

PEACE-KEEPING OPERATIONS AND THEIR ROLES IN THE AFRICAN SUB-REGION: THE EXAMPLES OF ECOMOG, IGAD AND SADC

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Introduction

Peacekeeping processes as mechanism for the active maintenance of truce between nations or communities especially by an international military force operate at different levels. These could be global, regional, sub-regional or even national. It is an intervention in an area of instability in order to facilitate the restoration of the area to back to peace and stability. It focuses on different aspects of peace processes. However, in Africa, due to the nature and magnitude of conflicts, peace-keeping operations are usually employed as strategies that aim to create conditions that favour lasting peace. In fact, in the West African region, due to the recurrence of conflicts since 1992 to date, the region has experienced more than 10 peace-keeping operations in different countries (Abiew, 2003). It is imperative to understand that, peace-keeping operations do not happen out of a vacuum. They are usually undertaken as a response to conflicts whose magnitude and cost have grown to become high in terms of loss of lives and properties and have created instability.

Conflicts in the West African region have attracted various peace-keeping operations in order to de-escalate, manage, make, build, restore, or enforce peace. The sole aim of these is to restore and maintain peace and ensure stability in affected areas.

Conceptualizing Peace Keeping Operations

Peace-Keeping Operations (PKO) basically means the employment of coercion as a conflict control mechanism in order to control, contain, manage or prevent conflicts between conflicting parties either in terms of armed conflicts or inter-state disputes.

Mohammed, et al (2007) opines that Peacekeeping has its origin in the United Nations and since its inception; the United Nations has developed a number of instruments for controlling and resolving conflicts between and within states. The most crucial among them is the United States Secretary General's supplement to an agenda for peace, these supplements are peace-building, disarmament, sanction, and peace enforcement. In fact, regional organizations that conduct peace-keeping operations have been able to draw such legitimacy from the United Nations Organizations (UNO) which has amongst its chief responsibilities, peace-keeping endeavors among member states and international actors. Regarding PKO, there is a charter which says that the UN has a mandate to:

Maintain international peace and security, and to that end to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of peace, and to bring by peaceful means, and in

conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustments or settlements of international disputes or situations which might lead to breach of the peace. (UN, 1992:3).

Other types of peace-keeping operations alongside ECOMOG, SADC, and IGAD as mentioned above are; Assistance, Non-aggression and mutual Defense (ANAD) which participated in peace-building in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea-Bissau, Inter-African Force (IAF) in the Central African Republic which mandate was to restore peace and security by monitoring the implementation of the Bangui Agreements of 25 January 1997. It includes provisions on conducting operations to disarm the former rebels and specifies that, the logistical and financial support for the Force is to be provided by France and/or other contributors of funds.

Peace-keeping is different from other types of peace endeavors like Peace Building, Peace-making, Peace de-escalates, Peace Management, Peace Restoration, Peace Enforcement and Mediation. All of the above peace endeavors mentioned falling under the wider coverage of what is called Peace Support Operations (PSO). Whereas PSO efforts make use of diplomatic means to prevent or control conflict, PKO employs the use of force in the form of troops to monitor and supervise or douse tension between conflicting parties under the strict guidance of UN's basic peace-keeping principles of consent, impartiality and the uses of force for self-defense. (Adar, 2000). It should, however, be noted that the principle of consent is what distinguishes peace-keeping from peace enforcement (Mohammed, H. et al 2007).

This chapter, therefore, examines Africa's sub-regional peace-keeping operations using selected case studies of ECOMOG, SADC, and IGAD to demonstrate the overview and practical issues surrounding peace-keeping operations in the West African region.

Brief History of Peace-keeping Operations in Africa

PKO in Africa began with the UN missions in various countries in Africa beginning from 1960. While just one mission occurred through the 1990s, turmoil in Africa escalated and the majority of missions were run from 1989 on. This period is one of the most dynamic and violent in modern African history. In many African countries, the years of the 1990s were the most characterized by conflicts of civil wars thereby making the UN-PK last for many years.

