From 12a42d0a6bef73a566c3239b3fc15a5e5efcb180 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Alexandre Girard Date: Sat, 6 Aug 2011 13:03:24 +0200 Subject: [PATCH] Update to 19722 cables - folder classification --- classification/CONFIDENTIAL/03ROME3567.txt | 311 +++++++++ classification/CONFIDENTIAL/03ROME4746.txt | 74 +++ .../CONFIDENTIAL/06MONTEVIDEO418.txt | 145 +++++ classification/CONFIDENTIAL/09BAGHDAD379.txt | 603 ++++++++++++++++++ classification/SECRET/07TEGUCIGALPA1247.txt | 169 +++++ classification/SECRET/08BOGOTA337.txt | 13 +- classification/SECRET/08KUALALUMPUR1114.txt | 298 +++++++++ dates/2003/08/03ROME3567.txt | 311 +++++++++ dates/2003/10/03ROME4746.txt | 74 +++ dates/2006/05/06MONTEVIDEO418.txt | 145 +++++ dates/2007/07/07TEGUCIGALPA1247.txt | 169 +++++ dates/2008/01/08BOGOTA337.txt | 13 +- dates/2008/12/08KUALALUMPUR1114.txt | 298 +++++++++ dates/2009/02/09BAGHDAD379.txt | 603 ++++++++++++++++++ origin/Embassy Baghdad/09BAGHDAD379.txt | 603 ++++++++++++++++++ origin/Embassy Bogota/08BOGOTA337.txt | 13 +- .../08KUALALUMPUR1114.txt | 298 +++++++++ origin/Embassy Montevideo/06MONTEVIDEO418.txt | 145 +++++ origin/Embassy Rome/03ROME3567.txt | 311 +++++++++ origin/Embassy Rome/03ROME4746.txt | 74 +++ .../Embassy Tegucigalpa/07TEGUCIGALPA1247.txt | 169 +++++ rel_date/2011/07/11/08BOGOTA337.txt | 13 +- rel_date/2011/07/27/07BRASILIA2132.txt | 209 ++++++ rel_date/2011/07/27/09BAGHDAD379.txt | 603 ++++++++++++++++++ rel_date/2011/07/28/06MONTEVIDEO418.txt | 145 +++++ rel_date/2011/07/31/07TEGUCIGALPA1247.txt | 169 +++++ rel_date/2011/08/02/08BOGOTA337.txt | 204 ++++++ rel_date/2011/08/05/03ROME3567.txt | 311 +++++++++ rel_date/2011/08/05/03ROME4746.txt | 74 +++ rel_date/2011/08/05/08KUALALUMPUR1114.txt | 298 +++++++++ 30 files changed, 6817 insertions(+), 48 deletions(-) create mode 100644 classification/CONFIDENTIAL/03ROME3567.txt create mode 100644 classification/CONFIDENTIAL/03ROME4746.txt create mode 100644 classification/CONFIDENTIAL/06MONTEVIDEO418.txt create mode 100644 classification/CONFIDENTIAL/09BAGHDAD379.txt create mode 100644 classification/SECRET/07TEGUCIGALPA1247.txt create mode 100644 classification/SECRET/08KUALALUMPUR1114.txt create mode 100644 dates/2003/08/03ROME3567.txt create mode 100644 dates/2003/10/03ROME4746.txt create mode 100644 dates/2006/05/06MONTEVIDEO418.txt create mode 100644 dates/2007/07/07TEGUCIGALPA1247.txt create mode 100644 dates/2008/12/08KUALALUMPUR1114.txt create mode 100644 dates/2009/02/09BAGHDAD379.txt create mode 100644 origin/Embassy Baghdad/09BAGHDAD379.txt create mode 100644 origin/Embassy Kuala Lumpur/08KUALALUMPUR1114.txt create mode 100644 origin/Embassy Montevideo/06MONTEVIDEO418.txt create mode 100644 origin/Embassy Rome/03ROME3567.txt create mode 100644 origin/Embassy Rome/03ROME4746.txt create mode 100644 origin/Embassy Tegucigalpa/07TEGUCIGALPA1247.txt create mode 100644 rel_date/2011/07/27/07BRASILIA2132.txt create mode 100644 rel_date/2011/07/27/09BAGHDAD379.txt create mode 100644 rel_date/2011/07/28/06MONTEVIDEO418.txt create mode 100644 rel_date/2011/07/31/07TEGUCIGALPA1247.txt create mode 100644 rel_date/2011/08/02/08BOGOTA337.txt create mode 100644 rel_date/2011/08/05/03ROME3567.txt create mode 100644 rel_date/2011/08/05/03ROME4746.txt create mode 100644 rel_date/2011/08/05/08KUALALUMPUR1114.txt diff --git a/classification/CONFIDENTIAL/03ROME3567.txt b/classification/CONFIDENTIAL/03ROME3567.txt new file mode 100644 index 000000000..752f6a6f9 --- /dev/null +++ b/classification/CONFIDENTIAL/03ROME3567.txt @@ -0,0 +1,311 @@ +03ROME3567 +GALILEO: AMBASSADOR ARAGONA ADVOCATES ADDITIONAL +Wed Aug 06 00:00:00 +0200 2003 +CONFIDENTIAL +Embassy Rome +This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.C O N F I D E N T I A L ROME 003567 + +SIPDIS + + +STATE FOR OES/SAT (BRAIBANTI, KARNER) +DEFENSE FOR OASD/NII (STENBIT MANNO WORMSER SWIDER CHESKY) +DEFENSE ALSO FOR OSD/P (TOWNSEND, NOVAK) +JOINT STAFF FOR J5/J6 + +E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/06/2013 +T... + +SUBJECT: GALILEO: AMBASSADOR ARAGONA ADVOCATES ADDITIONAL +TECHNICAL TALKS TO RESOLVE M-CODE OVERLAY ISSUE + +REF: USNATO 00777 + +Classified By: A/ECMIN David W. Mulenex; reasons 1.5 B and D. + +¶1. (C) Summary: Italian MFA Political Director Gianfranco +Aragona informed a U.S. delegation on July 16 that he still +believes technical solutions exist to the U.S.-EU dispute +over the Galileo Public Regulated Service (PRS) signal +overlay of the M-code. Aragona recognized US security +concerns regarding the overlay, but repeatedly insisted the +EU must safeguard the "Integrity and operability" of Galileo. + The U.S. delegation insisted that an overlay would harm U.S. +and NATO NAVWAR capabilities and put lives at risk in the +event of warfare. Aragona did not completely reject the +delegation's point that a political solution was necessary to +avoid this outcome but made it clear he does not believe the +dispute is ripe for high level political intervention. +Aragona did agree that the delegation's suggestion to merge +unclassified technical talks and plenary negotiations was a +good idea and promised to convey the idea to the Commission. +Aragona stated firmly that NATO would not be an acceptable +venue for classified discussions. He suggested they could +take place at the US Mission to NATO, but insisted that he +participants must be limited to the U.S. and the EC. See +Embassy comment para 16. End Summary. + +¶2. (U) On July 16 a U.S. delegation met with Italian MFA +Political Director Gianfranco Aragona to discuss the US-EC +dispute over the Galileo Public Regulated Service (PRS) +signal overlay of the GPS M-code. The U.S. delegation was +led by Ralph Braibanti, Director, Space and Advanced +Technology, State Department Bureau of Oceans and +International Environmental and Technical Affairs and +included Mel Flack, Director, Communications Electronic +Division, US Mission to NATO; Richard McKinney, Deputy +Director Space Acquisition, US Air Force; Todd Wilson, EST +Officer, US Mission to the EU; Marja Verloop EUR/ERA; and +representatives from the political and science sections of +Embassy Rome. Those joining Aragona included Giovanni +Brauzzi, Director, Office of NATO Affairs, MFA; Sandro +Bernardin, European Correspondent, MFA; Mario Caporale, +Navigation Office, Italian Space Agency; and Umberto +Cantielli, Chief, Navigation Identification Office, Defense +General Staff, Ministry of Defense. + +U.S. Delegation Insists Political Solution is needed + +¶3. (C) Braibanti told Aragona that the U.S. believes it is +important to hold informal consultations with key EU member +States to advance U.S.-EC differences over Galileo towards a +decision. He recalled that the President raised M-Code +overlay at the last U.S.- EU Summit. In reviewing the USG +position on Galileo, Braibanti explained that the U.S. +accepts the EU satellite system as a reality, but the +security implications of having the Galileo Public Regulated +Service (PRS) overlay the GPS M-Code are unacceptable to both +the U.S. and NATO. so far, the U.S. has fought a defensive +battle with the European Commission (EC). Braibanti allowed +that some progress has been made in convincing European +officials that direct overlay of M-Code by the PRS is a bad +idea. However, consideration being given by the EC to use +BOC 2.2 for Open Service (OS) also involves a partial overlay +of M-Code, and damages navigational warfare capabilities. +The U.S. will be unable to accept this outcome. + +¶4. (C) Braibanti assured Aragona that the USG is committed +to finding a solution, but cautioned that without some +flexibility and compromise from the EC, progress will be +difficult. The U.S. has proposed several technical options +for Galileo PRS and OS that our experts believe meet all +stated technical and performance requirements for Galileo +services. Braibanti underscored that, given the EC's +timetable for making design decisions on Galileo, member +states may find that the Commission has locked in technical +solutions that threaten U.S. and NATO capabilities to conduct +navigational warfare. To avoid this eventuality, which could +put allied lives at risk, member states need to give clear +political guidance now to the EC that the Galileo signal +structure cannot undermine NAVWAR operations. + +But Aragona Puts Faith in Further Technical Talks + +¶5. (C) Aragona, signaling his reluctance to take on U.S. +concerns vis-a-vis Italy's EU partners, underscored that +Galileo negotiations had been entrusted to the EC. He +assured the U.S. team that Italy recognized the security +issues at stake. "Given our NATO membership it would be +crazy for us not to be sensitive to U.S. arguments," Aragona +declared. These concerns are shared by the EC, he claimed, +but any solution must also safeguard the "integrity and +operability of Galileo for it to be a commercially viable and +reliable system (Note: Aragona came back repeatedly +throughout the course of the consultations to this theme. End +Note). + +¶6. (C) Aragona pressed claims by EC experts that technical +negotiations could lead to a solution to both protect the +integrity and operability of Galileo and address US security +concerns. Referencing the U.S.-EU Summit, Aragona asserted +that, as an "agreement" had been reached to proceed with +technical talks, the pace of negotiations to try to reach a +"technical solution" to the overlay conundrum should be +intensified. Italy and the EC are ready to take into +account U.S. and NATO security concerns and believe that +technical solutions, which protect them, are available. + +¶7. (C) Aragona wanted to know when the U.S. would be ready +to discuss the most recent EC proposals, which he understood +included a certain "inventiveness" and were "not so stuck in +the prejudices of the past." The EC was ready to sit and +discuss a mutually agreeable technical solution. As for +political input, Aragona said once more that the Commission +is well aware that U.S. security concerns must be addressed +while taking into account the "integrity" of the Galileo +system. + +¶8. (C) Braibanti countered that, with regard to EC +technical proposals, he was aware of only two to which a +formal reply had not been given: using filtering to mitigate +the navigation warfare problems posed by overlaying BOC 2.2, +and having the U.S. change the frequency for its military GPS +signals. In the spirit of cooperation, the U.S. had not +rejected these ideas out of hand, but instead asked its +technical experts to analyze them carefully. Now that he had +seen the results of this analysis, Braibanti could say with +some certainty that it is highly unlikely that either of +these options will work. Summing up this portion of the +discussion, Braibanti framed the state of play for Aragona: +We may well reach a situation in September where we will have +analyzed the EC's proposals and decided they can not provide +a solution which protects U.S. and NATO capabilities to +conduct NAVWAR. Our concern is that if EC technical experts +continue to operate within their current frame of reference, +we will arrive at a technical impasse. To avoid this +impasse, the EC team needs clear political direction from +member States that they should focus on options that do not +negatively impact NAVWAR. (Note: on the margins of the +meeting, Braibanti told Aragona that the USG worries the EC +negotiators may be positioning themselves to argue to the EU +member states that they had made a good faith effort to reach +a compromise, but the U.S. would not meet them halfway, so +Galileo must move ahead without an agreement to cooperate +with the U.S. Aragona discounted this possibility, +suggesting that the EC recognizes the need for Galileo-GPS +interoperability. (End Note) + +NATO a Non-Starter for Classified Talks + +¶9. (C) Aragona said the U.S. and EU face a practical +problem over where to hold classified discussions and that +this problem should be easily resolvable. Italy expects the +U.S. to provide a formal answer to the letter EC negotiator +Heinz Hillbrecht sent to Braibanti on July 2 (reftel). +Aragona maintained that the EC wants further discussions in a +classified setting, but that setting can not be NATO. He +underscored this point in uncharacteristically blunt +language. Aragona said holding the talks at the US Mission +to NATO was perfectly acceptable as long as they were U.S.-EC +rather than NATO-EC discussions. The issue under discussion +is between the U.S. and the EC, Aragona argued, and, +moreover, there are several non-EU members of NATO. +Braibanti took Aragona's points and assured him that the USG +was considering the issue of additional classified +discussions, including the modalities for such meetings. + +Some Agreement on Procedure, but.... + +¶10. (C) Braibanti, moving the discussion to how and when to +hold the next plenary negotiating session, said the U.S. will +work with the Commission on dates for a September meeting to +review technical and trade issues He suggested folding the +technical discussions into the plenary negotiating session. +This could help to ensure transparency and avoid +misunderstanding among the political negotiators about the +available technical options. Aragona acknowledged that +Braibanti's idea had merit and committed to "see what could +be done" to make a political recommendation to the EC to +proceed along these lines. + +Still Talking Past Each Other on substance + +¶11. (C) The U.S. delegation raised concerns that France +might be driving the EC toward a decision counter to the +interests of other EU member states, the U.S. and NATO. Mel +Flack said it was difficult not to arrive at the conclusion +that France was interested in an M-Code overlay so it could +guarantee reliability for precision guided weaponry it might +seek to sell to third countries. + +¶12. (C) "I have objected to Europeans who say that U.S. +actions demonstrate an intent to undermine Galileo," Aragona +told the delegation. "Likewise," he said, "I do not believe +that there is any maliciousness on the part of a particular +country or the EC." Above all, he maintained, Galileo is a +commercial undertaking; the system's signal structure was +selected according to well established criteria based on the +belief that it provided the most robust, reliable service. +"I accept your arguments about the need to jam adversaries in +a NAVWAR context," he said, but the U.S. "needs to keep in +mind that Galileo service must be sold. The problem of +selective jamming is not just political; commercial aspects +are also involved." When Aragona stated it would not be +acceptable to expect the EU to settle for alternate, less +robust, signals, Braibanti countered it would be unacceptable +for the U.S. and its allies to risk the lives of soldiers in +order to allow the EU to have more robust signals for +Galileo. + +¶13. (C) Aragona acknowledged the point in passing, but +moved quickly to close and summarize the conversation. He +suggested the next step would be to find a suitable venue to +hold classified discussions. He claimed there is flexibility +and that the EU is aware of the need for a solution amenable +to both sides. Braibanti emphasized that after the September +discussions the USG would like to hold another set of +bilateral consultations with Italy. Aragona was +noncommittal, offering to share thoughts after the September +plenary session and then decide on a way forward. In terms +of U.S.-Italian engagement, he said he hoped that discussions +would not lead to the "extreme" situation in which the U.S. +and EU would be negotiating on exclusively U.S. terms, by +which he meant asking the EU to accept moving PRS to another +frequency band and to only then negotiate a solution. He +noted in closing that Italy had its own technological and +industrial interests to defend. + +Better Signals, Less Political Clout from Other GOI Ministries + +¶14. (C) Braibanti, Flack and EST Couns met with Vice +Minister for Research Guido Possa on July 15. Possa is +responsible for the Italian Space Agency and through it for +Italian participation in ESA. After a brief explanation of +the overlay problem and its implications for NAVWAR, Possa +immediately understood that a political, and not a technical +approach was needed to resolve outstanding problems. Possa +suggested that the U.S. should work closely with the Germans, +and in Italy with Minister of Defense Martino, whose +commitment to NATO and to close cooperation with the U.S. +were well known. On the margins of a July 28 +representational event, ESTCOUNS and A/POLMINCOUNS raised +briefly the overlay problem with MINDEF Martino. Martino +said that, from his point of view, Galileo was unnecessary +and a huge waste of money -- one GPS system was enough. He +was unaware that the USG now supported Galileo in principle. +Martino was sensitive to our arguments on the security +implications of the overlay, but observed that he was +perceived within the GOI as too pro-American to be of much +assistance. He suggested that the Embassy's best bet for +moving the GOI closer to the USG position would be to +approach U/S to the PM Gianni Letta, who, we note, is PM +Berlusconi's closest political advisor. + +¶15. (C) ESTCOUNS, ECONCOUNS, AND USEU ECONCOUNS met July 18 +with Ministry of Transport Diplomatic Advisor Maraini to +discuss the Aragona meetings and to seek the perspective of +the Ministry on the decisions to be taken concerning Galileo +at the December Transport Council. Maraini told us that he +believed that Galileo was now principally a political +problem, and a problem beyond the competency of the Transport +Ministry and Transport Council. In a candid appraisal of +Hillbrecht-whom Maraini admitted he did not know well--the +Diplomatic Advisor said that the decision to be taken was +beyond the competency of Hillbrecht's technical committee. +Maraini understood and agreed with our assessment that very +little time and scope remained for technical solutions, and +that an impasse requiring a major political decision by the +EU was likely. Maraini is worried about the outcome. He +undertook to prepare a note for Minister Lunardi to be sent +to the Prive Minister before the PM's departure for Crawford. + +¶16. (C) Embassy Comment: The U.S. delegation made the trip +to Rome to follow up on indications from Aragona, made during +his recent trip to Washington, that he may have been willing +to carry some water for us with the EC and member states. We +were left with the impression that Italy's PolDir had instead +decided to keep his EU hat firmly in place and stick to the +script of the EC briefing book on Galileo. Despite +understanding within the functional ministries of the GOI, +peeling Aragona, the MFA, and Italy away from the EC position +will be difficult, judging from Aragona's assessment that +"technical solutions" still offer a way forward. He threw us +a quarter of a bone by offering to help give political top +cover to the expert level technical discussions. However, +Aragona's implicit insistence that Galileo's commercial +viability may depend on at least a partial M-Code overlay to +"guarantee" service is troubling for its resemblance to +French arguments. + +¶17. (U) This message has been cleared by OES/SAT Braibanti. +Sembler \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/classification/CONFIDENTIAL/03ROME4746.txt b/classification/CONFIDENTIAL/03ROME4746.txt new file mode 100644 index 000000000..32edd5540 --- /dev/null +++ b/classification/CONFIDENTIAL/03ROME4746.txt @@ -0,0 +1,74 @@ +03ROME4746 +GALILEO/M-CODE: INCREASED HIGH-LEVEL ITALIAN +Fri Oct 17 00:00:00 +0200 2003 +CONFIDENTIAL +Embassy Rome +This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.C O N F I D E N T I A L ROME 004746 + +SIPDIS + +E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/09/2013 +TAGS: ECPS ETRD IT TSPA TSPL PREL EUN + +SUBJECT: GALILEO/M-CODE: INCREASED HIGH-LEVEL ITALIAN +ATTENTION -- BUT NO ANSWERS + + CLASSIFIED BY: AMBASSADOR MEL SEMBLER FOR REASONS 1.5 (B)(D) + +¶1. (C) AT THE END OF AN OCTOBER 9 MEETING ON ANOTHER SUBJECT +WITH PM BERLUSCONI'S CLOSEST ADVISOR, PRIME MINISTRY +UNDERSECRETARY GIANNI LETTA, AMBASSADOR SEMBLER TOOK THE +OPPORTUNITY TO EXPRESS THE USG'S CONTINUED GREAT CONCERN OVER +LACK OF PROGRESS ON RESOLVING THE GALILEO/M-CODE OVERLAY +DISAGREEMENT WITH THE EU. THE AMBASSADOR TOLD LETTA BLUNTLY +THAT THE DISPUTE RISKS BECOMING A TRAIN WRECK ON ITALY'S EU +WATCH UNLESS MORE CONCERTED POLITICAL-LEVEL ATTENTION IS +GIVEN TO THE ISSUE. THE USG FELT THAT THAT AMERICAN +TECHNICAL EXPERTS HAD PROVIDED COMMISSION EXPERTS WITH +EXHAUSTIVE CLASSIFIED TECHNICAL BRIEFINGS, WHICH HAD +DEMONSTRATED PERSUASIVELY THAT NON-OVERLAY SPECTRAL OPTIONS +EXIST, WHICH WILL NOT DEGRADE GALILEO CAPABILITIES. +NEVERTHELESS, THE COMMISSION AND EU GOVERNMENTS HAVE BEEN +UNWILLING TO TAKE THE POLITICAL STEP TO DRAW THE OBVIOUS +CONCLUSIONS FROM THE TECHNICAL DISCUSSIONS. + +¶2. (C) LETTA RESPONDED THAT SENIOR LEVELS OF THE ITALIAN +GOVERNMENT WERE IN FACT PAYING CLOSE ATTENTION TO GALILEO. +IN THE PRIME MINISTRY, DIPLOMATIC ADVISOR GIOVANNI +CASTELANETTA HAD BEEN BRIEFING PM BERLUSCONI REGULARLY. +LETTA ALSO NOTED THAT DURING CABINET MEETINGS DEFENSE +MINISTER MARTINO HAD SPOKEN OPENLY IN SUPPORT OF THE U.S. +POSITION. NEVERTHELESS, LETTA OFFERED NO CLEAR INDICATION OF +WHAT FURTHER ACTIONS, IF ANY, THE GOI PLANNED TO TAKE WITHIN +THE EU. + +¶3. (C) IN A SEPARATE MEETING OCTOBER 14 WITH ECMIN, AGAIN ON +ANOTHER SUBJECT, GENERAL LEONARDO TRICARICO (THE PRIME + MINISTER'S MILITARY AND SECURITY ADVISOR) TOOK THE INITIATIVE +TO RAISE THE MATTER OF GALILEO. ECMIN REVIEWED USG CONCERNS +FOR TRICARICO, AS WELL AS THE AMBASSADOR'S EXCHANGE WITH +LETTA. ALTHOUGH HE ASKED SEVERAL QUESTIONS ABOUT THE RECENT +MEETINGS IN LONDON AND WASHINGTON, AND WAS CLEARLY ANXIOUS +ABOUT THE LACK OF FORWARD MOVEMENT IN U.S.-EU DISCUSSIONS, +TRICARICO WAS AT A LOSS TO SUGGEST WHAT ACTIONS ITALY SHOULD +OR COULD TAKE. + +¶4. (C) COMMENT: LETTA'S ACCOUNT OF THE HIGH-LEVEL ATTENTION +ITALIAN MINISTERS -- INCLUDING THE PM -- ARE GIVING THE +GALILEO/M-CODE DISPUTE IS WELCOME NEWS. REPORTS OF DEFMIN +MARTINO'S UNAMBIGUOUS SUPPORT FOR THE U.S. POSITION IS +WELCOME, AND CONFIRMS WHAT HE HAS TOLD US. (BUT MARTINO HAS +ALSO BEEN QUICK TO POINT OUT THAT HE NEEDS KEY ALLIES, SUCH +AS LETTA, IN ORDER TO SUCCEED IN THE INTERMINISTERIAL +PROCESS.) NEVERTHELESS, THERE IS LITTLE INDICATION THAT THE +GOI HAS ANY GAME PLAN ON HOW TO PREVENT THE WRONG OUTCOME AT +THE IMPORTANT DECEMBER MEETING OF EU TRANSPORT MINISTERS. +EMBASSY STANDS READY TO CONTINUE TO ENGAGE THE GOI AT THE +HIGHEST LEVELS ON GALILEO AS WASHINGTON AGENCIES WORK OUT THE +NEXT STEPS IN OUR STRATEGY. END COMMENT. +SEMBLER + +NNNN + 2003ROME04746 - Classification: CONFIDENTIAL + +" \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/classification/CONFIDENTIAL/06MONTEVIDEO418.txt b/classification/CONFIDENTIAL/06MONTEVIDEO418.txt new file mode 100644 index 000000000..046eba92d --- /dev/null +++ b/classification/CONFIDENTIAL/06MONTEVIDEO418.txt @@ -0,0 +1,145 @@ +06MONTEVIDEO418 +VAZQUEZ LOBBIES HARD FOR TRADE TALKS WITH U.S. WORKING GROUPS FORMED +Thu May 11 00:00:00 +0200 2006 +CONFIDENTIAL +Embassy Montevideo +VZCZCXYZ0000 +RR RUEHWEB + +DE RUEHMN #0418/01 1311501 +ZNY CCCCC ZZH +R 111501Z MAY 06 +FM AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO +TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5754 +INFO RUCNMER/MERCOSUR COLLECTIVE +RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ MAY SANTIAGO 2848 +RUMIAAA/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL +RUEHC/DEPT OF AGRICULTURE WASHDC +RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC +RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC +RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC,C O N F I D E N T I A L MONTEVIDEO 000418 + +SIPDIS + +SIPDIS + +DEPT FOR WHA/AS SHANNON AND EB/AS WAYNE +DEPT ALSO FOR WHA/BSC FOR BARNES, CROFT AND MURRAY +DEPT PLEASE PASS USTR +TREASURY FOR OASIA FOR DOUGLAS +COMMERCE FOR ITA/MAC BASTIAN +NSC FOR FISK AND CRONIN +SOUTHCOM FOR POLAD + +E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/10/2016 +TAGS: ETRD ECON PREL UY +SUBJECT: VAZQUEZ LOBBIES HARD FOR TRADE TALKS WITH U.S. WORKING GROUPS FORMED + + +Classified By: Charge d'Affaires James D. Nealon +for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). + +¶1. (C) Summary: President Vazquez appears to have wasted no +time in pushing his trade agenda. At the May 8 Cabinet +meeting, he recounted the results of his ten-day trip to the +U.S. and Mexico, and of his meeting with POTUS on May 4. He +advocated for expanded trade talks with the U.S., which he +said could eventually lead to a Free Trade Agreement (FTA). +His Cabinet strongly supported Vazquez in this endeavor, with +11 ministers in favor and only two against (ForMin Gargano +and Communist Minister for Social Development Arismendi). +Charge met on May 10 with Industry Minister Lepra, who had +accompanied Vazquez on the trip, to get a first-hand account +of the GOU's next steps. Lepra confirmed the overwhelming +Cabinet support and requested that we provide some +information on specific benefits of trade agreements for +public consumption. He confirmed that the GOU was looking at +its FTA with Mexico as a model to start talks (Note: Post is +translating this agreement for USTR. End Note.) He added +that he would lead a committee of five ministers to oversee +the trade talks, and he provided the names of the members of +the technical negotiating team. When reminded of the +importance of a clear leader to head this technical team, +Lepra immediately picked up the phone to call Economy +Minister Astori. After the conversation with Astori, he told +Charge that they had decided upon EconMin Director of Trade +Sarachaga as the team leader. This would be confirmed after +discussing the issue with Vazquez at the next Cabinet meeting +on May 15. It appears that Vazquez and his economic team +have found more support for an FTA than they may have thought +possible so early after their return and are capitalizing on +the momentum. End Summary. + +¶2. (C) On Monday May 8, shortly after his return, President +Vazquez called a Cabinet meeting to inform his ministers +about his ten-day trip to the U.S. and Mexico. Vazquez is +reported to have explained his vision of an increased trade +relationship with the U.S., leading to a possible FTA by +October. According to Vice-President Novoa and Industry +Minister Lepra, 11 out of 13 ministers expressed their +support for Vazquez's vision, with only Foreign Minister +Gargano (Socialist) and Social Development Minister Arismendi +(Communist) dissenting. According to the reports, Astori led +a strong, well-founded defense of the advantages of an FTA, +while Gargano threatened to resign if an FTA was ever signed +with the U.S. It appears that the level of support that +Vazquez garnered in this first Cabinet meeting was stronger +than expected. On the public front, the left-leaning daily +La Republica was unusually supportive, with overall favorable +reporting under a headline claiming that "The Government +pressed on the accelerator to make good on commercial +agreement with the U.S." A poll conducted by El Pais +indicated a strong majority of public support for a trade +agreement with the U.S. + +¶3. (C) Charge met on May 10 with Industry Minister Lepra to +get a better understanding of the GOU's plans and to +coordinate actions. Lepra was very upbeat about the trip and +about the prospects for an FTA. He relished in the increased +isolation in which ForMin Gargano was finding himself. Lepra +and Charge agreed to coordinate public stance regarding the +ongoing negotiations, to ensure that the Embassy not move +ahead of President Vazquez. Lepra confirmed that the model +FTA that the GOU favored was the Uruguay-Mexico FTA, ""for +political reasons"". This agreement was supported by the +entire political spectrum, he explained, and by Uruguay's +Mercosur partners. In addition, Lepra noted that the +Uruguay-Mexico FTA, signed in 2004, is a third-generation +agreement based on an improved NAFTA model. Charge confirmed +that post was in the process of translating this document so +that USTR may compare it with our latest FTA. Lepra then +requested our assistance in providing him with information +about our FTA with Vietnam, not because it is a particularly +good FTA, he noted, but rather to counter opposition from the +Communist Party. "If Communist Vietnam, after fighting a +brutal war against the U.S., can turn around and sign an +FTA," he explained, "how can our Communists be against it?" +Lepra also requested information on job creation, investment +and poverty reduction brought about by FTAs, again for the +GOU's campaign to build up public support. Charge pledged to +provide the information. Post would appreciate any and all +such information to be shared with the GOU. + +¶4. (C) Lepra said he would lead a political committee of five +ministers (Industry, Economy, Agriculture, Foreign Affairs +and Tourism), responsible for the trade talks. He also had a +technical negotiating team in mind, but was still unclear as +to who would lead this team. Charge noted the importance of +a solid negotiating team, with clear lines of authority, +given the short time frame in which negotiations were to be +conducted. Lepra immediately picked up the phone to call +EconMin Astori, with whom he agreed to have EconMin Trade +Director Sarachaga lead the negotiating team. He and Astori +would confirm their choice after the next Cabinet meeting on +May 15, he said. + +¶5. (C) Comment: Clearly, Vazquez has returned from the U.S. +in a strengthened position to initiate trade talks and is +making the best out of the momentum he has encountered. The +GOU appears to be keenly aware of the tight timeframe to +negotiate an agreement and determined to make the most of +this opportunity. Embassy will continue to be the +interagency coordinator" for the GOU to ensure that no time +is lost due to lack of focus on organizational details. End +Comment. +Nealon \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/classification/CONFIDENTIAL/09BAGHDAD379.txt b/classification/CONFIDENTIAL/09BAGHDAD379.txt new file mode 100644 index 000000000..d605ff452 --- /dev/null +++ b/classification/CONFIDENTIAL/09BAGHDAD379.txt @@ -0,0 +1,603 @@ +09BAGHDAD379 +PM MALIKI: STRENGTHENED CENTER OR EMERGING +Fri Feb 13 00:00:00 +0100 2009 +CONFIDENTIAL +Embassy Baghdad +VZCZCXRO1455 +OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK +DE RUEHGB #0379/01 0441140 +ZNY CCCCC ZZH +O 131140Z FEB 09 +FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD +TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1692 +INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE +RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FLC O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 07 BAGHDAD 000379 + +SIPDIS + +E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/12/2019 +TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM PINS KDEM KISL IZ +SUBJECT: PM MALIKI: STRENGTHENED CENTER OR EMERGING +STRONGMAN? + +Classified by Ambassador Ryan Crocker for reasons 1.4 (b) and +(d). + +------------------------ +Summary and Introduction +------------------------ + +¶1. (C) With the strong performance of the Da'wa Party in the +January 31 provincial council elections, Prime Minister +Maliki will claim a public mandate. While many media +analyses have tended to overstate this case (as Maliki won no +more than 38 percent in two provinces, and less elsewhere) it +is clear that the elections mark a significant improvement in +the Prime Minister's political fortunes, and that Da'wa can +legitimately claim to have displaced the Islamic Supreme +Council of Iraq (ISCI) as the country's preeminent Shi'a +political party. During his first two years in office, +Maliki was broadly assailed by critics as a weak and +ineffectual prime minister, ill-equipped by background and +experience to govern an increasingly violent Iraq and +incapable of imposing order on a chaotic GOI to confront the +country's myriad challenges. Now, at the start of 2009, with +an increasingly stable (if still violent and volatile) Iraq, +Maliki is assailed by those same critics -- leading Sunni and +Kurdish politicians, as well as other Shi'a coalition +partners -- as an aspiring strongman bent on imposing a +classic Arab autocracy on Iraq. + +¶2. (C) Maliki's personality and way of conducting business +has contributed to the present accusations of an emerging +"new Saddam." While his political foes are quite open about +their desire to see him ousted (providing more than adequate +reason for paranoia on the PM's part), Maliki is a product of +his Da'wa secret cell experience and tends to view everyone +and everything with instinctive suspicion. This worldview is +fed by his small and closed circle of Da'wa advisors. In +terms of governance and security, Maliki has moved in an +accelerated manner following his direction of government +efforts in spring/summer of 2008 to quell Sadrist challenges +in Basra and elsewhere to reestablish a strong Baghdad +center. While the ends are positive -- enhanced national +security and stability are welcome-- the means are being +subjected to increasing question. The concentration of +authority in Maliki's Office of the Commander in Chief +(OCINC), the establishment of an elite security force - with +its own judges and detention facilities - that reports +directly to the PM, the creation of a security force command +that short-circuits provincial authority, a willingness in +some cases to use strong-arm tactics against political +adversaries, and patronage networks to co-opt others all +follow a very familiar pattern of Arab world leadership. + +¶3. (C) That said, Nouri Al-Maliki is no Saddam Hussein. He +shares neither Saddam's brutality nor his penchant for +international military adventurism. Moreover, while Maliki's +thinking and actions are undoubtedly informed by the Shi'a +experience, he himself sees his conduct as national rather +than sectarian-inspired. His nationalism is very much at +issue in his relations with Iran. Having fled from Iran to +Syria during the Saddam era to avoid falling under Tehran's +sway (as he believes occurred with Shi'a arch-rival ISCI), +Maliki's suspicious outlook includes a dark assessment of +Iran's ambitions toward Iraq. + +¶4. (C) A key question posed by Maliki's evolving hold on +levers of political and security power is whether the PM is +becoming a non-democratic dictator bent on subordinating all +authority to his hand or whether Maliki is attempting to +rebalance political and security authority back to the center +Qrebalance political and security authority back to the center +after five-plus years of intended and unintended dispersal to +(and in some cases seizure by) actors and power structures +outside Baghdad. We believe the answer lies closer to the +latter than the former. This process will likely come into +sharper focus with the seating of the newly-elected +provincial councils and implementation of the provincial +powers law (which grants significant new power to the +provinces). And the PM's efforts will be met with resistance +by those, such as the Kurds and Maliki's Shi'a rivals, who +would argue that the post-Saddam national consensus (and +indeed the Iraqi constitution) requires substantial devolved +power to the provinces and regions. + +¶5. (C) While responsibility for the lack of political +consensus is broadly shared among Iraq's leaders from all +groups, the PM needs to set the tone. Here, Maliki has shown +that he is either unwilling or unable to take the lead in the +give-and-take needed to build broad consensus for the +Government's policies among competing power blocs. +Furthermore, the Prime Minister has appeared willing to +confront his adversaries with force, as illustrated by the +near-confrontation between the Iraqi Army and Peshmerga in +northern Diyala province last September. Working within this +context, the U.S. should continue to emphasize support for +Iraqi institutions over individuals as our bilateral +relationship matures, and must maintain a strong focus on +keeping Iraq's main groups committed to a peaceful, +negotiated, process to resolve contentious "national vision" +issues such as power-sharing, disputed borders, the +appropriate division of power between the central and +provincial/regional governments, hydrocarbons, and security. +End summary and introduction. + +-------------------- +Winter of Discontent +-------------------- + +¶6. (C) First seen as weak, ineffective, and ill-informed +about the political and security structures put in place +since Saddam's fall (Maliki was not a participant in the +governing bodies set up during the CPA), Prime Minister +Maliki was by the fall of 2008 being widely criticized - by +leaders of the Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP) and other Sunni +politicians, by the Kurdish political leadership, and by +fellow Shi'a from outside Maliki's Da'wa Party -- as +autocratic and excessively ambitious, with the long-term aim +of becoming a new strong man dictator. The "political reform +resolution," passed by parliament in conjunction with its +approval of the U.S.-Iraq Security Agreement and Strategic +Framework Agreement on November 27, 2008 (reftel), amounted +to a manifesto of grievances against the Prime Minister that +had been growing among his coalition partners, and the +opposition, throughout the year. + +¶7. (U) The document urged the Maliki Government to adhere to +the Constitution, to commit to a democratic federal system, +to share power with the legislature, to professionalize and +depoliticize the security forces, to guarantee a free +judiciary, disband "unconstitutional structures" within the +government, and release prisoners eligible for amnesty or +held without due process, among other demands. + +--------------------- +Maliki's (Small) Circle +----------------------- + +¶8. (C) A common complaint about Maliki is his failure to +consult with leaders of other power blocs and his excessive +reliance on a small inner circle for advice. These habits +certainly stem from Maliki's background, which includes more +than two decades as an operative of the Islamic Da'wa Party, +which conducted clandestine activities, including +assassination attempts against Saddam and senior regime +officials, during the 1970s and 80s. (Saddam's intelligence +service, for good measure, targeted Da'wa operatives for +assassination abroad.) + +¶9. (C) Maliki first joined Da'wa as a student at Baghdad +University in the 1960s. His ties to the group forced him to +flee Iraq in 1979, and live in exile first in Iran, then in +Syria, where he represented the party until Saddam's fall in +Q03. Today, most of Maliki's inner circle of advisors share +his Da'wa background. They include: + +-- Tariq Najm Abdullah, Maliki's Chief of Staff, who was +active in Da'wa's London chapter in the 1990s. Abdullah's +cool and taciturn demeanor seems to exemplify critics' +characterization of the Maliki government. Critics within +the GOI have dubbed him the "shadow Prime Minister" and some +claim he sometimes countermands Maliki's written +instructions; + +-- Sadiq al-Rikabi, a senior advisor, also from Da'wa's +London chapter, is often at Maliki's side. The PM tasked him +with leading the Security Agreement negotiations after +essentially firing the Iraqi MFA negotiating team, which +Maliki reportedly thought too concessionary and too beholden +QMaliki reportedly thought too concessionary and too beholden +to Foreign Minister Zebari - a bitter adversary; + +-- Ghati al-Rikabi (aka Abu Mujahed - a first cousin of +Sadiq), is an advisor and general fixer in Maliki's office; + +-- Ali al-Adib, who now heads Da'wa's parliamentary caucus, +represented the party during exile years in Iran. He +sometimes represents Maliki in GOI meetings and in visits to +the provinces; + +-- Sami al-Askeri is a nominally independent MP close to +Maliki. The PM appointed him to lead GOI efforts to bring +Sadrists and Shi'a extremists into mainstream politics; + +-- Hassan Sunayd is a Da'wa MP who had been an advisor to PM +Ja'afari. A poet, he was jailed and tortured by Saddam. He +is perhaps the most liberal and pragmatic member of Maliki's +circle; + +-- Ahmed al-Maliki, the Prime Minister's son and head of his +private office. He is rumored to have strained relations with +the Rikabis; + +-- Mowafaq al-Rubaiye, now the influential National Security +Advisor, had been an associate of Ahmed al-Chalabi in +London's Iraqi National Congress. Though Maliki apparently +values Rubaiye's counsel on certain issues, he is widely seen +as an unscrupulous self-promoter and Maliki himself has +openly excluded Rubaiye from engagement in some issues -- +including the Strategic Framework (SFA) and +Security Agreement (SOFA) negotiations. + +¶10. (C) Maliki appears loath to delegate sensitive political +tasks to persons outside this group, with the net effect of +hampering the GOI's capacity and stunting its institutional +development. The most recent example of this phenomenon we +have observed has been the difficulty the GOI has had in +standing up bilateral committees to work with the U.S. in +implementing the Security Agreement and the SFA. + +¶11. (C) Explaining the GOI delays and apparent disarray on +implementing the agreements, Sadiq al-Rikabi recently +confided to PMIN that he and his colleagues in Maliki's +circle were simply tired (and apparently tapped out). +Discussing an economic project with a senior USG official in +late December, Maliki complained, "If I don't get personally +involved, nothing happens." Clearly, Maliki's subordinates +have not been encouraged or empowered to take decisions on +their own - symptomatic of sclerotic bureaucracies across the +region. + +-------------------------------------- +This Paranoid Really Does Have Enemies +-------------------------------------- + +¶12. (C) Maliki's reluctance to delegate authority reflects +both an urge to control and a distrust of those outside his +circle. In meetings with Embassy officials, Maliki regularly +voices concern about plots against him. The Prime Minister +seems particularly fixated on the activities of Ba'thist +former regime elements in Syria and Jordan. More damagingly, +the PM's deep suspicion of the Iraqi Army's leadership as +Sunni Ba'athist and the source of potential coup-plotting has +only partially been tempered over the course of the past two +years. Similarly, Maliki shows a tendency to associate all +Sunni (and more broadly, Arab) opposition to his policies +with Ba'athist irredentism. This manifests itself in his +strained relationships with Iraqi Sunni political figures +such as Tawafuq/IIP leader Tariq al-Hashimi. It is also +visible in his (mistaken) dismissal of Iraq's externally +displaced as Sunnis who have not come to terms with +post-Saddam democratic Shi'a majoritarian rule. Maliki's +sectarian suspicion also shapes his view of the Saudis and +other Arab neighbors as unaccepting of Shi'a in governance. +Maliki staunchly denies -- and we agree -- that he is +motivated by overt sectarian bias. Rather, we see Maliki's +worldview as deeply informed by the Shi'a historical +experience. Unfortunately, the consequences in terms of his +willingness and ability to reach out to Iraqi Sunnis and the +broader Sunni world are effectively the same. + +¶13. (C) This said, the Prime Minister correctly sees rivals +across the spectrum of Iraq's ethnic, sectarian and political +leaderships as bent on his ouster. From the Kurdish +leadership (including KRG President Barzani, FM Zebari, and +Deputy Prime Minister Salih) to his Shi'a arch-rival ISCI +QDeputy Prime Minister Salih) to his Shi'a arch-rival ISCI +head Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim (and Vice President Adel Abd +al-Mehdi) and Sunni leader Vice President al-Hashimi, there +has been an unbroken and quite open criticism of Maliki's +leadership and proclaimed desire to see him ousted through a +parliamentary vote of no confidence. (This effort has been +hampered by fear of the political vacuum that would follow +Maliki's fall: There is no consensus among those who want to +bring him down about who/what should follow. Nevertheless, +the current impasse over a successor to ousted Parliamentary +Speaker Mashhadani is seen by some as a split between those +who favor a no confidence vote in the Prime Minister and +those who support Maliki.) + +-------------------- +Stove-Piped Security +-------------------- + +¶14. (C) Maliki has set up security structures that report +directly to the Prime Minister's Office, arguing that rather +than parallel lines of