



Intrusion Detection Systems for Industrial Control Systems

Clarisa Grijalva

Fall 2023



Outline

- Intrusion Detection Systems review
 - Types of IDS: Host and network-based
 - Detection methods: Signature and anomaly-based
 - How IDS works
 - IDS vs IPS
- IDS for ICS
 - Security requirement
 - Types of ICS-IDS



Intrusion Detection Systems



Intrusion Detection Systems

- An IDS is a system that monitors network or system activity for malicious activity
- Can be used to detect unauthorized access, misuse of privileges, or attempts to compromise system security
- Its primary purpose is to identify potential security threats or incidents and generate alerts or take automated actions to mitigate them



Types of IDS

- **Host IDS (HIDS)**

- Monitors activity on a specific host
- Collects and analyzes data from the system's operating system, applications, and files
- Can detect a variety of threats, including unauthorized access, malware infections, and changes to system configurations



Types of IDS

- **Network IDS (NIDS)**

- Monitors network traffic for suspicious activity
- Collects and analyzes data from network packets
- Can detect threats that are not visible on individual hosts, such as unauthorized access and malware infection
- Can detect a variety of network threats, including denial-of-service, man-in-the-middle, phishing, and spoofing attacks



Detection Methods

- **Signature-based**

- Uses known signatures of malicious activity to detect attacks
- Relies on a database of known attack patterns or signatures
- Compares incoming traffic against a database
- Effective in detecting known attacks
- Ineffective against new or unknown attacks
- Requires regular updates to the signature database



Detection Methods

- **Anomaly-based**

- Monitors network or system activity for deviations from normal behavior
- It creates a baseline of normal activity and then compares subsequent activity against that baseline
- Effective in detecting new or unknown attacks
- Can generate a lot of false positives
- Can be difficult to configure and tune



How IDS works

1. Data collection of system activity or network traffic

2. Data analysis

- Compares collected data with a database of known attack patterns or against a baseline of normal behavior

3. Alert generation

- Includes information about the nature of the incident, source and destination IP addresses, time of detection, etc.
- Can be prioritized based on severity



How IDS works

4. Notification and response

- Security personnel receive and review the alerts
- Implementation of manual or automated security measures

5. Logging and reporting

- Maintain logs of detected events and responses for later analysis and reporting

6. Continuous monitoring

IDS vs. IPS

• Intrusion *Detection* Systems

- Passive system that monitors activity and alerts administrators to suspicious events
- Used for threat detection, incident investigation, and compliance monitoring
- Helps identify security incidents and vulnerabilities but does not directly prevent them

• Intrusion *Prevention* Systems


- Active system that monitors activity and takes action to stop attacks
- Aims to prevent security incidents before they can cause harm
- Used for real-time threat prevention and protection
- Can block attacks, drop packets, or even modify traffic



IDS for Industrial Control Systems


ICS Architecture

- Level 0 – Field
 - Physical process devices
 - Sensors, actuators, switches, valves that interact directly with the industrial process
- Level 1 – Control
 - Control functions to manage specific processes
 - PLCs, RTUs



ICS Architecture

- Level 2 – Supervisory
 - Coordination of Level 1 controllers
 - HMIs and SCADA software
- Level 3 & 4 – Manufacturing, Enterprise and Business Planning
 - Production scheduling
 - Supply chain management





Security Requirements of ICS

- **Real-time**

- ICS are time-critical and operate in real-time
- The operation time of each physical device is strictly limited

- **Availability**

- Processes may be continuous and hence need to be highly available

- **Risk management**

- Human safety and fault tolerance are the primary concerns



Security Requirements of ICS

- **Physical effects**

- Interactions with physical processes and consequences in the ICS domain that can manifest in physical events

- **Communications**

- ICS uses a variety of industrial protocols for control and communications

- **Limited computing resources**

- Limited computing and storage resources, make it difficult to support the running of security programs



Security Requirements of ICS

- **Fixed business logic**
 - ICS should follow specific business logic, to achieve specific production goals
- **Legacy systems**
 - There exists a significant portion of legacy sub-systems in ICS, making it difficult to upgrade ICS
- **Hard updating and restarting of industrial equipment**
- **Poor security of industrial protocols**



Why ICS-IDS are necessary?

