
proactive Scaret sharing (pss)

pss is proposed to deal with a mobile adversary Mobile -- he compromised different players while we are executing the protocol Wote: For the sake of shares compromised shares simplicity, we assume the adv knows shall share sharing poly poly Wote: for the sake of problem & nobile adv has already compromised P3 8 P4. If we don't react, he probably compromises another player (P1 or P2) # you have to keep the same seent in your scheme while regolving this problem. shore of players are updated periodically without charging the secret. This can be done by adding shares of a new poly with a zero constant term to the shores of the original seered shary poly. As a result, the secret remains the same and the new secret sharing p.ly is the summation of two seent sharing polys. Assurbies + Erasing the old shares is an inevitable assumption.



The shoring's recorey phases are the same as 755. [3] After each enceation, shares are transformed from f(n) to f(n) where  $f(0) = \hat{f}(0) = \alpha$  and degrees are t-1.

## proactive update

- 1) Each player P; acts as an independent dealer and shares a polynomial  $g(n) \in \mathbb{Z}_q[n]$  of degree at most (t-2) with a random constant term.
- 2) Each Pj sends shares g (i) to Pi for 1 (i (n, i, e. . each player receives a point on every searct sharing poly gin). the following matrin shows the shares that each player Pe

receives:

$$P^1 \rightarrow \begin{bmatrix} \vartheta_1^{(1)} & \vartheta_2^{(1)} & \cdots & \vartheta_n^{(1)} \\ \vartheta_1^{(2)} & \vartheta_2^{(2)} & \cdots & \vartheta_n^{(2)} \end{bmatrix}$$

# each col will be generated by one player

 $P_1 \rightarrow \begin{bmatrix} \vartheta_1^{(1)} & \vartheta_2^{(2)} & \cdots & \vartheta_n^{(2)} \\ \vartheta_1^{(2)} & \vartheta_2^{(2)} & \cdots & \vartheta_n^{(2)} \end{bmatrix}$ 

# each row will be received by one player

 $P_1 \rightarrow \begin{bmatrix} \vartheta_1^{(1)} & \vartheta_2^{(1)} & \cdots & \vartheta_n^{(2)} \\ \vartheta_1^{(2)} & \vartheta_1^{(2)} & \cdots & \vartheta_n^{(2)} \end{bmatrix}$ 

# each row will be received by one player

 $P_1 \rightarrow \begin{bmatrix} \vartheta_1^{(1)} & \vartheta_2^{(1)} & \cdots & \vartheta_n^{(2)} \\ \vartheta_1^{(2)} & \cdots & \vartheta_n^{(2)} \end{bmatrix}$ 

# each row will be received by one player

The adds all the shares that he has received together and multiplies the result by his identity is as follows.

$$g(i) = i * \sum_{j=1}^{n} \partial_{j}^{(i)}$$

shores  $\sum_{j=1}^{\infty} \theta_j(i)$  are on a random poly of degree (t-2) with a random (notant term. After multiplying by "i", g (a) is a random poly with zero constant term & its degree is (t-1)

(A). Now, each Pi has two shores f(i) and g(i) on two [4] p.lys it degree (t-1) where f(0) = x (secret) and g'(0) = 0. Each pe therefor adds two shares together  $\hat{f}(i) = \hat{f}(i) + \hat{g}(i)$ keeps  $\hat{f}(i)$  and earases f(i) and g(i).

As a result, old shares (on f(n)) in the hand I adversay are useless & he has to start over...

f(m)=3+4n+7x2+5n3 € ZB(m) → f(2) = 1

 $g(n) = 0 + 4n + 2n^2 + 10n^3$ 9(1) = 3

we need of 1 Pougs 2

 $\begin{cases} g_{1}(\mathbf{x}) \\ g_{2}(\mathbf{x}) \\ g_{3}(\mathbf{x}) \\ g_{4}(\mathbf{x}) \end{cases}$ 

× g(2) = 5

9(3) = 1

9(4) = 12

$$f(3) = 5$$

$$f(4) = 9$$

$$f(2) = 6$$

$$f(3) = 6$$

$$f(4) = 8$$

new

f(m)=3+8x+9x+2x3 New secret sharing