authority he is exercising the +legitimate authority of Commander in Chief. Indeed, the +Office of the Commander in Chief (OCINC) has been the object +of particular criticism over the past year as security +responsibilities have been taken in practice from Iraqi +security commanders and subordinated to OCINC +decision-making. The Counter-Terrorism Bureau (CTB) and its +Iraqi Special Operations Force fall entirely outside of +Ministry of Defense (MOD) and Ministry of Interior (MOI) +chains of command, reporting directly to the Prime Minister's +Office. Designed, trained and equipped by U.S. Special +Forces under the Multi National Security Transition Command - +Iraq (MNSTC-I), the CTB was originally conceived to fall +under MOD authority. Instead, the Prime Minister's Office +has assumed direct control of the CTB, and Maliki is reported +to be personally involved in both the CTB's targeting process +and its operational direction. Critics believe his +motivation was to create a politicized force that could +protect his regime. Maliki's defenders argue he was +compelled to set up the CTB -- and the OCINC -- to get a +handle on an unwieldy security bureaucracy at a time of +national crisis, pointing to the need for the PM's direct +intervention at the head of Iraqi security forces in Basrah, +Sadr City, Maysan and elsewhere over the course of 2008. We +believe both interpretations are correct. Maliki genuinely +sees his personal leadership and control as essential to +advance security and stability but has also directed assets +under his control to reinforce his political position. + +¶15. (C) The CTB maintains not only its own armed operations +units, but also its own detention facilities (principally the +ill-reputed facility at Camp Honor - within the International +Zone) and even has on staff its own judges to customize +arrest warrants. Iraqi MOD interlocutors, and Maliki's +political rivals, have both expressed to Emboffs their alarm +over the extent of the PM's personal control over the CTB, +which has already apparently been misused as a political +rather than security instrument (see para 17, below). Like a +number of GOI entities, the CTB is technically +extra-constitutional, although the Prime Minister is pressing +Parliament to approve a bill that would legalize its +activities. + +¶16. (C) Another controversial innovation has been the +establishment of Provincial Operations Centers, which +consolidate command of all ISF operations within their areas +of responsibility, a concept which originated with the 2007 +Baghdad Security Plan. The model has since been replicated +in Basra, Diyala, Karbala, and Ninewa. Operations commands +all report directly to the Iraqi Ground Forces Commander in +Baghdad, bypassing provincial governors, who often are not +only cut out of planning and operational direction, but may +not even be current on what the ISF are doing in their +provinces. We know that Maliki often goes directly to Ground +Forces Commander Ali Gheidan, or to lower-level division +commanders, or with operations-level commanders such as +General Abud Qanbar in Baghdad with specific instructions. + +------------------------------- +Diyala Province: Smite Thy Foes +------------------------------- + +¶17. (C) The ISF's "Operation Benevolent Diyala," launched in +August 2008, was quickly decried by the province's Sunni +political establishment as a sectarian power play directed by +Maliki. Given the province has been one of Iraq's most +unstable since 2004 -- with Al-Qaida menacing the center and +north of the province, and the Jaysh al-Mahdi spilling over +Qnorth of the province, and the Jaysh al-Mahdi spilling over +from Sadr City in Diyala's southwest flank -- a robust +security operation was badly needed. However, of 1200 +individuals detained by the end of 2008, 1150 were Sunnis, +including many local leaders of the "Sons of Iraq" armed +neighborhood watches partnered with the Coalition Forces, and +many local affiliates of the Sunni Iraqi Islamic Party. + +¶18. (C) Sunni grievances grew after August 18, 2008, when +Maliki's CTB raided the provincial government center in +Ba'qouba and seized two of Diyala's most prominent Sunni +political leaders, in the process killing (apparently by +accident) an aide to the governor. Both the national and +Diyala provincial leaderships of the Iraqi Islamic Party have +told us they are convinced Operation Benevolent Diyala was +partly, if not principally, a partisan political operation. +The Diyala operation severely strained ties, which were never +good to begin with, between Maliki and Vice President +Hashimi, national chair of the IIP. Any political benefit +Maliki might have hoped to gain by means of the security +operation in Diyala appears to have backfired: The Sunni +Tawafuq list (IIP and its allies) placed first in Diyala in +the Jan. 31 provincial elections - winning almost four times +as many votes as Da'wa. + +---------------------------------------- +Kurdish Standoff -- Poxes on Both Houses +---------------------------------------- + +¶19. (C) The PM's centralization of control over security +forces, exaggerated sense of confidence in his own leadership +and judgment (a product of the security successes of +spring/summer 2008), his profound distrust of Kurdish +motives, and progressive Kurdish moves to expand influence +south of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) region came +to a threatening head in September 2008, when Maliki ordered +Iraqi Army units to deploy in Khanaqin, a Kurdish enclave in +Diyala. Technically below the green line separating the KRG +from "Iraq proper," Khanaqin, with an almost entirely Kurdish +population, had been uneventfully occupied by the Peshmerga +since 2003. A tense standoff between the IA and Peshmerga +ensued, with Maliki insisting that the Constitution gave him +authority to deploy the Army anywhere within Iraq's borders +and the Kurds arguing that he was being unnecessarily +provocative in a peaceful (and disputed) corner of the +province. Maliki's orders to reinforce the IA's positions +with a tank company suggested to some that he was spoiling +for a fight with the Kurds. Had the two sides come to blows, +it could have spread along the green line to Kirkuk and Mosul +and would have likely posed a grave threat to Iraq's +viability as a unified state. While the crisis was defused +following U.S. intervention and brokering by VP Abd al-Mehdi, +the fundamental dispute that prompted it remains unresolved. +Most importantly, the Khanaqin incident fed each party's +distrust of the other. KRG President Barzani is especially +distrustful of Maliki's intentions. + +------------ +Overreaching +------------ + +¶20. (C) Maliki's willingness to confront the battle-tested +Peshmerga suggested that he had no doubt whatsoever about the +Iraqi Army's fighting capacity. Maliki famously declared, in +the summer of 2007, that his forces were ready to secure the +country and that coalition forces could leave any time they +wanted. Maliki's inflated assessment of his forces' +capabilities was obvious in March 2008, when he ordered the +Iraqi Army to move into Basra and eject the Sadrist militias +and street gangs who had tacit control of the city and its +strategic ports. While the operation ultimately succeeded, +and indeed began the process of establishing GOI authority +over areas formally dominated by Sadrist militias and the +Iranian-backed Special Groups, its first week was marked by +logistical chaos and serious setbacks on the battlefield. +The tide only turned when Coalition Forces, whom Maliki had +characteristically not consulted in advance, launched a major +resupply and support effort. + +--------------------------- +If You Can't Defeat, Co-opt +--------------------------- + +¶21. (C) Despite Maliki's demonstrated willingness to use +force to advance his political position and strengthen +central authority, as in Diyala or Basra, he has also worked +intensively to develop and expand patronage networks. One of +the principal vehicles in this effort has been tribal support +councils (TSCs). Originally designed to consolidate tribal +support for security operations in Basra and Maysan +provinces, their mandate subsequently expanded to include IDP +returns, sectarian reconciliation, and economic development. +Feeding critics' suspicions that the TSCs were set up to +strengthen Baghdad's reach into the provinces, distribute +patronage, and develop loyalty to Maliki, the Prime +Minister's Office moved expeditiously during 2008 to set up +QMinister's Office moved expeditiously during 2008 to set up +TSC's across the south and eventually most of Iraq (ref B), +without apparent regard to the actual needs of different +localities. + +¶22. (C) The merits of the TSC model are open for debate: +Maliki's supporters argue that TSCs are efficient mechanisms +for dispensing resources from the center to the periphery and +for empowering tribes as elements of stability and natural +partners for rural development. Regardless, the TSCs have +been perceived by ISCI, Maliki's principal Shi'a coalition +partner, as a direct bid to undermine the provincial +governments it controlled and seize the loyalties of its core +constituents. Certainly, Maliki's TSCs have further +alienated ISCI from the Prime Minister. (In the fall, KRG +President Barzani also lashed out at Maliki over nascent TSCs +in Kirkuk and Mosul, viewing them as an open challenge to +Kurdish interests in disputed territories.) + +----------------------------- +But In The Success Column ... +----------------------------- + +¶23. (C) Despite the considerable controversy Maliki's +approach has generated, there is no doubt that Iraq's overall +security situation has improved dramatically on his watch. +He overcame formidable domestic opposition, and intense +pressure from Iran, to shepherd the Security Agreement and +SFA through parliament. Even most of his sharpest critics +concede he showed courage in confronting the Shi'a extremist +Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM) in the spring of 2008. There is +consensus that Muqtada al-Sadr and the JAM have had their +wings clipped, and while not wiped off Iraq's political map, +they no longer pose anywhere near the threat they did +2004-07. + +¶24. (C) Indeed, Maliki and Da'wa have been working +diligently, and with apparent success, to court the +disarrayed Sadrists and bring them closer to the political +mainstream (and even groom them as potential coalition +partners). Maliki's gambit to crush the JAM earned him the +grudging appreciation of many Sunnis and moderate Shi'a who +had previously seen him as a JAM enabler. Maliki is +particularly popular in Basra, which had been terrorized by +Sadrist militias and criminal spinoffs prior to the March +2008 operation against them. Maliki's "State of Law" +electoral list achieved first place showings in Baghdad and +eight of Iraq's nine southern provinces (voters punished the +Da'wa incumbent in Karbala, however). + +¶25. (C) Maliki has also exceeded expectations to date in his +handling of the integration of the mainly Sunni Sons of +Iraq/Awakening Movement into the Iraqi Security Forces. Many +had feared that he would not honor the SOI salary system set +up by coalition forces and would instead arrest and purge SOI +leaders. While the transition in Baghdad province went +smoothly, signs have been less encouraging in Diyala, and the +GOI's commitment to find work for the 80 percent of SOI not +absorbed into the ISF remains mainly hypothetical. On the +whole, Maliki has thus far honored his commitment to take on +and continue the SOI program. + +--------------------------------------------- --------------- +Conclusion: U.S. Interest in a Strengthened Center, But ... +--------------------------------------------- --------------- + +¶26. (C) The critical progress on security and stability made +over the past year, while underpinned by the U.S. military +surge, owes much to Maliki's leadership and restoration of +central government authority. It is in the interests of the +U.S. to see that process of strengthened central authority +continue, but in a manner that is sustainable, based on +institutions rather than personalities, and reflecting a +consensus national vision among Iraq's main ethnic/sectarian +groups. In this regard, the PM's deep distrust of virtually +all other actors on the Iraqi (and regional) scene undercuts +his -- and our -- efforts to reinforce the still-fragile +institutional gains of the past two years. We have pressed +the PM and other political leaders to deal seriously with the +range of grievances that separate them and to move forward on +the various reform agendas articulated in the August 2007 +leaders' declaration. However, Maliki sought to parry the +opposition's various grievances with the establishment of +five multi-party committees to resolve longstanding impasses +on security and defense, hydrocarbons, power sharing, budget, +and disputed territories. While the other parties delegated +different representatives to the committees, Maliki +characteristically appointed himself to represent Da'wa and +Qcharacteristically appointed himself to represent Da'wa and +his overworked Da'wa inner circle on all five. To date, the +committees have met only infrequently and have made little +visible progress. + +¶27. (C) Maliki's position may not be indefinitely +sustainable. Tellingly, Maliki's parliamentary critics +continue to emphasize the CoR "political reform document" +rather than the five committees, as their preferred vehicle +for change. Maliki's government remains dysfunctional on +many levels. He has a strained relationship with Foreign +Minister Zebari (who openly refers to KRG President Barzani +as his boss) and is known to dislike and distrust Interior +Minister Bolani (who has started his own political party). +He rarely convenes the Executive Council (composed of the +President, the two Vice Presidents, the KRG President, and +the Prime Minister). His defenders argue the role of Iraq's +President and Vice Presidents is more protocol than +executive. With the Kurds, the mainstream Sunnis, and even +non-Da'wa Shi'a coalition partners largely alienated, it may +be a matter of time before dislike of Maliki and the growing +threat to their particular interests finally unites the PM's +foes and overcomes their fundamental disagreement about who +and what would replace Maliki after a successful +no-confidence vote. + +¶28. (C) The results of the January 31 provincial elections, +however, with strong showings by Maliki's State of Law/Da'wa +list in nine of 14 participating provinces has clearly given +the Prime Minister momentum, allowing him to claim a tangible +base of public support, at least in Baghdad and Iraq's south. + While this success has likely taken some wind from the sails +of proponents of a no-confidence vote, Maliki's adversaries +might also calculate that they must act before the national +elections, expected at the end of 2009, to forestall an +irreversible consolidation of power. + +¶29. (C) Faced with this situation, we should continue to +emphasize our support for institutions rather than +individuals, and for processes rather than personalities, +even as we are mindful that Iraqi politics will remain +personalized and divided for the foreseeable future. In this +regard, the U.S. is not without assets in attempting to shape +Maliki's actions. The process of negotiating the SFA/SA with +the PM and his team demonstrated the importance Maliki +attaches to building a strong relationship with the U.S. and +his ability to deliver on key issues. His advisors have +shared with us anxiety over the position the new +Administration will take toward the PM and have sought +reassurance that the ties forged last year will continue. We +should press the PM on institution and political consensus +building as key to sustaining and advancing our relationship +-- and support. + +CROCKER \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/classification/SECRET/07TEGUCIGALPA1247.txt b/classification/SECRET/07TEGUCIGALPA1247.txt new file mode 100644 index 000000000..41978ec3b --- /dev/null +++ b/classification/SECRET/07TEGUCIGALPA1247.txt @@ -0,0 +1,169 @@ +07TEGUCIGALPA1247 +SELECTION OF NEW HONDURAN AMBASSADOR TO THE UN RAISES VISA ISSUES +Thu Jul 19 00:00:00 +0200 2007 +SECRET +Embassy Tegucigalpa +VZCZCXYZ0005 +PP RUEHWEB + +DE RUEHTG #1247/01 1982131 +ZNY SSSSS ZZH (CCY DTG ADX:00E6E7BA MSI6833 614) +P 192131Z JUL 07 +FM AMEMBASSY TEGUCIGALPA +TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6422 +INFO RUEAHLC/HOMELAND SECURITY CENTER WASHDC PRIORITY +RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY +RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0153S E C R E T TEGUCIGALPA 001247 + +SIPDIS + +C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (DTG CHANGED FROM 7/17 TO 7/19) + +SIPDIS + +STATE FOR D, WHA/CEN, CA/VO/L/C AND CA/VO/L/A +NSC FOR DAN FISK +E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/19/2017 +TAGS: CVIS PGOV PREL HO +SUBJECT: SELECTION OF NEW HONDURAN AMBASSADOR TO THE UN RAISES VISA ISSUES + +REF: STATE 98124 + +Classified By: AMB. CHARLES FORD. REASONS 1.4(B) AND (D). + +¶1. (C) SUMMARY. Jorge Arturo Reina, the current Minister of Government and Justice, was nominated by President Zelaya to represent Honduras as the ambassador to the United Nations. To assume his duties at the United Nations, Reina will need a G-1 visa to travel to the United States. To obtain that visa, he must first undergo a Security Advisory Opinion for an OO hit, and Advisory Opinion for an NCIII hit and apply for a waiver as he is currently ineligible for a visa under section 212(a)(3)(B) for past terrorist activities. Reina has a long history of involvement with Communist-inspired revolutionary groups and anti-American activities. Although he may have left his radical student days behind, his family is involved in the sale of passports and human smuggling of Chinese immigrants. Zelaya's naming of Reina to the United Nations, knowing Reina's history and that his previous visa was revoked, appears to be designed as a sign of his independence from the United States. Given the serious nature of Reina's past activities, any request for a waiver must be thoroughly reviewed. END SUMMARY. + +¶2. (U) President Zelaya selected his current Minister of +Government and Justice, Jorge Arturo Reina (Reina), as the +new Honduran ambassador to the United Nations on July 18, +replacing Ivan Romero Martinez. Zelaya picked Reina as his +new U.N. Ambassador despite knowing, along with the rest of +the Honduran public, that Reina's previous U.S. visa was +revoked. Zelaya stated that this nomination was a "protest +for Honduran sovereignty" and that Reina's previous visa +problems should have no effect on Reina's ability to +represent Honduras before the United Nations as the U.S. must +issue a visa to each member's representative. Zelaya also +stated that during his visit with Secretary Rice on July 10, +he notified her of the impending nomination and that the +Secretary did not raise any objections. With the appointment, +it is expected that the GOH will apply for a waiver and an +eventual G-1 visa on behalf of Reina to allow him to travel +to the United Nations in New York City. + +---------------------- +Reina's Visa Problem +---------------------- + +¶3. (C) Jorge Arturo Reina is currently ineligible for a visa +under section 212(a)(3)(B) of the Immigration and Nationality +Act based on his links and involvement with terrorist +activities in the 1970s and 1980s. In addition, there is +currently a "00" hit associated with his name which requires +the submission of a Security Advisory Opinion for review by +the Department and other interested agencies prior to ruling +on the visa application. Finally, there also exists a NCIII +hit from the Federal Bureau of Investigation indicating past +criminal activity in the U.S. that would also have to be +cleared through CA/VO/L/A. + +¶4. (C) In the mid-1990s, Reina obtained a waiver and +eventually a B1/B2 visa with the restriction that he provide +an itinerary for each trip to the U.S. While serving as a +Minister without Portfolio and Advisor to his brother, +ex-President Carlos Roberto Reina (1994 - 1998), Reina +obtained an A-1 visa with the same restriction and the +original tourist visa was canceled. He traveled numerous +times to the United States but failed to comply with the +restrictions prompting the Department to eventually revoke +his visa. He later received two single-entry B1/B2 visas, for +family medical reasons, to travel to the United States. + +------------------------------------------ +Links to Terrorist and Criminal Activities +------------------------------------------- + +¶5. (S/NF) As a student in the 1950s, Reina was a Communist +sympathizer and traveled to Moscow in 1957. Following +deportation to Costa Rica in the early 1960s after the +military coup in Honduras, Reina spent his months in exile +trying to organize armed resistance to the Honduran +government and unsuccessfully sought money and arms from +Fidel Castro in Cuba. He was allowed to return to Honduras in +1964 where he continued his organizational efforts and was +involved in left-wing student activities. Reina's involvement +included storing a cache of weapons on behalf of the Liberal +Party who used those weapons in their instigation of strikes +and public demonstrations to overthrow the military +government. He was widely believed to be a Soviet and/or +Cuban agent at that time. + +¶6. (S/NF) While a teacher and later Rector of the University +of Honduras (UNAH), he was instrumental in organizing +students and faculty to provide both moral and material +support to the Sandinistas in Nicaragua. During this time he +continued to speak out against the U.S.'s role in Central +America and was linked to supplying unknown persons with hand +grenades to be used against Standard Fruit Company. An +admirer of the Cuban Revolution, Reina traveled +surreptitiously to Cuba a number of times in the early 1980s +to meet with other revolutionaries and was suspected of +supplying arms to rebels in El Salvador during that country's +civil war. Post also received information in 1980 that Reina +was made aware of, and eventually approved, a plan by a +terrorist organization to kidnap a U.S. official. + +¶7. (S/NF) Reina's involvement in criminal activities did not +end with his entry into the Honduran government. The current +Director of Immigration, German Espinal, a trusted ally in +the fight against corruption, has linked Reina's son, Carlos +Eduardo Reina, a local businessman, to the sale of passports +and other identity documents to Chinese immigrants who +presumably intend to travel to the United States. While Reina +is not directly involved in this human smuggling operation, +he is believed to receive money from those sales to use his +position in the GOH to protect his son's illegal activities +and shield him from investigation. + +-------------------------------------------- +This Nomination Just One More Provocation +--------------------------------------------- + +¶8. (C) Zelaya's nomination of Reina appears to be part of his +ongoing efforts to press the USG on a range of issues to +determine what if any consequences he will see from bad +policy choices. Like a small boy poking a hornets' nest with +a stick, Zelaya keeps jabbing at the USG to see what the +reaction will be. His most recent "pokes" include his +on-again/off-again visit to Cuba to meet with Castro and +strengthen Honduran/Cuban relations; granting permission to +the Cuban airline, Aerocarribean, to begin service to +Honduras; his trip to Managua, Nicaragua to help celebrate +the anniversary of the Sandinista Revolution with President +Ortega; and his public desire for friendship with Hugo +Chavez. Zelaya has yet to suffer any adverse consequences for +his actions and he will continue to act in this manner to see +how far he can go. + +¶9. (C) Another example of this tendency to test limits is his +statement that Secretary Rice had no objection to Reina's +nomination. This subject was not raised in his meeting with +the Secretary, but rather with Deputy Secretary Negroponte on +July 10 (see reftel). Zelaya informed the Deputy Secretary of +the impending appointment but at no point did the Deputy +Secretary state that the USG was in agreement or that it +opposed the naming of Reina. Instead, Zelaya took the lack of +response as approval. + +¶10. (C) COMMENT. Jorge Arturo Reina's past history with +terrorist and criminal activities, and his ongoing acceptance +of his family's involvement in human smuggling, raises +serious issues that need to be considered prior to the +granting of a waiver for a G-1 visa, especially with regard +to the nature of any restrictions on the G-1 visa that would +be appropriate. Post is concerned that the approval of the +waiver and visa without serious consideration of conditions +will only encourage Zelaya to continue testing the USG as to +the outer limits of how far he can go in his relationship +with the ALBA entities. END COMMENT. +FORD \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/classification/SECRET/08BOGOTA337.txt b/classification/SECRET/08BOGOTA337.txt index 06d7e6f75..8045e93a7 100644 --- a/classification/SECRET/08BOGOTA337.txt +++ b/classification/SECRET/08BOGOTA337.txt @@ -169,18 +169,7 @@ GOC asked the Cuban government their views on Chavez' call to roll back the FARC's terrorist designation, the Cubans stated that it was "a difficult proposal." -¶8. (S) Uribe saw mixed loyalties among other Latin American -countries. Only Nicaragua had supported Chavez' FARC -proposal. Argentina remains difficult, since Venezuela -bought Argentine bonds and Chavez made campaign contributions -to the new President. Paraguay, in the midst of an election -cycle, is uncertain though the front-runner supports Chavez. -Uruguay, a possible ally, is sitting on the fence. Brazil -remains friendly with Colombia, but prefers neutrality lest -it offend anyone. In Peru, President Alan Garcia concurs - -with the United States and would follow its lead. Chile -remains a good friend to Colombia and its cause. +¶8. (S) Uribe saw mixed loyalties among other Latin American countries. Only Nicaragua had supported Chavez' FARC proposal. Argentina remains difficult, since Venezuela bought Argentine bonds and Chavez made campaign contributions to the new President. Paraguay, in the midst of an election cycle, is uncertain though the front-runner supports Chavez. Uruguay, a possible ally, is sitting on the fence. Brazil remains friendly with Colombia, but prefers neutrality lest it offend anyone. In Peru, President Alan Garcia concurs with the United States and would follow its lead. Chile remains a good friend to Colombia and its cause. ----------------- Hostages and HVTs diff --git a/classification/SECRET/08KUALALUMPUR1114.txt b/classification/SECRET/08KUALALUMPUR1114.txt new file mode 100644 index 000000000..d69d04147 --- /dev/null +++ b/classification/SECRET/08KUALALUMPUR1114.txt @@ -0,0 +1,298 @@ +08KUALALUMPUR1114 +PRESSURE MOUNTS AGAINST INTERNAL SECURITY ACT (ISA) +Tue Dec 23 00:00:00 +0100 2008 +SECRET +Embassy Kuala Lumpur +VZCZCXRO3142 +OO RUEHCHI RUEHDT RUEHHM RUEHNH +DE RUEHKL #1114/01 3580721 +ZNY SSSSS ZZH +O 230721Z DEC 08 +FM AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR +TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2163 +INFO RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE +RUCNASE/ASEAN MEMBER COLLECTIVE PRIORITY +RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0552 +RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 2711 +RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY +RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI PRIORITY +RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITYS E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 KUALA LUMPUR 001114 + +SIPDIS + +E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/19/2028 +TAGS: PTER PGOV PHUM KJUS KDEM +SUBJECT: PRESSURE MOUNTS AGAINST INTERNAL SECURITY ACT (ISA) + +REF: A. KUALA LUMPUR 1026 - DPM NAJIB DISCUSSES ISA + ¶B. KUALA LUMPUR 990 - RAJA PETRA RELEASED + ¶C. KUALA LUMPUR 944 - MCA AND GERAKAN CRITICIZE UMNO + ¶D. KUALA LUMPUR 846 - UPDATE ON RAJA PETRA + ¶E. KUALA LUMPUR 834 - KOK RELEASED FROM ISA + ¶F. KUALA LUMPUR 810 - UPROAR OVER ISA + ¶G. KUALA LUMPUR 806 - JOURNALIST DETAINED UNDER ISA + ¶H. 07 KUALA LUMPUR 902 - BEYOND ISA + +Classified By: Political Counselor Mark D. Clark, reason 1.4 (b, c and +d). + +NOTE: THIS CABLE TRANSMITS AN EDITED VERSION OF KUALA LUMPUR +1102 SENT ON 12/18/08 IN MORE RESTRICTED CHANNELS. END NOTE. + + +¶1. (S) Summary: The Malaysian government's use of the +Internal Security Act (ISA), which allows for detention +without trial and is central to the GOM's intelligence-driven +CT effort, has come under increasing political pressure over +the past three months. The GOM's employment of the ISA in +September to carry out three politically-motivated ISA +detentions unrelated to terrorism sparked unprecedented +public criticism. At least eight component parties from the +governing National Front (BN) coalition have since broken +ranks with the leading United Malays National Organization +(UMNO) and called for amending or abolishing the ISA. The +opposition party alliance led by Anwar Ibrahim has made the +revocation of ISA one of its highest profile policy goals. +In November, a High Court judge delivered a legal blow to the +GOM's wide discretion in using the ISA in a ruling that freed +blogger Raja Petra, and the GOM is appealing the decision. +Prime Minister Abdullah, his deputy and successor Najib and +Home Minister Syed Hamid have defended the ISA as essential +to national security, while Najib told the Ambassador +privately ISA should be retained but used more judiciously. +The GOM released 17 ISA detainees, among them 10 previously +linked to terrorist groups, including Yazid Sufaat, from +November 5 to December 4. + +¶2. (S) Comment: The ISA is the cornerstone of Malaysia's CT +effort and has allowed Special Branch to take successful +preemptive action against suspected terrorists and their +supporters. Given the GOM's exclusive reliance on the ISA +"crutch" and on Special Branch's role, police and prosecutors +remain ill-prepared to investigate and bring to trial +terrorist suspects (or prosecute other complex criminal +conspiracies). The ISA also is subject to misuse for +political ends and is an important insurance policy for +maintaining UMNO in power. For both CT and political +reasons, the GOM will not readily give up the ISA. We doubt +that the increased political pressure and seeming swing in +public opinion against the ISA, due in part to its misuse in +September, will result in the ISA's amendment or revocation +in the near future, absent the Opposition coming to power. +These developments, however, reinforce the conclusion (ref H) +that Malaysia cannot take for granted the availability of the +ISA as a CT tool in the long run. It remains in the U.S. +interest to encourage and assist Malaysia to develop an +approach centered on prosecutions and convictions before an +independent judiciary to combat terrorism. + +¶3. (C) Comment continued: It is unclear to what extent +outside political pressures played a direct role in the GOM's +latest release of ISA detainees. The decisions may have more +to do with Syed Hamid's personal exercise of authority as +Home Minister. Syed Hamid has taken a more proactive role as +Home Minister, compared to PM Abdullah who held the position +through March 2008 and tended not to become involved in +details. End Summary and Comment. + +¶4. (C) The Malaysian government's use of the Internal +Security Act (ISA), central to the GOM's intelligence-driven +counterterrorism efforts, has come under increasing political +pressure since the September ISA arrests of three persons +based on political rather security considerations. The +September 12 ISA detentions of an ethnic Chinese journalist, +an ethnic Chinese Opposition MP (Teresa Kok), and a prominent +blogger (Raja Petra Kamaruddin) served the ruling UMNO +party's immediate political purpose of sending a warning to +opposition politicians and those considering defecting from +BN, as some UMNO politicians have told us. This came at a +time when Anwar Ibrahim was publicly threatening to bring +down the BN government via parliamentary crossovers by +September 16. The arrests, however, also sparked +unprecedented public criticism of the ISA, including from +UMNO's ethnic minority partners within BN. The Malaysian +Chinese Association (MCA), the key ethnic Chinese BN +component party, reportedly threatened to leave BN unless the +GOM released the Chinese journalist; the GOM complied within +less than 24 hours (ref F). Authorities freed MP Teresa Kok +after seven days. Home Minister Syed Hamid ordered a +two-year ISA detention period for Raja Petra, who was freed +on appeal in November in a surprise court ruling (see below). + +¶5. (C) Comment: Unlike his predecessor Mahathir, PM +Abdullah refrained from using the ISA for political purposes +until December 2007 when police detained five leaders of the +ethnic Indian activist group HINDRAF that organized large +street protests. The public viewed the GOM's September 2008 +ISA arrests as more transparently political, in part because +of the lack of public order concerns. End Comment. + +¶6. (C) Political pressure against the ISA did not dissipate +following the release of the first two of the three recent +ISA detainees. At least eight component parties from the +governing BN coalition of 14 parties have since broken ranks +with UMNO and called for amending or reviewing the grounds +for the ISA, while several have supported the law's +abolition. In late September MCA, BN's second largest party, +called for "a comprehensive review of the ISA so that it will +apply strictly to cases relating to terrorism and subversive +elements," and also argued for the introduction of "checks +and balances in the use of ISA." The leader of the Gerakan +party, Koh Tsu Koon, called on the GOM to "abolish the ISA +once and for all," and rely on the judicial system instead. +The leader of the Peoples Progressive Party (PPP) also +initially called for ISA to be abolished, and on December 1 +said PPP would withdraw from BN unless if the ISA were not +amended before the next election. In response, Prime +Minister Abdullah called PPP's bluff and said the small +party, which holds no seats in Parliament, could leave BN if +it wished. BN MPs so far have not backed up their criticism +of ISA with action. In response to a petition circulated in +Parliament for the review or repeal of ISA, only one BN MP +signed his name. + +¶7. (C) The opposition party alliance (Pakatan Rakyat, or +Pakatan) led by Anwar Ibrahim has vocally condemned ISA as +undemocratic and unjust, and made the abolishment of ISA one +of its highest profile policy goals. A number of senior +officials from Pakatan's three parties, Anwar's Peoples +Justice Party (PKR), the Democratic Action Party (DAP), and +the Islamic Party of Malaysia (PAS) were detained under ISA +during the era of former Prime Minister Mahathir. Not +surprisingly, the three parties have vowed to revoke ISA if +they come to power. "Abolish ISA" was the most prominent +theme at PKR's annual party conference on November 29, which +Polcouns observed. The keynote event concluded with a focus +on ISA and featured large screens that scrolled through the +list of all 60-plus ISA detainees with the several thousand +attendees reciting the detainees' names as they appeared. +Well-known blogger Raja Petra, released from ISA detention +only days before, mounted the stage as the surprise guest of +the grand finale. + +¶8. (SBU) On November 7, a High Court judge delivered an +unanticipated legal blow to the GOM's wide discretion in +using the ISA in a habeas corpus ruling that freed blogger +Raja Petra. The Embassy obtained the full text of the +judge's 22-page ruling. ISA Section 8.B states "there shall +be no judicial review in any court" of the Home Minister's +exercise of "discretionary powers in accordance with this +Act," except for compliance with procedural requirements. +The judge ruled, however, that the Home Minister decisions +could not be "unfettered and arbitrary," allowing for the +court to consider whether the Minister's ISA detention order +was "in accordance with the Act," and its focus on threats to +national security, including the national economy; threats to +maintenance of essential services; and threats to the public +emanating from a "substantial body of persons" who intend to +change the government through unlawful means. In the case of +Raja Petra, the judge concluded that the grounds for his +detention did not fall within the purview of the ISA. The +government has appealed the ruling and as of mid-December the +appeal remains pending. + +¶9. (C) Many civil society groups took the opportunity over +the past three months to highlight their standing opposition +to the ISA, as well as other emergency ordinances that allow +for detention without trial. Both conservative and liberal +Muslim NGOs called on the GOM to abolish the ISA, as did the +inter-faith Consultative Forum that groups the leaders of all +major religions except Islam. The National Human Rights +Commission (SUHAKAM) chairman Abu Talib restated the +commission's existing position, namely "detention without +trial is against human rights principles; that's why we +advised the Government years ago to repeal the ISA." + +¶10. (C) As questions over the ISA have mounted, Prime +Minister Abdullah, his deputy and successor Najib, and other +senior UMNO leaders defended the ISA as essential to national +security. In the wake of public criticism over the September +ISA arrests, Home Minister Syed Hamid, who has authority +under the ISA to approve detention orders, defended the Act +as essential and stated clearly that "we have no plans to do +away with ISA." In early December, Syed Hamid waved off +criticisms, arguing that the ISA "has never been abused or +used for politics." He also commented that, "Malaysians +sometimes don't know how lucky we are in that we have not +experienced what is happening in Mumbai (the terrorist +attack) and Bangkok (political unrest) now." He said the +fact that there have been no post 9/11 terrors attacks in +Malaysia was in part due to the ISA. On December 15, Syed +Hamid again publicly defended use of the ISA, stating, "More +apt, faster and better to use the ISA... detention under the +act is early action to prevent the security of the country +from being adversely affected." + +¶11. (C) DPM Najib, who is anticipated to become Prime +Minister in late March 2009, told the Ambassador privately on +November 11 that the government continued to need the ISA, +"even though there are civil liberty concerns," but should +reserve ISA only for those who pose "serious threats, like +terrorists" (ref A). On December 8, PM Abdullah publicly +rejected calls for amendments to the ISA. + +¶12. (SBU) In early December, local and international press +reported that the GOM had released 17 ISA detainees from +November 5 through December 4. Of those released, 10 had +been held for suspected links to Al Qaeda, Jemaah Islamiyah, +and/or the Darul Islam terrorist groups. The released +terrorist suspects included Yazid Sufaat, who played an +important role in Al Qaeda's anthrax development program, +according to the 9/11 Commission. The remaining seven +persons released consisted of suspected foreign agents (2 +persons), southern Thailand separatists (2), document forgers +(2), and prominent blogger Raja Petra, according to an NGO +that consistently and accurately monitors ISA detentions. +In his public remarks, Syed Hamid said those recently +released ISA detainees had been rehabilitated and no longer +posed a security threat to Malaysia. + +¶13. (S) Note: Authorities had detained the terrorist +suspects for periods between two and (in the case of Yazid +Sufaat) seven years, for an average detention period of four +years for the ten individuals. Special Branch relies on a +process for rehabilitating ISA detainees, and eventually +releasing them under restricted and monitored conditions when +judged necessary. The GOM has never attempted to prosecute +any terrorist suspects, including those held under the ISA. +This is due in large part to the fact that the GOM pursues +almost exclusively an intelligence approach to CT, as opposed +to a law enforcement approach that would involve criminal +investigations, collection of legally admissible evidence, +and development of cases for prosecution in the courts. In +2007, Malaysia amended anti-terrorism provisions in its penal +code and criminal procedures code, but authorities have not +yet utilized these provisions. Malaysia also has a poor +track record of prosecuting other complex criminal +conspiracies, including drug trafficking cases, preferring +instead to utilize the ISA and other emergency ordinances to +detain suspects without trial. End Note. + +¶14. (S) A well-known journalist contacted us in early +December and said that officers of the Police Special Branch +had complained to him that Home Minister Syed Hamid had +ordered the recent releases of terrorist suspects without +adequate consultation and in some cases against the +recommendation of Special Branch. Australian and British +diplomats, speaking with Polcouns December 16, stated that +Syed Hamid, who is a lawyer by training, personally reviewed +the dossiers of ISA detainees and was inclined to approve +releases absent compelling justification from the Special +Branch. + +¶15. (C) The Thai embassy contacted Poloff on December 15 to +express concern over the release of two ISA detainees (Abdul +Rahman bin Ahmad and Mat Tarmizi bin Shamsudin, who +apparently are dual-citizens of Malaysia and Thailand) who +had been held for their connection to the insurgency in +southern Thailand. The Thai diplomat said Bangkok considered +Abdul Rahman in particular to be a major player in the +insurgency. He noted that those released are required to +remain in Malaysia and check in periodically with the police. + The Thai diplomat said he believed the GOM released the +detainees in order to diffuse criticism of the ISA. We +learned that the Thai embassy also has contacted other +Western embassies (UK, France, Australia) to express concern +over the recent ISA releases. + +KEITH \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/dates/2003/08/03ROME3567.txt b/dates/2003/08/03ROME3567.txt new file mode 100644 index 000000000..752f6a6f9 --- /dev/null +++ b/dates/2003/08/03ROME3567.txt @@ -0,0 +1,311 @@ +03ROME3567 +GALILEO: AMBASSADOR ARAGONA ADVOCATES ADDITIONAL +Wed Aug 06 00:00:00 +0200 2003 +CONFIDENTIAL +Embassy Rome +This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.C O N F I D E N T I A L ROME 003567 + +SIPDIS + + +STATE FOR OES/SAT (BRAIBANTI, KARNER) +DEFENSE FOR OASD/NII (STENBIT MANNO WORMSER SWIDER CHESKY) +DEFENSE ALSO FOR OSD/P (TOWNSEND, NOVAK) +JOINT STAFF FOR J5/J6 + +E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/06/2013 +T... + +SUBJECT: GALILEO: AMBASSADOR ARAGONA ADVOCATES ADDITIONAL +TECHNICAL TALKS TO RESOLVE M-CODE OVERLAY ISSUE + +REF: USNATO 00777 + +Classified By: A/ECMIN David W. Mulenex; reasons 1.5 B and D. + +¶1. (C) Summary: Italian MFA Political Director Gianfranco +Aragona informed a U.S. delegation on July 16 that he still +believes technical solutions exist to the U.S.-EU dispute +over the Galileo Public Regulated Service (PRS) signal +overlay of the M-code. Aragona recognized US security +concerns regarding the overlay, but repeatedly insisted the +EU must safeguard the "Integrity and operability" of Galileo. + The U.S. delegation insisted that an overlay would harm U.S. +and NATO NAVWAR capabilities and put lives at risk in the +event of warfare. Aragona did not completely reject the +delegation's point that a political solution was necessary to +avoid this outcome but made it clear he does not believe the +dispute is ripe for high level political intervention. +Aragona did agree that the delegation's suggestion to merge +unclassified technical talks and plenary negotiations was a +good idea and promised to convey the idea to the Commission. +Aragona stated firmly that NATO would not be an acceptable +venue for classified discussions. He suggested they could +take place at the US Mission to NATO, but insisted that he +participants must be limited to the U.S. and the EC. See +Embassy comment para 16. End Summary. + +¶2. (U) On July 16 a U.S. delegation met with Italian MFA +Political Director Gianfranco Aragona to discuss the US-EC +dispute over the Galileo Public Regulated Service (PRS) +signal overlay of the GPS M-code. The U.S. delegation was +led by Ralph Braibanti, Director, Space and Advanced +Technology, State Department Bureau of Oceans and +International Environmental and Technical Affairs and +included Mel Flack, Director, Communications Electronic +Division, US Mission to NATO; Richard McKinney, Deputy +Director Space Acquisition, US Air Force; Todd Wilson, EST +Officer, US Mission to the EU; Marja Verloop EUR/ERA; and +representatives from the political and science sections of +Embassy Rome. Those joining Aragona included Giovanni +Brauzzi, Director, Office of NATO Affairs, MFA; Sandro +Bernardin, European Correspondent, MFA; Mario Caporale, +Navigation Office, Italian Space Agency; and Umberto +Cantielli, Chief, Navigation Identification Office, Defense +General Staff, Ministry of Defense. + +U.S. Delegation Insists Political Solution is needed + +¶3. (C) Braibanti told Aragona that the U.S. believes it is +important to hold informal consultations with key EU member +States to advance U.S.