# MTAT.07.017 Applied Cryptography

Transport Layer Security (TLS)


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## Transport Layer Security

"TLS is cryptographic protocol that provides communication security over the Internet."

- Provides confidentiality, integrity and server authentication
- Most successful and widely used cryptographic protocol (!!!)
- Any application protocol can be encapsulated in TLS



# TLS History

- SSL 1.0 never publicly released
- SSL 2.0 Netscape (1995)
- SSL 3.0 Netscape (1996)
- TLS 1.0 (SSL 3.1) RFC 2246 (1999)
- TLS 1.1 RFC 4346 (2006)
- TLS 1.2 RFC 5246 (2008)
- TLS 1.3 RFC draft (2016)

No fundamental changes between versions

http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc5246.txt

# TLS Record Layer

#### [Type] [Version] [Length] [Data]

- Type: content type of encapsulated data:
  - Handshake message (0x16)
  - Change cipher spec message (0x14)
  - Alert message (0x15)
  - Application data (0x17)
- Protocol version: 0x0303 (for TLS v1.2)
- Length: length of the data (2 bytes)
- Data: encapsulated content
  - Can contain several same type messages




Header is never encrypted!



- Client verifies server's X.509 certificate
- Client extracts from the certificate server's public key
- Client encrypts random symmetric key using public key
- Only the server can decrypt symmetric key
- Now the client and server share the same symmetric key
- Symmetric key used for actual data encryption/authentication

## Dissecting TLS with Wireshark



## Alert Message

Signals about TLS related issues to other party [Level] [Description]

- Level (1 byte):
  - Warning (0x01)
  - Fatal (0x02)
- Description (1 byte):

```
close_notify(0),
unexpected_message(10),
bad_record_mac(20),
decryption_failed(21),
handshake_failure(40),
bad certificate(42).
unsupported_certificate(43),
certificate revoked(44).
certificate_expired(45),
illegal_parameter(47),
unknown ca(48).
access_denied(49),TLSv1 Record Layer: Alert (Level: Fatal, Description: Certificate Unknown)
                     Content Type: Alert (21)
decrypt_error(51),
                     Version: TLS 1.0 (0x0301)
user_canceled(90), Length: 2
. . .
                    ▼ Alert Message
                      Level: Fatal (2)
                      Description: Certificate Unknown (46)
```

# Change Cipher Spec Message

```
▼ TLSv1 Record Layer: Change Cipher Spec Protocol: Change Cipher Spec Content Type: Change Cipher Spec (20)
Version: TLS 1.0 (0x0301)
Length: 1
Change Cipher Spec Message
```

Signals to other party that from now on the negotiated cipher suite will be used to protect outgoing messages [0x01]

## **Application Data**

▼ TLSv1.1 Record Layer: Application Data Protocol: http

Content Type: Application Data (23)

Version: TLS 1.1 (0x0302)

Length: 448

Encrypted Application Data: 3a37312ac35ea3809f392b2b76174849218d83f179d6d305...

Contains (most likely encrypted) application data in a form as required by the application protocol (e.g., HTTP request/response etc.)

[Application Data]

## Handshake Message

# Negotiates TLS protocol security parameters [Type] [Length] [Body]

• Type: message type:

```
hello_request(0), client_hello(1), server_hello(2), certificate(11), server_key_exchange (12), certificate_request(13), server_hello_done(14), certificate_verify(15), client_key_exchange(16), finished(20)
```

- Length: length of the body (3 bytes)
- Body: message body
  - Can be split over several records

## Handshake Message: client\_hello

- Highest TLS version supported (2 bytes)
- Client randomness (32 bytes)
  - Timestamp in first 4 bytes
- Session ID length (1 byte) + session ID
- Cipher suites length (2 bytes)
- List of cipher suites supported: SV1 Record Layer: Handshake Protocol: Client Hello

  - 0x002f TLS\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_128\_CBC\_SHA
  - 0x0035 TLS\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_256\_CBC\_SHA
  - 0x0039 TLS\_DHE\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_256\_CBC\_SHA
- Compression methods length (1/4 byte)
- mt unix time: May 3, 2013 17:55:01.000000000 EEST

   List of compression methods supported tes: 7a8be086f64064e973ce6735a9db15aa7af15
  - 0x00 null (mandatory)
  - 0x01 DEFLATE (gzip)
- Extensions (optional)

- ▼ Cipher Suites (2 suites)

  Cipher Suite: TLS\_RSA\_WITH\_RC4\_128\_SHA (0x0005)

