

Verifying HANK

Evidence from size-persistence tradeoff.

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What is HANK?

NK = New Keynesian = Monetary Policy is not Neutral

RANK = Representative Agent + NK

TANK = Two-Agent¹ + NK = One agent is Spender, one is Saver + NK

HANK² = Heterogeneous Agent + NK = Heterogeneity in saving portfolio + NK

¹Sometimes referred as Spender-Saver Model

²The version by ?

²See ? for review.

Outcomes of ? model

? HANK model outcomes:

- ① **Size-Persistence trade-off:** Cumulative elasticity of aggregate consumption declines with the increase in autocorrelation of monetary shock in a nonlinear manner.
- ② **Inflation-Output Tradeoff:** the same Taylor rule shocks lead to the increased effects in Inflation-Output tradeoff.

Systematic Monetary Policy Identification

Monetary Policy Rule Counterfactuals

- ?? use the identified shocks and impulse responses to them to minimize a loss function.

FOMC Preferences

- ? use ? data on preferences of FOMC members and using the FOMC rotation mechanism they are able to construct an IV.

Empirical approach

Systematic Monetary Policy Identification

Based on method of ?.

I assume that the monetary policy rule is


$$(r - r^*)_{t+h} = \phi_t^h \mathbb{E}[\pi_{t+1} | \mathcal{I}_t] + \psi_t^h \mathbb{E}[x_{t+1} | \mathcal{I}_t] + \varepsilon_t.$$

$\mathbb{E}_t \pi_{t+1}$ and $\mathbb{E}_t x_{t+1}$ are the expectations of monetary authority about the inflation and output gap (or unemployment) at quarter $t + 1$.

I estimate the following State-Dependent LP-IV.

$$\begin{aligned}(r - r^*)_{t+h} = & \alpha^h + \beta_\pi^h \hat{\pi}_t + \gamma_\pi^h \hat{\pi}_t (\text{Hawk}_t - \overline{\text{Hawk}}) \\ & \beta_u^h \hat{x}_t + \gamma_u^h \hat{u}_t (\text{Hawk}_t - \overline{\text{Hawk}}) \\ & + \delta^h (\text{Hawk}_t - \overline{\text{Hawk}}) + \zeta^h Z + e_{t+h}^h,\end{aligned}$$

Figure: HAWK and HAWK IV indexes from ?




Results I


Policy Response to Tealbook GDP Deflator Inflation and FOMC Hawkishness

Figure: Policy Response to Inflation and FOMC Hawkishness. Short Specification

(a) Average Resp. to Projected CPI Inflation



(b) Differential Resp. to Projected CPI Inflation



(c) Average Resp. to Projected GDP



(d) Differential Resp. to Projected

Results I

Policy Response to Tealbook Unemployment and FOMC Hawkishness

(a) Average Response to Unempl. (β_u^h)

(b) Differential Response to Unempl. (γ_u^h)



Notes: This figure reports the responses of the $r_t - \rho_t$ to an increase in the Tealbook unemployment forecast of 1 p.p. The subfigure ?? reports the response for the *HAWK* index equal to the sample average and ?? is the addition to the response in case there are 2 (out of 12 in total) additional consistent hawks in the FOMC. The shaded areas correspond to 68%, 90% and 95% confidence intervals. [Click here to download the figure.](#)

Results II

Policy Response to Tealbook CIP Inflation and FOMC Hawkishness

(a) Average Response to Inflation (β_{π}^h)

(b) Differential Response to Inflation (γ_{π}^h)


average_cpi_inflation_shorter.pdf differential_cpi_inflation_sho

Notes: This figure reports the responses of the $r_t - \rho_t$ to an increase in the Tealbook inflation forecast of 1 p.p. (calculated as a predicted change in GDP deflator). The subfigure ?? reports the response for the *HAWK* index equal to the sample average and ?? is the addition to the response in case there are 2 (out of 12 in total) additional consistent hawks in the FOMC. The shaded areas correspond to 68%, 90% and 95% confidence bands calculated with Newey-West HAC estimator with


Results II

Policy Response to Tealbook Output Gap and FOMC Hawkishness

(a) Average Response to Output Gap (β_u^h)



(b) Differential Response to Gap (γ_u^h)



Notes: This figure reports the responses of the $r_t - \rho_t$ to an increase in the Tealbook unemployment forecast of 1 p.p. The subfigure ?? reports the response for the *HAWK* index equal to the sample average and ?? is the addition to the response in case there are 2 (out of 12 in total) additional consistent hawks in the FOMC. The shaded areas correspond to 68%, 90% and 95% confidence intervals.

Results

Predicted IRFs

Figure: Predicted IRFs in each of the state

irfs_plot_longer.pdf

irfs_plot_shorter.pdf

Notes: This figure shows the Impulse Response functions in each state calculated as in equation (??).

Size-Persistence in RANK

Rate path:

$$r_t = \rho + e^{-\eta t}(r_0 - \rho).$$

NK policy

$$C_0 = \bar{C} \exp \left(-\frac{1}{\gamma} \int_0^\infty (r_s - \rho) ds \right).$$


Size:

$$R_0 = \int_0^\infty (r_s - \rho) ds,$$

$$\frac{-d \log C_0}{dR_0} = \frac{1}{\gamma},$$

Picture of Size-Persistence trade-off

Panel A. T adjusts



Panel B. B^s adjusts




FIGURE 8. CUMULATIVE ELASTICITY OF AGGREGATE CONSUMPTION BY PERSISTENCE OF THE SHOCK

Figure: The difference between the New Keynesian models from ?

Size-Persistent tradeoff by ?, formally

$$\text{RANK:} \quad \frac{d}{d\nu} \frac{-d \log C_0}{dR_0} = 0 \quad (1)$$

$$\text{TANK with } B^g \text{ adjustment:} \quad \frac{d}{d\nu} \frac{-d \log C_0}{dR_0} = 0 \quad (2)$$

$$\text{TANK with } T \text{ adjustment:} \quad \frac{d}{d\nu} \frac{-d \log C_0}{dR_0} < 0 \quad (3)$$


$$\text{HANK:} \quad \frac{d^2}{d\nu^2} \frac{-d \log C_0}{dR_0} < 0 \quad (4)$$

Figure: Estimates of Size and Persistence


size_vs_persistence.pdf

Size and Persistence Over Time

(a) Size Dynamics



(b) Persistence Dynamics



Notes: This figure presents the size and persistence, calculated as mean and the first autocorrelation of impulse-response function in each state, constructed as described in ??, over time.

So, should we believe in HANK?


The evidence above suggests that, we should. At least we have found that consumption behaviour in size-persistent tradeoff corresponds to the TANK model.

Place for your suggestions and comments!


If you have any other suggestions/comments please write avlasov@nes.ru

- FED inflation (deflator, and CPI), GDP gap, unemployment forecast and NAIRU are from Tealbook (average of 1 and 2 quarter quarters ahead + averaging of FOMC meetings per quarter).
- HAWK index from ?.
- Natural rate of interest by ??
- Short-term rate (r) is by ? and Fed Funds Rate


Figure: Rates



Rate — Fed Funds Rate, r_t — Natural Rate of Interest, r_t^* — Excess Rate, r



Tealbook Projected ... — NAIRU — Unemployment — Unemployment



Tealbook Projected ... Inflation — Deflator — CPI

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