

Quantum Cryptography: Public key distribution and coin tossing

Charles H. Bennett, Gilles Brassard 1984

- uncertainty principle - makes it impossible to eavesdrop $4 \times 4 \pi \approx 7\%$ without high probability of detection.
- coin tossing protocol - secure against traditional eavesdropping, even with an unlimited computing power.
 - not secure against the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen paradox
- information theory - key is only totally secure if it is as long as the plaintext
- works on a passive eavesdropping channel - can't be so active as to suppress communication completely
- disadvantages - quantum transmissions can not be amplified
 - no digital signatures
- polarized light - send light through polaroid filter or calcite crystal
 - uncertainty principle - can't measure more than 1 bit info about polarization
 - polarization axis $\alpha \rightarrow$
 - filter at orientation α \rightarrow probability transmitted: $\cos^2(\alpha - \beta)$
 - probability unanswered: $\sin^2(\alpha - \beta)$
 - deterministic: when axis are perpendicular
 - when not perpendicular:
 - α axis \rightarrow 
 - 1 axis \rightarrow 1 axis
 - perpendicular filter at β \rightarrow loses info about axis

The filter changes axis polarization of the light

- Bases: for polarized photons is 2D

- ex: $r_1 = (1, 0)$ horizontal polarization
- $r_2 = (0, 1)$ vertical polarization
- angle α polarized, horizontal: state vector $(\cos \alpha, \sin \alpha)$
- measurement: $P(\text{horizontal}) = \cos^2 \alpha$
- $P(\text{vertical}) = \sin^2 \alpha$
- r_1, r_2 are nonlinear basis
- d_1, d_2 are diagonal basis

$d_1 = (0.707, 0.707)$ represents 45° photons

$d_2 = (0.707, -0.707)$ represent 135° photons

- conjugate: if 2 bases (rectilinear and diagonal), each has equal lengths projections on all vectors of that basis.
- Photon in one basis looks all stored info when measured in other basis.

- 3rd basis - circular polarization

- $c_1 = (0.707, 0.707)$
- $c_2 = (0.707i, 0.707)$ - not used by this paper

- classical public key cryptography - trapdoor functions

- one-time pad - key used once per message

- Alice - random polarization basis to encrypt key

- Bob - random polarization basis to decrypt key

- half the data is lost (if Bob measures in wrong basis)

- Alice and Bob compare over classical channel -

- assume channel susceptible to eavesdropping but NOT in injectors or interceptors of msg.

- example: 1/3 of shared key to test for interception

- don't use three bits in key

- Wegman-Carter authentication tags - small secret

- key that Alice and Bob agree on beforehand

- (similar to check sum) can use key bits from quantum channel to replace used bits.

Quantum Coin Tossing

• apply similar technique to the coin problem -

problem: Alice and Bob are on the phone.

They don't trust each other.

How can they agree on who won fair coin toss.

- method is secure against opponent of unlimited computing power

- Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen effect - threatens this system

however, it requires perfect detection of photons

- EPR paper raises skepticism in entanglement, our understanding of physics and universe, non-locality.

- QKD relies on our current understanding of quantum mechanics

1. Alice chooses random basis and random bits and sends encoded bits to Bob

2. Bob chooses random basis for each photon.

He records decrypted bits in two tables, one for rectilinear and one for diagonal basis.

He guesses which bases Alice used.

Bob wins if he chose correct basis.

3. Alice certifies this win/loss by sending her bits over a quantum channel.

4. Bob compares Alice bits with the corresponding table.

• Any attempts to cheat by Alice will be detected