-EC differences over Galileo towards a +decision. He recalled that the President raised M-Code +overlay at the last U.S.- EU Summit. In reviewing the USG +position on Galileo, Braibanti explained that the U.S. +accepts the EU satellite system as a reality, but the +security implications of having the Galileo Public Regulated +Service (PRS) overlay the GPS M-Code are unacceptable to both +the U.S. and NATO. so far, the U.S. has fought a defensive +battle with the European Commission (EC). Braibanti allowed +that some progress has been made in convincing European +officials that direct overlay of M-Code by the PRS is a bad +idea. However, consideration being given by the EC to use +BOC 2.2 for Open Service (OS) also involves a partial overlay +of M-Code, and damages navigational warfare capabilities. +The U.S. will be unable to accept this outcome. + +¶4. (C) Braibanti assured Aragona that the USG is committed +to finding a solution, but cautioned that without some +flexibility and compromise from the EC, progress will be +difficult. The U.S. has proposed several technical options +for Galileo PRS and OS that our experts believe meet all +stated technical and performance requirements for Galileo +services. Braibanti underscored that, given the EC's +timetable for making design decisions on Galileo, member +states may find that the Commission has locked in technical +solutions that threaten U.S. and NATO capabilities to conduct +navigational warfare. To avoid this eventuality, which could +put allied lives at risk, member states need to give clear +political guidance now to the EC that the Galileo signal +structure cannot undermine NAVWAR operations. + +But Aragona Puts Faith in Further Technical Talks + +¶5. (C) Aragona, signaling his reluctance to take on U.S. +concerns vis-a-vis Italy's EU partners, underscored that +Galileo negotiations had been entrusted to the EC. He +assured the U.S. team that Italy recognized the security +issues at stake. "Given our NATO membership it would be +crazy for us not to be sensitive to U.S. arguments," Aragona +declared. These concerns are shared by the EC, he claimed, +but any solution must also safeguard the "integrity and +operability of Galileo for it to be a commercially viable and +reliable system (Note: Aragona came back repeatedly +throughout the course of the consultations to this theme. End +Note). + +¶6. (C) Aragona pressed claims by EC experts that technical +negotiations could lead to a solution to both protect the +integrity and operability of Galileo and address US security +concerns. Referencing the U.S.-EU Summit, Aragona asserted +that, as an "agreement" had been reached to proceed with +technical talks, the pace of negotiations to try to reach a +"technical solution" to the overlay conundrum should be +intensified. Italy and the EC are ready to take into +account U.S. and NATO security concerns and believe that +technical solutions, which protect them, are available. + +¶7. (C) Aragona wanted to know when the U.S. would be ready +to discuss the most recent EC proposals, which he understood +included a certain "inventiveness" and were "not so stuck in +the prejudices of the past." The EC was ready to sit and +discuss a mutually agreeable technical solution. As for +political input, Aragona said once more that the Commission +is well aware that U.S. security concerns must be addressed +while taking into account the "integrity" of the Galileo +system. + +¶8. (C) Braibanti countered that, with regard to EC +technical proposals, he was aware of only two to which a +formal reply had not been given: using filtering to mitigate +the navigation warfare problems posed by overlaying BOC 2.2, +and having the U.S. change the frequency for its military GPS +signals. In the spirit of cooperation, the U.S. had not +rejected these ideas out of hand, but instead asked its +technical experts to analyze them carefully. Now that he had +seen the results of this analysis, Braibanti could say with +some certainty that it is highly unlikely that either of +these options will work. Summing up this portion of the +discussion, Braibanti framed the state of play for Aragona: +We may well reach a situation in September where we will have +analyzed the EC's proposals and decided they can not provide +a solution which protects U.S. and NATO capabilities to +conduct NAVWAR. Our concern is that if EC technical experts +continue to operate within their current frame of reference, +we will arrive at a technical impasse. To avoid this +impasse, the EC team needs clear political direction from +member States that they should focus on options that do not +negatively impact NAVWAR. (Note: on the margins of the +meeting, Braibanti told Aragona that the USG worries the EC +negotiators may be positioning themselves to argue to the EU +member states that they had made a good faith effort to reach +a compromise, but the U.S. would not meet them halfway, so +Galileo must move ahead without an agreement to cooperate +with the U.S. Aragona discounted this possibility, +suggesting that the EC recognizes the need for Galileo-GPS +interoperability. (End Note) + +NATO a Non-Starter for Classified Talks + +¶9. (C) Aragona said the U.S. and EU face a practical +problem over where to hold classified discussions and that +this problem should be easily resolvable. Italy expects the +U.S. to provide a formal answer to the letter EC negotiator +Heinz Hillbrecht sent to Braibanti on July 2 (reftel). +Aragona maintained that the EC wants further discussions in a +classified setting, but that setting can not be NATO. He +underscored this point in uncharacteristically blunt +language. Aragona said holding the talks at the US Mission +to NATO was perfectly acceptable as long as they were U.S.-EC +rather than NATO-EC discussions. The issue under discussion +is between the U.S. and the EC, Aragona argued, and, +moreover, there are several non-EU members of NATO. +Braibanti took Aragona's points and assured him that the USG +was considering the issue of additional classified +discussions, including the modalities for such meetings. + +Some Agreement on Procedure, but.... + +¶10. (C) Braibanti, moving the discussion to how and when to +hold the next plenary negotiating session, said the U.S. will +work with the Commission on dates for a September meeting to +review technical and trade issues He suggested folding the +technical discussions into the plenary negotiating session. +This could help to ensure transparency and avoid +misunderstanding among the political negotiators about the +available technical options. Aragona acknowledged that +Braibanti's idea had merit and committed to "see what could +be done" to make a political recommendation to the EC to +proceed along these lines. + +Still Talking Past Each Other on substance + +¶11. (C) The U.S. delegation raised concerns that France +might be driving the EC toward a decision counter to the +interests of other EU member states, the U.S. and NATO. Mel +Flack said it was difficult not to arrive at the conclusion +that France was interested in an M-Code overlay so it could +guarantee reliability for precision guided weaponry it might +seek to sell to third countries. + +¶12. (C) "I have objected to Europeans who say that U.S. +actions demonstrate an intent to undermine Galileo," Aragona +told the delegation. "Likewise," he said, "I do not believe +that there is any maliciousness on the part of a particular +country or the EC." Above all, he maintained, Galileo is a +commercial undertaking; the system's signal structure was +selected according to well established criteria based on the +belief that it provided the most robust, reliable service. +"I accept your arguments about the need to jam adversaries in +a NAVWAR context," he said, but the U.S. "needs to keep in +mind that Galileo service must be sold. The problem of +selective jamming is not just political; commercial aspects +are also involved." When Aragona stated it would not be +acceptable to expect the EU to settle for alternate, less +robust, signals, Braibanti countered it would be unacceptable +for the U.S. and its allies to risk the lives of soldiers in +order to allow the EU to have more robust signals for +Galileo. + +¶13. (C) Aragona acknowledged the point in passing, but +moved quickly to close and summarize the conversation. He +suggested the next step would be to find a suitable venue to +hold classified discussions. He claimed there is flexibility +and that the EU is aware of the need for a solution amenable +to both sides. Braibanti emphasized that after the September +discussions the USG would like to hold another set of +bilateral consultations with Italy. Aragona was +noncommittal, offering to share thoughts after the September +plenary session and then decide on a way forward. In terms +of U.S.-Italian engagement, he said he hoped that discussions +would not lead to the "extreme" situation in which the U.S. +and EU would be negotiating on exclusively U.S. terms, by +which he meant asking the EU to accept moving PRS to another +frequency band and to only then negotiate a solution. He +noted in closing that Italy had its own technological and +industrial interests to defend. + +Better Signals, Less Political Clout from Other GOI Ministries + +¶14. (C) Braibanti, Flack and EST Couns met with Vice +Minister for Research Guido Possa on July 15. Possa is +responsible for the Italian Space Agency and through it for +Italian participation in ESA. After a brief explanation of +the overlay problem and its implications for NAVWAR, Possa +immediately understood that a political, and not a technical +approach was needed to resolve outstanding problems. Possa +suggested that the U.S. should work closely with the Germans, +and in Italy with Minister of Defense Martino, whose +commitment to NATO and to close cooperation with the U.S. +were well known. On the margins of a July 28 +representational event, ESTCOUNS and A/POLMINCOUNS raised +briefly the overlay problem with MINDEF Martino. Martino +said that, from his point of view, Galileo was unnecessary +and a huge waste of money -- one GPS system was enough. He +was unaware that the USG now supported Galileo in principle. +Martino was sensitive to our arguments on the security +implications of the overlay, but observed that he was +perceived within the GOI as too pro-American to be of much +assistance. He suggested that the Embassy's best bet for +moving the GOI closer to the USG position would be to +approach U/S to the PM Gianni Letta, who, we note, is PM +Berlusconi's closest political advisor. + +¶15. (C) ESTCOUNS, ECONCOUNS, AND USEU ECONCOUNS met July 18 +with Ministry of Transport Diplomatic Advisor Maraini to +discuss the Aragona meetings and to seek the perspective of +the Ministry on the decisions to be taken concerning Galileo +at the December Transport Council. Maraini told us that he +believed that Galileo was now principally a political +problem, and a problem beyond the competency of the Transport +Ministry and Transport Council. In a candid appraisal of +Hillbrecht-whom Maraini admitted he did not know well--the +Diplomatic Advisor said that the decision to be taken was +beyond the competency of Hillbrecht's technical committee. +Maraini understood and agreed with our assessment that very +little time and scope remained for technical solutions, and +that an impasse requiring a major political decision by the +EU was likely. Maraini is worried about the outcome. He +undertook to prepare a note for Minister Lunardi to be sent +to the Prive Minister before the PM's departure for Crawford. + +¶16. (C) Embassy Comment: The U.S. delegation made the trip +to Rome to follow up on indications from Aragona, made during +his recent trip to Washington, that he may have been willing +to carry some water for us with the EC and member states. We +were left with the impression that Italy's PolDir had instead +decided to keep his EU hat firmly in place and stick to the +script of the EC briefing book on Galileo. Despite +understanding within the functional ministries of the GOI, +peeling Aragona, the MFA, and Italy away from the EC position +will be difficult, judging from Aragona's assessment that +"technical solutions" still offer a way forward. He threw us +a quarter of a bone by offering to help give political top +cover to the expert level technical discussions. However, +Aragona's implicit insistence that Galileo's commercial +viability may depend on at least a partial M-Code overlay to +"guarantee" service is troubling for its resemblance to +French arguments. + +¶17. (U) This message has been cleared by OES/SAT Braibanti. +Sembler \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/dates/2003/10/03ROME4746.txt b/dates/2003/10/03ROME4746.txt new file mode 100644 index 000000000..32edd5540 --- /dev/null +++ b/dates/2003/10/03ROME4746.txt @@ -0,0 +1,74 @@ +03ROME4746 +GALILEO/M-CODE: INCREASED HIGH-LEVEL ITALIAN +Fri Oct 17 00:00:00 +0200 2003 +CONFIDENTIAL +Embassy Rome +This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.C O N F I D E N T I A L ROME 004746 + +SIPDIS + +E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/09/2013 +TAGS: ECPS ETRD IT TSPA TSPL PREL EUN + +SUBJECT: GALILEO/M-CODE: INCREASED HIGH-LEVEL ITALIAN +ATTENTION -- BUT NO ANSWERS + + CLASSIFIED BY: AMBASSADOR MEL SEMBLER FOR REASONS 1.5 (B)(D) + +¶1. (C) AT THE END OF AN OCTOBER 9 MEETING ON ANOTHER SUBJECT +WITH PM BERLUSCONI'S CLOSEST ADVISOR, PRIME MINISTRY +UNDERSECRETARY GIANNI LETTA, AMBASSADOR SEMBLER TOOK THE +OPPORTUNITY TO EXPRESS THE USG'S CONTINUED GREAT CONCERN OVER +LACK OF PROGRESS ON RESOLVING THE GALILEO/M-CODE OVERLAY +DISAGREEMENT WITH THE EU. THE AMBASSADOR TOLD LETTA BLUNTLY +THAT THE DISPUTE RISKS BECOMING A TRAIN WRECK ON ITALY'S EU +WATCH UNLESS MORE CONCERTED POLITICAL-LEVEL ATTENTION IS +GIVEN TO THE ISSUE. THE USG FELT THAT THAT AMERICAN +TECHNICAL EXPERTS HAD PROVIDED COMMISSION EXPERTS WITH +EXHAUSTIVE CLASSIFIED TECHNICAL BRIEFINGS, WHICH HAD +DEMONSTRATED PERSUASIVELY THAT NON-OVERLAY SPECTRAL OPTIONS +EXIST, WHICH WILL NOT DEGRADE GALILEO CAPABILITIES. +NEVERTHELESS, THE COMMISSION AND EU GOVERNMENTS HAVE BEEN +UNWILLING TO TAKE THE POLITICAL STEP TO DRAW THE OBVIOUS +CONCLUSIONS FROM THE TECHNICAL DISCUSSIONS. + +¶2. (C) LETTA RESPONDED THAT SENIOR LEVELS OF THE ITALIAN +GOVERNMENT WERE IN FACT PAYING CLOSE ATTENTION TO GALILEO. +IN THE PRIME MINISTRY, DIPLOMATIC ADVISOR GIOVANNI +CASTELANETTA HAD BEEN BRIEFING PM BERLUSCONI REGULARLY. +LETTA ALSO NOTED THAT DURING CABINET MEETINGS DEFENSE +MINISTER MARTINO HAD SPOKEN OPENLY IN SUPPORT OF THE U.S. +POSITION. NEVERTHELESS, LETTA OFFERED NO CLEAR INDICATION OF +WHAT FURTHER ACTIONS, IF ANY, THE GOI PLANNED TO TAKE WITHIN +THE EU. + +¶3. (C) IN A SEPARATE MEETING OCTOBER 14 WITH ECMIN, AGAIN ON +ANOTHER SUBJECT, GENERAL LEONARDO TRICARICO (THE PRIME + MINISTER'S MILITARY AND SECURITY ADVISOR) TOOK THE INITIATIVE +TO RAISE THE MATTER OF GALILEO. ECMIN REVIEWED USG CONCERNS +FOR TRICARICO, AS WELL AS THE AMBASSADOR'S EXCHANGE WITH +LETTA. ALTHOUGH HE ASKED SEVERAL QUESTIONS ABOUT THE RECENT +MEETINGS IN LONDON AND WASHINGTON, AND WAS CLEARLY ANXIOUS +ABOUT THE LACK OF FORWARD MOVEMENT IN U.S.-EU DISCUSSIONS, +TRICARICO WAS AT A LOSS TO SUGGEST WHAT ACTIONS ITALY SHOULD +OR COULD TAKE. + +¶4. (C) COMMENT: LETTA'S ACCOUNT OF THE HIGH-LEVEL ATTENTION +ITALIAN MINISTERS -- INCLUDING THE PM -- ARE GIVING THE +GALILEO/M-CODE DISPUTE IS WELCOME NEWS. REPORTS OF DEFMIN +MARTINO'S UNAMBIGUOUS SUPPORT FOR THE U.S. POSITION IS +WELCOME, AND CONFIRMS WHAT HE HAS TOLD US. (BUT MARTINO HAS +ALSO BEEN QUICK TO POINT OUT THAT HE NEEDS KEY ALLIES, SUCH +AS LETTA, IN ORDER TO SUCCEED IN THE INTERMINISTERIAL +PROCESS.) NEVERTHELESS, THERE IS LITTLE INDICATION THAT THE +GOI HAS ANY GAME PLAN ON HOW TO PREVENT THE WRONG OUTCOME AT +THE IMPORTANT DECEMBER MEETING OF EU TRANSPORT MINISTERS. +EMBASSY STANDS READY TO CONTINUE TO ENGAGE THE GOI AT THE +HIGHEST LEVELS ON GALILEO AS WASHINGTON AGENCIES WORK OUT THE +NEXT STEPS IN OUR STRATEGY. END COMMENT. +SEMBLER + +NNNN + 2003ROME04746 - Classification: CONFIDENTIAL + +" \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/dates/2006/05/06MONTEVIDEO418.txt b/dates/2006/05/06MONTEVIDEO418.txt new file mode 100644 index 000000000..046eba92d --- /dev/null +++ b/dates/2006/05/06MONTEVIDEO418.txt @@ -0,0 +1,145 @@ +06MONTEVIDEO418 +VAZQUEZ LOBBIES HARD FOR TRADE TALKS WITH U.S. WORKING GROUPS FORMED +Thu May 11 00:00:00 +0200 2006 +CONFIDENTIAL +Embassy Montevideo +VZCZCXYZ0000 +RR RUEHWEB + +DE RUEHMN #0418/01 1311501 +ZNY CCCCC ZZH +R 111501Z MAY 06 +FM AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO +TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5754 +INFO RUCNMER/MERCOSUR COLLECTIVE +RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ MAY SANTIAGO 2848 +RUMIAAA/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL +RUEHC/DEPT OF AGRICULTURE WASHDC +RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC +RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC +RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC,C O N F I D E N T I A L MONTEVIDEO 000418 + +SIPDIS + +SIPDIS + +DEPT FOR WHA/AS SHANNON AND EB/AS WAYNE +DEPT ALSO FOR WHA/BSC FOR BARNES, CROFT AND MURRAY +DEPT PLEASE PASS USTR +TREASURY FOR OASIA FOR DOUGLAS +COMMERCE FOR ITA/MAC BASTIAN +NSC FOR FISK AND CRONIN +SOUTHCOM FOR POLAD + +E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/10/2016 +TAGS: ETRD ECON PREL UY +SUBJECT: VAZQUEZ LOBBIES HARD FOR TRADE TALKS WITH U.S. WORKING GROUPS FORMED + + +Classified By: Charge d'Affaires James D. Nealon +for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). + +¶1. (C) Summary: President Vazquez appears to have wasted no +time in pushing his trade agenda. At the May 8 Cabinet +meeting, he recounted the results of his ten-day trip to the +U.S. and Mexico, and of his meeting with POTUS on May 4. He +advocated for expanded trade talks with the U.S., which he +said could eventually lead to a Free Trade Agreement (FTA). +His Cabinet strongly supported Vazquez in this endeavor, with +11 ministers in favor and only two against (ForMin Gargano +and Communist Minister for Social Development Arismendi). +Charge met on May 10 with Industry Minister Lepra, who had +accompanied Vazquez on the trip, to get a first-hand account +of the GOU's next steps. Lepra confirmed the overwhelming +Cabinet support and requested that we provide some +information on specific benefits of trade agreements for +public consumption. He confirmed that the GOU was looking at +its FTA with Mexico as a model to start talks (Note: Post is +translating this agreement for USTR. End Note.) He added +that he would lead a committee of five ministers to oversee +the trade talks, and he provided the names of the members of +the technical negotiating team. When reminded of the +importance of a clear leader to head this technical team, +Lepra immediately picked up the phone to call Economy +Minister Astori. After the conversation with Astori, he told +Charge that they had decided upon EconMin Director of Trade +Sarachaga as the team leader. This would be confirmed after +discussing the issue with Vazquez at the next Cabinet meeting +on May 15. It appears that Vazquez and his economic team +have found more support for an FTA than they may have thought +possible so early after their return and are capitalizing on +the momentum. End Summary. + +¶2. (C) On Monday May 8, shortly after his return, President +Vazquez called a Cabinet meeting to inform his ministers +about his ten-day trip to the U.S. and Mexico. Vazquez is +reported to have explained his vision of an increased trade +relationship with the U.S., leading to a possible FTA by +October. According to Vice-President Novoa and Industry +Minister Lepra, 11 out of 13 ministers expressed their +support for Vazquez's vision, with only Foreign Minister +Gargano (Socialist) and Social Development Minister Arismendi +(Communist) dissenting. According to the reports, Astori led +a strong, well-founded defense of the advantages of an FTA, +while Gargano threatened to resign if an FTA was ever signed +with the U.S. It appears that the level of support that +Vazquez garnered in this first Cabinet meeting was stronger +than expected. On the public front, the left-leaning daily +La Republica was unusually supportive, with overall favorable +reporting under a headline claiming that "The Government +pressed on the accelerator to make good on commercial +agreement with the U.S." A poll conducted by El Pais +indicated a strong majority of public support for a trade +agreement with the U.S. + +¶3. (C) Charge met on May 10 with Industry Minister Lepra to +get a better understanding of the GOU's plans and to +coordinate actions. Lepra was very upbeat about the trip and +about the prospects for an FTA. He relished in the increased +isolation in which ForMin Gargano was finding himself. Lepra +and Charge agreed to coordinate public stance regarding the +ongoing negotiations, to ensure that the Embassy not move +ahead of President Vazquez. Lepra confirmed that the model +FTA that the GOU favored was the Uruguay-Mexico FTA, ""for +political reasons"". This agreement was supported by the +entire political spectrum, he explained, and by Uruguay's +Mercosur partners. In addition, Lepra noted that the +Uruguay-Mexico FTA, signed in 2004, is a third-generation +agreement based on an improved NAFTA model. Charge confirmed +that post was in the process of translating this document so +that USTR may compare it with our latest FTA. Lepra then +requested our assistance in providing him with information +about our FTA with Vietnam, not because it is a particularly +good FTA, he noted, but rather to counter opposition from the +Communist Party. "If Communist Vietnam, after fighting a +brutal war against the U.S., can turn around and sign an +FTA," he explained, "how can our Communists be against it?" +Lepra also requested information on job creation, investment +and poverty reduction brought about by FTAs, again for the +GOU's campaign to build up public support. Charge pledged to +provide the information. Post would appreciate any and all +such information to be shared with the GOU. + +¶4. (C) Lepra said he would lead a political committee of five +ministers (Industry, Economy, Agriculture, Foreign Affairs +and Tourism), responsible for the trade talks. He also had a +technical negotiating team in mind, but was still unclear as +to who would lead this team. Charge noted the importance of +a solid negotiating team, with clear lines of authority, +given the short time frame in which negotiations were to be +conducted. Lepra immediately picked up the phone to call +EconMin Astori, with whom he agreed to have EconMin Trade +Director Sarachaga lead the negotiating team. He and Astori +would confirm their choice after the next Cabinet meeting on +May 15, he said. + +¶5. (C) Comment: Clearly, Vazquez has returned from the U.S. +in a strengthened position to initiate trade talks and is +making the best out of the momentum he has encountered. The +GOU appears to be keenly aware of the tight timeframe to +negotiate an agreement and determined to make the most of +this opportunity. Embassy will continue to be the +interagency coordinator" for the GOU to ensure that no time +is lost due to lack of focus on organizational details. End +Comment. +Nealon \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/dates/2007/07/07TEGUCIGALPA1247.txt b/dates/2007/07/07TEGUCIGALPA1247.txt new file mode 100644 index 000000000..41978ec3b --- /dev/null +++ b/dates/2007/07/07TEGUCIGALPA1247.txt @@ -0,0 +1,169 @@ +07TEGUCIGALPA1247 +SELECTION OF NEW HONDURAN AMBASSADOR TO THE UN RAISES VISA ISSUES +Thu Jul 19 00:00:00 +0200 2007 +SECRET +Embassy Tegucigalpa +VZCZCXYZ0005 +PP RUEHWEB + +DE RUEHTG #1247/01 1982131 +ZNY SSSSS ZZH (CCY DTG ADX:00E6E7BA MSI6833 614) +P 192131Z JUL 07 +FM AMEMBASSY TEGUCIGALPA +TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6422 +INFO RUEAHLC/HOMELAND SECURITY CENTER WASHDC PRIORITY +RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY +RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0153S E C R E T TEGUCIGALPA 001247 + +SIPDIS + +C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (DTG CHANGED FROM 7/17 TO 7/19) + +SIPDIS + +STATE FOR D, WHA/CEN, CA/VO/L/C AND CA/VO/L/A +NSC FOR DAN FISK +E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/19/2017 +TAGS: CVIS PGOV PREL HO +SUBJECT: SELECTION OF NEW HONDURAN AMBASSADOR TO THE UN RAISES VISA ISSUES + +REF: STATE 98124 + +Classified By: AMB. CHARLES FORD. REASONS 1.4(B) AND (D). + +¶1. (C) SUMMARY. Jorge Arturo Reina, the current Minister of Government and Justice, was nominated by President Zelaya to represent Honduras as the ambassador to the United Nations. To assume his duties at the United Nations, Reina will need a G-1 visa to travel to the United States. To obtain that visa, he must first undergo a Security Advisory Opinion for an OO hit, and Advisory Opinion for an NCIII hit and apply for a waiver as he is currently ineligible for a visa under section 212(a)(3)(B) for past terrorist activities. Reina has a long history of involvement with Communist-inspired revolutionary groups and anti-American activities. Although he may have left his radical student days behind, his family is involved in the sale of passports and human smuggling of Chinese immigrants. Zelaya's naming of Reina to the United Nations, knowing Reina's history and that his previous visa was revoked, appears to be designed as a sign of his independence from the United States. Given the serious nature of Reina's past activities, any request for a waiver must be thoroughly reviewed. END SUMMARY. + +¶2. (U) President Zelaya selected his current Minister of +Government and Justice, Jorge Arturo Reina (Reina), as the +new Honduran ambassador to the United Nations on July 18, +replacing Ivan Romero Martinez. Zelaya picked Reina as his +new U.N. Ambassador despite knowing, along with the rest of +the Honduran public, that Reina's previous U.S. visa was +revoked. Zelaya stated that this nomination was a "protest +for Honduran sovereignty" and that Reina's previous visa +problems should have no effect on Reina's ability to +represent Honduras before the United Nations as the U.S. must +issue a visa to each member's representative. Zelaya also +stated that during his visit with Secretary Rice on July 10, +he notified her of the impending nomination and that the +Secretary did not raise any objections. With the appointment, +it is expected that the GOH will apply for a waiver and an +eventual G-1 visa on behalf of Reina to allow him to travel +to the United Nations in New York City. + +---------------------- +Reina's Visa Problem +---------------------- + +¶3. (C) Jorge Arturo Reina is currently ineligible for a visa +under section 212(a)(3)(B) of the Immigration and Nationality +Act based on his links and involvement with terrorist +activities in the 1970s and 1980s. In addition, there is +currently a "00" hit associated with his name which requires +the submission of a Security Advisory Opinion for review by +the Department and other interested agencies prior to ruling +on the visa application. Finally, there also exists a NCIII +hit from the Federal Bureau of Investigation indicating past +criminal activity in the U.S. that would also have to be +cleared through CA/VO/L/A. + +¶4. (C) In the mid-1990s, Reina obtained a waiver and +eventually a B1/B2 visa with the restriction that he provide +an itinerary for each trip to the U.S. While serving as a +Minister without Portfolio and Advisor to his brother, +ex-President Carlos Roberto Reina (1994 - 1998), Reina +obtained an A-1 visa with the same restriction and the +original tourist visa was canceled. He traveled numerous +times to the United States but failed to comply with the +restrictions prompting the Department to eventually revoke +his visa. He later received two single-entry B1/B2 visas, for +family medical reasons, to travel to the United States. + +------------------------------------------ +Links to Terrorist and Criminal Activities +------------------------------------------- + +¶5. (S/NF) As a student in the 1950s, Reina was a Communist +sympathizer and traveled to Moscow in 1957. Following +deportation to Costa Rica in the early 1960s after the +military coup in Honduras, Reina spent his months in exile +trying to organize armed resistance to the Honduran +government and unsuccessfully sought money and arms from +Fidel Castro in Cuba. He was allowed to return to Honduras in +1964 where he continued his organizational efforts and was +involved in left-wing student activities. Reina's involvement +included storing a cache of weapons on behalf of the Liberal +Party who used those weapons in their instigation of strikes +and public demonstrations to overthrow the military +government. He was widely believed to be a Soviet and/or +Cuban agent at that time. + +¶6. (S/NF) While a teacher and later Rector of the University +of Honduras (UNAH), he was instrumental in organizing +students and faculty to provide both moral and material +support to the Sandinistas in Nicaragua. During this time he +continued to speak out against the U.S.'s role in Central +America and was linked to supplying unknown persons with hand +grenades to be used against Standard Fruit Company. An +admirer of the Cuban Revolution, Reina traveled +surreptitiously to Cuba a number of times in the early 1980s +to meet with other revolutionaries and was suspected of +supplying arms to rebels in El Salvador during that country's +civil war. Post also received information in 1980 that Reina +was made aware of, and eventually approved, a plan by a +terrorist organization to kidnap a U.S. official. + +¶7. (S/NF) Reina's involvement in criminal activities did not +end with his entry into the Honduran government. The current +Director of Immigration, German Espinal, a trusted ally in +the fight against corruption, has linked Reina's son, Carlos +Eduardo Reina, a local businessman, to the sale of passports +and other identity documents to Chinese immigrants who +presumably intend to travel to the United States. While Reina +is not directly involved in this human smuggling operation, +he is believed to receive money from those sales to use his +position in the GOH to protect his son's illegal activities +and shield him from investigation. + +-------------------------------------------- +This Nomination Just One More Provocation +--------------------------------------------- + +¶8. (C) Zelaya's nomination of Reina appears to be part of his +ongoing efforts to press the USG on a range of issues to +determine what if any consequences he will see from bad +policy choices. Like a small boy poking a hornets' nest with +a stick, Zelaya keeps jabbing at the USG to see what the +reaction will be. His most recent "pokes" include his +on-again/off-again visit to Cuba to meet with Castro and +strengthen Honduran/Cuban relations; granting permission to +the Cuban airline, Aerocarribean, to begin service to +Honduras; his trip to Managua, Nicaragua to help celebrate +the anniversary of the Sandinista Revolution with President +Ortega; and his public desire for friendship with Hugo +Chavez. Zelaya has yet to suffer any adverse consequences for +his actions and he will continue to act in this manner to see +how far he can go. + +¶9. (C) Another example of this tendency to test limits is his +statement that Secretary Rice had no objection to Reina's +nomination. This subject was not raised in his meeting with +the Secretary, but rather with Deputy Secretary Negroponte on +July 10 (see reftel). Zelaya informed the Deputy Secretary of +the impending appointment but at no point did the Deputy +Secretary state that the USG was in agreement or that it +opposed the naming of Reina. Instead, Zelaya took the lack of +response as approval. + +¶10. (C) COMMENT. Jorge Arturo Reina's past history with +terrorist and criminal activities, and his ongoing acceptance +of his family's involvement in human smuggling, raises +serious issues that need to be considered prior to the +granting of a waiver for a G-1 visa, especially with regard +to the nature of any restrictions on the G-1 visa that would +be appropriate. Post is concerned that the approval of the +waiver and visa without serious consideration of conditions +will only encourage Zelaya to continue testing the USG as to +the outer limits of how far he can go in his relationship +with the ALBA entities. END COMMENT. +FORD \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/dates/2008/01/08BOGOTA337.txt b/dates/2008/01/08BOGOTA337.txt index 06d7e6f75..8045e93a7 100644 --- a/dates/2008/01/08BOGOTA337.txt +++ b/dates/2008/01/08BOGOTA337.txt @@ -169,18 +169,7 @@ GOC asked the Cuban government their views on Chavez' call to roll back the FARC's terrorist designation, the Cubans stated that it was "a difficult proposal." -¶8. (S) Uribe saw mixed loyalties among other Latin American -countries. Only Nicaragua had supported Chavez' FARC -proposal. Argentina remains difficult, since Venezuela -bought Argentine bonds and Chavez made campaign contributions -to the new President. Paraguay, in the midst of an election -cycle, is uncertain though the front-runner supports Chavez. -Uruguay, a possible ally, is sitting on the fence. Brazil -remains friendly with Colombia, but prefers neutrality lest -it offend anyone. In Peru, President Alan Garcia concurs - -with the United States and would follow its lead. Chile -remains a good friend to Colombia and its cause. +¶8. (S) Uribe saw mixed loyalties among other Latin American countries. Only Nicaragua had supported Chavez' FARC proposal. Argentina remains difficult, since Venezuela bought Argentine bonds and Chavez made campaign contributions to the new President. Paraguay, in the midst of an election cycle, is uncertain though the front-runner supports Chavez. Uruguay, a possible ally, is sitting on the fence. Brazil remains friendly with Colombia, but prefers neutrality lest it offend anyone. In Peru, President Alan Garcia concurs with the United States and would follow its lead. Chile remains a good friend to Colombia and its cause. ----------------- Hostages and HVTs diff --git a/dates/2008/12/08KUALALUMPUR1114.txt b/dates/2008/12/08KUALALUMPUR1114.txt new file mode 100644 index 000000000..d69d04147 --- /dev/null +++ b/dates/2008/12/08KUALALUMPUR1114.txt @@ -0,0 +1,298 @@ +08KUALALUMPUR1114 +PRESSURE MOUNTS AGAINST INTERNAL SECURITY ACT (ISA) +Tue Dec 23 00:00:00 +0100 2008 +SECRET +Embassy Kuala Lumpur +VZCZCXRO3142 +OO RUEHCHI RUEHDT RUEHHM RUEHNH +DE RUEHKL #1114/01 3580721 +ZNY SSSSS ZZH +O 230721Z DEC 08 +FM AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR +TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2163 +INFO RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE +RUCNASE/ASEAN MEMBER COLLECTIVE PRIORITY +RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0552 +RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 2711 +RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY +RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI PRIORITY +RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITYS E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 KUALA LUMPUR 001114 + +SIPDIS + +E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/19/2028 +TAGS: PTER PGOV PHUM KJUS KDEM +SUBJECT: PRESSURE MOUNTS AGAINST INTERNAL SECURITY ACT (ISA) + +REF: A. KUALA LUMPUR 1026 - DPM NAJIB DISCUSSES ISA + ¶B. KUALA LUMPUR 990 - RAJA PETRA RELEASED + ¶C. KUALA LUMPUR 944 - MCA AND GERAKAN CRITICIZE UMNO + ¶D. KUALA LUMPUR 846 - UPDATE ON RAJA PETRA + ¶E. KUALA LUMPUR 834 - KOK RELEASED FROM ISA + ¶F. KUALA LUMPUR 810 - UPROAR OVER ISA + ¶G. KUALA LUMPUR 806 - JOURNALIST DETAINED UNDER ISA + ¶H. 07 KUALA LUMPUR 902 - BEYOND ISA + +Classified By: Political Counselor Mark D. Clark, reason 1.4 (b, c and +d). + +NOTE: THIS CABLE TRANSMITS AN EDITED VERSION OF KUALA LUMPUR +1102 SENT ON 12/18/08 IN MORE RESTRICTED CHANNELS. END NOTE. + + +¶1. (S) Summary: The Malaysian government's use of the +Internal Security Act (ISA), which allows for detention +without trial and is central to the GOM's intelligence-driven +CT effort, has come under increasing political pressure over +the past three months. The GOM's employment of the ISA in +September to carry out three politically-motivated ISA +detentions unrelated to terrorism sparked unprecedented +public criticism. At least eight component parties from the +governing National Front (BN) coalition have since broken +ranks with the leading United Malays National Organization +(UMNO) and called for amending or abolishing the ISA. The +opposition party alliance led by Anwar Ibrahim has made the +revocation of ISA one of its highest profile policy goals. +In November, a High Court judge delivered a legal blow to the +GOM's wide discretion in using the ISA in a ruling that freed +blogger Raja Petra, and the GOM is appealing the decision. +Prime Minister Abdullah, his deputy and successor Najib and +Home Minister Syed Hamid have defended the ISA as essential +to national security, while Najib told the Ambassador +privately ISA should be retained but used more judiciously. +The GOM released 17 ISA detainees, among them 10 previously +linked to terrorist groups, including Yazid Sufaat, from +November 5 to December 4. + +¶2. (S) Comment: The ISA is the cornerstone of Malaysia's CT +effort and has allowed Special Branch to take successful +preemptive action against suspected terrorists and their +supporters. Given the GOM's exclusive reliance on the ISA +"crutch" and on Special Branch's role, police and prosecutors +remain ill-prepared to investigate and bring to trial +terrorist suspects (or prosecute other complex criminal +conspiracies). The ISA also is subject to misuse for +political ends and is an important insurance policy for +maintaining UMNO in power. For both CT and political +reasons, the GOM will not readily give up the ISA. We doubt +that the increased political pressure and seeming swing in +public opinion against the ISA, due in part to its misuse in +September, will result in the ISA's amendment or revocation +in the near future, absent the Opposition coming to power. +These developments, however, reinforce the conclusion (ref H) +that Malaysia cannot take for granted the availability of the +ISA as a CT tool in the long run. It remains in the U.S. +interest to encourage and assist Malaysia to develop an +approach centered on prosecutions and convictions before an +independent judiciary to combat terrorism. + +¶3. (C) Comment continued: It is unclear to what extent +outside political pressures played a direct role in the GOM's +latest release of ISA detainees. The decisions may have more +to do with Syed Hamid's personal exercise of authority as +Home Minister. Syed Hamid has taken a more proactive role as +Home Minister, compared to PM Abdullah who held the position +through March 2008 and tended not to become involved in +details. End Summary and Comment. + +¶4. (C) The Malaysian government's use of the Internal +Security Act (ISA), central to the GOM's intelligence-driven +counterterrorism efforts, has come under increasing political +pressure since the September ISA arrests of three persons +based on political rather security considerations. The +September 12 ISA detentions of an ethnic Chinese journalist, +an ethnic Chinese Opposition MP (Teresa Kok), and a prominent +blogger (Raja Petra Kamaruddin) served the ruling UMNO +party's immediate political purpose of sending a warning to +opposition politicians and those considering defecting from +BN, as some UMNO politicians have told us. This came at a +time when Anwar Ibrahim was publicly threatening to bring +down the BN government via parliamentary crossovers by +September 16. The arrests, however, also sparked +unprecedented public criticism of the ISA, including from +UMNO's ethnic minority partners within BN. The Malaysian +Chinese Association (MCA), the key ethnic Chinese BN +component party, reportedly threatened to leave BN unless the +GOM released the Chinese journalist; the GOM complied within +less than 24 hours (ref F). Authorities freed MP Teresa Kok +after seven days. Home Minister Syed Hamid ordered a +two-year ISA detention period for Raja Petra, who was freed +on appeal in November in a surprise court ruling (see below). + +¶5. (C) Comment: Unlike his predecessor Mahathir, PM +Abdullah refrained from using the ISA for political purposes +until December 2007 when police detained five leaders of the +ethnic Indian activist group HINDRAF that organized large +street protests. The public viewed the GOM's September 2008 +ISA arrests as more transparently political, in part because +of the lack of public order concerns. End Comment. + +¶6. (C) Political pressure against the ISA did not dissipate +following the release of the first two of the three recent +ISA detainees. At least eight component parties from the +governing BN coalition of 14 parties have since broken ranks +with UMNO and called for amending or reviewing the grounds +for the ISA, while several have supported the law's +abolition. In late September MCA, BN's second largest party, +called for "a comprehensive review of the ISA so that it will +apply strictly to cases relating to terrorism and subversive +elements," and also argued for the introduction of "checks +and balances in the use of ISA." The leader of the Gerakan +party, Koh Tsu Koon, called on the GOM to "abolish the ISA +once and for all," and rely on the judicial system instead. +The leader of the Peoples Progressive Party (PPP) also +initially called for ISA to be abolished, and on December 1 +said PPP would withdraw from BN unless if the ISA were not +amended before the next election. In response, Prime +Minister Abdullah called PPP's bluff and said the small +party, which holds no seats in Parliament, could leave BN if +it wished. BN MPs so far have not backed up their criticism +of ISA with action. In response to a petition circulated in +Parliament for the review or repeal of ISA, only one BN MP +signed his name. + +¶7. (C) The opposition party alliance (Pakatan Rakyat, or +Pakatan) led by Anwar Ibrahim has vocally condemned ISA as +undemocratic and unjust, and made the abolishment of ISA one +of its highest profile policy goals. A number of senior +officials from Pakatan's three parties, Anwar's Peoples +Justice Party (PKR), the Democratic Action Party (DAP), and +the Islamic Party of Malaysia (PAS) were detained under ISA +during the era of former Prime Minister Mahathir. Not +surprisingly, the three parties have vowed to revoke ISA if +they come to power. "Abolish ISA" was the most prominent +theme at PKR's annual party conference on November 29, which +Polcouns observed. The keynote event concluded with a focus +on ISA and featured large screens that scrolled through the +list of all 60-plus ISA detainees with the several thousand +attendees reciting the detainees' names as they appeared. +Well-known blogger Raja Petra, released from ISA detention +only days before, mounted the stage as the surprise guest of +the grand finale. + +¶8. (SBU) On November 7, a High Court judge delivered an +unanticipated legal blow to the GOM's wide discretion in +using the ISA in a habeas corpus ruling that freed blogger +Raja Petra. The Embassy obtained the full text of the +judge's 22-page ruling. ISA Section 8.B states "there shall +be no judicial review in any court" of the Home Minister's +exercise of "discretionary powers in accordance with this +Act," except for compliance with procedural requirements. +The judge ruled, however, that