09STATE98727.txt

09STATE98727
MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME (MTCR): IRAN'S
Wed Sep 23 00:00:00 +0200 2009
SECRET
Secretary of State
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TO AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0000
INFO MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME COLLECTIVES E C R E T STATE 098727 
 
SIPDIS 
PARIS FOR POL: NOAH HARDIE 
BRASILIA FOR POL: JOHN ERATH 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/23/2034 
TAGS: MTCRE ETTC KSCA MNUC PARM TSPA FR BR
SUBJECT: MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME (MTCR): IRAN'S 
BALLISTIC MISSILE PROGRAM 
 
Classified By: ISN/MTR Director Pam Durham. 
Reasons:  1.4 (B), (D), (H). 
 
¶1. (U)  This is an action request.  Please see paragraph 2. 
 
¶2. (C)  ACTION REQUEST:  Department requests Embassy Paris 
provide the interagency cleared paper "Iran,s Ballistic 
Missile Program" in paragraph 3 below to the French Missile 
Technology Control Regime (MTCR) Point of Contact (POC) for 
distribution to all Partners.  Info addressees also may 
provide to host government officials as appropriate.  In 
delivering paper, posts should indicate that the U.S. is 
sharing this paper as part of our preparation for the 
Information Exchange that will be held in conjunction with 
the MTCR Plenary in Rio, November 9-13, 2009.  NOTE: 
Additional IE papers will be provided via septels.  END 
NOTE. 
 
¶3. BEGIN TEXT OF PAPER: 
 
(SECRET REL MTCR) 
 
Iran,s Ballistic Missile Program 
 
Introduction 
 
Iran has the largest and most active missile program in 
the Middle East.  It possesses a sizable number of MTCR 
Category I and Item 19 missile systems, and is developing 
more capable systems with greater ranges. Iran's improving 
domestic ballistic missile capabilities raise concerns 
that it could act as a supplier of ballistic missile 
technology to other parties -- a development that is 
particularly troubling in view of Iran,s expanding 
military cooperation with Syria.  However, Iran also 
remains reliant on foreign sources for some critical 
materials, and continues to use its extensive procurement 
network to acquire these goods from entities in states 
both within and outside the MTCR. 
 
Capabilities 
 
Iran currently is involved in researching, developing, and 
producing multiple ballistic missile systems.  Iran 
produces liquid- and solid- propellant short-range 
ballistic missiles (SRBMs), liquid propellant medium-range 
ballistic missiles (MRBM), and on May 20, 2009 
successfully tested a two-stage solid propellant MRBM 
called the Sajjil. 
 
Iran's inventory of SRBMs includes the liquid-propellant 
Scud B and Scud C (which Tehran calls the Shahab-l and -2, 
respectively), the solid-propellant Fateh-110, and the 
Chinese-supplied CSS-8 (Western designation) based on the 
SA-2 surface-to-air missile.  Iran has moved beyond the 
point of merely assembling these systems and appears 
capable of producing many of these missiles' subsystems, 
as well as liquid and solid propellants.  Iran's expertise 
now includes guidance technology -- often the most 
difficult field for fledgling missile producers to master 
-- which Iran is marketing to third countries at defense 
exhibitions and on government websites. 
 
Shahab MRBMs 
 
Iran has pursued programs to develop a range of liquid- 
propellant MRBMs, most building on Scud technology.  Iran 
claims to have delivered the 1,300-km-range Shahab-3 to 
its military and, as has been discussed at prior MTCR 
Information Exchange (IE) meetings, has flight-tested the 
system multiple times.  Recent development efforts have 
focused on an improved variant of the Shahab-3, often 
referred to in the press as the Shahab-4 (and in previous 
IE sessions as the "Shahab-3 Lite").  Iranian officials 
have claimed that this missile has a range of 2,000-km 
and is more accurate than the standard Shahab-3. During a 
military parade in September 2007, Iran displayed a new 
MRBM, referred to as the Ghadr-l, which Iranian officials 
claimed had a range of 1,800-km. The missile is 
considered a variant of the Shahab-series ballistic 
missiles, and was seen with a "baby-bottle shroud" or 
triconic warhead. 
 
The Sajjil 
 
Iran is developing a two-stage solid-propellant MRBM 
publicly called the Sajjil. However, Admiral Ali 
Shamkhani, head of Iran,s Research Institute for 
Strategic Defense, has noted that the Sajjil project 
originally was called the Ashura. Iran first announced 
this system in November 2007, claiming it had developed a 
new solid-propellant ballistic missile with a range of 
2,000-km. But prior to these statements, Iran's defense 
ministry revealed it had conducted some tests related to 
solid-propellant missile technology that likely were 
related to the design for a two-stage 2,000-km-range 
system. Iran flight-tested the Sajjil on November 12, 
2008 and again on May 20, 2009.  The 2008 test probably 
failed, but the May 2009 test probably was successful. 
 