The earliest PKO was the ONUC - UN Operations in the Congo which took place from July 1960 to June 1964, according to Barnes, (1998), this was as a result of an attempted secession of the Katanga province from the Independence granted by Belgium to Congo which led to the assassination of Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba. At this point, the mission was expanded. Afterward, Congo retained the secessionist province of Katanga and the mission was followed by a civilian aid.

Other PKOs in Africa are the UN Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM I) which was undertaken from January 1989 to May 1991 as a response to Angola's lengthy civil war. The outcome of the mission was that Cuban troops were withdrawn one month off schedule. Having completed its mission, another mission was followed by UNAVEM II (1991) and UNAVEM III (1995). UN-Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG), UN-Angola Verification Mission II (UNAVEM II), UN Operation in Somalia I (UNOSOM I & II), UN-Operations in Mozambique (ONUMOZ), UN-Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM II), UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR), UN-Angola Verification Mission III (UNAVEM III), UN-Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA), UN-Mission in Central African Republic (MINURCA), UN-Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL), UN-Organization Mission in Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC), UN-Observer Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE), UN-Operation in Burundi (ONUB).

However, the specific PKOs that were undertaken in the West African region are; UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), which took place in October 1999 to December 2005 as a response to Sierra Leone's Civil War (1991-2002). The outcome was that the mission was expanded three times in 2000 and 2001 as the fighting continued. The war ended in December 2002 and UNAMSIL troops were slowly withdrawn. The mission was followed by the UN Integrated Office for Sierra Leone. This was created to consolidate the peace in Sierra Leone. (Berman, et al 2000). UN-Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda (UNOMUR) took place from June 1993 to September 1994, as a result of fighting between Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) (based in Uganda) and the Rwandan Government, which led the Observer Mission to encounter many difficulties in monitoring the border and issues arising from the terrain as well as the competing Rwandan and Ugandan factions. Because of the Rwandan genocide, the mission's mandate came to an end and it was not renewed. The mission was succeeded instead by UNAMIR, which had already begun its operations in 1993.

For Best (2005), as a result of the First Liberian Civil War, in September 1993 to September 1997, the UNOMIL was designed to support ongoing efforts by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to bring an end to the Liberian Civil War and ensure fair election through the use of UN-Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL). In 1997, an election was held and the mission terminated. The United Nations established a Peace-building Support Office in Liberia but within a few years, Liberian Second Civil War broke out.

Between May 2003 and April 2004, as a result of the failed implementation of the Linas-Marcoussi's agreement which was to end the ongoing conflict in the country, the UN-Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (MINUCI) was utilized to provide protection for citizenry from armed combatants. MINUCI was replaced by the UN Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI). UNOCI is ongoing and continued to protect the people in the country and aid the government in disarmament and demobilization of former combatants.

From September 2007 to December 2010, the UN-Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT) was a response to the then-ongoing violence in Darfur, eastern Chad, and northeastern Central African Republic. Eventually, the concern for civilian safety amidst activities by armed groups in the region prompted the mission. By the end of the mission, the government of Chad pledged that they would retain responsibility for protecting its citizens. After the termination of the mission, UN Integrated Peace-building Office in the Central African Republic continued efforts to protect the people.

Case Studies of Peace-keeping Operations in the West African Sub-Region: ECOMOG, IGAD, and SADC

This section focuses on some specific case studies of sub-regional peace-keeping operations in Africa. The aim is to provide an overview of the conduct of the three major peace-keeping operations in West Africa, namely; ECOMOG, SADC, and IGAD. The essence of the case studies is to demonstrate the necessity of peace-keeping operation usually as a last resort in a peace mission and those peace-keeping operations irrespective of their approach or strategy, do experience achievements and challenges. Students of peace and conflict resolution are therefore expected to capitalize on these experiences in order to fully understand the dynamics of conflict and peace-keeping endeavors generally and specifically within the West African sub-continent.

The ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) in Liberia, Serra Leone and Guinea Bissau

ECOWAS Cease-Fire Monitoring Group otherwise known as ECOMOG is a military force formed by member states of ECOWAS from units of their national armed forces (Khobe, 2000). It was an Economic Community of West African States as an African multilateral armed force established by the ECOWAS. ECOMOG at the continental level is a variety of home-grown strategies that were established to help resolve conflict situations in Africa. One of such initiatives is that of the ECOWAS Cease-fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) with a formal arrangement for separate armies to work together (Khobe, 2000).