the Home Minister decisions +could not be "unfettered and arbitrary," allowing for the +court to consider whether the Minister's ISA detention order +was "in accordance with the Act," and its focus on threats to +national security, including the national economy; threats to +maintenance of essential services; and threats to the public +emanating from a "substantial body of persons" who intend to +change the government through unlawful means. In the case of +Raja Petra, the judge concluded that the grounds for his +detention did not fall within the purview of the ISA. The +government has appealed the ruling and as of mid-December the +appeal remains pending. + +¶9. (C) Many civil society groups took the opportunity over +the past three months to highlight their standing opposition +to the ISA, as well as other emergency ordinances that allow +for detention without trial. Both conservative and liberal +Muslim NGOs called on the GOM to abolish the ISA, as did the +inter-faith Consultative Forum that groups the leaders of all +major religions except Islam. The National Human Rights +Commission (SUHAKAM) chairman Abu Talib restated the +commission's existing position, namely "detention without +trial is against human rights principles; that's why we +advised the Government years ago to repeal the ISA." + +¶10. (C) As questions over the ISA have mounted, Prime +Minister Abdullah, his deputy and successor Najib, and other +senior UMNO leaders defended the ISA as essential to national +security. In the wake of public criticism over the September +ISA arrests, Home Minister Syed Hamid, who has authority +under the ISA to approve detention orders, defended the Act +as essential and stated clearly that "we have no plans to do +away with ISA." In early December, Syed Hamid waved off +criticisms, arguing that the ISA "has never been abused or +used for politics." He also commented that, "Malaysians +sometimes don't know how lucky we are in that we have not +experienced what is happening in Mumbai (the terrorist +attack) and Bangkok (political unrest) now." He said the +fact that there have been no post 9/11 terrors attacks in +Malaysia was in part due to the ISA. On December 15, Syed +Hamid again publicly defended use of the ISA, stating, "More +apt, faster and better to use the ISA... detention under the +act is early action to prevent the security of the country +from being adversely affected." + +¶11. (C) DPM Najib, who is anticipated to become Prime +Minister in late March 2009, told the Ambassador privately on +November 11 that the government continued to need the ISA, +"even though there are civil liberty concerns," but should +reserve ISA only for those who pose "serious threats, like +terrorists" (ref A). On December 8, PM Abdullah publicly +rejected calls for amendments to the ISA. + +¶12. (SBU) In early December, local and international press +reported that the GOM had released 17 ISA detainees from +November 5 through December 4. Of those released, 10 had +been held for suspected links to Al Qaeda, Jemaah Islamiyah, +and/or the Darul Islam terrorist groups. The released +terrorist suspects included Yazid Sufaat, who played an +important role in Al Qaeda's anthrax development program, +according to the 9/11 Commission. The remaining seven +persons released consisted of suspected foreign agents (2 +persons), southern Thailand separatists (2), document forgers +(2), and prominent blogger Raja Petra, according to an NGO +that consistently and accurately monitors ISA detentions. +In his public remarks, Syed Hamid said those recently +released ISA detainees had been rehabilitated and no longer +posed a security threat to Malaysia. + +¶13. (S) Note: Authorities had detained the terrorist +suspects for periods between two and (in the case of Yazid +Sufaat) seven years, for an average detention period of four +years for the ten individuals. Special Branch relies on a +process for rehabilitating ISA detainees, and eventually +releasing them under restricted and monitored conditions when +judged necessary. The GOM has never attempted to prosecute +any terrorist suspects, including those held under the ISA. +This is due in large part to the fact that the GOM pursues +almost exclusively an intelligence approach to CT, as opposed +to a law enforcement approach that would involve criminal +investigations, collection of legally admissible evidence, +and development of cases for prosecution in the courts. In +2007, Malaysia amended anti-terrorism provisions in its penal +code and criminal procedures code, but authorities have not +yet utilized these provisions. Malaysia also has a poor +track record of prosecuting other complex criminal +conspiracies, including drug trafficking cases, preferring +instead to utilize the ISA and other emergency ordinances to +detain suspects without trial. End Note. + +¶14. (S) A well-known journalist contacted us in early +December and said that officers of the Police Special Branch +had complained to him that Home Minister Syed Hamid had +ordered the recent releases of terrorist suspects without +adequate consultation and in some cases against the +recommendation of Special Branch. Australian and British +diplomats, speaking with Polcouns December 16, stated that +Syed Hamid, who is a lawyer by training, personally reviewed +the dossiers of ISA detainees and was inclined to approve +releases absent compelling justification from the Special +Branch. + +¶15. (C) The Thai embassy contacted Poloff on December 15 to +express concern over the release of two ISA detainees (Abdul +Rahman bin Ahmad and Mat Tarmizi bin Shamsudin, who +apparently are dual-citizens of Malaysia and Thailand) who +had been held for their connection to the insurgency in +southern Thailand. The Thai diplomat said Bangkok considered +Abdul Rahman in particular to be a major player in the +insurgency. He noted that those released are required to +remain in Malaysia and check in periodically with the police. + The Thai diplomat said he believed the GOM released the +detainees in order to diffuse criticism of the ISA. We +learned that the Thai embassy also has contacted other +Western embassies (UK, France, Australia) to express concern +over the recent ISA releases. + +KEITH \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/dates/2009/02/09BAGHDAD379.txt b/dates/2009/02/09BAGHDAD379.txt new file mode 100644 index 000000000..d605ff452 --- /dev/null +++ b/dates/2009/02/09BAGHDAD379.txt @@ -0,0 +1,603 @@ +09BAGHDAD379 +PM MALIKI: STRENGTHENED CENTER OR EMERGING +Fri Feb 13 00:00:00 +0100 2009 +CONFIDENTIAL +Embassy Baghdad +VZCZCXRO1455 +OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK +DE RUEHGB #0379/01 0441140 +ZNY CCCCC ZZH +O 131140Z FEB 09 +FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD +TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1692 +INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE +RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FLC O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 07 BAGHDAD 000379 + +SIPDIS + +E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/12/2019 +TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM PINS KDEM KISL IZ +SUBJECT: PM MALIKI: STRENGTHENED CENTER OR EMERGING +STRONGMAN? + +Classified by Ambassador Ryan Crocker for reasons 1.4 (b) and +(d). + +------------------------ +Summary and Introduction +------------------------ + +¶1. (C) With the strong performance of the Da'wa Party in the +January 31 provincial council elections, Prime Minister +Maliki will claim a public mandate. While many media +analyses have tended to overstate this case (as Maliki won no +more than 38 percent in two provinces, and less elsewhere) it +is clear that the elections mark a significant improvement in +the Prime Minister's political fortunes, and that Da'wa can +legitimately claim to have displaced the Islamic Supreme +Council of Iraq (ISCI) as the country's preeminent Shi'a +political party. During his first two years in office, +Maliki was broadly assailed by critics as a weak and +ineffectual prime minister, ill-equipped by background and +experience to govern an increasingly violent Iraq and +incapable of imposing order on a chaotic GOI to confront the +country's myriad challenges. Now, at the start of 2009, with +an increasingly stable (if still violent and volatile) Iraq, +Maliki is assailed by those same critics -- leading Sunni and +Kurdish politicians, as well as other Shi'a coalition +partners -- as an aspiring strongman bent on imposing a +classic Arab autocracy on Iraq. + +¶2. (C) Maliki's personality and way of conducting business +has contributed to the present accusations of an emerging +"new Saddam." While his political foes are quite open about +their desire to see him ousted (providing more than adequate +reason for paranoia on the PM's part), Maliki is a product of +his Da'wa secret cell experience and tends to view everyone +and everything with instinctive suspicion. This worldview is +fed by his small and closed circle of Da'wa advisors. In +terms of governance and security, Maliki has moved in an +accelerated manner following his direction of government +efforts in spring/summer of 2008 to quell Sadrist challenges +in Basra and elsewhere to reestablish a strong Baghdad +center. While the ends are positive -- enhanced national +security and stability are welcome-- the means are being +subjected to increasing question. The concentration of +authority in Maliki's Office of the Commander in Chief +(OCINC), the establishment of an elite security force - with +its own judges and detention facilities - that reports +directly to the PM, the creation of a security force command +that short-circuits provincial authority, a willingness in +some cases to use strong-arm tactics against political +adversaries, and patronage networks to co-opt others all +follow a very familiar pattern of Arab world leadership. + +¶3. (C) That said, Nouri Al-Maliki is no Saddam Hussein. He +shares neither Saddam's brutality nor his penchant for +international military adventurism. Moreover, while Maliki's +thinking and actions are undoubtedly informed by the Shi'a +experience, he himself sees his conduct as national rather +than sectarian-inspired. His nationalism is very much at +issue in his relations with Iran. Having fled from Iran to +Syria during the Saddam era to avoid falling under Tehran's +sway (as he believes occurred with Shi'a arch-rival ISCI), +Maliki's suspicious outlook includes a dark assessment of +Iran's ambitions toward Iraq. + +¶4. (C) A key question posed by Maliki's evolving hold on +levers of political and security power is whether the PM is +becoming a non-democratic dictator bent on subordinating all +authority to his hand or whether Maliki is attempting to +rebalance political and security authority back to the center +Qrebalance political and security authority back to the center +after five-plus years of intended and unintended dispersal to +(and in some cases seizure by) actors and power structures +outside Baghdad. We believe the answer lies closer to the +latter than the former. This process will likely come into +sharper focus with the seating of the newly-elected +provincial councils and implementation of the provincial +powers law (which grants significant new power to the +provinces). And the PM's efforts will be met with resistance +by those, such as the Kurds and Maliki's Shi'a rivals, who +would argue that the post-Saddam national consensus (and +indeed the Iraqi constitution) requires substantial devolved +power to the provinces and regions. + +¶5. (C) While responsibility for the lack of political +consensus is broadly shared among Iraq's leaders from all +groups, the PM needs to set the tone. Here, Maliki has shown +that he is either unwilling or unable to take the lead in the +give-and-take needed to build broad consensus for the +Government's policies among competing power blocs. +Furthermore, the Prime Minister has appeared willing to +confront his adversaries with force, as illustrated by the +near-confrontation between the Iraqi Army and Peshmerga in +northern Diyala province last September. Working within this +context, the U.S. should continue to emphasize support for +Iraqi institutions over individuals as our bilateral +relationship matures, and must maintain a strong focus on +keeping Iraq's main groups committed to a peaceful, +negotiated, process to resolve contentious "national vision" +issues such as power-sharing, disputed borders, the +appropriate division of power between the central and +provincial/regional governments, hydrocarbons, and security. +End summary and introduction. + +-------------------- +Winter of Discontent +-------------------- + +¶6. (C) First seen as weak, ineffective, and ill-informed +about the political and security structures put in place +since Saddam's fall (Maliki was not a participant in the +governing bodies set up during the CPA), Prime Minister +Maliki was by the fall of 2008 being widely criticized - by +leaders of the Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP) and other Sunni +politicians, by the Kurdish political leadership, and by +fellow Shi'a from outside Maliki's Da'wa Party -- as +autocratic and excessively ambitious, with the long-term aim +of becoming a new strong man dictator. The "political reform +resolution," passed by parliament in conjunction with its +approval of the U.S.-Iraq Security Agreement and Strategic +Framework Agreement on November 27, 2008 (reftel), amounted +to a manifesto of grievances against the Prime Minister that +had been growing among his coalition partners, and the +opposition, throughout the year. + +¶7. (U) The document urged the Maliki Government to adhere to +the Constitution, to commit to a democratic federal system, +to share power with the legislature, to professionalize and +depoliticize the security forces, to guarantee a free +judiciary, disband "unconstitutional structures" within the +government, and release prisoners eligible for amnesty or +held without due process, among other demands. + +--------------------- +Maliki's (Small) Circle +----------------------- + +¶8. (C) A common complaint about Maliki is his failure to +consult with leaders of other power blocs and his excessive +reliance on a small inner circle for advice. These habits +certainly stem from Maliki's background, which includes more +than two decades as an operative of the Islamic Da'wa Party, +which conducted clandestine activities, including +assassination attempts against Saddam and senior regime +officials, during the 1970s and 80s. (Saddam's intelligence +service, for good measure, targeted Da'wa operatives for +assassination abroad.) + +¶9. (C) Maliki first joined Da'wa as a student at Baghdad +University in the 1960s. His ties to the group forced him to +flee Iraq in 1979, and live in exile first in Iran, then in +Syria, where he represented the party until Saddam's fall in +Q03. Today, most of Maliki's inner circle of advisors share +his Da'wa background. They include: + +-- Tariq Najm Abdullah, Maliki's Chief of Staff, who was +active in Da'wa's London chapter in the 1990s. Abdullah's +cool and taciturn demeanor seems to exemplify critics' +characterization of the Maliki government. Critics within +the GOI have dubbed him the "shadow Prime Minister" and some +claim he sometimes countermands Maliki's written +instructions; + +-- Sadiq al-Rikabi, a senior advisor, also from Da'wa's +London chapter, is often at Maliki's side. The PM tasked him +with leading the Security Agreement negotiations after +essentially firing the Iraqi MFA negotiating team, which +Maliki reportedly thought too concessionary and too beholden +QMaliki reportedly thought too concessionary and too beholden +to Foreign Minister Zebari - a bitter adversary; + +-- Ghati al-Rikabi (aka Abu Mujahed - a first cousin of +Sadiq), is an advisor and general fixer in Maliki's office; + +-- Ali al-Adib, who now heads Da'wa's parliamentary caucus, +represented the party during exile years in Iran. He +sometimes represents Maliki in GOI meetings and in visits to +the provinces; + +-- Sami al-Askeri is a nominally independent MP close to +Maliki. The PM appointed him to lead GOI efforts to bring +Sadrists and Shi'a extremists into mainstream politics; + +-- Hassan Sunayd is a Da'wa MP who had been an advisor to PM +Ja'afari. A poet, he was jailed and tortured by Saddam. He +is perhaps the most liberal and pragmatic member of Maliki's +circle; + +-- Ahmed al-Maliki, the Prime Minister's son and head of his +private office. He is rumored to have strained relations with +the Rikabis; + +-- Mowafaq al-Rubaiye, now the influential National Security +Advisor, had been an associate of Ahmed al-Chalabi in +London's Iraqi National Congress. Though Maliki apparently +values Rubaiye's counsel on certain issues, he is widely seen +as an unscrupulous self-promoter and Maliki himself has +openly excluded Rubaiye from engagement in some issues -- +including the Strategic Framework (SFA) and +Security Agreement (SOFA) negotiations. + +¶10. (C) Maliki appears loath to delegate sensitive political +tasks to persons outside this group, with the net effect of +hampering the GOI's capacity and stunting its institutional +development. The most recent example of this phenomenon we +have observed has been the difficulty the GOI has had in +standing up bilateral committees to work with the U.S. in +implementing the Security Agreement and the SFA. + +¶11. (C) Explaining the GOI delays and apparent disarray on +implementing the agreements, Sadiq al-Rikabi recently +confided to PMIN that he and his colleagues in Maliki's +circle were simply tired (and apparently tapped out). +Discussing an economic project with a senior USG official in +late December, Maliki complained, "If I don't get personally +involved, nothing happens." Clearly, Maliki's subordinates +have not been encouraged or empowered to take decisions on +their own - symptomatic of sclerotic bureaucracies across the +region. + +-------------------------------------- +This Paranoid Really Does Have Enemies +-------------------------------------- + +¶12. (C) Maliki's reluctance to delegate authority reflects +both an urge to control and a distrust of those outside his +circle. In meetings with Embassy officials, Maliki regularly +voices concern about plots against him. The Prime Minister +seems particularly fixated on the activities of Ba'thist +former regime elements in Syria and Jordan. More damagingly, +the PM's deep suspicion of the Iraqi Army's leadership as +Sunni Ba'athist and the source of potential coup-plotting has +only partially been tempered over the course of the past two +years. Similarly, Maliki shows a tendency to associate all +Sunni (and more broadly, Arab) opposition to his policies +with Ba'athist irredentism. This manifests itself in his +strained relationships with Iraqi Sunni political figures +such as Tawafuq/IIP leader Tariq al-Hashimi. It is also +visible in his (mistaken) dismissal of Iraq's externally +displaced as Sunnis who have not come to terms with +post-Saddam democratic Shi'a majoritarian rule. Maliki's +sectarian suspicion also shapes his view of the Saudis and +other Arab neighbors as unaccepting of Shi'a in governance. +Maliki staunchly denies -- and we agree -- that he is +motivated by overt sectarian bias. Rather, we see Maliki's +worldview as deeply informed by the Shi'a historical +experience. Unfortunately, the consequences in terms of his +willingness and ability to reach out to Iraqi Sunnis and the +broader Sunni world are effectively the same. + +¶13. (C) This said, the Prime Minister correctly sees rivals +across the spectrum of Iraq's ethnic, sectarian and political +leaderships as bent on his ouster. From the Kurdish +leadership (including KRG President Barzani, FM Zebari, and +Deputy Prime Minister Salih) to his Shi'a arch-rival ISCI +QDeputy Prime Minister Salih) to his Shi'a arch-rival ISCI +head Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim (and Vice President Adel Abd +al-Mehdi) and Sunni leader Vice President al-Hashimi, there +has been an unbroken and quite open criticism of Maliki's +leadership and proclaimed desire to see him ousted through a +parliamentary vote of no confidence. (This effort has been +hampered by fear of the political vacuum that would follow +Maliki's fall: There is no consensus among those who want to +bring him down about who/what should follow. Nevertheless, +the current impasse over a successor to ousted Parliamentary +Speaker Mashhadani is seen by some as a split between those +who favor a no confidence vote in the Prime Minister and +those who support Maliki.) + +-------------------- +Stove-Piped Security +-------------------- + +¶14. (C) Maliki has set up security structures that report +directly to the Prime Minister's Office, arguing that rather +than parallel lines of authority he is exercising the +legitimate authority of Commander in Chief. Indeed, the +Office of the Commander in Chief (OCINC) has been the object +of particular criticism over the past year as security +responsibilities have been taken in practice from Iraqi +security commanders and subordinated to OCINC +decision-making. The Counter-Terrorism Bureau (CTB) and its +Iraqi Special Operations Force fall entirely outside of +Ministry of Defense (MOD) and Ministry of Interior (MOI) +chains of command, reporting directly to the Prime Minister's +Office. Designed, trained and equipped by U.S. Special +Forces under the Multi National Security Transition Command - +Iraq (MNSTC-I), the CTB was originally conceived to fall +under MOD authority. Instead, the Prime Minister's Office +has assumed direct control of the CTB, and Maliki is reported +to be personally involved in both the CTB's targeting process +and its operational direction. Critics believe his +motivation was to create a politicized force that could +protect his regime. Maliki's defenders argue he was +compelled to set up the CTB -- and the OCINC -- to get a +handle on an unwieldy security bureaucracy at a time of +national crisis, pointing to the need for the PM's direct +intervention at the head of Iraqi security forces in Basrah, +Sadr City, Maysan and elsewhere over the course of 2008. We +believe both interpretations are correct. Maliki genuinely +sees his personal leadership and control as essential to +advance security and stability but has also directed assets +under his control to reinforce his political position. + +¶15. (C) The CTB maintains not only its own armed operations +units, but also its own detention facilities (principally the +ill-reputed facility at Camp Honor - within the International +Zone) and even has on staff its own judges to customize +arrest warrants. Iraqi MOD interlocutors, and Maliki's +political rivals, have both expressed to Emboffs their alarm +over the extent of the PM's personal control over the CTB, +which has already apparently been misused as a political +rather than security instrument (see para 17, below). Like a +number of GOI entities, the CTB is technically +extra-constitutional, although the Prime Minister is pressing +Parliament to approve a bill that would legalize its +activities. + +¶16. (C) Another controversial innovation has been the +establishment of Provincial Operations Centers, which +consolidate command of all ISF operations within their areas +of responsibility, a concept which originated with the 2007 +Baghdad Security Plan. The model has since been replicated +in Basra, Diyala, Karbala, and Ninewa. Operations commands +all report directly to the Iraqi Ground Forces Commander in +Baghdad, bypassing provincial governors, who often are not +only cut out of planning and operational direction, but may +not even be current on what the ISF are doing in their +provinces. We know that Maliki often goes directly to Ground +Forces Commander Ali Gheidan, or to lower-level division +commanders, or with operations-level commanders such as +General Abud Qanbar in Baghdad with specific instructions. + +------------------------------- +Diyala Province: Smite Thy Foes +------------------------------- + +¶17. (C) The ISF's "Operation Benevolent Diyala," launched in +August 2008, was quickly decried by the province's Sunni +political establishment as a sectarian power play directed by +Maliki. Given the province has been one of Iraq's most +unstable since 2004 -- with Al-Qaida menacing the center and +north of the province, and the Jaysh al-Mahdi spilling over +Qnorth of the province, and the Jaysh al-Mahdi spilling over +from Sadr City in Diyala's southwest flank -- a robust +security operation was badly needed. However, of 1200 +individuals detained by the end of 2008, 1150 were Sunnis, +including many local leaders of the "Sons of Iraq" armed +neighborhood watches partnered with the Coalition Forces, and +many local affiliates of the Sunni Iraqi Islamic Party. + +¶18. (C) Sunni grievances grew after August 18, 2008, when +Maliki's CTB raided the provincial government center in +Ba'qouba and seized two of Diyala's most prominent Sunni +political leaders, in the process killing (apparently by +accident) an aide to the governor. Both the national and +Diyala provincial leaderships of the Iraqi Islamic Party have +told us they are convinced Operation Benevolent Diyala was +partly, if not principally, a partisan political operation. +The Diyala operation severely strained ties, which were never +good to begin with, between Maliki and Vice President +Hashimi, national chair of the IIP. Any political benefit +Maliki might have hoped to gain by means of the security +operation in Diyala appears to have backfired: The Sunni +Tawafuq list (IIP and its allies) placed first in Diyala in +the Jan. 31 provincial elections - winning almost four times +as many votes as Da'wa. + +---------------------------------------- +Kurdish Standoff -- Poxes on Both Houses +---------------------------------------- + +¶19. (C) The PM's centralization of control over security +forces, exaggerated sense of confidence in his own leadership +and judgment (a product of the security successes of +spring/summer 2008), his profound distrust of Kurdish +motives, and progressive Kurdish moves to expand influence +south of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) region came +to a threatening head in September 2008, when Maliki ordered +Iraqi Army units to deploy in Khanaqin, a Kurdish enclave in +Diyala. Technically below the green line separating the KRG +from "Iraq proper," Khanaqin, with an almost entirely Kurdish +population, had been uneventfully occupied by the Peshmerga +since 2003. A tense standoff between the IA and Peshmerga +ensued, with Maliki insisting that the Constitution gave him +authority to deploy the Army anywhere within Iraq's borders +and the Kurds arguing that he was being unnecessarily +provocative in a peaceful (and disputed) corner of the +province. Maliki's orders to reinforce the IA's positions +with a tank company suggested to some that he was spoiling +for a fight with the Kurds. Had the two sides come to blows, +it could have spread along the green line to Kirkuk and Mosul +and would have likely posed a grave threat to Iraq's +viability as a unified state. While the crisis was defused +following U.S. intervention and brokering by VP Abd al-Mehdi, +the fundamental dispute that prompted it remains unresolved. +Most importantly, the Khanaqin incident fed each party's +distrust of the other. KRG President Barzani is especially +distrustful of Maliki's intentions. + +------------ +Overreaching +------------ + +¶20. (C) Maliki's willingness to confront the battle-tested +Peshmerga suggested that he had no doubt whatsoever about the +Iraqi Army's fighting capacity. Maliki famously declared, in +the summer of 2007, that his forces were ready to secure the +country and that coalition forces could leave any time they +wanted. Maliki's inflated assessment of his forces' +capabilities was obvious in March 2008, when he ordered the +Iraqi Army to move into Basra and eject the Sadrist militias +and street gangs who had tacit control of the city and its +strategic ports. While the operation ultimately succeeded, +and indeed began the process of establishing GOI authority +over areas formally dominated by Sadrist militias and the +Iranian-backed Special Groups, its first week was marked by +logistical chaos and serious setbacks on the battlefield. +The tide only turned when Coalition Forces, whom Maliki had +characteristically not consulted in advance, launched a major +resupply and support effort. + +--------------------------- +If You Can't Defeat, Co-opt +--------------------------- + +¶21. (C) Despite Maliki's demonstrated willingness to use +force to advance his political position and strengthen +central authority, as in Diyala or Basra, he has also worked +intensively to develop and expand patronage networks. One of +the principal vehicles in this effort has been tribal support +councils (TSCs). Originally designed to consolidate tribal +support for security operations in Basra and Maysan +provinces, their mandate subsequently expanded to include IDP +returns, sectarian reconciliation, and economic development. +Feeding critics' suspicions that the TSCs were set up to +strengthen Baghdad's reach into the provinces, distribute +patronage, and develop loyalty to Maliki, the Prime +Minister's Office moved expeditiously during 2008 to set up +QMinister's Office moved expeditiously during 2008 to set up +TSC's across the south and eventually most of Iraq (ref B), +without apparent regard to the actual needs of different +localities. + +¶22. (C) The merits of the TSC model are open for debate: +Maliki's supporters argue that TSCs are efficient mechanisms +for dispensing resources from the center to the periphery and +for empowering tribes as elements of stability and natural +partners for rural development. Regardless, the TSCs have +been perceived by ISCI, Maliki's principal Shi'a coalition +partner, as a direct bid to undermine the provincial +governments it controlled and seize the loyalties of its core +constituents. Certainly, Maliki's TSCs have further +alienated ISCI from the Prime Minister. (In the fall, KRG +President Barzani also lashed out at Maliki over nascent TSCs +in Kirkuk and Mosul, viewing them as an open challenge to +Kurdish interests in disputed territories.) + +----------------------------- +But In The Success Column ... +----------------------------- + +¶23. (C) Despite the considerable controversy Maliki's +approach has generated, there is no doubt that Iraq's overall +security situation has improved dramatically on his watch. +He overcame formidable domestic opposition, and intense +pressure from Iran, to shepherd the Security Agreement and +SFA through parliament. Even most of his sharpest critics +concede he showed courage in confronting the Shi'a extremist +Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM) in the spring of 2008. There is +consensus that Muqtada al-Sadr and the JAM have had their +wings clipped, and while not wiped off Iraq's political map, +they no longer pose anywhere near the threat they did +2004-07. + +¶24. (C) Indeed, Maliki and Da'wa have been working +diligently, and with apparent success, to court the +disarrayed Sadrists and bring them closer to the political +mainstream (and even groom them as potential coalition +partners). Maliki's gambit to crush the JAM earned him the +grudging appreciation of many Sunnis and moderate Shi'a who +had previously seen him as a JAM enabler. Maliki is +particularly popular in Basra, which had been terrorized by +Sadrist militias and criminal spinoffs prior to the March +2008 operation against them. Maliki's "State of Law" +electoral list achieved first place showings in Baghdad and +eight of Iraq's nine southern provinces (voters punished the +Da'wa incumbent in Karbala, however). + +¶25. (C) Maliki has also exceeded expectations to date in his +handling of the integration of the mainly Sunni Sons of +Iraq/Awakening Movement into the Iraqi Security Forces. Many +had feared that he would not honor the SOI salary system set +up by coalition forces and would instead arrest and purge SOI +leaders. While the transition in Baghdad province went +smoothly, signs have been less encouraging in Diyala, and the +GOI's commitment to find work for the 80 percent of SOI not +absorbed into the ISF remains mainly hypothetical. On the +whole, Maliki has thus far honored his commitment to take on +and continue the SOI program. + +--------------------------------------------- --------------- +Conclusion: U.S. Interest in a Strengthened Center, But ... +--------------------------------------------- --------------- + +¶26. (C) The critical progress on security and stability made +over the past year, while underpinned by the U.S. military +surge, owes much to Maliki's leadership and restoration of +central government authority. It is in the interests of the +U.S. to see that process of strengthened central authority +continue, but in a manner that is sustainable, based on +institutions rather than personalities, and reflecting a +consensus national vision among Iraq's main ethnic/sectarian +groups. In this regard, the PM's deep distrust of virtually +all other actors on the Iraqi (and regional) scene undercuts +his -- and our -- efforts to reinforce the still-fragile +institutional gains of the past two years. We have pressed +the PM and other political leaders to deal seriously with the +range of grievances that separate them and to move forward on +the various reform agendas articulated in the August 2007 +leaders' declaration. However, Maliki sought to parry the +opposition's various grievances with the establishment of +five multi-party committees to resolve longstanding impasses +on security and defense, hydrocarbons, power sharing, budget, +and disputed territories. While the other parties delegated +different representatives to the committees, Maliki +characteristically appointed himself to represent Da'wa and +Qcharacteristically appointed himself to represent Da'wa and +his overworked Da'wa inner circle on all five. To date, the +committees have met only infrequently and have made little +visible progress. + +¶27. (C) Maliki's position may not be indefinitely +sustainable. Tellingly, Maliki's parliamentary critics +continue to emphasize the CoR "political reform document" +rather than the five committees, as their preferred vehicle +for change. Maliki's government remains dysfunctional on +many levels. He has a strained relationship with Foreign +Minister Zebari (who openly refers to KRG President Barzani +as his boss) and is known to dislike and distrust Interior +Minister Bolani (who has started his own political party). +He rarely convenes the Executive Council (composed of the +President, the two Vice Presidents, the KRG President, and +the Prime Minister). His defenders argue the role of Iraq's +President and Vice Presidents is more protocol than +executive. With the Kurds, the mainstream Sunnis, and even +non-Da'wa Shi'a coalition partners largely alienated, it may +be a matter of time before dislike of Maliki and the growing +threat to their particular interests finally unites the PM's +foes and overcomes their fundamental disagreement about who +and what would replace Maliki after a successful +no-confidence vote. + +¶28. (C) The results of the January 31 provincial elections, +however, with strong showings by Maliki's State of Law/Da'wa +list in nine of 14 participating provinces has clearly given +the Prime Minister momentum, allowing him to claim a tangible +base of public support, at least in Baghdad and Iraq's south. + While this success has likely taken some wind from the sails +of proponents of a no-confidence vote, Maliki's adversaries +might also calculate that they must act before the national +elections, expected at the end of 2009, to forestall an +irreversible consolidation of power. + +¶29. (C) Faced with this situation, we should continue to +emphasize our support for institutions rather than +individuals, and for processes rather than personalities, +even as we are mindful that Iraqi politics will remain +personalized and divided for the foreseeable future. In this +regard, the U.S. is not without assets in attempting to shape +Maliki's actions. The process of negotiating the SFA/SA with +the PM and his team demonstrated the importance Maliki +attaches to building a strong relationship with the U.S. and +his ability to deliver on key issues. His advisors have +shared with us anxiety over the position the new +Administration will take toward the PM and have sought +reassurance that the ties forged last year will continue. We +should press the PM on institution and political consensus +building as key to sustaining and advancing our relationship +-- and support. + +CROCKER \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/origin/Embassy Baghdad/09BAGHDAD379.txt b/origin/Embassy Baghdad/09BAGHDAD379.txt new file mode 100644 index 000000000..d605ff452 --- /dev/null +++ b/origin/Embassy Baghdad/09BAGHDAD379.txt @@ -0,0 +1,603 @@ +09BAGHDAD379 +PM MALIKI: STRENGTHENED CENTER OR EMERGING +Fri Feb 13 00:00:00 +0100 2009 +CONFIDENTIAL +Embassy Baghdad +VZCZCXRO1455 +OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK +DE RUEHGB #0379/01 0441140 +ZNY CCCCC ZZH +O 131140Z FEB 09 +FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD +TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1692 +INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE +RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FLC O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 07 BAGHDAD 000379 + +SIPDIS + +E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/12/2019 +TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM PINS KDEM KISL IZ +SUBJECT: PM MALIKI: STRENGTHENED CENTER OR EMERGING +STRONGMAN? + +Classified by Ambassador Ryan Crocker for reasons 1.4 (b) and +(d). + +------------------------ +Summary and Introduction +------------------------ + +¶1. (C) With the strong performance of the Da'wa Party in the +January 31 provincial council elections, Prime Minister +Maliki will claim a public mandate. While many media +analyses have tended to overstate this case (as Maliki won no +more than 38 percent in two provinces, and less elsewhere) it +is clear that the elections mark a significant improvement in +the Prime Minister's political fortunes, and that Da'wa can +legitimately claim to have displaced the Islamic Supreme +Council of Iraq (ISCI) as the country's preeminent Shi'a +political party. During his first two years in office, +Maliki was broadly assailed by critics as a weak and +ineffectual prime minister, ill-equipped by background and +experience to govern an increasingly violent Iraq and +incapable of imposing order on a chaotic GOI to confront the +country's myriad challenges. Now, at the start of 2009, with +an increasingly stable (if still violent and volatile) Iraq, +Maliki is assailed by those same critics -- leading Sunni and +Kurdish politicians, as well as other Shi'a coalition +partners -- as an aspiring strongman bent on imposing a +classic Arab autocracy on Iraq. + +¶2. (C) Maliki's personality and way of conducting business +has contributed to the present accusations of an emerging +"new Saddam." While his political foes are quite open about +their desire to see him ousted (providing more than adequate +reason for paranoia on the PM's part), Maliki is a product of +his Da'wa secret cell experience and tends to view everyone +and everything with instinctive suspicion. This worldview is +fed by his small and closed circle of Da'wa advisors. In +terms of governance and security, Maliki has moved in an +accelerated manner following his direction of government +efforts in spring/summer of 2008 to quell Sadrist challenges +in Basra and elsewhere to reestablish a strong Baghdad +center. While the ends are positive -- enhanced national +security and stability are welcome-- the means are being +subjected to increasing question. The concentration of +authority in Maliki's Office of the Commander in Chief +(OCINC), the establishment of an elite security force - with +its own judges and detention facilities - that reports +directly to the PM, the creation of a security force command +that short-circuits provincial authority, a willingness in +some cases to use strong-arm tactics against political +adversaries, and patronage networks to co-opt others all +follow a very familiar pattern of Arab world leadership. + +¶3. (C) That said, Nouri Al-Maliki is no Saddam Hussein. He +shares neither Saddam's brutality nor his penchant for +international military adventurism. Moreover, while Maliki's +thinking and actions are undoubtedly informed by the Shi'a +experience, he himself sees his conduct as national rather +than sectarian-inspired. His nationalism is very much at +issue in his relations with Iran. Having fled from Iran to +Syria during the Saddam era to avoid falling under Tehran's +sway (as he believes occurred with Shi'a arch-rival ISCI), +Maliki's suspicious outlook includes a dark assessment of +Iran's ambitions toward Iraq. + +¶4. (C) A key question posed by Maliki's evolving hold on +levers of political and security power is whether the PM is +becoming a non-democratic dictator bent on subordinating all +authority to his hand or whether Maliki is attempting to +rebalance political and security authority back to the center +Qrebalance political and security authority back to the center +after five-plus years of intended and unintended dispersal to +(and in some cases seizure by) actors and power structures +outside Baghdad. We believe the answer lies closer to the +latter than the former. This process will likely come into +sharper focus with the seating of the newly-elected +provincial councils and implementation of the provincial +powers law (which grants significant new power to the +provinces). And the PM's efforts will be met with resistance +by those, such as the Kurds and Maliki's Shi'a rivals, who +would argue that the post-Saddam national consensus (and +indeed the Iraqi constitution) requires substantial devolved +power to the provinces and regions. + +¶5. (C) While responsibility for the lack of political +consensus is broadly shared among Iraq's leaders from all +groups, the PM needs to set the tone. Here, Maliki has shown +that he is either unwilling or unable to take the lead in the +give-and-take needed to build broad consensus for the +Government's policies among competing power blocs. +Furthermore, the Prime Minister has appeared willing to +confront his adversaries with force, as illustrated by the +near-confrontation between the Iraqi Army and Peshmerga in +northern Diyala province last September. Working within this +context, the U.S. should continue to emphasize support for +Iraqi institutions over individuals as our bilateral +relationship matures, and must maintain a strong focus on +keeping Iraq's main groups committed to a peaceful, +negotiated, process to resolve contentious "national vision" +issues such as power-sharing, disputed borders, the +appropriate division of power between the central and +provincial/regional governments, hydrocarbons, and security. +End summary and introduction. + +-------------------- +Winter of Discontent +-------------------- + +¶6. (C) First seen as weak, ineffective, and ill-informed +about the political and security structures put in place +since Saddam's fall (Maliki was not a participant in the +governing bodies set up during the CPA), Prime Minister +Maliki was by the fall of 2008 being widely criticized - by +leaders of the Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP) and other Sunni +politicians, by the Kurdish political leadership, and by +fellow Shi'a from outside Maliki's Da'wa Party -- as +autocratic and excessively ambitious, with the long-term aim +of becoming a new strong man dictator. The "political reform +resolution," passed by parliament in conjunction with its +approval of the U.S.