

# Assessed Coursework Coversheet

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# Decision Analytic Approach to negotiation for the Paris Agreement on climate change

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## Introduction

**Negotiation** is an important part of human interaction in which two or more groups talk things over to agree. This process is very important in many areas, such as business, politics, the law, and international relations. Negotiations can be as simple as two people talking to each other or as complicated as a lot of people with different goals talking to each other. The strategies used, how well people can communicate, and the negotiators' skills in dealing with important issues and managing relationships all play a role in how well a negotiation goes (Bazerman & Neale, 1994).

Think of negotiation as a tricky act of balance. Each participant wants the best outcome for themselves while also considering what others want and need. To become a great negotiator, you need to know your own goals, know what the other person wants, and be able to find compromises that are good for both sides (Raiffa, 1982; Bazerman and Neale, 1992). Some people negotiate with a competitive mindset, trying to get the most for themselves, while others negotiate with a more cooperative mindset, trying to find solutions that work for everyone (Thompson, 2001).

At its core, negotiation is one of the main ways that people talk to each other. Its purpose is to settle disagreements, divide up resources, and come to agreements that are good for everyone. To be good at negotiating, you need to be able to communicate, persuade others, and be willing to give to reach a deal (Lewicki et al., 2016). Negotiation skills are highly valued in many fields, such as business, politics, and the law (Mnookin, 2004).

The **Paris Agreement on climate change**, which was made at COP21 in Paris in 2015 under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), is a big promise to fight climate change around the world. 195 countries have signed the historic agreement to try to keep global warming well below 2 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels. They want to reach a stricter goal of 1.5 degrees Celsius to greatly lower the risk and effects of climate change (United Nations, 2015). The Agreement is different because it asks all countries, no matter how rich or poor, to help lower emissions. This encourages a framework for environmental governance that is cooperative and includes everyone (Bodansky, 2016).

The Paris Agreement is important because it stresses the need for developing countries to get financial and technical help, as well as being open and responsible. Nationally determined contributions (NDCs) are also part of this global agreement. These are the plans that each country makes to lower its emissions and deal with the effects of climate change. These contributions are reviewed regularly and are meant to get bigger over time, making sure that global efforts keep getting better (Schleussner et al., 2016).

As the effects of climate change continue to spread around the world, the Paris Agreement shows that countries are working together to make the world a better place for everyone. Its successful implementation is seen as essential for protecting the Earth for future generations and keeping the ecological balance that life on Earth needs (Rogelj et al., 2016).

## Aims and Objectives

This report seeks to analyse the complexities of negotiation within the framework of the Paris Climate Agreement, using the Decision Analytic Approach to Negotiation (DAAN). The report has several objectives:

1. **Analysis of Negotiations:** Employing the DAAN framework, this report will dissect the negotiation processes that shaped the Paris Climate Agreement.
2. **Identification of Key Parties:** It will pinpoint all parties in the negotiations, assessing their best and worst alternatives to a negotiated agreement.
3. **Determination of Critical Points:** The analysis will include identifying the reservation point and the zone of possible agreement among the parties.
4. **Exploration of Negotiation Strategies:** The report aims to explore how the negotiating parties might create value, claim value, and ultimately reach a mutually acceptable agreement through integrative negotiation strategies.
5. **Evaluation of DAAN Limitations:** It will assess the limitations of using DAAN in a global policy-making context, such as that of the Paris Agreement on climate change.
6. **Lessons for Future Policymaking:** Finally, the report intends to extract lessons from the Paris Agreement negotiations to enhance future global policy-making efforts on complex, multi-party issues.

By applying the DAAN framework to the implication of the Paris Agreement negotiations on climate change, this case study seeks to provide insight into the difficulties and potential advantages of establishing a worldwide agreement on the crucial matter of climate change.

## Decision Analytic Approach to Negotiation

### Literature review

The Decision Analytic Approach to Negotiation (DAAN) is a comprehensive framework that integrates prescriptive and descriptive elements. It equips negotiators with the ability to thoroughly prepare and effectively comprehend the strategies employed by their counterparts (Raiffa et al., 2002). This approach prioritises a methodical preparatory phase before engaging in negotiations, which is essential for enhancing the probability of achieving favourable results. By evaluating the Best and Worst Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement for each party, identifying all relevant interests, and comprehending the relative significance of these interests, negotiators can approach discussions with a well-defined strategy that optimises both value claiming and value creation (Bazerman and Neale, 1994).

