


Market power and TFP growth in Chile

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
October 26, 2022

Motivation

Real GDP per capita in PPP:
Chile as a share of the US



Traditional TFP measures



Main Research question: Why TFP Growth in Chile has stagnated for the last decade?

What this paper do:

- (a) Estimates firm-level market power measures for 2005-2020 using rich administrative micro-data from tax records.
 - Using data on prices and quantities at the firm level.
- (b) Aggregates from firm-level market power measures to macro misallocation using Baqaee and Farhi (QJE 2020).
- (c) Describes firm-level distortions spread out through production networks driving macroeconomic inefficiencies.

Key takeaway : Markups affected Chilean aggregated allocative efficiency by distorting factor allocations. The latter might explain a portion of Chile's TFP growth stagnation for the last decade.

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1 Methods

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$$\mu_{it} = \frac{\theta_{it}^V}{s_{it}^V}$$

The main challenge is correctly estimating the variable input-output elasticity θ_{it}^V . As Dorazselski noted, the critical assumption used in OP, LP, and ACF is that the choice of materials is a function of only capital, labor, and productivity (scalar unobservable assumption). Ignoring any possible demand-driven shock given the timing of firms' production decisions.

This is a troublesome assumption in non-perfect competitive setups (e.g., Cournot with heterogeneous firms) as the demand for production inputs will depend on other firms' productivities.

Markup: Production Approach

The data used in this work allows controlling for sold product prices and materials bought prices for all firms at the transaction level. This allows for prices not being in the residual when estimating markups using materials (rather than labor) as it assumes the most flexible input observed.

The latter does not solve the scalar unobservable assumption but alleviates any bias coming from the prices of goods sold and inputs bought by firms.

Aggregation: Setup (BF, 2020) Cost function

Firm i produces according to the following cost function:

$$\frac{1}{A_i} \mathbf{C}_i [p_1, \dots, p_N, w_1, \dots, w_F] y_i$$

- A_i : Hicks-neutral productivity.
- y_i : Firm i total output.
- The price includes a markup measure: $p_i = \mu_i \frac{C_i}{A_i}$
- μ_i : Firm i markup.

Aggregation: Setup (BF, 2020) Input output objects (1)

Revenue-based input-output matrix. ij^{th} element is the expenditure of firm i on inputs from firm j as a share of firm i total revenue:

$$\Omega_{ij} \equiv \frac{p_j x_{ij}}{p_i y_i} \quad (1)$$

Cost-based input-output matrix. Captures the change in the marginal cost function of firm i (C_i) when the price of firm j changes. Using Sheppard's Lemma is possible to express it as the expenditure of firm i on inputs from firm j as a share of firm i total costs:

$$\tilde{\Omega}_{ij} \equiv \frac{\partial \log \mathbf{C}_i}{\partial \log p_j} = \frac{p_j x_{ij}}{\sum_{k=1}^M p_k x_{ik}} \quad (2)$$

Both are related by **markup harmonic mean matrix**.

$$\tilde{\Omega} = \text{diag}(\mu) \Omega \quad (3)$$

$\text{diag}(\mu)$ is a Diagonal matrix with ij^{th} element: $\frac{\#\text{firms}}{\sum_t (\mu_{it})^{-1}}$

Aggregation: Setup (BF, 2020) Input-output objects (2)

Leontief inverse matrix capture both the direct and indirect firm exposures through the production networks:

$$\tilde{\Psi} \equiv (I - \tilde{\Omega})^{-1} = I + \tilde{\Omega} + \tilde{\Omega}^2 + \dots \quad (4)$$

Defining **sales shares**

$$b_{it} = \frac{p_{it} c_{it}}{\sum_{j=1}^N p_{jt} c_{jt}} \quad (5)$$

To form the **cost-based Domar Weight**; suppliers' relevance in final goods demand, both directly and through production networks.

$$\tilde{\Lambda}' \equiv b' \tilde{\Psi} \quad (6)$$

Aggregation: Setup (BF, 2020) Growth accounting (1)

A shock to supply factor f is described by the cost-based share of that factor minus the sum over all other factors g changes due to the shock to f :

$$\frac{d \log Y}{d \log L_f} = \tilde{\Lambda}_f - \sum_g \tilde{\Lambda}_g \frac{d \log \Lambda_g}{d \log L_f} \quad (7)$$

\implies the traditional Solow residual is inconsistent when aggregating shocks considering changes to indirectly affected factors

Aggregation: Setup (BF, 2020) Growth accounting (2)

TFP decomposition:

$$\underbrace{\Delta \log Y_t - \tilde{\Lambda}'_{t-1}(\Delta \log L_t + \Delta \log K_t)}_{\Delta \text{ Distorted Solow Residual}} \\ \approx \underbrace{\tilde{\Lambda}'_{t-1} \Delta \log A_t}_{\Delta \text{ Technology}} - \underbrace{\tilde{\Lambda}'_{t-1} \Delta \log \mu_t - \tilde{\Lambda}'_{t-1}(\Delta \log Sh_t^K + \Delta \log Sh_t^L)}_{\Delta \text{ Allocative Efficiency}}$$

This distortion-adjusted Solow residual weighs factor changes by the cost-based Domar weight ($\tilde{\Lambda}$) rather than by its share in aggregate income.

