


CS243: Introduction to Algorithmic Game Theory

Week 1.1, Introduction (Dengji ZHAO)

SIST, ShanghaiTech University, China

What is Game Theory


- **Game theory** is the study of mathematical models of **conflict** and **cooperation** between intelligent rational decision-makers [von Neumann and Morgenstern 1944].



- **Extensive form**: Go, poker
- **Normal form**: rock-paper-scissors
- **Cooperative game**: coordination games

What is Game Theory

- **Game theory** is the study of mathematical models of **conflict** and **cooperation** between intelligent rational decision-makers [von Neumann and Morgenstern 1944].



Mechanism Design (Reverse Game Theory)

Mechanism Design is to answer...

Question


How to **design** a mechanism/game, toward desired objectives, in strategic settings?



- **Roger B. Myerson** (born March 29, 1951, University of Chicago, US)
 - **Nobel Prize** for economics (2007), for "having laid the foundations of **mechanism design theory**."
 - ***Eleven game-theorists** have won the economics Nobel Prize.*

When Game Theory Meets CS?

- **Algorithmic Game Theory** is an area in the intersection of **game theory** and **algorithm design**, whose objective is to design algorithms in strategic environments [Nisan et al. 2007].



- *Computing in Games*: algorithms for computing equilibria
- *Algorithmic Mechanism Design*: design games that have both good game-theoretical and algorithmic properties
- ...

When Game Theory Meets CS?

- **Algorithmic Game Theory** is an area in the intersection of **game theory** and **algorithm design**, whose objective is to design algorithms in strategic environments [Nisan et al. 2007].

It is multidisciplinary:

- Artificial Intelligence → Multi-agent Systems → Algorithmic Game Theory
- Economics
- Theoretical Computer Science

Algorithmic Game Theory in Artificial Intelligence

- Algorithmic Game Theory research in AI (multi-agent systems):
 - **Game Playing**: computation challenge, AlphaGo, poker
 - **Social Choice**: preferences aggregation, voting, prediction
 - **Mechanism Design**: the allocation of scarce resources (security games), Ad auctions, online auctions, false-name-proof mechanisms (**Makoto Yokoo**)
- IJCAI Computers and Thought Award: **5 out of the 12 winners (1999-2017) had worked on AGT**, **Nick Jennings** (1999), Tuomas Sandholm (2003), Peter Stone (2007), Vice Conitzer (2011), Ariel Procaccia (2015).


Outline

- 1 Game Play
- 2 Game Design
- 3 Objective of CS243

Game Play

Let's playing games...

Rock Paper Scissors



Prisoners' Dilemma

- Two players: P1 and P2
- Strategies: Confess, Silent
- Outcomes: **number of years in prison**

		P2	
		Confess	Silent
P1	Confess	4 4	5 1
	Silent	1 5	2 2

Battle of the Sexes

- Two players: Girl, Boy
- Strategies: Baseball (B), Softball (S)
- Outcomes: payoffs/benefits/utilities

		Boy	
		B	S
Girl	B	6 5	1 1
	S	2 2	5 6

Chicken Game


- Two players: P1, P2
- Strategies: Swerve, Straight
- Outcomes: **utilities**

	Swerve	Straight
Swerve	Tie, Tie	Lose, Win
Straight	Win, Lose	Crash, Crash

	Swerve	Straight
Swerve	0, 0	-1, +1
Straight	+1, -1	-1000, -1000

Ultimatum Game

- Two players: P1, P2
- Strategies:
 - P1: propose to divide \$100 between P1 and P2
 - P2: accept or reject
- Outcomes: **utilities**



College/Master/PhD Entrance Exam

The setting:

- There are two colleges: $\mathcal{C}_1, \mathcal{C}_2$ and three students $\mathcal{S}_1, \mathcal{S}_2, \mathcal{S}_3$.
- The colleges' preferences are:
 - $\mathcal{C}_1: \mathcal{S}_1 \succ \mathcal{S}_2 \succ \mathcal{S}_3$
 - $\mathcal{C}_2: \mathcal{S}_1 \succ \mathcal{S}_2 \succ \mathcal{S}_3$
- The students' preferences are:
 - $\mathcal{S}_1: \mathcal{C}_1 \succ \mathcal{C}_2$
 - $\mathcal{S}_2: \mathcal{C}_1 \succ \mathcal{C}_2$
 - $\mathcal{S}_3: \mathcal{C}_2 \succ \mathcal{C}_1$

The process (**each college can only accept one student**):

- 1 Stage 1: each student chooses one college to apply and each college chooses her most preferred student to accept.
- 2 Stage 2: unaccepted students from Stage 1 can choose their second college to apply and the colleges who have quota left choose their most preferred student to accept.

