experience that humanize humans as specific beings and make life worth living. So, on the one side we have the 'destruction of the incalculable by calculation' (Stiegler, 2006: 91), based on the primacy of 'value for money' and of accounting practice as the framework determining the 'cold' and 'callous' calculus of an 'audit culture', consistent with the universalization of the commodity form, and on the other side we have the

values of responsibility for the other, the recognition of singularity, truth, justice, ethics as ultimate criteria for judging worth and the quality of life.

Underlying the radical ontology I am defending one finds a view of life, human and otherwise, that asserts the co-implication, co-constitution and co-dependence of living beings in a world we all inhabit. It supports the more-than-one, plural character of beings, developed in a variety of disciplines from philosophy (say Levinas, Merleau-Ponty or Ricoeur) to the life sciences (say Varela et al., 1993 and aspects of Simondon's work), elaborated in Venn (2000, 2009). One implication is the idea of relationality as a defining feature of the living and the recognition that cooperation and collaboration are what essentially characterizes life in common. This is diametrically opposed to all that neoliberalism stands for. It suggests also the importance of upholding the distinction between property and wealth, that is, between what may be privately owned or considered as commodity, and what must remain as collective or common wealth – rivers, seas and their inhabitants, forests, mineral and other naturally stored-up wealth, etc., as well as the cultural and symbolic means of sustaining and enhancing life. It is a distinction that has an ontological affinity with that between the calculable and the incalculable, while both distinctions trail epistemological and ethical questions which have become absolutely central when one places the well-being of humans and other creatures on a protected planet as the foremost politico-economic objectives.

Notes

1. Nobel Prize-winner for economics and one-time chief economist of the World Bank.

2. There is ample evidence that this 'trickle down' effect does not happen by itself; the increase in the gap between rich and poor within nations (Fan et al., 2009; Wilkinson and Pickett, 2009) and between 'North' and 'South' since neoliberal economic principles have been reconstituting the global economy further illustrates its mythical nature. This shows that liberal capitalism's claim to 'naturally' benefit everyone through growth is also mythical; the theology of growth underlying current dominant economic models is tied to a foundational rationality in which invisibility, indeterminacy, complexity and underlying 'natural' coherence relay and support each other.

3. Neoliberal policies, in rejecting the welfare state principles of state intervention to offset the effects of competition and capitalist accumulation on poverty, have discarded categories like class and deprivation, categories that indicated structural causes for inequality.

4. All quotations from French sources have been translated into English by the author.

5. Equally this means too that there is no essence of capitalism – though there are some elements in common, particularly concerning what forms of wealth or resource – such as land, labour, and money – may be considered as property or capital, that is, be subject to a process of deterritorialization. Related to this point, some would argue that it is the emergence of the abstract form of the commodity which is the common factor in different forms (summarized in Deleuze and Guattari, 1988:

ch. 13; see also Emmanuel, 1972; Marx, 1972, 1973; Venn, 2006). Clearly, complex issues are involved, including the debate about whether capitalism existed in other regions of the world independently of the European version. Braudel, for example, establishes that, before the 17th century, Japan had 'a long-standing merchant capitalism which it had patiently built by its own efforts', including centres of production (Osaka), consumption (Edo period), 'tri-metallic currency, bills of exchange, cheques, bank notes and trappings of a regular Stock Exchange' (1986 [1979]: 593, 592). Similarly he argues that India and China had built market economies that were more extensive and complex than in Europe, yet he makes a distinction between capitalism and market economies that complicates the debate.

6. Alongside the use of force to subdue and terrorize through exemplary punishment, we have these other elements of sovereign power: 'On the one hand, the juridical aspect: power uses obligations, oaths, commitments, and the law to bind; on the other hand, power has a magical function, role, and efficacy: power dazzles, and power petrifies' (Foucault, 2003: 68). These aspects are analysed for instance by reference to the Norman conquest (lecture 5), the formation of France as a nation out of its 'two peoples: a victorious and a vanquished people' (2003: 226). From medieval chroniclers, we know too about the savage means used in early medieval England to quell uprisings, to ensure a memory remains through generations to deter rebellion against the hierarchy of wealth and power sustained by sovereign power. Indeed, all conquerors have relied on similar shock and awe strategies to maintain inequalities of wealth and power, as Foucault indicates when he examines sovereign power and the role of the 'history of sovereignty' to 'fascinate, terrorize, and immobilize' (2003: 68) through religion, rituals, legends and so on; we find relatively more recent variants of this strategy of power in developments that use military apparatuses in tandem with ideologies (say the divine right of kings in feudalisms, or the 'civilizing mission' for the European colonial project) to secure inequalities; they all are aspects of the 'scandalous unification' of 'two essentially antithetical principles', namely, those of violence and justice (Agamben, 1998: 31).

7. These notions do not refer to Deleuze and Guattari's (1988) understanding, which while insightful about de-territorialization in relation to becoming and multiplicity, is also misleading or even counter-productive about the historical process and historicization generally; for example, when in the course of elaborating the concept of rhizome by reference to an analytical approach in which notions of assemblage, de-territorialization, multiplicity, plateau, nomadology and becoming are relayed, they declare: 'The rhizome is an anti-genealogy' (1988: 11); granted that this is asserted against 'arborescent' models of development (1988: 10), one is still left with the privileging of the de-territorialization phase of a metastable process, i.e. a process in which all three are dynamically correlated, something the authors recognize at other points.