Key object: $\tilde{\Lambda}$: Cost-based Domar weight represents suppliers' relevance directly and through the production network in final goods demand.

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Data Sources

- ① Sales, materials, investment: F29 (2005-2019)
- ② Wage bill, employment: DJ1887 (2005-2019)
- ③ Initial capital stock: F22 (2005-2019)
 - Capital stock using perpetual inventory methods combining capital stock with investment.
- ④ I-O matrices: Buying and selling books (forms 3327-3328) (2005-2014)
 - Firm-year level output and input flows.
- ⑤ Output and input prices: F2F electronic receipts (2015-2019)
 - Firm-year level output and input prices weighted by F2F transaction flows.

Data Cleaning

- Final sample does not include firms with a missing variable of sales, capital, wage bill, or materials.
- WinzORIZED labor, capital and materials shares over sales at 1% of both tails of the distribution.
- Firms with negative value added (sales minus materials), less than two workers, or capital less than 10.000 CLP (USD 15) are excluded.

Around 120,000 firms a year in the final sample.

Using prices to recover quantities sold.

Challenge: Different units for the same product; units are not reported.

⇒ Build a firm-level weighted price index:

$$\ln(Q_{it}) \approx \ln(P_{it} Q_{it}) - \ln(I_{it})$$

Where:

- $I_{it} = \sum_j^J \alpha_{ijt} P_{ijt}$
- α_{ijt} : share of product j in firm i total revenue.

Homologous procedure for intermediate inputs.


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
Markup: Time evolution [Details](#)

Benchmark: Materials markups of 3-factor second order translog Production function, estimated separately by six industries, controlling for sales and inputs prices at the firm level. β s are time-invariant while materials-output elasticities are time-varying due to yearly factors usage interactions.




Markup: Heterogeneity in industry/firm size

Industry




Size




Markup: different estimation strategies

Time series




Distribution




Aggregation: Distorted Solow residual decomposition

Percentage growth relative to 2005 levels CD markups



$$\underbrace{\Delta \log Y_t - \tilde{\Lambda}'_{t-1}(\Delta \log L_t + \Delta \log K_t)}_{\Delta \text{ Distorted Solow Residual}} \approx \underbrace{\tilde{\Lambda}'_{t-1} \Delta \log A_t}_{\Delta \text{ Technology}} - \underbrace{\tilde{\Lambda}'_{t-1} \Delta \log \mu_t - \tilde{\Lambda}'_{t-1}(\Delta \log Sh_t^K + \Delta \log Sh_t^L)}_{\Delta \text{ Allocative Efficiency}}$$


Aggregation: Comparing TPFs




Aggregation: Decomposing the allocative efficiency (1)

$$\underbrace{\Delta \log Y_t - \tilde{\Lambda}'_{t-1}(\Delta \log L_t + \Delta \log K_t)}_{\Delta \text{ Distorted Solow Residual}} \approx \underbrace{\tilde{\Lambda}'_{t-1} \Delta \log A_t}_{\Delta \text{ Technology}} - \underbrace{\tilde{\Lambda}'_{t-1} \Delta \log \mu_t - \tilde{\Lambda}'_{t-1}(\Delta \log Sh_t^K + \Delta \log Sh_t^L)}_{\Delta \text{ Allocative Efficiency}}$$

Cost-based Domar W.



Markups and factor shares




⇒ Flat markups, decreasing Labor and Capital shares.


Aggregation: Decomposing the allocative efficiency (2)

By industry



Δ log allocative efficiency components and $\tilde{\Lambda}$



(a) Markups




(b) Capital Share



What is driving the result? (1)

Why is markup evolution flat, but aggregate Labor and Capital Share decrease in time?



- Central firms (high $\tilde{\Lambda}$) have relatively high markups over the period.

What is driving the result? I don't know

It's clear that high markup central firms (high $\tilde{\Lambda}$) have relatively high MRPK and MRPL sub-hiring inputs with respect to a competitive setup. Still, it does not necessarily mean that labor and capital share should decrease.

The decline in labor share might be a composition result, a decrease in firm wage bills from which high markup central firms buy inputs, but I do not see that in the data.

I need to dig deeper.

Wrapping up

- Technological improvements are not generating a boost in aggregate TFP growth due to inefficient factor allocations.
- Key to understanding distorted factor allocations is to precisely estimate markups by considering sales and materials prices.

Still, I need to describe the specific channels through which firm-level markups spread out through production networks generating aggregate productivity losses.

Thanks

Thanks!