Although the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) was originally chartered by the Lagos Treaty of 1975 as an economic integration arrangement with common market objectives such as trade liberalization, harmonization of economic policies, free movement of the factors of production and sectorial developmental programs, it has uniquely taken on regional security responsibility with the formation of ECOWAS Cease-fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG). Therefore, as part of the extended function of ECOWAS, ECOMOG was formed by the ECOWAS member states through negotiating and signing a mutual defense assistance protocol (MDA) in Freetown, Sierra Leone in May 1989. Freetown protocol was in order to ensure Security, Peacekeeping and Mediation in internal conflicts of member countries. Member states in the treaty agreed to form a standing military force that will be used to render military aid and assistance to member states that fall victim to either external aggression or internal armed conflict that threatens the peace and security of the countries in the sub-region (Iheme, 2005:5). It, however, covers the sub-region by expanding its mandate to include the restoration of law and order in Sierra Leone and Guinea Bissau.

It is pertinent to state that, in many instances, the instruments have been usefully employed by regional organizations, ad-hoc groups of states or by individual states as is the case with ECOWAS. ECOWAS is a regional organization that has ECOMOG as its harbinger in the West African. The role of ECOMOG in the Liberian and Sierra Leone crises has been perceived by political analysts and media commentators as providing a foundation upon which a permanent and sustainable regional security mechanism for Africa can be built, especially in Liberia. (Brooks, 2000). Peacekeeping in the West-African region was the idea of ECOWAS, which created ECOMOG to resolve the crisis in the war-turned Liberia and subsequently in the sub-region to include the enforcement of many ephemeral peace accords signed by the armed factions. Later, the ECOMOG mission was deployed to Sierra Leone which was engulfed by crises (Nass, 2000: 64). Although the decision to deploy troops was political, ECOMOG's operations have been for the most part military.

The basis of ECOMOG creation and intervention in Liberia was the successive chain of events, including the political crisis in Liberia which reached its apogee following the invasion of the

Nimba County by Charles Taylor in December 1989 under the banner of National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL).

According to Nass (2000:70), in 1980, Sergeant Samuel Doe declared himself head of state of the Liberian state following his overthrow of President William Tolbert. Shortly, after the takeover of Doe, his regime fell into crises of survival arising from one of Doe's chief critique and former government official Charles Taylor. Taylor who formed a new insurgent movement called National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) to constitute himself as the leading challenger against the massive corruption, nepotism, sectionalism, indiscipline and indeed tribalization of the Liberian Army labeled against Doe's government.

Joined by the Gio and Mano ethnic group, Taylor began his campaign in Nimba County. By April and May 1990, the fighting and massacre of civilians had moved closer to the capital city (Monrovia) and other heavily populated areas. Burns & Nina (1975), argued the majority of Liberian territory later fell under the control of NPFL and by May 1990, President Doe was constrained to call upon *all patriotic citizens* to join forces with the government and fight the rebels. As a result of the exacerbation of the conflict, over half of the country's population of about 2.6 million was displaced internally and externally (Call & Cousens 2008). While some Liberians whose figure was said to, amount to around 700,000, were reported to have taken refuge in neighboring countries. Several attempts at mediation were made by Liberian groups, such as Christian and Muslim leaders under the Inter-Faith Mediation Committee at the beginning of the conflict; even member states of United Nations and OAU but all attempts were unsuccessful.

The events taking place in Liberia came under the scrutiny of the 13th summit of the Heads of States of ECOWAS countries which was held in Banjul, The Gambia on 30th of May 1990, under the chairmanship of Sir. Dawda Jawara of Gambia. The member states decided to set up the five-member Standing Mediation Committee with the task of achieving a peace settlement in the Liberian civil war. On the 6th of July 1990 at a summit meeting in Banjul, Gambia, the five members of the SMC took an unprecedented step in deciding to send a multinational peacekeeping force into Monrovia. Therefore, in its first decision, the Standing Mediation Committee, (acting on behalf of the Authority of Heads of States and Government), referring to the Protocol on Mutual Assistance and Defense and, called for:

- The parties to observe an immediate ceasefire;
- An ECOWAS ceasefire monitoring group (ECOMOG) to be set up for the purpose of keeping the peace, and restoring law and order and ensuring respect for the ceasefire;
- A broad-based interim government in Liberia set up through a National Conference of political parties and other interest groups;
- Free and fair election within 12 months leading to the establishment of a democratically elected government;
- The exclusion of all leaders of the various warring factions to the Liberian conflict from the Interim Government; and
- The creation of a Special Emergency Fund for the ECOMOG operation in Liberia

The mandate for peacekeeping force stated that they were to, 'keep the peace, restore law and order and ensure that a cease-fire was agreed to and by the warring factions in Liberia. Hence, on the 25th of August 1990, 3,000 troops from ECOMOG landed in Monrovia.

The arrival of Monrovia on 24th of August 1990, the ECOMOG force had a primary mission of Peace making and peace enforcement. Although many believed that, the peace enforcement mission was a violation of the original mandate of ECOMOG force. ECOMOG force ensured a cease fire by way of controlling Monrovia. This way, a general election was held. It was at this

time that, the ECOWAS began diplomatic move to initiate peace talks that would unify the country ahead of the country's general election (Dagne, 2003). After about three abortive attempts, Taylor held on to the claim that, since his (NPFL) has control of over 90% of the country, there was absolutely no need to conduct elections. This led him (Charles Taylor) to establish an alternative government for what he regarded as the bulk of "greater Libya" in his own capital city of Gbargna county with NPFL and its civilian counterpart, the national patriotic reconstruction assembly (NPFA). This political statement and the partitioning of the Liberian state has actually slowed or halted the peace talk initiative of ECOWAS/ECOMOG. Even though leading to 29th of May 1991 and the emergency of other new warring factions called the United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy (ULIMO) founded in Conakry the capital of Guinea. (Dzimba, 2001). The ULIMO is a coalition of other smaller Warring groups named; Samuel Doe's (AFL) which was the base of Doe's government, Movement for the Redemption of Liberation Muslims (MRLM), Liberation United Defense Force (LUDF) and Liberian Peace Council (LPC).

As tension intensified between these warring factions, francophone coalition was incorporated into ECOWAS negotiation efforts. This led to a new initiative of establishing a committee of five countries comprises of Cote de' voice, Togo, Burkina Faso and Guinea Bissau. This resulted in what was regarded as the Yamoussoukro (IV) accord on 30th of October 1990. In fact, Affendi (2001) argued that the essence of the accord was to ensure the disarmament and encampment of warring factions under the supervision of an expanded ECOMOG to implement Yamoussoukro accord met with serious frustration due to the re-eruption of fighting between ECOMOG and NPFL on the one hand and between ULIMO and NPFL on the other hand. The reason for this was that, partly Taylor accused ECOMOG of being partial for harboring support for ULIMO and refusing to disarm thus effectively undermining the Yamoussoukro accord.

Consequently, these successive tensions eventually escalated when an attempt was made to send 500 ECOMOG troops to ensure the enforcement of disarmament and encampment as contained in the Yamoussoukro accord, were sent into NPFL territory. But while engaging the AFL and ULIMO force, the ECOMOG forces were attacked by the NPFL forces in an operation tagged *operation octopus*.

Although, the ECOMOG forces had suffered a siege of two months in Monrovia, they eventually re-strategized to pursue an offensive operation using aircraft to descend on the NPFL forces. This offensive operation was what made the ECOMOG forces to regain Monrovia in December 1992. (Evans 1994, Howe (1996/7). But, once again, the ECOMOG forces found itself again fighting along two warring factions of ULIMO and AFL against NPFL. During this period, they were some notable accusations against ECOMOG. One of which was ECOMOG's attack on NPFL as an indication of Non neutrality of ECOMOG and secondly, US president Jimmy carter's questioning the size of ECOMOG contingent and the level of armaments available to it.

Within ECOWAS there was division in the success and future of ECOMOG vis-a-vis policy organization in Liberia. Attempt to other incidences that indict the ECOMOG contingent was in November 1992, when ECOWAS made a representation to UN Security Council meeting. The discussion was notably for disagreeing with the allegations of partiality by the ECOMOG but was very much particular about the fact that ECOMOG bombardment in Monrovia as a reaction to Operation Octopus has left many civilians dead and injured due to the indiscriminate nature of the attack.

