

# Discussion of “Control costs, rational inattention, and retail price dynamics” by James Costain and Anton Nakov

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# Overview

**Question:** How do firms set prices?

- Sticky prices? Sales? Sticky plans?
- Matters for real effects of monetary policy (+ other shocks)

**This paper:**

- Empirics: most price changes are to prices already seen  $\geq$  once in the last year.


**But** firms don't change their set of prices all at once.

- **Contrast** to Stevens (2019).
- Theory: explain data with short-term memory RI model.

**Key novelties:**


1. Directly calibrate  $Pr(\text{no nominal } \Delta p)$  and  $Pr(\text{return to old } p)$  from data.
2. Combine RI with stochastic price discrimination (Guimaraes & Sheedy, 2011).

# Empirics: a taxonomy of price changes




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
# Empirics: a taxonomy of price changes



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**Data:** mostly **recurrences**, then **type 3** introductions.

# Empirics: a taxonomy of price changes




**Calvo/menu costs:** mostly **type 1 introductions**, some **transitory** changes.

**Data:** mostly **recurrences**, then **type 3 introductions**.

**Sticky plans** (Stevens, 2019): mostly **recurrences**, then ...?


## Empirics: type 3 introductions in a sticky plan model



When plans change:

- 1 **type 2**, then all subsequent introductions in the plan are **type 3**.

## Empirics: type 3 introductions in a sticky plan model



**When plans change:**

- 1 **type 2**, then all subsequent introductions in the plan are **type 3**.
- Stevens (2019): median # prices in plan = 4, so expect  $\approx 75\%$  introductions = type 3.

**This paper:**

- 44% products have only type 1 or only type 3, but 11% of all intros are type 2.

Sticky plans could be good description of remaining products?



## Theory: adapting RI/CC to explain sticky nominal price points


Standard RI: sticky price points **relative to distribution of optimal prices**.  
⇒ sticky **real** prices.

# Theory: adapting RI/CC to explain sticky nominal price points

Standard RI: sticky price points **relative to distribution of optimal prices**.  
⇒ sticky **real** prices.

Costain Nakov solution:

Consider all prices



- $\lambda, \mu$ : weighted logit.
- Multi-stage decision isomorphic to standard RI if choose weights optimally.
- **Key insight:** optimal weights are unconditional probabilities  
- calibrate to empirical hazard functions.

## Theory: how should we interpret high $1 - \bar{\lambda}$ ?

**Standard RI model:**

Inputs	Outputs	
$f(z)$	$\Pr(p)$	$= \eta(p) \Rightarrow 1 - \bar{\lambda}$
$\pi(p, z)$	$\Pr(p z)$	

$\bar{\lambda}$  is endogenous, **not a free parameter**.

**Question:** when we calibrate  $\bar{\lambda}$ , what adjusts to allow that?

## Theory: how should we interpret high $1 - \bar{\lambda}$ ?

Standard RI model:

$$\frac{\begin{array}{c} \text{Inputs} \\ f(z) \\ \pi(p, z) \end{array}}{\begin{array}{c} \text{Outputs} \\ \Pr(p) \\ \Pr(p|z) \end{array}} = \eta(p) \Rightarrow 1 - \bar{\lambda}$$

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Options:

1.  $\eta(p)$  not chosen optimally.

## Theory: how should we interpret high $1 - \bar{\lambda}$ ?

Standard RI model:

$$\frac{\text{Inputs}}{\frac{f(z)}{\pi(p, z)}} \quad \frac{\text{Outputs}}{\frac{\Pr(p)}{\Pr(p|z)}} = \eta(p) \Rightarrow 1 - \bar{\lambda}$$

$\bar{\lambda}$  is endogenous, **not a free parameter**.

**Question:** when we calibrate  $\bar{\lambda}$ , what adjusts to allow that?

Options:

1.  $\eta(p)$  not chosen optimally.
2. Allow an input to change with calibration.

Which is it? Affects whether  $\bar{\lambda}$  changes after aggregate shocks.

# Conclusion

**Nice paper!** Important contributions to empirics and theory.

The 2 questions/comments:

1. Could be more systematic on why data rejects sticky plans.
2. Economic interpretation of calibrated  $\bar{\lambda}$  - which part of the firm problem adjusts?