Appendix

Markup: Estimation (1)

Assumptions following Akerberg, Caves & Frazier (ACF, 2015):

- A general production function with x_{it} being all production function inputs and interactions and ω_{it} the hicks-neutral firm productivity:

$$q_{it} = f(x_{it}; \beta) + \omega_{it} + \epsilon_{it}$$

- First order Markov process for productivity with innovation to productivity:

$$\omega_{it} = \omega_{it-1} + \varphi_{it}$$

- Moment conditions relying on instruments Z_{it} :

$$\mathbb{E}[Z_{it} \varphi_{it}(\beta)] = 0$$

Markup: Estimation (2)

- (a) Estimate the production function to get rid of measurement error: $q_{it} = q_{it}^* + \epsilon_{it}$
- (b)
- First recover productivity as: $\omega_{it}(\beta) = q_{it}^* - x'_{it}\beta$
 - Then recover innovations to productivity (φ_{it}) by solving:
$$\varphi_{it}(\beta) = \omega_{it}(\beta) - \mathbb{E}[\omega_{it}(\beta) | \omega_{it-1}(\beta)]$$
 - Use the productivity innovations to form moments and, by GMM, estimate the production function parameters (β)
 - Use β to form the desired output elasticity of variable input

I will not dig deeper on Dorazselski critique: Choice of materials is a function of only capital, labor, and productivity (scalar unobservable assumption) does not necessarily hold.

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Markup: Estimation decisions

- Benchmark estimation:
 - (a) Second order translog production function using three factors (K, L, M).
 - (b) Estimation performed separately by six industries.
 - (c) Time invariant output elasticities.
 - (d) Materials is the variable input.
 - (e) Control for output and input prices using F2F electronic receipts.

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Markup: Estimation Production function functional form

$$q_{it} = \omega_{it} + \beta_l l_{it} + \beta_k k_{it} + \beta_m m_{it} + \beta_{lk} l_{it} k_{it} + \beta_{lm} l_{it} m_{it} \\ + \beta_{mk} m_{it} k_{it} + \beta_{ll} l_{it}^2 + \beta_{kk} k_{it}^2 + \beta_{mm} m_{it}^2 + \beta_{lkm} l_{it} k_{it} m_{it} + \epsilon_{it}$$


Intermediate inputs are assumed to be the variable input in production, and thus the markup estimation is performed using materials output elasticity and its share.

$$\theta_{it}^M = \frac{\partial q_{it}}{\partial m_{it}} = \beta_m + \beta_{lm} l_{it} + \beta_{mk} k_{it} + 2\beta_{mm} m_{it} + \beta_{lkm} l_{it} k_{it}$$


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Aggregation: Decomposing the allocative efficiency (3)


$\Delta \log$ Labor share and $\tilde{\Lambda}$




(a) Agriculture



(b) Mining




(c) Manufacturing




(d) Utilities

Aggregation: Decomposing the allocative efficiency (4)


$\Delta \log$ Labor share and $\tilde{\Lambda}$



(e) Commerce



(f) Financial & Real Estate




(g) Others

Production Newtork: Descriptive stats

- Outdegree (N clients): Mean: 64.5; Median: 5 ; Standard deviation: 1,216
- Indegree (N providers): Mean: 9.6; Median: 1 ; Standard deviation: 36

Figure: Densities



Markup: Production Approach, DLW, 2012 (1)

- Cost minimization of firm i given its technology (Q_{it}), capital stock (K_{it}) and variable inputs (V_{it})

- Lagrangian:

$$\mathcal{L}(V_{it}, K_{it}, \lambda_{it}) = \sum_V P_{it}^V V_{it} + r_{it} K_{it} + \lambda_{it}(\bar{Q}_{it} - Q_{it}(V_{it}, K_{it}))$$

- FOC with respect to variable input V :

$$\frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial V_{it}} = P_{it}^V - \lambda_{it} \frac{\partial Q(\cdot)}{\partial V_{it}} = 0$$

- Rearranging and multiplying by $\frac{V_{it}}{Q_{it}}$:

$$\frac{\partial Q(\cdot)}{\partial V_{it}} \frac{V_{it}}{Q_{it}} = \frac{1}{\lambda_{it}} \frac{P_{it}^V V_{it}}{Q_{it}}$$

Markup: Production Approach, DLW, 2012 (2)

Markup : price to marginal cost ratio ($\mu = \frac{P}{MC}$ with $MC = \lambda$)

$$\frac{P_{it}}{\lambda_{it}} = \underbrace{\frac{\partial Q(.)}{\partial V_{it}} \frac{V_{it}}{Q_{it}}}_{\theta_{it}^V} \underbrace{\frac{P_{it} Q_{it}}{P_{it}^V V_{it}}}_{1/s_{it}^V}$$
$$\mu_{it} = \frac{\theta_{it}^V}{s_{it}^V}$$

Markup relies on two objects:

- Variable input share (s_{it}^V): Usually observed in the data
- Output elasticity of variable input (θ_{it}^V): Need to estimate it, this is the key challenge!

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Distorted TFP using CD markup estimation