DAAN combines knowledge from decision theory, behavioural economics, and empirical research on negotiation tactics to develop a comprehensive understanding of the dynamics involved in negotiations. This approach is especially beneficial in intricate and high-stakes negotiations that involve multiple interests and parties, such as international treaties. DAAN assists negotiators in thoroughly examining every aspect of the negotiation process. This allows them to uncover optimal solutions that may not be immediately obvious. As a result, DAAN goes beyond traditional win-lose scenarios and encourages the exploration of mutually beneficial outcomes (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981).

### Applying DAAN to the Paris Climate Agreement

The step-by-step approach to the Decision Analytic Approach to the Negotiation process for the Paris Climate Agreement is as follows (Raiffa et al, 2002)-

1. Problem structure and define main objective.
2. Find interest of each party in the negotiation.
3. Find alternative to negotiated agreement for each party.
4. State overall BATNA and WATNA to set reservation point.
5. Find zone of possible agreement to claim or create value.

### Structuring and Framing the Problem Statement

**Problem Structuring:** The negotiations faced the difficult task of aligning the disparate economic interests and developmental stages of participating countries (UNFCCC, 2015).

**Developed nations**, such as the United States, the European Union, and Japan, which have historically been responsible for most greenhouse gas emissions, have been urged to take the lead in reducing emissions while also providing financial and technological assistance to developing countries (Bodansky, 2016).


**Developing countries** such as China, India, and Brazil, striving for economic growth, sought to ensure that their development paths were not jeopardised (Rajamani, 2016).

**Small Island Developing States (SIDS)** such as the Maldives, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu, which face existential threats from rising sea levels, have called for stringent emission reduction targets and immediate international assistance (Betzold et al., 2019).

**Objectives:** The primary goal of the Paris Agreement is to prevent the global average temperature from rising more than 2°C above pre-industrial levels. Additionally, efforts will be made to further limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C. To achieve this ambitious objective, it is imperative to globally decrease the amount of greenhouse gas emissions, particularly carbon dioxide (CO<sub>2</sub>). This requires a fundamental shift in economic and social systems, guided by the most advanced scientific knowledge (UNFCCC, 2015).

## What is the **1.5°C** threshold?

In 2015, the Paris Agreement was signed to limit global warming to well below 2°C and preferably 1.5°C by the end of the century, compared to pre-industrial times (1850–1900)



Source: IPCC; Copernicus Climate Change Service

MONGABAY  
INDIA

Figure 1. (Shankar, 2024)

### Identification of Key Parties interest

A key part of the Decision Analysis Process to Negotiation (DAAN) framework is figuring out what each party interest. Understanding each party's interests is important in the Paris Climate Negotiation in order to understand their negotiating positions and strategies (Bodansky, 2016).

Parties	Interest
Developed Nations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• The objective is to decrease the release of greenhouse gases while minimising the financial expenses and ensuring the continuation of economic growth (Hovi et al., 2017).</li><li>• Guaranteeing the availability of clean energy technologies and upholding energy security (Böhmelt et al., 2019)</li><li>• Safeguarding their financial interests and ability to compete in the international marketplace (Rajamani, 2016)</li><li>• Ensuring continued dominance and impact in the international system of climate governance (Huang et al., 2019)</li></ul>
Developing Countries	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Ensuring economic growth and development while simultaneously tackling poverty and inequality (Huang et al., 2019)</li><li>• Obtaining financial and technological assistance for addressing climate change mitigation and adaptation (Chen et al., 2019)</li><li>• Safeguarding their autonomy and paths of progress (Rajamani, 2016)</li><li>• Ensuring the availability of funds and the transfer of advanced technology to address climate-related issues (UNFCCC, 2015)</li></ul>