- Emerging technologies bring new development opportunities for traditional ICS
- The shift from isolated environments to open environments exposes ICS to a broad scope of malicious cyberattacks
- Disruption of ICS could have a considerable negative impact on public safety or cause significant economic losses



Types of ICS-IDS

- **HIDS in ICS**

- Can be used on computer workstations found within the industrial network
- They do not run on PLCs or field devices

- **NIDS in ICS**

- Most common type of IDS used in ICS
- ICS networks often have limited bandwidth, and high latency requirements
- ICS use a variety of different networking devices and protocols, making difficult the deployment of a single NIDS



Types of ICS-IDS

- **Signature-based**

- *Quickdraw* was developed by Peterson et al. in 2014.
 - Snort-based IDS that uses a set of rules developed specifically for the industrial control protocols Modbus/TCP and DNP3.
 - Quickdraw can detect a variety of attacks on ICSs, including configuration attacks, coil and register read/write attacks, and Modbus attacks
- *Morris et al.* developed a Snort-based IDS in 2016 to detect illegal data in the Modbus protocol in a serial-based ICS. They provided details on 50 intrusion detection rules that can be used to detect malicious activity in ICSs.



Types of ICS-IDS

- **Anomaly-based**

- *Statistical-based*

- Utilizes statistical algorithms such as parametric and nonparametric methods, time series analysis, and Markov chains.
 - Examines events or network traffic against statistical models to confirm intrusion presence.
 - Anomaly detection assigns an anomaly score to events by comparing observed and trained statistical profiles.
 - The anomaly score quantifies the degree of irregularity, triggering alerts when it exceeds a predefined threshold.



Types of ICS-IDS

- **Anomaly-based**

- *Machine Learning-based*

- Involves creating mathematical models for event categorization
 - Machine learning techniques can be supervised (with labeled training data) or unsupervised (data not labeled)
 - Examples of machine learning algorithms include Artificial Neural Networks, Bayesian Networks, Support Vector Machines, Fuzzy Logic, Deep Learning, Clustering, Classification, and Decision Trees
 - Supervised learning distinguishes normal from abnormal behavior, while unsupervised learning identifies patterns without predefined labels



Types of ICS-IDS

- **Anomaly-based**

- *Specification-based*

- Also known as knowledge-based IDS
 - Constructs models based on expert-defined specifications that define legitimate system behaviors
 - Reduces false positives by using formal methods like state diagrams and finite automata

- Specialized process-aware IDS solutions monitor process data, control commands, and even the ICS's physical model to enhance detection accuracy



Types of ICS-IDS

- **Protocol analysis-based**

- Utilizes protocol analysis technology to monitor industrial control network traffic
- Detects changes in protocol format or data packet status
- Identifies abnormal behaviors within Industrial Control Systems (ICS)
- Common industrial protocols like Modbus, ENIP, and DNP3 are increasingly susceptible to cyberattacks
- These protocols were not originally designed with security in mind
- Vulnerabilities include lack of encryption, authentication, and susceptibility to attacks.