-Iraq Security Agreement and Strategic +Framework Agreement on November 27, 2008 (reftel), amounted +to a manifesto of grievances against the Prime Minister that +had been growing among his coalition partners, and the +opposition, throughout the year. + +¶7. (U) The document urged the Maliki Government to adhere to +the Constitution, to commit to a democratic federal system, +to share power with the legislature, to professionalize and +depoliticize the security forces, to guarantee a free +judiciary, disband "unconstitutional structures" within the +government, and release prisoners eligible for amnesty or +held without due process, among other demands. + +--------------------- +Maliki's (Small) Circle +----------------------- + +¶8. (C) A common complaint about Maliki is his failure to +consult with leaders of other power blocs and his excessive +reliance on a small inner circle for advice. These habits +certainly stem from Maliki's background, which includes more +than two decades as an operative of the Islamic Da'wa Party, +which conducted clandestine activities, including +assassination attempts against Saddam and senior regime +officials, during the 1970s and 80s. (Saddam's intelligence +service, for good measure, targeted Da'wa operatives for +assassination abroad.) + +¶9. (C) Maliki first joined Da'wa as a student at Baghdad +University in the 1960s. His ties to the group forced him to +flee Iraq in 1979, and live in exile first in Iran, then in +Syria, where he represented the party until Saddam's fall in +Q03. Today, most of Maliki's inner circle of advisors share +his Da'wa background. They include: + +-- Tariq Najm Abdullah, Maliki's Chief of Staff, who was +active in Da'wa's London chapter in the 1990s. Abdullah's +cool and taciturn demeanor seems to exemplify critics' +characterization of the Maliki government. Critics within +the GOI have dubbed him the "shadow Prime Minister" and some +claim he sometimes countermands Maliki's written +instructions; + +-- Sadiq al-Rikabi, a senior advisor, also from Da'wa's +London chapter, is often at Maliki's side. The PM tasked him +with leading the Security Agreement negotiations after +essentially firing the Iraqi MFA negotiating team, which +Maliki reportedly thought too concessionary and too beholden +QMaliki reportedly thought too concessionary and too beholden +to Foreign Minister Zebari - a bitter adversary; + +-- Ghati al-Rikabi (aka Abu Mujahed - a first cousin of +Sadiq), is an advisor and general fixer in Maliki's office; + +-- Ali al-Adib, who now heads Da'wa's parliamentary caucus, +represented the party during exile years in Iran. He +sometimes represents Maliki in GOI meetings and in visits to +the provinces; + +-- Sami al-Askeri is a nominally independent MP close to +Maliki. The PM appointed him to lead GOI efforts to bring +Sadrists and Shi'a extremists into mainstream politics; + +-- Hassan Sunayd is a Da'wa MP who had been an advisor to PM +Ja'afari. A poet, he was jailed and tortured by Saddam. He +is perhaps the most liberal and pragmatic member of Maliki's +circle; + +-- Ahmed al-Maliki, the Prime Minister's son and head of his +private office. He is rumored to have strained relations with +the Rikabis; + +-- Mowafaq al-Rubaiye, now the influential National Security +Advisor, had been an associate of Ahmed al-Chalabi in +London's Iraqi National Congress. Though Maliki apparently +values Rubaiye's counsel on certain issues, he is widely seen +as an unscrupulous self-promoter and Maliki himself has +openly excluded Rubaiye from engagement in some issues -- +including the Strategic Framework (SFA) and +Security Agreement (SOFA) negotiations. + +¶10. (C) Maliki appears loath to delegate sensitive political +tasks to persons outside this group, with the net effect of +hampering the GOI's capacity and stunting its institutional +development. The most recent example of this phenomenon we +have observed has been the difficulty the GOI has had in +standing up bilateral committees to work with the U.S. in +implementing the Security Agreement and the SFA. + +¶11. (C) Explaining the GOI delays and apparent disarray on +implementing the agreements, Sadiq al-Rikabi recently +confided to PMIN that he and his colleagues in Maliki's +circle were simply tired (and apparently tapped out). +Discussing an economic project with a senior USG official in +late December, Maliki complained, "If I don't get personally +involved, nothing happens." Clearly, Maliki's subordinates +have not been encouraged or empowered to take decisions on +their own - symptomatic of sclerotic bureaucracies across the +region. + +-------------------------------------- +This Paranoid Really Does Have Enemies +-------------------------------------- + +¶12. (C) Maliki's reluctance to delegate authority reflects +both an urge to control and a distrust of those outside his +circle. In meetings with Embassy officials, Maliki regularly +voices concern about plots against him. The Prime Minister +seems particularly fixated on the activities of Ba'thist +former regime elements in Syria and Jordan. More damagingly, +the PM's deep suspicion of the Iraqi Army's leadership as +Sunni Ba'athist and the source of potential coup-plotting has +only partially been tempered over the course of the past two +years. Similarly, Maliki shows a tendency to associate all +Sunni (and more broadly, Arab) opposition to his policies +with Ba'athist irredentism. This manifests itself in his +strained relationships with Iraqi Sunni political figures +such as Tawafuq/IIP leader Tariq al-Hashimi. It is also +visible in his (mistaken) dismissal of Iraq's externally +displaced as Sunnis who have not come to terms with +post-Saddam democratic Shi'a majoritarian rule. Maliki's +sectarian suspicion also shapes his view of the Saudis and +other Arab neighbors as unaccepting of Shi'a in governance. +Maliki staunchly denies -- and we agree -- that he is +motivated by overt sectarian bias. Rather, we see Maliki's +worldview as deeply informed by the Shi'a historical +experience. Unfortunately, the consequences in terms of his +willingness and ability to reach out to Iraqi Sunnis and the +broader Sunni world are effectively the same. + +¶13. (C) This said, the Prime Minister correctly sees rivals +across the spectrum of Iraq's ethnic, sectarian and political +leaderships as bent on his ouster. From the Kurdish +leadership (including KRG President Barzani, FM Zebari, and +Deputy Prime Minister Salih) to his Shi'a arch-rival ISCI +QDeputy Prime Minister Salih) to his Shi'a arch-rival ISCI +head Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim (and Vice President Adel Abd +al-Mehdi) and Sunni leader Vice President al-Hashimi, there +has been an unbroken and quite open criticism of Maliki's +leadership and proclaimed desire to see him ousted through a +parliamentary vote of no confidence. (This effort has been +hampered by fear of the political vacuum that would follow +Maliki's fall: There is no consensus among those who want to +bring him down about who/what should follow. Nevertheless, +the current impasse over a successor to ousted Parliamentary +Speaker Mashhadani is seen by some as a split between those +who favor a no confidence vote in the Prime Minister and +those who support Maliki.) + +-------------------- +Stove-Piped Security +-------------------- + +¶14. (C) Maliki has set up security structures that report +directly to the Prime Minister's Office, arguing that rather +than parallel lines of authority he is exercising the +legitimate authority of Commander in Chief. Indeed, the +Office of the Commander in Chief (OCINC) has been the object +of particular criticism over the past year as security +responsibilities have been taken in practice from Iraqi +security commanders and subordinated to OCINC +decision-making. The Counter-Terrorism Bureau (CTB) and its +Iraqi Special Operations Force fall entirely outside of +Ministry of Defense (MOD) and Ministry of Interior (MOI) +chains of command, reporting directly to the Prime Minister's +Office. Designed, trained and equipped by U.S. Special +Forces under the Multi National Security Transition Command - +Iraq (MNSTC-I), the CTB was originally conceived to fall +under MOD authority. Instead, the Prime Minister's Office +has assumed direct control of the CTB, and Maliki is reported +to be personally involved in both the CTB's targeting process +and its operational direction. Critics believe his +motivation was to create a politicized force that could +protect his regime. Maliki's defenders argue he was +compelled to set up the CTB -- and the OCINC -- to get a +handle on an unwieldy security bureaucracy at a time of +national crisis, pointing to the need for the PM's direct +intervention at the head of Iraqi security forces in Basrah, +Sadr City, Maysan and elsewhere over the course of 2008. We +believe both interpretations are correct. Maliki genuinely +sees his personal leadership and control as essential to +advance security and stability but has also directed assets +under his control to reinforce his political position. + +¶15. (C) The CTB maintains not only its own armed operations +units, but also its own detention facilities (principally the +ill-reputed facility at Camp Honor - within the International +Zone) and even has on staff its own judges to customize +arrest warrants. Iraqi MOD interlocutors, and Maliki's +political rivals, have both expressed to Emboffs their alarm +over the extent of the PM's personal control over the CTB, +which has already apparently been misused as a political +rather than security instrument (see para 17, below). Like a +number of GOI entities, the CTB is technically +extra-constitutional, although the Prime Minister is pressing +Parliament to approve a bill that would legalize its +activities. + +¶16. (C) Another controversial innovation has been the +establishment of Provincial Operations Centers, which +consolidate command of all ISF operations within their areas +of responsibility, a concept which originated with the 2007 +Baghdad Security Plan. The model has since been replicated +in Basra, Diyala, Karbala, and Ninewa. Operations commands +all report directly to the Iraqi Ground Forces Commander in +Baghdad, bypassing provincial governors, who often are not +only cut out of planning and operational direction, but may +not even be current on what the ISF are doing in their +provinces. We know that Maliki often goes directly to Ground +Forces Commander Ali Gheidan, or to lower-level division +commanders, or with operations-level commanders such as +General Abud Qanbar in Baghdad with specific instructions. + +------------------------------- +Diyala Province: Smite Thy Foes +------------------------------- + +¶17. (C) The ISF's "Operation Benevolent Diyala," launched in +August 2008, was quickly decried by the province's Sunni +political establishment as a sectarian power play directed by +Maliki. Given the province has been one of Iraq's most +unstable since 2004 -- with Al-Qaida menacing the center and +north of the province, and the Jaysh al-Mahdi spilling over +Qnorth of the province, and the Jaysh al-Mahdi spilling over +from Sadr City in Diyala's southwest flank -- a robust +security operation was badly needed. However, of 1200 +individuals detained by the end of 2008, 1150 were Sunnis, +including many local leaders of the "Sons of Iraq" armed +neighborhood watches partnered with the Coalition Forces, and +many local affiliates of the Sunni Iraqi Islamic Party. + +¶18. (C) Sunni grievances grew after August 18, 2008, when +Maliki's CTB raided the provincial government center in +Ba'qouba and seized two of Diyala's most prominent Sunni +political leaders, in the process killing (apparently by +accident) an aide to the governor. Both the national and +Diyala provincial leaderships of the Iraqi Islamic Party have +told us they are convinced Operation Benevolent Diyala was +partly, if not principally, a partisan political operation. +The Diyala operation severely strained ties, which were never +good to begin with, between Maliki and Vice President +Hashimi, national chair of the IIP. Any political benefit +Maliki might have hoped to gain by means of the security +operation in Diyala appears to have backfired: The Sunni +Tawafuq list (IIP and its allies) placed first in Diyala in +the Jan. 31 provincial elections - winning almost four times +as many votes as Da'wa. + +---------------------------------------- +Kurdish Standoff -- Poxes on Both Houses +---------------------------------------- + +¶19. (C) The PM's centralization of control over security +forces, exaggerated sense of confidence in his own leadership +and judgment (a product of the security successes of +spring/summer 2008), his profound distrust of Kurdish +motives, and progressive Kurdish moves to expand influence +south of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) region came +to a threatening head in September 2008, when Maliki ordered +Iraqi Army units to deploy in Khanaqin, a Kurdish enclave in +Diyala. Technically below the green line separating the KRG +from "Iraq proper," Khanaqin, with an almost entirely Kurdish +population, had been uneventfully occupied by the Peshmerga +since 2003. A tense standoff between the IA and Peshmerga +ensued, with Maliki insisting that the Constitution gave him +authority to deploy the Army anywhere within Iraq's borders +and the Kurds arguing that he was being unnecessarily +provocative in a peaceful (and disputed) corner of the +province. Maliki's orders to reinforce the IA's positions +with a tank company suggested to some that he was spoiling +for a fight with the Kurds. Had the two sides come to blows, +it could have spread along the green line to Kirkuk and Mosul +and would have likely posed a grave threat to Iraq's +viability as a unified state. While the crisis was defused +following U.S. intervention and brokering by VP Abd al-Mehdi, +the fundamental dispute that prompted it remains unresolved. +Most importantly, the Khanaqin incident fed each party's +distrust of the other. KRG President Barzani is especially +distrustful of Maliki's intentions. + +------------ +Overreaching +------------ + +¶20. (C) Maliki's willingness to confront the battle-tested +Peshmerga suggested that he had no doubt whatsoever about the +Iraqi Army's fighting capacity. Maliki famously declared, in +the summer of 2007, that his forces were ready to secure the +country and that coalition forces could leave any time they +wanted. Maliki's inflated assessment of his forces' +capabilities was obvious in March 2008, when he ordered the +Iraqi Army to move into Basra and eject the Sadrist militias +and street gangs who had tacit control of the city and its +strategic ports. While the operation ultimately succeeded, +and indeed began the process of establishing GOI authority +over areas formally dominated by Sadrist militias and the +Iranian-backed Special Groups, its first week was marked by +logistical chaos and serious setbacks on the battlefield. +The tide only turned when Coalition Forces, whom Maliki had +characteristically not consulted in advance, launched a major +resupply and support effort. + +--------------------------- +If You Can't Defeat, Co-opt +--------------------------- + +¶21. (C) Despite Maliki's demonstrated willingness to use +force to advance his political position and strengthen +central authority, as in Diyala or Basra, he has also worked +intensively to develop and expand patronage networks. One of +the principal vehicles in this effort has been tribal support +councils (TSCs). Originally designed to consolidate tribal +support for security operations in Basra and Maysan +provinces, their mandate subsequently expanded to include IDP +returns, sectarian reconciliation, and economic development. +Feeding critics' suspicions that the TSCs were set up to +strengthen Baghdad's reach into the provinces, distribute +patronage, and develop loyalty to Maliki, the Prime +Minister's Office moved expeditiously during 2008 to set up +QMinister's Office moved expeditiously during 2008 to set up +TSC's across the south and eventually most of Iraq (ref B), +without apparent regard to the actual needs of different +localities. + +¶22. (C) The merits of the TSC model are open for debate: +Maliki's supporters argue that TSCs are efficient mechanisms +for dispensing resources from the center to the periphery and +for empowering tribes as elements of stability and natural +partners for rural development. Regardless, the TSCs have +been perceived by ISCI, Maliki's principal Shi'a coalition +partner, as a direct bid to undermine the provincial +governments it controlled and seize the loyalties of its core +constituents. Certainly, Maliki's TSCs have further +alienated ISCI from the Prime Minister. (In the fall, KRG +President Barzani also lashed out at Maliki over nascent TSCs +in Kirkuk and Mosul, viewing them as an open challenge to +Kurdish interests in disputed territories.) + +----------------------------- +But In The Success Column ... +----------------------------- + +¶23. (C) Despite the considerable controversy Maliki's +approach has generated, there is no doubt that Iraq's overall +security situation has improved dramatically on his watch. +He overcame formidable domestic opposition, and intense +pressure from Iran, to shepherd the Security Agreement and +SFA through parliament. Even most of his sharpest critics +concede he showed courage in confronting the Shi'a extremist +Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM) in the spring of 2008. There is +consensus that Muqtada al-Sadr and the JAM have had their +wings clipped, and while not wiped off Iraq's political map, +they no longer pose anywhere near the threat they did +2004-07. + +¶24. (C) Indeed, Maliki and Da'wa have been working +diligently, and with apparent success, to court the +disarrayed Sadrists and bring them closer to the political +mainstream (and even groom them as potential coalition +partners). Maliki's gambit to crush the JAM earned him the +grudging appreciation of many Sunnis and moderate Shi'a who +had previously seen him as a JAM enabler. Maliki is +particularly popular in Basra, which had been terrorized by +Sadrist militias and criminal spinoffs prior to the March +2008 operation against them. Maliki's "State of Law" +electoral list achieved first place showings in Baghdad and +eight of Iraq's nine southern provinces (voters punished the +Da'wa incumbent in Karbala, however). + +¶25. (C) Maliki has also exceeded expectations to date in his +handling of the integration of the mainly Sunni Sons of +Iraq/Awakening Movement into the Iraqi Security Forces. Many +had feared that he would not honor the SOI salary system set +up by coalition forces and would instead arrest and purge SOI +leaders. While the transition in Baghdad province went +smoothly, signs have been less encouraging in Diyala, and the +GOI's commitment to find work for the 80 percent of SOI not +absorbed into the ISF remains mainly hypothetical. On the +whole, Maliki has thus far honored his commitment to take on +and continue the SOI program. + +--------------------------------------------- --------------- +Conclusion: U.S. Interest in a Strengthened Center, But ... +--------------------------------------------- --------------- + +¶26. (C) The critical progress on security and stability made +over the past year, while underpinned by the U.S. military +surge, owes much to Maliki's leadership and restoration of +central government authority. It is in the interests of the +U.S. to see that process of strengthened central authority +continue, but in a manner that is sustainable, based on +institutions rather than personalities, and reflecting a +consensus national vision among Iraq's main ethnic/sectarian +groups. In this regard, the PM's deep distrust of virtually +all other actors on the Iraqi (and regional) scene undercuts +his -- and our -- efforts to reinforce the still-fragile +institutional gains of the past two years. We have pressed +the PM and other political leaders to deal seriously with the +range of grievances that separate them and to move forward on +the various reform agendas articulated in the August 2007 +leaders' declaration. However, Maliki sought to parry the +opposition's various grievances with the establishment of +five multi-party committees to resolve longstanding impasses +on security and defense, hydrocarbons, power sharing, budget, +and disputed territories. While the other parties delegated +different representatives to the committees, Maliki +characteristically appointed himself to represent Da'wa and +Qcharacteristically appointed himself to represent Da'wa and +his overworked Da'wa inner circle on all five. To date, the +committees have met only infrequently and have made little +visible progress. + +¶27. (C) Maliki's position may not be indefinitely +sustainable. Tellingly, Maliki's parliamentary critics +continue to emphasize the CoR "political reform document" +rather than the five committees, as their preferred vehicle +for change. Maliki's government remains dysfunctional on +many levels. He has a strained relationship with Foreign +Minister Zebari (who openly refers to KRG President Barzani +as his boss) and is known to dislike and distrust Interior +Minister Bolani (who has started his own political party). +He rarely convenes the Executive Council (composed of the +President, the two Vice Presidents, the KRG President, and +the Prime Minister). His defenders argue the role of Iraq's +President and Vice Presidents is more protocol than +executive. With the Kurds, the mainstream Sunnis, and even +non-Da'wa Shi'a coalition partners largely alienated, it may +be a matter of time before dislike of Maliki and the growing +threat to their particular interests finally unites the PM's +foes and overcomes their fundamental disagreement about who +and what would replace Maliki after a successful +no-confidence vote. + +¶28. (C) The results of the January 31 provincial elections, +however, with strong showings by Maliki's State of Law/Da'wa +list in nine of 14 participating provinces has clearly given +the Prime Minister momentum, allowing him to claim a tangible +base of public support, at least in Baghdad and Iraq's south. + While this success has likely taken some wind from the sails +of proponents of a no-confidence vote, Maliki's adversaries +might also calculate that they must act before the national +elections, expected at the end of 2009, to forestall an +irreversible consolidation of power. + +¶29. (C) Faced with this situation, we should continue to +emphasize our support for institutions rather than +individuals, and for processes rather than personalities, +even as we are mindful that Iraqi politics will remain +personalized and divided for the foreseeable future. In this +regard, the U.S. is not without assets in attempting to shape +Maliki's actions. The process of negotiating the SFA/SA with +the PM and his team demonstrated the importance Maliki +attaches to building a strong relationship with the U.S. and +his ability to deliver on key issues. His advisors have +shared with us anxiety over the position the new +Administration will take toward the PM and have sought +reassurance that the ties forged last year will continue. We +should press the PM on institution and political consensus +building as key to sustaining and advancing our relationship +-- and support. + +CROCKER \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/origin/Embassy Bogota/08BOGOTA337.txt b/origin/Embassy Bogota/08BOGOTA337.txt index 06d7e6f75..8045e93a7 100644 --- a/origin/Embassy Bogota/08BOGOTA337.txt +++ b/origin/Embassy Bogota/08BOGOTA337.txt @@ -169,18 +169,7 @@ GOC asked the Cuban government their views on Chavez' call to roll back the FARC's terrorist designation, the Cubans stated that it was "a difficult proposal." -¶8. (S) Uribe saw mixed loyalties among other Latin American -countries. Only Nicaragua had supported Chavez' FARC -proposal. Argentina remains difficult, since Venezuela -bought Argentine bonds and Chavez made campaign contributions -to the new President. Paraguay, in the midst of an election -cycle, is uncertain though the front-runner supports Chavez. -Uruguay, a possible ally, is sitting on the fence. Brazil -remains friendly with Colombia, but prefers neutrality lest -it offend anyone. In Peru, President Alan Garcia concurs - -with the United States and would follow its lead. Chile -remains a good friend to Colombia and its cause. +¶8. (S) Uribe saw mixed loyalties among other Latin American countries. Only Nicaragua had supported Chavez' FARC proposal. Argentina remains difficult, since Venezuela bought Argentine bonds and Chavez made campaign contributions to the new President. Paraguay, in the midst of an election cycle, is uncertain though the front-runner supports Chavez. Uruguay, a possible ally, is sitting on the fence. Brazil remains friendly with Colombia, but prefers neutrality lest it offend anyone. In Peru, President Alan Garcia concurs with the United States and would follow its lead. Chile remains a good friend to Colombia and its cause. ----------------- Hostages and HVTs diff --git a/origin/Embassy Kuala Lumpur/08KUALALUMPUR1114.txt b/origin/Embassy Kuala Lumpur/08KUALALUMPUR1114.txt new file mode 100644 index 000000000..d69d04147 --- /dev/null +++ b/origin/Embassy Kuala Lumpur/08KUALALUMPUR1114.txt @@ -0,0 +1,298 @@ +08KUALALUMPUR1114 +PRESSURE MOUNTS AGAINST INTERNAL SECURITY ACT (ISA) +Tue Dec 23 00:00:00 +0100 2008 +SECRET +Embassy Kuala Lumpur +VZCZCXRO3142 +OO RUEHCHI RUEHDT RUEHHM RUEHNH +DE RUEHKL #1114/01 3580721 +ZNY SSSSS ZZH +O 230721Z DEC 08 +FM AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR +TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2163 +INFO RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE +RUCNASE/ASEAN MEMBER COLLECTIVE PRIORITY +RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0552 +RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 2711 +RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY +RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI PRIORITY +RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITYS E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 KUALA LUMPUR 001114 + +SIPDIS + +E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/19/2028 +TAGS: PTER PGOV PHUM KJUS KDEM +SUBJECT: PRESSURE MOUNTS AGAINST INTERNAL SECURITY ACT (ISA) + +REF: A. KUALA LUMPUR 1026 - DPM NAJIB DISCUSSES ISA + ¶B. KUALA LUMPUR 990 - RAJA PETRA RELEASED + ¶C. KUALA LUMPUR 944 - MCA AND GERAKAN CRITICIZE UMNO + ¶D. KUALA LUMPUR 846 - UPDATE ON RAJA PETRA + ¶E. KUALA LUMPUR 834 - KOK RELEASED FROM ISA + ¶F. KUALA LUMPUR 810 - UPROAR OVER ISA + ¶G. KUALA LUMPUR 806 - JOURNALIST DETAINED UNDER ISA + ¶H. 07 KUALA LUMPUR 902 - BEYOND ISA + +Classified By: Political Counselor Mark D. Clark, reason 1.4 (b, c and +d). + +NOTE: THIS CABLE TRANSMITS AN EDITED VERSION OF KUALA LUMPUR +1102 SENT ON 12/18/08 IN MORE RESTRICTED CHANNELS. END NOTE. + + +¶1. (S) Summary: The Malaysian government's use of the +Internal Security Act (ISA), which allows for detention +without trial and is central to the GOM's intelligence-driven +CT effort, has come under increasing political pressure over +the past three months. The GOM's employment of the ISA in +September to carry out three politically-motivated ISA +detentions unrelated to terrorism sparked unprecedented +public criticism. At least eight component parties from the +governing National Front (BN) coalition have since broken +ranks with the leading United Malays National Organization +(UMNO) and called for amending or abolishing the ISA. The +opposition party alliance led by Anwar Ibrahim has made the +revocation of ISA one of its highest profile policy goals. +In November, a High Court judge delivered a legal blow to the +GOM's wide discretion in using the ISA in a ruling that freed +blogger Raja Petra, and the GOM is appealing the decision. +Prime Minister Abdullah, his deputy and successor Najib and +Home Minister Syed Hamid have defended the ISA as essential +to national security, while Najib told the Ambassador +privately ISA should be retained but used more judiciously. +The GOM released 17 ISA detainees, among them 10 previously +linked to terrorist groups, including Yazid Sufaat, from +November 5 to December 4. + +¶2. (S) Comment: The ISA is the cornerstone of Malaysia's CT +effort and has allowed Special Branch to take successful +preemptive action against suspected terrorists and their +supporters. Given the GOM's exclusive reliance on the ISA +"crutch" and on Special Branch's role, police and prosecutors +remain ill-prepared to investigate and bring to trial +terrorist suspects (or prosecute other complex criminal +conspiracies). The ISA also is subject to misuse for +political ends and is an important insurance policy for +maintaining UMNO in power. For both CT and political +reasons, the GOM will not readily give up the ISA. We doubt +that the increased political pressure and seeming swing in +public opinion against the ISA, due in part to its misuse in +September, will result in the ISA's amendment or revocation +in the near future, absent the Opposition coming to power. +These developments, however, reinforce the conclusion (ref H) +that Malaysia cannot take for granted the availability of the +ISA as a CT tool in the long run. It remains in the U.S. +interest to encourage and assist Malaysia to develop an +approach centered on prosecutions and convictions before an +independent judiciary to combat terrorism. + +¶3. (C) Comment continued: It is unclear to what extent +outside political pressures played a direct role in the GOM's +latest release of ISA detainees. The decisions may have more +to do with Syed Hamid's personal exercise of authority as +Home Minister. Syed Hamid has taken a more proactive role as +Home Minister, compared to PM Abdullah who held the position +through March 2008 and tended not to become involved in +details. End Summary and Comment. + +¶4. (C) The Malaysian government's use of the Internal +Security Act (ISA), central to the GOM's intelligence-driven +counterterrorism efforts, has come under increasing political +pressure since the September ISA arrests of three persons +based on political rather security considerations. The +September 12 ISA detentions of an ethnic Chinese journalist, +an ethnic Chinese Opposition MP (Teresa Kok), and a prominent +blogger (Raja Petra Kamaruddin) served the ruling UMNO +party's immediate political purpose of sending a warning to +opposition politicians and those considering defecting from +BN, as some UMNO politicians have told us. This came at a +time when Anwar Ibrahim was publicly threatening to bring +down the BN government via parliamentary crossovers by +September 16. The arrests, however, also sparked +unprecedented public criticism of the ISA, including from +UMNO's ethnic minority partners within BN. The Malaysian +Chinese Association (MCA), the key ethnic Chinese BN +component party, reportedly threatened to leave BN unless the +GOM released the Chinese journalist; the GOM complied within +less than 24 hours (ref F). Authorities freed MP Teresa Kok +after seven days. Home Minister Syed Hamid ordered a +two-year ISA detention period for Raja Petra, who was freed +on appeal in November in a surprise court ruling (see below). + +¶5. (C) Comment: Unlike his predecessor Mahathir, PM +Abdullah refrained from using the ISA for political purposes +until December 2007 when police detained five leaders of the +ethnic Indian activist group HINDRAF that organized large +street protests. The public viewed the GOM's September 2008 +ISA arrests as more transparently political, in part because +of the lack of public order concerns. End Comment. + +¶6. (C) Political pressure against the ISA did not dissipate +following the release of the first two of the three recent +ISA detainees. At least eight component parties from the +governing BN coalition of 14 parties have since broken ranks +with UMNO and called for amending or reviewing the grounds +for the ISA, while several have supported the law's +abolition. In late September MCA, BN's second largest party, +called for "a comprehensive review of the ISA so that it will +apply strictly to cases relating to terrorism and subversive +elements," and also argued for the introduction of "checks +and balances in the use of ISA." The leader of the Gerakan +party, Koh Tsu Koon, called on the GOM to "abolish the ISA +once and for all," and rely on the judicial system instead. +The leader of the Peoples Progressive Party (PPP) also +initially called for ISA to be abolished, and on December 1 +said PPP would withdraw from BN unless if the ISA were not +amended before the next election. In response, Prime +Minister Abdullah called PPP's bluff and said the small +party, which holds no seats in Parliament, could leave BN if +it wished. BN MPs so far have not backed up their criticism +of ISA with action. In response to a petition circulated in +Parliament for the review or repeal of ISA, only one BN MP +signed his name. + +¶7. (C) The opposition party alliance (Pakatan Rakyat, or +Pakatan) led by Anwar Ibrahim has vocally condemned ISA as +undemocratic and unjust, and made the abolishment of ISA one +of its highest profile policy goals. A number of senior +officials from Pakatan's three parties, Anwar's Peoples +Justice Party (PKR), the Democratic Action Party (DAP), and +the Islamic Party of Malaysia (PAS) were detained under ISA +during the era of former Prime Minister Mahathir. Not +surprisingly, the three parties have vowed to revoke ISA if +they come to power. "Abolish ISA" was the most prominent +theme at PKR's annual party conference on November 29, which +Polcouns observed. The keynote event concluded with a focus +on ISA and featured large screens that scrolled through the +list of all 60-plus ISA detainees with the several thousand +attendees reciting the detainees' names as they appeared. +Well-known blogger Raja Petra, released from ISA detention +only days before, mounted the stage as the surprise guest of +the grand finale. + +¶8. (SBU) On November 7, a High Court judge delivered an +unanticipated legal blow to the GOM's wide discretion in +using the ISA in a habeas corpus ruling that freed blogger +Raja Petra. The Embassy obtained the full text of the +judge's 22-page ruling. ISA Section 8.B states "there shall +be no judicial review in any court" of the Home Minister's +exercise of "discretionary powers in accordance with this +Act," except for compliance with procedural requirements. +The judge ruled, however, that the Home Minister decisions +could not be "unfettered and arbitrary," allowing for the +court to consider whether the Minister's ISA detention order +was "in accordance with the Act," and its focus on threats to +national security, including the national economy; threats to +maintenance of essential services; and threats to the public +emanating from a "substantial body of persons" who intend to +change the government through unlawful means. In the case of +Raja Petra, the judge concluded that the grounds for his +detention did not fall within the purview of the ISA. The +government has appealed the ruling and as of mid-December the +appeal remains pending. + +¶9. (C) Many civil society groups took the opportunity over +the past three months to highlight their standing opposition +to the ISA, as well as other emergency ordinances that allow +for detention without trial. Both conservative and liberal +Muslim NGOs called on the GOM to abolish the ISA, as did the +inter-faith Consultative Forum that groups the leaders of all +major religions except Islam. The National Human Rights +Commission (SUHAKAM) chairman Abu Talib restated the +commission's existing position, namely "detention without +trial is against human rights principles; that's why we +advised the Government years ago to repeal the ISA." + +¶10. (C) As questions over the ISA have mounted, Prime +Minister Abdullah, his deputy and successor Najib, and other +senior UMNO leaders defended the ISA as essential to national +security. In the wake of public criticism over the September +ISA arrests, Home Minister Syed Hamid, who has authority +under the ISA to approve detention orders, defended the Act +as essential and stated clearly that "we have no plans to do +away with ISA." In early December, Syed Hamid waved off +criticisms, arguing that the ISA "has never been abused or +used for politics." He also commented that, "Malaysians +sometimes don't know how lucky we are in that we have not +experienced what is happening in Mumbai (the terrorist +attack) and Bangkok (political unrest) now." He said the +fact that there have been no post 9/11 terrors attacks in +Malaysia was in part due to the ISA. On December 15, Syed +Hamid again publicly defended use of the ISA, stating, "More +apt, faster and better to use the ISA... detention under the +act is early action to prevent the security of the country +from being adversely affected." + +¶11. (C) DPM Najib, who is anticipated to become Prime +Minister in late March 2009, told the Ambassador privately on +November 11 that the government continued to need the ISA, +"even though there are civil liberty concerns," but should +reserve ISA only for those who pose "serious threats, like +terrorists" (ref A). On December 8, PM Abdullah publicly +rejected calls for amendments to the ISA. + +¶12. (SBU) In early December, local and international press +reported that the GOM had released 17 ISA detainees from +November 5 through December 4. Of those released, 10 had +been held for suspected links to Al Qaeda, Jemaah Islamiyah, +and/or the Darul Islam terrorist groups. The released +terrorist suspects included Yazid Sufaat, who played an +important role in Al Qaeda's anthrax development program, +according to the 9/11 Commission. The remaining seven +persons released consisted of suspected foreign agents (2 +persons), southern Thailand separatists (2), document forgers +(2), and prominent blogger Raja Petra, according to an NGO +that consistently and accurately monitors ISA detentions. +In his public remarks, Syed Hamid said those recently +released ISA detainees had been rehabilitated and no longer +posed a security threat to Malaysia. + +¶13. (S) Note: Authorities had detained the terrorist +suspects for periods between two and (in the case of Yazid +Sufaat) seven years, for an average detention period of four +years for the ten individuals. Special Branch relies on a +process for rehabilitating ISA detainees, and eventually +releasing them under restricted and monitored conditions when +judged necessary. The GOM has never attempted to prosecute +any terrorist suspects, including those held under the ISA. +This is due in large part to the fact that the GOM pursues +almost exclusively an intelligence approach to CT, as opposed +to a law enforcement approach that would involve criminal +investigations, collection of legally admissible evidence, +and development of cases for prosecution in the courts. In +2007, Malaysia amended anti-terrorism provisions in its penal +code and criminal procedures code, but authorities have not +yet utilized these provisions. Malaysia also has a poor +track record of prosecuting other complex criminal +conspiracies, including drug trafficking cases, preferring +instead to utilize the ISA and other emergency ordinances to +detain suspects without trial. End Note. + +¶14. (S) A well-known journalist contacted us in early +December and said that officers of the Police Special Branch +had complained to him that Home Minister Syed Hamid had +ordered the recent releases of terrorist suspects without +adequate consultation and in some cases against the +recommendation of Special Branch. Australian and British +diplomats, speaking with Polcouns December 16, stated that +Syed Hamid, who is a lawyer by training, personally reviewed +the dossiers of ISA detainees and was inclined to approve +releases absent compelling justification from the Special +Branch. + +¶15. (C) The Thai embassy contacted Poloff on December 15 to +express concern over the release of two ISA detainees (Abdul +Rahman bin Ahmad and Mat Tarmizi bin Shamsudin, who +apparently are dual-citizens of Malaysia and Thailand) who +had been held for their connection to the insurgency in +southern Thailand. The Thai diplomat said Bangkok considered +Abdul Rahman in particular to be a major player in the +insurgency. He noted that those released are required to +remain in Malaysia and check in periodically with the police. + The Thai diplomat said he believed the GOM released the +detainees in order to diffuse criticism of the ISA. We +learned that the Thai embassy also has contacted other +Western embassies (UK, France, Australia) to express concern +over the recent ISA releases. + +KEITH \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/origin/Embassy Montevideo/06MONTEVIDEO418.txt b/origin/Embassy Montevideo/06MONTEVIDEO418.txt new file mode 100644 index 000000000..046eba92d --- /dev/null +++ b/origin/Embassy Montevideo/06MONTEVIDEO418.txt @@ -0,0 +1,145 @@ +06MONTEVIDEO418 +VAZQUEZ LOBBIES HARD FOR TRADE TALKS WITH U.S. WORKING GROUPS FORMED +Thu May 11 00:00:00 +0200 2006 +CONFIDENTIAL +Embassy Montevideo +VZCZCXYZ0000 +RR RUEHWEB + +DE RUEHMN #0418/01 1311501 +ZNY CCCCC ZZH +R 111501Z MAY 06 +FM AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO +TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5754 +INFO RUCNMER/MERCOSUR COLLECTIVE +RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ MAY SANTIAGO 2848 +RUMIAAA/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL +RUEHC/DEPT OF AGRICULTURE WASHDC +RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC +RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC +RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC,C O N F I D E N T I A L MONTEVIDEO 000418 + +SIPDIS + +SIPDIS + +DEPT FOR WHA/AS SHANNON AND EB/AS WAYNE +DEPT ALSO FOR WHA/BSC FOR BARNES, CROFT AND MURRAY +DEPT PLEASE PASS USTR +TREASURY FOR OASIA FOR DOUGLAS +COMMERCE FOR ITA/MAC BASTIAN +NSC FOR FISK AND CRONIN +SOUTHCOM FOR POLAD + +E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/10/2016 +TAGS: ETRD ECON PREL UY +SUBJECT: VAZQUEZ LOBBIES HARD FOR TRADE TALKS WITH U.S. WORKING GROUPS FORMED + + +Classified By: Charge d'Affaires James D. Nealon +for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). + +¶1. (C) Summary: President Vazquez appears to have wasted no +time in pushing his trade agenda. At the May 8 Cabinet +meeting, he recounted the results of his ten-day trip to the +U.S. and Mexico, and of his meeting with POTUS on May 4. He +advocated for expanded trade talks with the U.S., which he +said could eventually lead to a Free Trade Agreement (FTA). +His Cabinet strongly supported Vazquez in this endeavor, with +11 ministers in favor and only two against (ForMin Gargano +and Communist Minister for Social Development Arismendi). +Charge met on May 10 with Industry Minister Lepra, who had +accompanied Vazquez on the trip, to get a first-hand account +of the GOU's next steps. Lepra confirmed the overwhelming +Cabinet support and requested that we provide some +information on specific benefits of trade agreements for +public consumption. He confirmed that the GOU was looking at +its FTA with Mexico as a model to start talks (Note: Post is +translating this agreement for USTR. End Note.) He added +that he would lead a committee of five ministers to oversee +the trade talks, and he provided the names of the members of +the technical negotiating team. When reminded of the +importance of a clear leader to head this technical team, +Lepra immediately picked up the phone to call Economy +Minister Astori. After the conversation with Astori, he told +Charge that they had decided upon EconMin Director of Trade +Sarachaga as the team leader. This would be confirmed after +discussing the issue with Vazquez at the next Cabinet meeting +on May 15. It appears that Vazquez and his economic team +have found more support for an FTA than they may have thought +possible so early after their return and are capitalizing on +the momentum. End Summary. + +¶2. (C) On Monday May 8, shortly after his return, President +Vazquez called a Cabinet meeting to inform his ministers +about his ten-day trip to the U.S. and Mexico. Vazquez is +reported to have explained his vision of an increased trade +relationship with the U.S., leading to a possible FTA by +October. According to Vice-President Novoa and Industry +Minister Lepra, 11 out of 13 ministers expressed their +support for Vazquez's vision, with only Foreign Minister +Gargano (Socialist) and Social Development Minister Arismendi +(Communist) dissenting. According to the reports, Astori led +a strong, well-founded defense of the advantages of an FTA, +while Gargano threatened to resign if an FTA was ever signed +with the U.S. It appears that the level of support that +Vazquez garnered in this first Cabinet meeting was stronger +than expected. On the public front, the left-leaning daily +La Republica was unusually supportive, with overall favorable +reporting under a headline claiming that "The Government +pressed on the accelerator to make good on commercial +agreement with the U.S." A poll conducted by El Pais +indicated a strong majority of public support for a trade +agreement with the U.S. + +¶3. (C) Charge met on May 10 with Industry Minister Lepra to +get a better understanding of the GOU's plans and to +coordinate actions. Lepra was very upbeat about the trip and +about the prospects for an FTA. He relished in the increased +isolation in which ForMin Gargano was finding himself. Lepra +and Charge agreed to coordinate public stance regarding the +ongoing negotiations, to ensure that the Embassy not move +ahead of President Vazquez. Lepra confirmed that the model +FTA that the GOU favored was the Uruguay-Mexico FTA, ""for +political reasons"". This agreement was supported by the +entire political spectrum, he explained, and by Uruguay's +Mercosur partners. In addition, Lepra noted that the +Uruguay-Mexico FTA, signed in 2004, is a third-generation +agreement based on an improved NAFTA model. Charge confirmed +that post was in the process of translating this document so +that USTR may compare it with our latest FTA. Lepra then +requested our assistance in providing him with information +about our FTA with Vietnam, not because it is a particularly +good FTA, he noted, but rather to counter opposition from the +Communist Party. "If Communist Vietnam, after fighting a +brutal war against the U.S., can turn around and sign an +FTA," he explained, "how can our Communists be against it?" +Lepra also requested information on job creation, investment +and poverty reduction brought about by FTAs, again for the +GOU's campaign to build up public support. Charge pledged to +provide the information. Post would appreciate any and all +such information to be shared with the GOU. + +¶4. (C) Lepra said he would lead a political committee of five +ministers (Industry, Economy, Agriculture, Foreign Affairs +and Tourism), responsible for the trade talks. He also had a +technical negotiating team in mind, but was still unclear as +to who would lead this team. Charge noted the importance of +a solid negotiating team, with clear lines of authority, +given the short time frame in which negotiations were to be +conducted. Lepra immediately picked up the phone to call +EconMin Astori, with whom he agreed to have EconMin Trade +Director Sarachaga lead the negotiating team. He and Astori +would confirm their choice after the next Cabinet meeting on +May 15, he said. + +¶5. (C) Comment: Clearly, Vazquez has returned from the U.S. +in a strengthened position to initiate trade talks and is +making the best out of the momentum he has encountered. The +GOU appears to be keenly aware of the tight timeframe to +negotiate an agreement and determined to make the most of +this opportunity. Embassy will continue to be the +interagency coordinator" for the GOU to ensure that no time +is lost due to lack of focus on organizational details. End +Comment. +Nealon \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/origin/Embassy Rome/03ROME3567.txt b/origin/Embassy Rome/03ROME3567.txt new file mode 100644 index 000000000..752f6a6f9 --- /dev/null +++ b/origin/Embassy Rome/03ROME3567.txt @@ -0,0 +1,311 @@ +03ROME3567 +GALILEO: AMBASSADOR ARAGONA ADVOCATES ADDITIONAL +Wed Aug 06 00:00:00 +0200 2003 +CONFIDENTIAL +Embassy Rome +This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.C O N F I D E N T I A L ROME 003567 + +SIPDIS + + +STATE FOR OES/SAT (BRAIBANTI, KARNER) +DEFENSE FOR OASD/NII (STENBIT MANNO WORMSER SWIDER CHESKY) +DEFENSE ALSO FOR OSD/P (TOWNSEND, NOVAK) +JOINT STAFF FOR J5/J6 + +E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/06/2013 +T... + +SUBJECT: GALILEO: AMBASSADOR ARAGONA ADVOCATES ADDITIONAL +TECHNICAL TALKS TO RESOLVE M-CODE OVERLAY ISSUE + +REF: USNATO 00777 + +Classified By: A/ECMIN David W. Mulenex; reasons 1.5 B and D. + +¶1. (C) Summary: Italian MFA Political Director Gianfranco +Aragona informed a U.S. delegation on July 16 that he still +believes technical solutions exist to the U.S.