Space Launch Vehicle (SLV) 
 
Iran has accelerated its work toward developing a 
domestic space program, announcing in February 2008 its 
intent to place a satellite into orbit, utilizing a new 
SLV called Safir that Iran has displayed for the media. 
Iran tested the Safir on August 17, 2008, and claimed 
that it successfully placed a dummy satellite into orbit. 
However, no such object was ever detected in orbit. 
Prior to the launch, President Ahmadinejad publicly 
announced that Iran would orbit the Omid satellite, with 
no mention that it would be a mockup or a dummy 
satellite.  Taken together, these factors suggest that 
the launch actually failed. 
 
Iran's second attempt to orbit a satellite using the 
Safir was successful. The Omid satellite was launched on 
February 2, 2009, and remained in orbit until April 25, 
¶2009.  Although the Safir is restricted to very small 
payloads (the Omid weighed only 27 kg), Iran - through 
the Safir launch - has demonstrated several capabilities 
necessary for longer-range ballistic missiles:  staging, 
clustered engines in the second stage (although these 
were small), and gimbaled engines for control of the 
second stage, a more advanced technique than the jet 
vanes used in the first stage. 
 
Support to Foreign Ballistic Missile Programs 
 
As its missile program has advanced, Iran has 
increasingly been acting as a supplier of missile 
technology to other states, which could violate United 
Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCRs) 1737, 1747, 
and 1803.  Iran now offers a number of missile-related 
products on the global market, including 
electromechanical Scud gyros, propellants, and missile- 
related production facilities. 
 
Iran has been assisting Syria in the ballistic missile 
field since the early 1990s.  In addition to the joint 
construction with Syria's Scientific Studies and Research 
Center (SSRC) of both solid- and liquid-propellant 
production facilities in Syria, Syria and Iran have 
entered into an agreement for the transfer of Fateh-110 
production technology from Iran to Syria.  By at least 
2007, Syria began receiving missile parts and technical 
assistance from Iran related to this project and 
successfully flight tested two Fateh-110 missiles in 
December of 2007 and one in December 2008.  Syria -- and 
possibly Iran -- has made available the 270-km-range 
Fateh-110 short-range ballistic missile (SRBM) to 
Lebanese Hizballah, as part of Iran's agreement to share 
Fateh-110 production technology with Syria.   Hizballah 
personnel probably participated in Fateh-110 meetings and 
test launches in both Syria and Iran over the past three 
years.  This is consistent with Iran and Syria's past 
practice of supplying Hizballah with long-range rockets, 
which Hizballah used in the 2006 war against Israel. 
 
Foreign-Procured Materials 
 
Despite Iran's progress, and its overarching goal of 
self-sufficiency, its ballistic missile program remains 
reliant on outside sources for a variety of materials. 
Moreover, even though some of these materials are 
available domestically, Tehran has continued to acquire 
such goods abroad.  This may be because the missile 
program does not trust the quality of indigenously 
produced goods and therefore cannot reliably sustain its 
missile development efforts without foreign sources of 
supply. 
 
Much of Iran's procurement needs still lie in the field 
of advanced materials, and Iranian ballistic missile 
entities continue to seek specialized steels and aluminum 
from foreign suppliers.  These materials are often sought 
to produce ballistic missile airframes due to their high- 
strength, low weight, and corrosion-resistant properties, 
and are suitable for Iran's Shahab series of missiles. 
For example, Iran has sought MTCR-controlled titanium- 
stabilized duplex stainless steel (TiDSS) that can be 
utilized in structural components for liquid-propellant 
missiles, as well as AISI 4130-grade and AISI 4340-grade 
steel.  AISI 4340 and AISI 4130 are not MTCR-controlled, 
but have been used by Iran to produce first- and second- 
stage motor cases for its solid propellant MRBM.  In 
addition, Iran has sought specialized aluminum alloys 
such as types AlMg6 and 7075.  The lightweight AlMg6 
would allow Iran's ballistic missiles to achieve 
significant increases in range and the 7075 high-strength 
alloy is usable in missile airframes, reentry vehicles, 
and structural support elements.  Iran also has sought 
tungsten-copper alloys that are not MTCR-controlled but 
have been associated with the production of missile jet 
vanes. 
 
Iranian missile entities also continue to be dependent on 
foreign suppliers for graphite.  High-quality graphite 
could be used to produce nose cone tips, nozzle throat 
inserts, and jet vanes for Iran's Scud-based and solid- 
propellant missiles.  Similarly, Iran probably cannot 
produce machine tools of the quality and sophistication 
needed in the production of ballistic missiles, requiring 
procurement of these items abroad.  Iranian missile 
entities or front companies have sought machine tools 
such as lathes, vertical machining centers, milling 
machines, and turning centers.  Iranian missile entities 
also have sought equipment to test missiles or their 
components, including vibration and acoustic test 
equipment, data acquisition systems, and thermal shock 
chambers. 
 