<b>Small Island Developing States</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Immediate and urgent measures are required to tackle the issues of climate change and the rise in sea levels, as highlighted by Dimitra Manou et al. in 2018.</li> <li>• Obtaining international assistance and funding for climate adaptation and resilience measures (Betzold et al., 2019)</li> <li>• Safeguarding their continued existence and resilience in response to the impacts of climate change (McInerney-Lankford et al., 2019)</li> <li>• Safeguarding their political independence and geographical boundaries (UNFCCC, 2015)</li> </ul>
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### Assess each party's Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement (BATNA)

The concept of Alternatives to a Negotiated Agreement is a pivotal component in the Decision Analysis Process to Negotiation (DAAN) framework. BATNA (Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement), refers to the course of action a party will take if the negotiations fail and an agreement cannot be reached (Fisher et al., 1991).

Comprehending the Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement (BATNA) for each party is crucial in understanding their negotiating positions and strategies within the Paris Climate Negotiation.

<b>Parties</b>	<b>BATNA</b>
<b>Developed Nations</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Establish domestic climate policies, such as implementing carbon pricing and setting clean energy targets, without being dependent on international agreements (Böhmelt et al., 2019).</li> <li>• Engage in establishing climate agreements between two countries or within a specific region, except in developing countries (Hovi et al., 2017).</li> <li>• Direct attention should be paid to implementing adaptation and resilience strategies rather than prioritising mitigation efforts (Adger et al., 2007).</li> </ul>
<b>Developing Countries</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• According to Huang et al. (2019), it is recommended to prioritise economic growth and development instead of focusing on efforts to mitigate climate change.</li> <li>• Explore alternative avenues for securing funding and accessing advanced technology, such as engaging in South-South cooperation (Chen et al., 2019).</li> <li>• Promote the adoption of less strict emission reduction targets and extended timelines The source cited is Rajamani (2016).</li> </ul>
<b>Small Island Developing States</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Urgently request international assistance and funding for climate adaptation and resilience measures (Dimitra Manou et al., 2018).</li> <li>• Champion the implementation of stricter emission reduction goals and prompt action from developed nations (Betzold et al., 2019).</li> <li>• Explore the option of pursuing climate justice and receiving compensation by utilising international legal mechanisms (McInerney-Lankford et al., 2019).</li> </ul>

## Overall BATNA and WATNA

The **best alternative to a negotiated agreement (BATNA)** for the world in climate negotiations would involve leveraging advancements in technology, innovation, and unilateral actions by countries to limit global warming to the greatest extent possible, even in the absence of a new global agreement. If independent actions and innovations are successful in limiting global warming to **+2.0°C by 2100**, even without a more robust new agreement (Lindsay Maizland, 2023).

The **Worst Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement (WATNA)** would result in the failure to enhance current policies, resulting in the upper range of temperature forecasts (**+3°C or higher**). This scenario involves profound adverse consequences, such as substantial increases in sea levels, catastrophic weather events, and extensive loss of species (Lindsay Maizland, 2023).

## Reservation Points and the ZOPA

**Reservation points:** In negotiation theory, these are the thresholds beyond which a party will not accept a deal. These are the parties' minimum acceptable outcomes. These points represent global temperature increases of acceptable magnitude in climate negotiations.

Upper Bound Reservation Point:	Lower Limit Reservation Point
The agreeable worst-case scenario. Global warming of <b>2°C by 2100</b> is the Paris Agreement's upper limit. Participants agreed that climate change risks and impacts would be unacceptable beyond this threshold (United Nations, 2015).	The agreement should limit temperature rise to <b>1.5°C</b> . Schleussner et al. (2016) suggest that this lower bound is the best way to reduce climate change impacts.

**The Zone of Possible Agreement (ZOPA)** refers to the range of terms and conditions that are mutually acceptable to all parties involved in a negotiation. It is situated between the designated points where the parties involved in the negotiation have set aside. The presence of a ZOPA indicates the possibility of reaching a mutually agreed settlement through negotiation. On the other hand, if the current policies are not within this range, it becomes difficult to reach a satisfactory agreement.


Between **1.5°C and 2.0°C** is the Paris Agreement's **Zone of Possible Agreement (ZOPA)**. This range was where negotiators believed global climate change mitigation could be balanced with economic and development concerns.