-EU dispute +over the Galileo Public Regulated Service (PRS) signal +overlay of the M-code. Aragona recognized US security +concerns regarding the overlay, but repeatedly insisted the +EU must safeguard the "Integrity and operability" of Galileo. + The U.S. delegation insisted that an overlay would harm U.S. +and NATO NAVWAR capabilities and put lives at risk in the +event of warfare. Aragona did not completely reject the +delegation's point that a political solution was necessary to +avoid this outcome but made it clear he does not believe the +dispute is ripe for high level political intervention. +Aragona did agree that the delegation's suggestion to merge +unclassified technical talks and plenary negotiations was a +good idea and promised to convey the idea to the Commission. +Aragona stated firmly that NATO would not be an acceptable +venue for classified discussions. He suggested they could +take place at the US Mission to NATO, but insisted that he +participants must be limited to the U.S. and the EC. See +Embassy comment para 16. End Summary. + +¶2. (U) On July 16 a U.S. delegation met with Italian MFA +Political Director Gianfranco Aragona to discuss the US-EC +dispute over the Galileo Public Regulated Service (PRS) +signal overlay of the GPS M-code. The U.S. delegation was +led by Ralph Braibanti, Director, Space and Advanced +Technology, State Department Bureau of Oceans and +International Environmental and Technical Affairs and +included Mel Flack, Director, Communications Electronic +Division, US Mission to NATO; Richard McKinney, Deputy +Director Space Acquisition, US Air Force; Todd Wilson, EST +Officer, US Mission to the EU; Marja Verloop EUR/ERA; and +representatives from the political and science sections of +Embassy Rome. Those joining Aragona included Giovanni +Brauzzi, Director, Office of NATO Affairs, MFA; Sandro +Bernardin, European Correspondent, MFA; Mario Caporale, +Navigation Office, Italian Space Agency; and Umberto +Cantielli, Chief, Navigation Identification Office, Defense +General Staff, Ministry of Defense. + +U.S. Delegation Insists Political Solution is needed + +¶3. (C) Braibanti told Aragona that the U.S. believes it is +important to hold informal consultations with key EU member +States to advance U.S.-EC differences over Galileo towards a +decision. He recalled that the President raised M-Code +overlay at the last U.S.- EU Summit. In reviewing the USG +position on Galileo, Braibanti explained that the U.S. +accepts the EU satellite system as a reality, but the +security implications of having the Galileo Public Regulated +Service (PRS) overlay the GPS M-Code are unacceptable to both +the U.S. and NATO. so far, the U.S. has fought a defensive +battle with the European Commission (EC). Braibanti allowed +that some progress has been made in convincing European +officials that direct overlay of M-Code by the PRS is a bad +idea. However, consideration being given by the EC to use +BOC 2.2 for Open Service (OS) also involves a partial overlay +of M-Code, and damages navigational warfare capabilities. +The U.S. will be unable to accept this outcome. + +¶4. (C) Braibanti assured Aragona that the USG is committed +to finding a solution, but cautioned that without some +flexibility and compromise from the EC, progress will be +difficult. The U.S. has proposed several technical options +for Galileo PRS and OS that our experts believe meet all +stated technical and performance requirements for Galileo +services. Braibanti underscored that, given the EC's +timetable for making design decisions on Galileo, member +states may find that the Commission has locked in technical +solutions that threaten U.S. and NATO capabilities to conduct +navigational warfare. To avoid this eventuality, which could +put allied lives at risk, member states need to give clear +political guidance now to the EC that the Galileo signal +structure cannot undermine NAVWAR operations. + +But Aragona Puts Faith in Further Technical Talks + +¶5. (C) Aragona, signaling his reluctance to take on U.S. +concerns vis-a-vis Italy's EU partners, underscored that +Galileo negotiations had been entrusted to the EC. He +assured the U.S. team that Italy recognized the security +issues at stake. "Given our NATO membership it would be +crazy for us not to be sensitive to U.S. arguments," Aragona +declared. These concerns are shared by the EC, he claimed, +but any solution must also safeguard the "integrity and +operability of Galileo for it to be a commercially viable and +reliable system (Note: Aragona came back repeatedly +throughout the course of the consultations to this theme. End +Note). + +¶6. (C) Aragona pressed claims by EC experts that technical +negotiations could lead to a solution to both protect the +integrity and operability of Galileo and address US security +concerns. Referencing the U.S.-EU Summit, Aragona asserted +that, as an "agreement" had been reached to proceed with +technical talks, the pace of negotiations to try to reach a +"technical solution" to the overlay conundrum should be +intensified. Italy and the EC are ready to take into +account U.S. and NATO security concerns and believe that +technical solutions, which protect them, are available. + +¶7. (C) Aragona wanted to know when the U.S. would be ready +to discuss the most recent EC proposals, which he understood +included a certain "inventiveness" and were "not so stuck in +the prejudices of the past." The EC was ready to sit and +discuss a mutually agreeable technical solution. As for +political input, Aragona said once more that the Commission +is well aware that U.S. security concerns must be addressed +while taking into account the "integrity" of the Galileo +system. + +¶8. (C) Braibanti countered that, with regard to EC +technical proposals, he was aware of only two to which a +formal reply had not been given: using filtering to mitigate +the navigation warfare problems posed by overlaying BOC 2.2, +and having the U.S. change the frequency for its military GPS +signals. In the spirit of cooperation, the U.S. had not +rejected these ideas out of hand, but instead asked its +technical experts to analyze them carefully. Now that he had +seen the results of this analysis, Braibanti could say with +some certainty that it is highly unlikely that either of +these options will work. Summing up this portion of the +discussion, Braibanti framed the state of play for Aragona: +We may well reach a situation in September where we will have +analyzed the EC's proposals and decided they can not provide +a solution which protects U.S. and NATO capabilities to +conduct NAVWAR. Our concern is that if EC technical experts +continue to operate within their current frame of reference, +we will arrive at a technical impasse. To avoid this +impasse, the EC team needs clear political direction from +member States that they should focus on options that do not +negatively impact NAVWAR. (Note: on the margins of the +meeting, Braibanti told Aragona that the USG worries the EC +negotiators may be positioning themselves to argue to the EU +member states that they had made a good faith effort to reach +a compromise, but the U.S. would not meet them halfway, so +Galileo must move ahead without an agreement to cooperate +with the U.S. Aragona discounted this possibility, +suggesting that the EC recognizes the need for Galileo-GPS +interoperability. (End Note) + +NATO a Non-Starter for Classified Talks + +¶9. (C) Aragona said the U.S. and EU face a practical +problem over where to hold classified discussions and that +this problem should be easily resolvable. Italy expects the +U.S. to provide a formal answer to the letter EC negotiator +Heinz Hillbrecht sent to Braibanti on July 2 (reftel). +Aragona maintained that the EC wants further discussions in a +classified setting, but that setting can not be NATO. He +underscored this point in uncharacteristically blunt +language. Aragona said holding the talks at the US Mission +to NATO was perfectly acceptable as long as they were U.S.-EC +rather than NATO-EC discussions. The issue under discussion +is between the U.S. and the EC, Aragona argued, and, +moreover, there are several non-EU members of NATO. +Braibanti took Aragona's points and assured him that the USG +was considering the issue of additional classified +discussions, including the modalities for such meetings. + +Some Agreement on Procedure, but.... + +¶10. (C) Braibanti, moving the discussion to how and when to +hold the next plenary negotiating session, said the U.S. will +work with the Commission on dates for a September meeting to +review technical and trade issues He suggested folding the +technical discussions into the plenary negotiating session. +This could help to ensure transparency and avoid +misunderstanding among the political negotiators about the +available technical options. Aragona acknowledged that +Braibanti's idea had merit and committed to "see what could +be done" to make a political recommendation to the EC to +proceed along these lines. + +Still Talking Past Each Other on substance + +¶11. (C) The U.S. delegation raised concerns that France +might be driving the EC toward a decision counter to the +interests of other EU member states, the U.S. and NATO. Mel +Flack said it was difficult not to arrive at the conclusion +that France was interested in an M-Code overlay so it could +guarantee reliability for precision guided weaponry it might +seek to sell to third countries. + +¶12. (C) "I have objected to Europeans who say that U.S. +actions demonstrate an intent to undermine Galileo," Aragona +told the delegation. "Likewise," he said, "I do not believe +that there is any maliciousness on the part of a particular +country or the EC." Above all, he maintained, Galileo is a +commercial undertaking; the system's signal structure was +selected according to well established criteria based on the +belief that it provided the most robust, reliable service. +"I accept your arguments about the need to jam adversaries in +a NAVWAR context," he said, but the U.S. "needs to keep in +mind that Galileo service must be sold. The problem of +selective jamming is not just political; commercial aspects +are also involved." When Aragona stated it would not be +acceptable to expect the EU to settle for alternate, less +robust, signals, Braibanti countered it would be unacceptable +for the U.S. and its allies to risk the lives of soldiers in +order to allow the EU to have more robust signals for +Galileo. + +¶13. (C) Aragona acknowledged the point in passing, but +moved quickly to close and summarize the conversation. He +suggested the next step would be to find a suitable venue to +hold classified discussions. He claimed there is flexibility +and that the EU is aware of the need for a solution amenable +to both sides. Braibanti emphasized that after the September +discussions the USG would like to hold another set of +bilateral consultations with Italy. Aragona was +noncommittal, offering to share thoughts after the September +plenary session and then decide on a way forward. In terms +of U.S.-Italian engagement, he said he hoped that discussions +would not lead to the "extreme" situation in which the U.S. +and EU would be negotiating on exclusively U.S. terms, by +which he meant asking the EU to accept moving PRS to another +frequency band and to only then negotiate a solution. He +noted in closing that Italy had its own technological and +industrial interests to defend. + +Better Signals, Less Political Clout from Other GOI Ministries + +¶14. (C) Braibanti, Flack and EST Couns met with Vice +Minister for Research Guido Possa on July 15. Possa is +responsible for the Italian Space Agency and through it for +Italian participation in ESA. After a brief explanation of +the overlay problem and its implications for NAVWAR, Possa +immediately understood that a political, and not a technical +approach was needed to resolve outstanding problems. Possa +suggested that the U.S. should work closely with the Germans, +and in Italy with Minister of Defense Martino, whose +commitment to NATO and to close cooperation with the U.S. +were well known. On the margins of a July 28 +representational event, ESTCOUNS and A/POLMINCOUNS raised +briefly the overlay problem with MINDEF Martino. Martino +said that, from his point of view, Galileo was unnecessary +and a huge waste of money -- one GPS system was enough. He +was unaware that the USG now supported Galileo in principle. +Martino was sensitive to our arguments on the security +implications of the overlay, but observed that he was +perceived within the GOI as too pro-American to be of much +assistance. He suggested that the Embassy's best bet for +moving the GOI closer to the USG position would be to +approach U/S to the PM Gianni Letta, who, we note, is PM +Berlusconi's closest political advisor. + +¶15. (C) ESTCOUNS, ECONCOUNS, AND USEU ECONCOUNS met July 18 +with Ministry of Transport Diplomatic Advisor Maraini to +discuss the Aragona meetings and to seek the perspective of +the Ministry on the decisions to be taken concerning Galileo +at the December Transport Council. Maraini told us that he +believed that Galileo was now principally a political +problem, and a problem beyond the competency of the Transport +Ministry and Transport Council. In a candid appraisal of +Hillbrecht-whom Maraini admitted he did not know well--the +Diplomatic Advisor said that the decision to be taken was +beyond the competency of Hillbrecht's technical committee. +Maraini understood and agreed with our assessment that very +little time and scope remained for technical solutions, and +that an impasse requiring a major political decision by the +EU was likely. Maraini is worried about the outcome. He +undertook to prepare a note for Minister Lunardi to be sent +to the Prive Minister before the PM's departure for Crawford. + +¶16. (C) Embassy Comment: The U.S. delegation made the trip +to Rome to follow up on indications from Aragona, made during +his recent trip to Washington, that he may have been willing +to carry some water for us with the EC and member states. We +were left with the impression that Italy's PolDir had instead +decided to keep his EU hat firmly in place and stick to the +script of the EC briefing book on Galileo. Despite +understanding within the functional ministries of the GOI, +peeling Aragona, the MFA, and Italy away from the EC position +will be difficult, judging from Aragona's assessment that +"technical solutions" still offer a way forward. He threw us +a quarter of a bone by offering to help give political top +cover to the expert level technical discussions. However, +Aragona's implicit insistence that Galileo's commercial +viability may depend on at least a partial M-Code overlay to +"guarantee" service is troubling for its resemblance to +French arguments. + +¶17. (U) This message has been cleared by OES/SAT Braibanti. +Sembler \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/origin/Embassy Rome/03ROME4746.txt b/origin/Embassy Rome/03ROME4746.txt new file mode 100644 index 000000000..32edd5540 --- /dev/null +++ b/origin/Embassy Rome/03ROME4746.txt @@ -0,0 +1,74 @@ +03ROME4746 +GALILEO/M-CODE: INCREASED HIGH-LEVEL ITALIAN +Fri Oct 17 00:00:00 +0200 2003 +CONFIDENTIAL +Embassy Rome +This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.C O N F I D E N T I A L ROME 004746 + +SIPDIS + +E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/09/2013 +TAGS: ECPS ETRD IT TSPA TSPL PREL EUN + +SUBJECT: GALILEO/M-CODE: INCREASED HIGH-LEVEL ITALIAN +ATTENTION -- BUT NO ANSWERS + + CLASSIFIED BY: AMBASSADOR MEL SEMBLER FOR REASONS 1.5 (B)(D) + +¶1. (C) AT THE END OF AN OCTOBER 9 MEETING ON ANOTHER SUBJECT +WITH PM BERLUSCONI'S CLOSEST ADVISOR, PRIME MINISTRY +UNDERSECRETARY GIANNI LETTA, AMBASSADOR SEMBLER TOOK THE +OPPORTUNITY TO EXPRESS THE USG'S CONTINUED GREAT CONCERN OVER +LACK OF PROGRESS ON RESOLVING THE GALILEO/M-CODE OVERLAY +DISAGREEMENT WITH THE EU. THE AMBASSADOR TOLD LETTA BLUNTLY +THAT THE DISPUTE RISKS BECOMING A TRAIN WRECK ON ITALY'S EU +WATCH UNLESS MORE CONCERTED POLITICAL-LEVEL ATTENTION IS +GIVEN TO THE ISSUE. THE USG FELT THAT THAT AMERICAN +TECHNICAL EXPERTS HAD PROVIDED COMMISSION EXPERTS WITH +EXHAUSTIVE CLASSIFIED TECHNICAL BRIEFINGS, WHICH HAD +DEMONSTRATED PERSUASIVELY THAT NON-OVERLAY SPECTRAL OPTIONS +EXIST, WHICH WILL NOT DEGRADE GALILEO CAPABILITIES. +NEVERTHELESS, THE COMMISSION AND EU GOVERNMENTS HAVE BEEN +UNWILLING TO TAKE THE POLITICAL STEP TO DRAW THE OBVIOUS +CONCLUSIONS FROM THE TECHNICAL DISCUSSIONS. + +¶2. (C) LETTA RESPONDED THAT SENIOR LEVELS OF THE ITALIAN +GOVERNMENT WERE IN FACT PAYING CLOSE ATTENTION TO GALILEO. +IN THE PRIME MINISTRY, DIPLOMATIC ADVISOR GIOVANNI +CASTELANETTA HAD BEEN BRIEFING PM BERLUSCONI REGULARLY. +LETTA ALSO NOTED THAT DURING CABINET MEETINGS DEFENSE +MINISTER MARTINO HAD SPOKEN OPENLY IN SUPPORT OF THE U.S. +POSITION. NEVERTHELESS, LETTA OFFERED NO CLEAR INDICATION OF +WHAT FURTHER ACTIONS, IF ANY, THE GOI PLANNED TO TAKE WITHIN +THE EU. + +¶3. (C) IN A SEPARATE MEETING OCTOBER 14 WITH ECMIN, AGAIN ON +ANOTHER SUBJECT, GENERAL LEONARDO TRICARICO (THE PRIME + MINISTER'S MILITARY AND SECURITY ADVISOR) TOOK THE INITIATIVE +TO RAISE THE MATTER OF GALILEO. ECMIN REVIEWED USG CONCERNS +FOR TRICARICO, AS WELL AS THE AMBASSADOR'S EXCHANGE WITH +LETTA. ALTHOUGH HE ASKED SEVERAL QUESTIONS ABOUT THE RECENT +MEETINGS IN LONDON AND WASHINGTON, AND WAS CLEARLY ANXIOUS +ABOUT THE LACK OF FORWARD MOVEMENT IN U.S.-EU DISCUSSIONS, +TRICARICO WAS AT A LOSS TO SUGGEST WHAT ACTIONS ITALY SHOULD +OR COULD TAKE. + +¶4. (C) COMMENT: LETTA'S ACCOUNT OF THE HIGH-LEVEL ATTENTION +ITALIAN MINISTERS -- INCLUDING THE PM -- ARE GIVING THE +GALILEO/M-CODE DISPUTE IS WELCOME NEWS. REPORTS OF DEFMIN +MARTINO'S UNAMBIGUOUS SUPPORT FOR THE U.S. POSITION IS +WELCOME, AND CONFIRMS WHAT HE HAS TOLD US. (BUT MARTINO HAS +ALSO BEEN QUICK TO POINT OUT THAT HE NEEDS KEY ALLIES, SUCH +AS LETTA, IN ORDER TO SUCCEED IN THE INTERMINISTERIAL +PROCESS.) NEVERTHELESS, THERE IS LITTLE INDICATION THAT THE +GOI HAS ANY GAME PLAN ON HOW TO PREVENT THE WRONG OUTCOME AT +THE IMPORTANT DECEMBER MEETING OF EU TRANSPORT MINISTERS. +EMBASSY STANDS READY TO CONTINUE TO ENGAGE THE GOI AT THE +HIGHEST LEVELS ON GALILEO AS WASHINGTON AGENCIES WORK OUT THE +NEXT STEPS IN OUR STRATEGY. END COMMENT. +SEMBLER + +NNNN + 2003ROME04746 - Classification: CONFIDENTIAL + +" \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/origin/Embassy Tegucigalpa/07TEGUCIGALPA1247.txt b/origin/Embassy Tegucigalpa/07TEGUCIGALPA1247.txt new file mode 100644 index 000000000..41978ec3b --- /dev/null +++ b/origin/Embassy Tegucigalpa/07TEGUCIGALPA1247.txt @@ -0,0 +1,169 @@ +07TEGUCIGALPA1247 +SELECTION OF NEW HONDURAN AMBASSADOR TO THE UN RAISES VISA ISSUES +Thu Jul 19 00:00:00 +0200 2007 +SECRET +Embassy Tegucigalpa +VZCZCXYZ0005 +PP RUEHWEB + +DE RUEHTG #1247/01 1982131 +ZNY SSSSS ZZH (CCY DTG ADX:00E6E7BA MSI6833 614) +P 192131Z JUL 07 +FM AMEMBASSY TEGUCIGALPA +TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6422 +INFO RUEAHLC/HOMELAND SECURITY CENTER WASHDC PRIORITY +RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY +RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0153S E C R E T TEGUCIGALPA 001247 + +SIPDIS + +C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (DTG CHANGED FROM 7/17 TO 7/19) + +SIPDIS + +STATE FOR D, WHA/CEN, CA/VO/L/C AND CA/VO/L/A +NSC FOR DAN FISK +E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/19/2017 +TAGS: CVIS PGOV PREL HO +SUBJECT: SELECTION OF NEW HONDURAN AMBASSADOR TO THE UN RAISES VISA ISSUES + +REF: STATE 98124 + +Classified By: AMB. CHARLES FORD. REASONS 1.4(B) AND (D). + +¶1. (C) SUMMARY. Jorge Arturo Reina, the current Minister of Government and Justice, was nominated by President Zelaya to represent Honduras as the ambassador to the United Nations. To assume his duties at the United Nations, Reina will need a G-1 visa to travel to the United States. To obtain that visa, he must first undergo a Security Advisory Opinion for an OO hit, and Advisory Opinion for an NCIII hit and apply for a waiver as he is currently ineligible for a visa under section 212(a)(3)(B) for past terrorist activities. Reina has a long history of involvement with Communist-inspired revolutionary groups and anti-American activities. Although he may have left his radical student days behind, his family is involved in the sale of passports and human smuggling of Chinese immigrants. Zelaya's naming of Reina to the United Nations, knowing Reina's history and that his previous visa was revoked, appears to be designed as a sign of his independence from the United States. Given the serious nature of Reina's past activities, any request for a waiver must be thoroughly reviewed. END SUMMARY. + +¶2. (U) President Zelaya selected his current Minister of +Government and Justice, Jorge Arturo Reina (Reina), as the +new Honduran ambassador to the United Nations on July 18, +replacing Ivan Romero Martinez. Zelaya picked Reina as his +new U.N. Ambassador despite knowing, along with the rest of +the Honduran public, that Reina's previous U.S. visa was +revoked. Zelaya stated that this nomination was a "protest +for Honduran sovereignty" and that Reina's previous visa +problems should have no effect on Reina's ability to +represent Honduras before the United Nations as the U.S. must +issue a visa to each member's representative. Zelaya also +stated that during his visit with Secretary Rice on July 10, +he notified her of the impending nomination and that the +Secretary did not raise any objections. With the appointment, +it is expected that the GOH will apply for a waiver and an +eventual G-1 visa on behalf of Reina to allow him to travel +to the United Nations in New York City. + +---------------------- +Reina's Visa Problem +---------------------- + +¶3. (C) Jorge Arturo Reina is currently ineligible for a visa +under section 212(a)(3)(B) of the Immigration and Nationality +Act based on his links and involvement with terrorist +activities in the 1970s and 1980s. In addition, there is +currently a "00" hit associated with his name which requires +the submission of a Security Advisory Opinion for review by +the Department and other interested agencies prior to ruling +on the visa application. Finally, there also exists a NCIII +hit from the Federal Bureau of Investigation indicating past +criminal activity in the U.S. that would also have to be +cleared through CA/VO/L/A. + +¶4. (C) In the mid-1990s, Reina obtained a waiver and +eventually a B1/B2 visa with the restriction that he provide +an itinerary for each trip to the U.S. While serving as a +Minister without Portfolio and Advisor to his brother, +ex-President Carlos Roberto Reina (1994 - 1998), Reina +obtained an A-1 visa with the same restriction and the +original tourist visa was canceled. He traveled numerous +times to the United States but failed to comply with the +restrictions prompting the Department to eventually revoke +his visa. He later received two single-entry B1/B2 visas, for +family medical reasons, to travel to the United States. + +------------------------------------------ +Links to Terrorist and Criminal Activities +------------------------------------------- + +¶5. (S/NF) As a student in the 1950s, Reina was a Communist +sympathizer and traveled to Moscow in 1957. Following +deportation to Costa Rica in the early 1960s after the +military coup in Honduras, Reina spent his months in exile +trying to organize armed resistance to the Honduran +government and unsuccessfully sought money and arms from +Fidel Castro in Cuba. He was allowed to return to Honduras in +1964 where he continued his organizational efforts and was +involved in left-wing student activities. Reina's involvement +included storing a cache of weapons on behalf of the Liberal +Party who used those weapons in their instigation of strikes +and public demonstrations to overthrow the military +government. He was widely believed to be a Soviet and/or +Cuban agent at that time. + +¶6. (S/NF) While a teacher and later Rector of the University +of Honduras (UNAH), he was instrumental in organizing +students and faculty to provide both moral and material +support to the Sandinistas in Nicaragua. During this time he +continued to speak out against the U.S.'s role in Central +America and was linked to supplying unknown persons with hand +grenades to be used against Standard Fruit Company. An +admirer of the Cuban Revolution, Reina traveled +surreptitiously to Cuba a number of times in the early 1980s +to meet with other revolutionaries and was suspected of +supplying arms to rebels in El Salvador during that country's +civil war. Post also received information in 1980 that Reina +was made aware of, and eventually approved, a plan by a +terrorist organization to kidnap a U.S. official. + +¶7. (S/NF) Reina's involvement in criminal activities did not +end with his entry into the Honduran government. The current +Director of Immigration, German Espinal, a trusted ally in +the fight against corruption, has linked Reina's son, Carlos +Eduardo Reina, a local businessman, to the sale of passports +and other identity documents to Chinese immigrants who +presumably intend to travel to the United States. While Reina +is not directly involved in this human smuggling operation, +he is believed to receive money from those sales to use his +position in the GOH to protect his son's illegal activities +and shield him from investigation. + +-------------------------------------------- +This Nomination Just One More Provocation +--------------------------------------------- + +¶8. (C) Zelaya's nomination of Reina appears to be part of his +ongoing efforts to press the USG on a range of issues to +determine what if any consequences he will see from bad +policy choices. Like a small boy poking a hornets' nest with +a stick, Zelaya keeps jabbing at the USG to see what the +reaction will be. His most recent "pokes" include his +on-again/off-again visit to Cuba to meet with Castro and +strengthen Honduran/Cuban relations; granting permission to +the Cuban airline, Aerocarribean, to begin service to +Honduras; his trip to Managua, Nicaragua to help celebrate +the anniversary of the Sandinista Revolution with President +Ortega; and his public desire for friendship with Hugo +Chavez. Zelaya has yet to suffer any adverse consequences for +his actions and he will continue to act in this manner to see +how far he can go. + +¶9. (C) Another example of this tendency to test limits is his +statement that Secretary Rice had no objection to Reina's +nomination. This subject was not raised in his meeting with +the Secretary, but rather with Deputy Secretary Negroponte on +July 10 (see reftel). Zelaya informed the Deputy Secretary of +the impending appointment but at no point did the Deputy +Secretary state that the USG was in agreement or that it +opposed the naming of Reina. Instead, Zelaya took the lack of +response as approval. + +¶10. (C) COMMENT. Jorge Arturo Reina's past history with +terrorist and criminal activities, and his ongoing acceptance +of his family's involvement in human smuggling, raises +serious issues that need to be considered prior to the +granting of a waiver for a G-1 visa, especially with regard +to the nature of any restrictions on the G-1 visa that would +be appropriate. Post is concerned that the approval of the +waiver and visa without serious consideration of conditions +will only encourage Zelaya to continue testing the USG as to +the outer limits of how far he can go in his relationship +with the ALBA entities. END COMMENT. +FORD \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/rel_date/2011/07/11/08BOGOTA337.txt b/rel_date/2011/07/11/08BOGOTA337.txt index 06d7e6f75..8045e93a7 100644 --- a/rel_date/2011/07/11/08BOGOTA337.txt +++ b/rel_date/2011/07/11/08BOGOTA337.txt @@ -169,18 +169,7 @@ GOC asked the Cuban government their views on Chavez' call to roll back the FARC's terrorist designation, the Cubans stated that it was "a difficult proposal." -¶8. (S) Uribe saw mixed loyalties among other Latin American -countries. Only Nicaragua had supported Chavez' FARC -proposal. Argentina remains difficult, since Venezuela -bought Argentine bonds and Chavez made campaign contributions -to the new President. Paraguay, in the midst of an election -cycle, is uncertain though the front-runner supports Chavez. -Uruguay, a possible ally, is sitting on the fence. Brazil -remains friendly with Colombia, but prefers neutrality lest -it offend anyone. In Peru, President Alan Garcia concurs - -with the United States and would follow its lead. Chile -remains a good friend to Colombia and its cause. +¶8. (S) Uribe saw mixed loyalties among other Latin American countries. Only Nicaragua had supported Chavez' FARC proposal. Argentina remains difficult, since Venezuela bought Argentine bonds and Chavez made campaign contributions to the new President. Paraguay, in the midst of an election cycle, is uncertain though the front-runner supports Chavez. Uruguay, a possible ally, is sitting on the fence. Brazil remains friendly with Colombia, but prefers neutrality lest it offend anyone. In Peru, President Alan Garcia concurs with the United States and would follow its lead. Chile remains a good friend to Colombia and its cause. ----------------- Hostages and HVTs diff --git a/rel_date/2011/07/27/07BRASILIA2132.txt b/rel_date/2011/07/27/07BRASILIA2132.txt new file mode 100644 index 000000000..0720615b2 --- /dev/null +++ b/rel_date/2011/07/27/07BRASILIA2132.txt @@ -0,0 +1,209 @@ +07BRASILIA2132 +IRAN-RUSSIA-VENEZUELA TRIANGLE THREATENS REGIONAL +Tue Nov 13 00:00:00 +0100 2007 +SECRET +Embassy Brasilia +VZCZCXRO9093 +PP RUEHRG +DE RUEHBR #2132/01 3171441 +ZNY SSSSS ZZH +P 131441Z NOV 07 ZDK +FM AMEMBASSY BRASILIA +TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0429 +INFO RUEHAD/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI 0012 +RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA +RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHDC +RUEHAC/AMEMBASSY ASUNCION 6402 +RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA 4378 +RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES 5121 +RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 3862 +RUEHGE/AMEMBASSY GEORGETOWN 1361 +RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ 5760 +RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA 3635 +RUEHMN/AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO 7095 +RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0343 +RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO 2339 +RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO 6532 +RUEHRG/AMCONSUL RECIFE 7356 +RUEHRI/AMCONSUL RIO DE JANEIRO 5418 +RUEHSO/AMCONSUL SAO PAULO 1158 +RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC +RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDCS E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BRASILIA 002132 + +SIPDIS + +C O R R E C T E D COPY - ADDRESSEES ADDED + +SIPDIS + +UNVIE FOR AMB GREG SHULTE +DOE FOR DOE/NNSA + +E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/07/2017 +TAGS: PREL MASS BR VE XR RS IR +SUBJECT: IRAN-RUSSIA-VENEZUELA TRIANGLE THREATENS REGIONAL +STABILITY + +REF: BUENOS AIRES 2191 + +BRASILIA 00002132 001.3 OF 003 + + +Classified By: Ambassador Clifford M. Sobel, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) + +¶1. (C) Summary. Iran, Russia, and Venezuela are involved +in an open and growing collaboration with a common purpose to +make more arms available to radical populist governments and +spread anti-American ideology in the region, according to the +chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations and National Defense +committee. He is "truly concerned" and urges the USG to be +more engaged "before it is too late." The chairman said +presidential foreign policy adviser Marco Aurelio Garcia +strongly recommended Ahmadinejad visit Brazil. Chairman +Fortes surmised that Foreign Minister Celso Amorim was less +receptive to the visit. Fortes noted that with the +increasing wealth of oil-producing states, there are some +that will support Russian arms purchases, and in +conversation, the Deputy Minister alluded that perhaps +Ecuador and even Brazil could become beneficiaries. End +summary. + +¶2. (C) During a November 5 phone call, Senator Heraclito +Fortes (Democrats Party, opposition; of Piaui) asked the +Ambassador to meet with him urgently to raise a matter he +could not discuss on the telephone. In a meeting that +afternoon, which continued the next morning, Fortes told the +Ambassador, poloff, and assistant army attache that he is +"truly concerned" about Iranian and Venezuelan activities in +the region, including financing "friendship organizations" +between congresses and even potentially financing arms sales. + He described a recent meeting with the Iranian Deputy +Minister for Petroleum and former Ambassador to Brazil who +sought "cooperation" with Brazil, the nature of which +"depends on Brazil." (Note: This is Dr. Mansour Moazami, +Iranian Ambassador to Brazil from 2000 until about 2003. End +note.) He spoke of Iran's growing relationship with +Venezuela and Ecuador and even indicated that the recent trip +of President Putin to Iran was extremely successful and dealt +with many of the difficult issues that had to be resolved. +In mentioning arms sales, Chairman Fortes again underscored +Iran's interest in helping Brazil, depending on Brazil own +interest. The Deputy Minister told Fortes that Iran already +has agreements with Bolivia and Ecuador, but it was not made +clear to Fortes whether these were arms agreements. + +Connecting the Dots +------------------- + +¶3. (C) Fortes sees a sequence of dots showing more +Venezuelan influence and interference in the region, Iranian +support for Caracas, La Paz, and Quito, and the specter of +Russian arms in the region. + +¶4. (C) Fortes said the Iranian Deputy Minister described +President Vladimir Putin's recent visit to Iran as very good, +resolving many differences between them; the Iranian +mentioned Russian arms sales to Venezuela, Russian relations +with Venezuela, as well as Venezuelan support for Bolivian +and Ecuador, praised Venezuela, and mentioned Venezuela's +recent acquisition of 26 warplanes, claiming they are to +maintain peace. The Deputy Minister, a former ambassador to +Brazil and one who knows Brazil, told Fortes it is up to +Brazil to determine how it wanted to work with Iran, and +through thinly veiled references asked the chairman of the +Foreign Relations and National Defense Committee if he was +interested in reviving the Friendship Group that previously +had as its leader a former senator of, as Fortes implied, +questionable character. Fortes said he had never been +approached that way in his career. He said the moribund +group will likely be revived in the Senate without his +support. Fortes said he believed there was pressure from +unknown quarters within Brazil to purchase Russian arms, +adding that the Air Force Commander, General Juniti Saito, +told him if he (Saito) were pushed to buy Russian weapons he + +BRASILIA 00002132 002.3 OF 003 + + +would have no option, and Fortes thought it would be a huge +mistake. + +¶5. (C) Fortes continued pointing out worrisome signs: +leftist Venezuelan, Bolivian, and Peruvian deputies who are +trying to reactivate the Caracas-based Amazonian Parliament +(Parlamaz) were visiting Brasilia Nov 5-8 to lobby the +Brazilian Congress, and there are now "Bolivarian circles" in +Brazil that media have reported as being under Venezuelan +tutelage. Official Venezuelan diplomacy is increasingly +commercial, with huge contracts for firms such as Brazilian +construction giant Odebrecht, who then lobby for Venezuela, +Fortes noted. The expanded availability of the type of arms +in Venezuela that could be used for populist causes in Brazil +was also of concern to the senator. Fortes said it may not +be coincidental that Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey +Kislyak arrived in Brasilia the same day as Iranian Deputy +Petroluem Minister and he speculated there may have been a +three-way meeting with Brazilians, the Russian, and the +Iranian. + +¶6. (S) Iranian outreach plans in the region include another +Ahmadinejad trip including Brazil, probably for the next +inauguration of a Latin American president, making the trip a +springboard for Iranian regional diplomacy, Fortes said. +(Note: Ahmadinejad canceled a scheduled visit here last +September on short notice.) Presidential foreign policy +adviser Marco Aurelio Garcia supported the Iranian +president's visit, which may not have been supported by +Foreign Minister Celso Amorim, Fortes said, and the Iranian +Deputy Minister, who was in the traveling delegation to +Caracas and La Paz, said he tried everything up to the last +minute to get it reinstated. Fortes added that the Deputy +Minister was very disappointed at the cancellation, +especially since an Iranian advance team was already on the +ground in Brasilia. The senator indicated that he thought +that despite Garcia's strong support for the Ahmadinejad +visit, Celso Amorim may have intereceded due to the +sensitivities. Sensitive reporting indicates, though that +the reasons were other. + +"You Are Children" +------------------ + +¶7. (C) Fortes strongly urged the USG to engage much more +"before it is too late." The USG is "indifferent" to what is +happening in the region and he urged the USG to take notice +of Venezuelan, Russian, and Iranian plans in the region, +saying, "You are children: you ignore a problem until it is +well along and then it is too late." He suggested the USG +adopt a plan for regional integration and promote arms +manufacturing partnerships with Brazil and Argentina to arm +the region, and said it could be done indirectly through arms +firms without publicly linking the USG to the increased arms +sales. + +¶8. (S) Comment. Iranian and Venezuelan influence in Brazil +and the region is certainly growing and mutually reinforcing, +and Chairman Fortes is correct that there are differing views +on how to engage Iran, but clearly Brazil will be +increasingly sensitive to Iranian interests. It is also +interesting to recall President Lula's remarks on the margins +of the last UN General Assembly when he said Iran was not in +violation of any UN guidelines with its nuclear program, as +well as Brazil's abstention on November 7 in the Interpol +vote to issue international capture notices for Iranian +officials accused in the AMIA bombing (reftel). Chairman +Fortes's concerns parallel recent views we have heard +reporting on increasing Brazilian concerns over Venezuelan +arms purchases, the lack of a modernized Brazilian defense +capability, and increasing engagement of Venezuelan diplomats +in Brazil funding Bolivarian Circles and populist +organizations. Chairman Fortes is not alone in his feeling, +especially given the recent remarks of former president and + +BRASILIA 00002132 003.2 OF 003 + + +sitting senator Jose Sarney, a leader of the Brazilian +Democratic Movement Party. + +Sobel \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/rel_date/2011/07/27/09BAGHDAD379.txt b/rel_date/2011/07/27/09BAGHDAD379.txt new file mode 100644 index 000000000..d605ff452 --- /dev/null +++ b/rel_date/2011/07/27/09BAGHDAD379.txt @@ -0,0 +1,603 @@ +09BAGHDAD379 +PM MALIKI: STRENGTHENED CENTER OR EMERGING +Fri Feb 13 00:00:00 +0100 2009 +CONFIDENTIAL +Embassy Baghdad +VZCZCXRO1455 +OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK +DE RUEHGB #0379/01 0441140 +ZNY CCCCC ZZH +O 131140Z FEB 09 +FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD +TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1692 +INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE +RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FLC O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 07 BAGHDAD 000379 + +SIPDIS + +E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/12/2019 +TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM PINS KDEM KISL IZ +SUBJECT: PM MALIKI: STRENGTHENED CENTER OR EMERGING +STRONGMAN? + +Classified by Ambassador Ryan Crocker for reasons 1.4 (b) and +(d). + +------------------------ +Summary and Introduction +------------------------ + +¶1. (C) With the strong performance of the Da'wa Party in the +January 31 provincial council elections, Prime Minister +Maliki will claim a public mandate. While many media +analyses have tended to overstate this case (as Maliki won no +more than 38 percent in two provinces, and less elsewhere) it +is clear that the elections mark a significant improvement in +the Prime Minister's political fortunes, and that Da'wa can +legitimately claim to have displaced the Islamic Supreme +Council of Iraq (ISCI) as the country's preeminent Shi'a +political party. During his first two years in office, +Maliki was broadly assailed by critics as a weak and +ineffectual prime minister, ill-equipped by background and +experience to govern an increasingly violent Iraq and +incapable of imposing order on a chaotic GOI to confront the +country's myriad challenges. Now, at the start of 2009, with +an increasingly stable (if still violent and volatile) Iraq, +Maliki is assailed by those same critics -- leading Sunni and +Kurdish politicians, as well as other Shi'a coalition +partners -- as an aspiring strongman bent on imposing a +classic Arab autocracy on Iraq. + +¶2. (C) Maliki's personality and way of conducting business +has contributed to the present accusations of an emerging +"new Saddam." While his political foes are quite open about +their desire to see him ousted (providing more than adequate +reason for paranoia on the PM's part), Maliki is a product of +his Da'wa secret cell experience and tends to view everyone +and everything with instinctive suspicion. This worldview is +fed by his small and closed circle of Da'wa advisors. In +terms of governance and security, Maliki has moved in an +accelerated manner following his direction of government +efforts in spring/summer of 2008 to quell Sadrist challenges +in Basra and elsewhere to reestablish a strong Baghdad +center. While the ends are positive -- enhanced national +security and stability are welcome-- the means are being +subjected to increasing question. The concentration of +authority in Maliki's Office of the Commander in Chief +(OCINC), the establishment of an elite security force - with +its own judges and detention facilities - that reports +directly to the PM, the creation of a security force command +that short-circuits provincial authority, a willingness in +some cases to use strong-arm tactics against political +adversaries, and patronage networks to co-opt others all +follow a very familiar pattern of Arab world leadership. + +¶3. (C) That said, Nouri Al-Maliki is no Saddam Hussein. He +shares neither Saddam's brutality nor his penchant for +international military adventurism. Moreover, while Maliki's +thinking and actions are undoubtedly informed by the Shi'a +experience, he himself sees his conduct as national rather +than sectarian-inspired. His nationalism is very much at +issue in his relations with Iran. Having fled from Iran to +Syria during the Saddam era to avoid falling under Tehran's +sway (as he believes occurred with Shi'a arch-rival ISCI), +Maliki's suspicious outlook includes a dark assessment of +Iran's ambitions toward Iraq. + +¶4. (C) A key question posed by Maliki's evolving hold on +levers of political and security power is whether the PM is +becoming a non-democratic dictator bent on subordinating all +authority to his hand or whether Maliki is attempting to +rebalance political and security authority back to the center +Qrebalance political and security authority back to the center +after five-plus years of intended and unintended dispersal to +(and in some cases seizure by) actors and power structures +outside Baghdad. We believe the answer lies closer to the +latter than the former. This process will likely come into +sharper focus with the seating of the newly-elected +provincial councils and implementation of the provincial +powers law (which grants significant new power to the +provinces). And the PM's efforts will be met with resistance +by those, such as the Kurds and Maliki's Shi'a rivals, who +would argue that the post-Saddam national consensus (and +indeed the Iraqi constitution) requires substantial devolved +power to the provinces and regions. + +¶5. (C) While responsibility for the lack of political +consensus is broadly shared among Iraq's leaders from all +groups, the PM needs to set the tone. Here, Maliki has shown +that he is either unwilling or unable to take the lead in the +give-and-take needed to build broad consensus for the +Government's policies among competing power blocs. +Furthermore, the Prime Minister has appeared willing to +confront his adversaries with force, as illustrated by the +near-confrontation between the Iraqi Army and Peshmerga in +northern Diyala province last September. Working within this +context, the U.S. should continue to emphasize support for +Iraqi institutions over individuals as our bilateral +relationship matures, and must maintain a strong focus on +keeping Iraq's main groups committed to a peaceful, +negotiated, process to resolve contentious "national vision" +issues such as power-sharing, disputed borders, the +appropriate division of power between the central and +provincial/regional governments, hydrocarbons, and security. +End summary and introduction. + +-------------------- +Winter of Discontent +-------------------- + +¶6. (C) First seen as weak, ineffective, and ill-informed +about the political and security structures put in place +since Saddam's fall (Maliki was not a participant in the +governing bodies set up during the CPA), Prime Minister +Maliki was by the fall of 2008 being widely criticized - by +leaders of the Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP) and other Sunni +politicians, by the Kurdish political leadership, and by +fellow Shi'a from outside Maliki's Da'wa Party -- as +autocratic and excessively ambitious, with the long-term aim +of becoming a new strong man dictator. The "political reform +resolution," passed by parliament in conjunction with its +approval of the U.S.