

Threat Extraction


Introduction

The Check Point Threat Extraction blade removes exploitable content, including active content and embedded objects, reconstructs files to eliminate potential threats, and promptly delivers sanitized content to users to maintain business flow.


Exercise 1: Onboarding

In this exercise, we will enable the Threat Extraction blade and use it to remove the exploitable content from the generated files.


1. Connect to SmartConsole from the Jump Server, edit the GW object and enable Threat Extraction.




2. Review the default settings under General Properties -> Threat Extraction. And save the changes.




3. Edit the existing profile, **zeroday_demo** and activate Threat Extraction.




4. Under Threat Extraction -> **General**, there are **25** file types are enabled by default.



5. Click on the active link and edit the List and enable all file types.



- Under **Advanced**, change the logging option to **Log every file**. This is useful in a demo environment.




- Save the changes and Install the Access Control and Threat Prevention Policy.


Exercise 2: Web Extraction

In this exercise, we will generate and download documents and files with exploitable content and evaluate the cleaned files.


- From win_client, open a web browser (use Firefox for this lab). Use the file generator to generate a **DOCX** file. Check the box to **Include Image** and **Include Sensitive Link**.




- Download the file, notice that the file was renamed to indicate that the file was cleaned.




1. It is possible to customize the renaming of the cleaned file. See [sk114613](#).
3. Review the log in SmartConsole. Notice that the log indicates what kind of exploitable content was cleaned from the file.




4. Generate a PDF file that includes a sensitive link (*link to internal Shares*).




- Download the file. If you are using Firefox, the file will be opened automatically. Notice that the sensitive link is not a clickable link. Threat Extraction can remove the risk.




- Review the log in SmartConsole. Notice that the **Sensitive hyperlink** was recognized. It is also recognized as **PDF URI Actions**.




- Review the Threat Profile in use, notice that many Risks are specific to PDF file only.



8. Generate and download a new PDF file and include a **3D Art** object.



9. Review the log and notice that the item has been identified and logged.




Exercise 3: Mail Extraction


In the previous exercise, we tested generating and downloading files containing active exploitable content. Threat Extraction is capable of cleaning files that arrive over emails.

Some file type can be cleaned whether they come over email or if they are downloaded from the internet. For example, image files can be extracted when they arrive over emails but not when downloaded from the web. Refer to [sk101553](#) for more details.


- Use the demo server to generate and download a JPG image file.




- Try to download the file and notice that the original copy was downloaded, and it was not cleaned.
- Click Send Email to deliver the file over email.




- Review the Email. Pay attention to the message indicating that Threat Extraction modified the file.




- Review the logs in SmartConsole. The file was cleaned as expected.




- Generate a new RTF file. Sen the file over email.



- Review the logs in SmartConsole. Notice that the log indicates that the file was converted to a PDF file.




- Note that this behavior above is explained in sk101553.




Exercise 4: Extraction Methods

In the previous exercise, used the default configuration to extract the active exploitable content while keeping the original format. In this exercise, we will use a different approach. Convert the original file into text-based PDF file rendering active contents inactive.


1. Edit the Threat profile and change the extraction method to **Convert to PDF** and *Install the Threat Prevention Policy*.




2. From the demo server, generate a **DOCX** file. Download and send the file over email as well.




3. Notice that the file was converted to a PDF file. This is indicated also in the file name.



- Review the logs in SmartConsole. The log indicates that the DOCX file converted to a PDF file.



- Generate and download a PDF file. Notice that the log still indicates the Conversion to PDF. However, there are details regarding what contents were cleaned.




Exercise 5: Accessing the Original Files


In some cases, the users need to access the original files before they are cleaned by Threat Extraction. Some of the components that are cleared might be necessary for the functionality of the cleaned file.

By default, the user is allowed to download the file in case Threat Emulation decided that the file is clean. This behavior can be customized.


1. Review the profile and notice that we are allowing the user to access original files that are not malicious.



2. From the demo server, navigate to Malware Files -> Virus and download the **malicious** document **Melissa.doc**.



3. Download the file. Notice that the cleaned file is accessible, and we can read it.




- Use the MobaXterm SSH client to connect to the GW and review the Threat Emulation queue. Notice that the file is being scanned in the background.


```
[Expert@GW:0]# tecli sh clo que
|file's sha1|file's event_id|file type|insert time|status|
|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|
|45588547dc335d87ea5768512b9f3fc72ffd84a3|(AB45F8A2-A22D-CE4E-9C9F-8286F4E3DF52)|doc|8 Seconds|Uploaded to Cloud, waiting for response.
```

```
[Expert@GW:0]# tecli sh e q
File ID (SHA1)File NameEmulation RequiredStatusExternal Key / Internal Key
-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|
45588547dc335d87ea5768512b9f3fc72ffd84a3Melissa.docWinXP,Office 2003/7,Adobe 9In Progress6b39f22c13b310ab92f1a3dea07c3c28f677932/c678cfb246f2dd60f90796cde995555e3cb66385
45588547dc335d87ea5768512b9f3fc72ffd84a3Melissa.docWin7,Office 2013,Adobe 11In Progressb436cf7982cb98bf8ce33f8f257acf24beb091a8/0a6b5591d42dd7bf24fc5e6e4e91036b330c32e7
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
- This shows an important benefit of using Threat Extraction. We deliver a proactively cleaned version of the files. Users are only allowed to retrieve the original file if Threat Emulation confirms that the file is clean.
- Review the Threat Extraction log. It shows what active contents this file had.




- The cleaned document includes a link to allow users to retrieve the original file via UserCheck. Click the **Get Original** link.




- The UserCheck retrieval processes requires a confirmation of the risk of the file.



8. As expected, the file was blocked, and the user was denied permission to download the original file.



9. Review the Threat Emulation logs and confirm that the file was found to be malicious by Threat Emulation as expected.



End of Lab 10