Current policies and national contributions are **outside** this ZOPA. Many countries' commitments are insufficient to limit temperature rise to 2°C, let alone 1.5°C. This indicates a **negative zone of agreement**, where commitments do not match reservation points (Rogelj et al., 2016).



## Even With Pledges, World Is Not on Track to Meet Paris Agreement's Goal

Global temperature rise over preindustrial average



Note: Current policies and pledges and targets are projections. In each scenario, the temperature shown is the most likely of a range of possible outcomes. Pledges and targets include submitted and binding commitments for 2030 and beyond.

Figure 2 (Lindsay Maizland, 2023).

## Implications for Value Claiming and Creation

A **negative zone of agreement** limits the ability to claim value for securing commitments that align with national interests while meeting Paris Agreement goals. **Negotiations focus on creating value** and collaborating to achieve agreement goals (Bazerman & Neale, 1994).

**Value Creation:** The primary aim of the Paris Agreement is to restrict the rise in the global mean temperature to significantly less than 2°C above levels observed during the pre-industrial era, with further endeavours focused on constraining the increase to 1.5°C. In this context, the following strategies are crucial for value creation:

1. **Improved Collaboration:** Countries must collaborate to find climate change solutions that balance economic and developmental needs. This includes sharing technology, knowledge, and resources to help all nations meet their obligations (UNFCCC, 2015).
2. **Financial Support and Technology Transfer:** Developed nations must fulfil their financial pledges, such as \$100 billion annually, to support developing countries in mitigation and adaptation efforts. Developing nations need this support to pursue low-carbon development without sacrificing growth (Bodansky, 2016). The G7 also announced US\$420 Million for Climate Risk Insurance, the launch of CREWS, and a \$3 Billion Green Climate Fund commitment (UNFCCC, 2015).

3. **Regular Review and Adjustment of Commitment:** Regular reviews and dynamic adjustments based on technological advancements and economic conditions can enhance commitments over time (Schleussner et al., 2016).

**In the Paris Climate Negotiation, all parties worked together to create value by agreeing on a common goal of limiting global warming to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels and pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase even further to 1.5°C (UNFCCC, 2015). This was a significant achievement that demonstrated the power of cooperative negotiation and value creation.**

### **Limitations of the Decision Analytic Approach to Negotiation**

The Decision Analytic Approach to Negotiation (DAAN) provides a structured and systematic framework for analysing and conducting negotiations, but its use in Paris Agreement climate negotiations is limited. Global climate negotiations are complicated, participating countries have diverse interests, and international relations and climate science are dynamic. Main restrictions are:

1. **Interest complexity and diversity** The DAAN framework assumes negotiators can identify and quantify all parties' interests and preferences. However, the Paris Agreement negotiations involved 195 countries with diverse economies, political systems, and environmental priorities (UNFCCC, 2015). This diversity makes it difficult to assess and balance each country's interests using a single decision-analytic approach.
2. **Negotiations are dynamic and iterative:** International climate negotiations are ongoing processes. Countries must review and update their NDCs under the Paris Agreement (UNFCCC, 2015). Climate negotiations may be too ongoing and adaptive for the DAAN framework, which is usually used for single negotiations.
3. **Power imbalance:** In negotiations, the DAAN framework assumes all parties have similar power and influence. However, developed and developing countries have significant power asymmetries in Paris Agreement negotiations. More resources, technology, and bargaining power can favour developed nations (Bodansky, 2016). DAAN may struggle to address equity and ensure fair participation for all countries.
4. **Normative vs. descriptive:** DAAN is a prescriptive framework that recommends rational negotiation methods. Due to political, social, and cultural factors, real-world negotiations often differ from these ideals (Bazerman & Neale, 1994). The Paris Agreement negotiations were influenced by political agendas, historical responsibilities, and varying climate action commitments, which may not match DAAN's rational models.
5. **Psychological and behavioural factors:** The DAAN framework often ignores behavioural and psychological factors in negotiations. Cognitive biases like overconfidence and loss aversion can influence negotiators' strategies (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). The urgency of climate change and the high stakes may have exacerbated these biases in the Paris Agreement negotiations, leading to suboptimal decisions.