The Operation Octopus had some successes but did not end without costs as in serious allegations of human right violations against the ECOMOG forces.

In any case, the ECOWAS/ECOMOG intervention has in spite of the difficulties in 1997 succeeded in restoring peace in the war torn Liberia by way of having the fighters disarmed and Liberian refugees repatriated from neighboring countries and in the end precisely on August 2, 1997, Charles Taylor was sworn in as the elected president of the Liberian state (Wakili, 2006: 140).

Sierra-Leone

Finally, Charles Taylor succeeded in leading the overthrow of Doe's government in 1990. And In 1997, not sooner peace was restored in Liberia another serious conflict which endangers the stability of the sub-region emerged in the neighboring country of Sierra Leone was Major John Koromah aggressively toppled the democratically elected government of President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah on May 25th, 1997. The situation in Sierra Leone deteriorated and degenerated into a state of lawlessness (Weimer, 1991; Willett, 2005; Wulf & Debiel, 2009; United Nations, 1992). ECOMOG interfered, chased out the military rulers and consequently returned Tejan Kabbah as the President of Sierra Leone. The ejected military junta and other rebel forces sprung up and engaged ECOMOG forces and the forces of the Sierra Leone government for over eight years.

However, by July 1999, through the use of a combination of force and diplomacy, all the warring factions in the crisis signed an agreement in Togo to end the conflict and restore peace and security in the country (Galadima, 2005:294). In October 1999, the United Nations authorized its peace mission in Sierra Leone called the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL).

The UNAMSIL was assigned with the role of monitoring adherence to the truce agreement signed by the warring factions in May 1999 to provide security at key locations and assist in demilitarization, The UNAMSIL was also to engage in disbandment and recuperation programs and to facilitate law enforcement work in the country generally (Galadima, 2005:294).

Guinea Bissau

In June 1998, crisis broke out in Guinea Bissau. This abruptly sparks off the conflict that led to the removal of Chief of Army Staff Brigadier Ansumane Mane from office, for suspected involvement in an illegal sale of weapons to revolutionaries in Senegal (Tavares 2011).

The conflict became prevalent and hundreds of people were either displaced or killed. The ECOMOG troops intervened and restored peace and security in the country. President Joa Bernardo Vieira stepped down and handed over power to an Interim Government of National Unity headed by Prime Minister Francisco Fadul. Over 3,000 foreign troops from Guinea-Conakry and Senegal supported former President Vieira and were asked to withdraw ECOMOG forces which were authorized to keep peace in the country. Hence, France gave both logistics and stipends to the ECOMOG troops. (Van Aardt 1996) & (Vogt 1992). Thus, considering the records and experiences of ECOMOG operations in the three major cases examined above, it is clear that, ECOMOG carried out all the major components of the peace mission. Peacekeeping, peace enforcement and peacemaking in its operations in the sub-region. Indeed ECOMOG performance in peacekeeping operations has been remarkable and most outstanding in the African experience. ECOWAS assumed that the organization was charged with conflict management by coincidence rather than by design. Despite involvement in conflict resolution in the region, the organization (ECOWAS) has not still lost its economic focus. It started slowly and uncoordinatedly in her response to the conflict management with the experimentation of Economic Community Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), an unplanned military peacekeeping mission in the war turned Liberia and Sierra Leone. The above actions and efforts made the organization gained international recognition with its efforts on the restoration of peace in Sierra Leone, Liberia, Guinea, and Guinea Bissau among others. (Malan 1998). However, according to Nass (2000) & Onoja, L. (1996), it

was very glaring that the organization lacks the necessary capacity in financial and logistical resources to tackle this menace adequately and therefore required international support to confront the new trends in the conflict headway.

