

Fundamentals of Information & Network Security

ECE 471/571




Lecture #29: User Authentication & Passwords

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Basic Problem



How do you prove to someone that
you are who you claim to be?

Any system with access control must solve this problem

Authentication

- Binding of an identity to a subject (e.g., a person or a machine)
- Proof of information
 - What you know
 - What you have
 - What you are
 - Where you are
- Who is being authenticated?
 - Authenticate a person to a server
 - Authenticate a machine to a machine
 - Authenticate both a person and a machine to a server
 - A machine stores high-quality secret; a person memorizes low-quality password

Authentication of People

- User authentication: a computer verifies that you are who you claim to be
- Main techniques
 - What you know: password, SSN, Birth date
 - What you have: physical keys credit cards, smart card
 - What you are: biometrics

Password-Based Authentication

- *What you know*
- User has a secret password.
System checks it to authenticate the user.
- Password in plaintext is sent over for authentication.
- Problems
 - Eavesdropping
 - Database reading
 - Password guessing: on-line, off-line (dictionary attack)
- telnet, ftp

Storing User Password


Where to store

- Store passwords individually on each server
- Store all passwords at authentication storage node
 - Retrieve password information from storage node; authentication is done at server node
- Store all passwords at authentication facilitator node
 - Send the login info received to facilitator node; authentication is done at facilitator node; result is sent back to server node.

In what format

- Store plain passwords
- Store hashes of passwords
 - Password guessing
- Store encrypted passwords
 - Involves high-quality key, cannot do password guessing; vulnerable to insider attack.

UNIX-Style Passwords



Password Hashing

- Instead of user password, store $H(\text{password})$
- When user enters password, compute its hash and compare with entry in password file
 - System does not store actual passwords!
- Hash function H must have some properties
 - **One-way**: given $H(\text{password})$, hard to find password
 - No known algorithm better than trial and error
 - **Collision-resistant**: given $H(\text{password1})$, hard to find password2 such that $H(\text{password1})=H(\text{password2})$


UNIX Password System

- Problem: passwords are not truly random
 - With 52 upper- and lower-case letters, 10 digits and 32 punctuation symbols, there are $94^8 \approx 6 \text{ quadrillion}$ possible 8-character passwords
- Uses modified DES as if it were a hash function
 - Encrypt NULL string using password as the key
 - Truncates passwords to 8 characters!
 - Artificial slowdown: run DES 25 times
 - Humans like to use dictionary words, human and pet names $\approx 1 \text{ million}$ common passwords

Dictionary Attack

- Password file `/etc/passwd` is world-readable
- Contains user IDs and group IDs which are used by many system programs
- **Dictionary attack** is possible because many passwords come from a small dictionary
 - Attacker can compute $H(\text{word})$ for every word in the dictionary and see if the result is in the password file
 - With 1,000,000-word dictionary and assuming 10 guesses per second, brute-force online attack takes 50,000 seconds (14 hours) on average
 - This is very conservative. Offline attack is much faster!

Salt




- Users with the same password have different entries in the password file
- Dictionary attack is still possible!

Advantages of Salting

- Without salt, attacker can pre-compute hashes of all dictionary words once for all password entries
 - Same hash function on all UNIX machines
 - Identical passwords hash to identical values; one table of hash values can be used for all password files
- With salt, attacker must compute hashes of all dictionary words once for each password entry
 - With 12-bit random salt, same password can hash to 2^{12} different hash values
 - Attacker must try all dictionary words for each salt value in the password file

Shadow Passwords

x:14510:30



Hashed password is **not**
stored in a world-readable file

- Store hashed passwords in `/etc/shadow` file which is only readable by system administrator (root)
- Add expiration dates for passwords