


Rand. Alg. \rightarrow you have " n " & want to see if " n " exists in an array





\hookrightarrow (A) optimize by binary search $O(\log n)$
(sorted array)

Las Vegas Alg.

(B)

Repeat
randomly select an element from array
until " n " is found




(C)

Monte Carlo Alg.

$i = 1$
repeat
randomly select an element from array
 $i = i + 1$

until $i = k$

$k = 5$



Basic def security: a minimal security requirement of an 2
 Enc scheme is that it must be difficult, essentially in all cases,
 for a passive adv. to recover plaintext from the corresponding
 ciphertext.

Deterministic Enc schemes \rightarrow RSA, Rabin
 under a fixed public-key, a particular plaintext "m" is
 always encrypted to the same ciphertext "c".

\rightarrow It's easy to detect when the same message
 is sent twice.

\rightarrow this problem is going to be resolved in
 pr.b. encryption schemes as they utilize randomness...

Note quadratic residue mod "n":
 $n=10 \quad (1 \sim 9) \quad \mathbb{Z}_{10}$

$$\begin{array}{llll}
 1^2 \equiv 1 & 2^2 \equiv 4 & 3^2 \equiv 9 & 4^2 \equiv 6 \quad 5^2 \equiv 5 \\
 6^2 \equiv 6 & 7^2 \equiv 9 & 8^2 \equiv 4 & 9^2 \equiv 1
 \end{array}$$

1, 4, 5, 6, 9 \rightarrow are (quadratic residue mod 10)

Blum - Goldwasser probabilistic Enc Scheme

3

key gen


this is not a randomized behaviour

1. Select two large random (& distinct) primes p & q such that they congruent to 3 modulo 4.

$$p \equiv 3 \pmod{4} \quad q \equiv 3 \pmod{4}$$
2. Compute $n = pq$ ← factoring problem
3. use EEA/g to compute "a" & "b" such that

$$ap + bq = 1$$
4. public key is "n" & private key is (p, q, a, b)

Enc:



Randomized behaviour

- (a) obtain A's Authentic public key "n"
- (b) let $K = \lfloor G_2^n \rfloor$ and $h = \lfloor G_2^K \rfloor$. Represent "m" as a string $m_1 m_2 m_3 \dots m_t$ of length "t", where each m_i is a binary string of size "h"
- (c) select seed x_0 (random quadratic residue mod "n")

$$r \in \mathbb{Z}_n^* \rightarrow x_0 = r^2 \pmod{n}$$

- (d) $1 \sim t$: $\boxed{d-1} \quad x_i = x_{i-1}^2 \pmod{n} \quad \boxed{d-2} \quad p_i$ be the "h" least significant bits of x_i

$$\boxed{d-3} \quad c_i = p_i \oplus m_i \text{ XOR}$$

Dec

$$(e) \quad x_{t+1} = x_t^2 \pmod{n}$$

$$(f) \quad \text{ciphertext} : c = (c_1, c_2, \dots, c_t, x_{t+1})$$

$$(a) \quad d_1 = \left(\frac{p+1}{4} \right)^{t+1} \pmod{p-1} \quad (b) \quad d_2 = \left(\frac{q+1}{4} \right)^{t+1} \pmod{q-1}$$

$$(c) \quad u = x_{t+1}^{d_1} \pmod{p}$$

$$(d) \quad v = x_{t+1}^{d_2} \pmod{q}$$

$$(e) \quad x_0 = vap + ubq \pmod{n}$$

$$(f) \quad 1 \sim t$$

$$\boxed{f-1} \quad \text{Compute } x_i = x_{i-1}^2 \pmod{n}$$

$$\boxed{f-2} \quad p_i \text{ to be "h" least significant bits of } x_i$$

$$\boxed{f-3} \quad \text{Compute } m_i = p_i \oplus c_i \leftarrow \text{XOR}$$

Example of Blum-Goldwasser

4

key gen

$$p = 499 \equiv 3 \pmod{4}$$

$$q = 547 \equiv 3 \pmod{4}$$

$$n = p \times q = 272953$$

$$EE \text{ algo} \longrightarrow (-57)_a \underbrace{499}_p + (52)_b \underbrace{547}_q = 1$$

$$k = \left\lfloor \log_2^{n=272953} \right\rfloor = 18 \longrightarrow h = \left\lfloor \log_2^{k=18} \right\rfloor = 4$$

$2^4 = 16$ $2^5 = 32$

Enc

20 bit

$$m_1 \ m_2 \ m_3 \ m_4 \ m_5 \xrightarrow[t=5]{5 \times 4 = 20} 18 \text{ bits}$$

$$m_1 = 1001 \quad m_2 = 1100 \quad m_3 = 0001 \quad m_4 = 0000 \quad m_5 = 1100$$

Randomized Selection

$$r_0 = 399^2 \pmod{n} = 159201$$

i	$r_i = r_{i-1}^2 \pmod{n}$	p_i	$c_i = p_i \oplus m_i$
1	180539	1011	0010
2	193932	1100	0000
3	245613	1101	1100
4	130286	1110	1110
5	40632	1000	0100

$$r_6 = r_5^2 \pmod{n} = 139680 \longrightarrow c = (0010, 0000, 1100, 1110, 0100, r_6)$$

Dec

t=5

$$d_1 = ((p+1)/4)^6 \pmod{p-1} \equiv 463$$

$$d_2 = ((q+1)/4)^6 \pmod{q-1} \equiv 337$$

$$u = r_6^{463} \pmod{p} = 20$$

$$v = r_6^{337} \pmod{q} \equiv 24$$

$$r_0 = v a p + u b q \pmod{n} = 159201$$

$(r_i, p_i) \longrightarrow m_i = p_i \oplus c_i$
 XOR