Summary of Achievements and Challenges of ECOMOG in Peace-keeping operations

Since the inception of ECOMOG in peace-keeping operations in Liberia and later Sierra-Leone, ECOMOG has recorded some achievements and challenges alike. These include the following:

Achievements

- ECOMOG's intervention, especially in Liberia, was partly laudable due to the final restoration of political stability and peace in the war-turned mineral-rich country which experienced Seven (7) years of bitter crises; the stoppage of the slaughter of Krahn and Madingo people in Monrovia is a convenient reference point.
- ECOMOG's pioneering of a new security peace-making strategy was never practiced anywhere in the West-African sub-region.
- Prevention of renewal of hostilities between conflicting parties.
- Facilitation of a final, peaceful resolution to the dispute through mediation for peace between warring parties and group factions.

Challenges

- **Legality:** One critical question that has been raised, concerns the legality of the intervention of West African regional economic organization ECOWAS, using West African regional peace-keeping force ECOMOG, in the resolution of West African regional political conflict in Liberia.
- **Peacekeeping Challenges:** The epileptic willingness and indication of the warring parties to stop fighting, establish a cease-fire and welcome the peacekeeping force which is expressible in terms of the assurance of trust and cooperation of the warring parties were oftentimes not secured by the peace-keeping forces of the ECOMOG.
- **Enforcement Challenges:** Until November 1992, ECOMOG had not been able to fulfill its role as an enforcement machine due to a number of political problems. Chief among these challenges was arriving at a consensus on the three criteria indicated above. Initially, due to the insufficient number of troops (3500) for the operation and lack of coordination between ECOMOG Force Commander and ECOWAS Headquarters, the desire and efforts of ECOMOG to contain the Liberian conflict were unsuccessful until February 1993 when the UN and ECOWAS were able to impose and enforced an effective arms embargo on Liberia.
- **Internal Conflicts:** Because the Liberian conflict was internal with strong seated and deep-rooted *ethnic components and colorations*. Ethnic conflicts with a zero-sum character about them, with extremely high passions, fuelled by fundamentalists with primordial animosities and complicated by ethnic patterns of deprivation, the ECOMOG forces had on various instances faced set back.

Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in Sudan

IGAD was established in 1966 to succeed The Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development that had become redundant, Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) is another example of an African sub-regional organization formed to promote cooperation and development in the Horn of Africa. IGAD is one of the Eight RECs known as the African Economic Community (AEC). IGAD is known to play a considerable role in the management and resolution of interstate and internal conflicts in the region. IGAD constitutes seven countries and these countries are Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda (Goldsmith, Abura and Switzer, 2002: 193). One of the crises which prompted IGAD to make a series of peace initiatives in the region was the conflict in Sudan. The Sudanese conflict, which involved the northern and southern Sudan, “is Africa’s longest-running civil war”. At the heart of Sudanese conflict were several factors beyond just the simple North-South divides. These factors include ethnicity, religion, and resource control, social and economic disparities as well as foreign interference. Hundreds of thousands of Sudanese lost their lives and properties in the continuing civil war. Makinda, et al (2015).

Since the IGAD inception, the Sudan peace initiative took off in 1993. A year after, the Government of Sudan and the Sudanese People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) were brought together to sign a Declaration of Principles (DOP), it was a huge success for IGAD by getting the two parties in the disputes, which was intended to serve as a framework for peaceful settlement of the conflict between them.

According to Dagne, (2003), the following provision of the DOP was designed to guide the peace process; securing unity in Sudan through the establishment of a secular and democratic state, the right to self-determination for the South through a referendum and respect for human rights.

Subsequently, with the DOP as the framework, several peace talks under IGAD were convened. All the successive peace talks attempted to slim the major differences between the two parties. In 1997, the Government of Sudan formally accepted the provision of self-determination for the south and also appeared willing to make concessions on some other key issues.

Eventually, the acceptance of Khartoum of independence for the South was considered as a major step forward in the IGAD peace process in Sudan by the duo mediators and the international community. However, many contentious issues proved irremediable by IGAD mediators, especially from the separation of religion from politics, the composition and nature of the interim government prior to the referendum.

Between 1998 and 2001, several follow-up meetings were convened by IGAD between the parties but failed to make any development, until on 20th of July 2002. In 2002, IGAD convened a major historic peace talk in Machako, Kenya between the two disputing parties in Sudan. After a series of deliberations, the parties reached what a few described as a potentially historic agreement (Dagne, 2003:8) thereby, producing a Draft Peace Agreement Proposal.