Types of ICS-IDS

- **Protocol analysis-based**

- Cheung et al. proposed an IDS mechanism in 2007. It utilized a model derived from protocol specifications to describe expected system behavior. This approach generated a higher rate of false alarms.
- Bro, a network-based IDS developed by the University of Berkeley, collects network packets and parses protocols
- Lin et al. improved Bro by designing a packet parser supporting industrial protocols like DNP3, it also supports other protocols used in ICS



Types of ICS-IDS

- **Protocol analysis-based**

- Hong et al. analyzed smart grid substation systems based on IEC 61850 standards. Detected anomalies or malicious behaviors in multicast messages (e.g., GOOSE and SV) specified by IEC 61850.
- Protocol analysis-based IDS combined with traffic analysis for more effective intrusion detection
- Communication patterns defined in ICS protocols and specific business logic are used to extract detection rules

Types of ICS-IDS

- **Protocol analysis-based**

- Yusheng et al. introduced the SD-IDS algorithm for real-time deep inspection of Modbus TCP traffic. SD-IDS consists of rule extraction and deep inspection modules.
 - Rule extraction identifies semantic relationships among key fields in the Modbus TCP protocol.
 - Deep inspection detects anomalies or intrusions based on these relationships and real-time traffic data.



Types of ICS-IDS

- **Traffic mining-based**

- Protocol analysis-based IDS often struggle with detecting unknown attacks and parsing data packets efficiently
- Traffic mining-based intrusion detection techniques aim to address these limitations
- ICS environments exhibit fixed operation objects, static network topology, and limited applications
- Normal ICS traffic remains relatively stable

Types of ICS-IDS

- **Traffic mining-based**

- Traffic mining-based IDS collects data from different regions within an ICS
- Utilizes data mining (e.g., neural networks, Bayesian classifiers, support vector machines, decision trees) or data analysis (statistical analysis) techniques on collected data
- Stavroulakis and Stamp's approach extracts five tuples (source IP, destination IP, transport protocol, source port, destination port). Also considers traffic duration and average time intervals between adjacent packets.

Types of ICS-IDS

- **Traffic mining-based**

- Hou et al. propose a method based on probabilistic principal component analysis (PCA) to detect abnormal traffic
 - Recognizes the impact of random burst traffic on PCA
 - Uses an Iterative Variational Bayesian algorithm to estimate model parameters
 - Abnormal traffic is detected based on rank changes
 - Effective in suppressing false alarms caused by random burst traffic
- Artificial neural networks analyzes large volumes of data to identify unknown intrusions. Establish nonlinear mapping relationships between traffic features and system security states (normal/abnormal)

Types of ICS-IDS

- **Traffic mining-based**

- Vollmer and Manic extract various network traffic features (e.g., packet size, ICMP details, IP protocol data).
 - Construct input vectors for NN model training
 - Utilize the error backpropagation algorithm for model training
- Vollmer and Manic propose a sliding window-based feature vector extraction technique
 - Dynamically and accurately extracts 16 network features, including IP addresses, packet counts, time intervals, window duration, data transmission speed, and more
 - Combines BP and LM methods for intrusion detection, achieving high accuracy



Types of ICS-IDS

- **Control process analysis-based**

- Control process analysis-based IDS capitalizes on the semantic information and unique characteristics of ICS

- *Process Data Analysis-based*

- Monitoring critical process data (e.g., reactor pressure, temperature, pH level) to assess the security status of a physical process.
- Unexpected changes in process data can indicate intrusion attempts.

Types of ICS-IDS

- **Control process analysis-based**

- Krotofil et al. proposed a real-time attack algorithm designed for field devices
 - Uses run analysis to extract noise characteristics from the original value sequence of a process variable
 - Utilizes a triangle approximation technique to determine the dynamic nature of the value sequence
 - Generates a fake but plausible value sequence to replace true values
 - The detection method based on cluster entropy checks the consistency and rationality of the value sequence
 - Detects intrusion behaviors when consistency or rationality is violated

Types of ICS-IDS

- **Control process analysis-based**

- Hadz'iosmanovic' et al. designed an IDS method based on semantic analysis of process variables
 - Three-step approach: extracting current values, classifying variables into categories (constants, enums, continuous), and constructing behavioral models
 - Alarms are raised when actual behavior deviates from expected behavior predicted by the model
- Carcano et al. developed a formal modeling language to describe control system states
 - Supports the Modbus protocol, extendable to other industrial protocols
 - Defines critical states, danger levels, and distance measurement between system states
 - Calculates proximity between the current state and critical states during detection
 - Raises alerts if the proximity exceeds a preset threshold