In addition to items controlled by the MTCR, Iran 
continues to seek non-listed items on the international 
market.  For example, Iran often attempts to procure 
lower-grade, non-MTCR-controlled graphite that could 
contribute to Iran,s ballistic missile program through 
its use in machining processes or metals production.  In 
2008, Iran sought quantities of sodium perchlorate from 
suppliers in China.  Sodium perchlorate is not controlled 
by the MTCR, but can be used in the production of 
ammonium perchlorate. 
 
Procurement Infrastructure and Front Companies 
 
The Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO), a 
subordinate entity to the Iranian Ministry of Defense and 
Armed Forces Logistics, was created in 1998 and oversees 
all of Iran's missile-related research, development, and 
production efforts.  This includes efforts for ballistic 
missiles, surface-to-air systems, anti-tank guided 
rockets, and anti-ship cruise missiles.  The key missile- 
related AIO subordinates are:  the Shahid Hemmat 
Industrial Group (SHIG), the organization responsible for 
development and production of liquid-propellant ballistic 
missiles; the Shahid Bakeri Industrial Group (SBIG), the 
organization responsible for development and production 
of solid-propellant ballistic missiles and rockets; and 
the Fajr Industrial Group (FIG), the organization 
responsible for the development of ballistic missile 
guidance systems. 
 
As has been discussed extensively in previous IE 
sessions, these organizations often use an elaborate set 
of front companies to hide their involvement with AIO and 
the actual nature of their procurement.  The following 
front companies are commonly used as procurement covers 
for AIO and its subordinate organizations in dealings 
with technology suppliers outside of Iran: 
 
-     Ettehad Technical Group 
-     Everend Asia Company 
-     Helal Co 
-     Joza Industrial Co 
-     Mahestan (Import and Export) Co. 
-     Mehr Engineering and Industrial Group 
-     Mizan Machine Manufacturing Group (3MG) 
-     Pejman Industrial Services Corp 
-     Safety Equipment Procurement (S.E.P. Inc) 
-     Sahand Aluminum Parts Industrial Company (SAPICO) 
-     Tiz Pars Technical and Engineering Company 
-     Ecxir Trading Company 
-     Sabalan Co. 
-     Baharan Factories Group 
-     RAFIZCO 
-     Noavin Ltd. 
-     Pars Novin Industrial Company 
-     Parto Angizan Company 
-     South Industrial Power 
-     Aban Commercial and Industrial Group 
-     Pooya Commercial and Engineering Co. 
-     Selm Commercial Co. 
-     Saba Machinery Supplying Co. 
 
It is important to note that other AIO-affiliated 
organizations involved in non-ballistic missile 
enterprises also may share resources and technology with 
SHIG, SBIG, and FIG.  These entities include the Sanam 
Industrial Group, Sanam Projects Management (SPM), and Ya 
Mahdi Industries Group. Transfers of raw materials and 
machinery to these entities may contribute to Iran's 
production of MTCR Category I missile systems. 
 
In addition to the various companies linked to AIO, we 
also believe that the following Iranian entities have 
engaged in procurement activities for Iran's 
WMD/missile/conventional arms programs: 
 
-     Electro Sanam Company (E.S. Company) 
-     Instrumentation Factories Plan 
-     Iran Cement Engineering and Parts (ICEP) Co. Ltd. 
-     Kaveh Cutting Company 
-     M. Babaie Industries 
-     Missile Industries Group 
-     Motlagh Industrial Factory 
-     Parchin Missile Industries 
-     Sanam Industrial Group 
-     Sanam Projects Management (SPM) 
-     Schiller Novin 
-     Shafizadeh Industries 
-     Shahabadi Industies 
-     Shahid Babaie Industries Complex (SBIC) 
-     Shiveh Tolid Company 
-     State Purchasing Office (SPO) 
 
These entities act as key nodes in a global network of 
procurement agents and fictitious end-users that provide 
Iran with access to dual-use goods, raw materials, and 
critical technologies for its ballistic missile programs 
that would otherwise be unavailable. 
 
Outlook 
 
Iran currently appears focused on increasing the 
capability and range of its ballistic missiles.  Although 
Iran is unlikely to deploy the Safir SLV as a ballistic 
missile, the Safir, and the development and test of the 
two-stage Sajjil MRBM, has provided Iran with much of the 
technology and experience necessary to develop and 
produce longer-range ballistic missiles, including ICBMs. 
Tehran could attempt to develop and test much of this 
technology under the guise of an SLV program.  Iran 
remains dependent on foreign technology, however, and 
this dependency will continue to affect Iran's ability to 
acquire critical materials for its ballistic missile 
programs.  A key challenge to MTCR Partners is to ensure 
that Iran does not gain access to the technologies it 
needs to develop longer-range missiles. 
 
END TEXT OF PAPER. 
 
¶4.  (U)  Please slug any reporting on this or other MTCR 
issues for ISN/MTR.   A word version of this document 
will be posted at www.state.sgov.gov/demarche. 
CLINTON