On July 20th, 2002, the two warring parties signed what was called the Machakos Protocol. Under this protocol, a 6-year transition period was agreed upon and a referendum on the political future of Southern Sudan at the end of the transition period in 2008. Also, Southern Sudan was exempted by the protocol from the Islamic Law (Shari'a). Thereafter, a ceasefire arrangement was reached between the parties agreed. The currently, IGAD led peace initiatives have been commended by many observers as having achieved much more than the others in the movement towards resolving the Sudanese crisis in the end, although the search for peace in Sudan still continues. (Herbst 2005). Given this eventual developments, the 50-year-old protracted North-South war in Sudan. In 2003, a humanitarian crisis occurred, where over 2-million people were displaced and hundreds of thousands of others were killed in a conflict that involved the government of Sudan and numerous rebel groups in Darfur. This came as a result of another serious civil war that broke out in the Western Sudanese region of Darfur. In 2004, the African Union had sent an observer mission in Darfur in order to contain the situation.

Southern African Development Community (SADC) in Lesotho and the Democratic Republic of Congo

SADC was formed in 1980 following the Southern African Development Coordinating Conference (SADCC) by nine Southern African countries, namely, Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. It was born out of the experiences gained by member countries that have operated together in the group of Front-line States (FLS) formed in 1970.

As vanguard states, the Southern African States challenged and struggled to end the Apartheid regime in South Africa and aided the remaining countries in the sub-region to attain their political self-determination. (Damrosch 1993). The Front-line States understood that political freedom could only be meaningful when shared with greater economic and social collaboration, integration and the development of the countries in the sub-region. (Herbst, 1998). This concern ended in the Arusha, Tanzania meeting of July 1979 during which SADCC was conceived.

SADCC was intended to diminish Member States' reliance on Apartheid South Africa, to rally Member States' resources in the search for cooperative independence and to implement programs with far-reaching impact. The Heads of State and Government of SADCC met in Windhoek in August 1992, Namibia and signed a new pact that metamorphosed SADDCC to SADC. The circumstances that necessitated the change of name and shift of focus from Coordinating Conference to Development Community unavoidable were the end of the cold war and the departure of the white-dominated Apartheid government in South Africa. This development generated new challenges for the neighboring countries which largely revolved around the desire for greater political and economic

regionalism (Iheme, 2005). Among the core objectives of SADC was the campaign for economic integration and peace as well as security in the sub-region (Dzimba, 2001). Precisely, an organ of SADC called the Organ on Politics, Defense and Security Co-operation was designed and mandated with the task of prevention, management, and resolution of the conflict in the region. The organ was to involve itself in both intrastate and interstate conflicts and disputes in the region so as to ensure peaceful resolution and employ the use of armed forces if necessary (when peaceful means are exhausted). The mediation of SADC in the conflicts in Lesotho in 1998 and the Democratic Republic of Congo was a demonstration of the part played by SADC in Conflict management in Southern Africa.

Iyob & Khadiagala (2006), believe that the breaking of crises in Lesotho in January 1994 gave way to severe crises between the parties; this made the army go on a rampage in the capital of Lesotho. In August 1994, the government that was voted into power in 1993 was disbanded by King Letsie II who appointed his loyalists. There were fierce reactions in opposition to the *overthrow of the Monarchy* and Three Front Line States. New members of SADC which include Botswana, South Africa, and Zimbabwe intervened to resolve the internal crisis. The two key actors in the political crisis were coerced to sign a peace pact ending the conflict. The elected government was restored into office. Thus, the regional intervention commenced by three member countries of SADC in the region was decisive in conveying peaceful resolution in the Lesotho crisis.