Types of ICS-IDS

- **Control process analysis-based**

- *Analyzing Control Commands*

- Control commands play a crucial role in ICS, and adversaries may manipulate them to achieve attack objectives
 - Analyzing control commands helps identify intrusion behaviors in ICS

- Carcano et al. proposed a novel IDS technology for power grids. Introduces a new language to describe control commands in power grids. Provides semantic descriptions for detection features.

Types of ICS-IDS

- **Control process analysis-based**

- *Single Packet Signature-based Strategy*

- Detects illegal packets sent by PLCs or RTUs
 - Utilizes semantic analysis on control commands

- *State-based Strategy*

- Detects intrusions by monitoring the states of ICS
 - Invalid control commands often lead to critical system states

- Lin et al. proposed a semantic analysis technique for control commands in distributed ICS. Forecasts consequences of control commands based on network and physical facilities knowledge. Reveals attackers' intentions by analyzing control commands' outcomes.

Types of ICS-IDS

- **Control process analysis-based**

- *Single Packet Signature-based Strategy*

- Detects illegal packets sent by PLCs or RTUs
 - Utilizes semantic analysis on control commands

- *State-based Strategy*

- Detects intrusions by monitoring the states of ICS
 - Invalid control commands often lead to critical system states

- Lin et al. proposed a semantic analysis technique for control commands in distributed ICS. Forecasts consequences of control commands based on network and physical facilities knowledge. Reveals attackers' intentions by analyzing control commands' outcomes.

Types of ICS-IDS

- **Control process analysis-based**

- *Physical Model-Based IDS*

- Physical models accurately describe the evolution of an industrial control system
 - These models predict expected system outputs, which are compared with observed outputs for intrusion detection

- Cardeñas et al. constructed a linear state-space model for ICS. The model considers the system's current state, previous states, and control inputs.

- *Sequence-Based Detection*: Detects anomalies quickly by determining the minimum sequence length for a judgment.



Types of ICS-IDS

- **Control process analysis-based**

- *Change-Based Detection*: Detects transitions from normal to abnormal states based on predefined thresholds for residuals or accumulated residuals.
- Edelmayer et al. created an equivalent linear time-invariant representation of the original time-varying control system. Developed a detection filter based on this representation.
- Urbina et al. studied methods to limit the impacts of stealthy attacks. Proposed a novel metric to measure the impacts of these attacks



Types of ICS-IDS

- **Process-oriented**

- Focus on monitoring the underlying process in the control system rather than monitoring network traffic
- Intrusion Detection methods
 - Model process variable excursions beyond their appropriate ranges using machine-learning techniques
 - Another method requires plant personnel input to define critical process variable limits



Types of ICS-IDS

- **Process-oriented**

- Semantic Security Monitoring (SSM) uses analysis of control-bus traffic messages to construct a 3rd copy of the plant-PLC registers to detect events that suggest that plant operations may be out of specification, out of compliance, or out of a desired safety range



References

- Kaouk, M., Flaus, J. M., Potet, M. L., & Groz, R. (2019, April). A review of intrusion detection systems for industrial control systems. In *2019 6th International Conference on Control, Decision and Information Technologies (CoDIT)* (pp. 1699-1704). IEEE.
- Colbert, E. J., & Hutchinson, S. (2016). Intrusion detection in industrial control systems. *Cybersecurity of SCADA and other industrial control systems*, 209-237.
- Hu, Y., Yang, A., Li, H., Sun, Y., & Sun, L. (2018). A survey of intrusion detection on industrial control systems. *International Journal of Distributed Sensor Networks*, 14(8), 1550147718794615.