8. This Europe can be distinguished not just as different from the Europe of the Holy Roman Empire and its Christian order, as Foucault does, but also in contrast to the Europe of empires from the mid 18th century, a post-Enlightenment Europe, and an emergent would-be cosmopolitical Europe today, still caught up in the legacy of empire and racism.

9. Foucault argues that this history of conflict explains why, for Hobbes, the founding of the legitimacy of the sovereign on a Leviathan within the realm of law, feared but consented to by all, was the answer to problems of legitimacy unresolved by Magna Carta. An important issue arises here by reference to Agamben's (1998)

misinterpretation of the category of 'free men' or 'homo liber' in Magna Carta and the consequences for the development of the concept of bare life when he turns to the meaning of habeas corpus, introduced in England in 1679. Basically Agamben, though he recognizes that the rights and liberties listed in Magna Carta were 'conceded' (1998: 123), appears to think that they applied to all subjects, that is, ' "free men of our kingdom" so that they might enjoy "their ancient liberties and free customs" as well as the ones he now specifically recognized' (1998: 123), whereas historically in medieval England the category 'free men', as used in Magna Carta, excluded serfs (mainly Saxons), women and children, that is, non-legal persons, those without rights, that is, the great majority of people; it thus only applied to an elite, such as the military aristocracy and its allies, the 'free men' of Magna Carta, who had a right to property and specific liberties. Arendt's point about those denied the 'right to have rights' (2000: 37) is relevant here. Indeed serfs, if they left or escaped their lords' domain, were considered 'out law'and could be killed without further juridical process; they were in effect property of the lord who exercised a sovereign form of power, as characterized in Foucault by reference to 'the right to kill' or to 'let live', in accordance with the sovereign 'right of life and death', which was part of the 'classical theory of sovereignty' (2003: 240, 241). As we know, in England, the 'Norman Yoke' over the Saxons was a stark reality, sustained by laws and force, in spite of Magna Carta in 1215. It is therefore crucial to recognize that Magna Carta is a politico-legal document through and through, grounded in bios or political life. The initial error is compounded when Agamben begins the discussion of habeas corpus by noting it is 'The first recording of bare life as the new political subject' (1998: 123) and goes on to claim that 'It is not the free man and his statutes and prerogatives, nor even simply homo, but rather corpus that is the new subject of politics' (1998: 124). This leads him to assert that 'nascent European democracy thereby placed at the centre of its battle against absolutism not bios, the qualified life of the citizen, but zoe – the bare, anonymous life that is as such taken into the sovereign ban' (1998: 124). An ambiguity nevertheless runs through the concept of corpus, for: 'Corpus is a two-faced being, the bearer of subjection to sovereign power and of individual liberties' (1998: 125). My point is that rights and liberties are always conceded or elaborated not on the basis of corpus but on the basis of bios, the political life of human beings. Rights always involve a decision about who is entitled, as in Magna Carta, and who is cast out of responsibility and concern – perhaps as the 'remnants' or remains, as Agamben (1999) argues in *Remnants of Auschwitz*. As we have seen, for Foucault this politico-ontological division, operated by biopower and the (mutable) 'discourse of race war' (2003: 65ff.) is figured in terms of racism. The concept of 'bare life', like some essentializing analyses of 'racism', can mask the kind of genealogy of power and inequality that Foucault enables us to investigate.

10. Foucault (2004a: 304) notes an intriguing affinity drawn between this new understanding of political force and the concept of conservation of force emerging in physics – notably put to work in Leibniz, who could thus be relocated within the imaginary of classical political economy – with the implication that, when employed in the analysis of the present, this concept may, therefore, be politically suspect.

11. To provide a fuller picture, one could take account of the history of cycles of accumulation and crisis, cycles punctuated each time by a banking crisis accompanied by a shift in economic and political power. Thus, the ascendancy of the Dutch was followed by that of England from mid 18th century, then the USA after

the great crash of the London stock market in 1879; a new cycle may well be beginning today. See details in Braudel (1986 [1979]: 153 ff.) and Arrighi (1994).

12. Foucault sees the dispositif as having a strategic character since it concerns the manipulation of relations of force to achieve particular ends:

> The dispositif, thus, is always inscribed in a play of power, yet it is always tied up to one or more limits of know-how (*savoir*) that emerge out of it, but, equally, condition it. That's a dispositif: strategies of relations of force supporting types of power, and supported by the latter. (Foucault, *Dits et écrits*, vol. III, 299, cited in Agamben, 2007: 8–10)

What is introduced is power, knowledges, strategies, assemblages; yet, his focus on 'what is said' and the unsaid neglects the technical, material, and historical dimensions.

13. Braudel, in making a distinction between market economy and capitalism, makes the interesting observation that land in China, which had an extensive market economy going back to the Han dynasty, remained ultimately under the control of the state, which 'retained in theory the ownership of all land . . . in the name of the public good and the need for agricultural colonization' (1986 [1979]: 587).

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