Special Topics in Security
ECE 5968

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Admin News and Stuff

- Apologies for the correction delay
  - I'm correcting myself and I've been swamped
  - Should be done this weekend – high on my todo list

News from the field

- Lots of interesting things happening (all the time)
- One interesting news item: Google introducing "Advanced Protection Accounts"
  - Use of heavy two factor authentication
  - Account credential stealing is very popular, and two factor (without the phone) is very effective

Return-Oriented Programming (ROP) Attacks

Return-Oriented Programming

- Return-oriented programming (ROP) extends return-into-libc
  - Introduced by Shacham in 2007
  - Shown to be Turing complete (for libc)!
  - But, in practice is used to disable memory protection
- Instead of reusing functions, ROP reuses *gadgets*
  - Gadgets are small sequences of instructions ending in a return
  - Each gadget performs some small update to the program state
  - Execution becomes a chain of returns to gadgets

Gadgets


...
&gadget_2
&gadget_1
&gadget_0
Goal: eax = eax - 1
sub eax, edx
ret
inc edx
ret
xor edx, edx
ret

Gadgets


...
&gadget_2
addr
&gadget_1
0xdeadbeef
&gadget_0
Goal: *addr = 0xdeadbeef
mov [ecx], ebx
ret
pop ecx
ret
pop ebx
ret

Gadget Extraction



Gadget Extraction



Gadget Extraction



Gadget Extraction



ROP

- Works against virtually every architecture
- Useful in many situations
  - Non-executable memory regions
  - Signed code
- When combined with memory disclosure vulnerabilities, ROP is very difficult to defend against

ROP Defenses

1. Enforcing control flow, stack FIFO characteristics
   - Stackghost, ROPDefender, program shepherding, CFI
2. Detecting abnormal ret frequency
   - DROP, DynIMA
3. Deterministic gadget removal during compilation
   - Gfree
4. Randomized binaries
   - Binary stirring

Internet Services Security

SMTP

Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP)



- initially specified in RFC 821
- de facto standard for email transmission
- simple, text-based protocol
- MIME used to encode binary files (attachments)
- listens on port 25
- push protocol (used to exchange emails between servers)
- clients have to retrieve emails via other protocols such as IMAP or POP

SMTP Session

```
S: 220 www.example.com ESMTP Postfix
C: HELO mydomain.com
S: 250 Hello mydomain.com
C: MAIL FROM: sender@mydomain.com
S: 250 Ok
C: RCPT TO: friend@example.com
S: 250 Ok
C: DATA
S: 354 End data with <CR><LF>.<CR><LF>
C: Subject: test message
C: From: sender@mydomain.com
C: To: friend@example.com
C:
C: Hello,
C: This is a test.
C: Goodbye.
C: .
S: 250 Ok: queued as 12345
C: QUIT
S: 221 Bye
```

SMTP

- Security Issues
  - mail servers have wide distribution base and are publicly accessible
    - software vulnerabilities
    - configuration errors
  - `sendmail`
    - one of the first SMTP implementations (MTAs)
    - long history of vulnerabilities
    - complicated configuration (M4 macro language)
    - e.g., buffer overflow in Sendmail 8.12.9 and before (2003)
  - `postfix, qmail`
    - secure replacements
  - no authentication of sender is performed
    - huge problem
    - makes unsolicited email such a problem

SMTP

- Lack of authentication
  - everyone can connect to a SMTP server and transmit a message
  - server cannot check sender identity (besides IP address)
- Mail relay
  - server accepts message that does not *appear* to be either for a local address or from a local sender
- Solutions for authentication
  - SMTH-AUTH
    - access control list with explicit login
    - clients must be aware of SMTP-AUTH
  - POP-before-SMTP
    - logins are simulated by POP request (which require a login)
    - when a client performs a POP request, its IP address is authenticated with the SMTP server for some time (e.g., 30 minutes)

Spam

- Unsolicited email message
- Gather destination email addresses
  - brute force guessing
  - harvesting (web pages, mailing lists, news groups, …)
  - verified address are more valuable (social engineering, web bug)
- Delivering spam messages
  - own machine (not very smart)
  - other machines
    - open mail relays
    - open proxies
    - web forms
    - zombie nets (compromised machines)

Spam

- Countermeasures
  - client
    - filter tools (e.g., SpamAssassin)
    - automatic report systems
  - blacklists
    - identify origins of spam messages and quickly distribute this information
  - infrastructure
    - SPF (sender policy framework)
    - works by adding “reverse MX” records for a domain
    - only listed machines can send email from this domain

Spam

- Reasons for spam
  - legitimate businesses advertise products and services
  - attempts to get money from victims
    - actually quite old idea, was done with letters decades ago
    - victims sometimes even travel to remote places
  - offer of pornography or other interesting material to lure people on sites where Trojan horses can be installed

- Statistics
  - Ikarus Scan Centers
    - 10 million mail messages per day
    - 60% of these messages are spam
    - 30% contain virus attachments
  - MessageLabs (used by EU)
    - 66% are spam