  Cipher Suite: TLS\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_256\_CBC\_SHA (0x0035)
- Compression Methods Length: 1 ▼ Compression Methods (1 method) Compression Method: null (0)

Session ID Length: 0

Cipher Suites Length: 4

# Handshake Message: server\_hello

```
▼ TLSv1 Record Layer: Handshake Protocol: Server Hello
Content Type: Handshake (22)
Version: TLS 1.0 (0x0301)
Length: 74
▼ Handshake Protocol: Server Hello
Handshake Type: Server Hello (2)
Length: 70
Version: TLS 1.0 (0x0301)
▼ Random
gmt_unix_time: May 3, 2013 17:55:01.000000000 EEST
random_bytes: 6dbfaec346d39439ac083b8c0df9f485b327c:
Session ID Length: 32
Session ID 6a9137403d3b66f28e95ca0b0053734f6edad2813
Cipher Suite: TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA (0x0005)
Compression Method: null (0)
```

- TLS version selected (2 bytes)
- Server randomness (32 bytes)
  - Timestamp in first 4 bytes
- Session ID length (1 byte) + session ID
- Cipher suite selected (2 bytes)
- Compression method selected (1 byte)
- Extensions (optional)

# Handshake Message: certificate

- ▼TLSv1 Record Layer: Handshake Protocol: Certificate
  Content Type: Handshake (22)
  Version: TLS 1.0 (0x0301)
  Length: 2951
  ▼ Handshake Protocol: Certificate
  Handshake Type: Certificate (11)
  Length: 2947
  Certificates Length: 2944
  ▼ Certificates (2944 bytes)
  Certificate Length: 694
  ▶ Certificate (id-at-commonName=ubuntu)
  Certificate Length: 983
  ▶ Certificate Length: 1258
  ▶ Certificate Length: 1258
  ▶ Certificate (id-at-commonName=Juur-SK,id-at-orgal
  - Length of certificate list (3 bytes)
  - List of certificates
    - Certificate length (3 bytes)
    - DFR encoded certificate
  - The first is server's certificate
  - Other certificates are optional
    - Usually intermediate CA certificates

# Handshake Message: server\_hello\_done

```
▼ TLSv1 Record Layer: Handshake Protocol: Server Hello Done
Content Type: Handshake (22)
Version: TLS 1.0 (0x0301)
Length: 4
▼ Handshake Protocol: Server Hello Done
Handshake Type: Server Hello Done (14)
Length: 0
```

- Empty message body
- Tells that there will be no more messages from the server in this protocol round

# Handshake Message: client\_key\_exchange

```
▼ TLSv1 Record Layer: Handshake Protocol: Client Key Exchange Content Type: Handshake (22)
Version: TLS 1.0 (0x0301)
Length: 262
▼ Handshake Protocol: Client Key Exchange
Handshake Type: Client Key Exchange (16)
Length: 258
▼ RSA Encrypted PreMaster Secret
Encrypted PreMaster length: 256
Encrypted PreMaster: 34f527956711a0e5100b30571910486042!
```

# Contains (two byte length-prefixed) encrypted 48 byte random "pre-master secret"


- Encrypted using public key from the server certificate
- Encrypted according to PKCS#1 v1.5
- First two bytes in premaster secret contain TLS version
  - Must be checked by the server
  - Prevents some attacks (?)
- Next 46 bytes are truly random bytes

# Handshake Message: finished

```
▼ TLSv1.1 Record Layer: Handshake Protocol: Encrypted Handshake Message Content Type: Handshake (22)
Version: TLS 1.1 (0x0302)
Length: 64
Handshake Protocol: Encrypted Handshake Message
```

- The first encrypted message
- Serves to verify if encryption works
- Contains hash of concatenation of all previous handshake messages (excluding TLS record header)
  - Must be verified by other party to detect downgrade attacks

# Encryption



- Plaintext compression leaks information (CRIME attack)
- How many symmetric keys are needed?
  - MAC & encrypt (+ IV for block ciphers)
    - Separate keys for both directions

How to derive these keys from 48 byte pre-master secret?