These are following biases in the Paris Agreement negotiations:

- a) **Anchoring bias** refers to relying too heavily on the first piece of information (the "anchor") when making decisions (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974).

**Case Application:** Early emission reduction targets and financial commitments shaped subsequent negotiations. The \$100 billion annual financial support pledge by developed countries shaped financial commitment negotiations (UNFCCC, 2015).

- b) **Overconfidence Bias** one's abilities or prediction accuracy (Bazerman and Moore, 2012).

**Case Application:** Nations may overestimate their ability to meet emission reduction targets without sufficient external support, decreasing commitment realism (UNFCCC, 2015).

- c) **Status Quo Bias:** Preference for current state and resistance to change **Case Application:** In the Paris Agreement, some countries chose to maintain their current economic and energy policies over taking more aggressive climate actions due to concerns about economic impacts and system disruptions (Rajamani, 2016).
- d) **Framing effect**, people react differently to the same information based on how it is presented (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981).

**Case Application:** The Paris Agreement's framing of climate targets (e.g., 1.5°C as necessity vs. aspiration) affected countries' perception of urgency and feasibility (Schleussner et al., 2016).

- e) **The Fixed-Pie Assumption:** Negotiators may overlook mutually beneficial solutions due to a zero-sum mindset, resulting in a conflict between their interests (Thompson & Hastie, 1990).

**Case Application:** Countries initially viewed Paris Agreement negotiations as a zero-sum game, believing concessions would benefit others at their expense. Due to this bias, parties were reluctant to discuss integrative solutions early on (UNFCCC, 2015).

- f) **Groupthink:** A psychological phenomenon where group harmony and conformity lead to irrational or dysfunctional decision-making (Janis, 1972).

**Case Application:** In the Paris Agreement, negotiators may have accepted less ambitious targets to avoid conflict rather than advocating for stricter measures (Rogelj et al., 2016).

- g) **Negotiator's dilemma** is the conflict between cooperative strategies that create value and competitive strategies that claim it (Lax & Sebenius, 1986).

**Case Application:** Countries faced a choice between cooperating fully for greater benefits or prioritising individual gains at the expense of climate goals (Bazerman & Neale, 1994).

- h) **Endowment effect** refers to the phenomenon where individuals assign greater value to possessions due to ownership (Bazerman & Moore, 2013).

**Case Application:** Countries may be hesitant to adopt greener alternatives due to overvaluing their current economic practices and resources (Chen et al., 2019).

- i) **Optimism Bias:** People tend to overestimate positive outcomes and underestimate negative outcomes (Bazerman & Moore, 2013).

**Case Application:** In the Paris Agreement, countries may have overestimated their ability to meet climate targets without significant policy changes or underestimating the challenges of transitioning to low-carbon economies (Chen et al., 2019).

## Conclusion

The Paris Agreement, signed by 195 nations in 2015, aims to limit global warming to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels (UNFCCC, 2015). This case study used the Decision Analytic Approach to Negotiation (DAAN) to analyse complex negotiation processes, identify key parties' interests and BATNAs, and assess critical points and strategies. The analysis showed that aligning diverse national interests and creating value in a context where current policies are outside the ZOPA were difficult. Even with these obstacles, the Paris Agreement's collaborative framework and financial and technological support show that global climate change cooperation is possible.

## Recommendation

**Enhanced Collaboration:** Prioritize integrative solutions by fostering global cooperation, sharing technology, and resources to balance climate and developmental needs (UNFCCC, 2015).

**Regular Reviews:** Implement regular reviews and dynamic adjustments of national contributions based on technological advancements and changing economic conditions (Schleussner et al., 2016).

**Mitigate Cognitive Biases:** Train negotiators to recognize and counteract biases like the fixed-pie assumption, overconfidence, and anchoring to enhance decision-making (Bazerman & Moore, 2013).

**Equity and Fairness:** Address equity concerns by ensuring fair participation and considering historical responsibilities and development levels (Rajamani, 2016).

**By implementing these recommendations, future climate negotiations can be more effective in achieving their goals and promoting a cooperative international effort to combat climate change.**

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