-Iraq Security Agreement and Strategic +Framework Agreement on November 27, 2008 (reftel), amounted +to a manifesto of grievances against the Prime Minister that +had been growing among his coalition partners, and the +opposition, throughout the year. + +¶7. (U) The document urged the Maliki Government to adhere to +the Constitution, to commit to a democratic federal system, +to share power with the legislature, to professionalize and +depoliticize the security forces, to guarantee a free +judiciary, disband "unconstitutional structures" within the +government, and release prisoners eligible for amnesty or +held without due process, among other demands. + +--------------------- +Maliki's (Small) Circle +----------------------- + +¶8. (C) A common complaint about Maliki is his failure to +consult with leaders of other power blocs and his excessive +reliance on a small inner circle for advice. These habits +certainly stem from Maliki's background, which includes more +than two decades as an operative of the Islamic Da'wa Party, +which conducted clandestine activities, including +assassination attempts against Saddam and senior regime +officials, during the 1970s and 80s. (Saddam's intelligence +service, for good measure, targeted Da'wa operatives for +assassination abroad.) + +¶9. (C) Maliki first joined Da'wa as a student at Baghdad +University in the 1960s. His ties to the group forced him to +flee Iraq in 1979, and live in exile first in Iran, then in +Syria, where he represented the party until Saddam's fall in +Q03. Today, most of Maliki's inner circle of advisors share +his Da'wa background. They include: + +-- Tariq Najm Abdullah, Maliki's Chief of Staff, who was +active in Da'wa's London chapter in the 1990s. Abdullah's +cool and taciturn demeanor seems to exemplify critics' +characterization of the Maliki government. Critics within +the GOI have dubbed him the "shadow Prime Minister" and some +claim he sometimes countermands Maliki's written +instructions; + +-- Sadiq al-Rikabi, a senior advisor, also from Da'wa's +London chapter, is often at Maliki's side. The PM tasked him +with leading the Security Agreement negotiations after +essentially firing the Iraqi MFA negotiating team, which +Maliki reportedly thought too concessionary and too beholden +QMaliki reportedly thought too concessionary and too beholden +to Foreign Minister Zebari - a bitter adversary; + +-- Ghati al-Rikabi (aka Abu Mujahed - a first cousin of +Sadiq), is an advisor and general fixer in Maliki's office; + +-- Ali al-Adib, who now heads Da'wa's parliamentary caucus, +represented the party during exile years in Iran. He +sometimes represents Maliki in GOI meetings and in visits to +the provinces; + +-- Sami al-Askeri is a nominally independent MP close to +Maliki. The PM appointed him to lead GOI efforts to bring +Sadrists and Shi'a extremists into mainstream politics; + +-- Hassan Sunayd is a Da'wa MP who had been an advisor to PM +Ja'afari. A poet, he was jailed and tortured by Saddam. He +is perhaps the most liberal and pragmatic member of Maliki's +circle; + +-- Ahmed al-Maliki, the Prime Minister's son and head of his +private office. He is rumored to have strained relations with +the Rikabis; + +-- Mowafaq al-Rubaiye, now the influential National Security +Advisor, had been an associate of Ahmed al-Chalabi in +London's Iraqi National Congress. Though Maliki apparently +values Rubaiye's counsel on certain issues, he is widely seen +as an unscrupulous self-promoter and Maliki himself has +openly excluded Rubaiye from engagement in some issues -- +including the Strategic Framework (SFA) and +Security Agreement (SOFA) negotiations. + +¶10. (C) Maliki appears loath to delegate sensitive political +tasks to persons outside this group, with the net effect of +hampering the GOI's capacity and stunting its institutional +development. The most recent example of this phenomenon we +have observed has been the difficulty the GOI has had in +standing up bilateral committees to work with the U.S. in +implementing the Security Agreement and the SFA. + +¶11. (C) Explaining the GOI delays and apparent disarray on +implementing the agreements, Sadiq al-Rikabi recently +confided to PMIN that he and his colleagues in Maliki's +circle were simply tired (and apparently tapped out). +Discussing an economic project with a senior USG official in +late December, Maliki complained, "If I don't get personally +involved, nothing happens." Clearly, Maliki's subordinates +have not been encouraged or empowered to take decisions on +their own - symptomatic of sclerotic bureaucracies across the +region. + +-------------------------------------- +This Paranoid Really Does Have Enemies +-------------------------------------- + +¶12. (C) Maliki's reluctance to delegate authority reflects +both an urge to control and a distrust of those outside his +circle. In meetings with Embassy officials, Maliki regularly +voices concern about plots against him. The Prime Minister +seems particularly fixated on the activities of Ba'thist +former regime elements in Syria and Jordan. More damagingly, +the PM's deep suspicion of the Iraqi Army's leadership as +Sunni Ba'athist and the source of potential coup-plotting has +only partially been tempered over the course of the past two +years. Similarly, Maliki shows a tendency to associate all +Sunni (and more broadly, Arab) opposition to his policies +with Ba'athist irredentism. This manifests itself in his +strained relationships with Iraqi Sunni political figures +such as Tawafuq/IIP leader Tariq al-Hashimi. It is also +visible in his (mistaken) dismissal of Iraq's externally +displaced as Sunnis who have not come to terms with +post-Saddam democratic Shi'a majoritarian rule. Maliki's +sectarian suspicion also shapes his view of the Saudis and +other Arab neighbors as unaccepting of Shi'a in governance. +Maliki staunchly denies -- and we agree -- that he is +motivated by overt sectarian bias. Rather, we see Maliki's +worldview as deeply informed by the Shi'a historical +experience. Unfortunately, the consequences in terms of his +willingness and ability to reach out to Iraqi Sunnis and the +broader Sunni world are effectively the same. + +¶13. (C) This said, the Prime Minister correctly sees rivals +across the spectrum of Iraq's ethnic, sectarian and political +leaderships as bent on his ouster. From the Kurdish +leadership (including KRG President Barzani, FM Zebari, and +Deputy Prime Minister Salih) to his Shi'a arch-rival ISCI +QDeputy Prime Minister Salih) to his Shi'a arch-rival ISCI +head Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim (and Vice President Adel Abd +al-Mehdi) and Sunni leader Vice President al-Hashimi, there +has been an unbroken and quite open criticism of Maliki's +leadership and proclaimed desire to see him ousted through a +parliamentary vote of no confidence. (This effort has been +hampered by fear of the political vacuum that would follow +Maliki's fall: There is no consensus among those who want to +bring him down about who/what should follow. Nevertheless, +the current impasse over a successor to ousted Parliamentary +Speaker Mashhadani is seen by some as a split between those +who favor a no confidence vote in the Prime Minister and +those who support Maliki.) + +-------------------- +Stove-Piped Security +-------------------- + +¶14. (C) Maliki has set up security structures that report +directly to the Prime Minister's Office, arguing that rather +than parallel lines of authority he is exercising the +legitimate authority of Commander in Chief. Indeed, the +Office of the Commander in Chief (OCINC) has been the object +of particular criticism over the past year as security +responsibilities have been taken in practice from Iraqi +security commanders and subordinated to OCINC +decision-making. The Counter-Terrorism Bureau (CTB) and its +Iraqi Special Operations Force fall entirely outside of +Ministry of Defense (MOD) and Ministry of Interior (MOI) +chains of command, reporting directly to the Prime Minister's +Office. Designed, trained and equipped by U.S. Special +Forces under the Multi National Security Transition Command - +Iraq (MNSTC-I), the CTB was originally conceived to fall +under MOD authority. Instead, the Prime Minister's Office +has assumed direct control of the CTB, and Maliki is reported +to be personally involved in both the CTB's targeting process +and its operational direction. Critics believe his +motivation was to create a politicized force that could +protect his regime. Maliki's defenders argue he was +compelled to set up the CTB -- and the OCINC -- to get a +handle on an unwieldy security bureaucracy at a time of +national crisis, pointing to the need for the PM's direct +intervention at the head of Iraqi security forces in Basrah, +Sadr City, Maysan and elsewhere over the course of 2008. We +believe both interpretations are correct. Maliki genuinely +sees his personal leadership and control as essential to +advance security and stability but has also directed assets +under his control to reinforce his political position. + +¶15. (C) The CTB maintains not only its own armed operations +units, but also its own detention facilities (principally the +ill-reputed facility at Camp Honor - within the International +Zone) and even has on staff its own judges to customize +arrest warrants. Iraqi MOD interlocutors, and Maliki's +political rivals, have both expressed to Emboffs their alarm +over the extent of the PM's personal control over the CTB, +which has already apparently been misused as a political +rather than security instrument (see para 17, below). Like a +number of GOI entities, the CTB is technically +extra-constitutional, although the Prime Minister is pressing +Parliament to approve a bill that would legalize its +activities. + +¶16. (C) Another controversial innovation has been the +establishment of Provincial Operations Centers, which +consolidate command of all ISF operations within their areas +of responsibility, a concept which originated with the 2007 +Baghdad Security Plan. The model has since been replicated +in Basra, Diyala, Karbala, and Ninewa. Operations commands +all report directly to the Iraqi Ground Forces Commander in +Baghdad, bypassing provincial governors, who often are not +only cut out of planning and operational direction, but may +not even be current on what the ISF are doing in their +provinces. We know that Maliki often goes directly to Ground +Forces Commander Ali Gheidan, or to lower-level division +commanders, or with operations-level commanders such as +General Abud Qanbar in Baghdad with specific instructions. + +------------------------------- +Diyala Province: Smite Thy Foes +------------------------------- + +¶17. (C) The ISF's "Operation Benevolent Diyala," launched in +August 2008, was quickly decried by the province's Sunni +political establishment as a sectarian power play directed by +Maliki. Given the province has been one of Iraq's most +unstable since 2004 -- with Al-Qaida menacing the center and +north of the province, and the Jaysh al-Mahdi spilling over +Qnorth of the province, and the Jaysh al-Mahdi spilling over +from Sadr City in Diyala's southwest flank -- a robust +security operation was badly needed. However, of 1200 +individuals detained by the end of 2008, 1150 were Sunnis, +including many local leaders of the "Sons of Iraq" armed +neighborhood watches partnered with the Coalition Forces, and +many local affiliates of the Sunni Iraqi Islamic Party. + +¶18. (C) Sunni grievances grew after August 18, 2008, when +Maliki's CTB raided the provincial government center in +Ba'qouba and seized two of Diyala's most prominent Sunni +political leaders, in the process killing (apparently by +accident) an aide to the governor. Both the national and +Diyala provincial leaderships of the Iraqi Islamic Party have +told us they are convinced Operation Benevolent Diyala was +partly, if not principally, a partisan political operation. +The Diyala operation severely strained ties, which were never +good to begin with, between Maliki and Vice President +Hashimi, national chair of the IIP. Any political benefit +Maliki might have hoped to gain by means of the security +operation in Diyala appears to have backfired: The Sunni +Tawafuq list (IIP and its allies) placed first in Diyala in +the Jan. 31 provincial elections - winning almost four times +as many votes as Da'wa. + +---------------------------------------- +Kurdish Standoff -- Poxes on Both Houses +---------------------------------------- + +¶19. (C) The PM's centralization of control over security +forces, exaggerated sense of confidence in his own leadership +and judgment (a product of the security successes of +spring/summer 2008), his profound distrust of Kurdish +motives, and progressive Kurdish moves to expand influence +south of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) region came +to a threatening head in September 2008, when Maliki ordered +Iraqi Army units to deploy in Khanaqin, a Kurdish enclave in +Diyala. Technically below the green line separating the KRG +from "Iraq proper," Khanaqin, with an almost entirely Kurdish +population, had been uneventfully occupied by the Peshmerga +since 2003. A tense standoff between the IA and Peshmerga +ensued, with Maliki insisting that the Constitution gave him +authority to deploy the Army anywhere within Iraq's borders +and the Kurds arguing that he was being unnecessarily +provocative in a peaceful (and disputed) corner of the +province. Maliki's orders to reinforce the IA's positions +with a tank company suggested to some that he was spoiling +for a fight with the Kurds. Had the two sides come to blows, +it could have spread along the green line to Kirkuk and Mosul +and would have likely posed a grave threat to Iraq's +viability as a unified state. While the crisis was defused +following U.S. intervention and brokering by VP Abd al-Mehdi, +the fundamental dispute that prompted it remains unresolved. +Most importantly, the Khanaqin incident fed each party's +distrust of the other. KRG President Barzani is especially +distrustful of Maliki's intentions. + +------------ +Overreaching +------------ + +¶20. (C) Maliki's willingness to confront the battle-tested +Peshmerga suggested that he had no doubt whatsoever about the +Iraqi Army's fighting capacity. Maliki famously declared, in +the summer of 2007, that his forces were ready to secure the +country and that coalition forces could leave any time they +wanted. Maliki's inflated assessment of his forces' +capabilities was obvious in March 2008, when he ordered the +Iraqi Army to move into Basra and eject the Sadrist militias +and street gangs who had tacit control of the city and its +strategic ports. While the operation ultimately succeeded, +and indeed began the process of establishing GOI authority +over areas formally dominated by Sadrist militias and the +Iranian-backed Special Groups, its first week was marked by +logistical chaos and serious setbacks on the battlefield. +The tide only turned when Coalition Forces, whom Maliki had +characteristically not consulted in advance, launched a major +resupply and support effort. + +--------------------------- +If You Can't Defeat, Co-opt +--------------------------- + +¶21. (C) Despite Maliki's demonstrated willingness to use +force to advance his political position and strengthen +central authority, as in Diyala or Basra, he has also worked +intensively to develop and expand patronage networks. One of +the principal vehicles in this effort has been tribal support +councils (TSCs). Originally designed to consolidate tribal +support for security operations in Basra and Maysan +provinces, their mandate subsequently expanded to include IDP +returns, sectarian reconciliation, and economic development. +Feeding critics' suspicions that the TSCs were set up to +strengthen Baghdad's reach into the provinces, distribute +patronage, and develop loyalty to Maliki, the Prime +Minister's Office moved expeditiously during 2008 to set up +QMinister's Office moved expeditiously during 2008 to set up +TSC's across the south and eventually most of Iraq (ref B), +without apparent regard to the actual needs of different +localities. + +¶22. (C) The merits of the TSC model are open for debate: +Maliki's supporters argue that TSCs are efficient mechanisms +for dispensing resources from the center to the periphery and +for empowering tribes as elements of stability and natural +partners for rural development. Regardless, the TSCs have +been perceived by ISCI, Maliki's principal Shi'a coalition +partner, as a direct bid to undermine the provincial +governments it controlled and seize the loyalties of its core +constituents. Certainly, Maliki's TSCs have further +alienated ISCI from the Prime Minister. (In the fall, KRG +President Barzani also lashed out at Maliki over nascent TSCs +in Kirkuk and Mosul, viewing them as an open challenge to +Kurdish interests in disputed territories.) + +----------------------------- +But In The Success Column ... +----------------------------- + +¶23. (C) Despite the considerable controversy Maliki's +approach has generated, there is no doubt that Iraq's overall +security situation has improved dramatically on his watch. +He overcame formidable domestic opposition, and intense +pressure from Iran, to shepherd the Security Agreement and +SFA through parliament. Even most of his sharpest critics +concede he showed courage in confronting the Shi'a extremist +Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM) in the spring of 2008. There is +consensus that Muqtada al-Sadr and the JAM have had their +wings clipped, and while not wiped off Iraq's political map, +they no longer pose anywhere near the threat they did +2004-07. + +¶24. (C) Indeed, Maliki and Da'wa have been working +diligently, and with apparent success, to court the +disarrayed Sadrists and bring them closer to the political +mainstream (and even groom them as potential coalition +partners). Maliki's gambit to crush the JAM earned him the +grudging appreciation of many Sunnis and moderate Shi'a who +had previously seen him as a JAM enabler. Maliki is +particularly popular in Basra, which had been terrorized by +Sadrist militias and criminal spinoffs prior to the March +2008 operation against them. Maliki's "State of Law" +electoral list achieved first place showings in Baghdad and +eight of Iraq's nine southern provinces (voters punished the +Da'wa incumbent in Karbala, however). + +¶25. (C) Maliki has also exceeded expectations to date in his +handling of the integration of the mainly Sunni Sons of +Iraq/Awakening Movement into the Iraqi Security Forces. Many +had feared that he would not honor the SOI salary system set +up by coalition forces and would instead arrest and purge SOI +leaders. While the transition in Baghdad province went +smoothly, signs have been less encouraging in Diyala, and the +GOI's commitment to find work for the 80 percent of SOI not +absorbed into the ISF remains mainly hypothetical. On the +whole, Maliki has thus far honored his commitment to take on +and continue the SOI program. + +--------------------------------------------- --------------- +Conclusion: U.S. Interest in a Strengthened Center, But ... +--------------------------------------------- --------------- + +¶26. (C) The critical progress on security and stability made +over the past year, while underpinned by the U.S. military +surge, owes much to Maliki's leadership and restoration of +central government authority. It is in the interests of the +U.S. to see that process of strengthened central authority +continue, but in a manner that is sustainable, based on +institutions rather than personalities, and reflecting a +consensus national vision among Iraq's main ethnic/sectarian +groups. In this regard, the PM's deep distrust of virtually +all other actors on the Iraqi (and regional) scene undercuts +his -- and our -- efforts to reinforce the still-fragile +institutional gains of the past two years. We have pressed +the PM and other political leaders to deal seriously with the +range of grievances that separate them and to move forward on +the various reform agendas articulated in the August 2007 +leaders' declaration. However, Maliki sought to parry the +opposition's various grievances with the establishment of +five multi-party committees to resolve longstanding impasses +on security and defense, hydrocarbons, power sharing, budget, +and disputed territories. While the other parties delegated +different representatives to the committees, Maliki +characteristically appointed himself to represent Da'wa and +Qcharacteristically appointed himself to represent Da'wa and +his overworked Da'wa inner circle on all five. To date, the +committees have met only infrequently and have made little +visible progress. + +¶27. (C) Maliki's position may not be indefinitely +sustainable. Tellingly, Maliki's parliamentary critics +continue to emphasize the CoR "political reform document" +rather than the five committees, as their preferred vehicle +for change. Maliki's government remains dysfunctional on +many levels. He has a strained relationship with Foreign +Minister Zebari (who openly refers to KRG President Barzani +as his boss) and is known to dislike and distrust Interior +Minister Bolani (who has started his own political party). +He rarely convenes the Executive Council (composed of the +President, the two Vice Presidents, the KRG President, and +the Prime Minister). His defenders argue the role of Iraq's +President and Vice Presidents is more protocol than +executive. With the Kurds, the mainstream Sunnis, and even +non-Da'wa Shi'a coalition partners largely alienated, it may +be a matter of time before dislike of Maliki and the growing +threat to their particular interests finally unites the PM's +foes and overcomes their fundamental disagreement about who +and what would replace Maliki after a successful +no-confidence vote. + +¶28. (C) The results of the January 31 provincial elections, +however, with strong showings by Maliki's State of Law/Da'wa +list in nine of 14 participating provinces has clearly given +the Prime Minister momentum, allowing him to claim a tangible +base of public support, at least in Baghdad and Iraq's south. + While this success has likely taken some wind from the sails +of proponents of a no-confidence vote, Maliki's adversaries +might also calculate that they must act before the national +elections, expected at the end of 2009, to forestall an +irreversible consolidation of power. + +¶29. (C) Faced with this situation, we should continue to +emphasize our support for institutions rather than +individuals, and for processes rather than personalities, +even as we are mindful that Iraqi politics will remain +personalized and divided for the foreseeable future. In this +regard, the U.S. is not without assets in attempting to shape +Maliki's actions. The process of negotiating the SFA/SA with +the PM and his team demonstrated the importance Maliki +attaches to building a strong relationship with the U.S. and +his ability to deliver on key issues. His advisors have +shared with us anxiety over the position the new +Administration will take toward the PM and have sought +reassurance that the ties forged last year will continue. We +should press the PM on institution and political consensus +building as key to sustaining and advancing our relationship +-- and support. + +CROCKER \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/rel_date/2011/07/28/06MONTEVIDEO418.txt b/rel_date/2011/07/28/06MONTEVIDEO418.txt new file mode 100644 index 000000000..046eba92d --- /dev/null +++ b/rel_date/2011/07/28/06MONTEVIDEO418.txt @@ -0,0 +1,145 @@ +06MONTEVIDEO418 +VAZQUEZ LOBBIES HARD FOR TRADE TALKS WITH U.S. WORKING GROUPS FORMED +Thu May 11 00:00:00 +0200 2006 +CONFIDENTIAL +Embassy Montevideo +VZCZCXYZ0000 +RR RUEHWEB + +DE RUEHMN #0418/01 1311501 +ZNY CCCCC ZZH +R 111501Z MAY 06 +FM AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO +TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5754 +INFO RUCNMER/MERCOSUR COLLECTIVE +RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ MAY SANTIAGO 2848 +RUMIAAA/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL +RUEHC/DEPT OF AGRICULTURE WASHDC +RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC +RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC +RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC,C O N F I D E N T I A L MONTEVIDEO 000418 + +SIPDIS + +SIPDIS + +DEPT FOR WHA/AS SHANNON AND EB/AS WAYNE +DEPT ALSO FOR WHA/BSC FOR BARNES, CROFT AND MURRAY +DEPT PLEASE PASS USTR +TREASURY FOR OASIA FOR DOUGLAS +COMMERCE FOR ITA/MAC BASTIAN +NSC FOR FISK AND CRONIN +SOUTHCOM FOR POLAD + +E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/10/2016 +TAGS: ETRD ECON PREL UY +SUBJECT: VAZQUEZ LOBBIES HARD FOR TRADE TALKS WITH U.S. WORKING GROUPS FORMED + + +Classified By: Charge d'Affaires James D. Nealon +for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). + +¶1. (C) Summary: President Vazquez appears to have wasted no +time in pushing his trade agenda. At the May 8 Cabinet +meeting, he recounted the results of his ten-day trip to the +U.S. and Mexico, and of his meeting with POTUS on May 4. He +advocated for expanded trade talks with the U.S., which he +said could eventually lead to a Free Trade Agreement (FTA). +His Cabinet strongly supported Vazquez in this endeavor, with +11 ministers in favor and only two against (ForMin Gargano +and Communist Minister for Social Development Arismendi). +Charge met on May 10 with Industry Minister Lepra, who had +accompanied Vazquez on the trip, to get a first-hand account +of the GOU's next steps. Lepra confirmed the overwhelming +Cabinet support and requested that we provide some +information on specific benefits of trade agreements for +public consumption. He confirmed that the GOU was looking at +its FTA with Mexico as a model to start talks (Note: Post is +translating this agreement for USTR. End Note.) He added +that he would lead a committee of five ministers to oversee +the trade talks, and he provided the names of the members of +the technical negotiating team. When reminded of the +importance of a clear leader to head this technical team, +Lepra immediately picked up the phone to call Economy +Minister Astori. After the conversation with Astori, he told +Charge that they had decided upon EconMin Director of Trade +Sarachaga as the team leader. This would be confirmed after +discussing the issue with Vazquez at the next Cabinet meeting +on May 15. It appears that Vazquez and his economic team +have found more support for an FTA than they may have thought +possible so early after their return and are capitalizing on +the momentum. End Summary. + +¶2. (C) On Monday May 8, shortly after his return, President +Vazquez called a Cabinet meeting to inform his ministers +about his ten-day trip to the U.S. and Mexico. Vazquez is +reported to have explained his vision of an increased trade +relationship with the U.S., leading to a possible FTA by +October. According to Vice-President Novoa and Industry +Minister Lepra, 11 out of 13 ministers expressed their +support for Vazquez's vision, with only Foreign Minister +Gargano (Socialist) and Social Development Minister Arismendi +(Communist) dissenting. According to the reports, Astori led +a strong, well-founded defense of the advantages of an FTA, +while Gargano threatened to resign if an FTA was ever signed +with the U.S. It appears that the level of support that +Vazquez garnered in this first Cabinet meeting was stronger +than expected. On the public front, the left-leaning daily +La Republica was unusually supportive, with overall favorable +reporting under a headline claiming that "The Government +pressed on the accelerator to make good on commercial +agreement with the U.S." A poll conducted by El Pais +indicated a strong majority of public support for a trade +agreement with the U.S. + +¶3. (C) Charge met on May 10 with Industry Minister Lepra to +get a better understanding of the GOU's plans and to +coordinate actions. Lepra was very upbeat about the trip and +about the prospects for an FTA. He relished in the increased +isolation in which ForMin Gargano was finding himself. Lepra +and Charge agreed to coordinate public stance regarding the +ongoing negotiations, to ensure that the Embassy not move +ahead of President Vazquez. Lepra confirmed that the model +FTA that the GOU favored was the Uruguay-Mexico FTA, ""for +political reasons"". This agreement was supported by the +entire political spectrum, he explained, and by Uruguay's +Mercosur partners. In addition, Lepra noted that the +Uruguay-Mexico FTA, signed in 2004, is a third-generation +agreement based on an improved NAFTA model. Charge confirmed +that post was in the process of translating this document so +that USTR may compare it with our latest FTA. Lepra then +requested our assistance in providing him with information +about our FTA with Vietnam, not because it is a particularly +good FTA, he noted, but rather to counter opposition from the +Communist Party. "If Communist Vietnam, after fighting a +brutal war against the U.S., can turn around and sign an +FTA," he explained, "how can our Communists be against it?" +Lepra also requested information on job creation, investment +and poverty reduction brought about by FTAs, again for the +GOU's campaign to build up public support. Charge pledged to +provide the information. Post would appreciate any and all +such information to be shared with the GOU. + +¶4. (C) Lepra said he would lead a political committee of five +ministers (Industry, Economy, Agriculture, Foreign Affairs +and Tourism), responsible for the trade talks. He also had a +technical negotiating team in mind, but was still unclear as +to who would lead this team. Charge noted the importance of +a solid negotiating team, with clear lines of authority, +given the short time frame in which negotiations were to be +conducted. Lepra immediately picked up the phone to call +EconMin Astori, with whom he agreed to have EconMin Trade +Director Sarachaga lead the negotiating team. He and Astori +would confirm their choice after the next Cabinet meeting on +May 15, he said. + +¶5. (C) Comment: Clearly, Vazquez has returned from the U.S. +in a strengthened position to initiate trade talks and is +making the best out of the momentum he has encountered. The +GOU appears to be keenly aware of the tight timeframe to +negotiate an agreement and determined to make the most of +this opportunity. Embassy will continue to be the +interagency coordinator" for the GOU to ensure that no time +is lost due to lack of focus on organizational details. End +Comment. +Nealon \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/rel_date/2011/07/31/07TEGUCIGALPA1247.txt b/rel_date/2011/07/31/07TEGUCIGALPA1247.txt new file mode 100644 index 000000000..41978ec3b --- /dev/null +++ b/rel_date/2011/07/31/07TEGUCIGALPA1247.txt @@ -0,0 +1,169 @@ +07TEGUCIGALPA1247 +SELECTION OF NEW HONDURAN AMBASSADOR TO THE UN RAISES VISA ISSUES +Thu Jul 19 00:00:00 +0200 2007 +SECRET +Embassy Tegucigalpa +VZCZCXYZ0005 +PP RUEHWEB + +DE RUEHTG #1247/01 1982131 +ZNY SSSSS ZZH (CCY DTG ADX:00E6E7BA MSI6833 614) +P 192131Z JUL 07 +FM AMEMBASSY TEGUCIGALPA +TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6422 +INFO RUEAHLC/HOMELAND SECURITY CENTER WASHDC PRIORITY +RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY +RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0153S E C R E T TEGUCIGALPA 001247 + +SIPDIS + +C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (DTG CHANGED FROM 7/17 TO 7/19) + +SIPDIS + +STATE FOR D, WHA/CEN, CA/VO/L/C AND CA/VO/L/A +NSC FOR DAN FISK +E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/19/2017 +TAGS: CVIS PGOV PREL HO +SUBJECT: SELECTION OF NEW HONDURAN AMBASSADOR TO THE UN RAISES VISA ISSUES + +REF: STATE 98124 + +Classified By: AMB. CHARLES FORD. REASONS 1.4(B) AND (D). + +¶1. (C) SUMMARY. Jorge Arturo Reina, the current Minister of Government and Justice, was nominated by President Zelaya to represent Honduras as the ambassador to the United Nations. To assume his duties at the United Nations, Reina will need a G-1 visa to travel to the United States. To obtain that visa, he must first undergo a Security Advisory Opinion for an OO hit, and Advisory Opinion for an NCIII hit and apply for a waiver as he is currently ineligible for a visa under section 212(a)(3)(B) for past terrorist activities. Reina has a long history of involvement with Communist-inspired revolutionary groups and anti-American activities. Although he may have left his radical student days behind, his family is involved in the sale of passports and human smuggling of Chinese immigrants. Zelaya's naming of Reina to the United Nations, knowing Reina's history and that his previous visa was revoked, appears to be designed as a sign of his independence from the United States. Given the serious nature of Reina's past activities, any request for a waiver must be thoroughly reviewed. END SUMMARY. + +¶2. (U) President Zelaya selected his current Minister of +Government and Justice, Jorge Arturo Reina (Reina), as the +new Honduran ambassador to the United Nations on July 18, +replacing Ivan Romero Martinez. Zelaya picked Reina as his +new U.N. Ambassador despite knowing, along with the rest of +the Honduran public, that Reina's previous U.S. visa was +revoked. Zelaya stated that this nomination was a "protest +for Honduran sovereignty" and that Reina's previous visa +problems should have no effect on Reina's ability to +represent Honduras before the United Nations as the U.S. must +issue a visa to each member's representative. Zelaya also +stated that during his visit with Secretary Rice on July 10, +he notified her of the impending nomination and that the +Secretary did not raise any objections. With the appointment, +it is expected that the GOH will apply for a waiver and an +eventual G-1 visa on behalf of Reina to allow him to travel +to the United Nations in New York City. + +---------------------- +Reina's Visa Problem +---------------------- + +¶3. (C) Jorge Arturo Reina is currently ineligible for a visa +under section 212(a)(3)(B) of the Immigration and Nationality +Act based on his links and involvement with terrorist +activities in the 1970s and 1980s. In addition, there is +currently a "00" hit associated with his name which requires +the submission of a Security Advisory Opinion for review by +the Department and other interested agencies prior to ruling +on the visa application. Finally, there also exists a NCIII +hit from the Federal Bureau of Investigation indicating past +criminal activity in the U.S. that would also have to be +cleared through CA/VO/L/A. + +¶4. (C) In the mid-1990s, Reina obtained a waiver and +eventually a B1/B2 visa with the restriction that he provide +an itinerary for each trip to the U.S. While serving as a +Minister without Portfolio and Advisor to his brother, +ex-President Carlos Roberto Reina (1994 - 1998), Reina +obtained an A-1 visa with the same restriction and the +original tourist visa was canceled. He traveled numerous +times to the United States but failed to comply with the +restrictions prompting the Department to eventually revoke +his visa. He later received two single-entry B1/B2 visas, for +family medical reasons, to travel to the United States. + +------------------------------------------ +Links to Terrorist and Criminal Activities +------------------------------------------- + +¶5. (S/NF) As a student in the 1950s, Reina was a Communist +sympathizer and traveled to Moscow in 1957. Following +deportation to Costa Rica in the early 1960s after the +military coup in Honduras, Reina spent his months in exile +trying to organize armed resistance to the Honduran +government and unsuccessfully sought money and arms from +Fidel Castro in Cuba. He was allowed to return to Honduras in +1964 where he continued his organizational efforts and was +involved in left-wing student activities. Reina's involvement +included storing a cache of weapons on behalf of the Liberal +Party who used those weapons in their instigation of strikes +and public demonstrations to overthrow the military +government. He was widely believed to be a Soviet and/or +Cuban agent at that time. + +¶6. (S/NF) While a teacher and later Rector of the University +of Honduras (UNAH), he was instrumental in organizing +students and faculty to provide both moral and material +support to the Sandinistas in Nicaragua. During this time he +continued to speak out against the U.S.'s role in Central +America and was linked to supplying unknown persons with hand +grenades to be used against Standard Fruit Company. An +admirer of the Cuban Revolution, Reina traveled +surreptitiously to Cuba a number of times in the early 1980s +to meet with other revolutionaries and was suspected of +supplying arms to rebels in El Salvador during that country's +civil war. Post also received information in 1980 that Reina +was made aware of, and eventually approved, a plan by a +terrorist organization to kidnap a U.S. official. + +¶7. (S/NF) Reina's involvement in criminal activities did not +end with his entry into the Honduran government. The current +Director of Immigration, German Espinal, a trusted ally in +the fight against corruption, has linked Reina's son, Carlos +Eduardo Reina, a local businessman, to the sale of passports +and other identity documents to Chinese immigrants who +presumably intend to travel to the United States. While Reina +is not directly involved in this human smuggling operation, +he is believed to receive money from those sales to use his +position in the GOH to protect his son's illegal activities +and shield him from investigation. + +-------------------------------------------- +This Nomination Just One More Provocation +--------------------------------------------- + +¶8. (C) Zelaya's nomination of Reina appears to be part of his +ongoing efforts to press the USG on a range of issues to +determine what if any consequences he will see from bad +policy choices. Like a small boy poking a hornets' nest with +a stick, Zelaya keeps jabbing at the USG to see what the +reaction will be. His most recent "pokes" include his +on-again/off-again visit to Cuba to meet with Castro and +strengthen Honduran/Cuban relations; granting permission to +the Cuban airline, Aerocarribean, to begin service to +Honduras; his trip to Managua, Nicaragua to help celebrate +the anniversary of the Sandinista Revolution with President +Ortega; and his public desire for friendship with Hugo +Chavez. Zelaya has yet to suffer any adverse consequences for +his actions and he will continue to act in this manner to see +how far he can go. + +¶9. (C) Another example of this tendency to test limits is his +statement that Secretary Rice had no objection to Reina's +nomination. This subject was not raised in his meeting with +the Secretary, but rather with Deputy Secretary Negroponte on +July 10 (see reftel). Zelaya informed the Deputy Secretary of +the impending appointment but at no point did the Deputy +Secretary state that the USG was in agreement or that it +opposed the naming of Reina. Instead, Zelaya took the lack of +response as approval. + +¶10. (C) COMMENT. Jorge Arturo Reina's past history with +terrorist and criminal activities, and his ongoing acceptance +of his family's involvement in human smuggling, raises +serious issues that need to be considered prior to the +granting of a waiver for a