# **Key Derivation**

- TLS defines PRF() (pseudo-random function)
  - Uses SHA-256()
  - Produces infinitely long pseudo-random output
- 48 byte "master secret" is derieved:

```
PRF(premaster + "master secret" + client_random + server_random, 48)
```

• From "master secret" is derieved key block in the size needed:

```
PRF(master_secret + "key expansion" + server_random + client_random, 136)
```

Key block is split into keys needed:

```
client_mac_key = key_block[:20]
server_mac_key = key_block[20:40]
client_enc_key = key_block[40:56]
server_enc_key = key_block[56:72]
client_iv = ...
...
```

#### MAC Calculation

HMAC\_digest(key, seq + type + version + length + data)

- digest: digest algorithm from negotiated cipher suite
- key: client/server MAC key
- seq: client/server Sequence number (8 bytes)
  - Starts from 0
  - Incremented for every encrypted TLS record
- type: TLS record content type
- version: TLS protocol version (2 bytes)
- length: length of the content (2 bytes)
- data: content

Type, version and length are fields from TLS record header! This way integrity for TLS record header is also provided!

#### Task

Implement TLS 1.2 client that can retrieve server's certificate.

\$ ./tls getcert.pv https://www.eesti.ee/ --certificate server.pem

--> client\_hello()
<--- handshake()

<--- server hello()

```
[+] server randomness: 0A801E9E809F15D7BCDB3A4F9640A3395480E7EF41FC9E6BD9B9438ECD6
         [+] server timestamp: 1975-08-02 02:43:26
         [+] TLS session ID: B268B48206AC28679B315CAB6CF5D0EEB5B0E50A973097EF1AFE20C23E8520
         [+] Cipher suite: TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
<--- handshake()
         <--- certificate()
         [+] Server certificate length: 1636
         [+] Server certificate saved in: server.pem
<--- handshake()
         <--- server_hello_done()
--> alert()
[+] Closing TCP connection!
$ openssl x509 -in server.pem -text | grep 'Subject:'
Subject: C=EE, ST=Harjumaa, L=Tallinn, O=Estonian Information System Authority, CN=*.eesti
3 0.004 172 17 57 208 195 80 123 145 TCP
                                             66 56804 > https [ACK] Seg=1 Ack=1 Win=14720 Len=0 TSval=6
4 0.004 172.17.57.208 195.80.123.145 TLSv1
                                            118 Client Hello
5 0.008 195.80.123.145 172.17.57.208 TLSv1
                                           4410 Server Hello
6 0.008 172.17.57.208 195.80.123.145 TCP
                                             66 56804 > https [ACK] Seg=53 Ack=4345 Win=23296 Len=0 TSV
7 0.011 195.80.123.145 172.17.57.208 TLSv1
                                            530 Certificate, Server Hello Done
 8 0.011 172.17.57.208 195.80.123.145 TCP
                                             66 56804 > https [ACK] Sea=53 Ack=4809 Win=26240 Len=0 TSV
9 0.016 172.17.57.208 195.80.123.145 TLSv1
                                             73 Alert (Level: Fatal, Description: Certificate Unknown)
```

#### Task: Other Test Cases

```
$ ./tls_getcert.py https://www.ut.ee/
--> client_hello()
<--- handshake()
        <--- server_hello()
        [+] server randomness: 5AE09A3AD38FEBD7F6541A8E9E54813303D397CBFBD3CF667D615EFE73D
        [+] server timestamp: 2018-04-25 18:09:46
        [+] TLS session ID: 87500CF65DA6B1DD5BA9C675697802254AA383EFD29A403E76C8EC33B72362
        [+] Cipher suite: TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA
<--- handshake()
        <--- certificate()
        [+] Server certificate length: 1604
<--- handshake()
        <--- server_hello_done()
--> alert()
[+] Closing TCP connection!
$ ./tls_getcert.py https://danskebank.ee/
--> client_hello()
<--- handshake()
        <--- server hello()
        [+] server randomness: 5AE0993AA7777BD76CF82BF906842C6B3A71B6E3E6378528CEDEA00CBA5
        [+] server timestamp: 2018-04-25 18:05:30
        [+] TLS session ID: C37DDFE7B056C2FBD56BDFC93CC5934F78BB7C2668DA5A106E836F5D927FC6
        [+] Cipher suite: TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
        <--- certificate()
        [+] Server certificate length: 1916
        <--- server_hello_done()
--> alert()
```

[+] Closing TCP connection!

#### Task: Hints

- Compare your parsed output with output from Wireshark
  - Use capture filters 'host 1.2.3.4 and port 443'
- NB! One TLS record can contain several handshake messages
- Unix timestamp can be obtained using int(time.time())
- Unix timestamp can be printed using:
   datetime.datetime.fromtimestamp(int(time.time())).strftime('%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S')
- http://blog.fourthbit.com/2014/12/23/ traffic-analysis-of-an-ssl-slash-tls-session