In 1997, the corrupt, tyrannical and unpopular government of Colonel Mobutu Seso Seko of Democratic Republic of Congo, DRC (then Zaire) was toppled by Laurent Kabila, the leader of Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire and supported by neighboring countries of Angola, Rwanda, and Uganda. This action made the fight to break out in August 1998 in several parts of DRC between the Congolese Forces led by Laurent Kabila and many other rebel forces across the country (James, 1990). The crisis degenerated with the involvement of other countries in the region backing-up one group against the other in the conflict. Angola, Namibia, Zimbabwe, Sudan, and Chad initially supported Kabila, while Rwanda and Uganda supported the rebellious factions. Soon, the Congolese internal conflict became transformed into an unprecedented regional conflict in which as of mid-1999, the rebel forces dominated one-third of the country (Khobe, 2000). The height of the cruelty of the crisis prompted a series of peace moves to end it. One of the major peace initiatives was led by SADS, a regional body outside Central Africa. The SADS intervention in the crisis was triggered by the grave regional security consequences of the crisis and the lack of any effective regional interstate mechanisms for conflict management conflict in the Central African region.

In July 1999, SADC summoned a meeting in Lusaka, Zambia which had in attendance all the parties involved in the disputes, the parties were: the Congolese Government, rebel groups and the states supporting different warring factions-Angola, Zimbabwe, Rwanda, and Uganda. The result of the meeting was that Peace agreements were sealed and it focused on several far-reaching measures to end the crisis. The agreement led to the establishment of a cease-fire, withdrawal of all foreign armed groups in the territory of the DRC, deployment of a United Nations Peace Keeping Force in the DRC and the hosting of Inter Congolese National Dialogue (ICND) of all participants in the country.

While the Lusaka Accord did not instantly end the conflict, it nonetheless established the first major African-led peace effort towards the resolution of the crisis.

The murder of President Laurent Kabila on January 16, 2001, and his replacement with his son Joseph Kabila provided the dawn of hope to the peace process and certainly many provisions of Lusaka Accord initiated by SADC were implemented, a development that cemented the path for further peace treaties in the Nation.

General Challenges of Peace Keeping Operations (PKO) in Africa

Among many other things sub-regional organizations in peacekeeping and peacemaking efforts undertaken in Africa were usually commonly confronted with but not limited with the following: The different colonial experience of member states affects peacekeeping operations in many sub-regions, e.g. the political difference between Anglophone and Francophone countries in West Africa often affects ECOMOG peace operations.

- Clash of interest between countries within specific African sub-region and those outside the sub-region.
- Lack of clear standards among African countries on the nature and form of peacekeeping operations.
- Financial constraints faced by many countries often hamper deployment, reinforcement and the supply of other required logistic support for troops on peace mission operations.
- Fear of domination by smaller countries of bigger state(s)' major role in the region discourages such countries from active participation in peacekeeping effort.
- Lack of trust and rivalry between countries in sub-regional organizations further affect peacekeeping initiatives, as member states may refuse to participate.
- Lack of economic resources by African countries to sustain long peacekeeping missions involving military operations or a series of peace talks and negotiation.
- The domestic challenges of major contributors in contributing countries have made them shifted their focus inward, e.g. Boko Haram (BH) in Nigeria and Al-Shabab in Somalia. Thereby leaving the region more vulnerable in the event of other major crises within the sub-region.
- Inadequate or lack of support of African-led peace mission operations by the international community, particularly rich and powerful countries of the world and the United Nations.

Conclusion

There has been a rise in the phenomenon of inter-state and internal conflicts in Africa. Hence, the task of peace operation remains a major challenge confronting the continent. The Cases of studies of African-led peacekeeping and peace-building initiatives carried out among others, by three sub-regional organizations in this chapter. Namely; ECOWAS/ECOMOG, SADC and IGAD peace process in Sudan.

The brief discussion on the sub-regional peacekeeping operations by these major African sub-regional bodies reveals that all aspects of peace mission (peacekeeping, peace enforcement, peacemaking, and peace-building) have been implemented. From the arguments presented in these studies, ECOMOG stood out as the most successful regional peacemaker in Africa. ECOMOG, more than others (SADC and IGAD), appeared to have experimented with all aspects of peacemaking engagement, utilizing the services of the military and diplomats, and using both peaceful means and forceful means where appropriate in resolving numerous West African Conflicts. IGAD limited its effort to the use of diplomatic means, peace talks, conferences and negotiations in all its peace operations. SADS on its part used force on a limited scale and more peaceful negotiations in its interventions. However, with all their operational limitations, the sub-regional organizations demonstrate that Africa is capable of evolving mechanisms for the prevention and management of the growing internal and inter-state conflicts in the continent.

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