

Modes of operation

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A mode of operation describes how to repeatedly apply a cipher's single block operation (Enc operation / DES) to securely transform amounts of data larger than a block.

1. Electronic Code Book Mode (ECB)
2. Cipher Block Chaining Mode (CBC)
3. Output Feedback Mode (OFB)
4. Cipher Feedback Mode (CFB)
5. Counter Mode (CTR)
6. Galois Counter Mode (GCM)

Applications

To realize stream ciphers

To construct hash functions

To make Message Authentication Codes (MAC)

To build key Establishment protocols (KEP)

To make pseudo-Random Number Generator (RNG)

Benefits

In addition to confidentiality, they provide authenticity & integrity

Is the message really coming from the original sender?


Was the ciphertext altered during transmission?

Requirement

Most modes require a unique binary sequence (Initialization Vector) for each Enc operation → IV must be non-repeating & random } same plaintexts lead to # ciphers

① Electronic Code Book Mode (ECB)

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$$\text{Encryption: } y_i = e_k(x_i) \quad i \geq 1$$

$$\text{Decryption: } x_i = e_k^{-1}(y_i) \quad i \geq 1$$

$x_1 \rightarrow$ the 1st block
 $x_2 \rightarrow$ " 2nd "
 $x_3 \rightarrow$ " 3rd "
 \vdots

* Each block is encrypted separately

Advantages $\rightarrow \oplus$ No block synchronization between sender & receiver

\oplus Bit errors caused by noisy channels only affect the corresponding block but not succeeding blocks



\oplus Block cipher operating can be parallelized

Disadvantages $\rightarrow \ominus$ Identical plaintexts result in identical ciphertexts

\ominus An attacker can recognize if the same message has been sent twice

\ominus plaintext blocks are encrypted independently of previous blocks

Substitution Attack on ECB

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- Once a particular plaintext-ciphertext block mapping ($x_i \rightarrow y_i$) is known, a sequence of ciphertext blocks can be easily manipulated.

1	2	3	4	5
sending Bank A	sending acc #	receiving Bank B	receiving acc #	Amount in USD #

assumption


- The ~~key~~ between two banks will not change frequently
- The attacker sends \$500 transfers from his acc at Bank A to his acc at Bank B repeatedly.
- He now simply replaces block 4 of other transfers with the block ④ that he stored before

②

Cipher Block chaining Mode (CBC)

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- The enc of all blocks are "chained" together
- ciphertext y_i depends not only on block x_i but on all previous plaintext blocks
- The encryption is randomized by using an initialization vector



Encryption (first block): $y_1 = e_k(x_1 \oplus IV)$ $i=1$

Encryption (general block): $y_i = e_k(x_i \oplus y_{i-1})$ $i \geq 2$

$y_1 = e_k(x_1 \oplus IV) \rightarrow$ depends on x_1 & IV

$y_2 = e_k(x_2 \oplus y_1) \rightarrow$ " " x_2, x_1 & IV

\vdots

Decryption (first block): $x_1 = e_k^{-1}(y_1) \oplus IV$ $i=1$

Decryption (general block): $x_i = e_k^{-1}(y_i) \oplus y_{i-1}$ $i \geq 2$

$x_1 = e_k^{-1}(y_1) \oplus IV$

$x_2 = e_k^{-1}(y_2) \oplus y_1$

\vdots

it's not secret

benefit \rightarrow If we choose a new IV every time we encrypt, the CBC mode becomes a probabilistic Enc. scheme, i.e., two ciphertexts of the same exact plaintexts look entirely different.


③

Output Feedback Mode (OFB)

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It is used to build synchronous stream cipher from a block cipher

The key stream is not generated bitwise but instead in a blockwise fashion



Encryption (first block):

$$s_1 = e_k(IV) \text{ and } y_1 = s_1 \oplus x_1$$

Encryption (general block):

$$s_i = e_k(s_{i-1}) \text{ and } y_i = s_i \oplus x_i \quad i \geq 2$$

Decryption (first block):

$$s_1 = e_k(IV) \text{ and } x_1 = s_1 \oplus y_1$$


Decryption (general block):

$$s_i = e_k(s_{i-1}) \text{ and } x_i = s_i \oplus y_i \quad i \geq 2$$

key stream

④ cipher Feedback Mode (CFB)

It uses a block cipher as a building block for an asynchronous stream cipher



Encryption (first block):

$$y_1 = e_k(IV) \oplus x_1$$

Encryption (general block):

$$y_i = e_k(y_{i-1}) \oplus x_i \quad i \geq 2$$

Decryption (first block):

$$x_1 = e_k(IV) \oplus y_1$$

Decryption (general block):

$$x_i = e_k(y_{i-1}) \oplus y_i \quad i \geq 2$$

5.


Counter Mode (CTR)

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very much similar to stream cipher

key stream is computed in a blockwise fashion

similar to
one-pad ...



$$\text{Encryption: } y_i = e_k (IV \parallel CTR_i) \oplus x_i \quad i \geq 1$$

$$\text{Decryption: } x_i = e_k (IV \parallel CTR_i) \oplus y_i \quad i \geq 1$$

counter value will be change for each key stream

benefit # CTR mode can be parallelized since the 2nd encryption can begin before the 1st one has finished...


useful for high-speed implementation

6. Galois Counter Mode (GCM)

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It also computes a message authentication code (MAC)
i.e., a cryptographic checksum is computed for a message.

Message Authentication
Message Integrity



Encryption:
CTR_0 from IV & serial # & then CTR_0++
$y_i = e_k(CTR_i) \oplus x_i \quad i \geq 1$


Authentication:

$H = e_k(0)$
ADD: Additional Authentication Data
 $g_0 = ADD \times H$ (Galois field multiplication)
 $g_i = (g_{i-1} \oplus y_i) \times H \quad 1 \leq i \leq n$ (Galois field mul)
Tag: $T = (g_n \times H) \oplus e_k(CTR_0)$ (Galois field mul)

* Exhaustive key search


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key \rightarrow 56 bit \rightarrow 2⁵⁶






a pair of (cipher-plaintexts)

if you can map, then you can find the actual key from 2⁵⁶ possible keys



what the key had been



one pair of (p-c) is not enough, and you need a couple of (p-c) pairs to avoid false positive