G-1 visa, especially with regard +to the nature of any restrictions on the G-1 visa that would +be appropriate. Post is concerned that the approval of the +waiver and visa without serious consideration of conditions +will only encourage Zelaya to continue testing the USG as to +the outer limits of how far he can go in his relationship +with the ALBA entities. END COMMENT. +FORD \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/rel_date/2011/08/02/08BOGOTA337.txt b/rel_date/2011/08/02/08BOGOTA337.txt new file mode 100644 index 000000000..8045e93a7 --- /dev/null +++ b/rel_date/2011/08/02/08BOGOTA337.txt @@ -0,0 +1,204 @@ +08BOGOTA337 +CJCS ADMIRAL MULLEN'S JANUARY 17 MEETING WITH +Mon Jan 28 00:00:00 +0100 2008 +SECRET +Embassy Bogota +VZCZCXYZ0001 +PP RUEHWEB + +DE RUEHBO #0337/01 0281705 +ZNY SSSSS ZZH +P 281705Z JAN 08 +FM AMEMBASSY BOGOTA +TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1118 +INFO RUEHAC/AMEMBASSY ASUNCION PRIORITY 0512 +RUEHBE/AMEMBASSY BELMOPAN PRIORITY 0053 +RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA PRIORITY 8006 +RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES PRIORITY 2122 +RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS PRIORITY 9849 +RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ JAN 9199 +RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA PRIORITY 5846 +RUEHMU/AMEMBASSY MANAGUA PRIORITY 2134 +RUEHME/AMEMBASSY MEXICO PRIORITY 8270 +RUEHMN/AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO PRIORITY 2930 +RUEHNY/AMEMBASSY OSLO PRIORITY 0387 +RUEHZP/AMEMBASSY PANAMA PRIORITY 1138 +RUEHSJ/AMEMBASSY SAN JOSE PRIORITY 4734 +RUEHSN/AMEMBASSY SAN SALVADOR PRIORITY 1864 +RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO PRIORITY 2374 +RUEHTG/AMEMBASSY TEGUCIGALPA PRIORITY 1471 +RUEHGL/AMCONSUL GUAYAQUIL PRIORITY 4279 +RUEHUB/USINT HAVANA PRIORITY 0168 +RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY +RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY +RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL PRIORITY +RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY +RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC//USDP ADMIN/CHAIRS// PRIORITYS E C R E T BOGOTA 000337 + +SIPDIS + +SIPDIS + +E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/23/2018 +TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER MARR MOPS VZ AR BH BR CI CS +CU, ES, HO, MX, NU, PM, PA, PE, UY, CO +SUBJECT: CJCS ADMIRAL MULLEN'S JANUARY 17 MEETING WITH +PRESIDENT URIBE + +Classified By: Ambassador William R. Brownfield +Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d) + +------- +Summary +------- + +¶1. (S) President Uribe's overwhelming concern during a +January 17 meeting with Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff +(CJCS) Admiral Michael Mullen, was Hugo Chavez' aggressive +remarks and proposal to grant belligerent status to the FARC. + Uribe insisted the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia +(FARC) and National Liberation Army (ELN) must keep their +terrorist designation, and the USG and GOC should work +together to convince Latin American countries that Chavez' +approach would harm Colombia and regional democracy. Uribe +said Chavez has committed to bring down Uribe and his +government by using the FARC as his militia inside Colombia. +The GOC's current plan of action on hostages consists of +locating them, securing areas near the hostage groups, and +calling on the International Committee of the Red Cross +(ICRC) to negotiate their release. Uribe would authorize +Colombian forces to cross into Venezuela to arrest FARC +leaders and bring them to justice in Colombia. End Summary. + + +¶2. (U) Participants + +UNITED STATES + +CJCS Admiral Michael Mullen +Ambassador William Brownfield +CJCS/EA CAPT James Foggo +Defense Attach COL Mark Wilkins (notetaker) + +COLOMBIA + +President Alvaro Uribe +Defense Minister Juan Manuel Santos +Armed Forces Commander General Freddy Padilla +MFA U.S. and Canada Desk Officer Patricia Cortes + + +------------------------------- +Uribe Obsessed By Chavez Blasts +------------------------------- + +¶3. (C) President Alvaro Uribe arrived late to the meeting, +directly from a discussion with his cabinet on how to respond +to Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez' latest inflammatory +remarks, and the show of solidarity by the Venezuelan +Congress on granting "belligerent" status to the FARC. It +was clear that he was still focused on Chavez and the GOC +response. + +------------------------- +GOC Progress, USG Support +------------------------- + +¶4. (C) Uribe thanked the United States for its continued +support, stressing its decisiveness in helping Colombia pull +back from the brink of becoming a failed state. While much +work remains, Colombia has made great progress against +terrorists and the GOC feels certain they can win this +battle. Uribe attributed a great portion of the credit for +Colombia's success to the permanent assistance of the USG and + +its armed forces. Chairman Mullen reaffirmed the strength of +the bilateral relationship and assured Uribe of continuing +USG commitment to defeating our common adversaries. He +admired Colombians' determination and leadership. The +Colombian military had transformed itself remarkably and +performed the highest calling possible -- returning Colombia +to its citizens. + +--------------------------- +Chavez' Endorsement of FARC +--------------------------- + +¶5. (C) Turning to Venezuela, Uribe said his neighbor's +actions cause Colombia great difficulty. The FARC and ELN +must keep their terrorist designation, Uribe insisted, and +there should be negative consequences for any country +granting them belligerent status. It was important to +counter and challenge Chavez' rhetoric, especially on this +point. When France and Mexico granted that status to the +Farabundo Marti Liberation Front (FMLN) rebels in El Salvador +in 1981, Uribe commented, they fought an unelected and brutal +dictatorship. By contrast, the FARC waged war on a duly +elected democracy, they had no public support, and they +financed themselves through narcotrafficking and extortion. + +¶6. (S) Asked by the Chairman how much help Chavez gave the +FARC, Uribe replied that Chavez has a five to seven year plan +to advance his Bolivarian agenda in Colombia. He has created +popular militias inside Venezuela (apart from the Armed +Forces) to sustain his revolution. The GOC believes Chavez +thinks he could use the FARC as his militia inside Colombia +to combat its democratic government. Chavez remains +committed to bring down both Uribe and his government, as the +primary obstacles to his Bolivarian expansionist dreams. +With no clear Colombian presidential successor, a well +financed candidate favoring Chavez might find space in 2010. +The best counter to Chavez, in Uribe's view, remains action +-- including use of the military. + +---------------- +Regional Support +---------------- + +¶7. (S) Uribe urged the GOC and USG to work together to +convince Latin American countries that Chavez' approach to +the FARC was wrong and would harm Colombia and regional +democracy. The USG, he said, ought to lead a public campaign +against Venezuela and counter Chavez' progress through +preferential oil offers. The U.S. and Mexico, supported by +Honduras, Panama, Belize, and Costa Rica (especially Oscar +Arias in the latter) were natural leaders to counter Chavez. +Even Cuba, which felt Chavez had crossed into dangerous +territory, has exercised a restraining influence. When the +GOC asked the Cuban government their views on Chavez' call to +roll back the FARC's terrorist designation, the Cubans stated +that it was "a difficult proposal." + +¶8. (S) Uribe saw mixed loyalties among other Latin American countries. Only Nicaragua had supported Chavez' FARC proposal. Argentina remains difficult, since Venezuela bought Argentine bonds and Chavez made campaign contributions to the new President. Paraguay, in the midst of an election cycle, is uncertain though the front-runner supports Chavez. Uruguay, a possible ally, is sitting on the fence. Brazil remains friendly with Colombia, but prefers neutrality lest it offend anyone. In Peru, President Alan Garcia concurs with the United States and would follow its lead. Chile remains a good friend to Colombia and its cause. + +----------------- +Hostages and HVTs +----------------- + +¶9. (S) Uribe listed rescue of hostages held by the FARC as +one of his main goals for 2008. He outlined a plan whereby +the military would establish a "cordon sanitaire" around +areas where hostages were held. Then the GOC would +temporarily open the area to outside interlocutors such as +the ICRC to offer an international medical mission and +conduct negotiations. Under this umbrella, the GOC would +focus on the 44 hostages the FARC had identified as +"exchangeable." Chairman Mullen assured USG support for +GOC's efforts, but he cautioned that the USG wanted the +hostages returned alive. Uribe responded with his conviction +that the FARC would not kill hostages at this stage. The +best course of action, he advocated, remains to locate the +hostages, secure the positions, and then call in the ICRC to +negotiate their release. + +¶10. (S) Uribe said the GOC also placed a priority on high +value targets and that they had achieved great results in +late 2007. Finally, he said he was prepared to authorize +Colombian forces to cross into Venezuela, arrest FARC +leaders, and bring them to justice in Colombia. + +¶11. (U) CJCS Admiral Mullen cleared this cable. + + + +Brownfield \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/rel_date/2011/08/05/03ROME3567.txt b/rel_date/2011/08/05/03ROME3567.txt new file mode 100644 index 000000000..752f6a6f9 --- /dev/null +++ b/rel_date/2011/08/05/03ROME3567.txt @@ -0,0 +1,311 @@ +03ROME3567 +GALILEO: AMBASSADOR ARAGONA ADVOCATES ADDITIONAL +Wed Aug 06 00:00:00 +0200 2003 +CONFIDENTIAL +Embassy Rome +This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.C O N F I D E N T I A L ROME 003567 + +SIPDIS + + +STATE FOR OES/SAT (BRAIBANTI, KARNER) +DEFENSE FOR OASD/NII (STENBIT MANNO WORMSER SWIDER CHESKY) +DEFENSE ALSO FOR OSD/P (TOWNSEND, NOVAK) +JOINT STAFF FOR J5/J6 + +E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/06/2013 +T... + +SUBJECT: GALILEO: AMBASSADOR ARAGONA ADVOCATES ADDITIONAL +TECHNICAL TALKS TO RESOLVE M-CODE OVERLAY ISSUE + +REF: USNATO 00777 + +Classified By: A/ECMIN David W. Mulenex; reasons 1.5 B and D. + +¶1. (C) Summary: Italian MFA Political Director Gianfranco +Aragona informed a U.S. delegation on July 16 that he still +believes technical solutions exist to the U.S.-EU dispute +over the Galileo Public Regulated Service (PRS) signal +overlay of the M-code. Aragona recognized US security +concerns regarding the overlay, but repeatedly insisted the +EU must safeguard the "Integrity and operability" of Galileo. + The U.S. delegation insisted that an overlay would harm U.S. +and NATO NAVWAR capabilities and put lives at risk in the +event of warfare. Aragona did not completely reject the +delegation's point that a political solution was necessary to +avoid this outcome but made it clear he does not believe the +dispute is ripe for high level political intervention. +Aragona did agree that the delegation's suggestion to merge +unclassified technical talks and plenary negotiations was a +good idea and promised to convey the idea to the Commission. +Aragona stated firmly that NATO would not be an acceptable +venue for classified discussions. He suggested they could +take place at the US Mission to NATO, but insisted that he +participants must be limited to the U.S. and the EC. See +Embassy comment para 16. End Summary. + +¶2. (U) On July 16 a U.S. delegation met with Italian MFA +Political Director Gianfranco Aragona to discuss the US-EC +dispute over the Galileo Public Regulated Service (PRS) +signal overlay of the GPS M-code. The U.S. delegation was +led by Ralph Braibanti, Director, Space and Advanced +Technology, State Department Bureau of Oceans and +International Environmental and Technical Affairs and +included Mel Flack, Director, Communications Electronic +Division, US Mission to NATO; Richard McKinney, Deputy +Director Space Acquisition, US Air Force; Todd Wilson, EST +Officer, US Mission to the EU; Marja Verloop EUR/ERA; and +representatives from the political and science sections of +Embassy Rome. Those joining Aragona included Giovanni +Brauzzi, Director, Office of NATO Affairs, MFA; Sandro +Bernardin, European Correspondent, MFA; Mario Caporale, +Navigation Office, Italian Space Agency; and Umberto +Cantielli, Chief, Navigation Identification Office, Defense +General Staff, Ministry of Defense. + +U.S. Delegation Insists Political Solution is needed + +¶3. (C) Braibanti told Aragona that the U.S. believes it is +important to hold informal consultations with key EU member +States to advance U.S.-EC differences over Galileo towards a +decision. He recalled that the President raised M-Code +overlay at the last U.S.- EU Summit. In reviewing the USG +position on Galileo, Braibanti explained that the U.S. +accepts the EU satellite system as a reality, but the +security implications of having the Galileo Public Regulated +Service (PRS) overlay the GPS M-Code are unacceptable to both +the U.S. and NATO. so far, the U.S. has fought a defensive +battle with the European Commission (EC). Braibanti allowed +that some progress has been made in convincing European +officials that direct overlay of M-Code by the PRS is a bad +idea. However, consideration being given by the EC to use +BOC 2.2 for Open Service (OS) also involves a partial overlay +of M-Code, and damages navigational warfare capabilities. +The U.S. will be unable to accept this outcome. + +¶4. (C) Braibanti assured Aragona that the USG is committed +to finding a solution, but cautioned that without some +flexibility and compromise from the EC, progress will be +difficult. The U.S. has proposed several technical options +for Galileo PRS and OS that our experts believe meet all +stated technical and performance requirements for Galileo +services. Braibanti underscored that, given the EC's +timetable for making design decisions on Galileo, member +states may find that the Commission has locked in technical +solutions that threaten U.S. and NATO capabilities to conduct +navigational warfare. To avoid this eventuality, which could +put allied lives at risk, member states need to give clear +political guidance now to the EC that the Galileo signal +structure cannot undermine NAVWAR operations. + +But Aragona Puts Faith in Further Technical Talks + +¶5. (C) Aragona, signaling his reluctance to take on U.S. +concerns vis-a-vis Italy's EU partners, underscored that +Galileo negotiations had been entrusted to the EC. He +assured the U.S. team that Italy recognized the security +issues at stake. "Given our NATO membership it would be +crazy for us not to be sensitive to U.S. arguments," Aragona +declared. These concerns are shared by the EC, he claimed, +but any solution must also safeguard the "integrity and +operability of Galileo for it to be a commercially viable and +reliable system (Note: Aragona came back repeatedly +throughout the course of the consultations to this theme. End +Note). + +¶6. (C) Aragona pressed claims by EC experts that technical +negotiations could lead to a solution to both protect the +integrity and operability of Galileo and address US security +concerns. Referencing the U.S.-EU Summit, Aragona asserted +that, as an "agreement" had been reached to proceed with +technical talks, the pace of negotiations to try to reach a +"technical solution" to the overlay conundrum should be +intensified. Italy and the EC are ready to take into +account U.S. and NATO security concerns and believe that +technical solutions, which protect them, are available. + +¶7. (C) Aragona wanted to know when the U.S. would be ready +to discuss the most recent EC proposals, which he understood +included a certain "inventiveness" and were "not so stuck in +the prejudices of the past." The EC was ready to sit and +discuss a mutually agreeable technical solution. As for +political input, Aragona said once more that the Commission +is well aware that U.S. security concerns must be addressed +while taking into account the "integrity" of the Galileo +system. + +¶8. (C) Braibanti countered that, with regard to EC +technical proposals, he was aware of only two to which a +formal reply had not been given: using filtering to mitigate +the navigation warfare problems posed by overlaying BOC 2.2, +and having the U.S. change the frequency for its military GPS +signals. In the spirit of cooperation, the U.S. had not +rejected these ideas out of hand, but instead asked its +technical experts to analyze them carefully. Now that he had +seen the results of this analysis, Braibanti could say with +some certainty that it is highly unlikely that either of +these options will work. Summing up this portion of the +discussion, Braibanti framed the state of play for Aragona: +We may well reach a situation in September where we will have +analyzed the EC's proposals and decided they can not provide +a solution which protects U.S. and NATO capabilities to +conduct NAVWAR. Our concern is that if EC technical experts +continue to operate within their current frame of reference, +we will arrive at a technical impasse. To avoid this +impasse, the EC team needs clear political direction from +member States that they should focus on options that do not +negatively impact NAVWAR. (Note: on the margins of the +meeting, Braibanti told Aragona that the USG worries the EC +negotiators may be positioning themselves to argue to the EU +member states that they had made a good faith effort to reach +a compromise, but the U.S. would not meet them halfway, so +Galileo must move ahead without an agreement to cooperate +with the U.S. Aragona discounted this possibility, +suggesting that the EC recognizes the need for Galileo-GPS +interoperability. (End Note) + +NATO a Non-Starter for Classified Talks + +¶9. (C) Aragona said the U.S. and EU face a practical +problem over where to hold classified discussions and that +this problem should be easily resolvable. Italy expects the +U.S. to provide a formal answer to the letter EC negotiator +Heinz Hillbrecht sent to Braibanti on July 2 (reftel). +Aragona maintained that the EC wants further discussions in a +classified setting, but that setting can not be NATO. He +underscored this point in uncharacteristically blunt +language. Aragona said holding the talks at the US Mission +to NATO was perfectly acceptable as long as they were U.S.-EC +rather than NATO-EC discussions. The issue under discussion +is between the U.S. and the EC, Aragona argued, and, +moreover, there are several non-EU members of NATO. +Braibanti took Aragona's points and assured him that the USG +was considering the issue of additional classified +discussions, including the modalities for such meetings. + +Some Agreement on Procedure, but.... + +¶10. (C) Braibanti, moving the discussion to how and when to +hold the next plenary negotiating session, said the U.S. will +work with the Commission on dates for a September meeting to +review technical and trade issues He suggested folding the +technical discussions into the plenary negotiating session. +This could help to ensure transparency and avoid +misunderstanding among the political negotiators about the +available technical options. Aragona acknowledged that +Braibanti's idea had merit and committed to "see what could +be done" to make a political recommendation to the EC to +proceed along these lines. + +Still Talking Past Each Other on substance + +¶11. (C) The U.S. delegation raised concerns that France +might be driving the EC toward a decision counter to the +interests of other EU member states, the U.S. and NATO. Mel +Flack said it was difficult not to arrive at the conclusion +that France was interested in an M-Code overlay so it could +guarantee reliability for precision guided weaponry it might +seek to sell to third countries. + +¶12. (C) "I have objected to Europeans who say that U.S. +actions demonstrate an intent to undermine Galileo," Aragona +told the delegation. "Likewise," he said, "I do not believe +that there is any maliciousness on the part of a particular +country or the EC." Above all, he maintained, Galileo is a +commercial undertaking; the system's signal structure was +selected according to well established criteria based on the +belief that it provided the most robust, reliable service. +"I accept your arguments about the need to jam adversaries in +a NAVWAR context," he said, but the U.S. "needs to keep in +mind that Galileo service must be sold. The problem of +selective jamming is not just political; commercial aspects +are also involved." When Aragona stated it would not be +acceptable to expect the EU to settle for alternate, less +robust, signals, Braibanti countered it would be unacceptable +for the U.S. and its allies to risk the lives of soldiers in +order to allow the EU to have more robust signals for +Galileo. + +¶13. (C) Aragona acknowledged the point in passing, but +moved quickly to close and summarize the conversation. He +suggested the next step would be to find a suitable venue to +hold classified discussions. He claimed there is flexibility +and that the EU is aware of the need for a solution amenable +to both sides. Braibanti emphasized that after the September +discussions the USG would like to hold another set of +bilateral consultations with Italy. Aragona was +noncommittal, offering to share thoughts after the September +plenary session and then decide on a way forward. In terms +of U.S.-Italian engagement, he said he hoped that discussions +would not lead to the "extreme" situation in which the U.S. +and EU would be negotiating on exclusively U.S. terms, by +which he meant asking the EU to accept moving PRS to another +frequency band and to only then negotiate a solution. He +noted in closing that Italy had its own technological and +industrial interests to defend. + +Better Signals, Less Political Clout from Other GOI Ministries + +¶14. (C) Braibanti, Flack and EST Couns met with Vice +Minister for Research Guido Possa on July 15. Possa is +responsible for the Italian Space Agency and through it for +Italian participation in ESA. After a brief explanation of +the overlay problem and its implications for NAVWAR, Possa +immediately understood that a political, and not a technical +approach was needed to resolve outstanding problems. Possa +suggested that the U.S. should work closely with the Germans, +and in Italy with Minister of Defense Martino, whose +commitment to NATO and to close cooperation with the U.S. +were well known. On the margins of a July 28 +representational event, ESTCOUNS and A/POLMINCOUNS raised +briefly the overlay problem with MINDEF Martino. Martino +said that, from his point of view, Galileo was unnecessary +and a huge waste of money -- one GPS system was enough. He +was unaware that the USG now supported Galileo in principle. +Martino was sensitive to our arguments on the security +implications of the overlay, but observed that he was +perceived within the GOI as too pro-American to be of much +assistance. He suggested that the Embassy's best bet for +moving the GOI closer to the USG position would be to +approach U/S to the PM Gianni Letta, who, we note, is PM +Berlusconi's closest political advisor. + +¶15. (C) ESTCOUNS, ECONCOUNS, AND USEU ECONCOUNS met July 18 +with Ministry of Transport Diplomatic Advisor Maraini to +discuss the Aragona meetings and to seek the perspective of +the Ministry on the decisions to be taken concerning Galileo +at the December Transport Council. Maraini told us that he +believed that Galileo was now principally a political +problem, and a problem beyond the competency of the Transport +Ministry and Transport Council. In a candid appraisal of +Hillbrecht-whom Maraini admitted he did not know well--the +Diplomatic Advisor said that the decision to be taken was +beyond the competency of Hillbrecht's technical committee. +Maraini understood and agreed with our assessment that very +little time and scope remained for technical solutions, and +that an impasse requiring a major political decision by the +EU was likely. Maraini is worried about the outcome. He +undertook to prepare a note for Minister Lunardi to be sent +to the Prive Minister before the PM's departure for Crawford. + +¶16. (C) Embassy Comment: The U.S. delegation made the trip +to Rome to follow up on indications from Aragona, made during +his recent trip to Washington, that he may have been willing +to carry some water for us with the EC and member states. We +were left with the impression that Italy's PolDir had instead +decided to keep his EU hat firmly in place and stick to the +script of the EC briefing book on Galileo. Despite +understanding within the functional ministries of the GOI, +peeling Aragona, the MFA, and Italy away from the EC position +will be difficult, judging from Aragona's assessment that +"technical solutions" still offer a way forward. He threw us +a quarter of a bone by offering to help give political top +cover to the expert level technical discussions. However, +Aragona's implicit insistence that Galileo's commercial +viability may depend on at least a partial M-Code overlay to +"guarantee" service is troubling for its resemblance to +French arguments. + +¶17. (U) This message has been cleared by OES/SAT Braibanti. +Sembler \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/rel_date/2011/08/05/03ROME4746.txt b/rel_date/2011/08/05/03ROME4746.txt new file mode 100644 index 000000000..32edd5540 --- /dev/null +++ b/rel_date/2011/08/05/03ROME4746.txt @@ -0,0 +1,74 @@ +03ROME4746 +GALILEO/M-CODE: INCREASED HIGH-LEVEL ITALIAN +Fri Oct 17 00:00:00 +0200 2003 +CONFIDENTIAL +Embassy Rome +This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.C O N F I D E N T I A L ROME 004746 + +SIPDIS + +E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/09/2013 +TAGS: ECPS ETRD IT TSPA TSPL PREL EUN + +SUBJECT: GALILEO/M-CODE: INCREASED HIGH-LEVEL ITALIAN +ATTENTION -- BUT NO ANSWERS + + CLASSIFIED BY: AMBASSADOR MEL SEMBLER FOR REASONS 1.5 (B)(D) + +¶1. (C) AT THE END OF AN OCTOBER 9 MEETING ON ANOTHER SUBJECT +WITH PM BERLUSCONI'S CLOSEST ADVISOR, PRIME MINISTRY +UNDERSECRETARY GIANNI LETTA, AMBASSADOR SEMBLER TOOK THE +OPPORTUNITY TO EXPRESS THE USG'S CONTINUED GREAT CONCERN OVER +LACK OF PROGRESS ON RESOLVING THE GALILEO/M-CODE OVERLAY +DISAGREEMENT WITH THE EU. THE AMBASSADOR TOLD LETTA BLUNTLY +THAT THE DISPUTE RISKS BECOMING A TRAIN WRECK ON ITALY'S EU +WATCH UNLESS MORE CONCERTED POLITICAL-LEVEL ATTENTION IS +GIVEN TO THE ISSUE. THE USG FELT THAT THAT AMERICAN +TECHNICAL EXPERTS HAD PROVIDED COMMISSION EXPERTS WITH +EXHAUSTIVE CLASSIFIED TECHNICAL BRIEFINGS, WHICH HAD +DEMONSTRATED PERSUASIVELY THAT NON-OVERLAY SPECTRAL OPTIONS +EXIST, WHICH WILL NOT DEGRADE GALILEO CAPABILITIES. +NEVERTHELESS, THE COMMISSION AND EU GOVERNMENTS HAVE BEEN +UNWILLING TO TAKE THE POLITICAL STEP TO DRAW THE OBVIOUS +CONCLUSIONS FROM THE TECHNICAL DISCUSSIONS. + +¶2. (C) LETTA RESPONDED THAT SENIOR LEVELS OF THE ITALIAN +GOVERNMENT WERE IN FACT PAYING CLOSE ATTENTION TO GALILEO. +IN THE PRIME MINISTRY, DIPLOMATIC ADVISOR GIOVANNI +CASTELANETTA HAD BEEN BRIEFING PM BERLUSCONI REGULARLY. +LETTA ALSO NOTED THAT DURING CABINET MEETINGS DEFENSE +MINISTER MARTINO HAD SPOKEN OPENLY IN SUPPORT OF THE U.S. +POSITION. NEVERTHELESS, LETTA OFFERED NO CLEAR INDICATION OF +WHAT FURTHER ACTIONS, IF ANY, THE GOI PLANNED TO TAKE WITHIN +THE EU. + +¶3. (C) IN A SEPARATE MEETING OCTOBER 14 WITH ECMIN, AGAIN ON +ANOTHER SUBJECT, GENERAL LEONARDO TRICARICO (THE PRIME + MINISTER'S MILITARY AND SECURITY ADVISOR) TOOK THE INITIATIVE +TO RAISE THE MATTER OF GALILEO. ECMIN REVIEWED USG CONCERNS +FOR TRICARICO, AS WELL AS THE AMBASSADOR'S EXCHANGE WITH +LETTA. ALTHOUGH HE ASKED SEVERAL QUESTIONS ABOUT THE RECENT +MEETINGS IN LONDON AND WASHINGTON, AND WAS CLEARLY ANXIOUS +ABOUT THE LACK OF FORWARD MOVEMENT IN U.S.-EU DISCUSSIONS, +TRICARICO WAS AT A LOSS TO SUGGEST WHAT ACTIONS ITALY SHOULD +OR COULD TAKE. + +¶4. (C) COMMENT: LETTA'S ACCOUNT OF THE HIGH-LEVEL ATTENTION +ITALIAN MINISTERS -- INCLUDING THE PM -- ARE GIVING THE +GALILEO/M-CODE DISPUTE IS WELCOME NEWS. REPORTS OF DEFMIN +MARTINO'S UNAMBIGUOUS SUPPORT FOR THE U.S. POSITION IS +WELCOME, AND CONFIRMS WHAT HE HAS TOLD US. (BUT MARTINO HAS +ALSO BEEN QUICK TO POINT OUT THAT HE NEEDS KEY ALLIES, SUCH +AS LETTA, IN ORDER TO SUCCEED IN THE INTERMINISTERIAL +PROCESS.) NEVERTHELESS, THERE IS LITTLE INDICATION THAT THE +GOI HAS ANY GAME PLAN ON HOW TO PREVENT THE WRONG OUTCOME AT +THE IMPORTANT DECEMBER MEETING OF EU TRANSPORT MINISTERS. +EMBASSY STANDS READY TO CONTINUE TO ENGAGE THE GOI AT THE +HIGHEST LEVELS ON GALILEO AS WASHINGTON AGENCIES WORK OUT THE +NEXT STEPS IN OUR STRATEGY. END COMMENT. +SEMBLER + +NNNN + 2003ROME04746 - Classification: CONFIDENTIAL + +" \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/rel_date/2011/08/05/08KUALALUMPUR1114.txt b/rel_date/2011/08/05/08KUALALUMPUR1114.txt new file mode 100644 index 000000000..d69d04147 --- /dev/null +++ b/rel_date/2011/08/05/08KUALALUMPUR1114.txt @@ -0,0 +1,298 @@ +08KUALALUMPUR1114 +PRESSURE MOUNTS AGAINST INTERNAL SECURITY ACT (ISA) +Tue Dec 23 00:00:00 +0100 2008 +SECRET +Embassy Kuala Lumpur +VZCZCXRO3142 +OO RUEHCHI RUEHDT RUEHHM RUEHNH +DE RUEHKL #1114/01 3580721 +ZNY SSSSS ZZH +O 230721Z DEC 08 +FM AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR +TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2163 +INFO RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE +RUCNASE/ASEAN MEMBER COLLECTIVE PRIORITY +RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0552 +RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 2711 +RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY +RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI PRIORITY +RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITYS E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 KUALA LUMPUR 001114 + +SIPDIS + +E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/19/2028 +TAGS: PTER PGOV PHUM KJUS KDEM +SUBJECT: PRESSURE MOUNTS AGAINST INTERNAL SECURITY ACT (ISA) + +REF: A. KUALA LUMPUR 1026 - DPM NAJIB DISCUSSES ISA + ¶B. KUALA LUMPUR 990 - RAJA PETRA RELEASED + ¶C. KUALA LUMPUR 944 - MCA AND GERAKAN CRITICIZE UMNO + ¶D. KUALA LUMPUR 846 - UPDATE ON RAJA PETRA + ¶E. KUALA LUMPUR 834 - KOK RELEASED FROM ISA + ¶F. KUALA LUMPUR 810 - UPROAR OVER ISA + ¶G. KUALA LUMPUR 806 - JOURNALIST DETAINED UNDER ISA + ¶H. 07 KUALA LUMPUR 902 - BEYOND ISA + +Classified By: Political Counselor Mark D. Clark, reason 1.4 (b, c and +d). + +NOTE: THIS CABLE TRANSMITS AN EDITED VERSION OF KUALA LUMPUR +1102 SENT ON 12/18/08 IN MORE RESTRICTED CHANNELS. END NOTE. + + +¶1. (S) Summary: The Malaysian government's use of the +Internal Security Act (ISA), which allows for detention +without trial and is central to the GOM's intelligence-driven +CT effort, has come under increasing political pressure over +the past three months. The GOM's employment of the ISA in +September to carry out three politically-motivated ISA +detentions unrelated to terrorism sparked unprecedented +public criticism. At least eight component parties from the +governing National Front (BN) coalition have since broken +ranks with the leading United Malays National Organization +(UMNO) and called for amending or abolishing the ISA. The +opposition party alliance led by Anwar Ibrahim has made the +revocation of ISA one of its highest profile policy goals. +In November, a High Court judge delivered a legal blow to the +GOM's wide discretion in using the ISA in a ruling that freed +blogger Raja Petra, and the GOM is appealing the decision. +Prime Minister Abdullah, his deputy and successor Najib and +Home Minister Syed Hamid have defended the ISA as essential +to national security, while Najib told the Ambassador +privately ISA should be retained but used more judiciously. +The GOM released 17 ISA detainees, among them 10 previously +linked to terrorist groups, including Yazid Sufaat, from +November 5 to December 4. + +¶2. (S) Comment: The ISA is the cornerstone of Malaysia's CT +effort and has allowed Special Branch to take successful +preemptive action against suspected terrorists and their +supporters. Given the GOM's exclusive reliance on the ISA +"crutch" and on Special Branch's role, police and prosecutors +remain ill-prepared to investigate and bring to trial +terrorist suspects (or prosecute other complex criminal +conspiracies). The ISA also is subject to misuse for +political ends and is an important insurance policy for +maintaining UMNO in power. For both CT and political +reasons, the GOM will not readily give up the ISA. We doubt +that the increased political pressure and seeming swing in +public opinion against the ISA, due in part to its misuse in +September, will result in the ISA's amendment or revocation +in the near future, absent the Opposition coming to power. +These developments, however, reinforce the conclusion (ref H) +that Malaysia cannot take for granted the availability of the +ISA as a CT tool in the long run. It remains in the U.S. +interest to encourage and assist Malaysia to develop an +approach centered on prosecutions and convictions before an +independent judiciary to combat terrorism. + +¶3. (C) Comment continued: It is unclear to what extent +outside political pressures played a direct role in the GOM's +latest release of ISA detainees. The decisions may have more +to do with Syed Hamid's personal exercise of authority as +Home Minister. Syed Hamid has taken a more proactive role as +Home Minister, compared to PM Abdullah who held the position +through March 2008 and tended not to become involved in +details. End Summary and Comment. + +¶4. (C) The Malaysian government's use of the Internal +Security Act (ISA), central to the GOM's intelligence-driven +counterterrorism efforts, has come under increasing political +pressure since the September ISA arrests of three persons +based on political rather security considerations. The +September 12 ISA detentions of an ethnic Chinese journalist, +an ethnic Chinese Opposition MP (Teresa Kok), and a prominent +blogger (Raja Petra Kamaruddin) served the ruling UMNO +party's immediate political purpose of sending a warning to +opposition politicians and those considering defecting from +BN, as some UMNO politicians have told us. This came at a +time when Anwar Ibrahim was publicly threatening to bring +down the BN government via parliamentary crossovers by +September 16. The arrests, however, also sparked +unprecedented public criticism of the ISA, including from +UMNO's ethnic minority partners within BN. The Malaysian +Chinese Association (MCA), the key ethnic Chinese BN +component party, reportedly threatened to leave BN unless the +GOM released the Chinese journalist; the GOM complied within +less than 24 hours (ref F). Authorities freed MP Teresa Kok +after seven days. Home Minister Syed Hamid ordered a +two-year ISA detention period for Raja Petra, who was freed +on appeal in November in a surprise court ruling (see below). + +¶5. (C) Comment: Unlike his predecessor Mahathir, PM +Abdullah refrained from using the ISA for political purposes +until December 2007 when police detained five leaders of the +ethnic Indian activist group HINDRAF that organized large +street protests. The public viewed the GOM's September 2008 +ISA arrests as more transparently political, in part because +of the lack of public order concerns. End Comment. + +¶6. (C) Political pressure against the ISA did not dissipate +following the release of the first two of the three recent +ISA detainees. At least eight component parties from the +governing BN coalition of 14 parties have since broken ranks +with UMNO and called for amending or reviewing the grounds +for the ISA, while several have supported the law's +abolition. In late September MCA, BN's second largest party, +called for "a comprehensive review of the ISA so that it will +apply strictly to cases relating to terrorism and subversive +elements," and also argued for the introduction of "checks +and balances in the use of ISA." The leader of the Gerakan +party, Koh Tsu Koon, called on the GOM to "abolish the ISA +once and for all," and rely on the judicial system instead. +The leader of the Peoples Progressive Party (PPP) also +initially called for ISA to be abolished, and on December 1 +said PPP would withdraw from BN unless if the ISA were not +amended before the next election. In response, Prime +Minister Abdullah called PPP's bluff and said the small +party, which holds no seats in Parliament, could leave BN if +it wished. BN MPs so far have not backed up their criticism +of ISA with action. In response to a petition circulated in +Parliament for the review or repeal of ISA, only one BN MP +signed his name. + +¶7. (C) The opposition party alliance (Pakatan Rakyat, or +Pakatan) led by Anwar Ibrahim has vocally condemned ISA as +undemocratic and unjust, and made the abolishment of ISA one +of its highest profile policy goals. A number of senior +officials from Pakatan's three parties, Anwar's Peoples +Justice Party (PKR), the Democratic Action Party (DAP), and +the Islamic Party of Malaysia (PAS) were detained under ISA +during the era of former Prime Minister Mahathir. Not +surprisingly, the three parties have vowed to revoke ISA if +they come to power. "Abolish ISA" was the most prominent +theme at PKR's annual party conference on November 29, which +Polcouns observed. The keynote event concluded with a focus +on ISA and featured large screens that scrolled through the +list of all 60-plus ISA detainees with the several thousand +attendees reciting the detainees' names as they appeared. +Well-known blogger Raja Petra, released from ISA detention +only days before, mounted the stage as the surprise guest of +the grand finale. + +¶8. (SBU) On November 7, a High Court judge delivered an +unanticipated legal blow to the GOM's wide discretion in +using the ISA in a habeas corpus ruling that freed blogger +Raja Petra. The Embassy obtained the full text of the +judge's 22-page ruling. ISA Section 8.B states "there shall +be no judicial review in any court" of the Home Minister's +exercise of "discretionary powers in accordance with this +Act," except for compliance with procedural requirements. +The judge ruled, however, that the Home Minister decisions +could not be "unfettered and arbitrary," allowing for the +court to consider whether the Minister's ISA detention order +was "in accordance with the Act," and its focus on threats to +national security, including the national economy; threats to +maintenance of essential services; and threats to the public +emanating from a "substantial body of persons" who intend to +change the government through unlawful means. In the case of +Raja Petra, the judge concluded that the grounds for his +detention did not fall within the purview of the ISA. The +government has appealed the ruling and as of mid-December the +appeal remains pending. + +¶9. (C) Many civil society groups took the opportunity over +the past three months to highlight their standing opposition +to the ISA, as well as other emergency ordinances that allow +for detention without trial. Both conservative and liberal +Muslim NGOs called on the GOM to abolish the ISA, as did the +inter-faith Consultative Forum that groups the leaders of all +major religions except Islam. The National Human Rights +Commission (SUHAKAM) chairman Abu Talib restated the +commission's existing position, namely "detention without +trial is against human rights principles; that's why we +advised the Government years ago to repeal the ISA." + +¶10. (C) As questions over the ISA have mounted, Prime +Minister Abdullah, his deputy and successor Najib, and other +senior UMNO leaders defended the ISA as essential to national +security. In the wake of public criticism over the September +ISA arrests, Home Minister Syed Hamid, who has authority +under the ISA to approve detention orders, defended the Act +as essential and stated clearly that "we have no plans to do +away with ISA." In early December, Syed Hamid waved off +criticisms, arguing that the ISA "has never been abused or +used for politics." He also commented that, "Malaysians +sometimes don't know how lucky we are in that we have not +experienced what is happening in Mumbai (the terrorist +attack) and Bangkok (political unrest) now." He said the +fact that there have been no post 9/11 terrors attacks in +Malaysia was in part due to the ISA. On December 15, Syed +Hamid again publicly defended use of the ISA, stating, "More +apt, faster and better to use the ISA... detention under the +act is early action to prevent the security of the country +from being adversely affected." + +¶11. (C) DPM Najib, who is anticipated to become Prime +Minister in late March 2009, told the Ambassador privately on +November 11 that the government continued to need the ISA, +"even though there are civil liberty concerns," but should +reserve ISA only for those who pose "serious threats, like +terrorists" (ref A). On December 8, PM Abdullah publicly +rejected calls for amendments to the ISA. + +¶12. (SBU) In early December, local and international press +reported that the GOM had released 17 ISA detainees from +November 5 through December 4. Of those released, 10 had +been held for suspected links to Al Qaeda, Jemaah Islamiyah, +and/or the Darul Islam terrorist groups. The released +terrorist suspects included Yazid Sufaat, who played an +important role in Al Qaeda's anthrax development program, +according to the 9/11 Commission. The remaining seven +persons released consisted of suspected foreign agents (2 +persons), southern Thailand separatists (2), document forgers +(2), and prominent blogger Raja Petra, according to an NGO +that consistently and accurately monitors ISA detentions. +In his public remarks, Syed Hamid said those recently +released ISA detainees had been rehabilitated and no longer +posed a security threat to Malaysia. + +¶13. (S) Note: Authorities had detained the terrorist +suspects for periods between two and (in the case of Yazid +Sufaat) seven years, for an average detention period of four +years for the ten individuals. Special Branch relies on a +process for rehabilitating ISA detainees, and eventually +releasing them under restricted and monitored conditions when +judged necessary. The GOM has never attempted to prosecute +any terrorist suspects, including those held under the ISA. +This is due in large part to the fact that the GOM pursues +almost exclusively an intelligence approach to CT, as opposed +to a law enforcement approach that would involve criminal +investigations, collection of legally admissible evidence, +and development of cases for prosecution in the courts. In +2007, Malaysia amended anti-terrorism provisions in its penal +code and criminal procedures code, but authorities have not +yet utilized these provisions. Malaysia also has a poor +track record of prosecuting other complex criminal +conspiracies, including drug trafficking cases, preferring +instead to utilize the ISA and other emergency ordinances to +detain suspects without trial. End Note. + +¶14. (S) A well-known journalist contacted us in early +December and said that officers of the Police Special Branch +had complained to him that Home Minister Syed Hamid had +ordered the recent releases of terrorist suspects without +adequate consultation and in some cases against the +recommendation of Special Branch. Australian and British +diplomats, speaking with Polcouns December 16, stated that +Syed Hamid, who is a lawyer by training, personally reviewed +the dossiers of ISA detainees and was inclined to approve +releases absent compelling justification from the Special +Branch. + +¶15. (C) The Thai embassy contacted Poloff on December 15 to +express concern over the release of two ISA detainees (Abdul +Rahman bin Ahmad and Mat Tarmizi bin Shamsudin, who +apparently are dual-citizens of Malaysia and Thailand) who +had been held for their connection to the insurgency in +southern Thailand. The Thai diplomat said Bangkok considered +Abdul Rahman in particular to be a major player in the +insurgency. He noted that those released are required to +remain in Malaysia and check in periodically with the police. + The Thai diplomat said he believed the GOM released the +detainees in order to diffuse criticism of the ISA. We +learned that the Thai embassy also has contacted other +Western embassies (UK, France, Australia) to express concern +over the recent ISA releases. + +KEITH \ No newline at end of file