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A Game Design Example

Let's design a game...

Design Goal

How can a house-seller sell her house with the "highest" profit?

A Game Design Example

Design Goal

How can a house-seller sell her house with the "highest" profit?




- **Challenge:** the seller **doesn't know** how much the buyers are willing to pay (**their valuations**).

A Game Design Example

Design Goal

How can a house-seller sell her house with the "highest" profit?




Solution: Second Price Auction (Vickrey Auction/VCG)

- **Input:** each buyer reports a price/bid to the seller
- **Output:** the seller decides
 - *allocation:* the agent with the highest report price wins.
 - *payment:* the winner pays the second highest price reported.

A Game Design Example

Design Goal

How can a house-seller sell her house with the "highest" profit?



Solution: Second Price Auction (Vickrey Auction/VCG)

Properties:

- **Efficient:** maximising social welfare
- **Truthful:** buyers will report their highest willing payments

Generalized Second Price (GSP) Auction

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Generalized Second Price (GSP) Auction

Advertiser	Bid	Price	Order	CTR
A_1	6	4	1st	1
A_2	4	2	2nd	0.9
A_3	2	1	3rd	0.5
A_4	1			

Car Plates Allocation



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The Objectives of CS243

- Introduction of the basic concepts of AGT such as Nash equilibria, dominant strategies, and their computations
- Study of its key applications such as auctions, matching, voting, predictions
- Be ready for the advanced topics of AGT such as mechanism design, repeated games

Schedule

- 12 weeks lectures (Mon and Wed 1:00PM-2:40PM)
- One project
- One final exam

Course Plan

- Introduction
- Basic Concepts
- Dominate Strategy and Truthfulness
- Mechanism Design
- VCG
- Myerson's Optimal Mechanism
- New Trends in Mechanism Design for Considering Participants' Interaction
- Redistribution
- Sponsored Search Auction
- Double Auctions/Exchanges
- VCG-based Mechanism
- Social Choice

Course Plan

- Matching
- Cake Cutting
- Facility Location Games
- Cooperative Games and Cost Sharing
- Cooperative Games in Social Network
- Cost Sharing and Public Goods
- Price of Anarchy
- Computational Issues in AGT
- Distributed Mechanism Design

Evaluation

- Quizzes (10%)
- Homework (25%)
- Project (25%)
- Exam (40%)

Questions and Interactions

- Teaching Assistant:
 - Wanchen Su (Y4) suwch@shanghaitech.edu.cn
- Online Interactions:
 - Piazza
 - MOOC

What is on MOOC?



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What is on MOOC?

算法博弈论

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课程介绍

算法博弈论是起源于2000年的计算机与博弈论交叉的新型学科。相关研究在人工智能、理论计算机和经济学都有非常重要的价值。但相关课程在国内本科教育中还非常稀缺。因此复旦大学在2017年加入上科大后主导开设了这门课程。目的是为了让学生提前了解这个新兴领域，为他们未来工作和深造提供必要的理论博弈知识。本课程将以数学证明的严谨性为主，对算法博弈理论和基本模型进行讲授，并把它作为课堂的重点来讲授和讨论。课程内容涵盖了算法博弈的基本概念、方法和前沿，包括设计均衡、拍卖理论、合作博弈、众包等。内容由浅入深，突出了算法博弈论在实际中的广泛应用。同时2022年在上海市重点课程项目的支持下，教学团队将把内容重新整理并录制了微课。现在通过微课内容并严格控制视频时长（8分钟左右）来提高线上教学效果。该课程获得了上海市教委2021年度上海市级精品课程立项，并入选2022年度上海高等学校一流（线下）本科课程。

课程大图

知识图谱

策略、机制设计、双边拍卖、二价拍卖、传播机制、再分配机制、广告拍卖、类VCG、两人分蛋糕、阿罗不可能、选址问题、匹配、TTC算法、DA算法、传播匹配、无政府代价、合作博弈、成本分摊、公共物品建设、红气球挑战、传播合作。

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- <https://mooc.shanghaitech.edu.cn/portal/course/263/569.mooc>

Reading Material

- **Algorithmic Game Theory**, edited by N. Nisan, T. Roughgarden, E. Tardos, and V. Vazirani, Cambridge University Press, 2007.